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Independent Review – Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package

Commissioned by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

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# Acronyms

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AAP | Accountability to Affected Populations |
| ADF | Australian Defence Force |
| BPF | Building Peaceful Futures consortium |
| CRC | Community Resource Centre |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| DFAT | Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade |
| dfid | Department for International Development |
| DMA | Directorate for Mine Action |
| DoHA | Department of Home of Affairs |
| DPO | Disabled People’s Organisation |
| GBV | Gender Based Violence |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GEWE | Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment |
| GHD  | Good Humanitarian Donorship |
| GoI | Government of Iraq |
| GPC | Global Protection Cluster |
| HAG | Humanitarian Advisory Group  |
| HAQC  | Humanitarian Aid Quality Check |
| HCT  | Humanitarian Country Team |
| HDP | Humanitarian Development Peace nexus |
| HI | Humanity and Inclusion (formerly Handicap International) |
| HRP | Humanitarian Response Plan |
| IASC | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IHO  | International Humanitarian Organisation |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| ISIL | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |
| IQR | Investment Quality Reporting  |
| KII | Key Informant Interviews |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MHPSS  | Mental Health and Psychosocial Support |
| MRE  | Mine Risk Education |
| NAP | National Action Plan |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NRC | Norwegian Refugee Council |
| OCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| PPA | Partner Performance Assessment |
| PSEA | Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse |
| SADD  | Sex, Age and Disability Disaggregated |
| SGBV | Sexual and gender-based Violence |
| SOP  | Standard Operating Procedure |
| SRH  | Sexual and Reproductive Health |
| STC | Save the Children |
| UNAMI  | UN Assistance Mission for Iraq |
| UNDP-FFS | United Nations Development Program – Fund for Stabilisation |
| UNFPA  | United Nations Fund for Population Activities |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children’s Fund |
| UNITAD | UN Investigative Team for the Accountability of Islamic State  |
| UNMAS | United Nations Mine Action Service |
| UNSCR  | UN Security Council Resolution |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| VfM  | Value for Money |
| WASH  | Water, Sanitation and Hygiene |
| WHS | World Humanitarian Summit |
| WPS  | Women, Peace and Security |

# Executive Summary

The rapid rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was enabled by successive conflicts from 1991 to present, political instability and sectarianism, a weakened security sector, limited government service delivery and the conflict in neighbouring Syria. Following ISIL gaining control of the city of Mosul in June 2014, the Government of Iraq (GoI) requested assistance from the United Nations (UN) and United States to “defeat ISIL and protect our territory and people”.[[1]](#endnote-1) In 2017, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) initiated the Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package (hereafter “the Package”) to respond to this context.

The headline finding of this review is that the Package was appropriately conceived and has been effective in responding to a highly complex operating environment and cross section of needs. The Package was designed to respond to the humanitarian needs of Iraq’s most vulnerable conflict-affected populations and support Iraqi communities on a path toward greater resilience, cohesion and stability. By working through trusted partners, simultaneous progress has been achieved in addressing short and medium-term humanitarian needs, rapid recovery and stabilisation activities in retaken areas, and advancing social cohesion within conflict-affected communities.

The Package has funded a highly relevant range of mandated actors including the UNFPA, UNDP, an International Humanitarian Organisation (IHO), UNICEF, UNMAS, IOM and the Building Peaceful Futures (BPF) consortium led by Save the Children. The Package design aligns with several key policy priorities for Australia as outlined in DFAT’s *Humanitarian Strategy* (2016)[[2]](#endnote-2) and *Protection Framework* (2013), notably Protection, Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP), Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GEWE) and disability inclusion. The Package further aligns with DFAT’s *Foreign Policy White Paper* (2017) and advances commitments made by Australia at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2016 to predictable, flexible, multi-year funding; locally-led humanitarian action; bridging the humanitarian-development divide; and promoting protection and leaving no-one behind.

## Conclusions

### Appropriateness and relevance

In terms of appropriateness to context, DFAT’s Iraq Package was well conceived and relevant at the time of design, and has remained relevant throughout due to built-in flexibility to adapt to change and respond to emerging priorities. This structure has facilitated timely responses to complex social cohesion needs, and urgent Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) needs in central and southern Iraq.

Iraq was frequently referred to as a “protection crisis” across the literature and interviews conducted, which is reflected in the investment partnerships and programs. Successive conflicts and sanctions have further seen Iraq’s decline to 152 out of 153 countries on the global gender index.[[3]](#endnote-3)

Iraq will continue to be a complex operating environment with diverse and shifting conflict dynamics across the areas of operation of Package partners. Localised conflict analysis efforts undertaken by partners have helped ensure relevance and contributed to measures to meaningfully engage affected populations. Looking forward, integrating conflict analysis in future Package designs and ongoing programs, including gender and Women, Peace and Security (WPS) considerations, will be important for maintaining relevance and effectiveness.

### Effectiveness

Overall, the Package has made critical contributions to humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion objectives, and delivered significant aggregate, partner and policy level results for Australia and most importantly the people of Iraq.

In terms of cumulative aggregate results as of 2019, compiled partner reports indicate **2,300,217** vulnerable women, men, boys and girls have been reached with life-saving assistance including improved access to WASH, Mine Risk Education (MRE), and Sexual Reproductive Health (SRH).[[4]](#endnote-4) Of these **928,307** people have benefited from improved access to protection services and information including legal assistance to access property rights and identity documents, services for survivors of gender-based violence (GBV) and awareness sessions on preventing GBV and MRE. Access to legal documentation was widely stated across interviews as being critically important due to facilitating access to property rights and government services, supporting women’s empowerment, and safe, dignified and durable returns.

Package performance in the thematic priority areas of GEWE and disability inclusion has achieved significant results. In terms of GEWE, there isstrong evidence of a strategic approach through leveraging the access of the Ambassador and coordinating with like-minded donors to advocate on passing anti-domestic violence legislation. There is further evidence of dedicated GBV services for survivors provided through UNFPA and mainstreaming through the work of the dedicated gender advisers in UNMAS and Care. Donors consulted through this review spoke highly of the role of DFAT and the Embassy in Baghdad in progressing understanding and practice related to GEWE through leadership, advocacy and program investments.

For disability inclusion, a strategic approach is evident through support to civil society shadow reporting on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), dedicated specialised services including 15 rehabilitation centres assisting 39,400 individuals provided through IHO, and investment in inclusion through the role of Humanity and Inclusion in the BPF consortium. IOM further report that Australia’s bilateral advocacy resulted in the development of their first country level disability inclusion strategy that has been replicated across other responses.

Moving forward, the current Package approach and future packages would benefit from clearer alignment with *Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC)*[[5]](#endnote-5) protection standards, including being informed by a comprehensive protection risk analysis. The importance of alignment with the IASC standards relate to it being the highest-level humanitarian coordination forum with responsibility for formulating policy with system-wide implications. Aligning DFAT policy and M&E guidance with IASC protection standards improves coherence with sector standards and indicators, and better frames and captures the full range of results achieved. The review further observed that AAP practices and results are difficult to capture with the current metrics. Looking ahead systems to ensure the inclusive and representative voice of affected populations will require greater attention.

Despite the significant results achieved to date, complex humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion needs remain in Iraq and will be exacerbated by the multi-faceted challenges of COVID-19. These complex needs include the “hardened” internally displaced person (IDP) caseload; high levels of discrimination preventing access to government services; and long-standing social cohesion and reconciliation challenges. As a result, increased attention is needed toward social cohesion and reconciliation, governance, rule of law, access to justice and economic reform as the FFS transitions to early recovery. Future assistance to Iraq should be informed by inclusive community engagement processes to ensure no one is left behind.

### Connectedness and sustainability

Package partners ability to engage with GoI officials varies across geographic areas and can be complicated by the high turnover of senior staff at the central and governorate levels. Multilateral partners consulted demonstrated high levels of engagement with their GoI counterparts. The BPF consortium and IOM demonstrated investment in and support to Disabled People’s Organisations (DPO) and Civil Society Organisations (CSO) to advance disability rights and social cohesion objectives.

### Efficiency

Reaching firm conclusions in relation to the efficiency of Package investments is difficult due to the nature of unearmarked funding and related reporting. However, annual Partner Performance Appraisals (PPA) are undertaken, which review individual partner performance over the preceding 12-month period. These point to relatively strong performance among partners in terms of value for money (VfM) and alignment with DFAT policy priorities.

Partners expressed a strong appreciation for Australia’s commitment to multi-year funding, and its contribution to programming effectiveness and efficiency in Iraq. In particular, interviewees spoke persuasively to the efficiency dividend of multi-year funding in terms of building trust and relationships with local partners to work on social cohesion challenges and facilitate local ownership.

### Monitoring and knowledge management

In line with Australia’s Grand Bargain commitments, DFAT requires limited project-specific reporting from multilateral partners and works to ensure that its information needs align with existing data collection processes. This is intended to minimise the reporting burden on partners. Periodic reporting by the Package partners is collated by the Humanitarian Advisory Group (HAG) who provide six monthly reports to DFAT. These reports are then used by DFAT Post and Canberra to review performance and identify areas for follow-up.

This process collates a wide range of data and complies with Australia’s Grand Bargain commitment to harmonised and simplified reporting requirements. It does however highlight uneven reporting across the Package resulting in limited line of sight on the performance of some partners and makes comparative analysis difficult. It also impacts the appropriateness and relevance of the evidence being gathered, and its ability to be “meaningfully used and applied by DFAT management to improve Package outcomes in real time” in line with the stated objective of the Package M&E framework.

This limitation is mitigated by the important role of the Iraq-based Humanitarian Officer who engages and follows up with partners, participates in coordination fora, and works to triangulate reported results through consultation with relevant stakeholders. These efforts are by necessity primarily Baghdad based given in-country access challenges which impedes the ability to observe community level performance. Within this operational context, like-minded donors and agencies spoke to the efficacy of third party monitoring in Iraq, and its critical contribution to helping determine the quality and effectiveness of field level performance and contribute to AAP objectives.

It is also felt that efforts to more explicitly align DFAT policy and M&E guidance with current policy and normative commitments, including IASC standards, would strengthen policy coherence and enable more accurate framing and capturing of results.

### Women, Peace and Security (WPS)

Australia, and the Ambassador in particular, have contributed to strengthening the protective environment for women and girls in Iraq through a strategic approach to GEWE, investment in dedicated programs and mainstreaming efforts. Looking forward, advancing the WPS agenda in Iraq will require increased attention to women’s meaningful participation. This should include facilitating space for evidence-based dialogue with key stakeholders that gender equality reduces conflict risk and the inclusion of women leads to more durable and quality peace. WPS civil society in particular would benefit from more targeted capacity building measures including access to small-scale grants.

### Australia’s national interest

Without minimising the importance of the humanitarian imperative and adherence to Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles, there is wide recognition that continued assistance to Iraq is critical to pave the necessary conditions for stability and peace. DFAT interviewees further noted the importance of the Package investments in facilitating Australia’s seat at the table in strategic discussions and forums to advocate on WPS and humanitarian reform among other priorities. Continued support to Iraq aligns with Australia’s seat on the Human Right Council (HRC) and commitment to advancing gender equality and respect for human rightsin recognition of the role they play in “making Australia and the world safer and more secure”.[[6]](#endnote-6)

## Recommendations

Based on the above conclusions and results achieved, the review recommends a two-year extension of the current package to consolidate humanitarian and stabilisation gains, with more specific recommendations detailed below.

Maintain and strengthen an appropriate, relevant and effective package approach through diplomatic leadership and programming support for the following:

* Advocate and maintain support for critical protection services including legal information, counselling and assistance, specialised services for survivors of GBV and persons with disabilities, and access to detention facilities.
* Advocate and consider support for the programming necessary to advance stabilisation objectives including social cohesion and reconciliation, governance and rule of law, economic reform and inclusive community level engagement processes.
* Increase resource allocation to reconciliation and social cohesion, and consider current and new specialised partners.
* Support trusted partners to adapt and respond to the health, protection and economic impacts of COVID-19 on the most vulnerable.
* Continue to exercise diplomatic leadership and engage in strategic coordination with like-minded donors on issues of common interest such as GEWE, WPS and rights-based returns.
* Ensure future support and ongoing partner activities are informed by conflict analysis that integrates gender and identifies opportunities to advance WPS objectives.

Improve effectiveness through alignment with IASC protection standards

* Strengthen Iraq’s M&E framework and future package designs and M&E processes through alignment with IASC protection standards including a comprehensive protection risk analysis and three levels of action – strategic approach, dedicated programs and mainstreaming.
* Review and update current M&E processes and indicators with reference to independently verifiable indicators for AAP and Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA).

Progress connectedness, sustainability and efficiency

* Support progressive transition toward GoI leadership, continue to provide multi-year funding to partners and include indicators for tracking how they are building the financial management and reporting capacity of their local partners.
* Advocate for an appropriate and efficient coordination structure that caters for the remaining humanitarian needs, maintains the centrality of protection and strengthens engagement with national partners.

Enhance Package level M&E, document good practice, and improve policy coherence

* Strengthen Package level M&E through third party monitoring and more structured dialogue with partners through the role of posted Humanitarian Officer.
* Document good practice lessons from Iraq to inform ongoing and future packages.
* Review systemic M&E challenges that result in high levels of variation in partner reporting and update guidance and tools to align with current IASC standards to more accurately frame and capture results.
* Initiate DFAT policy guidance to accompany the Partnerships for Recovery: Australia’s COVID-19 Development Response (2020) to support Australia’s engagement in complex protracted crises and address the significant policy level and normative developments since the release of the Humanitarian Strategy (2016) and Protection Framework (2013).[[7]](#endnote-7)

Advance the WPS agenda through supporting Iraqi women’s meaningful participation

* Increase bilateral diplomatic engagement and coordinated advocacy with like-minded donors on advancing Iraqi women’s meaningful participation, including through an updated and appropriately resourced National Action Plan (NAP), and identify opportunities to strengthen more direct support to WPS civil society.

# Background

Iraq has experienced a sustained period of conflict, displacement and instability since 2003. This situation intensified as a result of the 2014-17 conflict against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package (hereafter “the Package”) initiated in 2017 by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) responds to this context by supporting international efforts aimed at meeting the humanitarian needs of Iraq’s most vulnerable conflict-affected populations, while also supporting Iraqi communities on a path towards greater resilience, cohesion and stability.

Working through a strategically identified cross-section of partners, DFAT supported activities are designed to address the short and medium term humanitarian needs of affected populations; rapid recovery and stabilisation activities in retaken areas (including rehabilitation of essential public services and economic opportunities); and initiatives aimed at reconciliation and social cohesion within conflict affected communities.

Collectively, these investments are intended to support two end-of-Package outcomes:

* Vulnerable people in Iraq affected by the conflict receive inclusive humanitarian assistance and have greater access to protection services;
* Institutions, infrastructure and social conditions improved for conflict-affected populations to recover and build resilience in a safe and stable environment.

Tab. 1: Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package Overview

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Partner  | 2017/18 | 2018/19 | 2019/20 | Total |
| Humanitarian  | **$18.5 million** | **$20.5 million** | **$20.2 million** | **$59.2 million** |
| IHO | $8 million | $5 million | $5 million | $18 million |
| UNFPA | $4 million | $4 million | $4.7 million | $12.7 million |
| UNICEF | Not funded | $4.5 million | $4 million | $8.5 million |
| Save the Children | $6.5 million | $7 million | $6.5 million | $20 million |
| Stabilisation  | **$9 million** | **$12 million** | **$10 million** | **$31 million** |
| UNDP | $6 million | $6 million | $6 million | $18 million |
| UNMAS | $3 million | $6 million | $4 million | $13 million |
| Social Cohesion/ Reconciliation  | **$500,000** | **$3 million** | **$1.5 million** | **$5 million** |
| IOM | Not funded | $3 million | $1.5 million | $4.5 million |
| Mosul project | $500,000 | Not funded | Not funded | $0.5 million |
| Administration | **$29,000** | **$456,000** | **$469,000** | **$954,000** |
| Admin and M&E | $29,000 | $456,000 | $469,000 | $954,000 |
| Total | **$28 million** | **$36 million** | **$32.2 million** | **$96.2 million** |

The Package aims to align with key priorities for Australia as outlined in DFAT’s Humanitarian Strategy (2016)[[8]](#endnote-8) and Protection Framework (2013), notably Protection, Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP), Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GEWE) and disability inclusion. The Package also aligns with DFAT’s Foreign Policy White Paper (2017) and advances commitments made by Australia at the World Humanitarian Summit (2016) to predictable and flexible funding, locally-led humanitarian action, bridging the humanitarian-development divide and promoting protection and leaving no-one behind.

Australia (through DFAT) has also supported the OECD DAC recommendation on the Humanitarian Development Peace (HDP) nexus coherence which sets out principles for good practice including “prevention always, development where we can and humanitarian support when we must”.[[9]](#endnote-9) This recommendation was endorsed after the Iraq Package design but together with Australia’s 2016 WHS commitment to the HDP nexus, both will be used to inform this review and forward-looking recommendations.

# Context analysis (including UN Security Council Resolution 1325 WPS and COVID-19)

The following is intended to provide an updated context analysis that includes a brief overview of key developments since the package design, factors relevant to evaluating the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, and grounding the recommendations moving forward. The following is non-exhaustive and further sector level analysis can be found in the Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) (2020).

## Conflict and fragility

Successive conflicts from 1991 to present, political instability and sectarianism, a weakened security sector and limited government service delivery, combined with the conflict in neighbouring Syria contributed to the rapid rise of ISIL in Iraq. In June 2014 following ISIL gaining control of Mosul, the GoI requested assistance from the UN and US to “defeat ISIL and protect our territory and people”.[[10]](#endnote-10) The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been a key partner of the US-led coalition military intervention to defeat ISIL, including Operation Inherent Resolve.

Over the past three decades, Iraq has experienced several cumulative shocks that have presented significant political, economic and social cohesion challenges for the GoI and its institutions, and between the GoI and its people.[[11]](#endnote-11) Successive conflicts have also resulted in Iraq being classified as the “most contaminated country by extent of mined area”.

Iraq’s economy is state run and highly dependent on the oil sector which constitutes an estimated 90 percent of government revenue and 65 percent of GDP.[[12]](#endnote-12) Despite the declared defeat of ISIL in late 2017, Iraq continues to experience political instability, endemic discrimination and regional tensions, as well as a popular protest movement that has been met with disproportionate and excessive use of force by state security actors.[[13]](#endnote-13) Humanitarian access is impacted by high levels of insecurity and bureaucratic impediments.

ISIL conducted widespread and systematic violations against civilian populations – including minority groups, women, and girls – that may amount to crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.[[14]](#endnote-14) In September 2017, the UN Investigative Team to promote Accountability for crimes committed by Da’esh/ ISIL (UNITAD) was established under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2379. There has yet to be any domestic or international legal accountability for rape or sexual slavery committed by an ISIL member.[[15]](#endnote-15) These grave violations combined with increasing gender inequality and additional human rights concerns present significant challenges for reconciliation and future peace and security in Iraq.[[16]](#endnote-16) They further highlight the importance of continued investment in accountability measures and GEWE across the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) continuum.

## UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security

Historically, women and girls in Iraq enjoyed more rights and freedoms than their regional counterparts. This includes the right to vote, run for political office, attend school and own property.[[17]](#endnote-17) However, successive conflicts and sanctions from 1991 to present have seen Iraq’s decline to 152 out of 153 countries on the global gender index.[[18]](#endnote-18) Patriarchal norms and discriminatory legal frameworks combined with conflict and fragility have significantly weakened the protective environment for women and girls and reduced their engagement in the public sphere.

The Iraqi constitution established a minimum 25 percent quota for women in parliament, however their access to influence and power remains constrained by patriarchal norms, evidenced by the 21 member parliamentary Committee on Security and Defence having no female members.[[19]](#endnote-19)

“Women make up 50 percent of the population, how can you possibly attempt to create and maintain international peace and security when you’re excluding 50 percent of the population?”

Sarah Taylor NGO Working Group WPS [[20]](#endnote-20)

Iraq’s current peace and security challenges and increasing gender inequality align with global evidence on the importance of the investing in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The political participation and inclusion of women in peace processes as well as being rights-based, is empirically linked to improving the quality and durability of peace.[[21]](#endnote-21) Empirical studies demonstrate gender equality is the greatest predictor of peace ahead of economic prosperity, level of democracy or religious identity.[[22]](#endnote-22) Conversely, lower levels of gender inequality increase internal and inter-state conflict risks.

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| The WPS Agenda can be broken down into four pillars: i) Participation, ii) Conflict prevention, iii) Protection and Relief and Recovery.These can then be further broken down into the following sub-thematic issues: peace processes, disarmament, sexual and gender-based violence, peacekeeping, displacement and humanitarian response, human rights, justice, rule of law, participation, security sector reform and reconstruction.Current practice tends to focus on women’s leadership in peace making and conflict prevention – and prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence. While the latter dominates media coverage and discourse, it is increasing attention and investment in women’s participation and leadership that is needed to prevent the latter and facilitate durable peace.[[23]](#endnote-23)*Adapted from* [*Advancing Women, Peace in the Security in the Middle East*](https://www.redr.org.au/media/dswf4xt4/advancing-women-peace-and-security-in-the-middle-east-cop-report.pdf) *(2019[[24]](#endnote-24))* |

Iraq’s *WPS National Action Plan (NAP)*[[25]](#endnote-25) expired in 2018 and challenges were reported in securing an updated plan that engages the necessary ministries. It is understood there is a revised draft in circulation at the time of writing. The Ambassador has been actively advocating with the GoI on the importance of an agreed and fully funded NAP. In terms of the Iraq Package, the humanitarian and stabilisation components have advanced the protection and relief and recovery pillars of WPS and will need continued support. Looking forward, increased attention to the participation pillar and engaging representative WPS civil society will need more dedicated attention and diplomatic engagement.[[26]](#endnote-26)

## Situation as of April 2020

According to the 2020 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) almost 1.4 million Iraqi’s remain displaced, with 370,000 remaining in camps. Between 2018 and mid 2019 an estimated 4.5 million Iraqis returned to their places of origin.[[27]](#endnote-27) Since mid-2019, returns have slowed significantly and in late 2019 the GoI increased pressure to close remaining camps resulting in some forced returns. Those that remain in IDP camps are frequently referred to as the “hardened caseload” – those with a perceived affiliation to ISIL and/or without the means or likelihood to achieve a durable solution in their place of origin. At present, the GoI’s only accepted durable solution is return to place of origin, which appears impractical for all within this caseload.

In Iraq, the 2013 Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) commitment to ensuring the centrality of protection has been reinforced in successive HRPs as a strategic objective and is supported by the 2019-21 Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) level protection strategy. The strategy is informed by a comprehensive protection risk analysis and accountable through an accompanying action plan and regular standing agenda item at the HCT. The strategy reinforces the IASC commitments to AAP and Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) recognising the critical importance of regular and structured engagement with age, gender and diversity representative populations to understand their needs, vulnerabilities and coping strategies. The strategy calls for a system wide approach that engages human rights, recovery and development partners, civil society and member states to assist Iraq in strengthening its governance through “security, rule of law, access to justice, socio-economic protection, and crucially, to ensure non-discriminatory access to public services”.[[28]](#endnote-28)

Despite the challenging context, significant progress has been made through DFAT’s humanitarian and stabilisation funding in terms of assistance, reconstruction and the level of internally displaced person (IDP) returns. A recent Global Protection Cluster (GPC) mission found that “In some governorates, joint efforts by Iraqi institutions, humanitarians and development actors have seen substantial progress: delivery of humanitarian aid, creation of compensation schemes, return of displaced people, resumption of services, reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, creation of laws and the reinstatement of the rule of law.”[[29]](#endnote-29) The mission further noted that progress has been uneven, and some of the more challenging underserved conflict-affected areas require continued support to address the underlying drivers of conflict and ethno-religious tensions that present residual conflict risks, and prevent durable peace and returns.[[30]](#endnote-30)

## COVID-19

COVID-19 will exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities and inequalities in Iraq. The intersection of COVID-19 and conflict risk in Iraq is aggravated by low levels of trust in GoI institutions, a weakened health system and limited and uneven basic service delivery across the country.[[31]](#endnote-31) The impact of COVID-19 combined with declining oil revenue will increase demand on a weakened health system that will have fewer resources to deliver.[[32]](#endnote-32) International organisations have highlighted the pre-existing vulnerability and high impact of socio-economic aftershocks if measures are not taken now to save lives, and protect livelihoods and food security. COVID-19 presents opportunities for non-state armed actors to capitalise on grievances, as evidenced by an increase in ISIL operations over April-May 2020.[[33]](#endnote-33)

While COVID-19 presents additional challenges, an adequately resourced response presents an opportunity in the Iraq context. In addition to enhancing Australia’s reputation as a good humanitarian donor in responding to humanitarian needs if delivered sensitively, it could facilitate higher trust levels in GoI institutions amongst the Iraqi people, and further progress stabilisation objectives through minimising the impact of COVID-19 on vulnerable populations and future drivers of conflict.

# Methodology

The purpose of this review is to assess the effectiveness, appropriateness and relevance of the Package, provide an important accountability mechanism for DFAT and facilitate evidence-based decision-making with respect to future assistance to Iraq. The review approach was desk-based primarily due to security considerations and access issues. The Review Plan was finalised following a literature review and consultations with key DFAT staff in March 2020 (**Annex II**).

Key Informant Interviews (KII) constituted the primary data collection method. From the 2 March to 14 April 2020, **33 KIIs were undertaken with 43 individuals** (20 female and 23 male) across DFAT and whole of government partners (8), Package partners (15), like-minded donors (4) and other relevant stakeholders (6). KIIs were undertaken in a semi-structured manner, responsive to the context, experience and expertise of the interviewee, and encouraging of additional relevant information. Several key actors were interviewed multiple times but have only been counted once. The full list of interviewees can be found in **Annex I**.

## Limitations and mitigation measures

Being desk based, the approach was reliant on available literature and phone interviews with partner agency representatives and other key informants from the donor and humanitarian community. While every effort was made to identify those best placed within each partner agency to comment on Australia’s contribution, there was considerable variance across interviewees in terms of their understanding of the specific intent of Australia’s Iraq Package, and also their understanding of field level programming, practice and issues – most notably practices related to AAP.

When there were outstanding questions following interviews, further information was sought from the partner by email, or augmented through interviews with other key informants such as donors, cluster representatives and agencies working in related fields.

The primary limitation of the review process was the inability of the review team to observe on the ground performance of partners and consult with affected populations and government representatives to validate partner-reporting assertions. While the decision for the review to be desk based is understandable given the context, it requires the review to rely heavily on partner reporting as a true and accurate representation of partner performance. While qualitative aspects of partner performance were explored during interviews with representatives, and triangulated through discussions with other donors, quantitative data is drawn directly from partner reporting as aggregated within the Package M&E framework.

The review team considered modalities to consult affected populations remotely, however this was not considered feasible due to the limited time and resources available. The review team were not able to consult with GoI representatives at the national or sub-national levels or local partners, but were able to interview the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI) which represents national and international NGOs. While the review team did discuss several options with DFAT to secure GoI participation, ultimately it was not deemed appropriate due to ongoing political uncertainty and the lack of individuals within GoI sufficiently well positioned to comment on the overall Australian package.

Overall, the complementary expertise and gender composition of the review team assisted with navigating the challenges presented by the review context and situating the following findings, conclusions and recommendations.

# Appropriateness and relevance

## Context at design (late 2017)

From the outset, the Iraq Package was conceived by DFAT as needing to be an “umbrella design” capable of providing a framework through which Australia could invest and support partner led activities across humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion needs. Implicit within the design logic was recognition that continued high levels of humanitarian programming were immediately required given the situation in late 2017 and 3.2 million Iraqis remaining displaced following ISIL’s defeat.[[34]](#endnote-34) At the same time, it was recognised that opportunities for durable returns and stabilisation would be negatively impacted without addressing the high levels of infrastructure destruction and widespread collapse of essential services.

While aiming to work across these different needs, the Package approach reflected an understanding of the complex needs of a returning population, many of which had been displaced multiple times, had been severely impacted by the physical and psychological impacts of ISIL rule, and who remained extremely vulnerable to a range of protection threats – notably women and girls. In late 2017, key challenges included ongoing and frequent security incidents; tensions and violations related to the principles[[35]](#endnote-35) of safe return; secondary displacement; risks related to sexual violence and abuse; and widespread threats posed by explosive hazards.[[36]](#endnote-36)

By placing emphasis on protection, the Package responded clearly to the widely held view of Iraq being a “crisis of protection”.[[37]](#endnote-37) This is reflected in the centrality of protection being a strategic objective of the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), a standing agenda item at HCT meetings and having its own dedicated action plan.

## Package structure

The above context was seen as requiring a multi-faceted, multi-partner approach that could be tailored to context and adapted over time, given the near certainty of flux and shifting priorities. This capacity for adaptability was highly appropriate to what was a complex and rapidly evolving context at the time of Package design and has facilitated rapid response to changing circumstances. Such an approach allowed Australia to provide support that helped respond to pressing humanitarian needs, while also ensuring immediate support to commencement of stabilisation efforts, including infrastructure rehabilitation and resumption of service delivery. Significantly and logically, the Package reserved resources at commencement to ensure capacity to respond to emerging needs.

There was an explicit statement of intent within the Package design document that gender equality, women’s empowerment, disability inclusion and protection were key priorities for Australia’s programming in Iraq. A less explicit, but highly appropriate aspect of the Package has been Australia’s “soft diplomacy” in terms of pressing upon partners the importance of GEWE, Sex and Age Disaggregated Data (SADD), disability inclusion and AAP considerations in particular. The impact of this commitment was seen through the review in terms of multiple partners speaking highly of Australian efforts to strengthen the protective environment for women and girls, including the Ambassador’s active role in helping promote and progress anti-domestic violence legislation within the GoI and across the donor community.

The foundation of DFAT’s approach at the time of design was to ensure close alignment with the Iraq HRP (2017), and to work through “existing and trusted” partners. Identification of “trusted partners” was based on an extensive desk-based assessment by DFAT of needs augmented by field visits, DFAT experience across the preceding three years of Iraq programming, and review of potential partner performance to date. Decision-making was also affected by DFAT’s broader history of involvement with each partner, including findings of due diligence undertaken by DFAT of partners. Consultations were held in Amman, Washington D.C. and New York with the leadership of potential partners. The overall composition and complementarity of different partners was another significant consideration in terms of ensuring a coherent package that addressed important needs across humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion.

The inner workings of the overall Package are outlined within the design document in a Package logic that outlines how the supported activities collectively contribute to achievement of the two end of Package outcomes. The Package logic reflects a coherent approach leveraging a range of appropriately mandated and skilled partners, and well-considered activities designed to progress and address high priority needs across the HDP continuum. The Package logic is attached at **Annex V**. It is important to note that in several cases, Package partners and investments may contribute to humanitarian and stabilisation outcomes, such as UNMAS, UNICEF, IOM and the BPF consortium.

## Humanitarian action

Following the military defeat of ISIL acute humanitarian needs remained which required response at the time of Package commencement – several of which remain today. This situation was clearly reflected in the Package with the majority of resources being allocated to trusted humanitarian partners best positioned to contribute to Package outputs and outcomes.

The HRP (2018) targeted 3.4 million people, while estimating 8.7 million people across Iraq would need some form of humanitarian assistance. In terms of protection priorities, the HRP highlighted the need for services in camp and non-camp settings to identify people in need of specialised protection services, including psychosocial support, sexual and reproductive health (SRH), victim assistance, and legal assistance with civil documentation. The need for dissemination of information to ensure informed, voluntary decisions on returns was also highlighted. Surveying, clearing of access routes and provision of emergency mine risk education were also cited as an important priority (contributing to both humanitarian and stabilisation outcomes).

In terms of health and education priorities, the HRP highlighted the acute disruption of services noting that the number of health related consultations performed in health clinics had risen eight-fold in the preceding eight years, and that schools in affected areas were operating double and triple shifts. Furthermore, 50 percent of children in displaced camps at that time were not able to access quality education and 3.2 million children were attending school irregularly or not at all.[[38]](#endnote-38)

A wide range of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) needs were also apparent, given the different needs of people living in camps or informal settlements; people who were newly or secondarily displaced, and those who were unable to return without assistance. Similarly, continued needs existed across these different caseloads in relation to ensuring food security and access to shelter and non-food items.

The HRP prioritised geographic areas of need, highlighting Ninewa, Kirkuk and Anbar governorates based on 80 percent of the estimated 8.7 million Iraqi’s requiring assistance being in those three governorates, and Ninewa in particular with 40 percent of all assessed needs based there.[[39]](#endnote-39)

The relevance of the Australian Package to these priorities can be seen across its investment portfolio as follows:

* Responding to the prioritised needs through investing in critical protection services:
	+ Partnering with UNFPA addresses specific challenges and risks faced by women and girls and ensures women, adolescents and youth have improved access to sexual and reproductive health (SRH) and related services to prevent and respond to GBV in six provinces.
	+ The BPF consortium brings together five leading NGOs, with complementary skills not necessarily available through the Australian Humanitarian Partnership (AHP) mechanism such as legal assistance and civil documentation through NRC and peacebuilding through Non-violent Peaceforce. The consortium brought a clear focus to people with disabilities through Humanity and Inclusion and gender through CARE.
	+ Given the threat posed by explosive hazards, Australia’s support to UNMAS is acutely relevant, and strengthened by UNMAS working closely with the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) to build capacity and ownership for a threat that will remain for decades to come.
	+ Partnering with an IHO on detention monitoring and family tracing recognising the high number of people detained.
* Balancing support to camp based IDPs through partnering with IHO, to deliver protection and services for displaced people in non-camp settings, including food aid, cash assistance, provision of NFI, health care access and WASH programming.
* Geographically, programming has focused on the provinces of Ninewa, Kirkuk and Anbar due to these being areas experiencing high levels of displacement, with the largest single investment – the multi-sector BPF consortium, led by Save the Children, based in Kirkuk (Al-Hawija District) and Ninewa (Sinjar district).
* Adapting to a changing context in 2018, DFAT drew on its emerging priorities funding to support UNICEF to address acute water shortages in Baghdad and southern governorates (Basra, Thiqar, Muthanna, Maysan) and balance the perceived assistance bias toward the North.

## Stabilisation

Implicit in the Package logic is the critical importance of investing in humanitarian and stabilisation programming to facilitate durable solutions as proposed in the 2018 UN Recovery and Resilience Plan. While stabilisation is necessarily seen as separate to humanitarian action due to its political and security dimensions, much of the humanitarian work described above, related to service delivery in particular, may in practice contribute to stabilisation and social cohesion outcomes.

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| **DFAT guidance (2018) defines stabilisation** as providing support to countries emerging from, or at risk of descending into, violent conflict and involves working with international and local partners to “prevent or reduce violence, protect people and key institutions, promote political processes which are conducted without resort to armed violence, allow the delivery of basic services to affected people, and help create conditions for longer term development which fosters societal resilience”.[[40]](#endnote-40) |

Australia’s primary stabilisation investments are through UNDP’s Financing Facility for Stabilisation (FFS) and UNMAS. The aim of the FFS is to support conditions for the safe return of IDPs to their areas of origin and to reassert the role of the GoI in its ability to restore basic services and create opportunities for livelihood restoration to the Iraqi people.

Stabilisation efforts are led by the GoI, with the UNDP-FFS having been set up to work in the name of and in partnership with the GoI. However, instability, churn of government staff, capacity issues and concerns in relation to corruption have contributed to a context where the UNDP-FFS needed to take more responsibility for delivery of projects than was originally intended. An implication of this shift in balance is that it detracts from government leadership and ownership.

Australian support to UNMAS made a critical contribution to stabilisation efforts with a REACH/CCM Cluster intentions survey (2017) reporting 21 percent of IDPs were not willing to return home primarily due to concerns related to explosive hazards and improvised explosive devices.[[41]](#endnote-41) Support for mine clearance was therefore viewed as a necessary precondition to stabilisation, to enable safe returns and facilitate the work of the FFS.

The table below demonstrates close geographic alignment of DFAT investments with both the scale and anticipated flow of IDP returns in April 2018 (the time of contract signing between DFAT and UNDP). At that time, UNDP briefed donors that 2.1 million people remained displaced, breaking down numbers by governorate. In March 2020, UNDP FFS reported to DFAT that its support had funded a total of 58 projects, distributed as follows:

Tab. 2: Investments

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Governorate | IDPs as of April 2018[[42]](#endnote-42) | % of total, April 2018 displaced | DFAT supported projects by governorate[[43]](#endnote-43) | DFAT project allocation by governorate |
| Ninewa | 1,230,000 | 61.5% | 41 | 70.7% |
| Anbar | 286,00 | 14.3% | 4 | 6.9% |
| Salah a Din | 285,00 | 14.25% | 11 | 19.0% |
| Kirkuk | 176,000 | 8.8% | 2 | 3.4% |
| Total (all governorates) | **2,000,000** | **98.85%** | **58** | **100.0%** |

The 58 supported projects addressed a broad range of infrastructure and service delivery needs, including roads, bridges, electricity supply, water supply, sewage, school, and hospital rehabilitation.

## Social cohesion and reconciliation

At the time of package design, social cohesion and reconciliation needs in Iraq were and remain high across national, regional and local levels. The Package design did not define social cohesion or reconciliation, nor was it able to draw upon DFAT policy guidance. While social cohesion was initially included in the scope of the UNDP FFS it was subsequently deprioritised. National level reconciliation efforts are considered the responsibility of UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) and interviewees highlighted the lack of visibility of national level initiatives. Interviewees further highlighted the complexity of social cohesion and reconciliation challenges and needs remaining in Iraq.

Social cohesion issues are frequently reported as barriers to return for the hardened IDP caseload and as a challenge for durable solutions and stability more broadly. The flexibility to add IOM as a partner to support local level social cohesion initiatives proved important. Further, the addition of Non-Violent Peaceforce to the BPF consortium, albeit late, was a strategic decision recognising the complex social cohesion needs and challenges preventing returns in Hawija and Sinjar districts. The 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview estimates 2.43 million Iraqi’s (including 1.75 million returnees) face critical resilience and recovery issues including livelihoods, social cohesion, adequate shelter and impeded access to government services.[[44]](#endnote-44) Looking forward there is a need to significantly scale up investment in social cohesion and reconciliation efforts, as well as clarify DFAT’s internal policy position and guidance for engaging in this area.

## Voice of affected populations and conflict analysis

DFAT’s approach of working through existing and trusted partners placed heavy reliance on partner systems to meaningfully and accurately assess the needs and priorities of affected populations. Discussions with key informants highlighted a breadth of practice in terms of needs assessment, but only limited direct consultation of affected communities. This is acknowledged by partners as relating to the frenetic nature of the post-ISIL period, and the urgency of early post-liberation response measures being quickly commenced, and being “seen” to have commenced.

Another important theme cutting across KIIs was the ongoing importance of social cohesion efforts, acknowledgment of their complexity, and the need for them to be nuanced and based on sound, locally relevant conflict analysis. Despite Iraq being a complex operating environment with diverse and shifting conflict dynamics across the areas of operation of Package partners, it is the review team’s understanding that no conflict analysis was undertaken at the time of Package design or used to inform the early implementation process. The efforts by some partners including BPF to undertake localised conflict analysis to inform conflict-sensitive programming, albeit late, was highly relevant and contributed to measures to engage affected populations.

Conflict analysis that integrates gender and WPS considerations should inform future Package design processes in protracted crises, acknowledging other Australian funded aid programs have benefitted from this previously including Afghanistan and the Philippines. This could involve reviewing or compiling credible secondary sources, working with like-minded donors (which is understood what occurred later in Iraq) or commissioning independent analysis. Partners operating in conflict-affected areas should be encouraged to undertake or secure access to inclusive participatory localised conflict analysis that adequately integrates gender and WPS considerations. It is a conclusion of this review that systems to ensure the voice of affected populations and conflict analysis inform Package design and partner programs remain under-developed, and further require greater priority moving forward.

## Adaptability

From 2017 to present, Iraq’s humanitarian and stabilisation context has continued to evolve, requiring capacity for adaptability to maintain relevance to the changing needs. Within this context, partners spoke positively of the DFAT Humanitarian Officer’s continued presence in Baghdad and willingness to work with them to evolve programming approaches and areas of focus according to the shifting needs. This adaptability has been aided by the broad umbrella objective set for the Package and two end of Package outcomes that address humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion needs. This allowed responsiveness to short and medium-term humanitarian needs of affected populations; rapid recovery and stabilisation activities in liberated areas; and support to emerging priorities related to social cohesion, and WASH needs, in southern Iraq.

While such breadth could potentially be interpreted as lacking focus, in a complex crisis such as Iraq, it has allowed DFAT important room to manoeuvre and provide support where it has the greatest likelihood of being most relevant, appropriate and effective. Targeted support to UNFPA to address funding shortfalls and address life-saving sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services and GBV prevention and response measures, as well as targeted support to UNICEF to address urgent and acute water shortages in the south are examples of adaptability facilitating programming relevance.

Overall, it is concluded that the end of Package program outcomes have remained relevant and appropriate throughout, with their breadth having provided DFAT flexibility to be responsive to the context and support emerging priorities. While firm conclusions regarding responsiveness to needs are hard to reach in a desk-based review, it is clear that Australian investments are responsive to the broadly defined needs of target populations. However, it is more difficult to determine community level responsiveness and inclusiveness, in part because of lack of clarity on the functionality of AAP mechanisms.

# Effectiveness

## Package level results

Measurement of the Iraq Package performance occurs through the Package M&E Framework which sets out a structure to capture results and impact at the package, partner and policy levels. Cumulative performance related data is then collated at Package and partner levels. This process for performance measurement is reliant on performance indicators agreed between DFAT and individual partners, and is also impacted by the divergent reporting requirements, timeframes and formats of the Package partners.[[45]](#endnote-45)

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| **Humanitarian aggregate results to date include:*** **929,307** people have benefitted from improved access to protection services and related information including:
	+ **4,314** persons benefited from legal information, counselling and assistance (BPF)
	+ **5,086** detainee visits and phone calls to family members (IHO)
	+ **22,852** displaced women and girls reached with GBV services (UNFPA)
	+ **41,982** survivors of violence accessed GBV services (UNFPA)
	+ **At least 199,897** persons sensitised on GBV issues (UNFPA)
	+ **655,176** persons benefited from MRE (UNMAS)
	+ **106** protection services have been strengthened (UNFPA)
	+ **2,482** people with a disability benefitted from rehabilitation services (IHO)
	+ **7,837** people with a disability accessed assistance and protection services (BPF)
	+ **541,410** vulnerable people received assistance including dignity kits and RH services (UNFPA), economic assistance and WASH (IHO), inclusive assistance (BPF), and PSS/ social cohesion activities (IOM)

**Humanitarian and stabilisation assistance** have enabled **1,536,073** people to benefit from improved access to WASH (UNICEF, UNDP and IHO). |

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| **Stabilisation and social cohesion aggregate results to date include:*** **4,660,404** IDPs have returned to liberated areas with Australia’s and like-minded donors investments contributing to this outcome (IOM DTM)[[46]](#endnote-46)
* **58** institutions/ infrastructure projects rehabilitated (UNDP)
* **1,403** explosives and hazards rendered safe (UNMAS)
* **1,098** community networks strengthened to support integration, dialogue and peacebuilding initiatives (IOM, BPF)
* **27,006** cash for work opportunities created (UNDP)
 |

In terms of cumulative aggregate results as of 2019, compiled DFAT partner reports indicate **2,300,217** vulnerable women, men, boys and girls have been reached with life-saving assistance including improved access to WASH, MRE, and SRH.[[47]](#endnote-47) A further **41,982** women survivors of violence have accessed GBV services including counselling from UNFPA.

As mentioned, the Package bridges two end of program outcomes intended to meet humanitarian assistance, and stabilisation and social cohesion needs. The following results are taken directly from or calculated based on the data contained in the detailed M&E framework dated 3 April 2020 and are considered attributable to Australia.

There are several different data sources and figures on returns across the literature reviewed. It is unusual to use returns as an indicator recognising the multiplicity of factors that influence returns, and future use of such indicators should emphasise importance of rights-based returns – returns that are voluntary, safe and dignified. IOM’s DTM return figures have been selected at the most reliable source of information on returns.[[48]](#endnote-48)

The package average Humanitarian Aid Quality Check (HAQC) rating for effectiveness is almost 4 with a high level of variability in partner performance across SADD data, disability inclusion, protection (measured against AAP indicators), and gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE). This can in part be explained by the different mandates of the partners and lack of grounding in IASC standards, which in turn affects ability to frame and capture results. It is further limited by the current HAQC criteria for protection, which relies on two AAP indicators. Recognising AAP indicators capture an important mainstreaming issue, they do not adequately capture or reflect the three necessary levels of protective action outlined in 5.2 below (strategic approach, dedicated programs and broader range of mainstreaming interventions).

In terms of end of program outcomes, the majority of partners appear on track notwithstanding the different reporting formats and timeframes, and in several instances have exceeded their anticipated targets. While start-up was slow for some partners and the BPF consortium in particular, it is expected that partners will meet their targets by the end of 2020 – notwithstanding the impacts of COVID-19.

## IASC centrality of protection

Iraq is frequently referred to and characterised in the literature and interviews as a “protection crisis”. The attention to several protection issues in the package design and M&E framework is positive, including strategic approach to GEWE and disability inclusion. Though it is inconsistent with the IASC commitment to ensuring the centrality of protection (2013), IASC Protection Policy (2016), and most critically not based on a comprehensive protection risk analysis. The lack of comprehensive risk analysis is problematic as vulnerability is intersectional, not based on one identity characteristic and compounded by age, gender and diversity factors.[[49]](#endnote-49) Diversity factors include but are not limited to disability status, ethnicity, religion, displacement status and sexual orientation and gender identity.[[50]](#endnote-50) It is also indicative of where some confusion may occur with respect to dialogue with partners on protection and tracking and understanding results.

To assist with addressing these challenges and gaps, relevant components of the package are more appropriately viewed through three necessary levels of protective action to support more robust results:[[51]](#endnote-51)

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| 1. **Strategic approach to the crisis context**
* Donor level leadership – advocacy – HCT, GoI, partners
* Response level – protection risk analysis, HCT strategy, advocacy and conditions for durable, rights-based returns, respect for IHL and human rights including minority, women, disability and child rights)

*2. Dedicated programs* (protection strategy, sector specific advocacy and response services e.g. GBV, child protection, legal, assistance, disability, MRE, MHPSS)*3. Mainstreaming/inclusion* (SADD data, GEWE, child protection, disability inclusion, AAP, PSEA) |

**Annex III** details further information on how the three levels of action can be applied to the Iraq Package and inform future designs, recognising access to operational protection expertise is advised. It is important to reinforce that all three levels of action require support and mainstreaming is never a substitute for dedicated program investment.[[52]](#endnote-52) The following results are based on the pre-determined thematic package priorities of GEWE and disability inclusion, and some additional protection results identified across the investments.

### GEWE – strategic approach, dedicated programs and mainstreaming

In applying the three levels of action to GEWE, there is strong evidence of a strategic approach through leveraging the access of the Ambassador and coordinating with like-minded donors to advocate on passing anti-domestic violence legislation. There is further evidence of dedicated programs though GBV prevention and response and SRH programming provided by UNFPA and CARE.

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| **CASE STUDY 1** **UNFPA strategic approach and dedicated GBV prevention and response** UNFPA has demonstrated a strategic approach through working with the GoI to table a proposal to government to amend the Welfare Act to provide a legal basis and mandate for shelters for survivors of SGBV.[[53]](#endnote-53) Through leading the Iraq PSEA network it has improved system wide capacity on an important and often under resourced issue. UNFPA has further provided the following concrete results through dedicated programs to prevent and respond to violence against women and girls:* **41,982** women and girls have been reached with GBV services including counselling
* **49,199** newly displaced women and girls reached with dignity kits
* **789** service providers and/or government personnel trained on GBV
* **50** women and girls’ safe spaces supported
* **At least 140,073** persons sensitised on GBV issues (incl. men and boys)
* **88,907** beneficiaries sensitised on SRH
 |

In terms of mainstreaming, notably CARE support to the BPF consortium and UNMAS through dedicated gender advisers have delivered positive results – though performance on mainstreaming varies across partners and UNDP in particular. Of the 19,325 cash for work opportunities, only 7.5 percent have gone to women.[[54]](#endnote-54) The impact of CARE’s gender technical support to the consortium can be seen through the BPF mid-term evaluation, with 80 percent of female beneficiaries in Sinjar and 100 percent of female beneficiaries in Hawija reporting that the support had improved their access to services, opportunities in the future or had a positive impact on their mental health and well-being.[[55]](#endnote-55) Further detailed case studies on partner contributions to GEWE are outlined below.

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| **CASE STUDY 2****UNMAS Mine Action and GEWE mainstreaming** Recognising Iraq is the “most contaminated country by extent of mined area” globally and previous mentioned linkages with explosive hazards being a barrier to IDP returns, UNMAS has contributed to several important results and outcomes including surveying 166,577,244 m2, 1,403 explosive hazards rendered safe and providing 655,176 IDP and host community members MRE. UNMAS has both government and community level access and engagement through partnerships with the DMA and Kurdish Regional Authorities, and community liaison officers. The additional depth of reporting provided by UNMAS helped share important results and stories on their contributions to gender-transformative programming through training Iraq’s first female deminers and deployment of mixed-gender demining teams, as well as support to DMA on Gender Action Plan development advancing UNSCR1325 WPS objectives. |

### Disability – strategic approach, dedicated programs and inclusion

In terms of disability, a strategic approach is evident through the support to civil society shadow reporting on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), dedicated specialised services provided through IHO and investment in inclusion through the BPF consortium. Together these are considered significant achievements in advancing the rights of persons with disabilities in Iraq and access to inclusive assistance.

IHO supported 15 rehabilitation centres assisting 39,400 individuals (mostly amputees).[[56]](#endnote-56) IOM further reported that Australia’s bilateral advocacy resulted in the development of their first country level disability inclusion strategy, which has been replicated across other responses. While these investments made a significant difference, inclusion beyond the BPF consortium (see case study below), IHO and IOM, need further investment by some of the larger package partners. It is likely these barriers are institutional, requiring central level discussions as well as at the country level.

The 2020 HRP planning figures indicate 15 percent of Iraqis have a disability and HI estimate up to 20 percent of Iraqi’s have some form of disability.[[57]](#endnote-57) These estimates could be used as a proxy metric to review partner’s reported disaggregated data against, while recognising that not all disabilities are visible and sensitivities can influence appropriateness of identifying an individual’s status. The Washington Group Questions are an established sector standard and helpful tool for non-specialists to identify people with a disability.[[58]](#endnote-58)

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| **CASE STUDY 3****Disability Inclusion and the BPF consortium**DFAT prioritisation, positioning and funding of Humanity and Inclusion in the consortium delivered results. The combination of donor prioritisation, dedicated technical staff and budget line “significantly improved the consortium partner tools and methodologies related to disability inclusion”.[[59]](#endnote-59) This resulted in consortium partners integrating disability throughout programs, improving attention to inclusion and access to services for persons living with a disability. This lesson is relevant to other areas of mainstreaming/inclusion including gender and child protection. While there is evidence of cross-fertilisation across the consortium partners of their respective expertise – gender, child protection, legal assistance – the observed and reported results are strongest with respect to disability inclusion. |

###  Legal assistance

The BPF Consortium inclusion of Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) as a partner was a strategic one. This facilitated access to NRC’s Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) programming expertise and Community Centre model, providing essential protection services through an effective community-based modality.

Access to legal assistance and civil documentation was frequently referred to across interviews and literature as a critically important protection service, in terms of facilitating proof of identity including birth registration, housing, land and property (HLP) rights, women’s empowerment and returns.

Without the necessary civil documentation, IDPs and returnees are unable to access health and education services, can have their freedom of movement restricted, are at higher risk of arrest and detention, unable to register the birth of a child and may be excluded from assistance – especially government assistance.[[60]](#endnote-60)

As of the end of March 2020, DFAT assistance has provided the following legal assistance to IDP, returnee and host community members in Hawija and Sinjar:

* **2,274 individuals** (823 females, 1,451 males) **received information** on legal identity and HLP rights;
* **880 individuals** (292 females, 588 males) **received tailored counselling** to empower them to claim their rights;
* **1,160 individuals** (566 females, 594 males) **received legal assistance** to access civil documentation and/ or realise HLP rights. The multi-cluster needs assessment (August 2019) found almost 2.9 million individuals are missing at least one form of civil documentation.[[61]](#endnote-61)

 “I did not have an identity card and NRC helped me get one. Because of this I have been accepted in school and checkpoints have changed the way they are dealing with me.”

 Male Child Beneficiary Hawija[[62]](#endnote-62)

NRC consider Sinjar and Hawija as two of the most complex areas for their ICLA program due to tensions that existed prior to the ISIL-coalition conflict and have intensified post-conflict around land use and ownership. Previously Yazidi’s were excluded from land ownership schemes, and now Sunni Arabs are reporting discrimination in claiming HLP rights. It is further noted that while inter-communal tensions are high and visible, intra-communal tensions have also intensified.

In addition to civil documentation and HLP challenges, further barriers to returns are high levels of discrimination and social cohesion issues. The addition by BPF of the Non-violent Peaceforce partnership for social cohesion and peacebuilding is important to advance work on some of the more complex social cohesion needs in Sinjar (Ninewa governorate) and Hawija (Kirkuk governorate) preventing access to HLP rights and durable returns.

###  Child protection

There is limited attention to child protection in the Package design with no investment in dedicated programs and limited evidence of mainstreaming outside of the BPF consortium. The BPF mid-term evaluation noted there had been no investment in child protection case management and there was less evidence of STC child rights influence which may in part be attributed to less budget allocation.[[63]](#endnote-63)

Investment in dedicated programs is necessary to strengthen the protective environment and child protection systems in areas where DFAT’s investments are being implemented. In terms of positive impact, the BPF mid-term evaluation noted that NRC had improved its internal child protection procedures due to the work of STC.[[64]](#endnote-64) There is little attention to or evidence of child protection mainstreaming in UNICEF reporting. From reviewing the Package level M&E and reporting, it appears a conceptual misunderstanding remains in understanding the difference between monitoring DFAT’s compliance focused child protection policy and investing in child protection programming and mainstreaming. The former is focused on risk management, whereas the latter involves investing in dedicated programming to protect children from violence, exploitation and abuse. Investing in the latter is also critical to supporting a protective and safe environment for children.

In terms of operationalising beyond paper-based commitments, DFAT’s child protection policy will in practice overlap with PSEA mechanisms (including the more recently released DFAT preventing sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment policy). Both policies are dependent on functional AAP processes and mechanisms.[[65]](#endnote-65) The above findings highlight the need to update DFAT guidance and M&E frameworks. The revisions should more clearly delineate the difference between compliance and programming measures to improve coherence with sector standards, facilitate more robust operationalisation of measures to protect children, and better understand and track performance.

###  Way forward

While significant results are evident across the thematic priority investment areas of GEWE and disability inclusion, the current framing is inconsistent with IASC protection standards, is not informed by a protection risk analysis or HCT level strategy and does not capture the full range of protection results. It is therefore recommended that the IASC centrality of protection, minimum response level measures (comprehensive risk analysis, HCT level strategy) and three necessary levels of action are used to update the Iraq M&E framework and guide future package design and M&E frameworks.

## AAP and PSEA

###  Inter-agency level

Strategic Objective 3 of the Iraq HRP (2020) commits to ensuring the centrality of protection and strengthened AAP “through streamlined and revitalised coordination, and collective ownership across all sectors”. Several inter-agency mechanisms are referenced including the Iraq Information Centre, PSEA Network, GBV hotline, Community Resource Centres and camp-based complaints and feedback mechanisms. The HCT commits to expanding AAP tools through establishing an AAP-Communicating with Communities working group to streamline coordination and strengthen inter-agency knowledge sharing and collaboration.[[66]](#endnote-66) AAP is a priority currently captured under protection in DFAT’s HAQC framework and is considered an essential component of protection mainstreaming to be addressed by all partners.[[67]](#endnote-67) However, as noted above AAP indicators alone are not adequate to capture protection results.

Iraq’s HRP (2020) further outlines how the Inter-Agency PSEA network receives complaints through the Iraq Information Centre and refers cases to the GBV sub-cluster for support services, with nearly 80 percent of cases originating from IDP camps and the majority from Ninewa province.[[68]](#endnote-68) Based on reporting, the main locations for SEA risks are security checkpoints and accessing services including health.[[69]](#endnote-69)

###  Partner level

The AAP practices of partners vary greatly based on the available reporting and interview data. Without in country access to observe AAP mechanisms such as hotlines or community centres or consultations with affected populations it is difficult to assess the level of inclusive participatory engagement and accountability across the package partners. While the BPF consortium and IOM were able to provide a level of detail on their AAP practices and challenges that indicate functional complaints and feedback mechanisms, some partners appeared less transparent or conscious of the need for inclusive engagement and accountability.

In terms of positive practices, the BPF mid-term evaluation adopted an inclusive participatory methodology that demonstrated consultation with persons with disabilities, women and children. 50 percent of child beneficiaries in Sinjar compared with 100 percent in Hawija were satisfied with the support they received, noting the remaining 50 percent in Sinjar were children with disabilities.[[70]](#endnote-70) The evaluation reported beneficiaries requested further livelihood support in KIIs and confirmed findings from other contexts, that affected populations prefer face-to-face AAP method.[[71]](#endnote-71)

### Way forward

Similar to protection, AAP and PSEA require dedicated internal partner and inter-agency measures to be effective. At present, DFAT’s M&E focus is on partner level performance. It is recommended to expand this with reference to independently verifiable internal indicators on AAP and PSEA for partners (multiple methods, IEC materials, number, type of case received and outcome, SOPs and referral pathways) as well as including attention to inter-agency measures (SOPs that address safe and confidential handling of PSEA allegations, inter-agency referral pathways, number, type of case received and outcome). To ensure mechanisms are accessible and inclusive, it is also recommended that de-identified aggregate level information is requested at both levels on the gender, age and diversity characteristics of those consulted in assessments and those accessing feedback and complaints mechanisms.

# Connectedness and sustainability

## Stabilisation, recovery, resilience and development

The investment design planned for dual humanitarian and stabilisation outcomes focused on immediate-medium term needs, factoring in sufficient flexibility to be responsive to emerging priorities throughout implementation. While pre-existing development deficits and conflict risks were present across Iraq, the initial focus of this Package was on recently liberated areas in the north. Several interviewees referred to a recent survey conducted in Iraq that identified similar levels of frustrations and political grievances among the population in the south, which is compounded by the perceived assistance bias toward Sunni populations in the north. Australia’s decision to include support to the south through the UNICEF partnership was a strategic one based on needs and in terms of conflict-sensitivity. It is also noted that during interviews several partners and donors raised the importance of increased attention to programming needs in the south looking forward.

The review team observed different definitions and approaches used across donors and agencies to characterise the remaining needs in Iraq and future coordination architecture. A recent literature review commissioned by Global Affairs Canada concluded there is no agreed definition of stabilisation across donors or academia but the starting point should be based on a “thorough understanding of the local context, of the drivers of conflict, and a solid risk analysis”.[[72]](#endnote-72)

Tensions and opportunities were identified with respect to ensuring the centrality of protection across current stabilisation and future development action in Iraq based on interviews and emerging literature.[[73]](#endnote-73) Irrespective of the coordination architecture and characterisation of assistance, measures need to be taken to ensure the centrality of protection, respect for humanitarian principles and a rights-based approach to returns to ensure no one is left behind.

For DFAT it may be useful to expand their internal guidance on stabilisation, recovery and nexus programming informed by like-minded donor policies and recent policy developments including OECD DAC policy commitments (2019), to help guide responses to complex protracted crises. Such guidance should cover the wide spectrum of inter-related issues relevant to package design and M&E in complex protracted crises, including stabilisation, recovery and the HDP nexus, WPS, social cohesion, reconciliation, peacebuilding, resilience, conflict analysis, and preserving the centrality of protection, humanitarian principles and access.

## Engagement of local actors

The level of GoI engagement varies across partners and geographic areas and is complicated by the high turnover of senior staff at the central and governorate levels. Ninewa province was cited by many interviewees as being particularly challenging for continued engagement due to high turnover of governors, social cohesion issues and being a historically underserved area.[[74]](#endnote-74) It is noted that UNDP, IOM, UNFPA, IHO, UNMAS and UNICEF have stronger relationships at the central level due to their mandates and longer-term engagement across the humanitarian-development divide. UNDP works closely with governorate authorities on the identification and prioritisation of projects for the FFS with no information provided or available on the representation or inclusion of women at this level.

IOM reporting indicates a high level of strategic engagement at the central and governorate levels on policies and programs related to durable solutions and social cohesion in particular. This engagement includes partnering with the National Reconciliation Committee of the Office of the Prime Minister, Community Police in Mosul on potential returns of IDP families, training Department of Health staff on Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support (MHPSS), and has resulted in brokering local return and reconciliation agreements in several districts of Ninewa. IOM also works closely and provides capacity building to local CSOs on its social cohesion interventions.[[75]](#endnote-75)

UNICEF works very closely with local authorities on their WASH project in the south and engages in cost sharing to expand reach, increase local ownership and contribute to the sustainability of the interventions.[[76]](#endnote-76)

UNFPA works very closely with central and governorate level authorities on high level legal and policy engagement to strengthen the protective environment for women and girls through securing anti-domestic violence and shelter laws. UNFPA engages a wide range of Ministries including Youth and Sport, Health, Education and Labour and Social Affairs, and local partners on GBV and Youth programming.

IHO coordinates and supports the national society and other movement partners, and provides training and support to the Ministry of Health, hospitals and rehabilitation clinics (15) to respond to ongoing needs, treat wounded protestors and specialised services to persons with disabilities.

The BPF consortium supported 24 DPOs-CSOs with increased capacity to manage resources and promote inclusion and through HI has made significant and positive contributions to supporting local DPO-CSOs. The BPF Mid-term Evaluation found 70 percent of DPOs and CSOs in Sinjar – and 86 percent in Hawjia – said they were able to influence the program.[[77]](#endnote-77)

“Both NRC and SC take our opinion into consideration before they start implementing an activity. Overall, I also find them very responsive to us when we make requests or give suggestions.”

DPO*[[78]](#endnote-78)*

“I always give my opinion. One time, I have the suggestions to celebrate World Peace Day and this suggestion was accepted. A local organisation implemented the idea with the support of Handicap International.”

DPO*[[79]](#endnote-79)*

UNMAS work closely with the DMA, the National Operations Centre, and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority to coordinate explosive hazard assessments and demining operations and ensure standards are maintained.[[80]](#endnote-80) UNMAS further provides significant ongoing capacity building support to the DMA, including facilitating a WPS workshop for GoI stakeholders.

While dedicated efforts have been made to engage and support local partners and authorities, significant challenges were reported by partners, particularly in areas where returns have been low and social cohesion challenges remain high. Interviewees frequently raised how multi-year funding is critical in the Iraq context due to the depth of programming needs and to building trust with local partners.

In terms of engaging and supporting WPS actors, interviewees highlighted the importance of distinguishing between women-led humanitarian organisations and those with a more explicit focus on the WPS agenda and peace and security components which tend to be less prevalent. This indicates a need for small-scale grants to support WPS civil society capacity development in this area.

Where feasible, partners have made efforts to engage Iraq’s private sector. In particular, UNDP FFS aims to procure locally, and works to ensure tenders are framed in such a way that smaller businesses are able to bid. Similarly, UNICEF has engaged local contractors in its WASH rehabilitation work in the south.

A common theme emerging from interviews was that engagement and strengthening of local actors is considerably enhanced by multi-year funding, and that this forms an important contribution to sustainability in that it strengthens traction with and the capacity of local partners. However, it was also acknowledged by partners that they rarely sub-contract local partners under multi-year funding arrangements, due to concerns around financial management capacity and probity issues. The current practice and challenges highlight the need for international partners to increase financial management and reporting technical support to their local partners.

## Coordination and complementarity

Throughout the review, Australia was praised for its good donorship, flexibility, strategic engagement on key issues and coordinated and complementary aid effort in Iraq. Australia engaged robustly and strategically across relevant humanitarian and stabilisation forums based on the interview data. As highlighted earlier, the Ambassador’s diplomatic leadership on humanitarian access and the anti-domestic violence law matched by GEWE programming were frequently referenced across interviews as positive contributions. The Humanitarian Officer’s engagement in coordination fora was also cited as being highly strategic and appreciated by likeminded donors in terms of progressing key issues of common interest. Partners expressed appreciation for the continuous presence of an informed Humanitarian Officer in the Embassy and the importance of this for meaningful dialogue.

Based on the interview data, the review team identified a high level of coordination and collegiality between DFAT and ADF through the Defence Attaché in Baghdad, and the Department of Home of Affairs (DoHA) representative in Amman. There is regular consultation and coordination between DFAT and DoHA, including on funding to the same partners in Iraq (IOM and CARE) for different projects.

## Policy and diplomacy

The development of Australia's three-year $100 million humanitarian and stabilisation package (2017/18 – 2020) was a response to Australia's Grand Bargain commitments at the WHS.[[81]](#endnote-81) The Package provides multi-year funding, encourages local partnerships, balances investments across the nexus and has made significant contributions to protection outcomes in terms of GEWE and disability inclusion. However, in terms of ensuring no-one is left behind – recognising vulnerability is intersectional – it is strongly recommended that future package designs and M&E processes are informed by a comprehensive protection risk analysis, IASC centrality of protection and three levels of action (see **Annex III** for more details). Further, as highlighted in **6.1** above it is recommended DFAT update its internal guidance on engaging effectively in complex protracted crises.

## Exit, transition and sustainability in Iraq

Recognising the shifting context and multiple shocks experienced during Package implementation, exit strategies and transition to a GoI lead response is widely considered premature. This is due to the remaining complex protection caseload including IDPs, high levels of discrimination, and reconciliation and social cohesion needs. In terms of advancing progress toward GoI ownership, a progressive transition with less complex sectors such as WASH may be more appropriate. Longer term multi-year funding will be necessary to facilitate government service delivery and leadership, and mitigate future conflict risks through unmet protection and displacement needs.

In terms of partner level performance, as highlighted above there is a high level of variability in GoI engagement across central, regional and local levels that is affected by political instability. However, there are significant positive results in terms of partnering with authorities and local organisations, particularly DPOs. The context is such that further support is needed to build on these results, expand support to WPS civil society actors and support transition to local leadership.

There were a range of donor perspectives on how to classify the crisis in Iraq at this point in time and what influence that should have on the coordination mechanism(s) looking forward. Other interviewees were quick to highlight that irrespective of how the crisis is characterised and agreed coordination mechanism, 1.4 million Iraqi’s remain displaced and endemic discrimination along ethno-religious lines prevents access to protection and necessary services from the main duty bearer – the state. This renders a quantum shift to development programming impractical at this point in time despite Iraq being considered a middle-income country.[[82]](#endnote-82)

It is recommended that DFAT advocate for a coordination structure that caters for remaining humanitarian needs and an effective COVID-19 response, maintains the centrality of protection across the HDP nexus and strengthens engagement with GoI institutions and national civil society.

# Efficiency

Efficiency is not well understood in the context of protracted crises or reported within the current Package M&E framework. This primarily relates to the light touch nature of reporting against unearmarked funding and makes it difficult for this review to reach meaningful conclusions in relation to the budget and timeline status of investments. Furthermore, the current reporting practices of some of the larger investment partners provide DFAT limited real-time oversight of expenditure and implementation tracking.

Generally speaking, this context is explained and justified by Australia’s Grand Bargain commitment, which commits Australia to minimal project-specific reporting from partners. However, it is noted even within this context that the detail made available through partner reporting varies considerably, with some reporting such as UNMAS providing significantly more information on efficiency issues than others.

Package funding is distributed across humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion with the aim of achieving a coherent and relevant overall program approach. While funding allocations are allocated by DFAT under humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion, there is in reality some overlap with investments such as UNMAS and UNICEF contributing to both humanitarian and stabilisation outcomes. The design and delivery of humanitarian and stabilisation assistance – and its conflict sensitivity – has significant potential to impact social cohesion outcomes.

Tab. 3 Current Package funding distribution

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Intervention | Partners  | 2017-20 allocation | Funding allocation as % of total |
| Humanitarian | IHO, UNFPA, UNICEF, BPF | $ 59.2 million | 62.2% |
| Stabilisation | UNDP, UNMAS | $ 31 million | 32.6% |
| Social Cohesion | IOM, Mosul project | $ 5million | 5.2% |

While this distribution has been relatively appropriate to the needs across package implementation to date, a finding of this review is that acute social cohesion and reconciliation needs remain and looking forward a greater proportion of resources should be allocated to such efforts. It is also noted that while the number of Iraqi’s in need of assistance (including IDPs) has declined the hardened IDP caseload require continued and more intensive humanitarian and social cohesion efforts.

Moving forward, it is important that Australia clearly and consistently communicates to partners its expectations of reporting quality and required level of detail. This is necessary to reach firm conclusions on partner performance and should ensure clear alignment with the 8 + 3 reporting standard as agreed by the donor community.

## Value for Money (VfM)

While reporting does include both qualitative and quantitative data, there is essentially no detailed reporting of spending at individual investment level, which renders conclusions regarding value for money difficult within a desk-based review. However, annual PPAs are undertaken by DFAT, which reflect on partner performance over the preceding 12-month period. This process also draws on DFAT access to the different internal head office systems of partners, including financial management systems. The PPA includes a section dedicated to consideration of VfM issues, assessing the degree to which the partner:

* Commits to eliminating inefficiency and duplication and applying lessons learnt to enhance VfM
* Delivers defined services within budget (predicted budgets compare well to actual expenditure)
* Scrutinises costs to pursue the most cost-effective options and considers proportionality in planning/allocating resources
* Robust systems and procedures monitor and manage VfM during implementation

This process results in allocation of scores against the above-mentioned measures, a brief narrative which considers global partner performance and context, and partner specific considerations.

Generally, partners in Iraq score well within PPAs for VfM, based on the following factors:

* Close alignment with government partners, including capacity building and development of improved governance systems, based upon:
	+ long standing relationships held between DFAT partners and their national (technical) counterparts
	+ support to development and implementation of the GoI’s sectoral plans
* Commitment to and strong coordination within the HCT in order to minimise duplication in activities and harnessed complementarities, for example:
	+ launch of interactive maps of (most) humanitarian, resilience and stabilisation programming in Iraq, to avoid gaps and/or duplication in planning
* Use of cash transfers to support vulnerable groups, as both an efficiency and effectiveness measure, through approaches such as:
	+ needs-based unconditional cash assistance programs
	+ conditional cash programming
	+ establishment of mechanisms aimed at assisting business development
	+ cash for work programming
	+ cash assistance assessments focused on facilitating multi-purpose cash grants to vulnerable groups
* Use of training of trainer methodologies to maximise impact and reach, for example:
	+ well documented procurement processes, regulated by SOPs, rules and regulations, including specific tendering requirements aimed at encouraging application of smaller, locally based contractors

The Review team also noted the potential for multi-stakeholder partnerships such as BPF to offer an efficiency dividend. In the case of BPF, it brings together five organisations that each have advanced technical capacity across different areas of expertise. This has allowed each agency to benefit, albeit to different degrees, from close proximity to the technical expertise of the others. However, it is also noted that there is a transaction cost to achieving such synergies in terms of the start-up and coordination processes needed to leverage the technical expertise of the different partners. This among other factors contributed to delays in implementation in the first year. However, BPF partners feel strongly that this up front “cost” will be more than made up for by program close in terms of benefits enjoyed from a strong program foundation.

## Multi-year funding

Another aspect of Australia’s Grand Bargain commitment is support to multi-year funding. Through simply being a three-year Package, DFAT assistance in Iraq varies from that of many other donors who continue to provide short term funding. Consistent across virtually all partner interviews undertaken as part of this evaluation was strong appreciation for Australia’s commitment to multi-year funding, in terms of its contribution to programming effectiveness and efficiency.

It is also noted that there were several consistent themes cutting across different partners’ assessment of the benefits of multi-year funding. At a higher level, these generally related to it having “facilitated higher quality programming” as described in the BPF mid-term review, or having supported “meaningful and sustainable engagement of local capacity”[[83]](#endnote-83) as reported by UNICEF.

The most common theme in relation to the benefit of multi-year funding was that it strengthened relationships with government counterparts and local partners, including the building of greater levels of trust. This was seen as being of particular importance in terms of social cohesion work. IOM reported that it allows nuanced and more rich understanding of opportunities location by location, and also helped reassure authorities that time they were investing would not be wasted given their prior experiences of lack of funding and continuity. However, it was also noted that frequent turnover and shifting of positions amongst government staff is a common, destabilising feature of Iraq, and that this can undermine some of the benefits brought about by multi-year funding.

Multi-year funding is reported as efficient in terms of enabling strengthened strategic planning, which in the case of UNMAS has allowed it to engage in constructive dialogue with GoI counterparts on advancing UNSCR1325 WPS and undertake gender-transformative programming through training and employing Iraq’s first female deminers.

Multi-year funding was also cited as aiding staffing continuity and retention, as well as providing greater opportunity for capacity building of local partners. The latter was cited as being of particular importance given capacity issues within local organisations, and the constraint that presents in terms of localisation efforts.

While partners greatly value multi-year funding, there was limited evidence of this being passed onto local partners, which was explained with reference to concerns related to probity and insufficient internal systems. Moving forward greater efforts will be required by partners to provide the technical support necessary to build the financial management and reporting capacity of local partners, if greater levels of localisation are to be achieved. Interestingly, other donors utilising third party monitoring cite this approach as having its own efficiency dividend in terms of poor quality programming being more quickly identified and addressed.

## Innovation

Multi-year funding is also spoken of as helping contribute to innovation by allowing adequate time for the carriage of concepts and pilots from development to implementation. Overall there was only limited examples of innovative practice observable within the package:

* UNMAS distributing gloves with MRE messages on them
* UNICEF introduced the use of Membrane Bio-Reactor technology to help ensure safe disposal of wastewater and hospital effluent

There are further initiatives cited as innovative within the Iraq context and represent important achievements, but which have been successfully applied in other contexts, such as integrated WASH and social cohesion approaches (BPF), mobilisation of mixed demining teams (UNMAS) and the introduction of parent-teacher committee’s (UNICEF).

# Monitoring and knowledge management

## M&E framework structure and purpose

The foundation of Package M&E is the M&E framework which aims to gather relevant data over the duration of the Package and track performance across the partner, package and policy levels. This framework, and an extensive supporting spreadsheet collating all available data, were initiated at Package commencement, and have been updated over the lifetime of the Package to include newer partners and accommodate changes to indicators.

The purpose of collating this data is to support management decision-making, improve the effectiveness of the Package, better communicate the impact for affected communities and support the broader humanitarian priorities and objectives of the Australian Government. From a management perspective, it is expected that cumulative data collection will help ensure that data can be “meaningfully used and applied to improving Package outcomes in real time”, helping provide an evidence base over the lifetime of the Package.

At Post, a dedicated DFAT Humanitarian Officer undertakes regular monitoring, oversees Iraq based engagement with partners, and is in large part “the face of the Package” in Iraq, representing DFAT in key coordination fora and relevant working groups. Desk staff from Canberra undertake annual field monitoring visits to review Package performance, and annual meetings of the Iraq Package Steering Committee provide oversight, considering progress, outcomes, risk and recommendations for unallocated funding.

The overall M&E approach is supported by the Humanitarian Advisory Group (HAG) who collate partner reporting bi-annually, navigating the different reporting formats, timeframes and level of detail, and provide some analysis based on secondary data sources.

## Partner reporting and performance indicators

In line with Australia’s Grand Bargain commitments, DFAT requires minimal project-specific reporting from multilateral partners and works to ensure that its data collection supports existing reporting processes to minimise the reporting burden on partners. However, each funding agreement includes performance expectations requiring partners to demonstrate progress towards DFAT priority areas. Stipulations are also included within contracts in relation to data gathering, including the need for sex, age and disability disaggregated (SADD) data and compliance with DFAT’s Child Protection Policy, among others. In practice partner compliance with DFAT’s performance expectations vary across partners and across DFAT priority areas such as SADD data, disability, GEWE, protection and AAP.

Periodic reporting of the seven Package partners is collated by HAG who provide six monthly reports to DFAT. These reports are then used by DFAT Post and Canberra to review performance and identify areas requiring follow-up.

Partner specific indicators used within the M&E framework were developed in consultation with partners, with the aim of identifying meaningful data to help demonstrate contribution to the End of Package outcomes. This involved a process of working with each partner at commencement to understand what pre-existing indicators and targets they already planned to report on, and then working to align their indicators with the program logic of DFAT’s Iraq Package, to the extent possible.

The result of this process has been the development of a selection of sentinel indicators that draw information from specific partner indicators and can be collated across partners to provide Package level results. This collated data is then used to inform DFAT’s HAQCs, as well as policy level impact in terms of progressing Australia’s humanitarian reform commitments.

While this process presents several performance measurement challenges, it aligns with DFAT’s GHD commitments of not requesting additional reporting from partners where it provides funding earmarked to the country level. Structural challenges encountered include some partners changing indicators across the multi-year funding period, and others not setting targets (e.g. UNMAS). The introduction of new partners, and needing to retro fit their results to a pre-existing framework present another challenge.

## M&E challenges

While this process efficiently collates an extraordinary range of data and complies with Australia’s Grand Bargain commitment to harmonised and simplified reporting requirements, there are weaknesses in the system. This related to the appropriateness and relevance of the evidence being gathered, and its suitability in terms of it being “meaningfully used and applied (by DFAT management) to improve Package outcomes in real time” as stated in the ambition of the Package M&E framework.

This disconnect relates to the significant variance in quality, focus and depth of reporting, which ranges from the very light touch reporting of IHO which prepares one brief report annually common to all of its donors, through to the significantly more in-depth reporting provided by the BPF consortium, and comparatively, in terms of depth by UNMAS and UNDP-FFS reporting (which attributes Australian funding to specific infrastructure projects). While all reporting is for the most part contractually compliant (noting some concerns related to SADD data and AAP), it varies greatly in quality and depth, and subsequently presents challenges in terms of comparative analysis and scoring based performance measurement systems.

DFAT clearly demonstrates the importance of SADD data to partners through the inclusion of specific contract clauses in partner agreements. The varied disaggregated data reporting practices by Package partners warrants further dialogue to identify and address the barriers to compliance in Iraq.

Interestingly, it is the BPF consortium that performs the strongest in the 2018-19 HAQC. While this may be a true reflection of results, it is noted that DFAT requires and receives far more extensive and nuanced reporting through its AHP mechanism, and therefore holds far richer data in relation to the BPF consortium than its multilateral partners.

This highlights the issue and impact of a considerable lack of equivalency across partner reporting approaches in terms of enabling DFAT access to enough evidence to achieve sufficient understanding and a clear line of sight on partner performance. It is also worth noting that the depth and detail of partner reporting is more or less inversely proportional to the overall size of a partner’s program, with IHO and UNICEF reporting far less detailed than that of BPF. The quality of written reporting is also uneven, with some partner reporting cited by DFAT representatives as inadequate and not doing justice to the quality of their programming – highlighting how written reporting can often deviate from actual performance.

Efforts are made to address such issues and augment data limitations at Post through formal and informal processes that aim to triangulate results, including follow up meetings with partners, dialogue with other donors that fund DFAT partners, field visits where security permits and participation in formal and informal coordination fora. While these efforts are important in reviewing and triangulating partner performance issues, they are generally undertaken with senior partner staff who often have limited line of sight themselves on the nuance of field level performance.

It is also noted that while HAG compiles bi-annual summaries of the reporting provided by partners they are not able to directly engage with partners. DFAT interviewees provided justification as to why direct engagement would not be appropriate given the role of the Baghdad-based Humanitarian Officer in leading partner dialogue. There do however remain M&E challenges that require structured and consistent follow up including SADD data, disability inclusion, gender mainstreaming, AAP and PSEA practices, progress toward policy commitments and clarifying attribution of results among others.

These factors collectively present a limitation of the overall M&E approach (especially given concerns related to AAP expressed elsewhere in this document) in that there is only limited line of sight on the issue of community level performance and impact, and the degree to which the Package is responding to the diverse and highly complex on-the-ground protection needs of affected populations.

Related to this are challenges highlighted above with respect to the lack of coherence between DFAT internal guidance and IASC standards, which are observable in the M&E tools and subsequent ability to appropriately frame and capture results. While a certain level of partner performance variation is reasonable based on mandates, in terms of performance on mainstreaming/ inclusion responsibilities related to SADD data, gender, disability, AAP and PSEA, minimum standard reference points are possible and recommended to better capture important evidence related to on the ground performance (see **Annex III** for more details).

## Options for strengthening Package Level M&E

When questioned on the challenge of determining the quality and effectiveness of field level performance, donors interviewed during this evaluation spoke of the importance of third party monitoring in Iraq. Third party field monitors can more easily access and observe field level implementation, as well as carry out unannounced spot checks. Consistent across likeminded donor interviews was a perspective that this capacity is integral to determining effectiveness and AAP, and that it also brings an efficiency dividend in terms of circumventing poor quality programming, and facilitate nimbler responses to shifts in context and priorities.

Given that third party monitoring is an approach strongly endorsed by like-minded donors using it, it is recommended that DFAT consider how third party monitoring could be integrated within its own M&E framework and contribute to improved access and accountability to affected populations. While it is understood that stand-alone third party monitoring may be too costly for a program of this size, existing third party monitoring by likeminded donors cover most, if not all of DFAT’s current partners. Agreements on cost-sharing with other donors would strengthen triangulation and accountability in what is widely considered a difficult M&E environment.

In addition to the potential contribution of third party monitoring, opportunities exist to strengthen the current bi-annual reporting compiled by HAG. Recognising the limitations presented by different partner reporting formats, timeframes and level of detail, it is recommended future package level M&E is assisted by updated DFAT policy guidance (IASC protection standards and three levels of action, engaging in protracted crises) and further dialogue with partners through the posted Humanitarian Officer to better align indicators and attribute results to Australian funding. Please see **Annex III** for further suggestions.

It is further recommended that DFAT invest more in understanding the comparative impact of different investments, recognising the resource implications and impact of attending an information session on hygiene promotion or preventing GBV compared to six months of intensive legal support to secure birth registration, divorce papers or HLP documentation are vastly different. Furthermore, better understanding of impact can facilitate stronger evidence-based stories on how Australian aid is benefitting Iraqi individuals and families.

# COVID-19

COVID-19 presents a significant and destabilising health, economic and human rights challenge for Iraq that requires international cooperation and assistance for the collective good. COVID-19 exacerbates pre-existing inequalities and vulnerabilities and is not experienced by all equally in Iraq – from the lack of ability to social distance in an IDP camp, to withstand economic shocks and access health services, to the increased risk of violence in the home for women and children.[[84]](#endnote-84)

“The coronavirus attacks indiscriminately, but communities and individuals do not experience the pandemic on an equal basis.”

Global Dashboard 2020[[85]](#endnote-85)

Protection risks identified by field protection clusters to date include social exclusion and discrimination, abuse of power, lack of access to services, family and child separation, physical and sexual violence, forced recruitment and MHPSS.[[86]](#endnote-86) Particularly vulnerable groups include ethnic minorities, older people, children, people with disabilities, women and girls and GBV survivors.[[87]](#endnote-87) In Iraq the protection cluster has reported lack of civil documentation as a barrier preventing access to health services.[[88]](#endnote-88) In addition to the humanitarian imperative, the responsibility to extend Covid assistance to Iraq is high recognising the increased vulnerability of a country recovering from successive conflicts with limited pre-crisis decentralised service delivery, particularly in Ninewa and Kirkuk, and the risk that further instability present for non-state actors to exploit.[[89]](#endnote-89)

# National interest

The review team were requested to consider how support to Iraq advances Australia’s national interest. Recognising humanitarian assistance is provided on the basis of need and Australia’s commitment to GHD principles, the focus here is predominantly on stabilisation. Australia’s national interest is served through advancing stabilisation objectives in Iraq and preventing future drivers of conflict, social exclusion and displacement.

Australia is widely perceived as a trusted and credible partner in Iraq, respected by the GoI due to not being seen as having an agenda and appreciated by like-minded donors for bringing technical expertise and leadership to various coordination fora. Australia is a mid-range donor, ranked seventh based on financial contributions in 2019, though frequently referred to as performing and exerting influence above this. DFAT interviewees highlighted the critical importance of financial contributions providing Australia a seat at the table in relevant forums and strategic discussions.

There is wide recognition that longer-term assistance is critical to pave the necessary conditions for stability and peace in Iraq. The nuance is in taking stock of the results achieved, appreciating the multiple shocks Iraq has faced over this time and understanding the necessary shifts in approach to consolidate gains moving forward. Continued support to Iraq further aligns with Australia’s seat on the Human Rights Council and commitment to advancing gender equality and respect for human rights in recognition of the role they play in “making Australia and the world safer and more secure”.[[90]](#endnote-90)

# Conclusions

##  Appropriateness and relevance

DFAT’s Iraq Package was well conceived and relevant to the context in which it was designed.It leveraged a range of appropriate and skilled partners and facilitated activities designed to address a range of high priority humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion needs.It has remained relevant due to build in flexibility that facilitated adaptiveness to emerging priorities including social cohesion, and WASH needs in central and southern Iraq. Iraq was frequently referred to as a “protection crisis” across the literature and interviews conducted, which is reflected in the investment partnerships and programs.

Iraq is a complex operating environment with diverse and shifting conflict dynamics across the areas of operation of Package partners. The efforts by some partners including BPF to undertake localised conflict analysis to inform conflict-sensitive programming were highly relevant and contributed to measures to engage affected populations. Looking forward, conflict analysis that integrates gender and WPS considerations should inform future Package design processes and ongoing programs in protracted crises.

##  Effectiveness

The Package has contributed to important humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion objectives, and delivered significant aggregate, partner and policy level results for DFAT and importantly the people of Iraq. More than **2.3 million** Iraqis have benefited from life-saving assistance with targeted investments contributing to outcomes related to protection and assistance, including GEWE, disability inclusion[[91]](#endnote-91), legal assistance, SRH, MRE and WASH.[[92]](#endnote-92) The Package invested in reducing risk and barriers to return posed by explosive hazards, contributing to both humanitarian and stabilisation outcomes. Through the UNDP FFS, DFAT has supported 58 projects that have contributed to infrastructure rehabilitation and resumption of service delivery in high priority areas. Through support to IOM and BPF, social cohesion investments have strengthened 1,098 community networks to support integration, dialogue and peacebuilding initiatives at the local level.

Package performance toward the thematic priority investment areas of GEWE and disability inclusion has achieved significant results. However, the current framing is inconsistent with IASC protection standards, is not informed by a protection risk analysis and unable to capture the full range of protection results. There remains a need to improve coherence with IASC centrality of protection and three levels of action within the Package approach.

The lack of consistency between DFAT internal guidance and IASC protection standards, are further observable in the M&E tools and subsequent ability to appropriately frame and capture results. Aligning DFAT policy and M&E guidance with IASC protection standards improves coherence with sector standards and indicators and better frames and captures the results achieved. AAP practices and results in particular are difficult to capture with the current metrics and verify at a distance (a limitation for both this review and ongoing package level M&E). It is a conclusion of this review that systems to ensure the inclusive and representative voice of affected populations remain under-developed, and require greater priority moving forward.

Despite the significant results achieved to date, complex humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion needs remain and will be exacerbated by COVID-19:

* Pockets of complex humanitarian needs remain such as the hardened IDP caseload, requiring renewed social cohesion efforts to address the barriers to their durable returns, including high levels of discrimination preventing access to government services.
* COVID-19 will exacerbate pre-existing needs, create additional humanitarian needs and has the potential to threaten stabilisation gains. It is also likely to worsen inequality and vulnerability, create new health, economic and protection needs and has the potential to increase conflict risks without an adequately resourced response.
* Increased attention and investment are needed in social cohesion and reconciliation, governance, rule of law, access to justice, decentralised and non-discriminatory service delivery, and economic reform, particularly as the FFS transitions to early recovery in 2021. Future assistance to Iraq, including the next phase of the FFS, needs to be informed by inclusive community engagement to strengthen social cohesion and ensure no one is left behind.

##  Connectedness and sustainability

The review found that partners’ ability to engage with GoI officials varies across geographic areasand is complicated by the high turnover of senior staff at the central and governorate levels. Multilateral partners consulted demonstrated high levels of engagement with their GoI counterparts in order to facilitate sustainability, though were open about the challenges. The BPF consortium and IOM have demonstrated investment in and support to DPO and CSOs to advance disability rights and social cohesion objectives.

##  Efficiency

Reaching firm conclusions in relation to efficiency of Package investments is difficult due to nature of unearmarked funding and related reporting. This makes it difficult for this review to reach meaningful conclusions in relation to the budget and timeline status of investments. However, annual PPAs are undertaken which review individual partner performance over the preceding 12-month period. These point to relatively strong performance among partners in terms of value for money and alignment with DFAT priorities.

Partners’ interviews expressed a strong appreciation for Australia’s commitment to multi-year funding; in terms of its contribution to programming effectiveness, efficiency and enabling of sustainable outcomes. Multi-year funding was further cited as aiding staffing continuity and retention and key to building relationships with local officials. There is limited evidence of partners contracting local partners under multi-year funding arrangements.

##  Monitoring and knowledge management

DFAT requires minimal project-specific reporting from multilateral partners based on its Grand Bargain commitmentsand works to ensure that its information needs align with existing data collection processes. This results in significant variation in reporting provided in terms of quality, focus and depth and an uneven line of sight on the performance of different partners. Partner reporting is less than adequate in relation to AAP and SADD. Monitoring by partners and DFAT itself is impeded by security and access considerations, which exacerbates monitoring and reporting challenges.

Given the M&E challenges, the role of the Iraq-based Humanitarian Officer is key in engaging partners, representation in coordination fora and triangulating reported results through consultations with relevant stakeholders. This role further facilitates opportunities to work with likeminded donors to advance issues of common interest.

Like-minded donors and agencies spoke to the efficacy of third party monitoring in the Iraq context, its critical contribution to helping determine the quality and effectiveness of field level performance, as well as contribute to AAP objectives.

The reliance on IDP returns as an M&E indicator is unusual and proved problematic due to the multiplicity of factors affecting returns and lack of grounding in rights-based language – voluntary, safe and dignified.

The lack of clear alignment between DFAT internal guidance and IASC protection standards is impeding M&E efforts, which is observable in the M&E tools and has a flow on effect in terms of accurately framing and capturing results.

##  Women, Peace and Security (WPS)

Australia and the Ambassador in particular have contributed to strengthening the protective environment for women and girls in Iraq through a strategic approach to GEWE, investment in dedicated programs and mainstreaming through assistance. Looking forward, advancing the WPS agenda in Iraq will require increased attention to women’s meaningful participation. This should include facilitating space for evidence-based dialogue with key stakeholders that gender equality reduces conflict risk and the inclusion of women leads to more durable and quality peace. WPS civil society in particular would benefit from more targeted capacity building measures including access to small-scale grants.

##  Australia’s national interest

Without minimising the importance of the humanitarian imperative and adherence to GHD principles, there is wide recognition that continued assistance to Iraq is critical to pave the necessary conditions for stability and peace. DFAT interviewees further noted the importance of the Package investments in facilitating Australia’s seat at the table in strategic discussions and forums to advocate on WPS and humanitarian reform among other priorities. Continued support to Iraq aligns with Australia’s seat on the Human Right Council (HRC) and commitment to advancing gender equality and respect for human rights in recognition of the role they play in “making Australia and the world safer and more secure”.[[93]](#endnote-93)

# Recommendations

Based on the above conclusions and results achieved, the review **recommends a two-year extension of the current package** to consolidate humanitarian and stabilisation gains. If a two-year extension is not possible, annual funding should occur under an updated overarching strategy to further advance protection and social cohesion objectives, facilitate a shift to medium-longer term programming and prevent future drivers of conflict in Iraq. Further specific recommendations are outlined below.

12.1 Maintain and strengthen an appropriate, relevant and effective package approach through diplomatic leadership and/or programming support for the following:

*12.1.1* **Advocate and maintain support for critical protection services**

This includes legal assistance to access civil documentation and housing, land and property rights (including addressing women and children’s specific needs); inclusive GBV prevention and response services including SRH; MHPSS; disability inclusion and dedicated services; and detention monitoring.

*12.1.2* **Advocate and consider support for programming necessary to advance stabilisation objectives**

This includes reconciliation and social cohesion, governance and rule of law (courts, law reform, HLP rights), access to justice, security sector reform, economic reform, decentralised and non-discriminatory government service delivery and inclusive community level engagement processes.

*12.1.3* **Increase resource allocation to reconciliation and social cohesion and consider current and new specialised partners**

In recognition of the residual conflict risks and hardened IDP caseload, adapt programming and partnerships to significantly increase theallocation to reconciliation and social cohesion across the regional and local levels to reduce protection risks and facilitate durable returns.

*12.1.4* **Support trusted partners to adapt and respond to the health, protection and economic impacts of COVID-19 on the most vulnerable**

This includes mitigating the risk of discrimination and exclusion in access to services for IDPs and returnees, increased risk of GBV for women and girls including those with a disability, and harmful coping mechanisms due to loss of livelihoods.

*12.1.5* **Continue to exercise diplomatic leadership and engage in strategic coordination with like-minded donors on issues of common interest such as GEWE, WPS and rights-based returns**

The embassy should continue to leverage access to the GoI to support bilateral and coordinated advocacy objectives, including on durable rights-based IDP returns and returns from Syria (voluntary, safe and dignified) and consideration of other rights-based durable solutions, as well as advance GEWE and WPS objectives.

*12.1.6* **Ensure future Packages and ongoing activities are informed by conflict analysis that integrates gender and WPS considerations**

Ensure future Packages are informed by conflict analysis and advocate with partners to undertake or access inclusive and participatory localised conflict analysis that integrates gender and WPS considerations. Such analysis can better support conflict-sensitive programming, social cohesion efforts and strengthen AAP approaches.

12.2 Improve effectiveness through alignment with IASC protection standards and minimum response level measures and verifiable indicators for AAP and PSEA, and ensure these inform future package designs, M&E frameworks and processes

*12.2.1* **Strengthen Iraq’s M&E framework, future package designs and M&E processes through alignment with IASC protection standards**

This includes a comprehensive protection risk analysis and three levels of action – strategic approach, dedicated programs and mainstreaming. To ensure no-one is left behind it is important to recognise that vulnerability is intersectional and compounded by age, gender and diversity factors. The IASC centrality of protection, minimum response level measures (comprehensive protection risk analysis, HCT level strategy) and three necessary levels of action at the donor and response levels should inform a revision of Iraq’s M&E framework and future package design and M&E frameworks. See **Annex III** for more details.

*12.2.2* **Review and update current M&E processes and indicators with reference to independently verifiable indicators for AAP and PSEA**

Efforts to strengthen M&E processes and data should take into account both i) partner level (multiple methods, IEC materials, # of cases, type of case received and outcome, SOPs and referral pathways) and ii) inter-agency measures (SOPs that address safe and confidential handling of PSEA allegations, inter-agency referral pathways, # of cases, type of case received and outcome). It is also recommended partner and inter-agency mechanisms are encouraged to collate de-identified SADD on those consulted in needs assessments and those accessing feedback and complaints mechanisms.

12.3 Progress connectedness, sustainability and efficiency through a staged transition to GoI leadership, continuation of multi-year funding, investing in local partner systems and advocate for an appropriate and efficient coordination structure

*12.3.1* **Support a progressive transition toward GoI leadership, continue to provide multi-year funding and require partners build the financial management and reporting capacity of their local partners**

Longer term multi-year funding will be necessary to facilitate government service delivery and leadership, and mitigate future conflict risks through unmet protection and displacement needs. Recognising the high levels of discrimination and social cohesion challenges that remain, a progressive transition toward GoI leadership through sectors such as WASH is more appropriate. Civil society and national NGOs play an important accountability role and Package partners should demonstrate how they will build their local partners financial management and reporting capacity. Future partner agreements should explicitly detail and track these commitments.

*12.3.2* **Advocate for an appropriate and efficient coordination structure moving forward**

It is recommended that DFAT advocate for a coordination structure that caters for remaining humanitarian needs and supports an effective COVID-19 response, maintains the centrality of protection across the HDP continuum and strengthens engagement with GoI institutions, CSOs, DPOs and national NGOs.

12.4 Enhance Package level M&E, document good practice, address systemic M&E challenges and improve policy coherence

*12.4.1* **Strengthen Package level M&E through third party monitoring**

Third party monitoring is recommended in the Iraq context due to the level of risk, limited field access and ability to interact with affected populations. The current end of program outcomes, subject to the above recommended sectoral program shifts and focus, remain suitable for a 2-year extension. Further package level M&E recommendations concerning IASC centrality of protection are detailed in **Annex III**.

*12.4.2* **Good practice lessons from Iraq should inform ongoing and future packages**

This includes the strategic collaboration and technical support between the Ambassador and Iraq-based Humanitarian Officer to progress relevant Package related protection, access and policy priorities. The highly regarded coordination between the two roles, and leveraging of respective strengths and access, should be documented to inform ongoing and future packages, and DFAT’s work in similar contexts. It is recommended an extension of this package maintains the posted Humanitarian Officer position and increases their scope for more structured dialogue with partners on M&E reporting.

*12.4.3* **Review the systemic challenges that result in high levels of variation in partner reporting, policy coherence and ability to capture results**

Systemic challenges are undermining the ability to interpret and understand results achieved. Opportunities exist to improve coherence through updating internal DFAT policy guidance and M&E processes including the HAQC and PPA to reflect IASC protection standards, the difference between child protection compliance and programming, and include independently verifiable indicators for AAP and PSEA.

*12.4.4* **Initiate DFAT policy guidance to accompany the Partnerships for Recovery: Australia’s COVID-19 Development Response (2020) to support Australia’s engagement in complex protracted crises and address the significant policy level and normative developments since the release of the Humanitarian Strategy (2016) and Protection Framework (2013)**

The policy guidance should address policy and normative developments related to the HDP nexus, stabilisation and recovery, social cohesion and reconciliation, WPS, WHS and Grand Bargain commitments, IASC centrality of protection and respect for humanitarian principles and access.

12.5 Advance the WPS agenda through supporting Iraqi women’s meaningful participation

*12.5.1* **Increase bilateral diplomatic engagement and coordinated advocacy with like-minded donors on the participation pillar of the WPS agenda in Iraq**

Australia should continue to advocate for an updated and adequately budgeted NAP and support regular dialogue with inclusive and representative WPS civil society. Australia is well positioned to advance WPS objectives in Iraq and increase attention to women’s participation, both bilaterally and together with like-minded donors given the Embassy’s achievements to date. Consider requesting a review of the Women Peace and Humanitarian Fund’s contribution to women’s participation and leadership in Iraq and explore opportunities to strengthen direct support to WPS civil society.[[94]](#endnote-94)

# Annex I – List of Interviewees

Interviewees were selected based on known key informants within DFAT and WoG, package partners and relevant non-package actors. A total of 33 interviews have been conducted with 43 individuals, 20 female, 23 male. Names have been removed for privacy reasons.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Name(s) | Title/ Role and Organisation | Date  |
| DFAT and Whole of Government Partners |
|  | Protracted Crises and Refugee Section, Humanitarian and Refugee Policy Branch, DFAT Canberra | 24.04.20 |
|  | Former Humanitarian Advisor, Australian Embassy Iraq | 02.03.20 & 07.04.20 |
|  | Australian Embassy Jordan, previously Middle East Development Section Former Humanitarian Advisor, Australian Embassy Iraq | 19.03.20  |
|   | Iraq lead, Iran, Iraq and Syria SectionFormer Director, Iran, Iraq and Syria SectionCurrent Direction, Iran, Iraq and Syria Section, Middle East Branch, DFAT Canberra | 02.04.20 |
|  | Counsellor (Immigration) Department of Home Affairs, Australian Embassy Jordan  | 23.03.20 |
|  | Colonel, Defence Attaché, Australian Embassy Iraq | 03.04.20 |
|  | Current Humanitarian Advisor, Australian Embassy Iraq | 01.04.20 |
|  | Ambassador, Australian Embassy Iraq | 15.04.20 |
| Package Partners |
| Building Peaceful Futures consortium |
|  | BPF Consortium Lead, Save the Children | 19.03.20 |
|  | Humanitarian Director Humanitarian Adviser, Save the Children | 26.03.20 |
|  | Country Director Head of Programs, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) | 30.03.20 |
|  | Country Director Technical Adviser, Humanity & Inclusion | 31.03.20 |
|  | Country Director Head of Programs, Care | 24.04.20 |
|  | Independent BPF Evaluator | 01.04.20 |
|  | Australian Humanitarian Partnership (AHP) Support Unit | 02.04.20 |
| Direct multilateral investment partners |
|  | Head of Stabilisation, IOM  | 30.03.20 |
|  | Country Representative, UNFPA | 23.03.20 |
|  | Reporting Officer, UNDP | 31.03.20 |
|  | Chief WASH, UNICEF  | 24.02.20  |
|  | Deputy Head(s) of Delegation, IHO | 26.03.20 |
|  | Country RepresentativeProgram Officer, UNMAS | 02.04.20 |
|  | Humanitarian Advisory Group (HAG) | 27.02.20 |
|  | HAG | 18.03.20 |
| Non-Package Actors |
|  | Deputy Director and Government Liaison, NCCI  | 27.03.20 |
|  | Deputy Head of Mission, OCHA Iraq | 20.03.20 |
|  | Humanitarian Adviser, DFID Iraq | 24.03.20 |
|  | Head of Stabilisation, Canada | 23.03.20 |
|  | Charges d’Affaires, Norway | 26.03.20 |
|  | Acting Dep Director Stabilisation, USAIDDirector, Program Office, USAIDSenior Refugee Coordinator, US State Department | 24.03.20 |
|  | Protection Cluster Coordinator, Iraq | 25.03.20 |
|  | Assistant Representative Protection, UNHCR Iraq | 03.04.20 |
|  | Senior Protection Adviser, Procap/ GPC Consultant  | 02.04.20 |

# Annex II – Review Plan

## Stabilisation package

### Evaluation plan - March 2019

## Introduction

### Overview

The Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package (“the Package”) is a three-year $100 million package designed to support humanitarian and stabilisation efforts in Iraq, concluding in June 2020.

This review will assess the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of the Package and inform the development of potential future investments. It is intended to act as an important accountability mechanism for DFAT, while also providing evidence to support forward-focused decision-making by DFAT staff and senior executives.

#### Background

In 2017 at the time of the package’s design, the UN estimated that up to 11 million Iraqis would need humanitarian assistance in 2018, including 5.1 million children.[[95]](#footnote-1)As at October 2017, over 66,500 Iraqi civilians had died of war-related causes since 2014.[[96]](#footnote-2) Since January 2014, nearly 3.2 million Iraqis have been internally displaced, including some who have been displaced multiple times.[[97]](#footnote-3) The scale of protection needs in Iraq are so great that the UN has repeatedly described it as a “protection crisis”.

The overall objective of the Package is to support international efforts to meet the humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable conflict-affected populations in Iraq and assist communities to become more resilient. This broad need emerges from the sustained period of conflict, displacement and instability that Iraq has experienced since 2003, and felt most recently and acutely as a result of the 2014-17 conflict against ISIL. Activities are designed to address short and medium-term humanitarian needs of affected populations, with a focus on humanitarian assistance; rapid recovery and stabilisation activities in retaken areas (including rehabilitation of essential public services and economic opportunities); and reconciliation and social cohesion. These investments will contribute to two end-of-package outcomes:

1. Vulnerable people in Iraq affected by the conflict receive inclusive humanitarian assistance and have greater access to protection services;
2. Institutions, infrastructure and social conditions improved for conflict-affected populations to recover and build resilience in a safe and stable environment.

The Package provides funding to the UNFPA, UNDP, ICRC, UNICEF, IOM, UNMAS and an NGO consortium led by Save the Children.

Gender equality, women’s empowerment, disability inclusion and protection are key priorities for Australia’s humanitarian program as outlined in DFAT’s *Humanitarian Strategy* (2016)[[98]](#footnote-4) and Protection Framework (2013), and reflected and integrated within the Iraq package.

A monitoring and evaluation framework has guided DFAT to compile performance reporting at regular intervals, with technical support provided by the Humanitarian Advisory Group (HAG).

The initial Investment Design rated the Package as high risk, noting that DFAT would have limited capacity to directly monitor activities. A full risk assessment was conducted at start-up and a Risk Management Plan developed to monitor risk against each activity supported through this package.

#### Overall Australian support to Iraq

The overall objective of the Package is to support international efforts to meet the humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable conflict-affected populations in Iraq (particularly women, children and persons with disabilities), while also assisting communities to become more resilient and stable.

The Package aimed to capture Iraq’s diverse needs at the time of design in late 2017, by providing a mechanism through which short and medium-term humanitarian needs of affected populations could be addressed; rapid recovery and stabilisation activities in liberated areas supported (including rehabilitation of essential public services and economic opportunities); and reconciliation and social cohesion progressed.

Protection, disability inclusion, and gender equality and women’s empowerment were all identified as priority areas where DFAT could add value and tangibly address the needs of the Iraqi people. More specifically, it was determined that partners would be required to mainstream gender throughout their work, as a strategy for promoting enduring peace by engaging whole communities to drive economic growth, reduce poverty and build resilience.

Funding was also specified for reconciliation efforts aimed at supporting social cohesion activities that promote peaceful coexistence and reintegration between affected and displaced communities, and help prevent a further return to violence. However, the Package acknowledges that reconciliation in Iraq is aspirational and the risks associated with progress in this area are high, given the fragile context.

#### The Package

The proposed approach was for DFAT to work through existing and trusted partners that have demonstrated experience in responding to the crisis, robust security, financial and risk management systems, and child protection and environment safeguards policies that DFAT have confidence in.

Specific investments include:

* ICRC ($18 million over 2017-20) (unearmarked) – delivering medical assistance and physical rehabilitation services (including for mine injuries); providing water, food and essential household items to affected populations; contribute to repairing water and health infrastructure; and protection activities such as reconnecting families;
* UNFPA ($12.86 million over 2017-20) (earmarked and unearmarked) – to address sexual and reproductive health issues, youth engagement and gender equality;
* UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilisation ($18 million over 2017-20) (unearmarked) – to provide funding support to the key stabilisation mechanism supporting Iraqi authorities to restore essential public services and rehabilitate critical infrastructure;
* UNMAS ($11 million over 2018-20) (unearmarked) – mine mapping and clearance work, capacity building for fellow mine action actors and risk education;
* Save the Children led consortium ($20 million over 2017-20) – to support implementation of the Building Peaceful Futures project, which aimed to support the safe return and reintegration of returnees, and improve vulnerable people’s resilience through inclusive access to essential protection, water, sanitation and hygiene, legal support, and primary and sexual reproductive health services in Ninewa and Kirkuk Governorates;
* IOM ($8.18 million over Jan 2019 – June 2020) (softly earmarked to social cohesion) – institutional and community reconciliation, creating an enabling environment of mutual trust within conflict-affected populations, including, where possible, supporting and promoting leadership and engagement by women;
* UNICEF ($8.5 million Jan 2019 – June 2020) (earmarked) – to support costs related to implementation of urgent WASH programming in southern governorates of Basra, Thi-Qar and Qadissiya.

At design, the package set aside $18 million to provide flexibility in programming to allow for emerging priorities to be addressed. Support provided to both IOM and UNICEF occurred through utilisation of these funds, with IOM also benefiting from the reconciliation funding allocation.

### Evaluation context

The Iraq response is a complex and multi-faceted humanitarian crisis. The scale of protection needs in Iraq are so great that the UN has repeatedly described it as a “protection crisis” and the centrality of protection is firmly enshrined at the core of the humanitarian response plan. Since January 2014, nearly 3.2 million Iraqis have been internally displaced, including some who have been displaced multiple times.[[99]](#footnote-5)

As of January 2020, of the 6 million displaced by the 2014-17 conflict against ISIL, 4.1 million remain in need of some form of assistance and 1.77 million remain in acute need (half of which are concentrated in Ninewa and Al-anbar).[[100]](#footnote-6) While returns have occurred, 1.5 million remain displaced and the priority is voluntary, dignified, informed and sustainable returns in line with the Principled Framework for Returns.[[101]](#footnote-7) Humanitarian access remains a challenge with 93 percent of districts in northern and central Iraq facing access constraints.[[102]](#footnote-8) These needs and challenges are compounded by political instability, pre-existing vulnerability, limited government service delivery and historically under-served areas and populations.

Since its commencement, Australia has been a committed supporter to the Iraq crisis response. This Package was specifically designed in the context of the progressive retreat of ISIL in Iraq, and the resulting needs posed by widespread displacement, destruction of infrastructure and decreased stability having impacted millions of Iraqis. This context presents both ongoing humanitarian needs as well as opportunities to support initiatives aimed at stabilisation and securing progress achieved in recent years, in terms of the Government of Iraq (GOI) now having control of most of the country.

The international humanitarian response in Iraq is coordinated under the UN’s Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan, while stabilisation efforts are led by the GOI and implemented by the UN Development Program’s (UNDP) Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS). Australian support aligns with these plans, and is directed through international organisations – primarily UN agencies, but also includes a $20 million grant to an NGO consortium led by Save the Children.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has been funded through the package budget, and is based upon an overarching package M&E framework developed at start-up. The M&E framework operates at multiple levels, covering high-level program issues as well as partner level performance. At the higher level, monitoring aims to evaluate performance in terms of alignment with humanitarian aid policy objectives and indicators to allow DFAT to measure the success of this multi-year funding modality. At investment level, the package M&E framework draws in and integrates partner-level performance assessment frameworks, allowing for tailored assessment metrics for each partner, taking into consideration issues such as size and duration of activities, ability to undertake direct monitoring and “attribution versus contribution” issues.

The overarching M&E framework is further informed by regular post-monitoring, DFAT’s Investment Quality Reporting (IQR) process, partners own reporting, high-level consultations, annual field monitoring and annual Package Reviews.

## About the evaluation

### Purpose of the evaluation

The evaluation will assess:

* the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the package, and make recommendations for future programming if package is extended 1-2 years with similar or reduced funding;
* the extent to which the Package protects the safety, dignity and rights of affected people and meets the needs of those most vulnerable (considering gender, disability in particular);
* whether the Package was delivered in a way which reinforced local capacity; supported recovery, resilience and long-term development;
* the extent to which Australia’s approach was coordinated and complementary to efforts of other actors; the extent to which Australia engaged with and influenced the international humanitarian system; and will comment on how the program contributes to Australia’s national interests.

The review will deliver a set of recommendations that will be practical in nature and focused on those which can inform ongoing and future investments.

### Evaluation approach

This desk-based review will consider evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. Preliminary consultations have been undertaken with staff at DFAT desk, DFAT post (recently departed officer) and with HAG (who support Package M&E).

Questions to be considered during the evaluation were pre-prepared and included in the evaluation terms of reference (see below at 5).

The process of the evaluation will involve the following steps:

* Preliminary review of relevant documentation at donor, response, package and investment levels:

*Donor level*

* DFAT Humanitarian Strategy
* Protection in Humanitarian Action framework
* Foreign Policy White Paper

*Response level*

* UN’s Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan
* UN Development Program’s (UNDP) Funding Facility for Stabilisation
* Clusters/ Working Groups, notably protection, returns and AAP

*Package level*

* Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package – Investment Design
* Package M&E Framework
* Package level reporting

*Investment level*

* Investment partner strategies
* Investment partner reporting
* Preparation of an Evaluation Plan (this document)
* Key informant interviewing
* Presentation of preliminary results
* Development of draft report
* Submission of final report
* Presentation of key findings

### Evaluation timeline

The evaluation will take place from February to April 2020. The key scheduling requirement is for the final report to be available at the end of April 2020 to assess the value of the program and inform a decision regarding possible program extension from July 2020.

| Action | Approximate Days (total) | Deadline |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Preparation of review plan | 6 | 9 March |
| A desk review of background documents  | 10 | 20 March |
| Key informant interviews with stakeholders  | 8 | 27 March |
| Presentation of preliminary findings  | 2 | 2 April |
| Development of draft report  | 10 | 8 April |
| Submission of the final report | 7 | 20 April |
| Presentation of final key findings | 2 | As agreed |
| TOTAL | **44** |  |

## Interviewing of key stakeholders

An interview guide has been drafted based on Analytical Framework and can be found at below. It is anticipated a minimum of 20 key informant interviews will be undertaken, drawing on the indicative list of interviewees provided below:

In Australia

DFAT Canberra

* Save the Children, Humanity and Inclusion & Care
* Australian Humanitarian Partnership Support Unit
* Humanitarian Advisory Group

In Iraq

* UN package partners (UNDP, IOM, UNMAS, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNICEF)
* DFAT post in Iraq (Humanitarian Advisors, Deputy HoM)
* NGO package partners (Save, Humanity and Inclusion, CARE & NRC)
* ICRC
* OCHA
* National Protection Cluster (Incl. UNHCR)
* Returns and AAP Working Groups
* Local partners (Iraqi civil society, WPS actors)
* Other embassies (US, UK, Germany)
* Relevant WoG partners eg ADF
* BPF Evaluation team (lead consultant)

## Preparation of a draft report

### Key audiences and use

The final report is intended to provide an important accountability mechanism to DFAT, and analysis and evidence to support decision-making by DFAT’s staff and senior executives.

It is anticipated that the evaluation will be of interest to a range of audiences. Primary audiences will be:

* DFAT Humanitarian Section
* DFAT Middle East Desk
* AHP Support Unit and implementing agencies – Save the Children, CARE, Norwegian Refugee Council, Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
* Whole of Government partners
* Australian Embassy Iraq

The evaluation will deliver a set of findings about the Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package, and make recommendations regarding future Australian assistance to Iraq. It is also hoped that lessons from this evaluation can inform future humanitarian and/or stabilisation packages within the context of protracted crises and complex operating environments.

## Evaluation questions and sub questions

| Evaluation Criteria | Key Evaluation Question and Sub-Questions |
| --- | --- |
| Relevance | 1. Is the Package appropriate and relevant?
2. Is there a clear link between end of program outcomes and needs and priorities of affected population?
3. Did communities receive the assistance they most needed, when they most needed it, and in a way that was most useful and accessible for them? If not, what barriers were faced?
 |
| Effectiveness | 2. Is the Package effective? 1. Did the investment protect the safety, dignity and rights of affected people?
2. Did investments make a difference in terms of gender equality and empowering women and girls?
3. Did people with a disability have equal access to partner programs and were their unique needs met?
4. To what extent have the end of program outcomes been achieved, most significant results, and are any unintended outcomes eventuating, either negative or positive?
5. Were DFAT’s M&E practices suitable to inform their management? Did these M&E practices enable them to assess the effectiveness and inclusion of their response? What would improve their M&E practices?
 |
| Efficiency | 3. How efficient was the package? 1. To what extent is the project being implemented according to agreed timelines and budgets?
2. In what ways is the project being implemented to achieve good value for money?
3. Are there benefits from the multi-year funding that could not have been achieved with annual funding? Has this supported the project’s aims, and if so, how?
 |
| Sustainable | 4. How connected and sustainable is the package? 1. Was the investment delivered in a way which supported stabilisation, recovery, resilience and long-term development?
2. To what extent were Government of Iraq (GoI) and key local actors able to guide and influence the project?
3. To what extent did the project strengthen local partners, including civil society (e.g. local women’s organisations, disabled people’s organisations) and local government, and include their participation in coordination fora?
4. Was Australia’s approach coordinated (with both UN, coalition, and GoI-led responses) and complementary?
5. To what extent did Australia engage with and influence the international humanitarian system both in Iraq and globally, both through programming and diplomacy?
6. Are appropriate exit and transition strategies in place, and how can they be strengthened?
7. What future funding options are most needed to address gaps?
 |
| Accountability | 5. How transparent and accountable is the package?1. To what extent are implementing partners sufficiently accountable to, and engaged with, affected communities?
2. What evidence exists of the package having been influenced by effective communication, participation and feedback from affected people and communities?
 |
|  | Recommendations 1. Changes to the scope of work or partners ensuring any changes recommended are feasible within a 1-2 year extension of the existing program.
2. Comment on the comparative advantage of Australia as a donor, and in particular, the comparative advantage of Australia’s humanitarian and stabilisation programming. To what extent and how does the Humanitarian and Stabilisation package advancing Australia’s national interest in Iraq?
3. Identify opportunities in the forward program to take forward the Women, Peace and Security agenda (UNSC 1325+).
 |

## Evaluation methodology

### Team composition

The evaluation team is comprised of Amra Lee and Scott Rankin.

* Amra Lee (Humanitarian Protection Specialist) is an experienced protection practitioner and researcher who brings over 14 years’ experience working with a diverse range of protection actors and humanitarian contexts. This includes extensive engagement in protracted crises in the Middle East region from 2008 to present. While recruited as a Protection Specialist, Amra also brings specialist research and evaluation expertise in protection and participatory data collection methods.
* Scott Rankin (Humanitarian Evaluation Specialist) is an experienced evaluator who has worked in humanitarian and development evaluation across Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America for the past 17 years. In recent years, Scott has led review of both DFAT’s Australia Middle East NGO Cooperation Agreement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Australian Humanitarian Partnership Rohingya Response programming, as well as evaluations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Responsibility for data analysis, formulation of findings and recommendations, and the overall quality of all outputs lie with the evaluation team.

## Methodology

The methodology for the evaluation is based upon ensuring a blend of qualitative and secondary quantitative evidence from which findings and conclusions can be reached with regards to the overall performance of DFAT’s Iraq Package.

An analytical framework is detailed below, detailing the methods to be used to answer the specific evaluation questions and sub-questions detailed above, intended data sources, performance measures and the type of analysis required.

Qualitative data will be sought through key informant interviews with a cross section of key stakeholders – internal (DFAT), Investment Partners, the Government of Iraq (GoI), like-minded donors (US, UK, Germany) and local organisations. Being desk based, there will be no opportunity for consultations with affected populations. However, interviewing of Investment Partners will place focus on understanding their internal processes and operational accountability to affected populations measures. Interviews will also be undertaken with the protection cluster and AAP working group for triangulation purposes.

Areas requiring detailed investigation can be summarised as:

* The relevance of the Iraq package to the bigger picture needs of the current context of Iraq, and the degree that investments align with coordination mechanisms;
* The degree that the approach has been responsive to changing circumstances;
* The degree that protection issues, including age, gender and disability considerations, have been adequately addressed by Investment Partners;
* Whether the overall package has achieved an appropriate balance in terms of humanitarian, stabilisation and social cohesion programming;
* Whether package monitoring and evaluation systems are structured in such a way that they adequately capture key lessons learned, progress program understanding and help guide forward planning.

The approach proposed for the evaluation builds off the foundation of a broad-based review of available documentation provided to the evaluation team by DFAT and HAG. This documentation covers important qualitative and quantitative information, including annual HAQC ratings, of relevance to the evaluation.

Collectively, the evaluation team will work through a logical sequence of document review, evaluation planning, and interviewing of key informants.

Given the nature of the Iraq crisis and the Australian response to it, the evaluation needs to balance following dimensions:

* Impact of the context (e.g. political and security developments) and humanitarian access on the achievement of package goals including returns;
* Appropriately managing different levels of depth and attribution in terms of accountability and reporting coming from the investment partners (e.g. NGOs, UN, ICRC);
* Reach meaningful conclusions in relation to the protection and accountability needs of affected populations given the evaluation team’s lack of access to the field and beneficiaries.

An initial feedback session will occur on 31 March to detail initial findings of the evaluation team.

## Evaluation tools

Given the review is desk based, a literature review and key informant interviews (KII) will be the primary techniques utilised by the evaluation team. An interview guide has been drafted (see below) based on the Analytical Framework to guide each key informant interview and ensure alignment with the agreed evaluation questions. Questions will be tailored for the specific key KII:

* Internally focused interviewees (DFAT);
* Investment partners;
* Externally focused interviewees (Donors, GoI, and local partners/ civil society).

Questions related to the protection, gender and disability inclusion dimensions of the Iraq Package will be asked of all interviewees with more specific probes for those with dedicated programs and expertise.

KIIs will be undertaken in a semi-structured manner that is responsive to the context and expertise of the informant and encouraging of additional information that may be relevant.

## Data management

It is expected that key informant interviewing will primarily bring forth qualitative data. It is not feasible or possible for the evaluation to gather primary quantitative data. Instead, the evaluation will draw on quantitative data from secondary sources, including that compiled by HAG as part of the M&E support to the package.

Interviews will be initially recorded through note taking, with key points captured within an evidence matrix against different evaluation questions. The evidence matrix will indicate the data and data sources which support the narrative result for each evaluation question and sub-question. This matrix will be used to assemble findings and guide report writing.

## Sampling strategy

The evaluation will use a purposive sampling approach, though the degree to which this can be thorough is restricted by the limited time available for the evaluation.

An indicative list of key informant interviewees can be found below and it includes:

* NGO consortium lead and members (Save the Children, NRC, Humanity & Inclusion, Care)
* UN agencies (UNDP, UNFPA, IOM, UNMAS, UNICEF)
* ICRC
* Relevant DFAT staff in Canberra and at post
* Whole of government partners (ADF)
* Third party informants (coordinating bodies, working groups, WPS civil society representatives)
* Like-minded donors (UK, US, Germany)

## Risk and limitations

The primary risks and limitations associated with this Evaluation relate to the limited time available and lack of field access.

| Risk or Limitation | Potential impact on the review | How it will be managed |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Limited time available to the evaluation | Depth of investigation of the performance of individual Australian activities | Work to triangulate findings through strategic identification of third parties able to comment with authority |
| Assessing program contribution at beneficiary level is complex given the number of actors involved | Confidence levels in attributing results could be limited | Efforts will be made to map different actors in target areas in order to understand issues of attribution |
| Lack of field access | Prevents observation and interaction with beneficiaries | It remains a limitation with respect to AAP and protection |
| Difficult to reach definitive conclusions regarding value for money | VFM conclusions lack rigour and validity | Undertake higher level analysis and contextualise findings in terms of weaknesses of approach |
| Combination of humanitarian and stabilisation objectives | National interest considerations limited to stabilisation activities | Aim to delineate humanitarian and stabilisation objectives and results |
| Language issues will restrict team members capacity to interview GoI and local partners | Input from non-English speaking key informants will be restricted | Utilise a trusted Arabic speaker to conduct interviews with a small number of Iraqi key informants |

## Making evaluative judgements

Judgements made by the evaluation team will be directly supported by evidence that will be collated within the evidence matrix. The evaluation team will present judgments that are defensible based on the data and evidence collected and in line with the Analytical Framework.

## Ethical issues

Interviewee data used in the analysis will be de-identified both in the analysis and reporting phase. Findings and conclusions related to protection and AAP will be qualified with respect to the evaluation team’s lack of direct access to the field and beneficiaries.

## Analytical framework

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Evaluation Questions and sub-questions | Doc review | KII | Specific Methods | Analysis Required |
| EQ 1 Is the package appropriate and relevant? |
| a | Is there a clear link between end of program outcomes and needs and priorities of affected population? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewQualitative data analysisKey informant interviewing (KII) with Investment partnersKII with OCHA, UNDP, local partners and civil society | Document and assess different approaches being employed and progress being achieved, including gap analysis |
| b | Did communities receive the assistance they most needed, when they most needed it, in a way that was most useful and accessible for them? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewQualitative data analysisKII with DFAT and Investment partners | Compare Australian approaches against needs assessments, sector standards and cluster/WG analysis |
| EQ 2 Is the package effective? |
| a | Did the investment protect the safety, dignity and rights of affected people?Did investments make a difference in terms of gender equality and empowering women and girls?Did people with a disability have equal access to partner programs and were their unique needs met? | **🗸****🗸****🗸** | **🗸****🗸****🗸** | Document reviewQualitative data analysisKII with DFAT and investment partnersKII with third parties (PC, AAP WG, local partners and civil society) | Compare Australian approaches against Australian commitments and country level strategies (HCT, protection cluster, gender, SGBV and disability) |
| b | To what extent have the end of program outcomes been achieved, most significant results, and are any unintended outcomes eventuating, either negative or positive? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewQualitative data analysisKII with DFAT and investment partners | Document and assess different approaches being employed and progress being achieved, including gap analysis |
| c | How adequate are DFAT’s M&E practices to inform their management, and to enable them to assess the effectiveness and inclusion of their response? What would improve their M&E practices? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewQualitative data analysisKII with DFAT and investment partnersKII with other donors | Document and assess different approaches being employed to assess effectiveness and inclusion |
| EQ 3. How efficient is the package? |
| a | To what extent is the project being implemented according to agreed timelines and budgets? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewKII with DFAT and investment partners | Document and assess different approaches being employed against initial agreements |
| b | In what ways is the project being implemented to achieve good value for money? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewKII with DFAT and investment partnersKII with other donors | Consider perspectives on what constitutes effectiveness and value for money in humanitarian settings |
| c | Are there benefits from the multi-year funding that could not have been achieved with annual funding? How has this supported the project’s aims? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewKII with DFAT and Investment partnersKII with OCHA, UNDP | Document perspectives on efficiency gains of multi-year funding versus annual fundingAnalysis of periodic reporting |
| EQ 4. How connected and sustainable is the package? |
| a | Was the investment delivered in a way which supported stabilisation, recovery, resilience and long-term development? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewQualitative data analysisKII with DFAT and investment partnersKII with OCHA, UNDP | Quantitative and qualitative analysis of periodic reportingDocument and assess different approaches being employed and progress being achieved, including gap analysis |
| b | To what extent did the Government of Iraq (GoI) and key local actors believe they were able to guide and influence the project? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewQualitative data analysisKII with DFAT and investment partnersKII with GoI officials and local actors | Consider GoI priorities over implementation period to assess different approaches being employed and GoI/ local actors’ perspectives |
| c | To what extent did the project strengthen local partners, including civil society (e.g. local women’s organisations, disabled people’s organisations) and local government, and include their participation in coordination fora? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewQualitative data analysisKII with DFAT and investment partnersKII with GoI officials and local actors (WPS, DPO) | Document and assess different approaches being employed alongside local partner and civil society perspectives |
| d | Was Australia’s approach coordinated and complementary? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewQualitative data analysisKII with DFAT and investment partnersKII with OCHA, UNDP, USAID stabilisation lead | Document perspectives of different partners on coherence of overall package |
| e | To what extent did Australia engage with and influence the international humanitarian system both in Iraq and globally, both through programming and diplomacy? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewKII with DFAT and Investment partnersKII with OCHA, UNDP | Document perspectives of DFAT and different partners on approaches employed to engage and strengthen the international humanitarian system |
| f | Are appropriate exit and transition strategies in place, and how can they be strengthened? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewKII with DFAT and investment partners | Document perspectives of partners on “exit and transition” in the current context, and their current understanding of DFAT plans |
| g | What future funding options are most needed to address gaps? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewKII with DFAT and investment partnersKII with OCHA, UNDP | Document perspectives of partners on current priorities, including the optimal balance/ proportion in terms of humanitarian and stabilisation funding. |
| EQ 5. How transparent and accountable is the package? |
| a | To what extent are implementing partners sufficiently accountable to, and engaged with, affected communities? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewKII with investment partnersKII with third parties (AAP WG, PC, OCHA, UNDP) | Analysis of approaches to AAP assessed against sector standards and needs analysis |
| b | What evidence exists of the package having been influenced by effective communication, participation and feedback from affected people and communities? | **🗸** | **🗸** | Document reviewKII with investment partnersKII with third parties (AAP WG, PC, OCHA,UNDP) | Analysis of approaches to AAP assessed against sector standards and needs analysis |

## Interview guide

Interview questions are informed by the document review and are designed with specific focus on assembly of an evidence base that supports the evaluation team to answer the Evaluation questions. Questions will be adapted according to the profile of the interviewee (DFAT post/Canberra, investment partners, clusters, GoI officials and local partners and civil society. The approach to interviews will be semi-structured and sufficiently open ended for interviewees to include additional information they regard relevant to the evaluation, but which may not fit within the questions detailed below.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Evaluation Question(s) | Probing Questions | KII target | Notes |
| EQ 1 Is the package appropriate and relevant? |
| *a. Is there a clear link between end of program outcomes and needs and priorities of affected population?*  | - How were affected populations consulted in needs assessments and monitoring processes?- What measures were taken to ensure consultations were age, gender and disability inclusive/ representative? | DFATInvestment partners  | Gender, age and disability inclusion considerations |
| *b. Did communities receive the assistance they most needed, when they most needed it, in a way that was most useful and accessible for them?* | - Was programming reflective of identified priority needs?- What feedback and complaints mechanisms are in place (agency and inter-agency level)?- What feedback and complaints were received and what resolution processes do partners have in place (e.g. SOPs, committee, # of feedback or complaints received etc.)?- What measures were taken to ensure consultations were age, gender and disability inclusive/ representative? | DFATInvestment partnersOCHA, UNDPLocal partners and civil society | Gender, age and disability inclusion considerations |
| EQ 2 Is the package effective? |
| *a. Did the investment protect the safety, dignity and rights of affected people?*  | - How were protection cluster and/or agency level strategies used to inform the design and delivery of the investment/program?- How did the investment/ program:i) promote a strategic approach to protection and/orii) deliver protection services and/oriii) mainstream protection principles | DFATInvestment partnersPCLocal partners and civil society | Gender, age and disability inclusion considerations |
| *b. Did investments make a difference in terms of gender equality and empowering women and girls?*  | - What strategies did different partners have in place to progress GEWE? How did these make a difference?- Dedicated programs results or mainstreamed? | DFAT Investment partnersLocal civil society e.g. WPS | Potential use of short case studies |
| *c. Did people with a disability have equal access to partner programs and were their unique needs met?*  | - How did the investment ensure PWD had equitable access to their programs (indicate whether dedicated or inclusive programs, access to dedicated expertise)?- How were AAP measures (consultation, feedback and complaints mechanisms) adapted to ensure inclusive access and feedback for PWD?- What are the main challenges faced in terms of disability programming in Iraq today?  | DFAT Investment partnersPC, AAP WGLocal civil society e.g. DPO | Consider different types of disability to ensure disaggregation in feedback |
| EQ 3. How efficient is the package? |
| *a. To what extent is the project being implemented according to agreed timelines and budgets?*  | - Are partners delivering programs in a timely and effective manner?- What types of challenges do partners face in terms of budget and timeline pressures?  | DFATInvestment partners | Can DFAT investments be adequately understood and disaggregated from broader reporting in terms of understanding progress against timelines and budgets? |
| *b. Is the project being implemented to achieve good value for money?*  | - How do partners define value for money in the context of Iraq?- Are partners able to provide meaningful reporting in terms of accounting for and reporting on DFAT investments? | DFATInvestment partners | Explore both qualitative and quantitative dimensions of VfM |
| *c. Are there benefits from the multi-year funding that could not have been achieved with annual funding? How has this supported the project’s aims?* | - What are partner perspectives on the pros and cons of multi-year funding compared to annual funding?- Has DFAT been responsive to shifting priorities of partners over the course of the investment? | DFAT Investment partnersOCHA, UNDP. Other donors | Aim to drill down into the context of multi-year funding to understand how it specifically affects programming of different partners |
| EQ 4. How connected and sustainable is the package? |
| *a. Was the investment delivered in a way which supported stabilisation, recovery, resilience and long-term development?*  | - Is there coherence in the overall package of investments, and does it collectively support progression towards stabilisation and longer term development?- What are they key barriers to stabilisation programming, and how can DFAT best support these being addressed? | DFATInvestment partners  | Tailor question to the specific context of each partners work on the humanitarian to recovery continuum |
| *b. To what extent did the Government of Iraq (GoI) and key local actors believe they were able to guide and influence the project?* | - What strategies do different partners have in place to consult, inform and engage the GoI in relation to programming?- Do GoI representatives believe they have sufficient voice in terms of guiding and developing ownership of humanitarian focused programming and stabilisation and recovery focused programming? | DFATInvestment partnersGoI officialsLocal partners/ civil society | While every effort will be made to meaningfully respond to this question, it is expected that the sample of interviewees will be limited, and therefore the results more anecdotal in nature |
| *c. To what extent did the project strengthen local partners, including civil society (e.g. local women’s organisations, disabled people’s organisations) and local government, and include their participation in coordination fora?* | - How did DFAT and partners ensure investments/programs engage and strengthen local partners, civil society (WPS, DPO) and government, and their participation in coordination fora? | DFAT Investment partnersGoI Officials, OCHA, UNDPLocal civil society e.g. WPS, DPOs | Language limitations will potentially restrict this cohort of interviews |
| *d. Was Australia’s approach coordinated and complementary?* | - How did DFAT and partners ensure investments/programs were coordinated and complimentary?- How frequently did different partners engage with relevant coordination mechanisms?- Is there coherence and logic to the overall suite of Australian funded investments in terms of both addressing humanitarian needs and supporting progress towards stabilisation and recovery? | DFATInvestment partnersClustersOCHA, UNDP, other donors | It is anticipated that some KIIs will be better placed to respond to this than others  |
| *e. To what extent did Australia engage with and influence the international humanitarian system and stabilisation actors both in Iraq and globally, both through programming and diplomacy?* | - How did DFAT engage with the humanitarian system and stabilisation actors in Iraq and globally in terms of programs and diplomacy? - How does DFAT measure its success in this area (DFAT only)?- What concrete results have you observed? | DFATInvestment partnersOCHA, UNDP, other donors | Triangulate DFAT responses against those of key humanitarian system actors |
| *f. Are appropriate exit and transition strategies in place, and how can they be strengthened?* | - How do different partners view “exit and transition” in the current context?- What is the current resource mobilisation scenario of different partners, and what are the implication of that scenario in terms of a responsible and sustainable transition and exit? |  | While every effort will be made to meaningfully respond to this question, it is anticipated that most partners will view discussion of exit strategies as premature |
| *g. What future funding options are most needed to address gaps?* | - What are the most acute funding gaps faced by different partners?What are the implications of these gaps in terms of progressing humanitarian and/or stabilisation? |  |  |
| EQ 5. How transparent and accountable is the package? |
| *a. To what extent are implementing partners sufficiently accountable to, and engaged with, affected communities?*  | - How were affected populations consulted in needs assessments and monitoring processes?- What feedback and complaints mechanisms are in place? (agency and inter-agency level, multiple methods, gender, age and disability inclusive)?- Are AAP approaches and findings adequately reported to DFAT? |  | Similar to EQ1 a. |
| *b. What evidence exists of the package having been influenced by effective communication, participation and feedback from affected people and communities?* | - What measures were taken to facilitate age, gender and disability inclusive/ representative assessments (e.g. participatory assessments)?- How do they receive feedback and complaints, what is the resolution process and how does this inform programming? (e.g. SOPs, committee, multiple methods for information dissemination and receiving feedback, adjusted programming documents)?- Are AAP approaches and findings adequately reported to DFAT? |  | Similar to EQ1 b. |
| 6. Recommendations |
| *a. Changes to the scope of work or partners ensuring any changes recommended are feasible within a 1-2 year extension of the existing program;* | - What priorities would different partners like to express to DFAT in terms of initiatives that would be feasible if there was to be a 1-2 year extension of the existing program? | DFAT |  |
| *b. Comment on the comparative advantage of Australia as a donor, and in particular, the comparative advantage of Australia’s humanitarian and stabilisation programming. To what extent and how does the Humanitarian and Stabilisation package advancing Australia’s national interest in Iraq?* | - What are the strengths and weaknesses of Australian funding compared to funding received from other donors?- What changes would they like to see in terms of how DFAT manages its investments?- How does the humanitarian and stabilisation package advance Australian interests?- How does the humanitarian and stabilisation package achievements match the priorities set out in the Foreign Policy White Paper? | DFATInvestment partnersEmbassy staff |  |
| *c. Identify opportunities in the forward program to take forward the Women, Peace and Security agenda (UNSC 1325+).* | - How is Australia and/ or other donors supporting WPS implementation in Iraq?- What are the most significant gaps and opportunities moving forward? | DFATDonorsLocal civil society (WPS) |  |

# Annex III – IASC Centrality of Protection and Three Levels of Action

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Level of action | Package level | Response level | Gap/ Recommendation |
| i) Strategic approach to the crisis context | Informed by protection risk analysis, conflict analysisLeverage access to GoI for strategic advocacy e.g. anti domestic violence law, humanitarian access, rights based returns | HC, HCT protection strategy, comprehensive protection risk analysis, and empowered protection cluster | Strategic principled approach moving forward – **durable rights-based returns (safe, voluntary, dignified)**Recognise endemic discrimination and hardened caseload barriers to returnsGender and conflict analysis |
|   | **Technical area** | **Package partner** |   |
| ii) Dedicated programs    | GEWE – GBV prevention and response including SRH | UNFPACare (consortium) | Specialised service gaps, preventionReview of UN Women Peace and humanitarian fund to address WPS participation gap |
| Mine clearance and MRE | UNMAS |   |
| Legal assistance/ civil documentation | NRC (consortium) | High scale of needs |
| Child protection  |   | Gap in terms of package, appears well-funded at response level, though critical service coverage gaps |
| Disability | HI, ICRC | Specialised service gaps |
| iii) Mainstreaming/ inclusion  | Disability inclusion | HI (consortium lead)IOM | Disaggregated dataUNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA |
| GEWE | Care (consortium)UNMAS | Meaningful measures to secure engagement of womenUNDP, UNICEF |
| Child protection | NRC, STC | Conflation of compliance policy with programming |
| AAP and PSEA | IOMBPF consortiumUNFPA (PSEA) | Inclusive community engagementUNDP, UNICEFConsider role of Groundtruth Solutions and third party monitoring |

# Annex IV – Literature Reviewed

## Package partners

BPF Proposal for AHP Activities, Building Peaceful Futures, Narrative and Annexes 1-7, 2018

BPF Mid-term Evaluation (January 2020)

BPF Annual Review 2019

Conflict Analysis Sinjar and Hawija

IHO, Annual Report(s) Iraq, 2018, 2019

IHO, Appeals Overview

IHO, Covid-19 Appeal (Global), 2020

IOM, DFAT Agreement and Annexes including IOM Iraq 2018 – 2020 Strategic Priorities and Plan

IOM, ‘IOM Launches Countrywide Strategy for Disability Inclusion’, 3 December 2019

Raber Aziz, IOM Iraq, ‘New hope for Peace: Women Spearhead Co-existence Efforts in Diyala, Iraq’ June 2019

IOM’s Community Stabilisation Programming in Iraq 2018 Overview

[IOM Displacement tracking matrix](http://iraqdtm.iom.int/archive/DTMReturnDashboards.aspx)

UNDP, DFAT Contract and UNDP FFS Revision, 2018

UNDP Annual Report 2018

UNDP, Independent Country Programme Evaluation Iraq, Independent Evaluation Office, October 2019

UNDP Progress Update Australia March 2020

UNFPA, DFAT Contract and Country Program Action Plan, March 2018

UNFPA Report to DFAT February 2020

UNFPA DFAT Annual Report (Updated) March 2020

UNICEF, DFAT Agreement and Annex

UNICEF Iraq Logframe 2019

UNICEF Iraq Progress Report January 2020

UNMAS, DFAT Contract and Proposal, 2018

UNMAS Iraq Monthly Newsletters

UNMAS, Government of Australia Contribution to Explosive Hazard Management: Enabling Humanitarian and Stabilisation Efforts in Liberated Areas, Iraq – Interim Substantive Report 1 April 2019 – 30 September 2019

UNMAS Iraq Risk Education and Gender mainstreaming initiative 28 April 2020

### DFAT

Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package: Investment Design Summary (December 2017)

Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package: Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (September 2019)

Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package Partner Risk Register

Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package Six-Monthly Reports (February 2020, September 2019, February 2019, September 2018)

Detailed M&E Framework (February 2020, September 2019, February 2019, September 2018)

Partner Performance Agreements 2018-19 (UNMAS, UNFPA, ICRC, UNDP, UNICEF) and Rating Matrix

Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package – first year completed 20 August 2018

Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package update 7 December 2018

Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package – Monitoring Mission 27 February 2019

Minute Iraq Package Steering Committee Recommendations 10 December 2018

Humanitarian Response Aid Quality Check for Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package 2018-19

Iraq Humanitarian and Resilience Package – Field Monitoring Visit Plan Sunday 3 – Thursday 7 February 2019

Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Package Results Dashboard 2019

Evaluation of Protection in Australia’s Disaster Responses in the Pacific 2018

DFAT Humanitarian Strategy 2016

DFAT Protection Framework 2013

[Evaluation of Protection in Australia’s Disaster Responses in the Pacific 2019](https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/evaluation-of-protection-in-australias-disaster-responses-in-the-pacific)

## Additional literature

Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan 2020

Iraq Humanitarian Country Team Protection Strategy 2019-21

IASC Statement on the Centrality of Protection 2013

Whole of System Review of Protection in Humanitarian Action 2015

IASC Protection Policy 2016

WHS Grand Bargain

Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles

[Advancing Women, Peace and Security in the Middle East](https://www.redr.org.au/media/dswf4xt4/advancing-women-peace-and-security-in-the-middle-east-cop-report.pdf), May 2019, Amra Lee for RedR Australia.

[OECD-DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus](https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf) 22 February 2019

[The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation: A guide for policy-makers and practitioners](https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=The+UK+Government%E2%80%99s+Approach+to+Stabilisation:+A+guide+for+policy-makers+and+practitioners&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8) (March 2019). Stabilisation Unit: UK Government.

[Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance and Reconciliation](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603859/EXPO_STU%282017%29603859_EN.pdf) (2018). Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department: European Parliament.

[Literature Review on the Stabilisation-Development Nexus](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/literature-review-stabilisation-development-nexus), 31 May 2019, Tana Copenhagan for Global Affairs Canada.

# Annex V – Iraq Package Program Logic

*(adapted from Investment Design Summary May 2020)*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Humanitarian Assistance | Stabilisation and Social Cohesion |
| Objective | To support international efforts to meet the humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable conflict-affected populations in Iraq and assist communities to become more resilient and stable |
| Purpose | Australia’s aid will provide predictable funding to support international efforts, in line with Australia’s national interest, to meet the humanitarian needs of conflict-affected and displaced Iraqis, contribute to the stabilisation of liberated areas and promote social cohesion |
| End of Program Outcome | Vulnerable people in Iraq affected by the crisis receive inclusive humanitarian assistance and have greater access to protection services | Institutions, infrastructure, and social conditions improved for conflict affected populations to recover and build resilience in a safe and stable environment |
| Output | Increased humanitarian assistance provided to affected populations in Iraq | Improved access and strengthened protection and disability services provided to conflict-affected populations. Including women and girls. | Explosive hazards mapped and cleared and mine risk reduction activities conducted | Regular inclusive dialogue between community networks, government and international actors leads to improved consultation to address needs and improve mutual understanding | Government functions, critical infrastructure and essential services are restored |
| Indicative Activity | Humanitarian organisations deliver food, NGI, WASH, and cash. And provides rehabilitation, PSS, primary healthcare and livelihood assistance | Humanitarian organisations provide protection services, promote respect for IHL and monitor detention facilities | UNFPA provide sexual and reproductive health services and assistance to survivors of SGBV, including PSS, and social service programmes to youths. | NGOs provide targeted assistance to persons with disabilities and support protection mainstreaming | UNMAS surveys and demines affected areas, and conducts mine education and awareness activities | NGOs facilitate and support community led networks around priority needs, promoting tolerance and inclusion | Dialogue and public awareness programmes support community reconciliation | UNDP FFS assists the Government of Iraq to rehabilitate infrastructure and services (i.e. schools, water networks, health centres and administrative buildings). Open transport routes and employs workers to remove rubble. |
| Gender, protection and disability considerations are mainstreamed by all partners. This will be a requirement in contracts or performance expectations |
| Assumptions | Humanitarian access is maintained | Communities continue to engage with NGOs and UN agencies | Project has popular buy in from groups and communities | FFS remains operational |
| Info Source | Information will be drawn from UN, International Humanitarian Organisation and NGO reporting. This data will be complimented by monitoring visits, annual reviews, dialogue with the Government of Iraq, engagement with other donors and high-level consultations. Performance expectations and milestones will be agreed with partners. |

1. <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/IraqAndSyria>. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. See <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/dfat-humanitarian-strategy.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2020/the-global-gender-gap-index-2020/results-and-analysis/> & <https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620602/rr-gender-profile-iraq-131218-en.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. There are a number of assumptions underpinning these calculations. The overall figure is an aggregate level accumulation of select UNFPA, IHO, STC, UNMAS and UNICEF indicator results. It is possible the same individuals have received more than one type of assistance/ service reducing the overall numbers reached. It is also possible the same individuals have been counted in both the 2018 and 2019 cumulative results. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Created by General Assembly Resolution 46/182 in 1991. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Foreign Minister Marise Payne Speech to the UN Human Rights Council 25 February 2019 <https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/speech/un-human-rights-council>. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. This includes the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus, stabilisation and recovery, social cohesion and reconciliation, WPS, WHS and Grand Bargain commitments, IASC centrality of protection and maintaining respect for humanitarian principles and access. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. See <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/dfat-humanitarian-strategy.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf> <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/content/fragility-what-s-minds-policy-makers-aid-workers-and-donors>. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/IraqAndSyria>. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Recent IOM-Yale study identified high levels of mistrust between <https://iraq.iom.int/news/evaluating-perceptions-security-and-police-iraq-iom-study>. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. CIA World Factbook. (2018). Iraq Country Profile. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/26/world/middleeast/iraq-protests-sweden-Najah-al-Shammari.html> and <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/16/iraq-state-appears-complicit-massacre-protesters>. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/iraq/>. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. <https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/escaping-from-isil-a-yazidi-sexual-violence-survivor-rebuilds-her-life/> Recognising the UN Investigative Team for the Accountability of Islamic State (UNITAD) mechanism has been established pursuant to UNSCR 2379 (2017). [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. <https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/iraq>. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/wrd/iraq-women.htm>. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2020/the-global-gender-gap-index-2020/results-and-analysis/> & https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620602/rr-gender-profile-iraq-131218-en.pdf. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/women-mps-the-iraqi-parliament>. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Sarah Taylor, Coordinator, NGO Working Group, Women, Peace and Security, interviewed in ‘Side by Side: Women Peace and Security.’ <https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/02_2013/wps_toolkit.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/womens-participation-in-peace-processes> and <https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/why-women-inclusive-security-and-peaceful-societies/> [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. <https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet%20Gender%20Equality.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Krause, Jana, Krause, Werner & Branfors Piia (2018), Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace *International Interactions* 44(6): 985-1016. Further evidence demonstrates inclusion of women increases the chances of a peace agreement lasting at least 15 years by 35%. [https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/2016/03/10/infographic-womens- inclusion-in-the-syria-peace-talks/](https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/2016/03/10/infographic-womens-%20inclusion-in-the-syria-peace-talks/) [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. https://www.redr.org.au/media/dswf4xt4/advancing-women-peace-and-security-in-the-middle-east-cop-report.pdf [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. <https://www.peacewomen.org/nap-iraq>. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. There are four pillars – participation, protection, conflict prevention and relief and recovery. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. <https://www.unocha.org/iraq/about-ocha-iraq>. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. <https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/wp-content/uploads/190909-HCT-Protection-Strategy-FINAL.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. <https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/wp-content/uploads/Not-wanted-anywhere_GPC_Iraq_Feb-2020.pdf?utm_source=SUBSCRIBE+TO+GPC+UPDATES&utm_campaign=bb853edbab-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_03_13_09_11&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_f7f07c0884-bb853edbab-47552885>. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. According to the 2019 BPF consortium conflict analysis “IS conflict is, for both Sinjar and Hawija, only the latest event in a long history of conflict, exclusion, oppression and/or power struggles. Each round of conflict introduces a new set of issues, and in some cases, grievances go back decades or more, and have become inherited rather than directly experienced.” [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. <https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-poll-iraqis-welcome-improved-security-and-social-cohesion-discontent-government>. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03/iraq-economy-oil-coronavirus.html>. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/isis-looks-prosper-world-distracted-virus>. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. As of September 2017 <http://iraqdtm.iom.int>. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Credit: HAG May 2020. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. 2018 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. <https://www.odi.org/events/4288-iraq-providing-aid-protection-crisis>. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. 2018 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. 2018 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/building-resilience/stabilisation-and-recovery/Pages/stabilisation-and-recovery>. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. REACH-CCM Cluster; Iraq IDP Camp Intentions Survey, December 2017-January 2018. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Taken from UNDP FFS presentation to donors, April 2018. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. UNDP FFS: Australia DFAT Progress Update, March 2020. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. HRP Iraq 2020, p14. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. The assumptions underpinning the M&E framework influence the reliability of the aggregate level results in particular. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/archive/DTMReturnDashboards.aspx>. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. There are a number of assumptions underpinning these calculations. The overall figure is an aggregate level accumulation of select UNFPA, IHO, STC, UNMAS and UNICEF indicator results. It is possible the same individuals have received more than one type of assistance/ service reducing the overall numbers reached. It is also possible the same individuals have been counted in both the 2018 and 2019 cumulative results. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Dashboard>. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. See DFAT Evaluation of Protection in Disaster Responses in the Pacific 2019. See also <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12651.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. For on overview of LGBT and the law in Iraq: [https://www.humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/iraq /](https://www.humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/iraq%20/). [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Adapted from DFAT Evaluation of Protection in Australia’s Disaster Responses in the Pacific 2018 ‘Three levels of action required to effectively operationalize protection in humanitarian action.’ p6. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. DFAT Evaluation of Protection in Disaster Responses in the Pacific 2019. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. DFAT HAQC 2018-19. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. DFAT HAQC 2018-19, under a very modest target of 13 percent. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. BFP Mid-term evaluation, p24. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. DFAT Iraq Package HAQC 2018-19. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. DFAT Iraq Humanitarian and Stabilisation Update 7 December 2018. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. The sensitivities of identifying people with disabilities, and the fact that not all disabilities are visible, can be addressed through the Washington Group tools for disability data collection, which do not rely on data collectors/enumerators using observation. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. BPF mid-term evaluation, p vi. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-unhcr-civil-documentation-idps-october-2019>. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-unhcr-civil-documentation-idps-october-2019>. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. BPF Mid-term Evaluation, p20. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. BPF mid-term evaluation, p23. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. BPF mid-term evaluation, p23. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/business-opportunities/Pages/preventing-sexual-exploitation-abuse-and-harassment-policy-takes-effect-from-1-july-2019>. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. Iraq HRP 2020, p22. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. <https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/themes/protection-mainstreaming/>. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. Iraq HRP 2020, p35. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. BPF Mid-term evaluation, p23. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. As reflected in the 2020 HRP (p35) and BPF mid-term evaluation 2020. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/stabilization-development-nexus_low.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. <https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/NP-82-web-1.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. Further supported by the BPF Conflict Analysis. [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. IOM Interim Report July 2019, p6. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. Six monthly report, 3 April 2020. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. BPF Mid-term evaluation, p31. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. BPD Mid-term evaluation, p31. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
79. BPD Mid-term evaluation, p31. [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
80. DFAT HAQC 2018. [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
81. According to DFAT’s 2018-19 HAQC for Iraq. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
82. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
83. UNICEF Additional Information, November 2019. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
84. In terms of GBV risks, on 7 April the UN Secretary-General publicly appealed for peace to be extended to the home in recognition of the increased risk of violence women are facing there. [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
85. <https://www.globaldashboard.org/2020/04/30/buildabridgetobetter-recommendations-to-drive-pandemic-responses/>. [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
86. <https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/covid-19/>. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
87. <https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/covid-19/>. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
88. <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/3/24/honour-infects-iraqi-families-refuse-quarantine-for-coronvairus-positive-daughters?fbclid=IwAR1whGuRTSFTYJnS_NDh1hTDFHkYZHvIjFSmscQXe8_ctLYW1g5LdJPHMnc>. [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
89. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/06/iraq-islamic-state-comeback-coronavirus-us-withdrawal/> <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isis-time-coronavirus>. [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
90. Foreign Minister Marise Payne Speech to the UN Human Rights Council 25 February 2019 <https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/speech/un-human-rights-council>. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
91. IOM reported that Australia’s bilateral advocacy resulted in the development of their first country level disability inclusion strategy, which has been replicated across other responses. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
92. Based on the HAG compiled M&E results as of 3 April 2020 and underlying assumptions/limitations. [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
93. Foreign Minister Marise Payne Speech to the UN Human Rights Council 25 February 2019 <https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/speech/un-human-rights-council>. [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
94. This includes Canada, United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden. [↑](#endnote-ref-94)
95. Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan 2017; UNICEF Iraq Monthly Humanitarian Situation Report, September 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
96. Iraq Body Count Database, <https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>, accessed 31 October 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
97. IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, accessed 31 October 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
98. See <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/dfat-humanitarian-strategy.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
99. IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, accessed 31 October 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
100. <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-humanitarian-needs-overview-2020-november-2019-enarku>. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
101. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Iraq_HNO_2020-Summary%5BEN%5D%20%281%29.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
102. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Iraq_HNO_2020-Summary%5BEN%5D%20%281%29.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)