Poverty Reduction Support Facility

Independent Completion Report

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**Executive Summary**

Despite the risks and the inherently political operating environment PRSF has been an unqualified success. Every stakeholder in every context expressed the view that the flexibility and responsiveness of PRSF was in fact the ideal way to support the strong ownership and clear agenda set out by the Vice President. While there was little clarity early on in the life of TNP2K, strong leadership by the Vice President and the TNP2K Secretariat has brought the necessary direction and purpose to the program.

TNP2K has achieved many of its objectives and in the view of the former Vice President met all of his expectations. Since Australia funded virtually all of TNP2K’s activities, as well as establishing PRSF to provide support services, Australia shares in the success. While the leadership was provided by the very high calibre staff of TNP2K, it is self-evident that none of it could have been achieved without Australia’s support through the PRSF. As noted by the Executive Secretary of TNP2K at the lessons learned workshop in April 2015, the fact that Australia trusted Indonesia to manage this program was a very important factor in the program’s success.

PRSF has provided high quality and timely support. There have been the inevitable ups and downs over the life of the facility, but most importantly at the end of this phase there is considerable trust between the partners; TNP2K, the Australian Embassy and PRSF. Given the political nature of the program compromises have had to be made. First, and most crucially, the Australian Government has been clear that the policy authority for the program lies with the Government and the TNP2K Secretariat, while the function of PRSF is to support TNP2K and provide quality assurance for activities. PRSF has been required to contract and administer staff and resources over which it has little effective control, while at the same time meeting its responsibilities for accountability under the contract with the Australian Government. There is a very natural and unavoidable tension in PRSF having two masters and the partnership approach from all parties has made this work. That in itself raises the question whether this is a “model” or if it is a one off and only works because of the individuals involved. On balance TNP2K / PRSF is not a model that can readily be copied, but the principles of the engagement are worth capturing and trying to graft on to future programs.

PRSF represents good value for money for the Australian Government. Analysis done by PRSF on the four key national poverty programs indicates that there has been a very high return for investment on interventions by TNP2K with support from PRSF. These results show that benefits to the poor have been real and measurable.

Sustainability remains an issue. TNP2K is not a structural part of the Government and many of its functions cannot be transferred to a line ministry right now, and maybe not for some years. The budget for TNP2K / PRSF in the first phase was also generous. PRSF started during an unprecedented growth phase of the Australian program in Indonesia. Essentially, every activity was gold plated and there was very little need to prioritise. That will have to change in the future as the budget is lower. It is a key question for the next phase of support – how much of the success of TNP2K was about the better use of evidence in policy, and how much was the ability to follow through and in some cases support the implementation of policy changes in line ministries? It is clear a significant activity budget for TNP2K is important. More investment by the Government of Indonesia will also be needed in a future program.

# Introduction

The Poverty Reduction Support Facility (PRSF) represents an innovative and in some ways risky undertaking for the Australian Government in Indonesia. It was conceived in the wake of the election of the second administration of President Yudhoyono and under the direct authority of Vice President Boediono. While this high level of ownership within the Government of Indonesia represented a unique opportunity for policy innovation, it was also high profile and therefore risky should it fail to achieve its objectives. The Vice President while well known to Australia was not part of mainstream politics and the office he established, the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (*Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan* or TNP2K), was outside the formal structure of Government. Nothing like this had been tried before. There was in a sense, no model to follow.

Now in 2015 with the election of a new Administration and a new Vice President, the Australian Government must again assess the pros and cons of providing flexible and high profile support to the national poverty reduction programs. The new Government is still establishing its policy platform and institutional structures, presenting some challenges for the Australian Government in providing appropriate support.

This review is intended to achieve two goals:

* To capture the story of PRSF and in particular its contribution to the work of TNP2K; and
* To provide some “lessons learned” to the Australian Government in implementing a new program of support.

## Scope of the Review

The PRSF ICR is not an evaluation of TNP2K or of the Government of Indonesia’s broader efforts at poverty reduction. It is more narrowly focused on the contribution of the PRSF to the work of TNP2K and an assessment as to the appropriateness and effectiveness of the support provided by the Australian Government. This will inevitably mean that some qualitative analysis has been undertaken on the outcomes achieved by various programs under TNP2K, but the review focuses on PRSF’s contribution and how the experience of the last 5 years can be used to improve support in the future.

## Methodology

The PRSF ICR is not a formal quantitative evaluation of the results from PRSF. It is a qualitative assessment of the program’s achievements based on a review of existing analysis and evidence. The review has been conducted through a combination of a desk review of existing material, commissioning some selective pieces of additional analysis and some structured discussions / interviews with key stakeholders.

## Description of Evaluation Activities

A desk review of materials has been combined with an in-country mission undertaken from 20 April until 1 May.

The purpose of the in-country mission was to:

1. Interview key stakeholders about PRSF;
2. Participate in a “Lessons Learned” Workshop in Jakarta;
3. Validate analysis and evidence from various sources; and
4. Request additional materials

The process for collection of data and analysis during the in-country mission was qualitative with semi-structured interviews and a workshop with key stakeholders. Guided by the “key evaluation questions” on page 6 of the Terms of Reference, interviews were tailored to specific individuals and groups to cover the key areas of the work of PRSF. Responses have been cross referenced with other interviews and written materials during the drafting of the report.

## Structure of the report

This report will be structured around three key questions and conclude with some thoughts on lessons learned that can be applied to any future program of support to TNP2K and in some sense for Australia’s overall engagement in Indonesia.

**Section 1:** What is PRSF, what did it do and what has been achieved?

**Section 2:** Is PRSF efficient and effective – from both a policy and an operational perspective?

**Section 3:** To what extent did PRSF facilitate a policy dialogue between Indonesia and Australia?

**Section 4:** What are the lessons learned from PRSF?

# Section 1: What is PRSF, what did it do and what has been achieved?

## Background

In 2009, the Government of Indonesia committed itself to *accelerate* the pace of poverty reduction, and the President of Indonesia declared poverty reduction to be his highest development priority. According to the medium-term development plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah*, RPJM, 2010-2014), the government aimed to lower the poverty rate from 14.1% in 2009 to 8-10% by 2014. During this period, Indonesia achieved a significant reduction in poverty. However, more than 28 million Indonesians (11.4% of the population) continued to live below the poverty line in mid-2014.

### The National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K)[[1]](#footnote-1)

As part of its commitment, the Government of Indonesia placed the oversight and coordination of poverty and social protection programs under the Vice-President’s Office. Through Presidential Regulation No. 15/2010, TNP2K was created and given the mandate to carry out oversight and coordination functions. TNP2K set out to play a key role in poverty reduction and social protection by:

* Improving the performance of poverty reduction programs;
* Improving program targeting using a common method and household list for all social protection programs;
* Undertaking monitoring and impact evaluations of the social assistance programs; and
* Identifying important but troubled social assistance programs and resolving their implementation issues.

Since 2012, TNP2K has aimed to maximize its impact by concentrating on reform of four important social protection and poverty reduction programs:

* ***Beras untuk Keluarga Miskin* (Raskin)**, which aims at improving the food security of 15.5m poor households through a monthly distribution of subsidized rice.
* ***Bantuan untuk Siswa Miskin* (BSM)** which is conditional cash transfer program introduced in 2008 to improve access to education by covering basic education costs for children from 15.5m poor households.
* ***Program Keluarga Harapan* (PKH)** or the Family Hope Program, which is a conditional cash transfer program to very poor households, currently supporting 2.8m households.
* **Jamkesmas**, which supports 86.4m poor and near poor individuals to access health services by providing them with free basic health services. TNP2K’s Unified Data Base (UDB) was used as the basis for identification of the Jamkesmas beneficiaries until December 31, 2013 as well as the National Health Security (*Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional* / JKN) program starting January 1, 2014.

TNP2K has also supported evidence-based policy making in the field of financial inclusion and employment, as well as in the field of community-driven development (PNPM and the new Village law).

### PRSF

In response to a request for help from the Vice President in 2010 Australia established the Poverty Reduction Support Facility (PRSF) to support TNP2K. According to the PRSF Design document (December 2010), Australian support was aimed at generating knowledge to inform social protection policies, define policy options, translate policy choices into operational programs and provide high- quality monitoring and evaluation.

PRSF was mobilized in July 2011 following a 14 month interim phase[[2]](#footnote-2) and has been operating at a fast pace. The primary function of PRSF is to provide TNP2K with technical, managerial and financial support services, including office space and equipment. In addition, PRSF also supports the Government and TNP2K in other ways, by:

1. undertaking research and studies;
2. designing and managing pilot reform projects;
3. supporting some reform initiatives in relevant government agencies and ministries, and
4. managing and developing the Unified Data Base (UDB)[[3]](#footnote-3); and
5. commissioning DFAT directed activities.

The PRSF Strategic Plan was developed in mid-2014 to cover the period mid-2014 to mid-2015. PRSF’s expected results are rationalized in relation to two specific ‘End of PRSF’ Outcomes:

* **PRSF Outcome 1** - TNP2K is supported to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of existing social protection programs. This is PRSF’s “Core Business”.
* **PRSF Outcome 2** - GOI is supported to advance its agenda for developing a comprehensive social protection framework. These are are funded through the so-called “DFAT window”. They are complementary to and support Outcome 1.

PRSF has approved and commissioned more than 50 research studies and reform experiments, originating from TNP2K requests, as well as 2 pilot projects and 2 technical assistance programs initiated by DFAT. Initially, PRSF’s activity budget was set at approximately $15 million over four years, but in line with planned scaling up of the Australian Aid Program in Indonesia at the time and in order to encourage a rapid pace of implementation, PRSF’s contract was amended to add additional funding to TNP2K’s activity budget. That amendment also allowed PRSF to have additional administrative resources to manage the increased budget. The total expenditure as of the end of September 2014 is $76.8 million of which $51.7 million has been expended on implementation of activities. The current total forecast for FY14-15 is $37.9 million.

### The DFAT Window

Besides direct support to TNP2K, PRSF supports the implementation of two distinct DFAT windows, which complement and reinforce the support given to TNP2K:

* The DFAT-supported social protection and poverty reduction activities window includes:
  + Experimentation and pilots, in safe migration and community-based poverty monitoring;
  + Co-funding technical assistance to the health sector with GIZ;
  + The Integrated referral system;
  + Social protection umbrella activities;
  + Support to Bappenas for the drafting of a medium development plan (MP3KI).
* Technical Assistance for PNPM, through which around 20 technical advisers are supporting the implementing agencies of PNPM and the new Village Law.

## What is PRSF?

In some ways the name “The Poverty Reduction Support Facility”, makes the purpose and role of the facility self-evident. It is not a traditional program with a set of discrete objectives of its own. It was conceived and then later designed to support the Government of Indonesia in its efforts to accelerate poverty reduction in Indonesia. For something that sounds relatively straight forward, there are many ways to interpret this role. Does it mean that PRSF is simply a “body shop” whose job is to respond to whatever it is asked to do? If so, who does the facility respond to, the Government of Indonesia? The Government of Australia? Both? Should PRSF have the technical capacity to engage in substance with TNP2K and other Government bodies or should it be content to just procure what is required? Can the facility efficiently procure what is required if it doesn’t understand the substance of the policy issues being addressed?

**Box 1: Concept of PRSF in the Design (December 2010)**

This concept proposes a multi-donor support facility managed by AusAID to support the new Vice-Presidential National Team for Accelerating Poverty Reduction. The purpose of the Vice President’s inter-ministerial National Team is to develop an overarching policy framework that unites all of the Government of Indonesia’s (GoI) social assistance and poverty programs. Policy will be enforced through oversight of the budget.

Indonesia’s Vice President has asked AusAID and the World Bank to coordinate donor support to the National Team. AusAID support will provide policy analysis, technical assistance, logistical management, and training. This assistance will help GoI define policy options; to translate their policy choices into operational programs; and to provide high quality monitoring and evaluation.

The project team rates the overall riskiness of this program as **high**. The reason for the high risk assessment is because the National Team was set up to bring order across Indonesia’s powerful ministries, who can be expected to resist consolidation and extra oversight.

These are all questions that it would be ideal to address in the design process, but in reality, have probably only been fully resolved in the last 6 months of the program. Like all good development activities PRSF has evolved along the way as it adapted to demands from TNP2K, other government agencies and the Australian Embassy. It might be said that a defining feature of PRSF is that it was not all that well defined early on allowing it to change as required. As Box 1 illustrates the remit was extremely wide and largely left the details to be worked out between the stakeholders as priorities emerged. Flexibility if you like was the underlying theme.

One of the really different and potentially difficult to manage features of PRSF is its relationship with TNP2K. Most facilities or programs are based on a relationship with what is usually referred to as the counterpart organisation. In the case of PRSF, its counterpart organisation is, at a strategic level, the TNP2K itself. But this is a very senior Ministerial committee chaired by the Vice President of indonesia. In practice the counterpart organisation for a large part of PRSF’s work is the TNP2K Secretariat. While the Secretariat is headed by a Deputy Minister who reports directly to the Vice President, all other staff, including the senior leadership team, are contracted by PRSF. In effect, PRSF were asked to employ the staff for and manage the government body the facility was created to support.

There are few other programs that have this structure and the risks are easy to see. The Secretariat is representing the Vice President with the force of a Presidential Regulation issued by the President himself. They were not and could never be subject to oversight by the contractor in any traditional sense. On the other hand, the head contract with GRM the managing contractor makes it clear that GRM are legally responsible for the efficient and effective use of public money. For example, in Box 2 part (a) from the original Scope of Services in the contract says PRSF will be responsible for the quality of outputs produced by technical assistance essentially working for TNP2K.

**Box 2: Original Scope of Services 2010**

The Facility will support four main areas of work:

* + 1. ***Assistance to the National Team Secretariat***: Providing support approximately 60 full-time positions and oversee the technical assistance management including quality of their outputs.
    2. ***Hiring premises and purchasing equipment***: Conducting all aspects of office management including security, paying office rent and utilities and maintaining equipment.
    3. ***Activities:*** Undertaking various types of work as directed by the Facility Steering Committee (FSC) such as evaluations, pilots, workshops and conferences.
    4. ***AusAID-commissioned studies and reviews****:* Implementing a limited number of AusAID identified priorities without going through the normal FSC process.

This tension is inherent in most programs but is particularly important in understanding PRSF. Because of this unique situation with TNP2K and PRSF, the Australian Government was in effect putting substantial funds under the control and management of TNP2K itself. This “trust” turned out to be well founded. TNP2K agreed to systems and procedures suggested by the contractor, particularly with regards to administration, finance and HR for its own staff. Disputes or disagreements such that they arose were almost always about policy issues or the quality and responsiveness of services being provided by PRSF. This is a tribute to all three parties, TNP2K, the Australian Embassy and the contractor GRM that despite the risks, good governance has been a feature of the program.

A complicating factor in PRSF is the DFAT window. This was a part of the PRSF contract that made it possible for the Australian Embassy to direct PRSF to support work not related to TNP2K. This was partly opportunistic (making use of an existing contract to cover a range of activities without an additional procurement or the cost of managing a separate contract) and partly complementary (making sure there was flexible and timely support for things that are complementary to the work of TNP2K). The former is sensible on efficiency grounds and fairly common, but the latter is a source of some tension between PRSF and TNP2K. TNP2K asserts that social protection is its mandate and so all support should be channelled through TNP2K. While in the end TNP2K have learned to live with this arrangement, it is not their preference.

What all this adds up to is that PRSF is not just one thing. It provides support in terms of administration, finance and HR to TNP2K. It manages a large amount of procurement for technical assistance (TA) to support pilots and program activities but it also delivers activities – both for TNP2K and through the DFAT window. PRSF has experimented with in house technical capacity; sometimes it has worked and sometimes it has not. Personal relationships between teams tend to determine the level and quality of cooperation between PRSF and TNP2K. Despite this personality based approach, collaboration is generally good between the secretariat and the facility. Importantly it is now clear at the end of the program that a governance model is in place where TNP2K can fulfil its mandate on accelerating poverty reduction with Australian support, and PRSF can meet its obligations to the Australian Government for efficient and effective use of public money; that elusive balance between development and fiduciary risk. What is less clear is whether this is as a result of deliberate decisions or circumstance.

## Achievements

When looking at achievements the way PRSF is structured to support TNP2K and to help administer the activity budget of TNP2K, makes it at times difficult to talk about one without talking about the other. In general, this report takes the view that PRSF has played an indirect role in everything that TNP2K has done, and so success achieved by TNP2K at least prime facie reflects well on PRSF. In this section the report tries to examine where PRSF’s contribution to the work of TNP2K has been positive, or where success has been achieved with little contribution or even in spite of PRSF. There are also achievements that are owned largely by PRSF, such as work done through the DFAT window and administrative efficiency and effectiveness more generally. While the two organisations, PRSF and TNP2K are separate, in much of their work it is sometimes difficult to distinguish where one starts and one stops, and they are fundamentally co-dependent; one cannot achieve its goals without the other.

At a very strategic level the former Vice President Boediono has noted that from his perspective TNP2K has met all his expectations. Given the high risk that was assigned to the undertaking in 2010, this is a very positive outcome.

The first and most important thing to note at the outset is that virtually all of the outcomes from the work of TNP2K and PRSF could not have been achieved without Australian support. That is not to say that Australia can claim all the outcomes without acknowledging that this has above all else been an Indonesian driven program. The leadership of the Vice President, the very high calibre of the Indonesian leadership of TNP2K and the skills and dedication of the staff are the true driving force behind achievements. There is also no alternative to the “model”, TNP2K had to be part of the Vice President’s Office and the work could only be carried out by professional Indonesians. It could not be outsourced to a contractor in the more traditional sense or any other sort of donor driven mechanism.

On the other hand, TNP2K could not have achieved what it has without the contractor and the support of the Australian Embassy. If TNP2K had had to rely on funding from the national budget and government procurement processes, or had had to recruit staff using government systems and pay scales, it would never have been able to move as fast or achieve as much. It is also unlikely that any other donor could have provided the resources and the flexibility of PRSF at the time it was required. The other most obvious alternative, a recipient executed multi-donor trust fund, would quite simply have been too slow and unwieldy. TNP2K and PRSF is a true partnership, and so both parties can share in the success.

From a very early stage of TNP2K the Vice President made it clear that he wanted to see some tangible results in the period of his term of Government. He was not suggesting poverty would be eradicated in 5 years, but he was also very clear that when he left office he wanted to show a clear impact from the work of TNP2K. This meant that the TNP2K Secretariat and their partners at PRSF needed to focus. A decision was made to concentrate on establishing the Unified Data Base (UDB), a key tool for better targeting of government resources, and on existing national poverty programs which presented the best opportunity for results. These priorities are set out in Box 3.

Much was achieved with this focus and much has been written or analysed in other reports. This report will not attempt to go over all the outcomes, but a short summary is worth noting.

The Unified Data Base (UDB) is without question the most significant achievement for TNP2K and represents a long term public good. As far back as 2005 when the first increase to the fuel price was accompanied by an unconditional cash transfer to over 15 million households. Analysis showed that leakage, or poor targeting was as high as 40%. The UDB now covers some 97 million individuals including their name, address and a range of information on their circumstances. It covers the bottom 40% of the population and allows national programs to accurately target various deciles of the poverty distribution. The recent increase to the fuel price / lowering of the fuel subsidy was in some measure made possible through efficiencies and better targeting of the compensation provided through a one-off unconditional cash transfer. A direct result of work done by TNP2K.

**Box 3: TNP2K Short to medium term priorities** (Source: TNP2K Website May 2015)

In executing its duties, the National Team for Accelerating Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) is mandated to complete five major tasks.

**Unification of National Targeting System**

Social protection programs such as the Family Welfare Program (PKH), Unconditional Cash Transfer (BLT), Health Insurance for the Poor (Jamkesmas), Rice for the Poor (Raskin) and Operational Grants for Schools (BOS) are key programs for targeted poverty alleviation. Nevertheless, a lack of effectiveness is caused by programs using different targeting approaches and beneficiary databases, resulting in relatively high inclusion and exclusion errors. Improvements to overall program performance will be made through the unification of the national targeting system.

**Refining the Implementation of Health Social Assistance for Poor Families**

Short- to medium-term priorities to refine the implementation of health assistance for poor families includes: 1) formulating and determining the best healthcare benefits provider; 2) studying healthcare cost structures for the poor; 3) determining the benefit packages; and 4) compiling rational work plans, including a calculation of the costs involved.

**Refining the Implementation and Broadening the Coverage of *Program Keluarga Harapan*/Family Welfare Program (PKH)**

The Family Welfare Program (PKH) is a social protection program that provides cash assistance to Poverty Stricken Households (*Rumah Tangga Sangat Miskin*, or RTSM) and members of targeted household (*Rumah Tangga Sasaran, or* RTS) who are required to meet a set of pre-defined terms and conditions. The short-term objective of this program is to reduce the financial burden felt by RTSMs, while the long-term objective is to break the inter-generational chain of poverty.

Seeing the significant benefits of conditional cash transfers (CCT), the SBY-Boediono government set a target that by the end of 2014, PKH should have been enjoyed by all RTSM in Indonesia, or around three million families. To that end, various improvements have been undertaken to ensure that PKH is carried out as a *CCT program*.

**Integrating other Community Empowerment Programs into the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM)**

The short- to medium-term priorities of community-based poverty alleviation programs is to integrate the Independent National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM Mandiri) with village/district planning and financing facilities including: 1) integrating other community empowerment programs to PNPM Mandiri; 2) improving the contributions of local/regional governments to PNPM Mandiri; 3) integrate PNPM Mandiri with village/district planning; and 4) integrate PNPM Mandiri with financing facilities beyond the state/regional budgets (APBN/APBD).

**Inclusive Financial National Program**

A well-functioning financial system is a prerequisite of a successful economy and social development that reaches each individual community. Market and financial institutions play an important role in distributing funds to the most productive economic activities. As such, they play a role in overcoming imbalances between information and transaction costs to eventually encourage economic growth, equitable opportunities and welfare, as well as alleviating poverty.

Realising the importance of financial sector in efforts to alleviate poverty, TNP2K has the mandate of taking steps in increase the commitment of the government, private sectors and the general public in creating inclusive financial systems.

By the end of 2014, 86% of the data in the UDB has been synchronised with the Population Administration Information System allowing some 83 million people much better access to services through the Social Protection Card (the so called Gold Card) and the subsequent Family Welfare Card (KKS), the Smart Indonesia Card (KIP) and the Healthy Indonesia Card (KIS). There are few places outside of China and India that deal in numbers of poor or vulnerable people this large.

There are some sustainability issues that need to be addressed. The UDB is still managed and housed at TNP2K, a body with no structural place in the Government and that might be closed at any time. The management and up keep of the UDB is also fully funded by the Australian Government and administered by PRSF. At a cost of around $1.5 million per year, the cost is not the major concern. Being able to attract and retain the necessary skills to the UDB team through a government system presents more challenges. There are also still some further synchronisation issues with a number of databases located in other agencies being brought into alignment right now. This work needs to be completed and a long term home found for the UDB before it can be declared sustainable. These will be key tasks for TNP2K and its partners in the next few years.

Having established the UDB, TNP2K also put it to work. While better targeting has been the mantra of TNP2K, its work has actually gone further than applying better data, and TNP2K has piloted a range of approaches to key national programs to improve their targeting, operation, and monitoring.

From 2011 to 2015 TNP2K funded a range of activities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Indonesia’s four largest national social assistance programs targeting the poor:

* Subsidi Beras Bagi Masyarakat Berpendapatan Rendah (Raskin): Rice for the Poor
* Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH): Conditional Cash Transfers to the extreme poor
* Bantuan Siswa Miskin (BSM): Cash Transfer for Poor Students
* *Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional*: National Health Security program (replacing Jamkesmas in 2014)

As well as the one-off Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat (BLSM): Temporary Unconditional Cash Transfers as compensation for the government lowering the fuel subsidy.

Together these programs represent approximately $6.6 billion of investment by the Government of Indonesia, or 0.6% GDP in 2014, and cover the poorest 25% of the population. A conservative economic analysis shows a very high return on investment. Depending on the program, its level of coverage, size and nature of benefits (cash or kind) and targeting accuracy, for every dollar spent, between $28 (RASKIN) and $487 (the unconditional cash transfer BLSM) of benefits were generated that would not otherwise have occurred. This adds up to a net present value of over $5.5 billion over a 5-10 year period for an investment of around $50 million.[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Table 1: Return on investment for PRSF support and TNP2K reforms**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **DFAT investment** | **Every $1 invested yields:** | **Net Present Value** |
| **Raskin** | $12.2 million | $28 | $345 million  (2013-17) |
| **PKH** | $23.3 million | $57 | $1.33 billion  (2012-2021) |
| **BSM** | $10.6 million | $157 | $1.6 billion  (2012-2021) |
| **BLSM** | $5.1 million | $487 | $2.48 billion  (2013-17) |

*Source: PRSF 2015.*

PRSF as noted above can take a reasonable amount of credit for these results and none of them would have been possible without funding from the Australian Government which was channelled to TNP2K through PRSF.

For the purposes of this review which is looking specifically at PRSF, it is necessary to look at what the goals, objectives and expected outcomes for the facility were and then compare them to the achievements. Box 4 is from the original scope of services for the PRSF contract and provides a good framework for assessing success or failure for the facility. In a practical sense this is what the Australian Government set out in the contract and this is what it paid for.

Like every program, the long term goal is not one that is solely within the power of the program to achieve. It requires a lot of things to happen and investment of time and resources by a large number of actors, including the national government, sub-national governments, communities, NGOs and other donors. While the poverty goals of the Government have not yet been fully achieved, poverty is falling and with better targeting of services, the vulnerability of the poor is clearly lower. The long term prospects for breaking out of intergenerational poverty are also improving through better targeting of programs like the school scholarships for the poor program (BSM).

The macroeconomic implications of better targeting are also often underplayed when discussing social protection programs. In Indonesia’s case, there is considerable evidence that the ability to better target compensation measures for the poor, in the form of unconditional cash transfers, has helped the Indonesian Government to lower fuel subsidies, crucial for sustainable Government finances. The sustainability of the national budget and the ability to maintain a well targeted social safety net are in turn key tools for reducing the impact of economic shocks on the poor and vulnerable. Following the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s, the story in Indonesia was not just one of increased poverty, but also ongoing vulnerability to shocks. TNP2K with its partners is making a key contribution to macroeconomic and social stability through its work.

**Box 4: Goals, Objectives, Expected Outcomes and Risk Management (Original Scope of Service 2010)**

***Long Term Goal:***To increase the rate of poverty reduction in Indonesia and reduce the impact of shocks and stresses on the poor and vulnerable*.*

***Medium term goal:***Improve the quality of policy advice for poverty programs.

***Objectives:*** Given the Facility’s central role in supporting the National Team Secretariat, its key objectives align with those of the National Team which are to:

1. design and oversee a large-scale program of social assistance and poverty reduction;
2. consolidate, simplify,, and improve the efficiency of existing programs; and
3. identify important but troubled social assistance programs and resolve their implementation problems.

The AusAID specific objective of supporting the Facility is to play an active role to contribute to the direction of poverty (particularly social assistance) reduction programs.

***Longer term outcomes (3 years +)***

1. Implementation of policy advice improves the effectiveness of social assistance and poverty reduction programs.
2. Social assistance programs are better targeted.
3. Poor families eligible for social assistance programs have reliable access to these programs.
4. Greater appetite within the diverse implementing agencies of GoI to implement integrated poverty programs.

***Interim outcomes***

1. Policy working groups produce policy advice that directly influences program decisions.
2. Policy advice is realistic and implementable.
3. Evaluations and pilot programs provide evidence base for policy formulation.
4. Gaps in social assistance coverage are identified and actioned.
5. AusAID participates in key policy discussions, in technical committees and influences decision making.

In the case of the medium term goal of improving policy advice given to poverty programs, TNP2K with support from PRSF has done well. TNP2K has a very high quality brand. It was initially thought that


It was initially thought that TNP2K would be primarily a policy centre that would do analysis and commission research that would lead to improved program implementation by line Ministries and sub-national governments. From interviews with key people in TNP2K and in PRSF it became clear fairly early on that TNP2K would need to support other agencies in piloting new ideas and in applying the UDB for better targeting. From interviews with the Ministry for Social Affairs, the Ministry for Education and Bappenas, it is clear that the technical support from TNP2K (and in some cases PRSF) on the ground to actually assist with improving program delivery was highly appreciated. In all cases the support was seen as high quality and flexible.

In fact the high quality, flexible and timely technical assistance in part mitigated the natural tension that arises from TNP2K imposing new directions on programs with the Vice President’s authority. A number of partner ministries when asked said they appreciate the technical support but would prefer they did not have to work through TNP2K and could receive assistance directly. PRSF’s main contribution to this work is its ability to recruit, support and retain high quality technical staff.

## Quality Assurance

One of the success stories of PRSF under the medium term goal of improving policy outcomes is one that might not immediately be apparent. Around 2012, about a year into the work of PRSF and with TNP2K ramping up its work significantly it was identified that a much more robust quality assurance process was needed. Not as a quality assurance process to make sure Australian funds were being spent efficiently and effectively as is normally the case. In this instance PRSF recognised that given the high profile and technically complicated work involved, TNP2K would benefit from an internal but independent process for quality assuring concepts, ideas and products. The QA process has evolved but is captured in Figure 1.

**Figure1: Quality Assurance process Strategic Objectives (Source: PRSF 2015)**




The establishment of the QA System coincided with the arrival of the Social Protection Specialist in mid-2012 and was recommended to be strengthened by the independent progress report for PRSF in early 2013. It was not universally welcomed by all the stakeholders.

Many at TNP2K saw this as a management control or compliance tool being imposed on them by the Australian Government and the contractor, something they would not accept. Others saw it as unnecessary and something that would slow down progress on reforms. At that crucial point in 2012-2013 when activities were scaling up, strengthening the internal quality assurance processes to make sure that ideas were sound, designs for activities were implementable and that outcomes were able to be sustained was extremely important.

The quality assurance process was strengthened over the last 2 years and today is accepted by virtually everyone as an important part of TNP2K and PRSF’s internal processes. TNP2K will always need to be in the driver’s seat and quality assurance cannot be about PRSF or the Australian Government trying to set the agenda or influence policy priorities, but systematically ensuring that TNP2K always produces high quality and robust analysis is now accepted as core business.

**Figure 2: Phases of the Quality Assurance process in PRSF (Source: PRSF 2015)**



It is worth noting that the strong engagement by the Australian Embassy in all likelihood made a difference in this instance. Given the initial reluctance by the TNP2K senior leadership to accept the idea of a more robust quality assurance process, it is unlikely the contractor would have been able to push back sufficiently to establish the current system. This is one of the issues where having a strong program management team and a specialist working in TNP2K regularly provided the engagement to get a change that was necessary.

## Is PRSF a model?

PRSF is not a model in the conventional sense that it can be replicated whenever it is needed. In many ways PRSF is a creature of circumstances. The combination of the election of a reform orientated Vice President with an academic background at the time Australia was scaling up its assistance to Indonesia and was prepared to take some risks was a happy coincidence. In 2009-10, Australia was becoming a partner of first choice in Indonesia, due to its growing resources and flexibility, but nothing of this ambition, partnering with Indonesia to better target the rapidly expanding social protection system, had been tried.

The approach was also radically different in that it relied heavily on the Indonesian leadership to drive an agenda in a highly contested policy space. While all facilities have the objective of building capacity with Indonesian institutions and leaders, PRSF was actually relying on that capacity already being there and for the leadership group within TNP2K to be able to drive reforms among other key government stakeholders. Because the Vice President put the full weight of his office behind this initiative and appointed an experienced and extremely capable Deputy Minister to lead the secretariat, this “punt” by the Australian Government has largely paid off. The Deputy Minister was able to attract very high quality Indonesian professional staff and turnover rates have been extremely low at or around 5% over the life of TNP2K.

While PRSF is not so much a model there are features that should be captured and used as a reference or framework for analysing the potential costs and benefits of future proposals and concepts. The former senior technical lead at TNP2K who is now the head of the Fiscal Policy Office at the Ministry of Finance offered a simple but compelling framework to describe the situation:

1. Leadership – is there political buy in at the highest levels?
2. Good Bureaucrats – is the Government committing competent civil servants?
3. High Quality Technical Staff – are the best technical inputs available?
4. Donor Commitment – is the funding flexible, sufficient and predictable?

This is a simplification of the story of TNP2K and PRSF but it is reasonable to say that without any of these the facility would not have had as much impact. The Vice President provided strong and consistent leadership and authority for TNP2K. He delegated his authority to TNP2K through a Deputy Minister who had the experience and standing to drive the agenda. Young, professional and highly committed Indonesians were prepared to work for TNP2K and in fact in many cases were drawn to the opportunity to have an impact on the future direction of their country in an important area of policy work. The Australian Aid Program mobilised a contractor quickly, gave TNP2K a flexible mandate to work with and rapidly scaled up the budget as activities took off. On top of that the Embassy committed its own resources to work beside TNP2K and PRSF to ensure that flexibility was not misdirected.

What is striking about this example of PRSF and TNP2K is it is not the way most facilities are structured. Even the best programs with good relationships are usually housed in separate offices and “outpost” technical assistance to the counterpart organisations. Most facilities struggle with uncertain agendas and lack of clarity from the government side, but in the case of PRSF, their counterparts are essentially consultants but are seen by the rest of the government as government staff. Scaling up budgets is not usually the problem, making sure funds that are committed are spent is more the norm, but PRSF found that TNP2K often had better buy-in with counterparts than a regular facility because they were seen as part of the government.

TNP2K and PRSF are not models that can be readily replicated, but the features that have made them a success can be noted and applied to consideration of where resources might be invested to greater affect in other programs and portfolios. Not only should the simple framework above be applied to test the likelihood of success for existing programs, the Australian Aid Program could actively look to use this as a guide for exploring new areas of work not currently being considered.

There are also some obvious “spin-offs” that have already emerged. The former Senior Technical Lead from TNP2K has moved to the Fiscal Policy Office at the Ministry Finance as its Head. This takes the type of evidence based policy making that has been championed by TNP2K into the heart of the government. The new Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs has appointed a Deputy Minister from Bappenas to his ministry and has instructed him to establish a policy think tank to replicate what TNP2K does in poverty reduction and social protection on economic policy. The Deputy Minister has asked the Head of the Fiscal Policy Office to be on the steering committee for this think tank and is recruiting experienced Indonesians from outside government to manage it using Australian support. Since the Coordinating Minister is a Co-Chair of TNP2K this has the very strong potential to create a policy coalition and improve the alignment of social, fiscal and economic policy.

More recently, Bappenas has published a paper on the agency evolving into more of a policy think tank, and has asked Australia’s Knowledge Sector Initiative for assistance to establish the core team. This growth in demand for evidence based policy making is certainly welcome, but whether it will prove to be a positive or a negative over all is still not clear. If coordination is good, then there is a potential for a big improvement in policy making across a broad cross section of social, economic and fiscal policies.

Australia also needs to be careful in how it supports these “spin-offs” created partly by the success of TNP2K. Australia is supporting each of these institutions through separate mechanisms. PRSF and MAHKOTA are working with TNP2K, AIPEG is working with the Coordinating Ministry, the Government Partnerships Fund has the Australian Treasury working with the Fiscal Policy office and the Knowledge Sector Initiative, while intended to work across all aspects of the so called “Knowledge Sector” is anchored in Bappenas who have asked that they not take a lead role in supporting the Coordinating Ministry. Australia could improve its coordination between these programs.

To some extent the Vice President in the previous government was able to provide some authority and guidance to GOI and to GOA stakeholders through TNP2K but with new players, new institutions and new policy agendas, the balance of benefits versus costs in supporting this type of work more broadly than TNP2K might not be clear for some time.

# Section 2: Was PRSF efficient and effective from both a policy and an operational perspective?

As noted above, this report is not intended to be a detailed evaluation of every activity under TNP2K and PRSF. It is a qualitative view on the efficiency and effectiveness particularly of the PRSF in supporting progress in accelerating poverty reduction in Indonesia over the last 4 to 5 years. There are already a large number of reports and evaluations that should be read in conjunction with this section.

## What was PRSF’s role in policy outcomes?

As already discussed at some length, the role of PRSF has never been absolutely clear, and when it comes to policy outcomes, it is particularly hard to separate out what is PRSF and what is support by PRSF to reforms and policy outcomes.

Without repeating the discussion in the previous section on results, it is clear that PRSF has played much more of a role than merely a support facility handling HR, finance and administration. However, PRSF has played much more of a role at the technical and implementation stages of activities and much less at the strategic level. In fact PRSF’s contribution to the strategic direction of TNP2K’s work has been at times to leave it to TNP2K. This sounds obvious, but actually is a source of some angst within both the PRSF and the TNP2K leadership.

Dealing first with the PRSF leadership, it is clear from interviews that at times PRSF has felt that they are not as involved as they would like at the early stages of strategic thinking and design of activities. In the view of some within PRSF this has hampered the contractor’s ability to meet its obligations to the Australian Government for efficiency and effectiveness and has potentially meant not all activities were as well thought through as they could have been. This is a very normal perspective for a contractor to have. Box 3 in the previous section shows that under long term outcomes the first one was:

1. Implementation of policy advice improves the effectiveness of social assistance and poverty reduction programs.

This objective or outcome is from the original Scope of Services for the PRSF contract. This is not just some abstract goal articulated in a concept note, this forms an integral part of the contract and the basis on which GRM the contractor will be assessed and ultimately paid. Moreover, as a long-term outcome for the program, it will in part affect future business for the contractor bidding for other work. To ask the contractor to ignore this goal or rely on the counterparts in the TNP2K secretariat to fulfil it is risky for the contractor and not really in line with the contract. So it is understandable if PRSF for both technical and commercial reasons would seek a greater role in strategic policy discussions. However, whether consciously or sub-consciously, to a large extent PRSF and GRM as the managing contractor relied on TNP2K to drive their own outcomes.

From the perspective of the Government, or in this case the TNP2K secretariat, there is no role for the PRSF in policy development or outcomes that TNP2K do not prescribe. It is not a matter of dislike or mistrust of PRSF by TNP2K, on the contrary the working relationships are very good between the two teams. The Vice President of the country has been given a mandate by the President and he has delegated this very important responsibility to the TNP2K secretariat to guide. They take this responsibility very seriously and are not about to delegate it to contractors.

This discussion is not about setting up a conclusion that the two parties are diametrically opposed and cannot therefore find a balance. In fact the opposite has been true. By not challenging TNP2K on the strategic directions of activities and concentrating on being flexible, responsive and providing high quality technical inputs, PRSF has gained a position of trust with TNP2K. The development of the quality assurance process discussed in the previous section is a good example of how PRSF have focussed on the technical quality of the work being done. This slightly more passive approach to the strategic agenda has at times been a source of frustration for both PRSF and the Embassy program management team, but was in fact the right approach given the situation.

Some short comments on publications is warranted as much of this report is concerned with the outcomes of interventions in programs. TNP2K has been a prolific producer of publications, studies and papers. One of PRSF’s core functions is to assist TNP2K in making sure that the information is tailored to the desired audience, that it is available in a timely fashion and that most importantly, the analysis in these publications is having an impact on policy decisions. PRSF has a Knowledge Management Unit and report in their quarterly reports to the Embassy on a range of indicators. These are largely focussed on volume or traffic on the TNP2K website and the number of requests for information that TNP2K receive. PRSF reporting also includes media coverage of activities and launches by the Vice President and the TNP2K Secretariat.

While all of this is good and shows that demand for information and analysis produced by TNP2K and to a lesser extent PRSF is growing, it is a long way from systematic. It is largely reporting what happens without seeking to go further and look into the impact. This is curious given the knowledge to policy mantra that TNP2K espouses. There is a real commitment from the top in TNP2K to knowledge driving policy. As the senior leadership group put it when interviewed, “it is not just about knowledge, it is how evidence translates to change that matters.”

In contrast, when the UDB team were asked about where requests for data were coming from and for what purpose, they could quote the volumes but not the details. To produce a report with details of who asked for data and for what purpose the team said it would take some time and cannot routinely be produced by the UDB team. This in itself points to a lack of demand for this type of information within TNP2K. What this indicates is that while TNP2K definitely does want to know that their work is in demand, they have not set up any systematic diagnostics to track who is demanding it, for what purpose and what impact it has had.

The PRSF Knowledge Management Unit expressed some interest in doing this work but said it was outside what TNP2K wanted them to do. The Knowledge Management Unit was originally part of TNP2K but was shifted to PRSF where it became essentially a unit to ensure the quality of products, providing translation, proof reading, editing and publishing services. It was clear from both the Communications Team in TNP2K and the Knowledge Management Unit in PRSF that it was not required for them to follow up with the end users of the publications to ask them if the materials were accessible, timely and useful, or if they had impacted on decision making.

This is a missed opportunity and should be followed up in any future support. TNP2K will not agree to PRSF or a replacement contractor acting as a critic of their work with counterparts, but processes to gather more information on the impact of materials produced and setting up reports that can routinely tell TNP2K who is asking for information and analysis and for what purpose should be put in place.

## Was PRSF efficient and effective in its operations?

In judging the efficiency and effectiveness of PRSF operations, it is useful to put it into some perspective. At the time TNP2K was being set up, the Vice President had made it clear he was in a hurry. Five years is a short space of time for major reforms and he needed to move quickly. At the same time, the Australian Aid program globally was scaling up to 0.5 percent of GNI, and Indonesia had one of the most ambitious targets for increased aid. The program was set to grow from $450 million per year to a projected $900 million per year. The design pipeline was a staggering $3-5 billion dollars over 4 to 5 years. There was no question of a budget constraint, the decision was clearly made to give TNP2K whatever it needed.

As any public finance economist will attest, unconstrained budgets in general do not lead to optimal outcomes. It is harder to weed out poor proposals and say no to requests from important vested interests. It is also harder to stay focussed. These issues were all prevalent in the early days of PRSF.

Without repeating the findings of the independent progress report from early 2013, it was clear that the contractor also struggled at the beginning to keep up. It is worth noting that every program has inception issues. The first 6 to 12 months of any new program is frantic and usually compounded by a contract that requires unrealistic milestones. PRSF had the added complication that TNP2K was just getting established and was in a hurry. In a sense PRSF had to establish two institutions, not one, as well as juggling some existing commitments under the DFAT window.

Acknowledging the challenges, the contractor was too slow to put in place systems to manage the program. It was clear pretty early on in 2011 that PRSF was going to scale up very quickly. Despite this it took until 2012 for the contractor to put in place an adequate in-house human resources team to deal with the huge workload of hiring technical assistance for TNP2K. In mid-2012 there was only 2 people on HR and there were no systems in pace to manage performance. Since 2012 there has been a huge investment in this function and the results are very good. The quality of technical inputs recruited by PRSF has been high and appreciated by all stakeholders. In addition retention rates for long and short term staff were extremely high. Some 94% of staff stayed for the duration of their contract, including full-time staff. Performance issues were minimal allowing both TNP2K and PRSF to deliver results.



*Source: PRSF*

Similar to the HR story, the quality assurance systems took a long time to eventuate, given that TNP2K were not originally supportive of this process. What is clear is that from mid-2012 onwards with the support of the program management team at the Embassy, a system was established that today is working pretty well.

Procurement is another issue that is often a source of frustration for counterparts. In PRSF’s case, the reality and the perceptions are often quite different. On the one hand the PRSF operations team presented some clear facts and figures to show that the average procurement time was around 4 to 8 weeks depending on the activity. This is an average, but is in fact quite acceptable for most government work and a fast stream process was put in place for shorter term activities guaranteeing no more than a month for recruitment once the request is made.

Given the requirements of the commonwealth procurement guidelines and the generally risk averse nature of the Australian Government when it comes to fraud, this average time for procurement is good. Despite this, in many interviews with TNP2K and other stakeholders like BAPPENAS, the comments about technical assistance were almost always that the quality of the TA was excellent but procurement was slow.

This reflects a couple of things. Most importantly it reflects the unrealistic expectations of most government counterparts when it comes to procurement. The use of a separate contractor has allowed procurement processes that are smoother than those provided by the Government of Indonesia. Most of the counterparts are unfamiliar with the commonwealth procurement rules (even at a broad level). Secondly, in many cases because of the nature of TNP2K, there are very small markets for technical assistance. In some cases, it is a short list of one person, and so overly administrative processes seem a waste of time.

While in general procurement has been handled well, some investment in more communication of procurement expectations would have been helpful. In general, TNP2K have accepted the procurement systems and standards as the “cost” of the support and have shown good judgement on governance issues of this kind. In the future, there are provisions in the commonwealth procurement guidelines for single source procurement under $500,000 and the contractor and the Embassy could have made more strategic use of them in case of TNP2K. There needs to be processes in place to ensure value for money for Australian funds, but there are circumstances such as in the case of TNP2K where grounds exist for a more timely response to specific needs.

When it comes to risk and fraud, PRSF is an interesting study. Typically the Australian Government views facilities administered by managing contractors as lower risk than say sector budget support, untied grants or even output based aid. Quite simply the contractor is the agent of the government and bears the fiduciary risk for the activities. This often leads to some very risk adverse behaviour in many facilities and more often than not fiduciary risk if given a higher weight than development risk by the contractor.

For PRSF, matters are complicated by the structure of the facility. On the one hand it is managing a large number of procurements, mostly for technical assistance, and so needs to ensure it has procedures in place to meets its obligations under various Australian standards. This PRSF has done reasonably well over the life of the program, as noted above, aided by the strong support from the Executive Secretary of TNP2K for compliance with human resources, administration and finance procedures.

On the other hand, what is more unusual is the treatment of the activity budget. Significant funds have been spent on piloting new approaches in the national poverty programs. These pilots have been under the authority of the TNP2K Secretariat and little is said in quarterly reporting by the contractor about fraud or risk management with regards to these investments. That is not to suggest that there is a problem and fraud is either occurring or activities are not being monitored. On the contrary, the approach that TNP2K takes in these big pilots is itself a risk mitigation strategy with better targeting (which we might interpret as same or better outcomes for lower cost). Pilots can help to further identify weaknesses in the targeting system.

The punchline of this discussion is that in the case of much of the activity budget for TNP2K, PRSF by supporting pilots that might be considered risky in a strictly fiduciary sense, have played a role in improving development outcomes and at the same time have helped to strengthen public financial management through better systems. It is not clear from reporting that this was done consciously by PRSF. It is likely that the facility felt compelled to support pilots that TNP2K proposed, but if left to their own devices would have decided against them on the grounds they were too risky. This is a good example of weighing up development risk against fiduciary risk and is worth noting for other future investments.

## Gender in PRSF

The PRSF gender strategy was an early initiative and to the credit of the facility a draft was finalised in September of 2011. The strategy recognised the very large opportunity presented by the work of TNPTK and PRSF in improving targeting of social assistance programs, particularly to women. It was anchored around some simple principles (see Box 5) that recognised the crucial importance of senior management oversight and commitment.

The strategy also showed an excellent grasp of the issues around targeting and was able to generate some clear and relevant indicators that would be readily able to be monitored through the development of the UDB and through on-going work with a range of existing national programs.

This early development of a gender strategy that is so closely linked to the core elements of the larger program is in contrast to many other programs but despite the potential it is not clear that this good start translated into a positive impact on TNP2K’s work. As Figure 3 shows there is a solid internal consistency and logic to the objectives of the strategy. Better access to information is core to TNP2Ks decision to focus its efforts most intensively on the UDB. Using that information requires an increased understanding of the issues facing women and how the national poverty programs can be used as a way to improve outcomes for women. To be really valuable this has to translate into activities that make existing poverty tools available to users of the system.

**Box 5: Principles underpinning the gender strategy**

* it should fit within the existing government policy framework for gender equality and women’s empowerment (see Part 4 for summary);
* it will be flexible and will adapt and change over time; and
* senior management oversight and commitment is required to ensure that: strategies and actions are resourced, and performance indicators are carried through into PRSF and TPN2K processes and procedures, which are regularly monitored, with action taken to improve compliance if necessary.

It is particularly important that the link to the medium term and long term goals in the gender strategy are not just about women, they are about the quality of policy advice for poverty programs and eventually reduction of and less vulnerability to shocks for all people – including women. This is again atypical for these types of facilities, where the gender strategy often falls short of making the link between better understanding of gender issues and constraints through better data, and the achievement of the overall goals of any given program or activity. It is not clear that this good foundation led to achievements by the program in implementing this gender strategy. The fact that all of the data in the UDB was sex disaggregated allowed for an excellent piece of analysis to be done in January of 2013.[[5]](#footnote-5)

**Figure 3: Objectives of the gender strategy and contribution to PRSF goals**

**PRSF Long term goal**

To increase the rate of poverty reduction in Indonesia and reduce the impact of shocks and stresses on the poor and vulnerable.

**PRSF medium-term goal**

To improve the quality of policy advice to poverty programs.

**Objective 3:** PRSF is supporting activities in selected provinces which are promoting gender equality in end user’s access to and decision making about a range of poverty reduction tools available to them.

**Objective 2:** PRSF and TPN2K have increased understanding of gender issues and increased capacity and commitment to incorporating gender strategies in policies and projects.

**Objective 1:** PRSF and TNP2K have increased access to information regarding the gender dimensions of poverty and gendered constraints to poverty reduction in Indonesia.

*Quality* policy advice by definition must include attention to gender and the promotion of gender equality.

*Both* *men and women* must benefit from poverty reduction programs and enjoy reduced vulnerability to shocks and stresses. To achieve this, activities must be based on a sound gender analysis and implemented with attention to gender issues.

The striking thing about this analysis is that it is not an analysis of whether or not the UDB had adequately incorporated gender related data. Since all the data was sex-disaggregated from the outset, this analysis could focus on what the data was telling policy makers about the challenges and constraints faced by poor women in Indonesia and identify some key issues and opportunities for TNP2K to consider. This practical approach clearly shows the value of having a strategy in place early with clear links to the program objectives. There is huge power in presenting analysis on a policy issues using the data of the policy institution who you want to make a decision or apply resources to change the way something works. In this case, TNP2K have created the UDB precisely to improve the targeting of national programs and so analysis using this information carries more weight. It should be implicit that if TNP2K is committed to evidence based policy that the evidence will compel changes to be made to incorporate better approaches for poor women. In this case it is not clear is that the analysis dis have any impact. Certainly there was no follow up or tracking of outcomes that have been cited. Disaggregating data by sex is a start, but gender analysis goes much further.

Much is made of mainstreaming gender issues in development programing. Much of it is used to wilfully obscure or marginalise interventions that target better policy outcomes for women. In most cases the preconditions for an evidence-based debate about policy options, data, is not prioritised and so not surprisingly little is achieved.

The 2013 analysis set out a range of issues and opportunities and made three general observations set out below[[6]](#footnote-6):

*The descriptive analysis of data in the UDB provided in this report tells us something about the what, but cannot adequately address questions about the why, or what do we do about this? It therefore should be considered as an entry point to identify areas where more focused qualitative or mixed methods research can be designed, or informed discussions can be held, aiming to answer specific policy or implementation protocol related questions. This initial analysis suggests three priorities in relation to gender differences:*

1. *What forms of identification are needed to access social protection? What are the barriers to obtaining these, particularly for women and the poor, and how can these be overcome?*
2. *How can social protection programs to reach households where the head is illiterate or has very little education (a proportionally more frequent situation for female-headed households)? What strategies are needed to ensure effective socialization and grievance mechanisms?*
3. *How can female labour force participation in poor households be increased without damaging impacts on care patterns, or without prohibitive overall (unpaid and paid) labour burdens?*

In this case it appears that these gender considerations were not “mainstreamed” into the national programs where TNP2K has been focussed. The analysis was a one-off driven by the capacity provided by PRSF through its dedicated gender adviser and once she left momentum for the strategy stalled.

That is not to say there have been no outcomes for women from the programs. In their presentation to the new Vice President on the work of TNP2K it is obvious that being able to identify and target the poor is at the very heart of the work. By identifying women headed households in particular TNP2K has helped to reduce both exclusion errors (women not having access to programs when they should) and inclusion errors (people being given access to programs when they shouldn’t).

The improvements to PKH are also a good example. This program was always targeted at women with a focus on reproductive health and school attendance but it had always struggled to get past the pilot phase of its work, with very low coverage. Through better targeting using the UDB, between 2011 and 2014 the number of recipients went up from just over 1 million households to just under 2.8 million households with average disbursement per household increasing from around Rp1 million to around Rp1.4 million. This has been of material benefit to women especially those in the lowest poverty decile, and was made possible because the Government could be more confident in increasing benefits because of improved targeting.

Under the scholarships for the poor program (BSM) the UDB has allowed for better targeting of boys in primary school (where enrolment rates of boys and girls are almost universal and equal but drop-out rates for boys are slightly higher than girls) and girls in secondary and senior secondary where the drop-out rates for girls are much higher than boys. From a scheme where schools made individual decisions about who got scholarships, BSM now has over 60% of the allocations for scholarships done through the UDB.

Despite these achievements, as is often the case, the gender strategy has only been partly achieved and there have been a number of missed opportunities. Of the gender strategy’s three objectives, the first one has been the most successful. As noted above more information on the gender dimensions of poverty is available to policy makers. The evidence is less clear on objectives two and three which are more focussed on policy makers understanding how poverty affects women and directly supporting interventions that target constraints faced by poor women. In recent gender training conducted by PRSF for TNP2K, feedback from participants indicated that many were only now really understanding the difference between collecting sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis (in the 4th year of the program). This indicates that one of the original objectives of PRSF is yet to be met; “realistic, gender sensitive, and implementable policy advice is used by TNP2K to directly influence program decisions.”

As noted in the strategy, there is a need for senior level ownership of the issues and for that to translate to a more general culture of understanding gender issues in day to day decision making. While there is very strong commitment and leadership to make sure that the national programs collect data disaggregated by sex this has not translated into a stronger more gender aware culture across the two organisations. The gender specialist at PRSF is still a lone champion of the cause, with some support from the Deputy Team Leader. While much has been achieved, some institutional arrangements like a joint gender working group across both TNP2K and PRSF chaired by someone senior from TNP2K would ensure that opportunities to maximise the outcomes of TNP2K work with respect to gender are not missed.

## A strong role for the program management team

As noted above, PRSF has generally done a satisfactory job of managing this quite unique program. It should also be noted that they have not been alone in this task, with the embassy putting in place a strong program management team. The program management team have played two important roles. Firstly they have engaged with TNP2K and PRSF on policy issues, including by the deployment of a social protection specialist working a few days a week in the TNP2K office. Secondly, the program management team have been very active in managing the contractor and ensuring that the facility is not only flexible and responsive, but is also meeting the accountability standards required by the Australian Government. At times these two roles have overlapped.

There is clear evidence that the program management team has made an important contribution to the program. As noted in the previous section, issues like the quality assurance process are unlikely to have been implemented without the intervention of the Embassy program management team. In a similar vein to the earlier discussion about the role of PRSF vis a vis the strategic direction of policy, it is not the Australian Embassy’s role to set an agenda for TNP2K. It is however important that the Australian Government can be a good and knowledgeable partner to TNP2K when it comes to their policy agenda.

A probably unforeseen consequence of the presence of the social protection specialist in the office where both TNP2K and PRSF were located was that the specialist has had a ground level view of how policy and operations were actually working. This certainly flowed back into performance management of the contractor by the program management team.

In terms of managing the performance of the contractor there is also considerable evidence that the program management team have been active. As noted in earlier sections, PRSF did not always act quickly enough nor at times did they put in place necessary procedures that would ensure the robustness of this reasonably risky investment. These issues are being dealt with through the contractor performance assessment process so this report will not go over them again. Suffice to say that PRSF as a facility has been considerably more effective for the active management of the contract by the Embassy.

# Section 3: Did PRSF facilitate the Australian Government’s engagement in a policy dialogue?

As already noted the opportunity for the Australian Government to work in close collaboration with the Vice President of Indonesia on a big agenda like social protection was and to some extent still is unique. While the success or failure of the investment rests on the outcomes already discussed, an important aspect of this program is the extent to which it changed the way the two Governments engage with each other. This section explores some of those dynamics.

## Did the PRSF facilitate a deeper policy engagement between Australia and Indonesia?

As already discussed in an early section, PRSF is not really a model. It was a product of a unique set of circumstances. It also came at a time when Australia’s engagement in Indonesia had never been broader. The aid program as mentioned was in the process of an unprecedented scale up of its operations, making it a major donor in a range of sectors where in the past it had been a small player. This was not the full extent of Australia’s engagement. The rise in importance of the G20 had made Indonesia and Australia regional partners in global geo-politics. Regional trade, security and trans-national crime issues had also seen very large increases in the level of bilateral cooperation. Jakarta was now Australia’s second largest embassy after Washington with representation by a large number of Government agencies not just the usual Foreign Affairs and Trade and Immigration officials. Australia’s relations with President Yudhoyono were generally very positive.

For the aid program though, PRSF represented a different level and style of engagement. Australia would be the primary partner and funder of the coordination body for billions of dollars-worth of Indonesian Government spending. When you consider that aid had fallen to just 0.5% of GDP and Australian Aid represented approximately the same percentage, 0.5%, of the national budget in Indonesia, this represented an unprecedented opportunity to influence national programs directed at the poorest Indonesians. More than that, TNP2K was the first step on the road to Indonesia building middle income welfare and transfer system with large social, fiscal and macroeconomic implications.

Early discussions were not based around these broader considerations, and focussed on the three clusters that had been established under the TNP2K structure. Australia had recently scaled up its involvement in flagship Indonesian programs like the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) and with PRSF and a couple of other programs such as the women’s empowerment program MAMPU would have investments in the hundreds of millions to support social protection and poverty alleviation.

PRSF provided a perfect platform for engagement with senior Indonesian Government figures on key policy issues. The support provided directly to TNP2K was very much appreciated, not just for the money and the resources but also for the spirit in which was provided. TNP2K then and now see this support as a sign of trust by the Australian Government, something they both respect and appreciate.

## Were the opportunities for policy engagement realised?

The report has discussed at some length already the quite significant achievements from the partnership between PRSF, TNP2K and the Australian Embassy particularly when it comes to the UDB and the national poverty programs. The level of engagement was very good and remains so today, but if anything fell short of expectations at the start of the program. Feedback at the recent Lessons Learned Workshop organised by PRSF[[7]](#footnote-7) noted that:

*Policy dialogue had not taken place as expected and this was in part attributed to the lack of direction provided by the Steering Committee. It was also noted that the Steering Committee had no formal mandate to oversee activities financed through the DFAT window. This was regarded as a weakness and as a source of misunderstanding, poor communication and missed opportunity for coordinated action. This had placed additional strain on PRSF, which was responsible for managing both TNP2K and non-TNP2K activities.*

This comment refers to dialogue between TNP2K and the Australian Embassy at a strategic level and with PRSF at a more operational level. At an activity level the engagement has been strong and detailed, but at a strategic level at times less so. As is so often the case with facilities, the formal steering committee proved a poor vehicle for managing the policy dialogue. It is clear from this feedback, that the DFAT window did nothing for the engagement with TNP2K, who for their part are not so much opposed to the activities, as disappointed at not being drawn into a discussion about them and how they related to the work of TNP2K early enough in the process. While this is a reasonable comment, some of the activities under the DFAT window pre-date TNP2K – such as support for the PNPM Support Facility or support for PEKKA.

There were also a number of examples of some cross portfolio engagement with TNP2K by other Australian funded programs but in general there are more missed opportunities than success stories. There are three examples that are illustrative, health, education and women’s empowerment.

Beginning with health, there are some positives and negatives in the engagement. Health is an important part of the national poverty programs, through PKH, Jamkesmas and Raskin. In addition to the clusters already established under TNP2K, a health working group was added. This was headed up by a senior Indonesian adviser who had close links to both TNP2K and the then health minister. Like many of the line ministries, the Ministry of Health was not universally in favour of the TNP2K approach. Health is a broad portfolio and is not just about social protection or poverty alleviation. So there is only a subset of issues where the TNP2K mandate and the health mandate overlap.

Australia had been designing new programs and was becoming a major donor in health. The Health Systems Strengthening program and our funding of Word Bank support meant we would potentially be on both sides of the table in these debates between TNP2K and the Ministry of Health. In addition, the Health Working Group under TNP2K had been asked to work on the strategic issue of reforms to the national health insurance system and steps towards universal health coverage. Our health programs were still working at much more programmatic levels, so this represented an opportunity for a broader more strategic engagement in this national policy debate.

In the end, the social protection and health teams in the embassy agreed that it would be beneficial for the health team to lead the engagement with TNP2K as well as the health ministry. It was agreed an adviser working for the Minister for Health through the Health System Strengthening Program would also work a few days a month over at TNP2K assisting the health working group. This is exactly the type of engagement that was envisaged at the start of PRSF. While a positive development, it has not led to a change in the strategic direction of Australia’s health programs and if anything has been a way to insulate the work Australia is doing in health from the influence of TNP2K.

Education is Australia’s largest investment in Indonesia, and the Education Partnership is the largest single program for Australia anywhere in the world. TNP2K has a number of entry points on education, through PKH, though the BSM (scholarships for the poor) program and through the pilot program Kiat Guru which is trialling having parents groups more involved in teacher performance. Despite these obvious areas of potential engagement, there has been little or no strategic discussions between Australia’s education team and TNP2K or PRSF. [[8]](#footnote-8) As with heath, education is much broader than social protection and poverty alleviation, and the overlap between the work of TNP2K and our Education Partnership is negligible. The opportunity to engage with the Vice President’s office was not inducement enough for those priorities to be reassessed. This seems to be a missed opportunity, given Australian Aid to education, even at $100 million per year is just a fraction of the over $25 billion a year Indonesia spends on education.

When the Australian program MAMPU was first being discussed, TNP2K was considered a potential government counterpart. MAMPU is a program that is designed to support better policy making for women, working from the top with policy makers, to the community by working with CSOs. In the end it was decided that TNP2K was not a permanent part of the Government and so was not an ideal counterpart for what was considered a long-term (8 year) investment. The early engagement with TNP2K was not wasted however, as some of the senior leadership at TNP2K proved effective advocates with Bappenas when the program was in its early stages. This was one of the few instances of cross portfolio cooperation with PRSF and TNP2K by other Australian Government programs.

There has been little meaningful engagement from other programs. Even those whose objectives are strongly aligned with TNP2Ks goals and approach, like the Knowledge Sector Initiative, have largely failed to build relationships with TNP2K or take advantage of PRSF. This is something that needs to be addressed in future.

Overall, PRSF is a large net positive for the Australian Embassy in terms of opportunities to engage senior and influential figures in the Indonesian Government. While there have been some missed opportunities, particularly for broader strategic engagement, the fact support to TNP2K is ongoing means those opportunities are still there.

# Section 4: What are the lessons from PRSF?

As the preceding discussion illustrates, PRSF has been a rich experience of engagement and activity. This section sets out the key lessons from the program.

On 29 April 2015 PRSF organised a lesson learned workshop attended by a large number of PRSF, TNP2K and Australian Embassy staff. The workshop was half a day and was split into 3 sessions covering:

1. Expectations and understanding of the partnership;
2. Implementation – what actually happened; and
3. Looking forward – Key messages for future cooperation and partnership.

This was a very useful exercise and demonstrated again that a culture of honesty and trust has developed amongst the partners. Many of the key findings and observations from that workshop have been discussed in early sections so this last section of the report focuses on the third element – lessons for the future.

## Looking forward – Key messages for future cooperation and partnership[[9]](#footnote-9)

*A key overall lesson identified by a number of people from all three organisations was that the success of the partnership depended on the combination of authority (provided by the Vice President’s office), change agents or “champions” (provided by the staff of the TNP2K Secretariat) and financial/ technical resources (provided through DFAT and PRSF). Particular emphasis was given to the contribution of Indonesian expertise that had been mobilized through PRSF and deployed to work in the Secretariat. This had created a capability that enjoyed technical and political legitimacy and through this, access to political leaders in Government and technocrats in the line ministries.*

*Yet there was concern over the sustainability of this model. TNP2K may continue to function through the next term of Government but it is not a permanent institution. Even if it were to become a more permanent institution, what funding options, beyond external funding, might be considered appropriate? If TNP2K is a temporary measure that will eventually have to pass on its functions, how does the Government avoid creating dependency within line ministries and how will the Government re-deploy capabilities from TNP2K when the time comes?*

Given the very different circumstances in 2015 to 2010, these questions of sustainability and what a reasonable exit strategy will look like, for the Government of Indonesia and for Australia, need to be discussed at the beginning of the new phase of support rather than in the middle or the end.

*The workshop also emphasised that a good governance system is required to ensure the smooth functioning of this kind of partnership. Ensuring good communication systems including for consultation are especially important so as to ensure partners’ interests and concerns are taken account of and emerging problems are tackled quickly. Such systems need to function at various levels from the strategic (Steering Committee) to the operational (PRSF secretariat). Regular consultations between the Australian Embassy and TNP2K as custodians of the partnership were considered most critical. Indonesian ownership of the entire process in order to support the partnership (strategic direction, provision of support) was particularly emphasized.*

*The governance system should also cover all aspects of the investment. In this case it means that activities financed through the DFAT window should be overseen by a defined governance arrangement. This could help ensure effective coordination of different activities and with different parts of government. DFATs work with local government was cited as one example where better coordination would be desirable.*

The key message to take out of these observations about governance is that the strategic oversight of the program through the steering committee was far less effective in the end than had been anticipated. It was in effect replaced by day to day, week to week and month to month back and forth and dialogue between various parties. Formal structures were less effective than informal ones based on solid working relationships and trust built up over time. In considering how to structure the oversight of the next phase of support this is worth making note of. It is a common feature of many programs that they blame a poorly functioning program steering committee for poor communication and cooperation, when in reality, particularly in Indonesia, good communication, cooperation and trust usually leads to better strategic outcomes whether there is a functioning steering committee or not. The key question in this case is, does the Deputy Minister in charge of TNP2K feel he has ready access to decision makers in the Embassy, and are they responsive to his needs? From the Embassy point of view, can they speak openly to the Deputy Minister and his senior leadership team about the strategic direction of the program? In this case, the answer to both questions has been yes.

*Lastly, at an operational level workshop participants found that robust management systems (including standard operating procedures) need to be put in place from the outset and communicated to all concerned. This would also clarify reporting requirements. From a TNP2K point of view, having the M&E and reporting system embedded within the different work clusters from the very beginning would have been desirable.*

This sounds like a fairly obvious point to make, but as already noted in an earlier section, the TNP2K staff were for the most part coming to their new role from different environments and would not be familiar with Australia’s administrative and governance requirements, and most of them would feel that they had joined the Vice President’s office, not a contractor firm. A big lesson for the next phase of work will be to invest more heavily early on in agreement on what the program should report on, in what form and to who. While HR, admin and finance systems are now working pretty well, this point raised in the workshop is consistent with a number of comments in interviews where people said they are happy to provide reporting and information, but it should be consistent with their work and clear upfront what is required. Compliance with Australian Embassy requirements is not a reasonable basis for asking for information in the case of TNP2K.

# Annex 1: PRSF – Value for Money of DFAT’s investment[[10]](#footnote-10)

From 2011 to 2015 the Poverty Reduction Support Facility (PRSF) supported the Vice President of Indonesia’s National Team to Accelerate Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) to fund a range of activities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Indonesia’s four largest national social assistance programs targeting the poor:

* *Subsidi Beras Bagi Masyarakat Berpendapatan Rendah* (Raskin): Rice for the Poor
* *Program Keluarga Harapan* (PKH): Conditional Cash Transfers to the extreme poor
* *Bantuan Siswa Miskin* (BSM): Cash Transfer for Poor Students
* *Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat* (BLSM): Temporary Unconditional Cash Transfers

Together these programs represent approximately $6.6 billion of investment by the Government of Indonesia, or 0.6% GDP in 2014,[[11]](#footnote-11) and cover the poorest 25%, equal to 15.5 million households or 62 million individuals.

A conservative economic analysis shows a very high return on DFAT’s investment: depending on the program, its level of coverage, size and nature of benefits (cash or kind) and targeting accuracy, **for every dollar DFAT spent, between $28 to a high of $487 of benefits were generated that would not otherwise have occurred**. This is the extra value of getting more GOI spending in the hands of those who need it, rather than wasted on the better off, and add up to a net present value of between $345 million to $2.48 billion over a 5-10 year period.

**Table 1. Return on investment for PRSF support and TNP2K reforms**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **DFAT investment** | **Every $1 invested yields:** | **Net Present Value** |
| **Raskin** | $12.2 million | $28 | $345 million  (2013-17) |
| **PKH** | $23.3 million | $57 | $1.33 billion  (2012-2021) |
| **BSM** | $10.6 million | $157 | $1.6 billion  (2012-2021) |
| **BLSM** | $5.1 million | $487 | $2.48 billion  (2013-17) |

*Source: PRSF 2015.*

**Cost-efficiency**

Cost-efficiency analysis is the relation of administrative costs to program outputs; for social protection programs this is the cost of delivering transfers to beneficiaries. Table 2 shows efficiency ratios for each of the four national programs, before and after the PRSF-supported TNP2K reforms. Three programs have made significant gains, and while BSM’s cost-transfer ratio has marginally increased, this was accompanied by a large increase in targeting accuracy. Administrative costs compare well to benchmarks for international programs which average 8-15% for cash transfers and 22% for food programs.[[12]](#footnote-12) While improved efficiency does not necessarily reflect more effective programs, as a proxy for this the last column shows each program has improved coverage of the poorest Indonesians.

**Table 2. Cost-Efficiency of national social transfer programs, before & after TNP2K**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Recipients** | **Program**  **Cost** | **Admin cost per recipient** | **Admin cost as % of total cost** | **Cost Transfer Ratio\*** | **% beneficiaries in bottom 40%** |
| Raskin 2010 | 31,000,000 | $1,820 m | $6 | 10% | 0.10 | 40% |
| **Raskin 2013** | **33,300,000** | **$2,150 m** | **$13** | **21%** | **0.03** | **54%** |
| PKH 2011 | 1,052,201 | $174 m | $31 | 22.4% | 0.29 | 64% |
| **PKH 2014** | **2,797,773** | **$415 m** | **$19** | **12.7%** | **0.15** | **78%** |
| BSM 2010 | 5,200,000 | $338 m | $3 | 5.1% | 0.05 | 13% |
| **BSM 2014** | **11,100,000** | **$689 m** | **$5** | **8.4%** | **0.09** | **44%** |
| BLSM 2008 | 19,000,000 | $2,200 m | $5.9 | 5.12% | 0.05 | 63% |
| **BLSM 2013** | **15,500,000** | **$960 m** | **$2.3** | **4%** | **0.04** | **78%** |

*Source: SUSENAS 2012, 2014; TNP2K 2014; World Bank 2014. \*Ratio of administrative to transfer costs*

# Annex 2: List of people interviewed for the ICR (in alphabetical order)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Person Met** | **Title** |
| Abdurahman Syebubakar | PRSF Senior Policy and Planning Adviser |
| Agus Munawar | TNP2K Cluster 3 Working Groups |
| Andi Yoga Tama | TNP2K Cluster 2 |
| Ari Perdana | Former TNP2K Head of Cluster 3 |
| Bambang Widianto | TNP2K Executive Secretary |
| Boediono | Former Indonesia Vice President (2009-2014) |
| Cipta Setiawan + team | PRSF Human Resource Director |
| David Smith | PRSF Operation Manager |
| Dewi Sudharta | Former DFAT Program Manager - Education Unit |
| Dewi Susanti | KIAT Guru Manager |
| Elan Satriawan | TNP2K Head of Working Groups |
| Emmy Widayanti, MPd | MOSA – Senior Adviser on Inter-institution Relations (former Director of Social Assistance Programs) |
| Hannah Derwent | DFAT Unit Manager - Women in Leadership Unit |
| Imma Yuliajati | PRSF Gender Adviser |
| James Gilling | Minister (Development Cooperation) DFAT Jakarta |
| Jean-Charles Rouge | PRSF M&E Specialist |
| Joanne Dowling | DFAT Unit Manager - Education Unit |
| John Leigh | DFAT Counsellor Health Section |
| Martin Kurnia | PRSF Procurement Manager |
| Martyn Ambury | PRSF Deputy Team Leader - Technical |
| Matt Wai-Poi | World Bank PREM Team |
| Megha Kapoor + team | PRSF Knowledge Management Manager |
| Mehnaz Bhaur | PRSF Quality Assurance Manager |
| Michael Joyce | TNP2K Mobile Money Specialist |
| Mohammad Ilyas | TNP2K Head of Unified Database |
| Muhammad Ikhsan | Former Deputy for Vice President's Office |
| Muhammad Maulana | TNP2K CDD Specialist |
| Oetami Dewi | MOSA - Head of Cooperation Unit |
| Oliver Mathieson | GRM International Country Director Indonesia |
| Patrick Hermanus | DFAT Senior Program Manager - PNPM Unit |
| Patrick Sweeting | PRSF Team Leader |
| Peter Riddell-Carre | PRSF Deputy Team Leader - Management |
| Prastuti Soewondo (Becky) | TNP2K Health Working Group |
| Ruddy Gobel | TNP2K Head of Communication Unit |
| Sri Kusumastuti Rahayu | TNP2K Head of Cluster 1 Task Force |
| Suahasil Nazara | Head of Indonesia Fiscal Policy Agency (former TNP2K Head of Working Groups) |
| Sudarno Sumarto | TNP2K Senior Policy Advisor |
| Surya Aslim | PRSF Outreach Specialist |
| Thamrin Kasman | Secretrary, Basic Education Directorate, MOEC |
| Theo van der Loop | TNP2K SME Project Design Specialist |
| Vanya Abuthan | DFAT A/g Unit Manager - PNPM Unit |
| Vivi Alatas | World Bank PREM Team Leader |
| Vivi Yulaswati | Bappenas, Director for Social Protection and Welfare |
| Wali Akbar | PRSF Grant Manager |

1. TNP2K is the Ministerial committee chaired by the Vice President, but unless otherwise stated then this report refers to TNP2K it is referring to the Secretariat that supports the Vice President and his ministerial colleagues. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The interim phase began in April 2010-June 2011 to lay the foundation for PRSF and prepare the system (e.g. hire premises, set-up the office, recruit staff) while PRSF was being designed and tendered. Due to funding constraints, TNP2K was not able to undertake any activities/studies during the interim phase. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The UDB is a central element of the Government of Indonesia’s social protection reforms, and is used to identify target beneficiaries for national social protection programs. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For this ICR, PRSF commissioned Value for Money Assessments on Raskin, PKH, BSM, and BLSM. They were produced by PRSF and reviewed by 2 independent economists. A summary of these assessments is at Annex 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See Gender Analysis of the Unified Data Base by Lockley, Tobias and Bah [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See page 19 Gender Analysis of the Unified Data Base 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. On 29 April 2015 PRSF organised a lessons learned workshop attended by a large number of PRSF, TNP2K and Australian Embassy staff. See Section 4 for more detail. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Even when KIAT Guru was part of the Education Portfolio within the Embassy, there was little cross over with the larger work of the Education Partnership. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. This sub section heavily para phrases the workshop report which captured feedback from both a written survey and through discussion. This is important as the workshop report captures the views of the various stakeholders themselves and therefore presents a picture of how people inside this program view its progress. Sections drawn largely from the workshop report are in italics. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. All monetary values in Australian dollars. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. World Bank Indonesia country program analysis, 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. World Bank 2008. “For Protection and Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets.” World Bank: Washington. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)