

**Tetra Tech Coffey**

**Australia Middle East NGO Cooperation Agreement Program - Phase Three (AMENCA 3)**

Palestinian Farmers Connecting to Markets

Mid-Term Review Final Report

July 2019

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| Donor reviews invariably place heavy demands on both the donor and its implementing partners. Hence, the review team is especially appreciative of the responsive, cordial, open and participative way in which all concerned have supported the AMENCA Mid Term Review. |

Definitions

**Definitions**: Within AMENCA 3 the **agricultural value chain** refers to the processes involved in the production, harvest/collection, processing, packaging, logistics and marketing (wholesale and retail) of a specific commodity. The value chain approach aims to analyse each of these steps and add value that improves the overall efficiency, returns, health or benefits. An **agricultural market** **system** is a broader concept that includes the various commodity value chains, but also considers the important need for inputs (fertiliser, seed, irrigation), services (information, finance, transportation) and policy to work together harmoniously. The **markets systems development** approach aims to develop market systems so that they function more effectively, sustainably and beneficially for poor people, building their capacities and offering them the opportunity to enhance their lives.

Abbreviations

ADR Aggregate Development Results

AIP Aid Investment Plan (DFAT)

AHLD Annual High-level Dialogue

AMENCA 3 Australia Middle East NGO Cooperation Agreement Program Phase 3

APHEDA Union Aid Abroad-APHEDA (Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad)

APPR Aid Program Performance Report (DFAT)

ARIJ Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem

ASALA Palestinian Businesswomen's Association

AUD Australian Dollar

CBO Community-Based Organisation

DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)

FGD Focus Group Discussion

GBV Gender-Based Violence

GSC Golden Sheep Company

ICARDA International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas

INGO International NGO

JIC Jenin Investment Company

M&E Monitoring and evaluation

MEL Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

MEF Monitoring and evaluation framework

MoA Ministry of Agriculture

MRL Maximum residue limit

MSD Market Systems Development

MTR Mid-term review

NGO Non-government organisation

NIS New Israeli Shekal

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)

PA Palestinian Authority

PARC Agricultural Development Association

PIF Palestinian Investment Fund

PLDC Palestinian Livestock Development Centre

PSI Palestinian Standards Institute

RWDS Rural Women's Development Society

TPAG Technical and Program Advisory Group

UAE United Arab Emirates

UN United Nations

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

USD United States Dollar

WATC Women’s Affairs Technical Committee

Executive Summary

This report presents findings from the independent Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the third phase of the *Australia Middle East NGO Cooperation Agreement (AMENCA 3)* Program. AMENCA 3 is funded by the Australian government through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). It is a AUD40 million investment which commenced in April 2016 in the Palestinian Territories and builds on the achievements of its two predecessor programs (AMENCA 1 and AMENCA 2) which date back to 2005. It is implemented by a consortium of Australian and Palestinian non-government organisations (NGOs) and supported by a panel of short-term technical advisers.

AMENCA 3 was designed as a five-year program to connect Palestinian farmers to markets. It included a ‘stop/go’ point at the three-year mark (approximately April 2019), to determine whether a final two years should be undertaken. The MTR was commissioned partly to provide DFAT with an evidence base to help them make this decision, and partly to consider improvements to AMENCA 3 in the event that it continues.

Economic integration, inclusive growth, and open trade and investment are basic principles of the *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper* (DFAT, 2019). Reflecting this ambition, AMENCA 3 commits to a range of measures designed to foster stronger partnerships for economic growth and thereby contributes to greater market linkages, as well as stronger relationships for stability and security of the region.

AMENCA 3 commenced using a *Market Systems Development* (MSD) approach which was subsequently evolved into a ‘hybrid’ MSD approach in recognition of the unique and complex economic and social conditions that exist in the Palestinian Territories. The ‘hybrid’ approach accepts that markets function better when implementing partners work to ‘*lift’* the smallholder’s capacity for market engagement, while also increasing the ‘*reach’* of the private sector to equitably engage with empowered smallholders.

Review Findings

AMENCA 3 has achieved considerable on-the-ground traction and success, despite the seemingly paralysing nature of the political situation in the Palestinian Territories. The challenges smallholder Palestinian families face when trying to access agricultural markets reflect the insecurity, deep distrust, structured exclusion, and extreme market fragility that are common to conflict-affected economies. The evidence obtained through this MTR definitively demonstrates that even under such challenging circumstances, markets can grow for the benefit of smallholders provided they are given the right support and mentoring.

AMENCA 3’s early indications of meaningful market transformation, shows that there is no development effectiveness reason for the program not to continue for its full five years. AMENCA 3’s current trajectory, its success to date, and the experience of similar MSD programs internationally, more than justifies ongoing support as this will significantly augment the market-level impacts that are currently emerging.

Equally promising, though inconsistent at the present time, are the program’s achievements to support social inclusion – particularly for women and youth. The program has exceeded its 2018 income targets for farmers and especially for women - with significant gains being made in cost savings on input supply, production improvements, and market access. Importantly, traditional prejudices surrounding women’s businesses and products are changing despite significant barriers in this area. The NGOs are innovatively meeting these challenges, notably through demonstrations and peer communication. Gender transformative approaches, particularly in the dairy value chain and animator program, extend beyond economic empowerment, addressing gender norms and gender inequality - thus creating potential impacts and advances in women’s status, mobility and land inheritance rights. While these are promising examples, AMENCA 3 could be more consistent in challenging gender related barriers, especially ensuring that gender and poverty analysis is explicit and visible in all program documentation, including market analysis.

Through AMENCA 3, Australia has established a reputation for working with civil society in the Palestinian Territories in a way that fosters, facilitates and mobilises the impressive capacity of Palestinian civil society, development professionals, agribusiness and communities to engage in effective development. Local NGOs, who were initially openly sceptical of the program’s ‘hybrid’ MSD approach, now see that this offers more consistent and sustainable market-level impacts and ownership than they have achieved through their more prevalent humanitarian or direct delivery approaches.

At the overall program level, AMENCA 3 has a strong monitoring and evaluation system focused on high-level aggregated results. However, the system has not been adapted to measure market-level outcomes attributable to the intervention or sector level engagements. This is a deficiency that prevents AMENCA 3 from demonstrating its impacts in the manner other MSD programs are able to do. Despite this, data collection is occurring at the project level and credible data does appear to be being generated. Hence, the MTR is confident that the partners know significantly more about the results the interventions are generating than is currently being reported. Intervention and sector level monitoring and results measurement (MRM) now needs to be strengthened to enhance internal learning and adaptation.

On balance, the current delivery model is facilitating results, however there are indications that the governance structures and technical advice provided in support of the program could be strengthened to enable improved strategic and efficient delivery. Furthermore, DFAT program management capacity is significantly stretched in addressing the political and risk profile of the program. Some practical measures can be taken to remedy this through recalibration of the program management and oversight function together with adjustments to the profile of technical assistance and more flexible use of the advisory pool.

Furthermore, while the relationship with the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture remains fraught, this is not considered to be critical for ongoing delivery as AMENCA 3 is increasingly recognised by all other stakeholders as one of the leading market programs in the Palestinian Territories.

The sustainability of AMENCA 3’s interventions are inextricably linked with the need for a long-term political solution in the region. However, AMENCA 3 is, in the meantime, providing Palestinian communities and businesses with a capacity that should help them to maintain some stability in the face of an unpredictable economy and operating environment.

Recommendations

This report makes a number of recommendations that have been summarised and clustered into three categories (see Table 1). While recommendations have been grouped for clarity, the original links are also provided along with the page references. It is suggested that the reader consider each recommendation within the narrative of the report, as this will clarify the context from which it originates.

Table 1: AMENCA 3 MTR Recommendations

| Recommendation | Page |
| --- | --- |
| 1. Stay the course, learn lessons and embed a common approach. |  |
| * 1. Clearly articulate the hybrid model: AMENCA 3 partners have developed some common understandings of the hybrid MSD model but these remain undocumented and hence open to interpretation. DFAT, the MSD adviser and INGO partners should work together to agree on a description of the AMENCA 3 hybrid approach and the principles behind it by the end of 2019 to inform future investments. (Recommendation 1) | 22 |
| * 1. Clarify APHEDA situation: DFAT to agree that APHEDA may provide a copy of DFAT’s letter advising of APHEDA’s full reinstatement to its communities, stakeholders, partners and the Palestinian Authority. DFAT to explore other opportunities to help communicate the current state of play. (Recommendation 2). | 25 |
| * 1. Continue AMENCA 3: Consider extending support for AMENCA 3 for at least a further two years to embed current changes within markets and to reach impact at scale, noting that MSD programs typically implement for 5-10 years to reach sustainable results at scale. (Recommendation 11). | 39 |
| * 1. Collaborate at sector level: DFAT should facilitate the NGO consortia to form cross-program agriculture sector teams to undertake regular (annual or six-monthly) sector-level reviews of the overall work as a new part of the current TPAG arrangements. Each review should define the sector-level results chain, review the intervention portfolio, and determine what changes are necessary. Initial sectors should include small ruminant dairy and high value horticulture (Recommendation 3). | 28 |
| * 1. Review approach to infrastructure investments: AMENCA 3 advisers (MSD, Program) should be tasked to undertake a study of small infrastructure investments and the broader systemic constraints that limit the capacity of stakeholders (the Palestinian Authority, farmers, the private sector and contractors) to meet what is clearly an important market gap. AMENCA 3 should base any future infrastructure portfolio on addressing these systemic constraints wherever possible. (Recommendation 4). | 28 |
| * 1. Impact evaluation: Consider undertaking a formal DFAT-funded independent impact evaluation to address under-reporting to date and to capture: a) indirect impacts not currently being considered by the reporting framework (e.g. from establishing missing market functions, crowding, copying and monopoly disruption); b) ongoing impacts from AMENCA 2 (e.g. seed banks, nurseries); c) cross-partner impacts across a sector (e.g. sheep dairy sector where multiple partners are contributing to transformation). (Recommendation 14). | 41 |
| 1. Invest differently |  |
| * 1. Adapt advisor arrangements: DFAT should update contracted advisory arrangements to fill technical gaps, and support NGOs to improve integration and responsiveness: (a) retain a cross-program coordination and report-writing function (ideally a single person who could also negotiate flexible advisory services);  (b) localise the GESI advisor position and ensure they have sufficient poverty analysis skills; (c) add a fixed international Monitoring and Results Measurement (MRM) adviser to update consortia and AMENCA 3 M&E Frameworks to appropriately capture market systems results; and (d) introduce demand-driven flexible advisor services (contractor could use a panel arrangement) to complement these skills where necessary  To begin this adjustment, DFAT could task the advisory services contractor with proposing how it would go about this and other recommendations in this report. (Recommendation 7). | 34 |
| * 1. Structured MSD capacity development: The contractor for advisory services should be tasked to support further structured MSD skills development both directly, as well as through staff involvement in organised MSD training, drawing on skills within the INGO teams as well as external advisors and training programs as appropriate. This should concentrate on key management, Results Measurement and Inclusion issues. (Recommendation 6). | 30 |
| * 1. AHLD Key Stakeholder Group: DFAT should adapt the AHLD format. DFAT should retain the conference and exposition format and add a formal half-day meeting of a select Key Stakeholder Group (comprised of appropriate representatives from DFAT, INGOs, the Palestinian Authority, local NGOs, the private sector and producer associations). (Recommendation 8). | 36 |
| * 1. Community of Practice: Australia could work with other donors to form or strengthen a Market Systems Development working group or sub-group to harmonise donor efforts and share good practice across the development community in the Palestinian Territories. (Recommendation 9). | 37 |
| * 1. Improve communications arrangements: NGO partners should ensure they follow DFAT’s communications and branding policies and processes to ensure cross program lessons and outcomes are properly communicated and that Australia’s contribution is appropriately acknowledged. Any future contract amendment with the INGOs should include the provision of regular publishable social media or other communications content that exemplifies the strong results seen in the field. (Recommendation 10). | 37 |
| * 1. Consistent poverty and gender analysis to inform interventions: Enhance GESI advisory skills to work with the INGO partners to undertake a rigorous poverty and gender analysis for all existing and future interventions, to ensure that at least 50% of beneficiaries in each intervention are poor and/or small-scale producers and that gender norms and risks are explicit and visible in market studies and the design of interventions. Gender analysis should be more holistic and focus on identifying and valuing gender patterns within the market in addition to counting women’s participation. (Recommendation 15). | 45 |
| 1. Pivot practice within existing interventions and approaches |  |
| * 1. Better capture results: Complement the current high-level aggregate results reporting with a deeper emphasis on monitoring and results measurement (MRM) including processes for formal review, reflection, learning and adaptation. AMENCA 3 should enhance the capacity and consistency with which MRM is used across the program. AMENCA 3’s current M&E Advisor should be complemented with enhanced inputs from an MRM specialist to help the projects and the program capture results pertaining to ‘indirect’ market systems impacts (such as copying and crowding), women’s economic empowerment and agency, civil society strengthening and – to the degree possible – systemic change. AMENCA 3 should revise its program level targets and indicators to better monitor and understand social outcomes, including differences in outcomes for men and women in communities. (Recommendation 12). | 40 |
| * 1. Address exclusion: New GESI adviser to work with NGOs to conduct consistent and careful assessments of who is being excluded from markets because of gender, age, ethnicity, disability, or cultural reasons by undertaking household level analysis, followed by a focus of efforts on removing barriers and finding ways of fostering culturally sensitive ways for more inclusive and equitable markets. Monitoring should also consider how gender norms and patterns are a risk to effective value chain and market effectiveness. (Recommendation 16). | 46 |
| * 1. Encourage exit from underperforming interventions: Each AMENCA 3 NGO Consortium should undertake quarterly intervention reviews to track progress against expected results. Where partners are underperforming or where assumptions underpinning the results chain are found to be invalid, or where changes have no chance to scale further, the Consortium should consider withdrawing from the intervention. Decisions about whether to continue or exit from an intervention should be reviewed by the AHLD Key Stakeholder Group (or similar). (Recommendation 5). | 29 |
| * 1. Revise high level targets: Considering the high level of overperformance compared with initial targets, continuation for a further two years should be based on a collective revision of targets to reflect positive progress to date and provide appropriate performance incentives across AMENCA 3. This will require recommended updates from the MRM and Reporting/Coordination advisers which would then be workshopped with DFAT and Consortia and the AHLD Key Stakeholder Group. (Recommendation 13). | 40 |
| * 1. Adjust definition of youth: DFAT ARO revise the definition of youth to increase the upper age limit to 30 years to enable AMENCA 3 to apply its core skills (agricultural market linkages) to young Palestinians appropriately given the social and cultural context. (Recommendation 17). | 47 |

# Section A: About this Mid Term Review

AMENCA 3 (also referred to in this report as ‘the program’) is funded and managed by the Australian government through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). It is implemented by a consortium of Australian and Palestinian non-government organisations (NGOs); and supported by a panel of technical advisers[[1]](#footnote-2).

This report presents the findings of the independent Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the third phase of the *Australia Middle East NGO Cooperation Agreement Program* (AMENCA 3). This MTR is intended to inform immediate decisions regarding the future of AMENCA 3, and thus it will have implications for DFAT, its NGO partners, and its advisers.

**Section A (*About this Mid-Term Review*)**, provides the background and purpose of the MTR and why it matters. This includes an overview of DFAT’s objectives for the MTR, the key evaluation questions, and the methods used to collect and analyse the available data.

**Section B (*About AMENCA 3*)**, introduces the AMENCA 3 program, and provides an overview of the program’s objectives, partners and activities.

**Section C (*MTR findings*)**, presents the Review’s findings against each evaluation question, and then outlines its conclusions and recommendations for AMENCA 3’s future.

# Why this MTR matters

AMENCA 3 was designed as a five-year program. Given the complex and dynamic political and security context in the Palestinian Territories, DFAT included a ‘stop/go’ point at the three-year mark (approximately April 2019), as an opportunity to review progress, consider the evolving context, and determine whether a final two years should, in fact, be undertaken. One of the primary tasks of the MTR is therefore to add to the evidence base from which DFAT can make this stop/go decision. Because DFAT appreciates that all stakeholders need a prompt decision, the agency moved to contract and deliver the MTR as efficiently as possible (Wild, 2019).

The MTR has also been tasked to provide evidence and guidance that can inform AMENCA 3’s future direction should the decision be made in favour of continuing the program. Accordingly, this MTR has a strong formative aspect. This guidance will help DFAT, the NGO consortiums, and their affiliated advisers, to:

* reflect on and learn from the results to date;
* optimise the program’s implementation;
* maximise its results in the future; and
* refine its monitoring, evaluation and learning to ensure that this not only captures aggregated results, but informs the ongoing evolution of the interventions and activities.

# MTR objectives and team

The MTR has three aims:

1. To determine the progress of the program against its objectives to date.
2. To provide an evidence base and advice that will help DFAT determine whether the program should be extended.
3. To advise if/ what adjustments might enhance the program’s future direction.

DFAT contracted Coffey, a Tetra Tech Company, to conduct the MTR. The Review Team consisted of:

* David Swete Kelly as the team leader and agriculture markets specialist;
* Amy Gildea as monitoring and evaluation specialist.
* Tim Gill as food security and agriculture sector specialist (provided by DFAT[[2]](#footnote-3)).

Ishara Davey (DFAT Policy Officer, Middle East Development Section) joined in the review mission as an observer and provided valuable insights into DFAT policy settings.

# MTR methodology

## Answering the evaluation questions

The MTR was guided by the following seven questions. Section 3 is therefore broadly structured to respond to these questions, while also providing additional insights that the MTR Team consider important.

1. Does AMENCA 3’s program logic, approach and governance remain valid or require changes?
2. What results has AMENCA 3 achieved to date? Do these achievements indicate the Program is on track to realise its objectives?
3. Are the current NGO projects on track to achieve the intermediate and long-term outcomes of the AMENCA 3 Program?
4. Have enough financial and human resources been allocated to enable AMENCA 3 to achieve its objectives?
5. What is the level of sustainability in the current NGO projects; how can AMENCA 3 strengthen the sustainability of the outcomes by the end of the NGO projects?
6. How effective are the NGO projects in improving the economic and social position of women and youth? What are the factors that contribute and / or hinder successful approaches?
7. Based on the assessments made above, are there any improvements to AMENCA 3 that could be identified if DFAT determines to extend AMENCA 3 for a further two years?

The analytical framework for the MTR was provided in an *Evaluation Plan* describing how the MTR would collect and assess the evidence needed to answer each question (Coffey, 2019).

## Data collection

The MTR findings have been informed by the program’s theory, its reported learning, and the feedback provided by its participants and stakeholders. The findings draw from data collected during three activities:

1. Phone interviews with the program’s Australian-based stakeholders.
2. A desk review of program documentation.
3. The in-country fieldwork and consultation with key stakeholders (17 March to 27 March 2019).

Across these three activities the MTR used a mix of methods that combined qualitative and quantitative data collection in an iterative process.

Primary data collection methods included: interviews, field visits, focus group discussions, and observations of AMENCA 3’s governance meetings. Overall, 125 people were interviewed and/or participated in focus group discussions, including: 76 program partners, 29 program staff and affiliates, four DFAT staff in Ramallah, and four DFAT staff based in Canberra. Those consulted during the MTR are listed in Annex 5.

The interview dataset was then triangulated with the findings from the desk review, and the scan of the literature relevant to both the program, and to delivery in the Palestinian context.

## Assessment criteria

The MTR *Evaluation Plan* included a Review Framework (Annex 4), that provided a complete mapping of data sources, assessment processes, and assessment criteria against the seven evaluation questions. The eleven assessment criteria included:

1. The Results Reported by AMENCA 3 are consistent with its results framework and are considered to be sustainable.
2. The evidence underpinning results reporting is of sound-to-high quality.
3. The intervention model (i.e. hybrid MSD model) used by AMENCA 3 is credibly able to achieve the objectives (for example, has the selection of value chains been appropriate and does it remain appropriate moving forward) and have partners implemented the hybrid model as intended and/or made any adaptations or innovations that have impacted AMENCA 3.
4. Program activities effectively address known barriers to women’s, men’s and youth’s participation in economic activities/livelihoods.
5. Program activities are delivered in a way that facilitates participation by and results for women, men and youth.
6. Women perceive the program activities to be of high value, and report (at least) equivalent results.
7. Program activities are on-time, on-budget, and consistent with the intent of the design.
8. Program resources are proportionate to the expected activities and outputs.
9. The Program is learning during implementation, and has an adequate MEL system working to support this.
10. Program staff are performing their roles effectively, and no significant gaps or governance concerns are identified.
11. The Program architecture and governance structures (i.e. the AHLD and TPAG) are efficiently fulfilling DFAT’s standards for program management and are engaging effectively to oversee the Program.

## Limitations of the MTR

The challenges of working in the Palestinian Territories are significant, and this MTR was no exception. The MTR faced five major limitations:

1. It was difficult for the MTR to determine the sustainability of the inclusive market opportunities as these, although promising, were still early-stage. The program level data shows significant achievements, yet most have been delivered in the last twelve months. Furthermore, the longer-term impacts are difficult to predict, given the multitude of market distorting factors and the security concerns in the Palestinian Territories, all of which are beyond AMENCA 3’s control.
2. Two of AMENCA 3’s four partner consortiums have been suspended as a result of alleged terrorist links. The suspension of World Vision, which occurred in August 2016 (soon after program commencement), compromised program targets, but not so much the beneficiaries who were yet to fully engage. In contrast, the suspension of APHEDA in mid-2018 not only compromised program delivery and undermined its sustainability, but adversely affected the project’s beneficiaries who by then were fully engaged. The MTR has struggled to understand the implications this has for program achievements and potential impact. This has been further confounded by the decision to stop all monitoring of APHEDA initiatives while the suspension was in place, hence more recent data has not been collected. Since the MTR mission was completed, the decision has been made to lift APHEDA’s suspension. Reintegration of APHEDA will be a hugely beneficial, if not challenging task.
3. The economic and political dimensions on the ground have played a significant role in the development of AMENCA 3. Any emergent private sector enterprise in the Palestinian Territories can be subject to high level of economic, supply and political pressure. The MTR has therefore provided its professional judgement on the realism of the intended outcomes in such a fraught environment. Regrettably, no stakeholders were interviewed from the Israeli civil administration responsible for overseeing the movement of goods and people into and out of the Palestinian Territories. Nor were interviews possible with the Israeli traders or merchants involved in the supply chains that were being assessed. Yet while this would have helped the MTR to refine the contextual understanding of AMENCA 3, it is not considered a substantive limitation on the findings.
4. The MTR team was unable to visit Gaza to assess the local activities of Oxfam and APHEDA due to security issues at the time. Although a subsequent telephone interview with Oxfam partners in Gaza allowed them to verbally share their experiences, the failure to witness (even briefly) the progress being made by the projects on-the-ground diminished the MTR Team’s perspective, and undermined the rigour of its understanding of AMENCA 3’s potential in the Gaza Strip. This is important as NGOs stressed the very different market conditions faced between Gaza and the West Bank.
5. All of AMENCA 3’s stakeholders appreciated that one of the aims of the MTR was to influence the stop/go decision facing DFAT. Hence there was an inevitable desire to present both well and comprehensively. Knowing this, the MTR took care to ensure transparency regarding the criteria it would be using to assess program performance to date, although not all stakeholders benefited - the lack of longer engagement with APHEDA and its consortium members, as well as the lack of access to Gaza, meant that these stakeholders had less opportunity to speak of their experiences than they were expecting.

# Section B: About AMENCA 3

# AMENCA 3 overview

AMENCA 3 is a five-year AUD40 million Australian investment which commenced in April 2016 in the Palestinian Territories, and which builds on the groundwork, relationships, and achievements of two predecessor programs (AMENCA 1 and AMENCA 2[[3]](#footnote-4)), beginning in 2005. AMENCA 3 sits alongside other Australian investments in the Palestinian Territories and the wider region, most notably basic services to refugees.

AMENCA 3 has been working in the Palestinian Territories to increase agricultural outputs and strengthen agricultural value chains, and thereby enhance economic opportunities especially for women and youth. The goal of AMENCA 3 is for Palestinian farmers to connect with markets. Its three outcomes are:

1. Women and men are more market ready;
2. Women and men engage more sustainably and profitably in value chains; and
3. Women and youth are more economically empowered.

The program works with international NGOs (INGOs) and their Palestinian networks to identify barriers to participation in the agriculture sector, to design activities that can address these constraints, and to facilitate relationships that bring market actors together.

AMENCA 3 uses a *Market Systems Development* (MSD) approach to facilitate agricultural development across the Palestinian Territories. Early in its implementation (2016) this was modified to what was loosely defined as a ‘hybrid’ MSD approach, to allow for some direct delivery by NGOs.

AMENCA 3 commenced in April 2016 following a competitive tender process that resulted in the selection of four Australian NGOs (CARE Australia, Oxfam Australia, APHEDA-Union Aid Abroad, and World Vision Australia) as its lead implementing partners.

CARE Australia, Oxfam Australia, and World Vision Australia are the national arms of international organisations, each with multiple programs operating in the Palestinian Territories, and hence each with activities that benefit from access to significant international resources. APHEDA, on the other hand is a smaller Australian-centric NGO, although with a long and committed record of supporting Palestinians living in the Palestinian Territories.

Four months into the program, on 5 August 2016, DFAT suspended World Vision activities in the Palestinian Territories due to an alleged diversion of funds to Hamas by a staff member[[4]](#footnote-5). Since this time, funding to World Vision has remained suspended pending the outcome of the court case which is ongoing (at time of writing), with the result that World Vision has had no effective implementation during AMENCA 3.

The three remaining INGOs each formed a consortium with relevant local organisations, which together include many of the major NGOs operating in the agriculture sector (Figure 1). The implementation of AMENCA 3 over the last three years has therefore been undertaken by these three consortiums. DFAT insisted that each consortium, and all employees, adhered to very strict guidelines to minimise the risk of funding reaching listed terrorist organisations.

Figure 1: AMENCA 3 NGO Consortia

Despite these precautions, however, at the end of June 2018, the Sydney Daily Telegraph published allegations that a terrorist link had been found within the APHEDA consortium. Thus, once again, intense political fallout resulted in DFAT being forced to immediately suspend APHEDA’s work in the West Bank and Gaza.

The suspension of two of AMENCA 3’s four partners has significantly reduced the program’s potential for achievement and impact. It is unclear if World Vision will be reintegrated into AMENCA 3, however, the audit into allegations against the APHEDA consortium have now been concluded and cleared APHEDA of any wrongdoing. APHEDA’s re-accreditation has been approved and early discussions regarding recommencement of APHEDA activities have begun.

The proposed budget envelope for the full five years of AMENCA 3 was estimated to be around AUD40million (Table 2). However only the first three years was initially approved with a little over AUD26million being committed. Of this AUD5.125million was allocated to each NGO. The suspension of two NGOs has materially affected delivery. Hence, early projections of expenditure for the full three years stand at about AUD20 million or just under 80 percent of the budget up to 30 June 2019. The expenditure rate has been very uneven across the three years, with very little expensed initially due to a lack of consensus between advisers and NGOs over intervention logic and design, followed by rapid expenditure on co-investments with perceived lower risk.

Table 2: Amended budget expectations for AMENCA 3 (DFAT figures as of April 019)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Budget Line | 2015/16  Actual AUD | 2016/17  Actual AUD | 2017/18  Actual AUD | 2018/19  Planned AUD | Total  Planned AUD |
| DFAT oversight and governance | 185,990.15 | 8,105.77 | 3,607.43 | 9,381.82 | 207,085.17 |
| CARDNO | 222,161.18 | 526,441.31 | 354,244.88 | 460,173.76 | 3,151,759.94 |
| APHEDA | 800,000 | 2,217,488 | 1,780,089 | 0 | 5,125,000 |
| CARE | 800,000 | 2,483,267 | 0 | 1,841,733 | 5,125,000 |
| Oxfam | 800,000 | 2,154,275 | 0 | 2,170,725 | 5,125,000 |
| World Vision | 800,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 800,000 |
| External Audit / Reviews | 0 | 35,708.25 | 34,277.42 | 269,425.45 | 339,411.12 |
| Total | 3,608,151.33 | 7,425,285.33 | 2,172,218.73 | 4,751,439.03 | 19,873,256.23 |

# AMENCA projects

The three consortiums implementing AMENCA 3 run three separate projects:

1. Souqona being implemented by the CARE consortium.
2. Takamol being implemented by the Oxfam consortium.
3. Ghalleh being implemented by the APHEDA consortium.

These projects, and their associated NGOs, are widely recognised and appreciated by their stakeholders in the Palestinian Territories, whereas recognition of AMENCA 3 as an overarching framework seems to be limited largely to the program staff.

## CARE Souqona

CARE’s Souqona (meaning ‘*our market’*) initiative is aimed at increasing the income, agency, and market opportunity of female and male Palestinian farmers engaged in the vegetable, sheep and goat dairy value-chains. It was launched in April 2016, and operates in 23 locations in three northern Governates of the West Bank (Nablus, Jenin, and Tubas) (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Souqona interventions in the West Bank

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | |  |  | | --- | --- | | Governate | Location | | **West Bank** | | | Nablus | Aqrabaneyyeh  Beit Fourik  Beit Hasan  Dajan  Ein Shibli  Froush Beit  Nassareyieh | | Tubas | Aqaba  Aqqaba  Atouf  Bardala  Ein al Beida  Faraa  Kardala  Tammoun  Tayaseer  Tubas | | Jenin | Aba  Almaneyieh  Arraneh  Deir Abu Daef  Deir Ghazaleh  Faqquaa  Jalameh  Jdaideh | |

### Key Souqona activities:

The primary implementation activities being undertaken by Souqona are:

1. **Safer products:** This activity focuses on safer pesticide application and reduced pesticide use. The primary aim is to ensure that partner firms can certify all produce as adhering to the allowable minimum residue limits (MRL). This is a response to significant concerns that bad practice, and the use of unregistered or uncontrolled pesticides, has not only led to levels of residue that have exceeded the MRLs, but has resulted in acute and chronic impacts on the health of the farmers themselves. Certification should therefore not only improve access to domestic and international markets, and deliver a price/demand premium, but convey a significant health benefit.
2. **Dairy model**: Souqona works with women and men farmer cooperatives to buy, chill, and market fresh goat and sheep milk to larger buyers. Currently, small holder farmers cannot store milk, and are therefore obligated to process and sell soft white cheeses on a daily basis, in consequence of which they are price takers with little transactional power. Collecting bulk quantities of milk, and chilling and ensuring its quality, is therefore delivering a significant price premium.
3. **Animal feed:** Small ruminant livestock in the Palestinian Territories are generally poorly fed, have low fecundity, and are prone to disease, low birth weights, and high mortality of both mothers and offspring. By significantly improving nutrition through the use of comparatively cheap feed supplements, milk supplements, and silage, productivity and survival rates have been much improved.
4. **Small Infrastructure (Farm Roads and Irrigation)**: Souqona works to identify opportunities where local farm road construction and rehabilitation can improve the access of Palestinian farmers to their land, and thereby bolster their investment in their land. The project also works to improve access to reliable water through support to infrastructure such as wells, farm tanks and irrigation.
5. **Social Inclusion:** Souqona has worked to improve the economic inclusion of youth and women through support to entrepreneurship, ‘community initiatives’, training and demonstrations. Young women leaders were chosen as ‘animators’ to promote the economic opportunities being supported by Souqona, and to act as advocates for women’s needs.

**Figure 3: Marketing Safer Vegetables**



## Oxfam Takamol

Oxfam’s Takamol project is aimed at improving smallholder access to, and empowerment in, olive, high value fruit, and small ruminant value chains. Takamol is the most extensive of the three AMENCA 3 investments, and covers twelve Governates across both the West Bank and Gaza (Figure 5).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Figure 4: Takamol locations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip | |  |  | | --- | --- | | Governate | Location | | **West Bank** | | | Hebron | Halhul  Bet Omar  Kharas  Surif  Doura  Hebron  Yatta | | Bethlehem | Tuqu’  Nahalien  Batteir  Husan | | Jordan Valley | Northern and middle parts | | Tubas | Tubas  Tammon  Ibziq | | Qalqilya | Azon Itma  Kofor Soor | | Tulkarem | Talkarem  Dair Alqusoon  Shwaikeh | | **Gaza** | | | North Gaza | Beit Lahia | | Gaza | El Sheikh Ejleen  Gaza | | Deir El Balah | Deir El Balah  Alsawayda | | Khan Younis | El Mawasi | | Rafah | Oraiba  Al Shokah | |

### Key Takamol activities:

All of the Takamol activities being funded through AMENCA 3 sit within Oxfam’s broader Economic Justice Programme[[5]](#footnote-6) and include:

1. **High value fruits:** Takamol works in the grape and guava value chains to improve varieties, inputs, processing and marketing (e.g. the establishment of a packhouse with Shahed Grapes Company). This work is primarily with key private sector and farmer cooperatives, and occurs in both Gaza and the West Bank. Supplementary work is also occurring with avocado and mango, although at this stage this work has more of a focus on improved productivity and production, and less on marketing.
2. **Sheep and Goat Dairy:** Takamol works in the West Bank with livestock farmers to improve milk and cheese production (e.g. with Golden Sheep Enterprise Ltd), and promote private veterinary services (e.g. with Afaq Enterprise Veterinary Services Ltd).
3. **Olive:** Olive is a newer target for Takamol in both the West Bank and Gaza, the focus being on the promotion of good agricultural practices, mill efficiency, and marketing. Partners include the likes of the Green Mount of Olives Company.
4. **Small Infrastructure (Farm Roads and Irrigation):** Takamol works to identify opportunities where local farm road construction and rehabilitation can improve the access of Palestinian farmers to their land, and thereby bolster their investment in their land. The project also works to improve access to reliable water through support to infrastructure such as wells, farm tanks and irrigation.
5. **Women Food Processing Businesses and Cooperatives:** Takamol is working to develop women’s food enterprises in the West Bank and Gaza by focusing on product quantity, quality, diversity and markets. One example is support to the Happy Homes Association.

## APHEDA Ghalleh

APHEDA was implementing the activities associated with its Ghalleh project up until its suspension in June 2018. Ghalleh aimed to enhance the long-term profitability of small-scale farmers and producers in five Governates across both the West Bank and Gaza (Figure 5).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Figure 5: Ghalleh interventions in the West Bank | |  |  | | --- | --- | | Governate | Location | | **West Bank** | | | Tubas | Tammoun | | Jenin | Burqin  Kufr  Qabatiyah  Marj Ben Amer  Al Yamoun | | **Gaza** | | | Deir El Balah | All | | Gaza | Al Zaitoun | | Khan Younis | Khuza’a  Al Mawasi | | Rafah | Al Mawasi | |

### Key Ghalleh activities

The primary implementation activities being undertaken by Ghalleh were:

1. **Vegetables**: Ghalleh worked with private sector actors in both the West Bank (Jenin Investment Company) and the Gaza Strip (Zeitouna pickling factory and Al Basheer Export Company) to increase the scale, quality and variety of the produce they were processing or selling in the vegetable value chains. Emphasis was given to strategies that: reduced input costs related to water access; allowed for the collective purchase of inputs; improved farming practices in general; and improved access to export markets in Israel and the Gulf region. Ghalleh also worked with the private sector to improve access to business loans for agricultural inputs and infrastructure (e.g. greenhouses).
2. **Almonds**: Ghalleh worked with the almond value chain to introduce new varieties, and to promote the uptake of treated wastewater for irrigation. In partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture, the consortium developed an Arabic manual for almond farmers. The aim is to increase production, and help to guarantee the domestic supply.
3. **Dates**: Ghalleh worked with the date palm value chain to promote more economic and efficient options for date peeling, pitting and drying. It also worked to extend the date season by supporting processors to produce date paste (Al Sham company); reducing the impact of harvest gluts in Gaza; and working on pest control.
4. **Small Infrastructure (Farm Roads and Irrigation)**: In line with Souqona and Takamol, Ghalleh was also working to identify opportunities where local farm road construction and rehabilitation could improve the access of Palestinian farmers to their land, and thereby bolster their investment. Likewise, it was also working to improve access to reliable water through support to infrastructure such as wells, farm tanks and irrigation.

# AMENCA 3 technical advisory services

DFAT funds technical advisors (sourced through Cardno Emerging Markets) to provide expertise to the INGOs and their consortiums. The suite of advisers and the areas of specialisation have changed and evolved during AMENCA 3. While 11 advisers have been engaged over the three years, they have largely filled four key roles:

1. Program Coordination/Agriculture.
2. Monitoring & Evaluation.
3. Social Inclusion (women and youth).
4. Private Sector/Market Systems Development.

The current four advisers filling these positions are shown in green in the table below (Table 3). All advisers operate on a short-term basis except for the in-country Program Coordinator (Tariq Shaieh) who is engaged full-time in Ramallah.

Table 3: AMENCA 3 advisory services contracted through Cardno (2015-2019).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Title | Start Date | End Date |
| Agriculture Sector Adviser | 16-Nov-15 | 31-Dec-15 |
| Technical Team Leader & M&E Advisor | 16-Nov-15 | 26-Jun-16 |
| Gender & Youth Advisor | 16-Nov-15 | 02-Jul-16 |
| Private Sector Advisor | 16-Nov-15 | 31-Aug-16 |
| Agriculture Advisor / Agriculture & SI Advisor | 01-Apr-16 | 28-Feb-17 |
| Monitoring & Evaluation Advisor | 20-Jul-16 | 31-Oct-16 |
| TST Team Leader & PSD Advisor | 20-Jul-16 | 22-Jan-18 |
| TST Coordinator (STA) / Program Adviser (LTA) | 20-Jul-16 | 30-Jun-19 |
| Monitoring & Evaluation Advisor | 14-Nov-16 | 30-Jun-19 |
| Social Inclusion Advisor | 01-May-17 | 30-Jun-19 |
| Private Sector Development Advisor | 16-Feb-18 | 30-Jun-19 |

# Section C: MTR Findings

# Relevance

AMENCA 3 works to build inclusive economic opportunity and growth in the Palestinian Territories’ agriculture sector. These are core concerns of the Palestinian Authority and Australia. The program has a growing reputation for the relevance of its approach and impact with both farming communities and the private sector. The relevance of AMENCA 3’s market-based approach is increasingly recognised for its potential to generate some level of economic stability within the Palestinian Territories. Most interventions draw heavily on domestic demand to reduce risk to export and Israeli market restrictions. The hybrid MSD approach has proved crucial to stimulating new market segments in which small scale producers can participate profitably.

## Agricultural context

Political constraints play a more significant role in determining the development agenda in the Palestinian Territories than in most development contexts. Market forces are unable to operate unimpeded due to the political and security situation which effectively reduces the ability of market actors to supply and expand their markets in a predictable manner.

AMENCA 3 is the leading investment amongst a small number of other donor interventions that aim to improve agricultural productivity and market function in the Palestinian Territories. Any investment that is currently focused on the Palestinian productive sector is considered important, given that the Palestinian economy is currently contracting, and is expected to continue to contract in the coming years, accompanied by further rises in poverty and unemployment. Independent analysis confirms that this contraction is primarily due to the constraints being imposed by the Government of Israel (World Bank, April 2019). Although the ever-worsening economic situation is being particularly felt in Gaza, given its already ten-year blockade, the whole of the Palestinian productive sector is being eroded.

The many constraints on the Palestinian productive sector include security actions, road closures, and ad hoc changes to checkpoint activity which restrict movement of goods and services, as well as partners’ access to beneficiary communities. In the case of agriculture (including most of the AMENCA 3 interventions) these are compounded by other major constraints including:

1. **Restrictions on access to water and agricultural land in Area C.** The ongoing situation in Area C severely restricts Palestinian access to 63 per cent of the agricultural resources of the West Bank, including its most fertile land and its best grazing land. The construction of the separation barrier, and the expansion of Israeli settlements, have been the particular drivers that have diminished both access to land and the land available for agriculture (UNCTAD, 2015). Furthermore, any agricultural infrastructure in Area C must be approved by the Israeli authorities. Yet because permits are very difficult to obtain, significant irrigation, water and access infrastructure (often provided by donors) has been demolished because the permits have not been in place (OCHA, 2019).
2. **The ban on the import of a wide range of items considered ‘dual use’.** These items are generally civilian products and technologies that the Israeli authorities consider might have alternative military applications. The list is extensive - 56 items in the West Bank, and 118 items in Gaza - and includes most common fertilisers and fertiliser blends, sterilants used in the dairy sector, and, for Gaza, aggregates, cement and steel, as well as many items of food processing equipment. A few categories are broadly defined, and all are administered without any right of appeal (World Bank, April 2019).
3. **Arbitrarily unfavourable decisions regarding the movement of goods.** Check points and borders limit the consortiums’ ability to introduce more efficient farm technologies into the Palestinian Territories, as well as to send saleable produce from the Palestinian Territories into Israel in a timely manner. As such, the check points distort trade across the wall - Israeli produce can easily access the Palestinian markets at times of oversupply, while the movement of Palestinian produce into Israel (or elsewhere) is strictly controlled. In consequence, although export opportunities can be created for farmers and processors from the West Bank and Gaza (into Israel, the Gulf States and Europe in particular), these are subject to arbitrary closure by Israel, as has already been seen in a number of AMENCA 3-established pathways.

These constraints not only limit market access but increase the cost of production and put downward pressure on commodity prices. As such, Palestinian commodities become uncompetitive, thereby seriously impacting on the productivity of the Palestinian agriculture sector. Yields in the Palestinian Territories are in fact often half that of equivalent environments in Israel or Jordan (UNCTAD, 2015).

## Is AMENCA 3 still valid given the political, social and economic context in the Palestinian Territories?

Investment in agricultural productivity is especially critical for the Palestinian Territories, given the agriculture sector’s potential to rapidly and significantly improve incomes, exports, food security and job creation in the region (UNCTAD, 2015). Unlike other sectors that require a significant lead time before impacts can be achieved, agriculture in the Palestinian Territories has unrealised potential that could be rapidly mobilised were the current restrictions to be relaxed or removed.

As the economy has contracted in recent years, and unemployment has concurrently increased, people have fallen back on agriculture and livestock options for their livelihoods. Yet despite the significant increase in agricultural employment in the past two decades, over the same time period the sector’s relative contribution to GDP has dropped by more than two thirds. While available labour has increased, production has remained static due to the external constraints being imposed on the sector. While the eventual solution to this can only be political, investment in agricultural productivity in the meantime is providing both stability and a safety net for Palestinian families that is helping to buffer many from dire poverty (UNCTAD, 2015).

Australia’s support to AMENCA 3 is a strategic use of limited donor resources that is:

* demonstrating a long-term commitment (14 years up till now) to the economic viability and stability of the Palestinian Territories;
* investing in the Palestinian Authority’s priority productive growth sector;
* improving incomes, and providing sustainable job opportunities to smallholder farmers, women and youth;
* helping to shift the development landscape from one of long-term humanitarian relief to one of sustainable economic development;
* leveraging significant additional investment from the agri-business sector;
* strengthening and equipping civil society organisations to address the region’s economic stagnation, especially by creating lasting livelihood opportunities for Palestinians; and
* testing a hybrid MSD model that has not only proved to be viable, but is a valuable addition to DFAT’s agriculture sector programming approaches.

## How does AMENCA 3 align with the priorities of Australia and the Palestinian Authority?

Economic integration, inclusive growth, and open trade and investment are basic principles of the *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper* (DFAT, 2019). AMENCA 3 reflects these ambitions, by fostering stronger partnerships for economic growth. It thereby contributes directly and substantially to the economic stability and prosperity of the Palestinian people, as well as to the stability and security of the region more generally.

AMENCA 3 is Australia’s major development investment for the Palestinian people, and its core bilateral investment in the Palestinian Territories under *Australia’s Palestinian Territories Aid Investment Plan* (AIP) 2015-2019 (DFAT, 2015), the first outcome of which is to “*Improve public financial management and a more competitive agricultural economy in the Palestinian Territories* ”. Over the three financial years 2015/16 to 2017/18, AMENCA 3 constituted about one third of Australia’s spending on this outcome, and 10 per cent of Australia’s overall ODA to the Palestinian Territories (DFAT, 2016, 2017, 2018). In 2017/18 AMENCA 3 constituted over half the spending on Outcome 1, and 5 per cent of Australia’s overall ODA. While modest, this funding is in line with the absorptive capacity of both Australia’s partners, and the Palestinian markets. It is also in line with similar MSD programs elsewhere.

AMENCA 3 also supports the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to make agriculture a driver of the economy, and a tool for strengthening the fabric of communities. AMENCA 3 directly contributes to two of the five priorities outlined in the Palestinian Authority’s *National Agricultural Sector Strategy 2017-2022* (MoA, November 2016):

1. Increased agricultural production, productivity, and competitiveness in local and international markets contributes to the betterment of the gross domestic product and food security; and
2. Improved agricultural value chains allow female and male farmers and entrepreneurs to access better quality agricultural services.

The Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture was heavily and enthusiastically involved in the design of AMENCA 3, as well as in its early implementation. However, recent bilateral tensions and conflicting expectations regarding the level of control the Ministry should be wielding over the program, have resulted in it suspending its engagement with the program. This breakdown in the relationship represents an important (but hopefully not critical) risk to the program that will be discussed in greater detail in Section 9.4.

## Does AMENCA 3’s program logic and approach remain valid or require changes?

The Palestinian Territories has proven to be a receptive and responsive environment for market-based interventions. It has taken some time for local NGOs to adopt and become adept in the MSD approach, but now that they have a greater depth of experience, including with its success, they are convinced that this is an appropriate development methodology for economic growth in the Palestinian Territories. What AMENCA 3 has found is that many markets have significant latent potential - if it works with partners to find ways around the current environment’ then markets quickly and quite excitingly expand to fill the space. Part of the reason for this quick response is that, while market investments remain risky, stakeholders are very willing to mobilise their often-scarce resources to co-invest. Palestinian farmers and private sector actors clearly remain passionate about their heritage.

While many of these actors are rightly suspicious of poorly thought through and imposed donor interventions, the facilitatory market focused approach used by AMENCA 3 is seen as a relevant and welcome alternative. Individuals, communities and private sector stakeholders find AMENCA 3’s MSD approach to be refreshing. This stands in rather stark contrast to other humanitarian and ‘direct delivery’ approaches even though they often provide goods and services for free. A study of all donor market interventions in the Palestinian Territories in early 2018, considered that AMENCA 3 was a pioneer of the ‘markets’ approach (Shamieh, February 2018).

Figure 6: AMENCA 3’s focus on women farmers as organisers and consolidators for the dairy sector is an exciting innovation



# Effectiveness

AMENCA 3 demonstrates early evidence of impact that is beyond what would be expected for a market systems program at this stage of implementation. Despite various challenges, delays and suspensions – and in the absence of a results measurement system able to capture some of the qualitative dimensions of impact – AMENCA 3 is exceeding, or on track to achieve, almost all quantitative targets, with clear signs of early systemic change and women’s economic empowerment.

This emerging success is however still fragile, hence there is considerable merit in the interventions being supported over a longer time period, as many of the innovative market functions are not yet fully established in the economy.

## How effective has the hybrid MSD approach been?

Central to AMENCA 3’s success has been what was described in its beginnings as its ‘hybrid’ approach, which in essence aimed to integrate a traditional livelihood approach with the emerging opportunities presented by Market Systems Development. While initial attempts by AMENCA 3 to document this ‘hybrid’ model centred on the core principles of “systemic analysis” and “facilitation” (Peishi, 2017), the project left it to the NGOs to interpret what this meant, with the unfortunate result that although learning has evolved significantly since the early days, it has not necessarily been tracked. Yet, the MTR Team considers that many of the lessons learnt are cutting edge.

Integral to the program’s hybrid approach have been the NGOs, whose roles have not only been significant but innovative. Certainly, one of the AMENCA 3 NGOs (Oxfam) has had substantial experience and is a key partner in two other MSD efforts[[6]](#footnote-7).

The NGOs have carefully co-invested with stakeholders to provide support in two broadly defined areas – *Uplift* and *Reach*.

1. **Uplift**:
   1. **Mobilise, organise, and empower communities**: The NGOs have worked to develop the capacity, confidence, rights, access, and agency of the target communities and groups. These communities and groups have in consequence become more emancipated, more organised, and more capable of taking considered and informed control of their futures, particularly in the form of their increasingly effective engagement with the Territories’ market systems. Innovation and entrepreneurship have grown within the communities, allowing for the innovators and entrepreneurs to occupy niche private sector roles related to:

Production of goods that meet the quality, consistency and quantity requirements of consumers;

The local provision of reliable, accessible, and affordable inputs and services; and

The establishment of local processing and value addition of product.

* 1. **Create market-ready actors:** The target beneficiaries have thus become more market ready, making them more attractive, equal, rational, organised and engaging partners for the formal private sector to work with. The capacity for communities to produce and aggregate product that achieves consistent quality and supply are central achievements.

1. **Reach**:
   1. **Bridge fraught market relationships:** At the same time, AMENCA 3 has worked with the private sector actors to develop their vision, capacity, and confidence to engage with the transformed communities through the supply of goods and services, and by enabling their access to broader, more lucrative markets through the aggregation/value addition of product. This includes catalytic co-investment by AMENCA 3 to reduce the cost and risk associated with expanding into new areas.
   2. **Mentor and support:** Business advisers within the NGOs have been required to mentor and support the private sector in establishing sustainable market relationships with community groups, and in helping them persevere in the face of adversity.
   3. **Sustain the confidence and trust of the communities:** Private Sector partners emphasise that the communities’ confidence in the NGOs has been such that it has allowed the NGOs to sponsor changes that were resisted when previously presented to the communities by the private sector alone (e.g. silage, supplements).

**The Hybrid Approach: *Uplift* and *Reach***

The AMENCA 3 hybrid approach to Market Systems Development uses a smart combination of interventions that provides:

a) *Uplift*: directly ‘empowers’ the poor (especially women and youth) so they are more capable and equipped to engage equally and profitably with value chain actors, and

b) *Reach*: incentivises private sector market actors to expand their businesses and ‘engage’ with these more capable and organised smallholders in a balanced, equitable, profitable and risk sharing relationship.

Some of these *uplift* roles are not usual MSD functions, the hybrid aspect of the program’s approach having combined more usual NGO roles with the core principles of MSD (although most of these principles are in essence generic attributes reflecting the best practices common to good development). The core set of MSD principles foundational to the hybrid approach now needs to be documented by DFAT and the NGO partners.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | 1. Clearly articulate the hybrid model: AMENCA 3 partners have developed some common understandings of the hybrid MSD model but these remain undocumented and hence open to interpretation. DFAT, the MSD adviser and INGO partners should work together to agree on a description of the AMENCA 3 hybrid approach and the principles behind it by the end of 2019 to inform future investments. |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Milking More Money from Less Labour**  In Tubas in northern West Bank, CARE has brought together a series of parallel interventions that have opened up a new sector: fresh sheep milk sold into retail markets. For the first time, instead of having to spend 4-5 hours a day making cheese and selling it to visiting traders at the lowest possible price, women are able to bring their raw milk to a collection hub that fetches a good price from a commercial dairy company.  The hybrid MSD approach has been absolutely essential to the success of this model. No amount of support to the dairy company alone would have made it worth their while purchasing milk from Tubas when yields were so low and seasonal, production fragmented amongst individual smallholders, quality and safety unknowable, and chilling unavailable. All of these issues needed to be addressed simultaneously, and the aggregation effect crystallised by the transformation of a relatively weak women’s CBO into a professional milk aggregator owned and run by small scale female sheep farmers themselves.  Some of the gaps in the value chain could only be filled by direct provision of equipment such as chillers and testing equipment; other interventions such as the introduction of silage (high quality fodder) and milk powder for early weaning were on a ‘try before you buy’ basis accompanied by farmer training. Alongside these were traditional MSD interventions where the dairy company is incentivised by co-investment to test the feasibility of purchasing from smallholders.  Another critical factor that relied on the hybrid approach was the empowerment of women to break traditional restrictions on mobility and engagement in technical and financial matters; without this the intervention could have resulted in elite capture by male herders with larger resources.  The success of the intervention was evident in the women running the collection hub and in the ‘crowding in’[[7]](#footnote-8) of five other dairy companies eager to exploit emerging domestic markets in sheep milk, yoghurt and cheese products. | |
|  |  |

If lessons are to be learned, and good practices promoted and emulated, the following are essential principles for all AMENCA 3 interventions, whether they be *uplift,* or *reach* interventions:

* A systems-based analysis to identify the evidence and market entry points.
* A carefully crafted and regularly reviewed results chain for all interventions developed.
* The undertaking of all work through system partners – the NGOs should generally refrain from becoming actors in their own right but can provide direct support if no other mechanisms exist[[8]](#footnote-9).
* Catalytic co-investment, as all partners should be expected to co-invest and have “skin-in-the-game” be it for *uplift* or *reach* outcomes.
* Facilitation (as opposed to direct delivery) wherever feasible.

## What results has AMENCA 3 achieved to date? Do these achievements indicate the Program is on track to realise its objectives?

Despite early problems with understanding and accepting a new ‘market’ approach, challenges with advisory mechanisms, and low initial expenditure, AMENCA 3 is now operating well and is outperforming expectations – an especially good result given the difficult operating environment.

Comparison with DFAT’s experience with MSD programs in seven other countries, shows that AMENCA 3 is achieving early traction and shifts in pro-poor market dynamics in ways that equal or exceed those seen elsewhere at a similar point in the program cycle. These early results are particularly impressive for an MSD program given that experience elsewhere shows that new MSD projects take time to establish trusting market relationships and business confidence. The latest annual report (AMENCA 3, March 2019) outlines good outcome-level performance as evidenced by:

* Eight 2019/20 targets having already been exceeded ahead of time, including: private sector investment leveraged (AUD15million already); rural road access; value chain performance; adoption of innovation; and the role of women and youth in economic activities.
* Achieving verified income increases well ahead of schedule for 23,000 farmers, including 7,000 women and 7,000 youth.
* Delivering AUD16.5 million in additional production (80% of the 2020 target), across a diverse agricultural portfolio including value addition in the vegetable, dairy and fruit sectors.

These headline results are complemented by road investments that have allowed 5,500 farmers to now access 2,100ha of underutilised agricultural land, and water infrastructure investments that have secured irrigation for 500ha of land. Poor road access and irrigation are significant barriers to farm productivity in the West Bank and Gaza.

The program is making an important contribution to modernising the farm sector in the Palestinian Territories, with 9,000 farmers adopting new technologies and practices. Export markets are also opening, with AUD8.4 million in export earnings achieved by the program so far. Many opportunities for expansion into Gulf and European markets exist, but are subject to arbitrary closure of pathways.

Annex 3 presents a table summarising aggregate results alongside targets for 2018 and 2020.

The fact that AMENCA 3 is seeing solid results after three years is noteworthy. The MTR team considers that this is partly the consequence of:

* the kick-start AMENCA 3 received given that each NGO Consortium already had significant foundational relationships with communities and some significant private sector links. These were established by the NGOs either through their involvement in previous phases of AMENCA, or through the profile these NGOs had already attained in their work with other donors. Establishing trust and relationships is fundamental to improved market function; and
* the obvious technical skills, qualifications, capacity and competency of NGO consortium staff. Palestinian professionals are clearly well trained and creative, and so, after some initial teething pains, those engaged in AMENCA 3 are now enthusiastically adopting and adapting AMENCA 3’s hybrid MSD approach.

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| **Getting Serious About Local Grapes**  The Hebron area is a major producer of grapes for local markets where the fruit is highly popular, but producers extract very little value from it. The production season is very short and, given high temperatures and the significant glut of grapes hitting the market at the same time, producers have little choice but to accept the low price on offer at the market. Improved packing, cold storage and processing options are desperately needed but out of the reach of the multitude of small-holder grape farmers.  Oxfam overcame these challenges by creating a way to aggregate production, sort the good from the bad with a price signal for quality, package effectively and store in chilled rooms, and find ways to make other high value products with the lower quality fruit.  The hardest part was overcoming distrust, forming a consortium and encouraging investment in a market that has always been seen as low value. In order to do this, they needed to prove the concept by developing branding and packaging materials, renting a facility that could grade, pack and cool-store grapes, and training workers (particularly women) in grading, packing and processing. Farmer training in better practices has also been an important part of helping producers understand the value of investing to be able to harvest quality fruit that can attract the premium price.  This initial investment paid off and Oxfam was able to form a multi-stakeholder consortium to invest their own funds in a bespoke facility that could take the work to scale and deliver a far longer grape season to producers with good returns to investors. This is the result of taking local grapes seriously as a business that can be profitable if certain barriers can be overcome, and the outcome is a better price for farmers producing quality grapes and new livelihood opportunities for women processing low-grade fruit. |

### Results Analysis

The consortia have exceeded 19 of 23 aggregate targets[[9]](#footnote-10) for 2018, with the four remaining targets at least 80 percent achieved. On average they surpassed the cumulative targets for 2018 by 71 percent and increased the incomes of almost 10,000 more farmers than expected at this stage, despite a much smaller level of expenditure than planned.

This begs two obvious questions:

1. Is the reporting credible? and
2. Were the targets reasonable in the first place?

These are not easy questions to answer, especially within the limited scope of the MTR mission, but several factors indicate that both questions should be answered in the affirmative:

* Is the reporting credible?
* the NGOs have robust M&E systems that are well understood by staff and easily explained;
* NGOs undertake internal spot-checks, and the AMENCA 3 M&E Adviser undertakes validation exercises to ensure data is credible; and
* triangulation of data (based on farmer reporting, private sector data and detailed data from CBOs) is in place.
* Were the targets reasonable in the first place?
* targets already appear ambitious for this stage of program implementation and considering the market constraints that apply in the Palestinian Territories; and
* far less resources have been expensed compared to the planned expenditure associated with the establishment of initial targets.

It is also worth exploring whether the results are *broad-based* (and therefore less vulnerable to policy shifts or seasonal effects) or *narrow range* (and thus dependent on a few interventions being highly successful while most others fail or deliver modest outcomes). In DFAT’s experience with MSD programming, it is often the case that one or two interventions yield very strong returns while others have little or no impact, and it’s important to assess whether the spread of successful interventions is sufficient to ensure overall program results don’t collapse if an intervention area suddenly fails. While there are clearly some AMENCA 3 interventions showing little impact or potential for impact at scale, there are indeed a number of intervention pathways achieving results at multiple levels through multiple partners.

For example, while APHEDA is only able to report on results up to mid-2018 due to its suspension, it can demonstrate strong returns from gherkin exports (AUD1.8m), pickled eggplant exports (AUD0.8m) and vegetable production (AUD0.5m). They also report eight separate investments above AUD100,000 from three private sector partners and 90 farmers. Furthermore, CARE is also supporting vegetable value chain development in similar areas and has been able to complement some of APHEDA’s partners during the suspension. This strong spread of interventions and impacts indicates the program is reasonably well buffered against arbitrary policy and access changes over time. It also demonstrates that initiatives are unlikely to suddenly collapse due to other external risks such as poor weather or pest infestation. This vegetable experience is also backed up by the MTR team’s exposure to a number of other value chains displaying similar strong impacts, such as the sheep dairy value chain in northern West Bank (Tubas) – involving six new commercial buyers and processors – and the grape value chain in southern West Bank (Hebron) where numerous investors including the Chamber of Commerce and individual farmers are buying shares in a large processing and cold storage facility to exploit a wider range of fresh, chilled and processed products.

For many new market segments, MSD programs can expect ‘overshoots’ – for example, a price signal may stimulate an increase in supply that surpasses or outpaces demand – but at this stage it’s hard to predict whether the interventions are close to achieving ceilings in demand. Certainly, for the dairy and grape sectors, demand appears to be very strong and sustainable, based on domestic markets in the Palestinian Territories. Israeli and export markets are being actively explored but seen as a ‘bonus’, and rightly so given the risk of arbitrary closure of such markets.

In summary, at this stage it’s not unreasonable to assess that the results strongly validate the hybrid market systems approach and indicate that the balance of interventions has indeed begun to transform a number of market sectors in significant and scalable ways. However, it will be important to review 2019 results to see if trends can continue given that most of the achievements reported depend on the exponential increases delivered in 2018.

## Impact of APHEDA’s suspension

The impact of the suspension on APHEDA, its local partners, and the delivery of its program benefits has been significant. Ghalleh was the first of the NGO projects to show significant results in terms of private sector partnerships and, although the interventions have suffered during the suspension, these partnerships continue to hold high impact potential provided programming is re-established smoothly. APHEDA and its long-term partners have previously demonstrated their ability for rapid mobilisation during previous AMENCA phases. As such, DFAT has commenced early planning with APHEDA for reintegration of Ghalleh into AMENCA 3.

APHEDA, and its consortium partners, face challenges in remobilising Ghalleh. Partners have suffered and continue to suffer reputational damage as a result of the suspension. The suspension was also an important factor that triggered the withdrawal of engagement by the Palestinian Authority with AMENCA 3, which has broader programmatic and relational impacts for DFAT.

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|  | 1. Clarify APHEDA situation: DFAT to agree that APHEDA may provide a copy of DFAT’s letter advising of APHEDA’s full reinstatement to its communities, stakeholders, partners and the Palestinian Authority. DFAT to explore other opportunities to help communicate the current state of play. |

This would not only reassure all Ghalleh stakeholders, but it could also provide an avenue for DFAT to re-engage with the Ministry of Agriculture.

## Is the intervention portfolio of AMENCA 3 strategic and well managed?

AMENCA 3’s primary sectors of intervention are:

1. Small Ruminants Dairy (CARE and Oxfam).
2. Safer High Value Vegetables (CARE and APHEDA).
3. High Value Fruits and Nuts - Oxfam (Guava, Grapes, Avocado, Olives) and APHEDA (Almonds, Dates).
4. Small Infrastructure – Farm to Market Roads and Irrigation (CARE, Oxfam, APHEDA).

The MTR Team considers that the majority of the interventions across these sectors are innovative and well thought through. There are four areas, however, where some enhancement to the interventions should be considered.

### Moving from a value-chain to a market perspective

Many AMENCA 3 interventions are focusing on specific product value chains in order to directly improve the effectiveness or efficient functioning of elements within those value chains. Yet many of the fundamental constraints on value chain performance sit in the broader markets beyond the value chains themselves. AMENCA 3’s hybrid approach has already recognised this, and as such has identified the need for specific *uplift* and *reach* interventions that help to strengthen the functioning of the target markets as a whole. However, other important market-wide issues also need to be understood, tracked, and targeted if necessary. Examples include insufficiencies in:

* the associated input markets (for goods or services);
* production infrastructure,
* transport and logistics,
* factor markets (e.g. land, water, capital and finance);
* entrepreneurship;
* gender and inclusion (e.g. how the limited access and agency of women and youth constrain market growth);
* business development services; and
* the associated regulations and policy.

Although there is evidence from across AMENCA 3 that the teams are thinking (at least in an ad hoc way) about most of these issues, a review of the NGO analysis indicates that they are not being coherently and systematically taken into consideration during the development of either the sector or the intervention logics. Instead, what is generally happening is that an innovation or technology (e.g. safe vegetables) is proposed, and then ways are explored of introducing that innovation into the value chain. Yet while this is a valid, iterative and successful approach, it would be beneficial for all stakeholders if the approach were underpinned by a broader sector and intervention analysis establishing that the particular value chain element (e.g. pesticide residues) is, in fact, a central impediment to pro-poor market function, and that other elements are not more critical. One instructive example comes from the technical interventions into the small ruminant dairy sector, which seem quite innovative (breeds, chillers, aggregation, vaccination, advice etc). However, a more fundamental review of the overall market would complement this work and either confirm the current track or inspire changes. For example, a market sector review would complement AMENCA 3’s work, by taking into consideration such issues as:

* the overall competitive risks to small ruminant dairy in the region;
* the impediments to pro-poor and inclusive growth (see also Section 12.1.1 on Poverty and economic exclusion);
* the impact of biosecurity risks such as zoonotic diseases;
* impacts on the natural resource base (e.g. water, rangelands); and
* broader issues such as aggregation and logistics.

It may be that over time, both the various sector assessments and the on-the-ground experience of the teams, demonstrate that many interventions are facing similar major challenge/s (e.g. transport and logistics). In this case AMENCA 3 should consider the potential of market-based partnerships with the private sector to address this as a sector in its own right.

AMENCA 3’s current value-chain interventions should be complemented by regular and ongoing reviews that assess market function more broadly. This, combined with the teams’ on-the-ground experience, would either confirm the current sector/intervention logic, or inspire changes/refinements to the interventions that enable them to address broader market concerns. These studies could be commissioned across AMENCA 3 using the advisory resources, and should be combined with the regular Sector Reviews (see next).

### Developing Whole-of-Program, AMENCA 3 wide, sector approaches

Currently, each NGO consortium works independently to determine in which agriculture sectors pro-poor growth can occur, to choose which of these sectors it will work with, and to then develop sector strategies and the associated portfolios of interventions. Reassuringly, this independent process has settled on four common sectors (mentioned at the start of Section 8.3) in which the interventions also show significant overlap - an outcome which appears to demonstrate that these analyses were sound. The MTR considers that having three partners work independently to develop their approaches is valid – parallel analysis and interventions that test differing approaches are, in fact, key principles of MSD.

However, there are worrying signs of competition and criticism between NGOs. This is not helpful and often the criticisms levelled are unfounded. The NGOs need to see themselves as collaborators and hence the MTR considers that significant learning could be gained if AMENCA 3 were to bring the teams together over the next two years to:

1. discuss their sector work and the factors that are driving successes;
2. analyse the broader sector contexts, and the ways in which their respective interventions are complementary. NGOs need to consider how their combined effort might gain the scale and reach necessary to drive systemic change within these sectors (as discussed above in Section 8.4.1); and
3. enhance synergies between the individual programs by building stronger market networks and links; by sharing learning and approaches; and/ or by focusing joint efforts on critical/ intractable parts of the market, or in certain geographies.

Some of these discussions had been put in place by the program and some examples of collaboration are beginning to emerge in areas such as:

* Dairy Value Chain (Oxfam and CARE);
* youth employment and entrepreneurship; and
* veterinary services.

Many of these links have formed where synergies have already existed between market players. There remains, however, significant opportunity to enhance such cross learning between NGOs as they try to intervene in similar market functions/ intervention areas such as:

* food safety (Care and APHEDA are both working with the Palestinian Standards Institute);
* aggregation;
* access to finance;
* women’s economic empowerment;
* youth inclusion;
* input and information services; and
* export access.

In these and many other areas, Oxfam and CARE (and APHEDA too in the past) have been trialling different approaches to a similar problem.

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|  | 1. Collaborate at sector level: DFAT should facilitate the NGO consortia to form cross-program agriculture sector teams to undertake regular (annual or six-monthly) sector-level reviews of the overall work as a new part of the current TPAG arrangements. Each review should define the sector-level results chain, review the intervention portfolio, and determine what changes are necessary. Initial sectors should include small ruminant dairy and high value horticulture. |

### Rethinking the Small Infrastructure Sector engagements

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| **Road Infrastructure Improves Access**  Beneficiaries of roads built under AMENCA 3 report that prior to the roads being built it was difficult to reach agricultural areas. Women and men could not reach their crops nor take their tractors to assist with farming the land. There was a higher rate of accidents particularly on rainy days. Now farmers - including women –can take their own cars, access their lands and revive them. Many have built new greenhouses. |

Small infrastructure has clearly been an important and valued foundational investment across AMENCA 3. At the start of the program, investments in small infrastructure (either directly funded, or co-funded with local authorities, farmers and contractors), helped to boost early expenditure, to rapidly add to the productive potential of communities, and to deliver tangible early benefits that helped bring the communities on board.

Most of these small infrastructure interventions were directly funded, or co-funded with local authorities, farmers and contractors. Now that the program has settled down and developed a strong portfolio of market interventions, it may be appropriate for AMENCA 3 to review its work in small infrastructure. It is not the intention to question the foundational necessity of small infrastructure, but to take a broader system/market level approach to investment. The fundamental need is to unpack why the small infrastructure market is not operating effectively. A deeper analysis of ‘why’ the market is failing may well help AMENCA 3 identify creative intervention points that address some of the fundamental systemic impediments. DFAT experience in using MSD approaches in the Cambodia irrigation market (see CAVAC literature) provides an example of how innovation was used to move donor investment from delivering irrigation on a case by case basis, to a situation where the market functioned more effectively.

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|  | 1. Review approach to infrastructure investments: AMENCA 3 advisers (MSD, Program) should be tasked to undertake a study of small infrastructure investments and the broader systemic constraints that limit the capacity of stakeholders (the Palestinian Authority, farmers, the private sector and contractors) to meet what is clearly an important market gap. AMENCA 3 should base any future infrastructure portfolio on addressing these systemic constraints wherever possible. |

### Exit strategies

At the start of AMENCA 3, the consortiums were encouraged to deliver at least some activities that met community needs in the short term, with the aim of delivering some early and tangible outcomes that would bring on board the target communities. However, a number of these interventions are still ongoing, and as such need to be reviewed, as they cannot be easily aligned with the now established sector strategies. In addition, there is evidence that some investments are struggling to deliver traction, and as such have little capacity to achieve systemic outcomes in the long-term.

Two characteristics of a healthy MSD program are that it can quickly prune those interventions that are not showing promise at scale, and that it has built a culture of being able to let go of interventions without disincentivising those who have been involved. The MTR came across little evidence, however, that any AMENCA 3 intervention has been purposefully closed due to its weak performance. Yet pruning is essential if AMENCA 3’s portfolio is to be kept vibrant and focused on areas of traction. It not only delivers better outcomes, but allows an NGO to shift scarce resources to areas where there is greater potential for success.

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|  | 1. Encourage exit from underperforming interventions: Each AMENCA 3 NGO Consortium should undertake quarterly intervention reviews to track progress against expected results. Where partners are underperforming or where assumptions underpinning the results chain are found to be invalid, or where changes have no chance to scale further, the Consortium should consider withdrawing from the intervention. Decisions about whether to continue or exit from an intervention should be reviewed by the AHLD Key Stakeholder Group (or similar). |

## Is there evidence of systemic change?

AMENCA 3, like most MSD approaches, is well aware of the need for its market interventions to lead to systemic change. Like other MSD programs both effort and business skills are needed to select intervention areas where there is significant market growth potential, and where growth can have direct benefit flows to the poor as suppliers, producers or employees. Whereas there are now some very solid examples of successful interventions, AMENCA 3 is now increasingly challenged by the need to demonstrate that these initial successes can lead to broader systemic change. This is more than just supporting individual businesses to unlock growth, create jobs and increase incomes. It is also about creating a series of partnerships that through different channels introduce innovations so the sector as a whole goes through a process of innovation and transformation, and starts to work in a different manner from which the poor can benefit.

Currently AMENCA 3 has realised a number of market innovations that have potential to achieve systemic change, including:

* developing a new commercial sheep milk market in the northern West Bank;
* commercialisation of the local and seedless grape sectors, including cold storage and the development of new products using thinnings and low-grade produce; and
* opening up the gherkin market with strong demand for pickling.

Currently the evidence used by AMENCA 3 for systemic change covers the major concepts of crowding in and copying. However, work from around the world appreciates that these two elements are only part of the story. In some value chains and smaller market spaces crowding in and copying are sometimes inappropriate as there is little scope for multiple players to do the same thing. In these cases, other measures are found to also reflect change. Whereas early partnerships in more robust markets typically demonstrate innovations aimed to encourage crowding in, the early partnerships in more conflicted markets usually enable a partner to fill a market gap. For example, an early partnership might provide an input or service that is not currently available to the market. Even though these early partnerships are not easily copied by others, they do demonstrate successful innovation in the sector. Multiple demonstrations of innovation, along with other measures, are generally required to generate sufficient confidence to encourage risk taking by other market actors. In addition, each partnership that fills a market gap increases the potential for broader market changes and lowers the barriers to others innovating (Miehlbradt, Warner, & Swete Kelly, 2018).

Aspects such as hope, business confidence, trustful market relationships, new market functions, independent innovation/investment, and group empowerment add more depth and learning to the quantitative indicators AMENCA 3 currently uses. Progress towards these changes also needs to be directly monitored and measured.

## Are NGO’s acting as effective market facilitators rather than market actors?

Another pertinent question is the degree to which the NGOs are ‘inserting’ themselves in the value chain as market actors that are difficult to replace or phase out. Based on the intervention logic presented and the interviews in-country it seems this is not usually a problem. However, the transition of NGOs from a direct delivery approach to a market facilitation approach has not always been smooth.

For example, a recent analysis highlighted the challenges faced by one local NGO, the Palestinian Livestock Development Centre (PLDC), when it changed to an MSD approach (El-Ahmed & Nabris, January 2019). PLDC’s decision to integrate MSD into their support to local communities provides critical lessons for any NGO considering a change in approach. The transition requires an NGO to become a market facilitator while avoiding becoming a market actor in any shape or form. The PLDC, however, integrated these two incompatible roles by becoming a shareholder in the very market it was helping to facilitate. The result was a conflict of interest that confused stakeholders, and undermined the intervention. The lessons learnt were many: for the transition to a market facilitation approach to work smoothly, an institutional paradigm-shift is necessary, including measures such as building the understanding and ownership of MSD by the board of directors and other stakeholders, and aligning the mission, vision, and core programmes of the NGO with the MSD approach through a revision of procedural systems and processes, as well as strategy.

Overall however, NGOs are now aware that they cannot replace market actors. For example, the use of supply contracts directly between suppliers and traders in the grape sector (underwritten and brokered by Oxfam, but without Oxfam being party to the agreement) demonstrates how the direct linkages are operating between farmer and trader. In addition, the case studies provided in Annex 2, unpack the way that AMENCA 3’s *uplift* and *reach* hybrid interventions marry to transform the way markets operate for the poor.

The MTR Team noted however, that there is quite a range in the competency and ownership of the MSD approach across the consortium partners. For the future it is important that NGOs undergo more consistent and structured MSD training, with guided support throughout from skilled personnel with knowledge and expertise in the MSD approach. AMENCA’s MSD adviser can provide or facilitate much of this guidance, but it is clear that ongoing inputs in particular areas are needed as AMENCA 3 evolves. The CARE, Oxfam and APHEDA consortiums have varying capacity. Where gaps exist NGOs should aim to either employ skilled MSD people or upgrade the skills of their specialist staff so that basic capacity is embedded full-time within each organisation.

While many AMENCA 3 NGOs have taken the opportunity to train staff, this needs to be supported in a more structured and consistent manner for both INGOs and their consortium partners.

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|  | 1. Structured MSD capacity development: The contractor for advisory services should be tasked to support further structured MSD skills development both directly, as well as through staff involvement in organised MSD training, drawing on skills within the INGO teams as well as external advisors and training programs as appropriate. This should concentrate on key management, Results Measurement and Inclusion issues. |

# Efficiency

There is a mixed picture regarding the operational resourcing of AMENCA 3. Clear opportunities exist to more efficiently use resources for cross program learning, governance and management.

## Have enough financial and human resources been allocated to enable AMENCA 3 to achieve its objectives?

AMENCA 3’s original design, contracting and implementation arrangements innovatively, but loosely combined:

* the evolving principles of MSD[[10]](#footnote-11);
* the flexibility for NGOs to also continue with direct delivery paradigms;
* contracts based on NGO ‘partnership’ principles; and
* the close integration of the Palestinian Authority in oversight.

These were then used to test a new way of working in one of the world’s most politically charged ‘development’ contexts. Hindsight shows that it was an ambitious undertaking and somewhat inevitably, AMENCA 3 got off to a slow start due to:

* the differing expectations of many stakeholders (particularly NGOs, advisers and Government),
* poor relations between some advisors and the teams;
* the unwieldy approvals process for interventions; and
* the suspension of World Vision.

These delays had knock on effects for the approval and delivery of projects and budget expenditure.

Operational efficiency became such a concern for AMENCA 3 that a *Rapid Management and Operations Review* was commissioned by DFAT in 2017 (Pilbrow & Forde, May 2017). This looked at internal systems and processes, current functions, the role of advisers, DFAT management, and program oversight. It recommended significant changes to AMENCA 3 systems, primarily focused on greater autonomy for the NGOs and a less authoritarian role for the advisers. There is little doubt that the Review’s findings have had generally positive impacts for AMENCA 3 and that the program has now settled considerably. The program has since caught up, and is delivering targets as intended. However, it is not surprising that around 20% of the budget predicted for the first three years will remain unspent as of June 2019.

In essence, the *Rapid Management Review* re-established within AMENCA 3 the primacy of the individual *Grant Agreements* signed with each INGO – agreements which are based on the partnership principles established within the *Australian NGO Cooperation Program* (ANCP) (DFAT, March 2019). However, in so doing, it de-emphasised some of the more loosely defined MSD principles, process and aspirations incorporated in the design. Importantly:

1. It saw the ‘hybrid’ approach as a pragmatic tool that allowed NGOs to choose between their traditional direct delivery paradigm and the MSD paradigm.
2. It disbanded or de-emphasised tools that were there to build team-based learning such as ‘intervention plans’ and ‘thematic working groups’.
3. It focused AMENCA 3’s M&E, six month and annual planning on ensuring accountability rather than driving internal learning.
4. It relegated much of the cross-program advice to a responsive role, rather than one focused on ensuring AMENCA 3’s overall strategic coherence.

In effect, this tended to return AMENCA 3 to the operating frameworks used in AMENCA 1 and AMENCa 2. Despite this, NGO stakeholders still enthusiastically progressed their understanding of the markets-based approach. Now that AMENCA 3 has developed its market momentum, it is a useful time to take stock and consider re-introducing some of the MSD processes aimed at building internal debate, dialogue and cross program learning. The MTR has already mentioned the need for more structured sector and intervention reviews and studies (Recommendations 1-7). In addition, some other operational issues also need attention.

### DFAT resourcing

AMENCA 3 is managed by DFAT using the limited resources of the Australian Representative Office (ARO) in Ramallah as well as the Middle East Development Section (MDS) in Canberra. DFAT resources in both remain limited. Unlike most other development programs, these offices need to dedicate a significant amount of DFAT staff time to administering and managing the development, political and anti-terrorism dimensions of the aid program. As such, DFAT has internalised much of the management load for AMENCA 3. The following snapshot outlines the range of issues that have consumed considerable management time over the last three years:

* the ongoing scrutiny applied to programs in the Palestinian Territories given the political, security and anti-terrorism context;
* oversight of security and logistical concerns across the program;
* management and resolution of uncertainties related to the role of advisers, and their relationship with NGO Consortiums during the first two years of AMENCA 3;
* emerging tensions with the Ministry of Agriculture regarding AMENCA 3 oversight and the related changes to the Steering Committee and formation of the AHLD;
* the suspension of two AMENCA 3 Consortiums and the management of associated review and legal processes; and
* the need to carefully harmonise the work of AMENCA with other donor interventions in the Palestinian Territories.

As can be seen considerable resources at the ARO and in Canberra are dedicated to risk mitigation, direction, management and oversight. Resource constraints were raised in the internal DFAT review of ARO program management in 2016 (DFAT, 2017), as well as the AMENCA 3 *Rapid Management Review* (Pilbrow & Forde, May 2017). Changes have occurred and some have had impact. Importantly the appointment of a full-time Program Coordinator, who is engaged through Cardno, has been seen by all stakeholders as a positive move. There may be scope to further marginally increase the use of the Technical Advisers (especially the Program Coordinator and the M&E Advisor) and also the use of internal DFAT advisers. However, the reality remains that a large proportion of desk-based and posted resources are still taken up with managing AMENCA 3 – this is the nature of the program.

## How are technical roles and advice best embedded within AMENCA 3?

The role of advisers was not clear at the commencement of AMENCA 3. This led to a disparate understanding of roles and responsibilities, and a breakdown in relationships, trust and cooperation during the program’s first two years. Inevitably, implementation and progress were impeded. This discord was, in fact, the principal reason behind the *Rapid Management and Operations Review* commissioned by DFAT in 2017 (Pilbrow & Forde, May 2017). The result of this review, and of ongoing dialogue, is that the roles and relationships have now been agreed, adjusted, and stabilised, with all stakeholders now considering that the program’s advisory positions are generally adding value. Currently, CARDNO provides a technical panel of four advisers for AMENCA 3 (Table 3).

Further refinement to the functioning of the advisory roles is, however, both possible and desirable. Both the program’s advisers and its other stakeholders recognise there are opportunities across AMENCA 3 to enhance the coherence and quality of these roles, to improve their efficiency and effectiveness, and to draw out important lessons including:

1. The need to further unpack the portfolio of advisory tasks in order to achieve a better definition of each adviser’s duties and time inputs. The M&E Adviser and the national Program Coordinator are engaged with coordination, management, reporting and the accountability requirements of DFAT. The MSD and Inclusion Advisers, on the other hand, are undertaking the more typical advisory roles associated with technical quality, and mentoring during implementation.
2. Because adviser specialties - MSD, M&E, and Inclusion - are not isolated but on a continuum, there is a need for careful coordination and cooperation across the advisory roles if a coherent vision is to be achieved. It seems, however, that at present there is little opportunity for this to effectively occur.
3. The advisers appear to have become more involved in the program’s detail which, while important, has tended to be at the expense of their important, more strategic roles in maintaining the common agreed principles.
4. There are important needs that the current advisory pool does not necessarily have the skills and experience to address. Examples include:
   1. The need for a deeper more unified understanding of the hybrid MSD approach, and a need to document the approach;
   2. The need for more frequent and structured sector and intervention reviews to drive learning, adaptation, and portfolio planning, both across the program and within the NGOs;
   3. The need for a much stronger focus on monitoring and results measurement (MRM) at the intervention, sector and program levels, in order to more clearly define benefit flow, adaptively manage the interventions, clarify attribution, explore externalities, and measure emerging elements of systemic change (further discussed in Section 8). This needs moreover to be integrated with the current high-level M&E system;
   4. The need for a deeper awareness of the rich and quickly evolving thinking on the critical issues of women’s economic empowerment, and gender and social inclusion. A particular understanding is needed of how best to plan, integrate, implement and measure these within an MSD program.
   5. The need for a more nuanced understanding of the poverty, exclusion, market access, culture and gender dynamic operating in the Palestinian Territories, and the difficult security and access issues. This requires a more tailored approach to advising than is currently the case.

If these challenges are to be resolved, it is probably better to address them by carefully balancing and enhancing the resources across AMENCA 3, rather than by simplistically expecting the program’s advisory services to address all needs. Options to consider include:

1. Retaining the M&E Adviser in their current role focused on high-level Program reporting. In this role the M&E Adviser will continue to amalgamate the annual program-level aggregate results report using the 23 indicators defined in the AMENCA 3 M&E Framework (AMENCA 3, Dec 2016)[[11]](#footnote-12);
2. Expanding the current TOR and time inputs of the MSD adviser so that cross-program MRM processes can be developed, and MRM supported within each NGO;
3. Sponsoring NGO M&E staff to attend specialist training in MSD and MRM principles at one of the many MRM training programs that are run each year (e.g. DFAT is supporting trainings such as <https://www.hposthumus.nl/upcoming-trainings>);
4. Strengthening the internal processes for sector and intervention level reviews within each NGO as well as across the program.
5. Revising support to gender and inclusion by:
   1. Appointing a local part-time GSI specialist to provide the program with general support. This position could perhaps be provided by one of the current NGOs;
   2. Revising the necessary skills of the international advisor position to include a much deeper, more current appreciation of the ways in which MSD programs can incorporate/ address WEE issues, as well as ways to more effectively collaborate with the local GSI adviser and the NGO gender teams.
6. More proactively using the flexible advisory fund. No one adviser ever has the tools to meet all of a program’s needs, and the flexible advisory pool needs to be much more creatively used to address the gaps. In other words, the core advisors need to recommend additional short-term support in areas where they do not have the necessary skills. This could include:
   1. introducing specific skills to address specific needs; and/ or
   2. undertaking specific surveys or case studies to draw out important results and delineate important lessons.

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|  | 1. Adapt advisor arrangements: DFAT should update contracted advisory arrangements to fill technical gaps, and support NGOs to improve integration and responsiveness: (a) retain a cross-program coordination and report-writing function (ideally a single person who could also negotiate flexible advisory services);  (b) localise the GESI advisor position and ensure they have sufficient poverty analysis skills; (c) add a fixed international Monitoring and Results Measurement (MRM) adviser to update consortia and AMENCA 3 M&E Frameworks to appropriately capture market systems results; and (d) introduce demand-driven flexible advisor services (contractor could use a panel arrangement) to complement these skills where necessary  To begin this adjustment, DFAT could task the advisory services contractor with proposing how it would go about this and other recommendations in this report. |

Revising the skills sets of advisors to better meet what is needed now that the program is approaching maturity, and using the pool of advisors fund to complement the existing capacity and to fill the gaps, would help to shape approaches to M&E, gender and social inclusion that better deliver on the program’s mandate, and that take it to the next level.

## Does AMENCA 3 represent good value for money?

One of the frustrations that the Ministry of Agriculture raised was their perception that AMENCA 3 funds were not being used to directly deliver goods and services to Palestinian farmers. The expectation that ‘hand-outs’ are an important ‘deliverable’ and that the percentage of budget spent in this way should be a prime measure of success, not only reflects the growing donor dependency in the Palestinian Territories, but also a weak grasp of the way in which an MSD program works.

MSD approaches depend on a strong investment in market mentoring, advice and analysis, but a very light touch, catalytic approach to co-investment. Direct delivery and hand-outs to communities or the private sector, is counterproductive as it simply undermines ownership and sustainability. Most MSD programs therefore spend upwards of 70% of their budget on the provision of highly skilled business advisors and inclusion professionals who work with partners to better plan, grow and expand their investments. Any direct investment by AMENCA 3 should only occur where there is commitment, ownership and co-investment from market stakeholders.

Many donors have found that pushing MSD programs to increase their expenditure has the unintended consequence of reducing the sustainability of the interventions (HELVITAS, May 2016). When AMENCA 3 was designed the budget allocated was in fact quite high when compared with similar MSD projects in similar sized economies. Part of this was due to the expectations already created by previous phases of AMENCA that used a direct delivery model. Part was also due to the understanding that the “hybrid’ MSD approach would invest in very specific areas that helped communities establish a better foundation to engage with markets (‘lift’). Even so, the designed budget of AUD40 million for a five-year program was definitely at the high end of the range. In reality, actual expenditure is well below this due largely to the suspension of program partners, but even so the lower expenditure should not be seen in any way as an indicator of poor performance.

The MTR considers that the current expenditure levels achieved are in fact, well aligned with expectations for MSD projects. As already discussed, the impacts being delivered, even at this early stage prove that the approach is on track to deliver excellent value for money.

## Does AMENCA 3’s governance remain valid or require changes?

### Engagement with the Palestinian Authority

Governance arrangements for AMENCA 3 have changed markedly. The program began with what could be considered an outsized role for the Palestinian Authority on the *Program Steering Committee* (PSC), given the size and nature of AMENCA 3. While this demonstrated a strong level of enthusiasm for Palestinian Authority engagement with AMENCA 3, directly engaging the Deputy Minister (assigned by the MoA) in a program that could not provide direct support to public administration functions, was an inefficient use of resources and led to an assumption that the program required high level Palestinian Authority oversight.

As with all MSD programs, government needs to be considered as an important market actor, capable of influencing the ground rules and settings that either facilitate or impede growth of relevant markets. They are one of many market actors that play a role, along with smallholders themselves, producer organisations, processors, input providers, buyers, traders, exporters and many others. MSD programs often struggle to find the right balance of these stakeholders to guide and advise the program so it can explore missed opportunities and find new solutions when faced with new market failures. As such, the outsized role for government was at odds not only with other DFAT MSD programs, but also quite different to governance of other donor MSD programs operating in the Palestinian Territories. As such, the initial program governance arrangements inadvertently created unrealistic expectations that the Palestinian Authority could materially direct INGO investments. This would have had disastrous consequences for a program that needs to be nimble, light touch and responsive to market signals from producers, input suppliers and traders.

In DFAT’s MSD experience, this program stands out by having very high-level government representation but no representatives from other market actors on the initial governing body. Drawing on the Rapid Management Review of May 2017, DFAT realised this was an initial error of design and changed direction, abolishing the PSC and replacing it with an *Annual High-Level Dialogue* (AHLD). Along with a number of other factors cited by the Deputy Minister (lack of transparency or influence over budgets, perceived inefficiency, suspension of NGOs), this step ultimately led to the suspension of engagement by the MoA in the program.

Palestinian Authority dis-engagement does create some impediments to AMENCA 3 success because the program cannot effectively work with the enabling environment rule-setter, nor with the provider of public extension, subsidies and support functions that influence smallholder market access. Implementing INGOs reinforced to the MTR team their desire for the situation to improve.

### Changing Governance roles

The review team agrees that the governing body needed to change, but it’s clear that DFAT:

1. should have noticed the anomaly in governance roles during the design stage;
2. managed the change process more effectively; and
3. should consider whether the now AHLD provides the right forum to guide the program.

The AHLD was held during the review mission and worked effectively as a mechanism which brings all implementing partners together to showcase existing activities. The review team concluded that the AHLD plays an important role in sharing good MSD practice in the Palestinian Territories, highlighting stories of change, creating a market ‘buzz’ that encourages further investment in domestic smallholder markets, and facilitating new networks between producer organisations, NGOs and the private sector. It does not however have an effective governance function, which limits the AHLD’s capacity to help the program progressively improve as a DFAT investment.

Other aspects related to program coordination/governance include the *Technical and Performance Advisory Group* (TPAG) meetings. These provide an effective forum for reviewing and improving technical progress and help boost strategic and operational cooperation among the implementing partners. However, legacy issues of competition and low trust between partners, and historically with Technical Advisors, is taking some time to improve to a functional and working relationship where strategic program decisions are made. The TPAG has limited capacity to improve coordination or deal with high level opportunities, threats or challenges.

What does DFAT need from AMENCA 3 governance arrangements?

* **Engagement:** a mechanism for engaging Palestinian Territory government, private sector and producer groups in the program.
* **Coordination:** a way to help the implementing INGOs to work together to generate better results.
* **Environment scanning:** consideration of emerging Palestinian Territory-wide opportunities, threats, challenges and risks that impact the program.
* **Efficiency:** how to streamline arrangements such as technical advice, reporting and communications.
* **Safeguards:** ensuring INGOs have appropriate arrangements in place.
* **Reporting:** comment on INGO and AMENCA 3 reports.
* **Planning:** comment on INGO workplans (note: budgets envelopes for each INGO are pre-determined by DFAT).

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|  | 1. AHLD Key Stakeholder Group: DFAT should adapt the AHLD format. DFAT should retain the conference and exposition format and add a formal half-day meeting of a select Key Stakeholder Group (comprised of appropriate representatives from DFAT, INGOs, the Palestinian Authority, local NGOs, the private sector and producer associations). |

The stakeholder group could include:

* DFAT (program manager level)
* Representatives of each of the implementing NGOs
* Representative from the Palestinian Authority (operational level)
* Producer group representative (with no conflict of interest, e.g. from a cooperative peak body)
* Representatives of the key categories of women and youth
* Private sector representative (with no conflict of interest, e.g. from a chamber of commerce or an agribusiness industry group)

### Cross-donor harmonisation

AMENCA 3 undertook extensive consultation with all agriculture donors in early 2018. This not only revealed a disturbing lack of understanding between donors but also an enthusiasm for a donor consultation group focused on Market Systems Development (Shamieh, February 2018). Currently minimal formal mechanisms for engagement and interaction between MSD donors (Australia, CIDA, SDC and DANIDA) exist. This study also identified other actors using complementary approaches, including the FAO which is leading three agriculture initiatives that aspire to a value chain approach, although the activity so far has been largely based on direct intervention and humanitarian assistance (FAO, August 2017). While groups such as the *Agriculture Sector Working Group* meet regularly, its mandate and membership are too broad, and its meetings are not necessarily effective.

There appears to be an opportunity for like-minded MSD donors to work together to engage in meaningful policy dialogue with the Palestinian Authority, to influence outcomes, and to harmonise donor efforts.

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|  | 1. Community of Practice: Australia could work with other donors to form or strengthen a Market Systems Development working group or sub-group to harmonise donor efforts and share good practice across the development community in the Palestinian Territories. |

## Communications and public diplomacy

AMENCA 3 has allowed each of the NGOs to badge their own projects. Hence there is reasonable brand recognition of CARE (Souqona), Oxfam (Takamol), and APHEDA (Ghalleh). In addition, NGOs promote their involvement as part of their own portfolio of activities in the Palestinian Territories. For example, Oxfam’s Takamol project is promoted as part of Oxfam’s broader Economic Justice Program. Often the support received from Australia receives little or no mention in the documentation (e.g. a recent article on vegetable packhouses (El-Ahmend & Nabris, January 2019)). This approach properly elevates the NGO contribution, but it downgrades the important contribution that Australian aid is making.

The issue of communications and public diplomacy for the AMENCA 3 program is somewhat complex. There are many important case studies within AMENCA 3, and its approach presents some important development lessons, but the contested political context of this program is perhaps unique across Australia’s development cooperation engagements. Therefore, a balanced approach that maintains a low public profile in Australia but elevates the program in the Palestinian Territories and promotes professional and development learning is seen as being very worthwhile.

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|  | 1. Improve communications arrangements: NGO partners should ensure they follow DFAT’s communications and branding policies and processes to ensure cross program lessons and outcomes are properly communicated and that Australia’s contribution is appropriately acknowledged. Any future contract amendment with the INGOs should include the provision of regular publishable social media or other communications content that exemplifies the strong results seen in the field. |

# Sustainability of results

Sustainability of AMENCA 3 is well thought through as part of the MSD approach. Time is needed to embed new market functions and increase the potential for AMENCA 3’s wider advocacy and influence.

## What is the level of sustainability in the current NGO projects?

There is good evidence that the issues surrounding the sustainability of AMENCA 3’s specific interventions and intervention areas have been well thought through. Market and community-based partners are now in place for most market functions, and the Consortium partners have (largely) refrained from inserting themselves as actors into their interventions.

AMENCA 3 has leveraged private sector investments, promoted new practices, and supported the organizational capacities of the service providers. By increasing the capabilities and satisfaction of the actors in these ways, it has enhanced their ability to continue beyond the term of the project’s support. It has also contributed to systemic change within markets, as well as to improvements in market coordination.

## How can AMENCA 3 strengthen the sustainability of the outcomes by the end of the NGO projects?

The program is, nevertheless, facing three external sustainability challenges that are much greater than is usually the case for a market program.

1. If DFAT decides to discontinue AMENCA 3 at the upcoming stop/go point then many interventions, partners and beneficiaries will suffer. While sustainability mechanisms are already in place for many of the interventions, the reality is that the systems, practices and capacity of the market players have not yet reached a stage where they are ready to assume independent management. Furthermore, in many cases partner co-investment has been predicated on a longer timeframe. The experience of the sudden suspension of APHEDA clearly demonstrated that withdrawal needs to be staged if the harm and exposure of beneficiaries and partners is to be reduced. DFAT has already indicated that some form of exit strategy would be needed if ongoing funding is curtailed. The MTR strongly supports this decision.
2. All the interventions of AMENCA 3 depend for their ongoing sustainability on stability, peace, and at least a modicum of regulated market behaviour. In the past, many Palestinian enterprises that have shown promise have struggled or entirely failed due to escalations in insecurity, or through the sudden imposition of antagonistic market practices, policies or regulations. Nevertheless, the strengthening of Palestinian markets in spite of such risks, not only brings immediate benefits to the businesses, the workers, and the broader communities, but also provides some buffer to the severe impacts of market collapse.
3. Lastly, the reengagement of the Ministry of Agriculture with AMENCA 3 would be beneficial to sustainability. If this occurred the most important impact could be for the Ministry itself. The Ministry’s current approach to agricultural support does not reflect emerging best practice given their inclination to intervene in markets through subsidies, handouts and other market-distorting behaviour. Re-engagement with AMENCA 3 would not only expose the Ministry to a new way of working, but could inspire strategic and policy change within the organisation. In addition, the field staff of the Ministry would be more familiar with the way in which AMENCA 3 works and more able to both support its interventions and ensure that neither the Ministry itself, nor its development partners, create market distortions by directly intervening in market functions.

Sustainability is a central tenant of a market facilitation approach and current AMENCA 3 interventions are clearly owned and run by its market stakeholders. As such, most interventions are progressing appropriately. However, changes are currently both seminal and early stage, and early termination of AMENCA 3’s mentoring and collaboration would mean many of the changes would flounder, with the negative impacts concentrated on small scale producers who have recently entered new market segments but have little resources to sustain shocks.

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|  | 1. Continue AMENCA 3: Consider extending support for AMENCA 3 for at least a further two years to embed current changes within markets and to reach impact at scale, noting that MSD programs typically implement for 5-10 years to reach sustainable results at scale. |

## Natural Resource Management

NGO partners must ensure all interventions and approaches are compliant with DFAT’s policies. All new activities will need to be designed and implemented in accordance with DFAT’s Environmental and Social Safeguards Policy (DFAT, March 2019). Partners must comply with the Palestinian Authority’s environmental regulations. The Key Stakeholder Group (or similar) need to regularly review cumulative environmental, health and safety impacts of AMENCA3 across interventions, particularly in relation to water, livestock medicines, fertiliser run-off and pesticides. Risks associated with climate change should also be considered. DFAT’s environmental safeguards team are able to provide further advice on managing environmental risks and safeguard policy compliance.

# Building the evidence base: monitoring and evaluation

Robust monitoring is in place at the Program and Project level and credible data does appear to be being generated. The MTR is confident that the projects know significantly more about the results the interventions are generating than is currently being reported. More of this needs to drive internal learning and adaptation.

Initial investigation by the MTR into the M&E systems used for reporting and learning within AMENCA 3 indicate that:

* Oxfam and CARE have a clear understanding of their own M&E systems. APHEDA’s M&E systems could not be assessed, due to the curtailing of its operations. However, its interventions are continuing to contribute to the overall program level results;
* there is a data validation process underway to ensure that the M&E processes are as described. In addition, spot-checks and triangulation are being used internally by the NGOs to ensure accuracy and independence;
* the M&E systems are collecting far more data and depth of data than has been made available in the AMENCA 3’s Annual report;
* the program level M&E system is primarily being used to inform aggregate development results rather than learning; and
* the program level M&E system seems not to be as tightly linked to the project-level results chains as one would expect.

From this we see that significant work has gone into delivering a coherent results framework at the program level together with a process of data validation at the project level. This has delivered credible data that ensures the project remains accountable for the targets originally set. However, AMENCA 3’s indicators are largely derived from DFAT’s *Aggregate Development Results* (AMENCA 3, Jan 2019). While this provides program owners and external stakeholders with confidence about the high-level impact and return on investment of AMENCA 3 (accountability), it provides very little data to help drive AMENCA 3 learning and adaptation.

This focus on high-level accountability has caused the NGOs to give much more emphasis to quantitative outcomes than necessary. Using high level quantitative indicators throughout can distort market selection and engagement by pushing NGOs to focus on interventions that deliver short-term quantitative impacts, and make it more difficult for programs to prioritise some of the more fundamental investments needed to establish critical market functions or to improve inclusion. For example, helping missing or fragile market functions to establish and work better can be an essential but longer-term contribution to market performance.

Hence, both accountability and learning are essential and must be carefully balanced in an MSD program. The MTR could clearly see that each of the projects know significantly more about the “quality” of results that the interventions are generating than is currently being reported. Given the emphasis that the current program level M&E and reporting system gives to accountability, there are numerous ‘hidden results’ in the program.

This process may also result in AMENCA 3 updating its high-level indicators to better reflect market and social outcomes, including differences in outcomes for men and women in communities. The number and type of indicators, as well as a review of the targets, would benefit from further rationalisation to ensure the right mix of indicators are being used to best reflect meaningful changes to market systems in addition to differentiated results for different stakeholders.

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|  | 1. Better capture results: Complement the current high-level aggregate results reporting with a deeper emphasis on monitoring and results measurement (MRM) including processes for formal review, reflection, learning and adaptation. AMENCA 3 should enhance the capacity and consistency with which MRM is used across the program. AMENCA 3’s current M&E Advisor should be complemented with enhanced inputs from an MRM specialist to help the projects and the program capture results pertaining to ‘indirect’ market systems impacts (such as copying and crowding), women’s economic empowerment and agency, civil society strengthening and – to the degree possible – systemic change. AMENCA 3 should revise its program level targets and indicators to better monitor and understand social outcomes, including differences in outcomes for men and women in communities. |

Without this perspective, there may be an incomplete understanding of the nature of market change, inclusion, attribution, and the underlying relationships. Overall more formal and cross program use of the principles and processes of MRM will improve stakeholder understanding of the significant changes occurring. Related to this, the MTR has also proposed some changes be made across AMENCA 3 including to the advisory services, internal NGO capacity, and the formal processes of reflection and review (see Section 9.2 and Recommendations 3, 5 and 6).

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|  | 1. Revise high level targets: Considering the high level of overperformance compared with initial targets, continuation for a further two years should be based on a collective revision of targets to reflect positive progress to date and provide appropriate performance incentives across AMENCA 3. This will require recommended updates from the MRM and Reporting/Coordination advisers which would then be workshopped with DFAT and Consortia and the AHLD Key Stakeholder Group. |

The ongoing M&E Working Group meetings were observed to be effective forums in which to ensure coherence between projects and sharing of information on key indicators and data of interest. There is strong appetite by NGOs to continue to learn, improve and adapt their M&E systems to strengthen reporting and how M&E can support an MSD approach.

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|  | 1. Impact evaluation: Consider undertaking a formal DFAT-funded independent impact evaluation to address under-reporting to date and to capture: a) indirect impacts not currently being considered by the reporting framework (e.g. from establishing missing market functions, crowding, copying and monopoly disruption); b) ongoing impacts from AMENCA 2 (e.g. seed banks, nurseries); c) cross-partner impacts across a sector (e.g. sheep dairy sector where multiple partners are contributing to transformation). |

# Economic and social inclusion

Inclusion in market systems is absolutely essential and requires a careful assessment of the drivers of poverty and exclusion. These drivers can relate to biases based on gender, age, ethnicity, isolation or disability. The usual approach is to conduct a household level analysis of exclusion and poverty and to then focus most effort on the major issues identified. Together, the AMENCA 3 investments are only partially meeting these expectations and those expressed in DFAT’s Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy and DFAT’s Disability Action Strategy 2017-2020.

## How effective are the NGO projects in improving the economic and social position of women and youth?

As mentioned, AMENCA 3 has met or exceeded all of the 2018 income targets for farmers and especially for women (Figure 7) and is on track to achieve its 2020 targets.

Figure 7: AMENCA 3 inclusion results (AMENCA 3, March 2019)

Women have notably benefitted from increasing income in the last year. CARE reports significant cost savings in input supply and production improvements such as the use of high protein rations, silage and the feeding of milk powder to kids and lambs. Women have benefitted from increased production and sales of a variety of pickling vegetables (APHEDA) and in the high value fruit, small ruminant and women focused small scale food processing value chains as promoted by Oxfam.

Over the life of the program the response of youth to interventions has increased significantly.In 2018 results show that an increasing number of youths were reporting income improvements – in fact AMENCA 3 has already exceeded its youth income target for 2019. Youth enjoyed particular income success from gherkin production (APHEDA and CARE), high value fruits (Oxfam), and in managing small ruminant herds (Oxfam and CARE). Youth are also becoming more engaged in the milk collection hubs encouraged by CARE.

Where AMENCA 3 has supported women’s businesses to develop, it has been encouraging to see communities, consumers and companies overcoming their traditional gender bias somewhat faster than anticipated. However, traditional prejudices are reportedly still slow to change - despite encouraging shifts in community acceptance of women and youth run businesses, there is clearly still significant progress to make in this area. The consortia are making headway in innovative ways in meeting these challenges, notably through demonstrations and peer communication.

Other promising initiatives include women taking significant roles in the establishment and leadership of cooperatives or CBOs (for example the Beit Fourik dairy hub). CARE notes that for one road intervention the local authority has strongly encouraged local landowners to provide lenient land rental terms for any enterprises run by women and youth. APHEDA prior to their suspension had also undertaken a women’s land inheritance intervention which sought to raise awareness of inheritance rights and legal processes for women to inherit their family lands. [[12]](#footnote-13).

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| **Empowering Women to Act in the Value Chain**  The challenge that faced the Souqona team (and female farmers) in Beit Fourik was to make sure that the inclusive business model was designed to put women at the core of the intervention in a way that corresponded to the complicated multi-level combination of socio-economic constraints that face women in Palestine (West Bank). The team used human centred design tools and made sure that selected activities were layered according to each stage of the value chain and that used economic empowerment as the main entry point to catalyse social change on different levels.  Coupled with technical trainings on animal husbandry and business management (for women who run the milk collection hub unit), the project provided agency training sessions for women focusing on life skills, aspirations and dealing with other actors. Part of these capacity building activities promoted women’s role in modelling and profiling successful women playing non-traditional roles in the value chain as aggregators, dealers and not only as workers at the early stages of the value chain. The training was not done in isolation of the community. It considered potential back lash from male members and made sure that they were engaged in parallel activities (community awareness raising sessions on women’s right, roles, and access). They were also consulted in the design of the agency capacity building sessions for women, the selection of the topics, and even the methodology of delivery. Getting males and mothers-in-law buy in facilitated women’s access to these sessions that had previously been considered as taboo in conservative communities (like Beit Fourik).  Figure 8: Changing women’s lives in Beit Fourik |

While these are promising examples, assessment of a number of intervention strategies highlighted that AMENCA 3 could be more consistent in challenging gender related barriers despite the often-central focus on women in the design of the program. In addition, it was observed that some activities including women are in fact peripheral to the main value chain and market interventions, for example the female led cooperative bakehouse in Hebron. While specific gender focused activities are part of an effective approach to the promotion of gender equality, there is still scope for the program to strengthen its focus on gender in its mainstream activities.

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| **Challenging Social Norms and Realising Transformational Shifts in Women’s Rights and Roles**  AMENCA3 has been challenging social norms and shifting gender dynamics. Traditionally in conservative families in some areas where the program operates, it is the mother in law’s role to supervise other women in the family and can be considered a “crime” for the women and girls of the family to “go out” unaccompanied.  Within this environment a number of women have never had a chance to go out of the house – to the doctor for example - without having a companion. One such woman became an animator for the Souqona project and believes that whilst she is not rebellious she was simply courageous enough to claim her right to go out. Her husband initially refused this idea on the grounds that it would mean leaving their son and the household chores unfinished. Using the negotiation skills she had learned in a CARE training session on communication and negotiation, she convinced her husband to give her one month to trial being an animator and demonstrate that she could still meet her family responsibilities.  As an animator she communicates with female farmers and supports and encourages their attendance at workshops on barn management, before and after birth related work, newborn care, cleaning, milking, watering, and home-based milk processing.  This has transformed this woman’s life – both within the community and within her home. Her relationship with her mother in law has changed as the family has come to realise the impact and influence she has in their community. Her mother in law takes an active interest in her participation, asks when her meetings with CARE are, and tells her to “pay attention” during these meetings. Her son now drives her to work, helps around the house and prepares meals for her upon her return home from work.  Added to this she has also proved her value within the community and overcame significant social barriers also related to the fact she wears a full-face veil. Initially this was problematic in the community and this animator recounted that people did not want to deal with her because of her face being veiled/obscured. However, CARE increased her confidence and provided her with the tools to engage with the community and now she is famous in town with many people asking for her assistance, asking CARE to “bring the girl with the face veil”. The challenge for women to prove themselves in the community is very important and this animator wants to be an exemplar model to enable and challenge other women.  Figure 9: Gender transformative results in Beit Fourik milk collection hub |

On CARE’s part their organisational commitment to gender transformative approaches has resulted in clear evidence of a strategic and targeted approach to inclusion of gender and youth in their market interventions underpinned by sound analysis. CARE’s support, particularly in the dairy value chain and animator program, extends beyond economic empowerment issues, addressing gender norms and issues of gender inequality creating powerful impacts. The evidence presented at the AHLD in March demonstrated a clearly targeted and inclusive approach to assessing the status quo along the value chains of interest and identifying opportunities to enhance and introduce women into meaningful roles, prior to developing their intervention strategies. Outcomes and reported backlashes against men and women are being carefully monitored by CARE staff enabling the right support and adaptation of programming as appropriate in relation to issues of safety and business viability. A clear example of this is where the female led cooperative dairy hub in Beit Fourik was experiencing direct opposition by male cooperatives in the area. CARE continued to support the cooperative through market linkages to ensure their ongoing survival and acceptance in the community. Following this sustained support, the cooperative is now well accepted by the community and provides advice to male (and female) farmers in the area.

The selection of some value chains that can disproportionately benefit women farmers is a promising strategy that should be pursued further. Such interventions have enabled women to demonstrate they can perform effectively as market actors in the cash economy despite inter-generational preconceptions. Much transformation is taking place, but again is relatively poorly conveyed in program reporting. It should be remembered, that AMENCA 3 is focused on economic empowerment as one (critical) aspect of a broader effort to achieve gender equity and equality.

With Oxfam, however, there has been a lack of detailed market level analysis of these exclusion issues, in addition to analysis of specific agendas such as gender-based violence (GBV) and disability. This has resulted in a lack of identification of risks together with approaches to appropriately address these in market interventions. Oxfam are working currently to address these gaps, for example, they are currently in discussions and formulating a relationship with a Disabled Persons Organisation (DPO) and exploring what future market opportunities look like.

### Poverty and economic exclusion

The MTR also raised questions as to whether or not AMENCA 3 was in fact reaching the poor under its ambit to alleviate poverty. A core objective of market-based development approaches is to increase productivity and trade, and, ultimately, economic returns for small producers and businesses (Norell, 2012). However, the MTR Team observed that in AMENCA 3’s interventions did not have a clear idea of the poverty impact of the program and was not disaggregating direct impact by poverty levels.

Adapting MSD models to engage smallholder farmers in market-based development requires an understanding of the specific characteristics of this target group. Most of the world’s poor—over one billion people—are ‘necessity entrepreneurs’: microbusiness owners who engage in marginal and temporary economic activity, usually for survival (Brewer, 2014). They have low levels of access to capital, skills and technology, and their microbusiness strategies usually consist of maximising income security by smoothing consumption and diversifying activities. Because they are embedded in family and kinship networks, necessity entrepreneurs often have an obligation to share rather than accumulate wealth, and can become trapped in ‘communities of the poor’ (Berner, 2012). For these reasons, necessity entrepreneurs face limitations to their inclusion in MSD initiatives, and require targeted strategies for engagement that reflect their unique circumstances. It was unclear from the analysis underpinning the intervention strategies and the results as reported whether or not AMENCA 3 is benefitting the poor and what the exact strategies for engaging this group are – it appeared that some interventions are successfully reaching small holders, however, that many other interventions are falling short.

As such, additional poverty, gender and inclusion analysis is needed so that AMENCA 3 can more explicitly support interventions that value equitable social and economic change through market system development (such is the intention of its Gender and Inclusion Strategy). Poverty, gender and inclusion analysis as part of the market sector review will support AMENCA 3 to more effectively:

* identify what gender, inclusion and poverty patterns shape the success of the market;
* identify where to intervene to affect systematic market changes that address poverty, gender equality or inclusion;
* determine how specific interventions can be directed toward creating outcomes that improve the lives of women and youth;
* ensure women and youth have access to appropriate capital and other support; and
* work with companies to inspire and improve their gender and inclusion practices by demonstrating win/win benefits.

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|  | 1. Consistent poverty and gender analysis to inform interventions: Enhance GESI advisory skills to work with the INGO partners to undertake a rigorous poverty and gender analysis for all existing and future interventions, to ensure that at least 50% of beneficiaries in each intervention are poor and/or small-scale producers and that gender norms and risks are explicit and visible in market studies and the design of interventions. Gender analysis should be more holistic and focus on identifying and valuing gender patterns within the market in addition to counting women’s participation. |

To address this gap, agencies such as BEAM Exchange[[13]](#footnote-14) have published resources to assist implementing agencies to identify the unique barriers faced by the poor (especially women and youth), and better equip them to design and implement MSD programs that reflect the constraints faced. These resources demonstrate the potential to adapt MSD approaches to include marginalised groups and poor producers in profitable value chains - approaches which AMENCA 3 could benefit exploring and/or adopting going forward.

## What are the factors that contribute to and / or hinder successful approaches?

### Design matters

One of the key components of AMENCA 3 and the hybrid MSD model is its ability to empower people, especially farmers and SMEs. Within this concept lies an explicitly strong commitment to youth, gender equality and women’s empowerment and an opportunity to alleviate poverty for women who are at a disadvantage in the domestic, regional and global trade market due to attitudinal and structural barriers that impact on their ability to benefit from trade. However, how this is prosecuted by the various consortia reflects their own understanding and application of good practice approaches to inclusion in addition to their internal resourcing capacity.

There does not appear to be a robust gender analysis underpinning the original design of the AMENCA 3 program to understand the explicit linkages between the context and how the central focus on women and youth in the program design came about. A clear gender analysis in the design document could have provided some ongoing guidance for the consortia on the expectations on how to execute an inclusive MSD program. Nevertheless, the program has developed relevant strategies to interpret and guide the work going forward which are sufficiently robust.

To date, gender analysis has not been systematically included prior to developing the intervention strategies, and so there is limited evidence to fully understand how AMENCA 3 is impacting on women and girls in comparison to men and boys *consistently* across all of the projects and activities.

In those cases where gender analysis has been included, there’s a strong focus on counting women and their participation in the value chain with less analysis of broader gender roles and patterns related to the market.

Both the selection criteria for the value chain and the results chains reinforce a focus on gender as the number of women, rather than gender as integral to understanding market systems. Yet when done holistically, gender analysis helps to identify power dynamics and inequities. NGO partners can then seek to change how support is structured or how relationships such as cooperative groups are organized in order to shift power dynamics. This could mean introducing a different institutional partner or exploring a different financial instrument or shifting the terms named within the financial documents and contracts (such as contracts with dairy farmers) to create more equitable terms and documents.

Of those projects and intervention strategies where gender analysis has been undertaken, several have shown that AMENCA 3 does bring positive benefits to women, for example by increasing their economic opportunities, including production of export crops; by enhancing their participation in cooperatives and CBOs; and by investing in infrastructure and hardware projects at the community level such as milk.

The AMENCA 3 social inclusion strategy is reasonably strong and provides a guide to ensure youth inclusion, gender equality and women’s empowerment are systematically addressed in AMENCA 3 interventions. Its approach seeks to tackle unequal power relations in order to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment and is guided by the AMENCA 3 Theory of Change: that farming communities participate more effectively in markets. However, in the absence of more gender analysis the AMENCA 3 Gender Strategy, has not yet translated fully in implementation.

Issues of inclusion must always be addressed if market systems are to function fairly and effectively. Gender should be viewed holistically and could seek to draw on approaches being implemented by other DFAT Programs such as MDF and Pacific RISE and their gender lens investing approach.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | 1. Address exclusion: New GESI adviser to work with NGOs to conduct consistent and careful assessments of who is being excluded from markets because of gender, age, ethnicity, disability, or cultural reasons by undertaking household level analysis, followed by a focus of efforts on removing barriers and finding ways of fostering culturally sensitive ways for more inclusive and equitable markets. Monitoring should also consider how gender norms and patterns are a risk to effective value chain and market effectiveness. |

A number of changes could be made to improve inclusive performance of the program, including:

* systematic consideration of the degree to which smallholders, women and youth are benefiting sufficiently from sector growth; and
* more holistic gender analysis including an assessment of the way gender patterns and norms impact on value chain/market performance.

International research also highlights the unmet potential to draw on female consumers to promote gender equality in AMENCA 3 communities. Women as consumers tend to be more aware and active in shopping, and therefore play an important role in advancing the sustainability and buy-local agenda. Compared to men, women are more likely to be buyers of local products, and woman-to-woman connections could add a competitive advantage to AMENCA 3’s positioning in the domestic market.

Disability inclusion has not been directly explored as part of this review, a point that highlights the lack of attention to it within programming and management overall. There is scope to pay more attention to it overall as part of a strengthened approach to inclusion and exclusion overall within the program.

### Resourcing and requisite expertise

Cardno provides a social inclusion technical advisor who works with the NGO project staff to provide guidance across the AMENCA 3 program to operationalise the policies and strategies in each intervention, recognising that each intervention strategy needs to develop context specific approaches. This support is not as effective as it could have been given the turnover of advisors and the skill sets of advisors that have been supporting the program. The social inclusion has not previously worked on MSD programs and therefore do not bring the combined experience necessary to elevate and challenge the NGOs sufficiently to extend and expand their approaches.

The NGOs have also been building their resources to address gender on the ground. CARE works closely with their Regional Gender Advisor, while Oxfam has just lost their full-time staff member (to CARE). The resourcing capacity within APHEDA prior to their suspension is unclear.

### Program reporting and demand for information

Greater attention to M&E at the program level is particularly important for gender. If there is no sustained attention at this level, particularly from a qualitative perspective, there may be an incomplete understanding of the nature of the barriers and their underlying causes. There may also be an incomplete understanding of the risks that gender norms and patterns pose to value chain and market system development effectiveness. There will be an ongoing inability to report confidently on gains made, and to capture unintended consequences so that stakeholders are aware if the work being done is not creating harm. Increased technical support for Oxfam and at the program level would be well placed to analyse and learn from what is working and where opportunities and risks lie.

Inclusion data is collected through the project partner’s M&E systems from the household level up and data is then reported in the Annual AMENCA 3 Report. In discussions at the M&E Working Group Meeting in March it became apparent that a significant amount of granular information is being collected by CARE and Oxfam at the household level that is not currently being reported up at the program level.

The program does not report formally on instances of gender-based violence (GBV) to DFAT. There is an absence of monitoring and/or evaluation of violence at the program level that warrants attention. CARE does, however, monitor regularly for community ‘backlash’ both against women and men as a result of their participation in various project related activities. This information is not currently required to be reported up to the program level and is a missed opportunity to ensure that all activities are following a ‘do no harm’ approach.

## The Australian definition of youth

Overall the Australian definition of youth (16-24 years) is not helpful in the Palestinian context given the social and cultural mores.The restriction has locked youth interventions into peripheral activities such as vocational training for university students. Expanding the definition to include men and women up to 30 years of age (or even 35 years as is the case with Australian government funded programs in Myanmar) would enable AMENCA 3 to apply its core skills (agricultural market linkages) to young Palestinians, a critical group for future economic development.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | 1. Adjust definition of youth: DFAT ARO revise the definition of youth to increase the upper age limit to 30 years to enable AMENCA 3 to apply its core skills (agricultural market linkages) to young Palestinians appropriately given the social and cultural context. |

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# Annex 2: Case studies

## Case Study 1: Sheep dairy sector in northern West Bank (CARE, Tubas/Nablus)

Small-scale herders, particularly women, extracting too little value from their primary assets: milking sheep and goats, due to:

| Problem: | Barriers | Inputs | Outputs | Solution |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scattered production | no mechanism for aggregating produce to achieve scale and build market value | + CBO transformation into service-provider  (LIFT) | = increased social capital and mobility through effective CBO aggregation mechanism | Aggregation through CBO |
| Remoteness and immobility | no mobility or options to sell outside of traditional traders | + women’s agency training  + training in milk testing and hub operation  (LIFT) | = women access new higher-skilled work at the collection hub | Empowerment and agency |
| Weak infrastructure | inability to chill, test and store milk | + household milk storage vessels  + milk collection hub infrastructure  (LIFT) | = herders can store milk; testing facility provides mechanism for quality feedback loop | Dairy collection centre |
| Low productivity & seasonality | traditional husbandry practices reducing productivity; no milk during lambing | + training and access to inputs for improved lamb and ewe feeding practices  (LIFT + REACH) | = income increases and labour decreases | Improved knowledge and access to quality inputs |
| Lack of value chain options | no market for non-cheese dairy products; no choice but to make cheese daily | + introduce raw milk sector  (REACH) | = can sell milk raw or process into cheese according to price signal | New accessible market segment |
| Lack of interest from commercial sector | no offers for purchase outside of traditional traders | + propose opportunity to cow dairy company interested in exploring sheep dairy  (REACH) | = dairy company starts purchasing raw milk and retailing new products; 5 more companies copy | Introduction of new traders and products |
| Monopolistic behaviour | traders exploiting the lack of options or scale or mobility: offering very low price | + introduction of new commercial actors  (REACH) | = pressure on traditional traders to increase prices to secure supply | Stranglehold releasing |
| Low income | income limited to NIS12/kg cheese (equiv. ~4l raw milk) | + ability to sell raw milk; new markets also available for cheese  (REACH) | = extract greater value for the fresh milk than for traditional cheese sales | Higher income (~NIS4/l milk) |

The hybrid model has proven capable of creating several transformations simultaneously that can quite rapidly build the scaffolding of pro-poor and pro-women systemic change in the sheep dairy value chain, through a combination of ‘lift up’ (more direct forms of support for the poor) and ‘reach down’ (indirect benefits flowing to the poor through the private sector) interventions. The simultaneous application of these two types of intervention is probably crucial to success in this instance.

If the private sector dairy company was simply induced to consider buying sheep milk from smallholders without the direct ‘lift up’ support, they would have found the low level of productivity and the lack of aggregation, testing and cold storage of milk to be extremely difficult barriers to overcome, and would likely have given up quickly. The result would have been that the commercial sector would reaffirm its belief that the sheep dairy sector should remain artisanal, non-commercial and seasonal, locking thousands of smallholders out of a decent income. Of course if the dairy company had enough resources, enough blind faith, strong logistics and an dynamic workforce, they could find and fund solutions to all of these problems (one dairy company in the south of West Bank has proven this is possible), but that had never so far happened in the northern part of West Bank and was unlikely to emerge spontaneously.

It is highly likely that the combination of simultaneous interventions – that stimulate improved production, create pro-poor aggregation mechanisms, ensure that women can benefit and negotiate the changes with their husbands, put in place the infrastructure that enable traders to consider new products in the value chain – has been entirely necessary to get this new pro-poor market segment off the ground. It has also been completely necessary to intervene directly to ensure that women gain and retain a favourable place in the value chain as it expands – testimonies from women attested to the pressure they are able to collectively resist to let men control the dairy hubs and new value chain opportunities.

There is ample room to scale up primary production and facilities are currently too small scale to accommodate the supply and demand. It remains to be seen whether the investment to scale up will become available, whether the quality will remain consistent at higher volumes, and whether domestic demand will be met through other models that do not prioritise women farmers.

Below is a schematic illustrating the simultaneous interventions undertaken to facilitate the emergence of a new market segment. It’s clear that the interventions have not yet had time to demonstrate long-term sustainability, and further interventions will likely be necessary to maintain and expand the market for sheep dairy products. But the fact that five additional domestically focussed commercial dairy companies have already crowded in to purchase sheep raw milk from producers indicates that the demand for quality sheep milk is strong.

## Case Study 2: Local grape grading and marketing (Oxfam, Halhul/Hebron)

| Problem: | Barriers | Inputs | Outputs | Solution |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Low productivity | traditional viticulture practices reducing productivity | + GAP training and demo plots for grape production practices  (LIFT) | = income increases and labour decreases | Improved knowledge and practices |
| Few options for women grape farmers | Women involved in labour but not engaged in commercial market | + train women in grading, packaging and processing into value-added products  (LIFT) | = new income opportunities for women | New pro-women market segments |
| Poor handling and processing | No cold storage or grading; grapes harvested and packed in boxes and sold same day | + grape packing house rented as proof of concept  + consortium establish purpose built packing house  (LIFT & REACH) | = Cold storage, grading, packing and processing become available for local grape market | Cold storage and packing house |
| Mistrust between traders and farmers | Traders don’t expect improved quality/quantity; farmers don’t trust good prices will result from their efforts | + brokered and guaranteed supply contracts between traders and producers  + engaged both in plans to establish packing house  (REACH) | = transparent arrangements for payment on objective quality  = improved predictability for farmers and traders | Transparent supply contracts |
| Lack of coordination in VC | farmers compete for low prices in glut season | + bring stakeholders (farmers, coops, chamber of commerce, traders, investors) together to market collectively  (REACH) | = establishment of coordination mechanism for marketing company | Multi-stakeholder cooperation in marketing |
| Unfair competition | Surplus Israeli produce delivered into the Palestinian Territories with no labelling differentiation | + branding, packaging and marketing specifically for local grapes  (REACH) | = quality Palestinian Territory grapes marketed effectively with product differentiation | Product differentiation |
| Lack of value chain options | no market outside short season fresh grapes | + introduce cold storage  + trial processing low-grade grapes for juice, vinegar, sumac  (REACH) | = can sell premium grapes at premium price and low-grade grapes at market price | New accessible market segments |
| Lack of interest from commercial sector | no buyers outside of traditional local markets | + establish marketing company focussed on local grapes  + trial shipments to export destinations  (REACH) | = company starts purchasing local grapes at market or above-market rates; processing for seconds  = successful market creation if allowed to continue exporting | Introduction of new traders, export pathways and products |
| Price gouging behaviour | traders exploiting the glut in supply, rapid spoiling and lack of objective grading: offering very low price | + establishment of new commercial consortium  (REACH) | = pressure on traditional traders to increase prices to secure supply | Stranglehold releasing |
| Low income | income limited to ~NIS3/kg in ‘glut’ season | + ability to sell grapes at premium rate for off-season sales; new markets also available for processed seconds  (REACH) | = extract greater value for the premium grapes and same value for low-grade grapes | Higher income (+NIS1.2/kg premium on good quality grapes) |

Due to the lack of established commercial players and poor coordination in the local grape market, Oxfam took the innovative step of bringing together a range of stakeholders (farmers, cooperatives, chamber of commerce, traders and investors) to establish a new marketing company. The local grape sector was an ideal candidate for development because of large production levels and demand, but short seasons and no value adding. This initiative exploits the pre-competitive market space where shared interests of producers, buyers and processors outweigh antagonism, and brings the players together to improve quality and pricing, reduce losses and extend season length. The skill of the NGO in building trust and cooperation amongst very diverse actors is evident in the decision of the stakeholders to invest in a bespoke cold storage, grading and packing facility. Imperative to building this trust was to demonstrate the potential by renting a facility, training graders and packers, developing branding and packaging material and improving the production practices of farmers. The proof of concept has been sufficient to see building work commence on the new facility, which indicates the stakeholders are sufficiently convinced of the value of collaborating and scaling up to invest their own finances.

This is a very promising start that shows strong signs of traction. It still remains to be seen whether the consortium will remain stable over time and whether the market power of small-scale producers will be retained once farmers are making their own contracting arrangements without NGO assistance. Also, while we know that grape-based sumac is now for sale on the market, we have no visibility of the benefits flowing to women in the processing sector. Finally, there appears to be insufficient consideration of the potential for copying and crowding; the new facility is an impressive step forward but will only cater for a small proportion of the grapes potentially available for improved production, harvesting, transport, grading, storage and processing if the sector takes off.

# Annex 3: AMENCA 3 aggregated program level results (AMENCA 3, March 2019)

Green shading reflects achievements that have already exceeded the targets set for 2018 (light green), 2019 (mid green), and 2020 (dark green), while red reflects results that remain below the 2018 targets.

| **Indicator**  *[as established by DFAT and consortia in November 2017; may differ from original program targets]* | **Cumulative Results for 2018** | **Agreed Cumulative Target for 2018** | **% achievement of cumulative target for 2018** | **Agreed End of Program Target for 2020** | **% achievement to date against 2020 target** | **Result** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| At least 40,000 farmers report increased income from AMENCA 3 interventions | 22762 | 13785 | 165.12 | 41921 | 54.30 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| * Of which 15,000 are women | 7132 | 4000 | 178.30 | 12914 | 55.23 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| * Of which 5,000 are youth | 6602 | 2951 | 223.72 | 10164 | 64.95 | Exceeded 2019 target |
| $80 million of additional agricultural production is generated from AMENCA 3 interventions (USD million equivalent to AUD115million) | 11.5 | 14.26 | 80.65 | 60.39 | 19.04 | Not met 2018 target |
| 50 km of feeder roads rehabilitated (km) | 35.3 | 39 | 90.51 | 56 | 63.04 | Not met 2018 target |
| Area of farmland with enhanced access as a result of roads rehabilitated through AMENCA 3 (in dunums) | 20885 | 10750 | 194.28 | 16250 | 128.52 | Exceeded 2020 target |
| Number of farmers with improved access to agricultural infrastructure, services and information as a result of rehabilitated roads | 5476 | 4450 | 123.06 | 7610 | 71.96 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| 15,000 farmers have access to improved water management systems | 4141 | 3620 | 114.39 | 10750 | 38.52 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| Increase in area of irrigated land as a result of AMENCA 3 water management interventions reported by farmers | 4802 | 4452.7 | 107.84 | 15404 | 31.17 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| ***[APHEDA only]*** *Increase in volume of water (cubic m) or days of irrigation as a result of AMENCA 3 water management interventions* | *100020* | *394200* | *25.37* | *788400* | *12.69* | *Not met 2018 target* |
| Number of farmers reporting that improved water management systems still functional | 3186 | 2492 | 127.85 | 7898 | 40.34 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| 12,000 farmers adopt innovative agricultural practices | 8757 | 3925 | 223.11 | 11825 | 74.05 | Exceeded 2019 target |
| $15 million of private sector investment leveraged (AUD million) | 14.82 | 5.79 | 255.96 | 17.53 | 84.54 | Exceeded 2019 target |
| $75 million of additional domestic sales facilitated (AUD million) | 17.05 | 12.89 | 132.27 | 69.93 | 24.38 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| $25 million of additional exports facilitated, including new exports (AUD million) | 8.41 | 9.35 | 89.95 | 35.9 | 23.43 | Not met 2018 target |
| Number of participating farmers reporting that some of their produce is being exported | 931 | 714 | 130.39 | 2074 | 44.89 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| At least 6 agricultural value chains functioning better as a result of AMENCA 3 interventions | 8 | 4 | 133.33 | 6 | 133.33 | Exceeded 2020 target |
| 70% of the interventions developed include new opportunities for women and youth (%) | 82.33 | 70 | 117.61 | 70 | 117.61 | Exceeded 2020 target |
| Number of women reporting greater mobility within agricultural value chains | 5542 | 3200 | 173.19 | 9740 | 56.90 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| Women and youth able to report examples of economic empowerment |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| * 8,000 women | 4675 | 2744 | 170.37 | 8875 | 52.68 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| * 3,000 youth | 3510 | 1125 | 312.00 | 3500 | 100.29 | Exceeded 2020 target |
| Percentage of households that report joint decision-making involving women and/or youth (%) | 39.33 | 47 | 83.68 | 47 | 83.68 | Not met 2018 target |
| Women and youth reporting more active or equitable roles in agricultural value chains as a result of AMENCA 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| * 400 women | 3837 | 2700 | 142.11 | 7395 | 51.89 | Exceeded 2018 target |
| * 750 youth | 2454 | 444 | 552.70 | 1528 | 160.60 | Exceeded 2020 target |

# Annex 4: Evaluation framework

| Evaluation Question | Sub-questions | Assessment Criteria | Assessment Process | Data Collection Requirements | Data Sources |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. RELEVANCE: Does the program logic, approach and governance of AMENCA 3 remain valid or require changes? | 1. Did AMENCA 3 align at implementation and does it still **align with DFAT’s aid policy** and its Palestinian Territories Aid Investment Plan? 2. Did AMENCA 3 align at implementation and does it still **align with the Palestinian Authority’s (PA)** objectives, and does the Palestinian Authority still value it? 3. Has the **‘hybrid MSD’ approach been the most relevant** way to maximise connecting Palestinian farmers to markets including by promoting economic empowerment for women and youth in the Palestinian Territories, and is it still the most relevant way? 4. Have the **value chains and locations** actioned during AMENCA 3 been the most relevant interventions, and based on a solid evidence base? 5. **Has anything changed** to affect the relevance of this investment? Are the assumptions underpinning the AMENCA 3 Investment Design Framework and M&E Framework still relevant? | C3. The intervention model (i.e. hybrid MSD model) used by AMENCA 3 is credibly able to achieve the objectives (for example, has the selection of value chains been appropriate and does it remain appropriate moving forward) and have partners implemented the hybrid model as intended and/or made any adaptations or innovations that have impacted AMENCA 3.  C9. The program is learning during implementation, and has an adequate MEL system working to support this  (Plus, analysis from Question 2 below) | C3. Assess the feasibility of the intervention model achieving AMENCA 3’s objectives based on evidence to date, a literature review regarding credibility of the model, and feedback from program staff and participants.  C9. Review annual plans, performance reporting and interview notes for evidence of learning and improvement. Review the quality of the MEL framework against DFAT’s M&E Standards.  (Plus, analysis against Question 2 below) | * Literature scan needs to review the evidence underpinning the ‘hybrid MSD’ intervention model, and its success in achieving intended outcomes * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT Stakeholders need to seek additional information about the intervention model, the evidence base underpinning the model, adaptation to the Palestinian Territory context, and possible improvements * Interviews with program participants need to seek their views about the effectiveness of the intervention model and possible improvements | * Desk Review * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders * Interviews with Participants * Literature scan |
| 1. EFFECTIVENESS: What results has AMENCA 3 achieved to date? Do these achievements indicate the Program is on track to realise its objectives? | 1. Are DFAT and its implementing partners **strategically focused** to meet the objectives outlined in the AMENCA 3 Investment Design Framework and the M&E Framework? Do DFAT and its implementing partners have a clear sense of the strategic vision and the methodology determined to achieve it? 2. Were the original and revised outcomes for the program realistic and achievable? Will they be achieved? Have M&E arrangements been sufficient to capture progress? 3. Are the approaches to **economic empowerment for women and youth** operationalised across the program in the most effective way to achieve the program’s objectives? 4. Have implementing partners sought the **technical assistance** available through the program’s advisors when required, and was that assistance useful? | C1. The Results Reported by AMENCA 3 are consistent with its results framework and are considered to be sustainable  C2. The evidence underpinning results reporting is of sound-to-high quality  C3. The intervention model (i.e. hybrid MSD model) used by AMENCA 3 is credibly able to achieve the objectives (for example, has the selection of value chains been appropriate and does it remain appropriate moving forward) and have partners implemented the hybrid model as intended and/or made any adaptations or innovations that have impacted AMENCA 3. | C1. Collate all results reported by AMENCA 3, both in formal reporting and through primary data collection, and map these against program logic model.  C2. Assess the evidence base for these results, and assign each results area with a ‘confidence rating’ based on the quality of evidence  C3. Assess the feasibility of the intervention model achieving AMENCA 3’s objectives based on evidence to date, a literature review of the model, and feedback from program staff and participants. | * Literature scan needs to review the evidence underpinning the intervention model, and its success in achieving intended outcomes * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders need to seek information about program results, quality of evidence, and progress against objectives * Interviews with program participants need to seek their views on the results of participation in program activities, the value of the program / intervention model | * Desk Review * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders * Interviews with Participants * Literature scan |
| 1. EFFICIENCY: Have sufficient financial and human resources been allocated to enable AMENCA 3 to achieve its objectives? | 1. Does this activity represent Value-for-Money (refer to DFAT’s **Value-for-Money** principles)? Is the program making the best use of DFAT’s and its implementing partner’s time and resources to achieve outcomes? 2. **Has AMENCA 3 been managed efficiently** and have management and implementation arrangements been sufficiently flexible to cope with changes, challenges and opportunities as they arose? Has DFAT resourced the management of AMENCA 3 appropriately? Have governance mechanisms been appropriate? 3. Have DFAT and its implementing partners sufficiently identified and actioned potential **synergies** across AMENCA 3? | C7. Program activities are on-time, on-budget, and consistent with the intent of the design  C8. Program resources are proportionate to the expected activities and outputs  C10. Program staff are performing their roles effectively, and no significant gaps or governance concerns are identified  C11. The Program architecture and governance structures (i.e. the AHLD and TPAG) are efficiently fulfilling DFAT’s standards for program management and is engaging effectively to oversee the Program | C7. Review of performance reporting against annual plans. Compare feedback (from program participants and staff) about program activities against the design  C8. Compare staff and financial resources for AMENCA 3 to other investments with comparable expectations for activities and outputs (if possible)  C10. Compare staffing profile against the intent set out at design. Review performance reporting and interviews with program staff and stakeholders to identify any budget, governance or staffing issues  C11. Compare investment management records and feedback from DFAT and program staff with the standards described in the Aid Management Guide. Identify any specific concerns of the AHLD and TGAP team. | * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders need to seek information about implementation constraints, including financial and staff resources * Interviews with program participants need to seek their views about the quality of program activities, and any resourcing limitations * Desk review needs to identify comparable investments and their financial and staff resource allocations (if possible) * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders need to seek information about AHLD and TGAP’s governance structure and personnel / staffing model * Interviews with AMENCA 3 Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders need to seek information DFAT’s role as contract manager, and the quality of the relationship | * Desk Review * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders * Interviews with Participants |
| 1. IMPACT: Are the current NGO projects on track to achieve the intermediate and long-term outcomes of the AMENCA 3 Program? | 1. To what extent can changes that have occurred in the operating environment be **attributed** to the implementation of AMENCA 3? 2. What are **the positive and negative changes produced directly or indirectly** by AMENCA 3 for different groups of farmers, including women and youth? | C1. The Results Reported by AMENCA 3 are consistent with its results framework and are considered to be sustainable  C2. The evidence underpinning results reporting is of sound-to-high quality  C3. The intervention model (i.e. hybrid MSD model) used by AMENCA 3 is credibly able to achieve the objectives (for example, has the selection of value chains been appropriate and does it remain appropriate moving forward) and have partners implemented the hybrid model as intended and/or made any adaptations or innovations that have impacted AMENCA 3. | C1. Collate all results reported by AMENCA 3, both in formal reporting and through primary data collection, and map these against program logic model.  C2. Assess the evidence base for these results, and assign each results area with a ‘confidence rating’ based on the quality of evidence  C3. Assess the feasibility of the intervention model achieving AMENCA 3’s objectives based on evidence to date, a literature review of the model, and feedback from program staff and participants. | * Literature scan needs to review the evidence underpinning the intervention model, and its success in achieving intended outcomes * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders need to seek information about program results, quality of evidence, and progress against objectives * Interviews with program participants need to seek their views on the results of participation in program activities, the value of the program / intervention model | * Desk Review * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders * Interviews with Participants * Literature scan |
| 1. SUSTAINABILITY: What is the level of sustainability in the current NGO projects; how can AMENCA 3 strengthen the sustainability of the outcomes by the end of the NGO projects? | 1. Has AMENCA 3 achieved (or is it likely to achieve) the impact and scale intended to ensure sustainability into the future, noting it is only three years into a five-year Investment Design Framework? To what extent will outcomes be sustained beyond the program at the level of individuals, enterprises, and systemic change? 2. What factors have emerged that might prohibit AMENCA 3 achieving impact and scale? 3. Are the implementing partners working through existing market actors or being active market participants? Have AMENCA 3’s interventions engendered sufficient ownership from market actors to continue into the future? | C1. The Results Reported by AMENCA 3 are consistent with its results framework and are considered to be sustainable  C2. The evidence underpinning results reporting is of sound-to-high quality  C3. The intervention model (i.e. hybrid MSD model) used by AMENCA 3 is credibly able to achieve the objectives (for example, has the selection of value chains been appropriate and does it remain appropriate moving forward) and have partners implemented the hybrid model as intended and/or made any adaptations or innovations that have impacted AMENCA 3. | C1. Collate all results reported by AMENCA 3, both in formal reporting and through primary data collection, and map these against program logic model.  C2. Assess the evidence base for these results, and assign each results area with a ‘confidence rating’ based on the quality of evidence  C3. Assess the feasibility of the intervention model achieving AMENCA 3’s objectives based on evidence to date, a literature review of the model, and feedback from program staff and participants. | * Literature scan needs to review the evidence underpinning the intervention model, and its success in achieving intended outcomes * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders need to seek information about program results, quality of evidence, and progress against objectives * Interviews with program participants need to seek their views on the results of participation in program activities, the value of the program / intervention model | * Desk Review * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders * Interviews with Participants * Literature scan |
| 1. INCLUSION (WOMEN AND YOUTH): How effective are the NGO projects in improving the economic and social position of women and youth? What are the factors that contribute and / or hinder successful approaches? | 1. What access have women [and youth] had to project resources compared with men? (for example, access to project funding, market information, supply chains etc.) 2. What practical benefits have been received by women and youth [compared with men]? (for example, increased income, better access to services in their community) 3. Is there any evidence of changes in gender relations due to project activities? (E.g. differences in the way women are viewed or treated within the household, farming groups and in the community?) 4. What processes have been used to integrate gender equality into the project? (For example, to what extent have investments drawn on quality gender analysis to set priorities for assistance, and integrated gender equality effectively in their designs?) 5. To what extent are AMENCA 3’s investments promoting women’s and youth economic empowerment? 6. To what extent are AMENCA 3’s investments supporting national and regional efforts to end violence against women and girls? 7. To what extent has the project impacted on GBV and the safety of women in both public and private spaces? 8. To what extent are AMENCA 3’s investments promoting women’s leadership and participation in decision-making? | C4. Program activities effectively address known barriers to women’s, men’s and youth’s participation in economic activities/livelihoods  C5. Program activities are delivered in a way that facilitates participation by and results for women, men and youth  C6. Women perceive the program activities to be of high value, and report (at least) equivalent results | C4. Use a review of targeted literature to map barriers and establish, if possible, a counterfactual argument to women’s, men’s and youth’s participation in economic and livelihood activities in the Palestinian Territories and effective strategies to address these and compare this against AMENCA 3 activities and achievements. Consider lessons from other DFAT and donor global program engagement with women, men and youth. Triangulate findings from the desktop research with key informant interviews and information collected on who are the key beneficiaries of AMENCA 3  C5. Review participation rates, participants’ exit / satisfaction reporting, and interview notes for evidence of gender sensitive practice and results for women, men and youth i.e. how women, men and youth have benefited from the Program  C6. Review interview notes and responses from women, and compare these to responses from men | * Literature scan needs to map barriers to women’s leadership in the Pacific, and the most promising strategies to address these barriers * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders need to seek additional information about gender sensitive design & implementation of program activities * Interviews with program participants need to include enough women, and to prompts about gender sensitive approaches | * Desk Review * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders * Interviews with Participants * Literature scan |
| 1. FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES: Based on the assessments made above, are there any improvements to AMENCA 3 that could be identified if DFAT determines to extend AMENCA 3 for a further two years? | 1. Are the assumptions and risk assessments in the original program logic still valid in the current environment? 2. How could the program structure be amended to enhance the effectiveness of individual projects? 3. How best could this level of funding (approx. AUD40m over 4 years) in this sector achieve the desired outcomes in the existing AMENCA 3 design? | C3. The intervention model (i.e. hybrid MSD model) used by AMENCA 3 is credibly able to achieve the objectives (for example, has the selection of value chains been appropriate and does it remain appropriate moving forward) and have partners implemented the hybrid model as intended and/or made any adaptations or innovations that have impacted AMENCA 3.  C10. Program staff are performing their roles effectively, and no significant gaps or governance concerns are identified.  C11. The Program architecture and governance structures (i.e. the AHLD and TPAG) are efficiently fulfilling DFAT’s standards for program management and is engaging effectively to oversee the Program. | C3. Assess the feasibility of the intervention model achieving AMENCA 3’s objectives based on evidence to date, a literature review of the model, and feedback from program staff and participants.  C10. Compare staffing profile against the intent set out at design. Review performance reporting and interviews with program staff and stakeholders to identify any budget, governance or staffing issues.  C11. Compare investment management records and feedback from DFAT and program staff with the standards described in the Aid Management Guide. Identify any specific concerns of the AHLD and TGAP team. | * Literature scan needs to review the evidence underpinning the intervention model, and its success in achieving intended outcomes. * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders need to seek information about improvements or adaptations to the program that could be made to enhance progress towards objectives. * Interviews with program participants need to seek their views on the value of the program / intervention model and opportunities for improvements. | * Desk Review * Interviews with Program Staff and DFAT stakeholders * Interviews with Participants * Literature scan |

# Annex 5: Stakeholders consulted

| Stakeholder(s) | Role | Organisation | Date |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DFAT Policy Leaders (Canberra/desk based) | | |  |
| Luke Wild | Director Middle East Branch (MEB) | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) | January 31, 2019 |
| Courtenay Prettyman | DFAT MEB, Program Officer | DFAT | January 31, 2019 |
| Ishara Davey | DFAT MEB Program Officer | DFAT | January 31, 2019 |
| Grant Morrison | Director, NGO Policy Sector | DFAT | 2 April 2019 |
| DFAT Australian Representative Office Palestinian Territories | | |  |
| Tawfic Raad | Program Manager | DFAT | March 18, 2019 |
| Mark Bailey | Head of Office (ARO Ramallah) | DFAT | March 18, 2019 |
| Warren Hoye | Head of Cooperation (ARO Ramallah) | DFAT | March 18, 2019 |
| Lima Anfous | Public Affairs Officer | DFAT | March 18, 2019 |
| Partner Government | | |  |
| Abdullah Lahlouh | Deputy Minister | Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture | March 21, 2019 |
| Ahmad Zakarneh | Director General of Planning | Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture | March 21, 2019 |
| Amjad Salah | Director General of Plant Protection | Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture | March 21, 2019 |
| Other Donors |  |  |  |
| Miral Al-Far | Deputy Head of Cooperation, Danish Representative Office Ramallah | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark | March 19, 2019 |
| Rula Daghash | Program Manager | Swedish Consulate | March 22, 2019 |
| Ayman Daraghmeh | Senior Program Manager | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation | March 22, 2019 |
| Implementation and Delivery Partners (INGOs, PNGOs, Consortia) | | |  |
| Patrick McCloskey | Portfolio Manager | CARE | 27 Feb 2019 |
| May Abdelhadi | MEL coordinator for Gaza | CARE | 27 Feb 2019 |
| Hiba Tibi | Gender advisor Westbank & Gaza | CARE | 27 Feb 2019 |
| Hasan Jabbar | Project Manager | CARE | 27 Feb 2019 |
| Ken Davis | International Program Manager Union Aid Abroad | Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad (APHEDA) | 27 Feb 2019 |
| James Riturban | Portfolio Manager | Oxfam | 27 Feb 2019 |
| Cindy Colla | Contractor Representative | Cardno | 28 Feb 2019 |
| Mike Freeman | M&E Advisor | Cardno (Contracted) | 28 Feb 2019 |
| Fiona McCulloch | Social Inclusion Advisor | Cardno (Contracted) | March 19, 2019 |
| Mark Winters | Market Systems Development Technical Advisor | Cardno | 22 March 2019 |
| Tariq Shamieh | Market Systems Development Technical Advisor | Cardno | March 19, 2019 |
| Izzat Zaidan | Takamol Consortia Members | Agricultural Development Association (PARC) | March 24, 2019 |
| Mekky Alhafeth | Takamol Consortia Members | Agricultural Development Association (PARC) | March 24, 2019 |
| Dr. Abed Alghani Saya’reh | Takamol Consortia Members | Agricultural Development Association (PARC) | March 26, 2019 |
| Haneen Zaidan | Takamol Consortia Members | Rural Women’s Development Society (RWDS) | March 24, 2019 |
| Luay Qasrawi | Takamol Consortia Members | Rural Women’s Development Society (RWDS) | March 24, 2019 |
| Ahmad Sawafta | Takamol Consortia Members | Palestinian Livestock Development Society (PLDC) | March 24, 2019 |
| Ma’re Shawahneh | Takamol Consortia Members | Palestinian Livestock Development Society (PLDC) | March 24, 2019 |
| Murad Abu Muais |  | Paltrade | March 24, 2019 |
| Feras Badran | Project Agronomist | Advanced Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) | March 25, 2019 |
| Nader Hrimat | Project Agronomist | Advanced Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) | March 25, 2019 |
| Tareq Bremer | Technical Officer | International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) | March 23, 2019 |
| Mustafa Tamaizeh | Program Manager | OXFAM Implementation Team | March 20, 2019 |
| Mohammed Sawafta | Economic Development Program Manager | OXFAM Implementation Team | March 20, 2019 |
| Alaa Eid | Economic Development Project Manager | OXFAM Implementation Team | March 20, 2019 |
| Sami Khader | Director | APHEDA Implementation Team (Ma’an Development Centre) | March 21, 2019 |
| Wahbeh Asfour | National Project Manager | APHEDA Implementation Team (Ma’an Development Centre) | March 21, 2019 |
| Nibal Nasser | Deputy Director of ICP | APHEDA Implementation Team (Bethlehem University) | March 21, 2019 |
| Hana Abu Nahla | Gaza Project Coordinator | APHEDA Implementation Team | March 21, 2019 |
| Merna Ziadeh | Program Manager | APHEDA Implementation Team (Asala) | March 21, 2019 |
| Private Sector Actors | | |  |
|  | Chairperson | Golden Sheep Company | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Director | Golden Sheep Company | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Executive Director | Sharakat | March 21, 2019 |
|  | Director | Jenin Investment Company (APHEDA Private Sector Partner) | March 21, 2019 |
|  | Water well owner and avocado farmer | Azoun cooperative | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Farmer and member at the cooperative benefiting from AFAQ and Golden Sheep services | Al-jadedeh cooperative | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Chairman | North Hebron Chamber of Commerce Industry and Agriculture | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Head of the board of director | Hebron agriculture cooperative | March 24, 2019 |
|  | General Director | AFAQ | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Marketing officer | Bair Zeit university students | March 24, 2019 |
|  | General manager | Saniora company | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Business development manager | Alhedmey company | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Marketing officer | Imarets delights company | March 24, 2019 |
| Beneficiaries | | | |
|  | Chairwoman & Technical Operator | CARE Beit Fourik Milk Collection Hub | March 27, 2019 |
|  | Head of milk collection hub | CARE Beit Fourik Milk Collection Hub | March 26, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | CARE Beit Fourik Milk Collection Hub | March 26, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | CARE Beit Fourik Milk Collection Hub | March 26, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | CARE Beit Fourik Milk Collection Hub | March 26, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | CARE Beit Fourik Milk Collection Hub | March 26, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | Bardala CBO Milk Collection Hub | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | Bardala CBO Milk Collection Hub | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | Al Nassarieh CBO Milk Collection Hub | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | Faquaa CBO | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | Al Yamouni Feed Factory | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | Al Yamouni Feed Factory | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | Al Byara Dairy Factory | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | Natural Alternatives- Badael Tabeeieh Silage Factory | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Silage Intervention | March 25 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Silage Intervention | March 25 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Milk Powder Intervention | March 25,2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Milk Powder Intervention | March 25,2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Milk Powder Intervention | March 25,2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Milk Powder Intervention | March 25,2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- High Protein Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- High Protein Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- High Protein Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Safer Product Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Safer Product Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Safer Product Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Safer Product Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Safer Product Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Safer Product Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Gherkin Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Gherkin Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Gherkin Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Water Network Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Agricultural Roads | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE- Roads & Water Networks Intervention | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE Beneficiary | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer/Breeder | CARE Beneficiary | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Yoghurt Seller | CARE Beneficiary | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Animator | CARE Beneficiary | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Animator | CARE Beneficiary | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Animator | CARE Beneficiary | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Animator | CARE Beneficiary | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Animator | CARE Beneficiary | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | CARE Beneficiary | March 25, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Farmer | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 24, 2019 |
|  | Cooperative’ olive campaign contractors | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 26, 2019 |
|  | Farmers in Surief | OXFAM Beneficiary | March 26, 2019 |
| Other Donors | | |  |
| Mark Ahern | Program Leader for Governance and Jobs (West Bank/Gaza) | World Bank | March 21, 2019 |
| Damir Cosic | Senior Economist | World Bank | March 21, 2019 |
| Nur Nassin Eddin | Economist | World Bank | March 21, 2019 |
| Other Stakeholders |  |  |  |
| Ammar Nada | Economic Mapping Project Manager | Office of the Quartet | March 21, 2019 |
| Rami Siam | Associate Advisor- Movement & Trade | Office of the Quartet | March 21, 2019 |
| Michael Pilbrow | Independent Consultant | Strategic Development Group | March 14, 2019 |

1. A panel of technical advisers is being managed by Cardno on behalf of DFAT. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Tim Gill has no involvement in AMENCA 3’s program management. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. AMENCA 1 was a five-year program (2005-2009), implemented by three Australian NGOs (CARE, Austcare and World Vision) (AusAID, January 2008).

   AMENCA 2 was a six-year, AUD39m program (July 2009 to June 2015), implemented by 4 Australian NGOs and 7 Palestinian NGOs (Van der Velde, May 2016) (Rankin, 2015) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. On 4 August 2016, the Israeli authorities charged a Palestinian World Vision employee, Mr Mohammed El Halabi, with diverting funds from World Vision projects in Gaza to Hamas. The court case is ongoing. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Oxfam’s Economic Justice Programme was one of the pioneers of the MSD approach in the Palestinian Territories. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. One funded by Denmark/Switzerland, and one by Sweden. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. ‘Crowding-in’ refers to the largely independent replication of the business model by other private sector actors. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. In this case significant care is needed to ensure that support is both sustainable and that there are clear exit strategies for NGO involvement. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. excluding a target to which only APHEDA was contributing. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. The whole field of MSD has been growing, learning and evolving over the last 10 years. Importantly for AMENCA 3, the global thinking on MSD ‘hybrid’ approaches was only just beginning to take shape when the program commenced. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. AMENCA 3’s indicators are largely derived from DFAT’s Aggregate Development Results (AMENCA 3, Jan 2019) [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. This intervention will be subject to an evaluation in the coming months. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. https://beamexchange.org/ [↑](#footnote-ref-14)