
Kiribati
Targeted Public Sector Support
(TPSS)
Independent Completion Report

Aid Works Initiative # ING366

Draft Report

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Report prepared for AusAID

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Aid Activity Summary

Aid Activity Summary

Aid Activity Name	Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support Program		
Aid Works initiative number	# ING366		
Commencement date	1 February 2006	Completion date	30 June 2010
Total Australian \$	\$3,823,443		
Total other \$	N/A		
Delivery organisation(s)	AusAID Post and Australian Volunteers International for sourcing of Technical Assistance through PACTAM.		
Implementing Partner(s)	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, in association with the Office of the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs		
Country/Region	Kiribati		
Primary Sector	Public Sector Support		

Acknowledgments

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Author's Details

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AusAID	Australia Agency for International Development
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AG	Auditor General's Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoA	Government of Australia
GoNZ	Government of New Zealand
GoK	Government of Kiribati
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
NZAID	New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency
NEPO	National Economic Planning Office
NDS	National Development Strategy
OP	Office of the President
PACTAF	Pacific Technical Advisory Facility
PACTAM	Pacific Technical Advisory Mechanism
PFTAC	Pacific Financial Technical Advisory Centre
PRIF	Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility
PSC	Public Sector Commission
PSIF	Public Sector Improvement Facility (Samoa)
PSO	Public service Office
QAI	Quality at Implementation (AusAID)
RERF	Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund
SPASAI	South Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions
TA	Technical Assistance
ToR	Terms of Reference
WB	World Bank
WoG	Whole of Government

Executive Summary and Consolidated Recommendations

1. The review has confirmed the Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support (TPSS) program is a development initiative which has supported a number of successful activities across a broad spectrum of public sector agencies in Kiribati. The program has a high profile amongst stakeholders and partners and has been appreciated with regards to the resources it has accessed and provided to targeted agencies. TPSS has provided an appropriate foundation for providing ongoing support within the GoK/GoA Partnership for Development Priority Three; i.e. Improved Growth and Economic Development.
2. TPSS as it was conceived was appropriate and relevant within the development context of the period it was initiated i.e. 2006. It addressed higher order priorities and objectives of the Kiribati National Development Strategy (NDS) 2004-7 and was consistent with Australian and broader donor objectives to support public sector and economic reform objectives and activities within a harmonised context. Relevance of the program continued under the NDS 2008-11 and during the development of the GoK/GoA Partnership of Development. Stakeholders and partners believe TPSS has provided relevant and appropriate activities, within a demand driven context. However; there appears to be little evidence indicating service delivery across the country has improved or that there has been an improvement with regards to a 'customer service culture' in targeted agencies.
3. TPSS has genuinely positioned itself as helping to deliver on the Government's policy priorities. Eligibility criteria for funding proposals require consistency with agreed bilateral priorities, as well as relevant sector and corporate plans where they exist. Nonetheless, it is difficult to ascertain whether TPSS funds have been efficiently and effectively targeted to the highest policy priorities of the Government, in part because of: the lack of a clear Government policy agenda for public service improvement; the broad nature of TPSS; the lack of a strategic management and development focus, and the lack of a robust and integrated monitoring and evaluation framework in support of TPSS. These issues have been further and significantly compounded by the fact that there is no design document or framework which provides strategic, management or operational guidance to the program.
4. TPSS is largely a provider of technical assistance (TA) to the GoK. A majority of the TA has been sourced through the Pacific Technical Advisor Mechanism (PACTAM) managed by Australia Volunteers International (AVI). In general the TA sourced has been effective and cost efficient with regards to the technical needs of the hosting agency. The TA was mostly demand driven and the recruitment, deployment and performance management of the advisors was done in a collaborative context (GoK) with genuine efforts to utilise human resource and capacity building strategies to enhance the capacity of partner agencies. However; real questions exist with respect to the sustainability of the perceived impacts, and to the value of using TA in in-line positions and in situations where capacity substitution regularly occurs.
5. Where appropriate the donors have attempted to work together by using multi-lateral facilities and mechanisms, as well as regional programs to facilitate and support broad based reform objectives associated with public sector support e.g. the Pacific Financial Technical Advisory Centre and the Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility. However; additional directly

sourced high cost TA has been used to support a number of bilateral and multilateral missions and initiatives which has resulted in many technical reports. Little evidence exists to suggest the reports or activities associated with these missions have translated into sustainable impacts and/or have been a cost effective means to support the overall development needs of Kiribati. There is also little evidence to suggest that any significant progress has been made towards donor harmonisation and the reduction of transactional costs for GoK and/or the donors (including AusAID) as a result of the significant financial investment made in the joint missions.

6. The lack of a formal design document and/or any associated formalised frameworks in support of performance management, knowledge management and the support of gender and equity and/or other cross-cutting priorities have resulted in TPSS poorly managing and implementing AusAID policy with regards to these important development criteria. Consequently TPSS has not performed well against these important criteria within the context of this completion report.

7. Not-with-standing the above issues; TPSS appears to have been well managed (directly) by AusAID and implemented within an adhoc context. The existing program has been well received and greatly appreciated by partner agencies and beneficiaries. The program also appears to have achieved a number of financial and development impacts across a number of partner agencies e.g. taxation, customs tourism and Air Kiribati and it has formed a sound foundation for future support through the GoK/GoA Partnership for Development.

Evaluation Criteria Ratings

Evaluation Criteria	Rating (1-6)
Relevance	3
Effectiveness	3
Efficiency	3
Sustainability	2
Gender Equality	1
Monitoring & Evaluation	2
Analysis & Learning	2

Rating scale:

Satisfactory		Less than satisfactory	
6	Very high quality	3	Less than adequate quality
5	Good quality	2	Poor quality
4	Adequate quality	1	Very poor quality

Consolidated Recommendations (refer Section 4)

Recommendation 1: AusAID immediately begin preparations to design a new (more and appropriately) targeted program of support to allow the Ministry of Finance to better manage

Public Finance Management within a Whole of Government context i.e. a program aligned to Priority Three of the GoK/GoA Partnership for Development.

Recommendation 2: The proposed design should work within the Ministry of Finance and Development and should focus on: developing Ministry capacity, improved budget management and improved revenue collection – within a whole of government context.

Recommendation 3: The proposed design must be done in accord with AusAID's quality at entry criteria. It must provide a robust design framework which appropriately addresses contextual and operational issues associated with: program governance and management; implementation strategies, performance management; knowledge management and acquisition; capacity development (including TA use); harmonisation strategies; gender and equity plus other key cross-cutting priorities, and appropriate outsourcing arrangements i.e. minimising AusAID's role in program management and implementation. The design must undergo peer review and be appropriately approved.

Recommendation 4: AusAID Post raise itself beyond program and contract management requirements and focus on providing strategic/policy support and leadership to GoK with respect to the design and implementation of the new program. This should include actively working towards ensuring there is a realisation of legitimate harmonisation opportunities amongst donors supporting the public finance management sector.

Section 1 – Background

8. Kiribati has a poorly developed local economy, evidenced by the fact that in 2009, it had the lowest real per capita GDP in the region at US\$482. This is the result of a narrow and vulnerable economic base and an underperforming public sector. As the public sector accounts for 50 per cent of GDP and provides around two-thirds of formal sector employment, government expenditure drives the economy.¹ Significant fiscal risks are associated with public enterprises (State Owned Enterprises), which mostly perform poorly and require government subsidies and loan guarantees to continue operating. Public enterprises crowd out service sector opportunities and poor quality infrastructure and services add to a difficult operating environment for private enterprises.

9. The Government of Australia is the largest provider of development assistance to Kiribati with \$11.8 million (in 2009) followed by Taiwan (\$9.3 million) and New Zealand (\$5.4 million)². Australia continues to be an important provider of aid in Kiribati and in 2010 Australia's share of total ODA increased to over 40 per cent. There are in excess 20 of donors working in Kiribati. In 2009 it was estimated that official development assistance to Kiribati exceeded 65% of GDP with an estimate of \$50 million³.

10. The Kiribati public service does not have the capacity and work culture needed to make sustained improvements to the delivery of basic services and drive much needed reforms. The underperforming public sector also dominates the Kiribati economy, as the main provider of services and infrastructure and as the largest employer. However, GOK fail to deliver adequate services to its people and is inefficient in its use of resources. While the public sector is over-staffed (measured against the quality and outreach of services), it still faces significant capacity challenges with a high turnover of staff⁴ and skill gaps in strategic areas.

11. The bulk of productive public sector work is undertaken by a few officers. There is a lack of accountability and poor communication between and within government agencies. There is also a culture of acceptance of under-performance (primarily at middle management and lower levels) and a failure to directly acknowledge and address systemic issues. Recent experience would suggest some progress has been made in recent years in strengthening operational planning and reporting on performance, this has been in response to donor demand for greater scrutiny of budget processes, and so has not been used to identify problems and improve operational efficiency. The appointment of competent and energetic leaders to key positions in the past few years has been an encouraging sign of awareness at the highest levels of government of the need to revitalise and develop the public service.

12. According to the ICR ToR, the: "The Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support (TPSS) initiative was established following a joint AusAID, NZAID, Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank (WB) mission in late 2006". According to QAI documentation it was 'designed' to respond to priority issues that were identified during consultations for the Kiribati Development Plan 2008-11 (KDP) as requested by the Government of Kiribati (GoK).

¹ ADB Country Partnership Strategy 2010-2014

² AusAID draft 2009 Annual Performance Report.

³ Draft 2009 Kiribati Public Financial Management Performance Report – ADB

⁴ Due to low salaries, migration, overseas study opportunities and mandatory retirement age of 50 years

13. The ICR was conducted over a 2-3 week period during May. It involved a comprehensive desk review of program documentation and a relatively brief 4 day in-country visit for consultations with stakeholders and beneficiaries. Additional phone and email communications⁵ were made with other partners and stakeholders as follow-up to the in-country consultations. After the in-country consultations, ICR analysis and write up took place. The ICR ToR requires the consultant to prepare an ICR according to AusAID's prescribed ICR Template (#155 – June 30, 2010), in addition the ToR requires the ICR to provide an assessment of 'lessons learned' and a set of recommendations for the implementation of future public sector (financial) management programs in Kiribati.

14. Whilst the review is relatively comprehensive, time constraints did not allow the consultant to evaluate specific initiatives or sub-projects in depth, nor did the consultant have the time or resources to conduct impact studies or a cost benefit analysis of initiatives associated with TPSS. This review provides AusAID/GoK with relevant information pertaining to TPSS's overall effectiveness and guides AusAID with regards to future development opportunities for ongoing public financial management support in Kiribati.

Section 2 – Findings

2.1 Relevance

15. TPSS appears to derive from a three person programming mission that was jointly commissioned by AusAID and NZAID in April 2006. The purpose of the programming mission was to advise the Governments of Kiribati, Australia and New Zealand on the development and implementation of a joint program of Australian and New Zealand assistance aimed at "improving public sector performance".

16. The Government's intention to make significant improvements to public sector performance was clearly reflected in the issues identified in Kiribati National Development Strategy (NDS) 2004-7. Priority areas included: to restore fiscal sustainability and protect reserve funds against erosion of their long-term ability to underpin the government budget; develop a competitive environment and incentives to greater efficiency in the public sector; establish effective performance monitoring as part of the public sector planning system; strengthen and protect the maintenance of public sector assets; and bring the public enterprises under central financial and operational supervision.

17. These priority areas also closely aligned to AusAID's and NZAID's existing activities in support of public sector development⁶ and the mission confirmed that it would be appropriate to jointly provide ongoing support for a number of strategic public sector initiatives which the report details. However, the report does not cross-reference the recommendation to existing

⁵ These included communications with the ADB (Suva), the World Bank (Sydney), AVI (Melbourne) and AusAID (Canberra).

⁶ AusAID and NZAID had been supporting a variety of programs in the Public Service Commission, Ministry of Finance, Customs and the Office of the President.

AusAID/NZAID country strategy priorities or higher level objectives that may have been in existence at the time⁷.

18. A second multi-donor (AusAID, NZAID, PFTAC, ADB) mission reaffirmed and endorsed the proposal for the (to be designed) TPSS program in a January 2007 report *Multi-donor mission for strengthening financial management in Kiribati* and this mission confirmed that multi-donor support for Public Financial Management in Kiribati would be appropriate and consistent with development objectives supported in Kiribati by all partners supporting public sector development in Kiribati. The GoK endorsed the 2007 multi-donor report. Both reports provided details for proceeding with the design of the endorsed “Facility”, a key operational requirement being the use of the AusAID funded Pacific Technical Assistance Mechanism (PACTAM) for the sourcing of identified Technical Assistance. A third bilateral mission (AusAID design) was mobilised in 2008 to design a ‘Public Sector Support Program’ and this mission once again confirmed that support for public sector development was consistent with AusAID/GoK development objectives. However the design did not proceed and at the time of drafting the ICR there is no evidence that a unified design document for TPSS exists.

19. The Kiribati NDS 2008-11 (as well as GoK Annual Budget Statements) more recently reaffirmed the prioritisation of support for public sector management (including public financial management) development and it expressly highlights and endorses the support for public sector development Australia (and the partner donors) is providing to the GoK⁸. Furthermore the recently developed GoK/GoA Partnership for Development (2009) specifically targets public sector management and development through Priority Three (Improved Growth and Economic Management). The Draft Priority Three Implementation Strategy⁹ identifies focus areas where recent alignments to TPSS have taken place i.e. revenue/expenditure effectiveness.

20. It is clear from the documentation and consultations that TPSS is seen to be very relevant and appropriate with regards to the GoK’s past, existing, and ongoing strategic economic and public sector framework. However; there appears to be little evidence indicating service delivery across the country has improved or that there has been an improved ‘customer service culture’ in targeted agencies, except perhaps in the Kiribati Tourism Authority, as a result of initiatives supported by the program.

21. TPSS appears to have taken capacity building quite seriously and it invested significant resources to support initiatives using advisors sourced through PACTAM. Whilst many of these advisors were recruited as ‘in-line’ and/or provided direct advisory support (i.e. ‘doing a job’) as opposed to providing indirect support (i.e. advising, mentoring and capacity building) all advisors recruited by PACTAM appear to have had an ‘intuitive’ understanding of the importance of supporting relevant capacity building principles. All partners

⁷ The consultant was not able to identify/access a consolidated country program strategy or any other documentation from 2006/7 outlining AusAID/NZAID higher level objectives in support of public sector development.

⁸ See Chapter 4 – Development Strategies

⁹ Contained in the Schedule to the GOK/GOA Partnership for Development

interviewed indicated that advisers provided to their agency actively used strategies¹⁰ which were relevant with regards to developing competencies and capabilities in individuals and/or the work unit with the aim of providing sustained and self-generating performance improvement¹¹. Whilst some appointments were clearly in the form of capacity substitution (e.g. the revenue controller in customs), it is obvious that AusAID and counterparts¹² would like to see a significant shift towards capacity development within a relevant organisational context. Even so, there is little evidence to suggest any sustained organisational capacity development has been achieved (see later sections).

22. The ‘partnership’ relationship across key donors (i.e. World Bank, ADB, NZAID and AusAID) with the inclusion of GoK is well documented, consistent and very relevant with regards to intent of the Paris Declaration, Accra Accord and Cairns Compact. Whilst the donors indicate that there are regular high level discussions in support of harmonisation; the reality of the circumstances in Kiribati is that little practical harmonisation or alignment of resources appears to take place with regards to public sector or public finance development on the ground e.g. no formal governance/management arrangements appear to be in place to support and/or guide TPSS across the partners.

23. Other than through the documentation and the joint missions outlined¹³, little appears to have occurred to support the true intent of donor harmonisation within the local context¹⁴. Still joint missions occur and high level dialogue does take place, and there is a strongly expressed desire to move the harmonisation agenda forward, future initiatives should continue to actively pursue the dialogue and move harmonisation towards a more practical and relevant outcome with regards to the use and allocation of resources. This will be particularly important if AusAID is to place a stronger emphasis on supporting Public Finance Management where the ADB is deemed the lead agency for this area in Kiribati.

24. TPSS documentation, including the numerous reports¹⁵ associated with the program, rarely makes reference to key cross-cutting issues including i.e. gender, corruption, the environment, disability and HIV/AIDs. Other than corruption, which appears to be covertly addressed in initiatives supporting taxation and customs there is little evidence to suggest any of these cross-cutting issues have been seen as having any direct relevance to the development and/or operational objectives of TPSS.

¹⁰ Partners interviewed regularly used terms such as ‘mentor, share, open, collaborate, train, workshop, plan’ – all characteristics of a good capacity development environment.

¹¹ This statement paraphrases the AusAID definition of capacity building.

¹² Refer to the 2009 Kiribati Annual Program Progress Report, page 14.

¹³ AusAID will also be funding and leading a review of the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund in the near future (late 2010). This review appears to be on behalf of the four key donors in Kiribati.

¹⁴ The exceptions being: high level discussions which appear to result in the allocation of tasks/support of initiatives in support of some PFM activities, and the Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility which has a joint governance structure and collaboratively targets and manages numerous infrastructure initiatives across the Pacific, including Kiribati.

¹⁵ This includes key program documents such as advisor completion reports, mission reports and QAI reports do not seem to place much priority on cross-cutting issues because they have not been specifically acknowledged in the programs objectives.

2.2 Effectiveness


25. Assessing the effectiveness of capacity building and reform efforts is always difficult. In TPSS, it is particularly difficult given the lack of real clarity about its focus and strategic priorities. Whilst associated documentation indicates the program objectives are to:

1. Ensure sustainability of the public sector planning system
2. Strengthen public finance management, and
3. Build capacity in priority areas”¹⁶

26. In reality, no design documentation actually exists to put a governance/management, programming or strategic framework around the program, even though it is clear that there was an expectation one would be designed and peer appraised. The outlined objectives appear appropriate with regards to Kiribati’s identified needs; however in a developmental context they would be extremely difficult to achieve and monitor given the parlous nature of the Kiribati’s financial, economic and public sector management systems.

27. PSIF seems to have succeeded in identifying and funding a wide variety of initiatives that generally align to the outlined objectives. The targeted initiatives supported by the program is summarised¹⁷ in the following schematic.

Approximate TPSS % Expenditure - High to Low Cost Activities



28. Given the diverse range of initiatives supported (e.g. customs, tourism, aviation) it is difficult to understand how the program believes this is a ‘targeted’ approach to public sector support. The ‘targeting’ of the support appears to have taken place without a documented strategy for improving public service cooperation/collaboration, other than through broad bilateral/multilateral dialogue. However it could be argued that the four public sector

¹⁶ Draft TPSS Independent Completion Report ToR – version 3 April 2010 and associated program documentation e.g. QAI report, program ToRs etc.

¹⁷ This table is based upon dollar figures (rounded off) contained in the May 2010 Aid Works allocation summary.

summits supported by TPSS (two are pending) helped in this area, although there is no evidence of implementation strategies or activities deriving from the summits being directly supported by TPSS.

29. The risk of a reactive program, rather than a coherent, strategic one was recognised in the initial mission reports, and measures (such as the establishment of strategic Facility with an active management/governance structure to support the program) were proposed to mitigate this. Original mission documents provided detailed information pertaining to the structure and priority targets for such a Facility¹⁸.

30. In spite of the apparent lack of strategic structure and focus, TPSS does appear to be a genuinely ‘demand driven’ program with regards to the identification, use and management of the technical assistance (TA) sourced by PACTAM on behalf of the program. Bilateral dialogue with the GoK is strong and the partner government appropriately identifies capacity gaps, both with regards to personnel and organisation needs for consideration within the development budget. Detailed project proposals are developed by GoK, which link to organisational and work plans with specific (and often achievable) targets e.g. increased taxation/excise revenue, continued licensing endorsements, increased tourist numbers/income.

31. These project proposals work their way through GoK development approval processes across the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs and are then passed onto AusAID for consideration of TPSS funding. If approved, GoK counterparts are actively involved in the ‘tweaking’ of proposals and ToRs as well as (in most cases) being active participants in the recruitment (interview) process. Performance management of TPSS supported technical assistance is embedded within the partner agency and this facilitates the development of good human resource capacity and practices within the hosting organisation.

32. TPSS has genuinely positioned itself as helping to deliver on the Government’s policy priorities. Eligibility criteria for funding proposals require consistency with agreed bilateral priorities, as well as relevant sector and corporate plans where they exist. Nonetheless, it is difficult to ascertain whether TPSS funds have been targeted to the highest policy priorities of the Government, in part because of: the lack of a clear Government policy agenda for public service improvement; the broad nature of TPSS; the lack of a strategic management and development focus, and the lack of a robust and integrated monitoring and evaluation framework in support of TPSS.

33. As a result, while PSIF has been able to ‘do good things’ (e.g. the taxation, customs, tourism and auditor support), it is difficult to see how its various activities contribute to a coherent and cohesive impact upon WoG service delivery. TPSS at best might be considered a transactional development initiative as it has not been able to raise itself beyond facilitating access to a funding and a technical assistance pool which (at the moment) appears to sit in isolation from donor and WoG reform strategies. The design concepts outlined early in the programs genesis clearly had hoped that TPSS would be transformational and able to

¹⁸ Refer to Sections 3 and 4 of the April 2006 Mission, page 3 of the December 2006 Mission and Sections 3 and 4 of the March 2008 Design Mission Aide Memoire.

integrate and embed itself as a valuable and sustainable GoK resource capable of appropriately managing and strategically dispersing multilateral resources to address emerging and existing priorities not readily funded through the Kiribati budget.

34. The original design concept proposed that TPSS be embedded with GoK WoG structures with a governance/management system aligned to the major central agencies i.e. Office of the President (OP), Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the Public Service Office (PSO). The original recommendations also proposed accessing and managing technical assistance through the Pacific Technical Advisory Facility (PACTAF), later to become PACTAM.

35. Other than the use of PACTAM which has been used to recruit and manage technical assistance, all other management and coordination of the program appears to be the responsibility of the Post and this places a significant administrative burden on both A-based and locally recruited personnel. This is not a very effective mechanism to manage a development program as it removes critical AusAID resources away from strategic oversight and forces key AusAID personnel to focus on operational and contractual matters that are better outsourced and managed insitu through an appropriate local established management structure/unit.

36. With regard to PACTAM and the recruitment, deployment and management of technical assistance, this appears to have been well done and effective in the context of the deployments which TPSS supported. In-country consultations confirmed there was, in general, universal praise for the quality of the technical assistance recruited and the quality of the interaction and tasks undertaken by the technical assistance deployed by TPSS. Although it is noted that AusAID formally reported that there were a number of instances where advisors deployed through PACTAM were not effective e.g. issues associated with the recruitment and sustainability of personnel deployed to work with Air Kiribati¹⁹.

37. Technical assistance provided by TPSS, through PACTAM was particularly noted by stakeholders and partners as being effective with regards to:

- The collaborative recruitment strategies used to identify, deploy and performance manage the TA.
- The consistent effort to use legitimate capacity building methodologies by all technical assistance, even though the majority of the technical assistance was deployed as 'in-line' or direct (doing) TA e.g. establishing counterpart relationships (individual and team), the use of: active training and collaborative work programs, mentoring initiatives, accessing external linkages; supporting insitu performance management strategies and objectives, and maintaining professional interaction after demobilisation.

¹⁹ The AusAID April QAI reports highlighted issues with the Air Kiribati deployments associated with: the Air Engineer deployee being marginalised as a result of 'recruitment issues' and the Avionics Engineer being poor value for money due to the high cost of deployment in direct support two local technical personnel. As noted elsewhere – these concerns were not 'confirmed' by Air Kiribati personnel when 'interviewed'.

- Supporting interagency and WoG interaction and cooperation within and across the government – particularly with regards to trying to address improved service delivery objectives.
38. Technical assistance effectiveness was regularly questioned²⁰ with regards to:
- The appropriateness of deploying significant numbers of TA (particularly international personnel from Australia) when alternative resourcing options might be more appropriate e.g. locally/regionally sourced TA at a lower cost, retired local/regional expertise, direct resourcing/funding options provided in a more transparent way to facilitate alternative opportunities to ‘plug’ the resource gap.
 - The balance and appropriateness of targeting ‘in-line’ and ‘direct’ TA versus the use of ‘indirect’ TA support with regards to sustainability issues – addressed more fully in section 2.4 of this report.
 - The significant number of TA deployed in support of a variety of missions which have produced numerous reports and recommendations, few of which have been implemented.
 - The transparency of TA costs and the need to more legitimately account for transactional and operational costs (including the impact upon AusAID and GoK) associated with the deployment of TA in a development context.
39. Sustainable capacity within AusAID (and GoK) to manage initiatives such as TPSS (without contracted support) does not exist at the moment. As a consequence TPSS effectiveness has been impacted by AusAID and GoK not being able to truly focus on higher level public sector and financial management strategic requirements because a considerable amount of time is spent on implementation support for the program.
40. In general, there was widespread support for the TPSS concept, in particular as a source of supplementary funds and resources for initiatives that would normally be unable to be funded through the Government’s budget. All persons interviewed indicated that TPSS was relatively effective in supporting a wide variety of initiatives across a broad client group.

2.3 Efficiency

41. TPSS has an approved budget of \$3,823,443 at the time of the ICR. The status of expenditure as of May 2010 is summarised in the following table:

Budget	Committed & Expended	Unallocated	Unexpended Activities Pending
\$3,823,443	\$3,517,499	\$202,944	\$103,000

²⁰ When counterparts were asked if, given the choice they would prefer foreign sourced TA at a value of \$X or more flexible resourcing (e.g. local personnel, retired regional personnel, volunteers, flexible funding etc) at a cost of \$(X-Y) – all chose the alternative options at lower ‘real’ value.

42. According to Aid Works approximately \$2,666,000 (or 70%) of the budget was expended on TA managed through PACTAM, approximately \$490,000 (or 13% of the budget was in support of bilateral/multilateral missions and the balance of the allocated/used budget was in support of bilateral programming e.g. four public sector summits held over 4 years. Given the relatively high level of expenditure against allocation (92.6%) it can be concluded that TPSS was efficient in expending the budget during the activity period. However the very high level of expenditure committed towards the deployment and use of bilateral and multilateral TA (83%) may not be considered an overly efficient allocation of resources to a country where there are severe issues with the availability of recurrent funding to support the delivery of public sector services.

43. The debate on the use and application of development funding flows is ongoing and evolving and it is worthwhile acknowledging that TPSS has taken a low risk approach in assigning the majority of its funding in support of TA related activities. There is clear shift away from the focus on using and deploying high cost foreign TA, which is usually allocated without financial transparency towards alternative development options (refer footnote 20). It is recognised that there will be risks associated with the alternative options; however the agreed development principles underlying the Paris Declaration, the Accra Accord and the Cairns Convention are clearly establishing a partnership and accountability framework which will provide all development partners with an increased degree of comfort on pursuing alternative high risk options to the 'default' low risk (high cost) TA modality²¹.

44. The average cost of international TA across the Australian program in 2007 was approximately \$219,000 per annum per person²²; for the life of TPSS the average figure appears to be approximately \$150,000 per annum per person²³. This would indicate that TPSS has sourced its TA for very good value compared to the average program. Discussions with PACTAM advisors and management at Australian Volunteers International (AVI – the managing contractor for PACTAM) confirms recruited TA market values are tightly monitored and that TA costs are only based upon equivalent employment costs within an equivalent Australian market context. Advisors are told the rates are non-negotiable and those that accept the deployment do so with the knowledge that this is the case.

45. Management costs paid to AVI would appear to be just over 10% of total fees paid; based upon 222 person months and a total TA cost of \$2.7 million. This compares very well to industry wide standards where it is not uncommon for management fees to be approximately 15-25% of total procurement (TA) cost elsewhere.

46. As an additional comparison: within the Samoan Public Sector Improvement Facility (PSIF - a Facility fully established with a WoG structure in Samoa) total management overheads were 42%²⁴. However it should be noted that the PSIF is a fully contained facility

²¹ For a more comprehensive overview on this debate, the following references are recommended: AusAID Policy Note 2009 – Capacity Development in the Public Service, AusAID 2009 – AusAID's Approach to TA: Getting Beyond Good Enough (Peter Morgan); AusAID 2008 – Emerging Lessons on TA (Heather Bassler)

²² AusAID TA Mapping Survey 2007.

²³ Based upon 18.5 person years costing a total of \$2.7 million (rounded up and approximate)

²⁴ Refer to the Samoa Public Sector Independent Progress Report (May 2009).

within Government of Samoa structures and very little international TA is deployed – so most of the facility overheads stay in Samoa. PSIF might be considered a higher risk alternative development modality where development costs and overheads remain in-country and therefore have the potential substantial supplement national income and GDP.

47. The above analysis does not take into account the real and transactional costs (above and beyond the management costs paid to AVI) associated with having AusAID staff spending a great deal of time directly working on TPSS programming. These transactional costs would be quite substantial and they also dilute AusAID's effectiveness and efficiency in strategically managing and value adding to the Kiribati program on behalf of Australia.

48. TPSS is due for completion on the 30 June 2010; however there are still a number of outstanding initiatives in the pipeline e.g. additional public sector summits (X2), the AusAID sponsored review of the quite critical Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund (RERF), and support for renewable energy sources. No exit or transition strategy for TPSS appears to exist and it is unclear how TPSS will support ongoing programs beyond June 30, other than by maintaining the status quo. From an efficiency perspective it would have been prudent for AusAID to have developed an exit strategy for TPSS; to have completed the RERF review, and to have initiated the design of a new program prior to the drafting of this ICR and the program completion date on the 30th June.

2.4 Impact and Sustainability

49. During the review stakeholders made the following observations with regards to TPSS impact and sustainability:

- i. All GoK personnel interviewed indicated that they were of the opinion that TPSS sponsored activities (both TA and non-TA) were beneficial and had a positive impact upon the way government did business. There was a unanimous expression of appreciation for the support provided by TPSS.

- ii. Deployed TA were described as having significant and real impacts²⁵ which have the 'potential' to be sustained, these include:

- Government revenue increased as a direct consequence of TA deployment in Taxation. This was as a result improved business compliance.
- Government revenue increased as a direct consequence of TA deployment in Customs. This was as a result of increased excise collection.
- Government revenue indirectly increased as a consequence of improved and more regular audit activity in the Audit Office.
- Air Kiribati was able to maintain prescribed maintenance certification necessary for its ongoing (immediate) existence²⁶.

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²⁵ In general, impacts for this report are based upon qualitative reports (written and verbal)– the consultant did not have access to quantifiable data supporting the assertions made by stakeholders and/or contained in reports e.g. actual increases to revenue/excise as a result of support to Taxation and Customs

²⁶ As noted elsewhere in the section on efficiency – doubts have been legitimately raised as to the cost effectiveness of this intervention given one deployee worked with two counterparts (one of who moved to another airline) to maintain equipment ratings needed to fulfill licensing requirements.

- Air Kiribati was able to return to profitability as a result of management and administrative restructuring facilitated/catalysed by the deployment of TA.
- Tourism numbers are up and significantly tourist yield rates are reported to up by 48% as determined by the latest (draft) tourism expenditure survey report.

50. It should be noted that during the period of this review it was not possible to directly ascertain whether the described ‘impacts’ can be truly ascribed to the actions and roles of the advisor input or whether they are a combination advisor support in combination with other factors aligned to the circumstances of the advisors deployment i.e. whether the advisor was a direct or indirect causality of the impact.

51. A recognised unintended impact associated with TPSS has been increased awareness and understanding of TPSS amongst client and beneficiary groups (including international visitors and recruited TA) as a result of information dissemination via the web site developed to service the Ministry of Tourism and hospitality and broad-based information sharing through the annual Public Sector Forums²⁷.

52. The donors and GoK have attempted to work together by using multi-lateral and regional facilities and mechanisms to facilitate and support broad based reform objectives associated with public sector support e.g. the Pacific Financial Technical Advisory Centre (PFTAC), the South Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions (SPASAI) and the Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility (PRIF). Many of these initiatives have supplemented activities supported by TPSS quite well and it will be important for ongoing programs to continue this interface in the future.

53. Not-with-standing the above observations; and recognising that TPSS enjoys support and patronage at the highest levels of GoK, little evidence exists to suggest that TPSS is sustainable in a development or financial context as it currently exists²⁸. The lack of sustainability is largely a function of the huge human resource and financial gaps which exist within current government structures and financial systems. These gaps will only be addressed if GoK and development partners establish a true medium to long-term development framework which will:

- Operate within a well structured design context and possesses a medium to long-term horizon of support which acknowledges that recurrent funding and capacity gaps will need to be collaboratively addressed together. The recently developed GoK/GoA Partnership for Development has initiated this process, however more must be done to harmonise donor practices in Kiribati to minimise transactional inefficiencies. This should include establishing transparent costing mechanisms so that the true cost of development (particularly TA and transactional costs) can be seen so that partner governments (and some donors) can make informed decisions with regards to the appropriate deployment and use of resources.
- Accept that the development investments in countries such as Kiribati are ‘high risk’ and ‘low value’ and accelerate opportunities to directly supplement recurrent budget (and human resource needs) by either using government systems or establishing parallel systems which have the potential to use localised mechanisms for accountability and

²⁷ PACTAM advisors were often used to facilitate these Forums.

²⁸ It should be noted that there are strong arguments to say that in certain circumstances (e.g. small island states) it is developmentally inappropriate to assume that developmental interventions (and the use of TA) should be ‘sustainable’ given the huge gap that will always exist between local revenue collection and the legitimate need to provide basis infrastructure, health and education services in these countries. Refer to Emerging Lessons on TA (Heather Basser) AusAID TA Mapping Survey 2007

have the potential to merge with local systems over time. This can be done whilst maintaining robust ‘external’ audit controls.

- Acknowledges that some human resource gaps (i.e. in-line positions) may need to be filled for quite a while given the unique circumstances of Kiribati. If this is to occur, it must be done within a ‘capacity supplementation framework’ whereby alternative long-term recruitment, deployment and/or financing methodologies are used to recruit and pay for these individuals i.e. don’t use simple short-term ‘outsourcing models’.
- Use alternative development methodologies which have the potential to return more development dollars to the country/region, e.g. greater use of: retired personnel, regional expertise, volunteers, enhanced twinning opportunities, WoG secondments, and incentive based funding.

54. It is the opinion of the consultant that AusAID has the potential to better support GoK public and financial sector reform requirements within a sustainable framework. However to achieve this there is a need to transition TPSS into a more appropriate modality supporting the GoK/GoA Partnership for Development. This should be a modality better able to work within and across the GoK public sector and economic reform framework, including with other donors.

2.5 Monitoring and Evaluation

55. As highlighted elsewhere TPSS does not possess a design framework, nor does it have a performance or monitoring and evaluation framework.

56. AusAID directly monitors program progress by means of:

- i. Annual Program Performance Report – this is an annual report which is dependent upon M&E information captured through Quality at Implementation (QAI) Reporting. It is a generic report which provides an overview of the initiatives progress within the context of AusAID’s country program
- ii. Quality at Implementation Reporting – these reports track outputs and impacts captured from activity level reporting and feed into the country program reporting. The reports detail impacts and outcomes relative to the programs objectives. At an operational level these reports focus on TPSS outputs i.e. mainly activity generated reports.
- iii. Activity level reporting – all supported activities appear to generate activity reports, usually large documents with numerous recommendations, few of which appear to have implementation strategies or are followed up in an integrated context e.g. joint mission review recommendations for a program design.
- iv. PACTAM delivered TA is provided through a period contract with AusAID. AVI as the contract manager for PACTAM has a contractual requirement to performance manage PACTAM employees (in partnership with GoK agencies). In addition AVI must report to AusAID on a quarterly basis with regards to ongoing TA progress.

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v. As PACTAM supported TA's is performance managed in partnership with their host agencies the cross-accountabilities between the deployed TA and the host agencies is strong. This is recognised as an extremely beneficial capacity development outcome which tends to strengthen host agency organisational capacity with regards to human resource management. TPSS is one of the few development programs where this type of TA performance management is institutionalised across the program.

57. As can be seen the 'default' M&E framework used by TPSS is report focused. In general, the quality of the reports are informative, often they are peer reviewed as the output/milestone (report) generates a contractual payment. Where reporting has been perceived to be of an inappropriate standard, proactive efforts have been made by AusAID to address the issue e.g. AusAID and AVI have recently worked together to improve TA reporting against workplans.

58. Because of the lack of a performance framework little knowledge learning and sharing exists and information contained in the reports is generally left within the context of the original report. To the credit of the post, most reports were readily available and accessible during ICR consultations.

59. Had a mid-term review taken place, these issues may have been identified earlier and appropriate remedial strategies developed and implemented to address these significant issues.

2.6 Gender and Equity

60. Little or no effort has been made by TPSS to support or institutionalise gender and equity principles within or across the program. Other public sector and economic reform programs have demonstrated that it is possible to incorporate and use high level gender and equity strategies to enhance opportunities in support of pursuing this important cross-cutting issue e.g. support for government income/expenditure disaggregation of data/information, gender analysis of budget programming and general policy formulation – amongst many others. The lack of a design and/or performance framework to drive the program has allowed this lack of focus and accountability with regards gender and equity to occur without any consequence in a programming context. Consequently gender and equity derives impacts or outcomes that can be associated with the program are effectively non-existent.

2.7 Analysis, Learning and Lessons Learned

61. Good designs always possess a performance framework and associated mechanisms (including a mid-term review) for the collection, management and dissemination of development knowledge i.e. issues, outcomes and impacts. Information management and dissemination is an important part of good development practice. TPSS does not have any structured or sustainable mechanism (other than the production and general electronic storage

of reports) for the management and dissemination development knowledge accrued during the life of the program.

62. Indirectly TPSS has supported some good analysis and learning initiatives through the support of discrete activities. Examples would include: the annual Public Sector Summits where stakeholders have had the opportunity examine and discuss issues associated with public sector service delivery in a collaborative context, and the establishment of the Kiribati tourism and hospitality web site which provided a means for broad based sharing of information associated with Kiribati and associated service delivery matters in a global context. A number of interviewed stakeholders indicated that both these activities were informative and valuable activities associated with TPSS.

63. AusAID officers and many advisors deployed during the life of the program have certainly provided substantive analysis and produced valuable reports which provide an excellent overview of the issues and potential solutions to many of the problems confronting Kiribati (and many other similar small island states) with regards to ineffective service delivery at a local level. However TA reporting is not a very effective or efficient means to develop a knowledge base and share information with partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries²⁹ which impact upon ‘demand driven’ factors influencing appropriate reforms with regards to public sector and economic management at a local level.

64. It is a shame that no additional or external investment was made by AusAID to develop and support a mechanism of ‘local’ knowledge management that may have translated ‘theory’ into a readily accessible and ‘applied’ mechanism in support of good development practice at a local level. Given the relatively high investment in the use of advisors, it would have been an effective allocation of resources to have invested some program resourcing into a knowledge management system that could have supported TPSS (and other development initiatives) in Kiribati and across the Pacific.

65. As a means to facilitate some knowledge acquisition and dissemination (albeitly by another report) the following highlights some of the cumulative lessons that have been learned as a result of the implementation of TPSS. Many of these lessons are significant in the context of examining options for ongoing support for Priority Three of the GoK/GoA Partnership for Development i.e. Improved Growth and Economic Development. Lessons of significance include:

- i. Experience from elsewhere³⁰ confirms that there is a need to take a more integrated approach to strengthening the Public Service and its management of financial, human and physical resources.
 - a) This is based upon the assumption that capacity and systems (i.e. corporate planning; financial management, and information systems; not simply individuals i.e. TA) are critical constraints to better public sector performance.

²⁹ e.g. school/hospital/health centre expenditure summaries, newsletters, sponsored radio programs

³⁰ Refer to: Capacity building resources on the AusAID intranet; the Samoa Public Sector Improvement Facility (ICR), and the Program Design Document for the PNG Public Sector Economic Governance Program.

ii. TA deployment can make a contribution to overall economic and public sector reform management and implementation at an organisational and sector level.

a) However there is little evidence that TA alone can achieve impacts which translate into improved service delivery or directly affect the general population of Kiribati.

iii. Donors and GoK, in general, do not actively work together to harmonise strategic, operational and financial opportunities in support of public sector improvement resulting in:

a) Replication of efforts in a complex delivery modality i.e. transactional inefficiency.

b) An ineffective use (non-existent at times) of GoK systems, structures and personnel in the management and implementation of donor supported resources.

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iv. A program must be delivered and managed within a well structured and robust operational framework/design that is readily available and understood. It should clearly outline:

a) Realistic objectives.

b) A collaborative and cohesive management mechanism aligned to partner government systems.

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c) A simple and relevant performance framework which benefits and services all partners and beneficiaries. It must support information collection, analysis and dissemination.

d) Capacity development is a medium to long-term commitment which requires a longer term vision and implementation horizon.

e) Opportunities for donor harmonisation and the alignment of appropriate resources.

f) Strategies for addressing gender and other cross-cutting needs, priorities and outcomes within a legitimate framework.

vi. Financial and management mechanisms and decisions must be transparent and understood.

vii. TA support is only one modality that can be used to improve the capacity of counterpart agencies within a development context – alternative options should be fully explored and used according to an appropriate risk allocation i.e. TA should not be used as the default mechanism of development.

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viii. When TA is chosen as an appropriate mechanism of development support consideration must be made with regards to:

a) Full and open transparency of financing and costs associated with the deployment of TA.

b) Substantial auxiliary/ancillary resource support for the operational (recurrent) budget.

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c) The balance between the use of direct and in-direct TA and how if possible do we move from direct to in-direct TA over time.

- d) Ensuring there are consistent and appropriate strategies used to empower and enhance counterpart capacity during TA deployment e.g. counterpart involvement in the development of ToRs, recruitment and performance management.
- ix. If a program is ‘targeting’ its support, then it must define and align the use of resources to well defined and articulated activities/initiatives/objectives which may impact upon the desired outcome i.e. do not expend your resources over a diverse spectrum of beneficiaries who/which may have a limited individual impact on the overall program objective(s).

2.8 Evaluation Criteria Ratings

Evaluation Criteria	Rating (1-6)
Relevance	3
Effectiveness	3
Efficiency	3
Sustainability	2
Gender Equality	1
Monitoring & Evaluation	2
Analysis & Learning	2

Rating scale:

Satisfactory		Less than satisfactory	
6	Very high quality	3	Less than adequate quality
5	Good quality	2	Poor quality
4	Adequate quality	1	Very poor quality

Section 3 – Opportunities and Future Options

3.1 Opportunities

66. It has been suggested that the next phase of support should be aligned to the GoK/GoA Partnership for Development Priority Three; i.e. Improved Growth and Economic Development. This priority specifically addresses Kiribati’s need to raise more revenue and better allocate resources to meet the immediate development requirements. Discussions undertaken during the in-country consultations confirm that this priority is valid and achievable. It is also a consistent and appropriate extension of the current program with the

ability to build upon successful initiatives which have already had some limited impact i.e. improved taxation and revenue collections.

3.2 Future Options

67. It is proposed that the future design process limit its scope to focussing on a program fully aligned to the Ministry of Finance. This program would directly support³¹:

1. Ministry of Finance capacity to better manage Public Finance Management within a Whole of Government context
2. Improved Budget Development and Management i.e. government expenditure
3. Increased Revenue Strategies and Opportunities i.e. government income

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68. With regards to improved Ministry of Finance capacity to better manage Public Finance Management within a Whole of Government context, it is suggested the proposed design process closely examine opportunities to support GoK with regards to:

- Ensuring the objectives of Priority Three of the GoK/GoA Partnership for Development are achieved.
- Designing an initiative with a robust ‘program approach’ i.e. within a WoG context; with a single governance structure which provides services to multiple stakeholders; addresses issues of horizontal integration at the governance and implementation level; is sequenced in a way that allows logical and seamless progression, and has a simple and effective performance framework which manages program monitoring; evaluation; knowledge acquisition and management, and information for learning.
- Ensuring the design incorporates and utilises ‘best practice’ capacity building principles i.e. accountability, transparency and open dialogue; collaborative governance, leadership and strategic management; actively supports and encourages the use of alternative development methodologies, beyond TA; uses and utilises longer-term professional networks within and across the Pacific, and where TA is utilised - structure it within a phased context, and finally establish a long-term horizon for the program.
- Appropriately and effectively addresses issues and priorities associated with gender, HIV/AIDs, the environment (e.g. green finance), corruption, disability and disaster mitigation.
- Examine opportunities for truly harmonising (at a minimum front-end processes) with other significant donor partners i.e. NZAID; World Bank and the ADB

69. With regards to improved budget development and management it is suggested the proposed program could look at opportunities to support GoK with regards to strengthening:

- Budget credibility.
- Budget comprehensiveness and transparency.
- Policy based budgeting.
- Budget predictability (including development/donor contributions - which are currently very poorly reported).
- Control in budget execution.
- Debt management.
- Accounts recording and reporting.

³¹ These priorities all align to identified and recognised performance indicators outlined in the 2009 Public Finance Management Report.

- Potential for appropriate public sector reform opportunities deriving from and aligned to improved economic financial management practices.

70. With regards to increased revenue strategies it is suggested the proposed program could look at opportunities to support GoK with regards to enhancing:

- Taxation compliance and collection.
- Revenue compliance and collection.
- Private sector strengthening.
- Licensing support and/or reform.
- Reform of the State Owned Enterprises including privatisation.
- GST/VAT options and opportunities – very important if the revenue base is to be expanded in the context of multi-lateral trade agreements being pursued across the Pacific.
- External scrutiny and auditing.
- Supportive and empowering legislative opportunities.
- Ongoing and alternative opportunities for supporting continued investment in the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund, or alternative trust account options³².

71. The new design could also assess its risk profile relative to other AusAID investments and examine opportunities for pursuing design opportunities with a higher risk profile to enable the program to trial working within existing government systems and structures e.g. direct and indirect grants to the MoF to manage identified and allocated resources.

Section 4 – Recommendations and Conclusion

4.1 Recommendations

72. Clearly the original high level objectives articulated by TPSS remain relevant. However, it critical that any ongoing support in Kiribati for public sector support must be:

- Truly targeted, and
- Within an appropriate design framework which is both robust and relevant to Kiribati's development needs.

Recommendation 1: AusAID immediately begin preparations to design a new (more and appropriately) targeted program of support to allow the Ministry of Finance to better manage Public Finance Management within a Whole of Government context i.e. a program aligned to Priority Three of the GoK/GoA Partnership for Development.

Recommendation 2: The proposed design should work within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and should focus on: developing Ministry capacity, improved budget management and improved revenue collection – within a whole of government context.

Recommendation 3: The proposed design must be done in accord with AusAID's quality at entry criteria. It must provide a robust design framework which appropriately addresses contextual and operational issues associated with: program governance and management;

³² This opportunity could also be examined in the broader context of ongoing Australian development investment in Kiribati.

implementation strategies, performance management; knowledge management, acquisition and sharing; capacity development (including TA use); harmonisation strategies; gender and equity plus other key cross-cutting priorities, and appropriate outsourcing arrangements i.e. minimising AusAID's role in program management and implementation. The design must undergo peer review and be appropriately approved.

Recommendation 4: AusAID Post raise itself beyond program and contract management requirements and focus on providing strategic/policy support and leadership to GoK with respect to the design and implementation of the new program. This should include actively working towards ensuring there is a realisation of legitimate harmonisation opportunities amongst donors supporting the public finance management sector.

4.2 Conclusion

73. The review found TPSS to have met the basic needs of GoK with regards to public sector support. It has supported a number of good initiatives within the original context of the program and is considered effective in terms of achieving value for money in the provision of TA. However; strategically and operationally it has struggled to address the higher level objectives articulated at implementation, largely because it did not have a robust design and implementation framework to guide and support its implementation.

Attachments

Attachment A – Exit Note

Independent Completion Report
Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support Program
TPSS
18th May 2010

1. Independent Completion Report (ICR) Objective

The objective of the independent completion report is to:

Provide an assessment of the Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support (TPSS) program. The assessment will include reference to program:

- a. Relevance
- b. Effectiveness
- c. Efficiency
- d. Impact and Sustainability
- e. Monitoring and Evaluation
- f. Gender and Equity
- g. Analysis and Lessons learned

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In addition, the information collected whilst compiling the TPSS ICR will be used to provide an assessment of 'lessons learned' and a set of recommendations for the implementation of future public sector financial management programs in Kiribati.

2. Findings

These initial findings are based upon a comprehensive desk analysis of various documents³³ associated with TPSS and interviews with a number of key stakeholders and beneficiaries³⁴ interviewed during a relatively brief in-country visit held between the 17 and 20 May 2010.

2.1 General Observations

TPSS is a relatively small and diverse development intervention that is characterised by the following.

- The value of the program is \$3,823,443³⁵ spread over 5 financial years i.e. 2005/06 – 2009/10. A small amount of the budget³⁶ will remain unallocated and/or under-expended at the end of the current financial year.
- By the end of the in-country visit no unified documentation pertaining to the implementation strategy or the program design could be found in Canberra or Tarawa for the TPSS program³⁷.

³³ By the conclusion of the visit in excess of 200 program related documents had been consulted.

³⁴ In-country discussions were held with 17 persons, of which 12 were GoK beneficiaries.

³⁵ AidWorks report as of 17 May 2010, although the program financial approval is noted as \$2.8 million in the 2009 Annual Program Performance Report.

³⁶ It is estimated that approximately \$500,000 will be unallocated or under-expended as of the 19 May 2010. Approximately \$300,000 of this is aligned to un-expended targeted initiatives.

- The program allocated funding in support of 21 discrete activities.
- 10 of the activities were in support of direct technical assistance (TA) for use by targeted government agencies. This TA was recruited and managed through the Pacific Technical Assistance Facility (PACTAM) managed by Australian Volunteers International (AVI).
- TPSS is scheduled to finish in June 2010. A small number of activities may roll over into the 2010/11 financial year³⁸.
- Whilst TPSS is a relatively low value program it has been managed within the usual high risk context AusAID adopts for all programs.

2.1 Strengths

TPSS has a number of strengths, achievements and initial impacts. Significant amongst these are:

iii. All GoK personnel interviewed indicated that they were of the opinion that TPSS sponsored activities (both TA and non-TA) were beneficial and had a positive impact upon the way government did business. There was a unanimous expression of appreciation for the support provided by TPSS.

iv. TA identified, selected and mobilised appears to be demand driven and generally* deployed using good capacity building principles, these include:

- ToRs were developed by the partner agency and embedded in a detailed project proposal which was supported by GoK and submitted to donors for appraisal and support.
- In a majority of cases the TA was selected using joint recruitment procedures, including GoK representation on the selection panels.
- Even though some of the TA was direct (i.e. in-line as opposed to purely advisory) counterpart relationships were established with individuals and teams to facilitate skills development.
- Training and capacity development practices were associated with all TA deployments.
- Performance management involved and utilised counterpart personnel from within the agency.

v. TA impact often resulted in significant and real impacts which have the potential to be sustained, these include:

- Government revenue increased as a direct consequence of TA deployment in Taxation. This was as a result improved business compliance.
- Government revenue increased as a direct consequence of TA deployment in Customs. This was as a result of increased excise collection.
- Government revenue indirectly increased as a consequence of improved and more regular audit activity in the Audit Office.
- Air Kiribati was able to maintain prescribed maintenance certification necessary for its ongoing existence.
- Air Kiribati was able to return to profitability as a result of management and administrative restructuring facilitated/catalysed by the deployment of TA.
- Tourism numbers are up and significantly tourist yield rates are by 48% as determined by the latest tourism expenditure survey.

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³⁷ A variety of related mission documents were commissioned and cross-referenced (and at times peer reviewed) to the program as it exists. However there does not appear to be a mechanism established or documented which has allowed a consolidated program implementation strategy to be established.

³⁸ Significant activities likely to roll over include: the design of the new initiative and the review of Kiribati RERF.

- vi. Recruitment, deployment and management (including monitoring) of TA by PACTAM appears to be a relatively efficient and effective mechanism³⁹ for use by AusAID. It is characterised by:
 - Deployment being initiated by a single (relatively simple) service order.
 - TA selection, mobilisation and demobilisation is managed by PACTAM.
 - TA performance management is embedded in the home agency and supported by PACTAM.
 - Financial and performance management reports are regularly provided to the Post.

2.2 Weaknesses

The major weaknesses of TPSS appear a function of the (apparent) non-existence of single unified (and endorsed) design document to guide program implementation and evaluation. Significant amongst these are:

The lack of documentation associated with a unified program design and implementation makes it impossible to determine the program's effectiveness against pre-determined and agreed objectives⁴⁰. The lack of design documentation also results in:

- A lack of programming and in-country management structure which allows for cohesive dialogue with partners and beneficiaries within a coordinated and strategic framework. This means that AusAID personnel are often drawn into exchanges which are operational and not focussed at a strategic level.
 - The lack of a performance framework which guides informed knowledge acquisition and sharing of outcomes associated with the program i.e. technical and cross-cutting outcomes. This results in information being lost with regards to organisational (GoK and AusAID) development.
 - The inability to understand how and why the program is 'targeted' towards certain activities e.g. the default use of TA for a majority of the budget.
 - The inability to understand why the program committed and expended significant funds on 'missions' which did not appear to progress beyond conceptual dialogue e.g. the joint AusAID/NZAID mission in April 2006, the multi-donor PFM Mission in December 2006 and the AusAID Public Sector design mission in 2008.
 - The implied emphasis on donor harmonisation when there appears little evidence indicating proactive donor harmonisation has taken place within the program⁴¹.
 - The inability to legitimately implement and track cross-cutting (gender, HIV/AIDs/Corruption/disability/environmental & disaster mitigation) objectives and outcomes.
- ii. The significant support for TA deployment without direct reference to the consistent use of appropriate capacity development strategies which are likely to achieve sustainable outcomes e.g.
- Transparent financial reporting to counterpart agencies (before and after deployment) of TA cost to assist with informed decision making with regards to alternative TA options.

³⁹ A detailed analysis of the cost effectiveness of PACTAM compared to other TA contractor/contracting modalities would be well worth pursuing to determine the 'real' cost benefits which may exist by using the Facility.

⁴⁰ The ICR ToR indicates that program objectives were determined by a joint ADB/WB/NZAID/AusAID mission conducted in 2006 – however the programming mission did not develop or recommend a program design. QAI reports indicate the program's objectives align to the 2008-11 KDP.

⁴¹ It is noted a number of joint missions did take place, however they did not appear to have a direct impact upon TPSS.

- Inconsistent recruitment strategies (counterpart involvement at interview) across the program.
- TA deployments with ill-defined counterpart relationships and training requirements.
- Appropriate balance/definition with regards to the use of direct and in-direct TA.
- Auxiliary and transparent resource allocations in support of TA deployment – including interface to work programs.
- The potential to use other TA options in support of identified priorities e.g. twinning and inter-agency deployments (exchanges), local/regional retirees, increased access to Pacific expertise, volunteers and youth ambassadors, and other TA/Support facilities (PFTAC, SPACSAI, PRIF)⁴²,
- The lack of opportunity to examine alternative funding options e.g. direct/indirect grants, alternative activity support based upon a cost and risk analysis.

3. Lessons Learned

i. A program must be delivered and managed within a well structured and robust operational framework/design that is readily available and understood. It should clearly outline:

a) Realistic objectives

b) A collaborative and cohesive management mechanisms aligned to partner government systems

c) A simple and relevant performance framework which benefits and services all partners and beneficiaries

d) Capacity development is a medium to long-term commitment which requires a longer term vision and implementation horizon.

e) Opportunities for donor harmonisation and the alignment of appropriate resources.

f) Strategies for addressing gender and other cross-cutting needs, priorities and outcomes within a legitimate framework.

ii. Financial and management mechanisms and decisions must be transparent

iii. TA is only one modality that can be used to improve the capacity of counterpart agencies within a development context – alternative options should be fully explored and used according to an appropriate risk allocation i.e. TA should not be used as the default mechanism of development support.

iv. When TA is chosen as an appropriate mechanism of development support consideration must be made with regards to:

a) Full and open transparency of financing and costs associated with the deployment of TA.

b) Auxiliary/ancillary resource support for the operational (recurrent) budget

c) The balance between the use of direct and in-direct TA and how if possible do we move from direct to in-direct TA over time.

d) Ensuring there are consistent and appropriate strategies used to empower and enhance counterpart capacity during TA deployment e.g. counterpart involvement in the development of ToRs, recruitment and performance management.

v. If a program is 'targeting' its support, then it must define and align the use of resources to well defined and articulated activities/initiatives/objectives which may impact upon the desired outcome i.e. do not expend your resources over a diverse spectrum of beneficiaries who/which may have a limited individual impact on the overall program objective(s).

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⁴² Pacific Financial and Technical Assistance Centre, South Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions and the Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility

4. Options and Opportunities for the Future

It has been suggested that the next phase of support should aligned to GoK/GoA Partnership for Development Priority Three; i.e. Improved Growth and Economic Development. This priority specifically addresses Kiribati's need to raise more revenue and better allocate resources to meet the immediate development requirements.

Discussions undertaken during the in-country consultations confirm that this priority is valid and achievable. It is also a consistent and appropriate extension of the current program with the ability to build upon successful initiatives which have already had some limited impact i.e. improved taxation and revenue collections. It is therefore proposed that the future design process limit its scope to focussing on a program fully aligned to the Ministry of Finance. This program would directly support⁴³:

1. Ministry of Finance capacity to better manage Public Finance Management within a Whole of Government context
2. Improved Budget Development and Management i.e. government expenditure
3. Increased Revenue Strategies and Opportunities i.e. government income

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With regards to improved Ministry of Finance capacity to better manage Public Finance Management within a Whole of Government context, it is suggested the proposed design process could look at opportunities to support GoK with regards to:

- Ensuring the objectives of Priority Three of the GoK/GoA Partnership for Development are achieved.
- Designing an initiative with a robust 'program approach' i.e. within a WoG context; with a single governance structure which provides services to multiple stakeholders; addresses issues of horizontal integration at the governance and implementation level; is sequenced in a way that allows logical and seamless progression, and has a simple and effective performance framework which manages knowledge and information for learning.
- Ensuring the design incorporates and utilises 'best practice' capacity building principles i.e. accountability, transparency and open dialogue; collaborative governance, leadership and strategic management; actively supports and encourages the use of alternative development methodologies, beyond TA; uses and utilises longer-term professional networks within and across the Pacific, and where TA is utilised - structure it within a phased context, and finally establish a long-term horizon for the program.
- Appropriately and effectively addresses issues and priorities associated with gender, HIV/AIDs, the environment (e.g. green finance), corruption, disability and disaster mitigation.
- Examine opportunities for truly harmonising (at a minimum front-end processes) with other significant donor partners i.e. NZAID; World Bank and the ADB

With regards to improved budget development and management it is suggested the proposed program could look at opportunities to support GoK with regards to strengthening:

- Budget credibility
- Budget comprehensiveness and transparency
- Policy based budgeting
- Budget predictability (including development/donor contributions which are poorly reported)
- Control in budget execution

⁴³ These priorities all align to identified performance indicators outlined in the 2009 Public Finance Management Report.

- Debt management
- Accounts recording and reporting
- Potential for appropriate public sector reform opportunities deriving from and aligned to improved economic financial management practices.

With regards to increased revenue strategies it is suggested the proposed program could look at opportunities to support GoK with regards to enhancing:

- Taxation compliance and collection
- Revenue compliance and collection
- Licensing support and/or reform
- Reform of the State Owned Enterprises including privatisation
- GST/VAT options and opportunities
- External scrutiny and auditing
- Supportive and empowering legislative opportunities
- Ongoing and alternative opportunities for supporting continued investment in the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund, or alternative trust account options⁴⁴.

The new design could also assess its risk profile relative to other AusAID investments and examine opportunities for pursuing design opportunities with a higher risk profile to enable the program to trial working within existing government systems and structures e.g. direct and indirect grants to the MoF to manage identified and allocated resources.

5. Next Steps

1. It is anticipated to have a draft ICR available for circulation at the end of May 2010⁴⁵
2. During the first two weeks the draft ICR is circulated and comments collated with regards to the draft ICR
3. Collated comments incorporated into the final draft and further consultations* undertaken if necessary with a final version of the ICR being available late June.
4. It is suggested that AusAID initiate the development of the new program's design ToR and recruit and deploy a design team as soon as possible. It is important not to underestimate the likely delays in commissioning and approving (including tendering) a new design⁴⁶.

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6. Conclusion

Despite the lack of documentation associated with the design, TPSS has been reasonably well managed and implemented within an adhoc context. The existing program has been well received and greatly appreciated by partner agencies and beneficiaries. The program appears to have achieved significant financial and development impacts across a number of partner agencies e.g. taxation, customs tourism and Air Kiribati.

It is now an appropriate time to refocus and realign the program within a more robust and targeted development methodology/design supporting the GoK/GoA Partnership for Development (Priority Three - Improved Growth and Economic Development).

⁴⁴ This opportunity could also be examined in the broader context of ongoing Australian development investment in Kiribati.

⁴⁵ As discussed at the time the consultant was engaged, previous commitments exist which will limit opportunities to quickly process the completion of both the draft and final report, hence the delayed submission of both reports.

⁴⁶ Most designs the consultant has been associated with in the past have taken 6-9 months to complete i.e. including recruitment/mobilisation; concept paper and design peer reviewing and subsequent successful tendering. Some large initiatives have taken over 12 months.

Attachment B – Terms of Reference

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

Review of the Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support Program (TPSS)

1. Background

The Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support (TPSS) initiative was established following a joint AusAID, NZAID, Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank (WB) mission in late 2006. It was designed to respond to priority issues that were identified during consultations for the Kiribati Development Plan 2008-11 (KDP) as requested by the Government of Kiribati (GoK).

Its objectives are to:

1. Ensure sustainability of the public sector planning system
2. Strengthen public finance management
3. Build capacity in priority areas

Activities under each objective area aim to improve performance through a focus on the systems and processes within GoK central Ministries and Agencies.

Following the signing of the Australia Kiribati Partnership for Development (PPD) in January 2009 and the onset of the Global Recession, greater focus has been placed on increasing Government revenue. In 2009, the bulk of Australia's assistance was delivered through the ongoing placement of technical advisers in central Ministries and Agencies to improve performance and increase revenue.

The TPSS finishes on 30 June 2010 and will be superseded by a new program under PPD Outcome 3: Improved Growth and Economic Management.

2. Purpose and objectives of Review

The purpose of the review will be to provide an independent evaluation of the performance of this initiative, in compliance with AusAID performance assessment guidelines for Quality at Completion. The review will:

- i) Assess and assign a rating for the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, monitoring and evaluation, gender equality, analysis and learning for the TPSS.
- ii) Provide lessons learned for management of activities to improve public sector performance and public finance management, with recommendations for future implementation of activities, including any under the new program under PPD Outcome 3.

3. Evaluation Methodology

The Consultant should conduct a desk review of program documentation, followed by a field visit to Tarawa.

The Consultant should:

- i) Develop a brief (no more than 2 page) evaluation plan, with a focus on planning for field work, including a list of meetings required;

- ii) Attend a briefing at the AusAID Program Office in Tarawa on commencement of field work;

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- iii) Meet with relevant staff in Central Ministries and Agencies which have benefited from activities under the TPSS
- iv) Meet with ADB and WB offices in Suva, and Counsellor Suva Post on the way through to Kiribati [NB, could also undertake interviews by telephone. Romaine – pls let us know if you'd like to meet the consultant];
- v) Draft the independent evaluation, and revise as required in response to AusAID review processes (technical review by Office of Development Effectiveness and Peer Review via written comments from relevant areas of AusAID).

4. Review scope

In writing the report, the Consultant should provide:

- i) An assessment of and rating (from 1-6, in accordance with AusAID Quality at Completion Guidelines) for TPSS in relation to:
 - Relevance - whether the activity contributes to higher level objectives of the aid program as outlined in country and thematic strategies;
 - Effectiveness - whether the activity achieves clearly stated objectives, particularly in regards to technical assistance;
 - Efficiency - whether the activity achieves value for money from inputs of funds, staff and other resources, and whether it continually manages risks. This should be done particularly in regards to technical assistance inputs and direct funding to the Government of Kiribati;
 - Sustainability - whether the activity appropriately addresses sustainability so that the benefits of the activity will continue after funding has ceased, with due account of partner government systems, stakeholder ownership and the phase-out strategy. This should be done particularly in regards to technical assistance;
 - Monitoring and evaluation - whether the monitoring and evaluation framework effectively measures progress towards meeting objectives;
 - Gender equality - whether the activity advances gender equality and promotes women (considering four dimensions of gender equality: access, decision-making, women's rights and capacity-building); and
 - Analysis and learning - whether the activity is based on sound technical analysis and continuous learning.
- ii) An assessment of 'lessons learned' and a set of recommendations for the implementation of future public sector financial management programs. Specifically, this should include:
 - lessons around in-line deployment of technical assistance, taking into consideration the weak capacity of GoK Ministries and Agencies and the need for real and sustainable capacity building;
 - lessons around harmonisation of assistance with other partners such as ADB, WB and NZAID;
 - Linkages between the TPSS and other regional initiatives, funded by other partners as well as by AusAID, such as the regional audit program;

- Capacity of AusAID's Program Office in Tarawa to provide program management and monitoring of the TPSS, in terms of resources, time and skills;
- Recruitment of suitable technical assistance and the continued relevance and effectiveness of the PACTAM as a recruitment and management tool. The quality assurance role of PACTAM should also be examined, as well as other mechanisms for ensuring the quality of technical assistance inputs;

5. Timeframe and Inputs

The Consultant should commence the evaluation on 26 April and finalise the evaluation report by 31 May. This will include up to 5 days input for a desk review of relevant program documentation and up to 5 days field work in Tarawa, Kiribati.

6. Reports and Milestones

The Consultant should provide the following reports:

i) A brief (no more than 2 page) evaluation plan, with a focus on planning for field work by 30 April;

ii) A draft independent evaluation report of no longer than 15 pages, addressing the above scope by 13 May or 5 days after field work is complete, whichever is earliest;

iii) A final report one week after receiving AusAID comments following any technical and peer review processes.

The milestones will be as follows:

i) 60% of professional fees, upon AusAID acceptance of the draft independent completion report;

ii) 40% of professional fees, upon AusAID acceptance of the final independent completion report; and

iii) An amount for reimbursables, covering travel costs (flights, accommodation, airport tax, per diems and in-country transport) to be claimed as costs are incurred.

7. Skills and experience of review team

It is expected that the review will be undertaken by one Consultant, who should have the following skills and experience:

i) Excellent written and verbal communication and demonstrated ability to produce written work to a high standard;

ii) Monitoring and evaluation expertise, including excellent analytical skills as well as consultative and participatory research methods;

iii) Experience in best practice capacity development, including the use of technical assistance;

iv) Experience in evaluation of programs in the Pacific, with experience in Kiribati preferred; and

v) An understanding of evaluation in relation to gender equality.

8. Reading

i) Kiribati Development Plan 2008-2011.

ii) TPSS Activity reports

iii) GoK Ministry and Agency reports

iv) AusAID Quality at Completion guidelines.

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Attachment C – Persons Consulted

Ministry, Institution, Agency or Organisation Represented	Persons Consulted
Government of Kiribati	
Ministry of Finance	Tiimi Kaiekieki - Director Bintonga Even – DS
Public Service Office	Wiiriki Tooma – PS
Ministry of Communications, Transport and Tourism	Tarataake Teannaki – STO Bwereeti Tentoa – AS Danial Rochford – PACTAM Advisor
Audit Office	Toromon Metuatera – Commissioner
Air Kiribati	Iosabata Namakin – CEO Hibwebwe Kabiriera – PDO
Customs	Tekaie Ititaake – PCO Anee Tenanoa - SCO Teekeke Tataio – CO
Taxation	Taake Camma – CoT
Attorney General	Titabu Tabane – AG
Office of the President	Tangtang Kaureata
NZAID	Kurs Hakaraie – DHC
AusAID	Joanne Craigie – FS Romaine Kwesius – Counsellor Suva (phone) Corrine Tarnawsky – DPS Naunta Taatu – PM Anglea Corcoran – Director (phone)
World Bank	Kylie Coulson – by email
ADB	Emma Ferguson – by email
AVI – PACTAM	Goopy Weaving – by phone

Attachment D – Consultation Questions and Work Plan

1. Consultation Communication with the World Bank and the ADB

As you are aware, I have been working with the AusAID Post (via Corinne) to put together an AusAID Independent Completion Report (ICR) on the Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support Program (TSSP) which has worked across a number of GoK government departments over the past five years. In addition, there has been cooperation between the key donors (NZAID, the WB, the ADB and AusAID) to jointly support a number of activities which broadly are covered by TSSP.

Given we have not been able to chat on the phone; I'm hoping you might write some brief response to the following questions which I can use in the ICR.

1. Obviously there has been good high level dialogue between the key development partners in areas supported by TSSP. In your opinion how has this translated to actual sustainable impact with regards to improved public sector service delivery?
2. As above – except how has this translated to actual sustainable impact with regards to improved collection of revenue/taxes by GoK?
3. As above – except how has this translated to actual sustainable impact with regards to improved budget management by GoK?
4. As above – except how has this translated to actual sustainable impact with regards to private sector growth and improved participation in the economy.
5. How would you describe the key donors ability and willingness to harmonise both 'front end' and rear end' business practices in the Kiribati context to reduce transactional cost for both the donors and GoK. What are the main limitations to donor harmonisation and the alignment of business practices to GoK systems and structures?
6. From your experience and knowledge of TSSP how would you rate TSSP on a scale of 1 to 6 (1 being less than satisfactory and 6 being very high quality) with regards to TSSP:
 - a. Relevance
 - b. Effectiveness
 - c. Efficiency
 - d. Sustainability
 - e. Support for cross-cutting initiatives
 - f. Monitoring and evaluation, and
 - g. Shared analysis and learning.

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Thanks – I appreciate this is likely to cause you, or someone some additional work in the office. However if you are able to respond to the queries (albeitly briefly) it would be greatly appreciated.

I have to have a draft of the ICR to AusAID by the 28th May – so if you can get me brief responses by Wednesday the 26th May it would be greatly appreciated.

Best regards

2. Submitted Work Plan

Independent Review of the Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support Program (TPSS)

Objectives of the Review

The purpose of the review will be to provide an independent evaluation of the performance of the Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support Program. This review will include:

- i. A detailed desk assessment of all documentation associated with the design, implementation and management of the Program, and
- ii. In-country consultations with key stakeholders and partners associated with the implementation and management of the Program in Kiribati.

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The methodology and report produced will be in accord with AusAID's AusAID performance assessment guidelines for Quality at Completion reporting.

Program Background

The Kiribati Targeted Public Sector Support initiative was established following a joint AusAID, NZAID, Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank (WB) mission in late 2006. It was designed to respond to priority issues that were identified during consultations for the Kiribati Development Plan 2008-11 (KDP) as requested by the Government of Kiribati (GoK).

Its objectives are to:

1. Ensure sustainability of the public sector planning system
2. Strengthen public finance management
3. Build capacity in priority areas

Activities under each objective area aim to improve performance through a focus on the systems and processes within GoK central Ministries and Agencies.

In-Country Consultations

The independent consultant will be in Tarawa during the period 16-20 May 2010 to assess the program. The consultant will meet with key GoK partners and stakeholders to determine the perceived relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, monitoring and evaluation, gender equality, analysis and learning for Program. This will provide lessons learned for management of activities to improve public sector performance and public finance management, with recommendations for future implementation of activities, including any under a new proposed Program.

Consultations will involve a briefing at the AusAID Program Office in Tarawa. In addition the consultant will meet with relevant GoK staff in Central Ministries and Agencies which have benefited from activities under the TPSS. A phone hook-up will also be established with ADB and WB offices in Suva, and Counsellor Suva Post to discuss donor partner perceptions of TPSS.

Key Considerations

Stakeholder and partner discussions will focus on the following key questions:

Relevance

Were the TPSS objectives relevant to GoK, Australian Government and partner donor priorities?

Were the TPSS objectives relevant and appropriate to the context and needs of beneficiaries?

If not, what changes should have been made to the activity or its objectives to ensure ongoing relevance?

Effectiveness

Were TPSS objectives achieved? If not, why?

To what extent did supported activities and initiatives contribute to achievement of objectives?

Efficiency

Did the implementation of TPSS make effective use of time and resources to achieve the outcomes?

Was TPSS designed for optimal value for money?

Was TPSS able to work within and use GoK financial and public sectors systems – if not why not?

Have there been any financial variations to the TPSS? If so, was value for money considered in making these amendments?

Has management of TPSS been responsive to changing needs?

Did TPSS suffer from delays in implementation? If so, why and what was done about it?

Did the TPSS have sufficient and appropriate staffing resources?

Was a risk management approach applied to management of TPSS (including anti-corruption)?

What were the risks to achievement of objectives? Were the risks managed appropriately?

Impact

Did TPSS produce intended or unintended changes in the lives of beneficiaries and their environment, directly or indirectly?

Were there positive or negative impacts from external factors?

Sustainability

Do beneficiaries and/or GoK country stakeholders have sufficient ownership, capacity and resources to maintain the activity outcomes after partner funding has ceased?

Are there any areas of TPSS that are clearly not sustainable? What lessons can be learned from this?

Gender Equality

What were the outcomes of TPSS for women and men, boys and girls?

Did TPSS promote equal participation and benefits for women and men, boys and girls?

Did TPSS promote more equal access by women and men to the benefits of the activity, and more broadly to resources, services and skills?

Did TPSS promote equality of decision-making between women and men?

Did TPSS help to promote women's rights?

Did TPSS help to develop capacity (donors, partner government, civil society, etc) to understand and promote gender equality?

Monitoring and Evaluation

Does evidence exist to show that objectives have been achieved?

Were there features of the M&E system that represented good practice and improved the quality of the evidence available?

Was data gender-disaggregated to measure the outcomes of the activity on men, women, boys and girls?

Did the M&E system collect useful information on cross-cutting issues?

Analysis & Learning

How well was the TPSS design based on previous learning and analysis?

How well was learning from implementation and previous reviews (self-assessment and independent) integrated into the activity?

What lessons from TPSS can be applied to designing the next phase of the Program?