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| **AUSTRALIA-INDONESIA FACILITY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION: Review of Phase 1**August 2014 |
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**Review of Phase 1 of the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction was commissioned by:**

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)

**Review Team:**

This review was undertaken by a two person team of sectoral specialists (also with significant evaluation experience), namely: Steve Darvill (DFAT’s Humanitarian Adviser and Director for Disaster Risk Reduction); and Lisa Roberts (an independent consultant engaged from DFAT’s Aid Advisory Services Panel).

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**Aid Activity Summary**

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| Aid Activity Name  | Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (Phase 1) |
| Aid Works Initiative Number | Initiative: INI422 |
| Timeline  | July 2008 – June 2013 |
| Estimated  | $67,000,000 AUD  |
| Delivery Organisation | AusAID, BNBP and Geoscience Australia |
| Implementing Partner(s) | Regional BPBDs, BMKG, Bandan Geologi, LIPI, ITB, NU, Oxfam, RedCross, IOM, UNDP, ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre and a range of civil society organisations |
| Country/Region  | Indonesia and ASEAN |
| Primary Sector  | Disaster Risk Management (DRM) |

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# Executive Summary

**Background**

The Australia Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR) represents Australia’s largest investment in disaster risk reduction (DRR) and is a core component of Australia’s bi-lateral development program in Indonesia. AIFDR is co-managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Indonesia’s national disaster management agency, *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencane* (BNPB).

The goal of AIFDR is to *“strengthen national and local capacity in disaster management in Indonesia, and promotion of a more disaster resilient region”*. AIFDR commenced operations in April 2009 and formally concluded on the 30 June 2013. AIFDR is currently in a transition phase prior to an anticipated second phase commencing in 2015.

AIFDR’s expected-end-of-facility outcomes for Phase 1 that are the subject of review are:

**Outcome 1 – Better understanding of risk and vulnerability:** Disaster managers in priority areas of Indonesia and the region have an improved understanding of disaster risk and vulnerability.

**Outcome 2 – Better able to reduce disaster risk in practice:** Disaster managers and vulnerable communities in demonstration provinces of Indonesia are better prepared to reduce impacts through disaster management planning and practice.

**Outcome 3 – Partnership with national and international organisations:** Partnerships enable sustainable disaster reduction in Indonesia and the region.

**Review activities**

This review of AIFDR Phase 1 has been commissioned by DFAT, and there are two key drivers behind it: (Driver 1) to provide a performance review of Phase 1 of AIFDR; and (Driver 2) to draw out lessons learnt from Phase 1 that are relevant to facility learning to inform Phase 2.

The focus of this review is primarily on AIFDR’s performance post-2011 given a detailed independent Mid-Term Progress Review (MTR) was completed in that year. With that said, the review team has also reviewed operations before the MTR so as to understand the genesis and early years of the facility. Outside the scope of this review is AIFDR’s performance during the facility’s transition phase, and an assessment of DFAT’s investments in disaster response managed by the Disaster Risk Unit (DRU).

The review was conducted over a relatively short time frame with a small two person team. AIFDR’s performance was assessed with reference to three evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. AIFDR’s monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management arrangements have also been reviewed and rated. The review team has not assessed impact as it was outside the scope of this review and is, in any case, probably immeasurable at this stage.

**Evaluation criteria ratings**

The review team’s ratings of AIFDR’s performance against the evaluation criteria are included in the table below.

**Table 1: Evaluation Criteria Ratings**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Criteria**  | **Rating (1-6)** | **Comments**  |
| **Relevance**  | **5** | **High relevance against development goals.** The impacts of natural disasters in Indonesia have time and time again reversed economic and social development gains. Consequently, investing in reducing disaster risk, and strengthening community preparedness capacities to respond to disasters makes good development sense. Reducing disaster risk is one of the 11 priorities of GoI’s medium-term development plan (2010-2014). AIFDR has supported the genesis and early years of Indonesia establishing its national system for DRM. Australian support has been deployed at a critically important time when other donors were only providing relatively minor support.  |
| **Effectiveness**  | **5** | **Highly effective.** Despite the enormous challenges the review team has had pinning down a program logic. AIFDR’s portfolio post MTR appears well defined, targeted and its focus on capacity development and sub-national level engagement highly appropriate. AIFDR appears to have had a ‘rocky’ start but has evolved into a credible DRM facility with solid achievements made across all of its core components: risk and vulnerability; partnerships; and training and outreach. There is now evidence of ‘genuine’ interconnectivity between components. The evidence suggests AIFDR can claim to have made a significant contribution to increasing BNPB’s capacity to perform its mandated function, and a contribution (albeit less conclusive) to increasing community and local government capacities in the five demonstration provinces (West Sumatra; East Java; West Java; South Sulawesi; Nusa Tenggara Timur).  |
| **Efficiency**  | **4** | **Adequate efficiency.** The review team notes the political imperative to showcase Australian expertise, and efforts made to address issues regarding AIFDR’s efficiency raised in the MTR. Rating is based on efforts made post MTR to consolidate the facility’s portfolio of activities by reducing the number of partners and contracts; and tightening its geographic focus through the selection of 5 target provinces.  |
| **Monitoring and Evaluation**  | **2** | **Less than adequate standard of facility level M&E.** AIFDR’s facility level M&E system is weak, and is considered by the evaluation team as not particularly helpful for accountability or learning. The system has not been updated by all AIFDR work streams as indicators reportedly were superseded in some cases. AIFDR’s weak facility level M&E should have been addressed by AIFDR’s Senior Management Team.AIFDR’s project level M&E was solid with individual mid-term and final evaluations conducted on all programs supported by AIFDR.  |
| **Knowledge Management**  | **2** | **Less than adequate standard of knowledge management.** AIFDR had no formal knowledge management system in place and therefore missed opportunities for facility learning. AIFDR appears to have been better at facilitating the sharing of knowledge between its partners than incorporating facility learning appropriately internally. |

# List of Abbreviations

**AADMER** ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response

**AHA Centre** ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management.

**AIFDR** Australia Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction

**AIPD** Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Decentralisation

**APEC** Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

**ASEAN** Association of South East Asian Nations

**Bappenas** Ministry of National Development Planning (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional)

**BIG** Geospatial Information Agency (Badan Informasi Geospatial)

**BMKG** Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics Agency (Badan Meteorogi, Klimatologi dan Geofisika)

**BNPB** Indonesian National Disaster Management Agency (Badan Nasional Penganggulangan Bencana)

**BPBD** Sub-national Disaster Management Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah)

**BPPT** Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology (Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi)

**CBDRM** Community-Based Disaster Risk Management

**CDSP** Capacity Development Support Program

**CSO** Civil Society Organisation

**DFAT** Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**DRM** Disaster Risk Management

**DRR** Disaster Risk Reduction

**DRU** Disaster Response Unit

**EOC** Emergency Operation Centre

**GFDRR** Global Fund for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

**GoA** Government of Australia

**GoI** Government of Indonesia

**HFA** Hyogo Framework for Action

**ICR** Independent Completion Report

**INGO** International Non-Governmental Organisation

**IOM** International Organisation for Migration

**ITB** Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung)

**M&E** Monitoring and Evaluation

**MAMPU** Empowering Indonesian Women for Poverty Reduction

**MTR** Mid-Term Progress Review

**NGO** Non-Government Organisation

**NTT** East Nusa Tenggara Province (Nusa Tenggara Timur)

**NU** Nahdlatul Ulama

**OCHA** Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs

**OSM** Open Street Map

**Perda** Sub-national Regulation (Peraturan Daerah)

**Perka** Head of Agency Regulation (Peraturan Kepala)

**PMI** Indonesian Red Cross (Palang Merah Indonesia)

**SCDRR** Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction

**UN** United Nations

**UNDP** United Nations Development Program

**USAID** United States Agency for International Development

**VfM** Value for money

**Box 1: Definitions**

The following definitions for key terms used in this report are provided for clarity.

Disaster risk: *The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over some specified future time period.*

Disaster risk management: *The systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.

Comment: This term is an extension of the more general term “risk management” to address the specific issue of disaster risks. Disaster risk management aims to avoid, lessen or transfer the adverse effects of hazards through activities and measures for prevention, mitigation and preparedness.*

Disaster risk reduction: *The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. Note that while the term “disaster reduction” is sometimes used, the term “disaster risk reduction” provides a better recognition of the ongoing nature of disaster risks and the ongoing potential to reduce these risks.*

***SOURCE: UNISDR retrieved from http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology***

# 1. Introduction

Spread across a chain of thousands of Islands between Asia and Australia, Indonesia is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world. The country is exposed to multiple hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, forest fires, floods and landslides. Increasing disaster risks in Indonesia are driven by the twin challenge of increasing exposure of its population and economic assets, and the inability of the most vulnerable to cope with disaster shocks. Acknowledging that natural disasters are a real and ever present threat to Indonesia’s development the Government of Indonesia (GoI) includes disaster management as one of its’ top eleven development priorities[[1]](#footnote-1).

Australia has a history of supporting its near neighbour in times of disaster, most notably in response to the catastrophic impacts of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. This mega-disaster was the catalyst for a massive shift in consciousness around the need for countries to invest in reducing the risk of disasters and mitigating disaster impacts through better preparedness and risk reduction efforts. This shift was evident in the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015*[[2]](#footnote-2) (HFA) endorsed by 160 member states barely one month after the Indian Ocean Tsunami.

In 2008, the Governments of Australia (GoA) and Indonesia announced the establishment of the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR). AIFDR was the manifestation of a political commitment on behalf of Australia and Indonesia to support the Asia region to reduce disaster risk and strengthen regional disaster management capabilities. The focus quickly became primarily a bi-lateral partnership between Australia and Indonesia to support Indonesia’s newly established national disaster management agency, *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencane* (BNPB).

AIFDR represents Australia’s largest investment in disaster risk reduction (DRR) and is a core component of Australia’s bi-lateral development program in Indonesia. The goal of AIFDR is to *“strengthen national and local capacity in disaster management in Indonesia, and promotion of a more disaster resilient region”.*

AIFDR is co-managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and BNPB. AIFDR work programs and funding decisions are developed and jointly agreed by DFAT and BNPB. The facility commenced operations in April 2009 and formally concluded on the 30 June 2013. AIFDR is currently in a transition phase prior to an anticipated second phase commencing in 2015.

This review of AIFDR Phase 1 has been commissioned by DFAT, and there are two main drivers behind it:

**First,** to provide a performance review of Phase 1 of AIFDR (‘accountability driver’).

**Two,** to draw out lessons learnt from Phase 1 that are relevant to facility learning to inform AIFDR Phase 2 (‘learning driver’).

The focus of this review is primarily on AIFDR’s performance post-2011 given a detailed independent Mid-Term Progress Review (MTR) was completed in that year. With that said, the review team has also reviewed operations before the MTR so as to understand the genesis and early years of the facility. Outside the scope of this review is AIFDR’s performance during the facility’s transition phase that commenced at the end of Phase 1, and an assessment of DFAT’s investments in disaster response that were funded and managed by the Disaster Risk Unit (DRU).

## Indonesia’s Disaster Profile and Disaster Management Arrangements

There is now an overwhelmingly large body of evidence amassed showing the economic and social costs of disasters in Indonesia. According to analysis undertaken by the World Bank, Indonesia ranks 12th among countries with high mortality risks from multiple hazards. An estimated 40 per cent of the country’s population are living in areas of risk, which equates to more than 90 million people potentially at risk of a large scale humanitarian crisis should a large disaster occur. The Government of Indonesia’s statistical data on disaster occurrences shows a significant increase in the frequency of disasters impacting public expenditures. GoI reports that between 2001 and 2007 there have been more than 4,000 occurrences of disasters including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, droughts, landslides, and windstorm [[3]](#footnote-3). Chart 1 and 2 below illustrate the enormity of human and economic losses from natural disasters in Indonesia over a thirty year period (1980-2010). Whilst many of these losses are attributable to large scale events, such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), the Nias (2005), Yogyakarta (2006) and Pandang (2009) earthquakes and the Mount Merapi eruption (2010), significant losses and damage are also experienced as a result of smaller scale events occurring with much greater frequency.

**Chart 1: Percentage of people killed by disaster type in Indonesia 1980-2010[[4]](#footnote-4)**



**Chart 2: Estimated economic damages reported by disaster type in Indonesia 1980 - 2010[[5]](#footnote-5)**



*Key for Chart 1 and Chart 2: \* Includes tsunami*

Indonesia’s introduction of a new Law on Disaster Management (Law 24/2007) laid the foundations for the country’s national disaster management system. A major shift brought about by the 2007 DM Law was the establishment of a dedicated agency for disaster management, the BNPB, where previously there was only an ad-hoc inter-ministerial council. BNBP has the mandate to command, coordinate and implement an integrated disaster management system. It falls under the coordination of the Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare (*Menkokesra*), but its Head reports directly to the President.

Indonesia was also one of the first countries in Asia to formulate a National Action Plan for Disaster Risk reduction (NAP-DRR)[[6]](#footnote-6), a priority action of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)[[7]](#footnote-7).

While the establishment of Indonesia’s DM Law and NAP-DRR are hugely important – the country’s disaster management system is still in its infancy, and requires significant further development, (and resourcing). The World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) country profile for Indonesia (2010) found that: *“a major development effort is required to support the implementation, and in some cases further development of the country’s new DRM laws; build capacity of national and local disaster management agencies to perform their mandated functions; and strengthen community disaster resilience*”[[8]](#footnote-8). GFDRR’s country report states “*further investment in Indonesia’s DRM system is critically important to supporting the country’s ongoing development efforts*”[[9]](#footnote-9). It also notes the most substantial gaps in capacity and resourcing for DRR exist at the sub-national level.

## 1.2 History of AIFDR

AIFDR is a political initiative of the ex-Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, and the ex-President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It was formally announced at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in 2008 and was a result of concerns at the highest political level about limited capacity to respond to large scale natural disasters in East Asia. Australia and Indonesia identified shortcomings in areas of coordination and coherence and, an insufficient focus on preventing and mitigating disasters.

AIFDR commenced operations in April 2009, and was officially launched by Australian and Indonesian Foreign Ministers in July 2010. It was originally conceived as a regional facility, but quickly became primarily a bi-lateral facility focusing on building the capacity of Indonesia to self-manage disasters. A small level of regional engagement occurred through AIFDR’s support to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) e.g. provision of ‘seed funding’ for the first 2 years of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), and support for implementation of the Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) work plan (specifically Concept Notes 1 and 2).

Pressures to stand up AIFDR meant that it did not undergo standard feasibility and design stages, and appears to have commenced operations with only a concept note as guidance[[10]](#footnote-10). Understandably, AIFDR leveraged pre-existing relationships between Australian and Indonesian science agencies to kick start the risk and vulnerability program as the foundation for initiating a relationship with BNBP, and providing the basis for stakeholders to engage with the facility. In the early days, AIFDR staff were in constant dialogue with BNPB to determine mutually agreeable programming priorities but BNPB, at that time, was only newly formed and was experiencing its own internal teething problems. Moreover, within six months of AIFDR’s start, the Padang earthquake (September 2009) and then twin disasters of the Mount Merapi eruption and the Mentawa Islands tsunami occurred. These events meant that AIFDR’s key partner, BNPB, had its energies focused on emergency response thereby reducing the capacity of AIFDR to focus on DRR. The review team acknowledges these challenges and the consequences for programming decisions at that time.

AIFDR’s governance arrangements and first program logic were established in its first and only formal design that was completed in late 2009. The review team were advised by AIFDR’s previous Co-Director that the design was done quickly, and failed to understand programming limitations – specifically those related to the weak capacity, at that time, of BNPB to plan and implement programs.

For the first two years of operations the AIFDR team were focused on cementing a partnership with BNPB; assessing where major gaps existed in Indonesia’s new disaster management system; and where Australia was best placed to provide support. These years can be best described as an exploration phase, but, as one Australian Government interviewee noted: “*five GA science staff were bolted into AIFDR so it was clear that science had to be a big priority. But, there was a clear justification for science areas as hazard information is needed before being able to effectively invest in DRR. BNPB recognised this was a gap in GoI capacity and requested these programs”[[11]](#footnote-11).*

A detailed MTR of AIFDR was completed in late 2011. On the back of the MTR recommendations, AIFDR revised its governance arrangements, and adopted a stronger program logic evidenced by AIFDR’s Development Strategy (2012), which articulated a new way forward that proactively linked AIFDR components, and was geographically targeted on five demonstration provinces, namely: West Sumatra; East Java; West Java; South Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara Timor (representing approximately 42% of Indonesia’s population). The selection of provinces and activities was based on clear criteria including *“emerging directions and priorities of the Indonesian Governments disaster management efforts; a comparatively high level of disaster risk within the provinces; and where successful AIFDR projects already exist”[[12]](#footnote-12).* The Development Strategy spelt out how AIFDR would aim to demonstrate linking national policies to sub-national practice (described in the strategy as the ‘policy to practice’ approach).

AIFDR Phase 1 officially came to an end in June 2013, but the facility remains operational with staff and budget in place. AIFDR officials refer to the post-June 2013 period onwards as ‘transition’. A design for Phase 2 is complete and will go to the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs soon for approval. DFAT is anticipating the commencement of AIFDR Phase 2 in 2015.

The Chart below provides a timeline for AIFDR to assist readers to understand the sequencing of key decisions and changes in AIFDR operations.

**Chart 3: AIFDR Timeline**



## 1.3. Evaluation purpose

The Terms of Reference (ToRs) for this review tasked the review team to:

* *To assess key program deliverables and key development outcomes of relevance to the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Government of Australia (GoA);*
* *To evaluate and assess AIFDR’s partnership with Indonesia’s National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and other key partners (such as ASEAN, UNDP, NGOs and CSO’s) in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.*
* *To support the implementation of Australia’s new disaster risk management program for Indonesia (AIFDR Phase 2), including the science program delivered by Geoscience, by capturing and documenting key lessons learnt.*

The purpose for this review is primarily for accountability reasons i.e. as an assessment of AIFDR’s performance. Additionally, the evaluation team have been tasked to gather and assess lessons learnt from AIFDR Phase 1 that may be relevant to Phase 2. Consequently, this review also has learning objectives inbuilt into its design. To this end, the review team has attempted to highlight observable areas of weakness and sub-optimal performance as a means to constructively provide feedback to inform future performance – rather than to overtly criticise Phase 1 staff whose efforts to produce meaningful DRR outcomes from a weakly defined (initially), high expectation and politicised concept were often exemplary.

The ToRs for this exercise are narrower than the Australian Aid Program’s standard criteria for Program Completion Reports, which include an assessment of sustainability, gender, and cross cutting issues. The reason is that the detailed MTR was only completed in 2011 (i.e. within 2 years of AIFDR Phase 1 ending).

The review team were tasked to review AIFDR’s performance with reference to three evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. AIFDR’s monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management arrangements have also been reviewed and rated. The review team has not assessed impact as it was outside the scope of this review and is, in any case, probably immeasurable at this stage.

The review team has focused primarily on AIFDR’s performance after the MTR (2011), but has also reviewed earlier operations so as to understand the genesis and early years of the facility. To the best of our ability, the review team have also attempted to distil the performance of AIFDR to the end of Phase One (*per* TORs) from that occurring in the transition year, which falls outside the purview of this review. Also, readers of this report should note that the review team were not tasked with assessing Australia’s investments in disaster response that were funded and managed by the Disaster Risk Unit (DRU) in Jakarta.

## 1.4 Methodology

The methodology for this review is set out in a detailed evaluation plan, which is presented in Annex 2. A qualitative mix-method approach was used, involving document analysis, case studies, and semi-structured interviews. Stakeholders from BNPB; Indonesia’s science agencies and research institutes; AIFDR’s implementing partners; other bilateral aid donors; ASEAN Secretariat; the AHA Centre; DFAT and Emergency Management Australia were interviewed in Jakarta, Bandung and Canberra.

The review was conducted over a relatively short time frame, including 5 working days in Jakarta, 1 day in Bandung, and 4 days in Canberra for interviews. Interviews were conducted with AIFDR partners and other donors only. There was no provision in the ToRs for field based consultations with program beneficiaries or, as noted, with GoI officials in other line ministries.

The review team consisted of two sector specialists, namely: Lisa Roberts (an independent consultant from DFAT’s Aid Advisory Services Disaster Management and Humanitarian Panel) and Steve Darvill (DFAT’s Humanitarian Adviser and Director for DRR, based in Canberra). This review cannot be characterised as independent given Mr Darvill is a DFAT member of staff. However, Mr Darvill was operating at ‘arms-length’, and has not had any direct involvement with AIFDR prior to undertaking this review. Further, Mr Darvill is an internationally recognised humanitarian specialist with considerable evaluation experience that was invaluable to the review process.

The review process involved the team producing a combined record of interview that was thematically grouped and analysed. Examples of case studies were discussed with each AIFDR program manager before the review team determined its selection. Subsequently, the review team triangulated data extracted from stakeholder interviews; the desk based document review; and from case studies. The review team produced a summary of initial findings which were provided to AIFDR staff for the purposes of ‘reality testing’ preliminary findings. Given AIFDR’s goal posts shifted several times over the course of its five year history, the review team were keen to ensure their findings accurately reflected the genesis, operations, and performance of the facility. Including a reality testing phase in the design of this review gave AIFDR staff an opportunity to provide additional evidence where this was found lacking or findings were inconclusive. The review team has relied on AIFDR’s activity evaluations and partners project reports for the purposes of assessing facility level performance. The review team has not independently verified each AIFDR funded activity that it cites as evidence of facility achievement.

AIFDR stakeholders likely to find this review report useful include:

* BNPB as AIFDR’s key operational partner.
* Geoscience Australia as AusAID/Australian Aid’s whole of government partner in the initial set up and on-going staffing of AIFDR.

## 1.5 AIFDR Program Logic

One of the biggest challenges for the review team has been in understanding the program logic. Initially, AIFDR appears to have been a ‘flexible pool of funds to support good ideas’ but as the facility evolved there were several attempts to develop a more robust program logic that connected the various work streams of AIFDR.

The review team has identified four sets of expected ‘end-of-facility outcomes’ for AIFDR. The first set appears in the 2009 design; a second set was developed by AIFDR’s Management Team in 2011 drawing on lessons learnt from the previous two years; a third set appears in AIFDR’s Development Strategy (mid 2012); and a fourth set is contained in AIFDR’s Quality at Implementation Report (dated 13 Jan 2012). This review has used the same ‘end-of-facility outcomes’ as used in the MTR, namely:

**Outcome 1 – Better understanding of risk and vulnerability:** Disaster managers in priority areas of Indonesia and the region have an improved understanding of disaster risk and vulnerability.

**Outcome 2 – Better able to reduce disaster risk in practice:** Disaster managers and vulnerable communities in demonstration provinces of Indonesia are better prepared to reduce impacts through disaster management planning and practice.

**Outcome 3 – Partnership with national and international organisations:** Partnerships enable sustainable disaster reduction in Indonesia and the region.

In terms of AIFDR’s structure – it comprises of three components (or units) and one modality:

Risk and Vulnerability: This component facilitates partnerships between Australian and Indonesian scientists and BNPB to develop and demonstrate risk assessment methods, tools and information for a range of natural hazards.

Training and Outreach: Works with BNPB and local disaster management agencies (BPBD) to develop and roll out standardised training curriculum; and support capacity development and institutional strengthening through the management of AIFDR’s Capacity Development Support Program (CDSP).

Partnerships: Supports key risk reduction partners in Indonesia and the ASEAN Secretariat and the AHA Centre.

Research and Innovation (R & I) Grants: Small grants scheme managed by AIFDR to support DRR research and innovation in Indonesia, as well as supporting linkages between community and government at national, provincial and local levels. The R&I Grants scheme was phased out in 2011/12 for what is believed to be management efficiency, and cost efficiency reasons (contracts were small value, yet time-intensive to manage).

# 2 Evaluation Findings

This section of the report sets out the review teams’ findings regarding the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of AIFDR in achieving the original goal, and expected end-of-facility outcomes. Essentially, the three criteria pose the question ‘ Did AIFDR do the right thing (relevance) in the right place (effectiveness) at the right time (efficiency)?’. It should be noted from the outset that the review team has struggled to come up with definitive conclusions in several areas as a consequence of the evolving nature of AIFDR’s program logic, and its weak facility-level monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes.

In the early years, the facility’s primary (unwritten) purpose appears to have been political ie, to cement Australia’s bilateral partnership with GoI. This purpose was anchored in AIFDR’s development objective of supporting Indonesia’s new disaster management architecture, which would provide visibility and leverage for Australia’s diplomatic efforts.

Assessing the political dimensions of any development investment is challenging, especially using development evaluation criteria. Nonetheless, as an integrated department, it will be imperative that all DFAT development activities (including AIFDR) capture empirical evidence of their contribution to diplomatic and trade outcomes. In this case, the narrow range of review consultations has meant that the review team has struggled to attribute political influence and leverage to AIFDR beyond its relationship with BNPB.

## 2.1 Relevance

**Relevance:**

*“The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistence with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners and donors policies”* OECD definition.

**To what extent was AIFDR relevant? This section answers this question by looking at Indonesia’s hazard profile and community needs; assessing whether AIFDR’s investments were the most relevant at the time; and examines the extent to which AIFDR aligns with Indonesian and Australian government priorities and political objectives.**

**2.1.1 Disaster Risk Reduction makes good business sense in Indonesia**

The impacts of natural disasters in Indonesia have time and time again reversed economic and social development gains. The table below illustrates the enormity of human and economic losses from natural disasters over a thirty year period (1980-2010). Furthermore, the Australian aid program has heavily invested in the development of our near neighbour. Aid investments that build disaster resilience and strengthen community preparedness capacities to respond to disasters when they occur make good humanitarian and development sense. Consequently, the review team deems Australia’s decision to invest in DRR as highly relevant to Australia’s bi-lateral aid program to Indonesia.

**Table 2: Data related to human and economic losses from disasters in Indonesia that have occurred between 1980 and 2010[[13]](#footnote-13)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Number of events  | 321 |
| Number of people killed  | 192,474 |
| Average killed per year | 6,209 |
| Number of people affected | 21,663,204 |
| Average affected per year | 698,813 |
| Economic Damage (US$ x 1,000) | 23,601,677 |
| Economic Damage per year (US$x1,000) | 761,344 |

**2.1.2 Aligns with Indonesia’s Top Development Priorities and Decentralisation Agenda**

Disaster risk management is a top development priority for the Government of Indonesia, and is included as a key priority in Indonesia’s RPJMN 2010-2014 National Medium-Term Development Plan. Since 2007, Indonesia has significantly strengthened its national capacities to manage disaster risks. The review team considers AIFDR has demonstrated strong relevance by aligning support with implementation of core aspects of Indonesia’s disaster management architecture, and helping strengthen the capacity of BNPB to perform its mandated function. Furthermore, Australian support was deployed at a critically important time when other donors were only providing relatively minor support.

AIFDR has over the course of its 5 year timeframe increasingly supported sub-national DRM initiatives. Through partnerships with CSO’s, NGO’s and faith-based organisations, AIFDR has assisted an estimated 200 vulnerable communities in 31 districts to strengthen their disaster preparedness capacities often in partnership with local authorities. Through AIFDR’s Training and Outreach component, technical advisers have been deployed to provinces to help build the capacity of BPBD’s, and national training curricula have been rolled out with the aim of supporting sub-national governments to provide credible DRM services to their constituents. The review team therefore considers that AIFDR has contributed to GoI’s decentralisation agenda.

**2.1.3** **Were AIFDR’s resource allocations the most relevant and appropriate?**

The review team assessed each AIFDR component, and components grouped as a ‘whole’, as highly relevant to AIFDR’s goal to *“strengthen national and local capacity in disaster management in Indonesia, and promotion of a more disaster resilient region*”.

The ‘Risk and Vulnerability’ component with its strong focus on risks associated with volcano, earthquake and tsunamis hazards is highly relevant given Indonesia’s disaster profile. Earthquakes (including tsunami’s) are responsible for the highest mortality rates, and economic losses of all disaster types (refer to Chart 1 on pg. 11 and Chart 2 on pg. 12) in Indonesia. Before AIFDR, Indonesia’s science agencies had limited capability to produce reliable hazard information. Consequently, BNPB and communities had little or no access to hazard information generated through scientific enquiry to inform DRR and DRM decision making. Through AIFDR’s support, BNPB has substantially improved access to volcano, earthquake and tsunami hazard information, and more recently has had access to several tools that translate the science into useful products for disaster managers, e.g. InaSAFE and Open Street Map (OSM). It is ‘early days’ though in terms of the development and trialling of these tools, and supporting government and civil society to use tools appropriately is a core component of AIFDR Phase 2.

The ‘Training and Outreach’ component is highly relevant given that an estimated 40% of the country’s population is exposed to a wide range of hazards across a vast archipelago with limited central government capacity to reach remote communities. Strengthening local government and community DRM capacities is therefore recognised by GoI as critical as they are the drivers of DRM efforts and first responders in times of crisis. Placing them at the centre of response plans, building their disaster resilience and enhancing their capacity for effective risk reduction and response makes good development sense.

The ‘Partnerships’ component is highly relevant as it supports AIFDR’s Outreach partners (Oxfam, ARC and IOM etc) to translate GoI’s DRM policies into practical action, and facilitates the transfer of science to disaster managers and communities through the trial use of new technologies (e.g. InaSAFE and OSM). AIFDR’s ‘Partners’ also facilitate important vertical linkages between national and local level government and non-government actors, and horizontal linkages between government, NGOs and communities. However, to date, AIFDR’s partnership arrangements appear to only weakly link with the private sector and therefore miss an important and relevant stakeholder in effective DRM practice.

As previously mentioned, the review team assesses all components as relevant, but there is insufficient evidence to conclusively state whether the relative allocation of investments to the different components over the course of Phase 1 (and therefore weighting given to each at any point in time) was appropriately calibrated to facilitate strong connections between components (ie, the transference of knowledge into practice), or reflected the country’s highest priority DRM and DRR needs at any given time. The review team found no evidence of business plans or strategies that articulate how AIFDR determined whether the spend was relevant.

**2.1.4 Serving Australia’s diplomacy objectives**

AIFDR was born from a political initiative with in-built soft diplomacy objectives for Australia i.e. increasing Australia’s political profile with its bi-lateral partner, Indonesia, and gaining privileged access to the Indonesian polity. AIFDR has certainly provided an entry point for DRM and DRR dialogue and operational level cooperation with the GoI but, as noted earlier, attribution of political influence is difficult to empirically demonstrate in the absence of opportunities to directly consult GoI representatives beyond sectoral agencies with responsibilities for disaster management.

AIFDR staff pointed to several occasions where Australia appeared to be the donor of preference or to be granted preferential treatment in terms of information and access to disaster-affected areas. Several of these emanated from the highest level e.g. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono formally recognising AIFDR during his opening speech at the 5th AMCDRR. Another example cited by AIFDR staff is Australia’s support to the response to the Central Aceh earthquake in July 2013. Australia’s then Prime Minister (Kevin Rudd) paid an unexpected visit to Indonesia a few days after the earthquake in an attempt to bolster the bilateral relationship that had wavering as a result of Australia’s asylum seeker policy. Australia made an offer to assist in the earthquake response although international assistance had not formally been requested by Indonesia. Indonesia’s ex-President, accepted Australia’s offer before a planned bilateral meeting with ex-PM Rudd in Bogor. Australia was the preferred response partner in this case as there were a number of offers made by other partners/donors that were not taken up. Other examples cited by AIFDR staff where Australian offers of response assistance were taken up for a range of crises include; Aceh Tengah Earthquake, volcanic eruptions of Mts Kelud and Sinabung, and floods in Jakarta and Manado (post end of AIFDR Phase 1).

Whether these events translated into political influence in more contentious dialogues is a matter of conjecture. The review team notes that, over the course of Phase One, Australia-Indonesia relations were strained on a number of occasions (e.g. on phone-tapping allegations, asylum seekers) and the fact that AIFDR continued largely unaffected appears to reflect a high premium placed on the partnership by GoI. To this end, it may be argued that AIFDR provided a foothold into GoI in difficult times. Nonetheless, the review team could find no firm evidence to suggest that resolution of ‘harder’ political issues was facilitated by AIFDR – or, put another way, would not have been resolved in the absence of AIFDR. The review team suggests that if this rationale is to continue to underpin Phase Two, then AIFDR should maintain a log of statements by influential Indonesian officials that might demonstrate causal linkages.

* + 1. **Supporting Indonesia’s Regional Aspirations as a Leader in DRM**

The GoI’s aspirations to play a ‘leadership’ role in DRM and DRR were set in train by ex-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who was at the forefront of efforts to operationalise the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) at nation state level. In recognition of his efforts, the ex-President was the first person to be designated a global DRR champion by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, UNISDR. At a regional level, Indonesia aggressively lobbied ASEAN member states for the right to host the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) in Jakarta. Through its support for these Indonesian aspirations, AIFDR has demonstrated relevance i.e. it has supported Indonesia’s ‘leadership’ aspirations through: (1) AIFDR’s bi-lateral investments that have helped GoI and Indonesian science agencies build their DRR capacities thereby bolstering their regional profile for credible science; and (2) AIFDR’s support of ASEAN’s AADMER and the AHA Centre[[14]](#footnote-14).

## 2.2 Effectiveness

**Effectiveness:**

*“The extent to which the development intervention objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance” OECD definition*

**To what extent was AIFDR effective? This assessment of AIFDR’s effectiveness starts with an examination of how AIFDR addressed weak governance arrangements identified in the MTR. This section then proceeds to assess the extent to which AIFDR achieved its expected end-of-facility outcomes, and also examines unintended outcomes associated with AIFDR.**

**2.2.1 Governance Arrangements**

AIFDR staff advised the review team the formal governance arrangements for the Australia-Indonesia partnership as dictated by the 2009 design were consistently problematic as BNPB for internal reasons sought to distance themselves from Bappenas and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. AIFDR got caught in these inter-agency power plays and was unable to pull together an Executive Committee as originally intended. The MTR identified AIFDR’s governance was weak, and recommended the establishment of an Executive Committee. In January 2012, Australia and Indonesia agreed to establish that Executive Committee but, following a request from BNPB, the membership of the Executive Committee was amended from that proposed in the MTR. BNPB requested that they have sole responsibility for inviting other GoI line ministries, which ostensibly limited invitees to only those approved by BNBP.

AIFDR Executive Committee meetings have been held three times per year and, to date, have included Head of BNPB, Head of Australian Aid, and representatives typically from Bappenas and Ministry of Home Affairs. The Executive Committee was tasked to assess AIFDR’s efficiency and to provide high level strategic oversight. It has operated as a high-level meeting affirming the Australia-Indonesia bilateral relationship and mutual commitments to DRR and the disaster management sector. However, it has been more political than operational and has generally failed to deliver the high level strategic and programming advice as originally proposed. Operational level decision-making through AIFDR Phase 1 has been largely negotiated at the co-director level through regular monthly meetings of co-directors. The new design for Phase 2 addresses this issue by including a Steering Committee made up of operational staff through which programming issues can be more easily addressed. In summary, the review team can confirm AIFDR has successfully followed through on the MTR recommendation to establish an Executive Committee to strengthen governance arrangements, and furthermore, that the proposals for further improvements in existing governance arrangements should yield more effective decision-making in AIFDR Phase 2.

The MTR also recommended the establishment of a Joint Monitoring Group to strengthen program governance. A Joint Monitoring Committee was not formally established despite attempts by AIFDR. Instead, focal points from BNPB were identified for Risk and Vulnerability; Training and Outreach; and Partnership components (this was an informal arrangement). The review team considers this informal arrangement of focal points was sub-optimal.

The review team found AIFDR has only poorly complied with standard quality assurance systems e.g. poor facility level M&E, and weak documentation of decision making processes related to resource allocations around AIFDR investments. The review team conclude poor compliance with standard accountability processes has resulted in AIFDR not having ready access to documentation evidencing, at a whole-of-facility level the significance of its achievement. It will be critical in Phase 2 to ensure robust quality systems are not only set up, but used.

**2.2.2 Expected End-of-Facility Outcomes**

AIFDR’s three expected end-of-facility outcomes were conceived by the AIFDR Management Team sometime between the initial design in 2009 and the MTR in 2011. The anticipated outcomes are ambitious for a five year program, heavily orientated around the production of hazard information and the transfer of this information to government and communities to help reduce disaster risk and improve disaster resilience. Consequently, it is hard to demonstrate genuine ‘end-to-end’ programming i.e. transferring the knowledge generated by scientific agencies into knowledge and practices that reduce risk and build disaster resilience of communities.

With that said, AIFDR has made very conscious efforts to facilitate interconnectivity between its three components. It has taken time to operationalize for programmatically sound reasons, including: (1) limited capacity of the newly established BNPB to perform its role; (2) long time frames required to generate credible hazard information; (3) tools not readily available to translate the science into usable format for disaster managers and vulnerable communities ; (4) building disaster managers and vulnerable communities capacities to use hazard information previously unavailable takes a long time, as does changing community behaviours based on newly acquired knowledge. Nonetheless, AIFDR Phase 1 has begun the journey of ‘end to end’ programming through investments in both the science and the tools. The right foundations are now in place for AIFDR-2 to populate the tools, and socialise them with disaster managers and communities.

The review teams assessment of the extent to which AIFDR has delivered its three expected end-of-facility outcomes are discussed in detail directly below. Overall, AIFDR has delivered Outcome 2 and 3 of its expected end-of-facility outcomes, and significant progress has been made towards Outcome 1.

***Outcome 1: Better understanding of risk and vulnerability: disaster managers in priority areas of Indonesia and the region have an improved understanding of disaster risk and vulnerability***

The review team assess AIFDR as demonstrating significant progress towards the achievement of this expected end-of-facility outcome, although it has only partially been achieved. The rationale for this assessment is that since mapping of Indonesia’s worst-ranked disaster hazards has taken the best part of Phase 1, results of the transfer of the science investment to increased knowledge and ultimately behavioural change on the ground will have to occur in Phase 2.

Key outputs from AIFDR Phase 1 ‘Risk and Vulnerability’ component are as follows:

* Through the GREAT program (Graduate Research on Earthquakes and Active Tectonics) seed funding has been provided to the Bandung Institute of Technology's Faculty of Earth Science and Technology to roll out the only university program devoted to earthquake and tsunami science in Indonesia; and also to provide educational exchanges with Australia (the Australian National University and Geoscience Australia). This program has now expanded beyond the initial seed funding provided by AIFDR with the Department of Education (DIKNAS) now investing directly.  To date GREAT has produced 24 young Indonesian specialists.
* Badan Geologi has had a long history of creating provincial scale earthquake hazard maps. Four years ago the techniques being used were not aligned with international earthquake hazard mapping standards. As a result of AIFDR funding Badan Geologi now undertake earthquake hazard mapping aligned with international good practice methods. These hazard maps are provided to provincial level governments, but it is not yet clear whether they are influencing decision making. It will be important in Phase 2 to gain a better understanding of and enhance the use of earthquake hazard maps at the community level.
* AIFDR, in partnership with a team of GoI and tertiary organisations, produced the first National Tsunami Hazard Map i.e. the first nationally consistent understanding of tsunami hazard across the entire country. BNPB has used the National Tsunami Hazard Map in their prioritisation of at-risk districts for the construction of vertical evacuation structures through implementation of the 2012 Presidential Master Plan for Reducing Tsunami Risk.
* A new tsunami hazard map for the Mentawai Islands was officially published by Badan Geologi in early 2014, and was used to inform the Mentawai Megathrust international disaster response exercise by BNPB in April 2010. The same map was also used for local level evacuation planning by the Mentawai Islands District Disaster Management Agency (BPBD).

Mindful of the long lead time required for AIFDR’s science outputs, the evidence shows AIFDR had adopted a conscious strategy of investing in new technologies that would bring the science to the community. AIFDR funded development of the open source software of InaSAFE and OSM. AIFDR’s Training and Outreach and Partnerships components facilitated the transfer of these tools through linking to outreach partners (Oxfam, ARC and IOM etc) to pilot these technologies, and, through CDSP, these tools are being socialised. To date, the InaSAFE software has been applied in a diverse range of environments in Indonesia – ranging from flood scenarios in the complex megacity of Jakarta to understanding potential earthquake and tsunami impacts in the rural community of Manokwari in West Papua.

**Box 2: Tools for Assessing Disaster Risk**

To understand risk disaster managers must have: (1) an understanding of hazard; (2) knowledge of the exposure of people and buildings; and (3) access to useable tools to pull this information together to inform decision making. AIFDR has funded the development of a tool called InSAFE that is capable of pulling a range of important data sources together to support decision making. InSAFE is a free and open source software that produces natural hazard impact scenarios, providing a simple yet robust way to combine data from scientists, local government and communities to assess likely effects of future disaster events.

AIFDR has also invested in enhancing GoI ability to map its own exposure of people and buildings. By supporting the use of OpenStreetMap AIFDR has supported GoI to map over 1.4 million buildings that were previously not mapped. Now, for the first time, it is possible in some communities (such as Padang) to undertake a tsunami risk assessment that incorporates an understanding of where people live. In Jakarta, improvements in mapping and the presence of AIFDR sponsored mapping experts in the megacity’s BPBD during the flooding season have led to enhanced understanding in real-time of the progression of flood waters and the impact on communities.

***Source: AIFDR Risk and Vulnerability Unit***

Key outputs from AIFDR Phase 1 ‘Research and Innovation’ small grants modality are as follows:

* AIFDR and BNPB have learnt more about social vulnerability, and how vulnerability indicators can be incorporated into assessments.
* Under the small-grants program issues such as participation of women and children with disabilities, integration of DRR into sustainable livelihoods, climate change vulnerability, post-disaster micro-financing and community disaster mitigation and preparedness, have been researched.
* Of the 8 competitive grants, 6 were deemed successful and 2 (Delsos in NTT and the Australian Red Cross DRM film) were given additional funding to enable replication.
* The Australian Red Cross tsunami disaster risk reduction film *Pesan dari Samudra* (Message from the Ocean) funded by AIFDR was aired on one of Indonesia’s biggest television networks in December 2012. It is a good example of innovative programming, and was according to an ex-AIFDR co-director one of the facilities best value-for-money activities.
* Four AIFDR funded activities report that they have positively influenced local disaster management policy: (Daya Annisa – gender and women’s participation in DRM and livelihoods); (ASB- disability included into local disaster management regulations – ref to Box 4); (World Relief – CBDRM integrated into local government DRM activities); (Delsos – ongoing support of women-led activities by local authorities).

On the basis of project reports, the review team found the ‘Research and Innovation’ small grants modality as having been an effective mechanism for supporting innovative approaches to DRR and DRM. However, in order to support this finding, AIFDR could have done more to capture and share ‘lessons learnt’ generated through the program. It will be important in Phase 2 to ensure robust systems are in place to document the impacts, sustainability of interventions and lessons generated through grant funded projects.

**Box 3: Innovative Programming**

“Pesan Dari Samudra” (Message From the Ocean) tells the story of a family in Indonesia battling a disaster situation. It is a 76-minute feature film made by award winning Indonesian filmmakers Mira Lesmana and Riri Riza. This groundbreaking project, funded by the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR), is an initiative from the Australian Red Cross. The film was screened on one of Indonesia’s biggest television networks (Metro TV) on Dec 29 2012 eight years after the devastating tsunami struck Indonesia on Dec. 26, 2004. The film explains what to do, and what not to do, in the case of an earthquake or tsunami.

***Source: Jakarta Globe blog, Dec 21 2012 (archive)*.**

***Outcome 2: Better able to reduce disaster risk in practice: Disaster managers and vulnerable communities in demonstration provinces of Indonesia are better prepared to reduce impacts through disaster management planning and practice***

AIFDR has delivered this expected end-of-facility outcome through its Training and Outreach, and Partnership components. According to BNPB officials, the Training and Outreach and Partnership components have delivered critically needed resources to sub-national levels of government and communities, including capacity development support through CDSP; CBDRM programmes, and rolled out national training curriculum. Capacity building (CDSP) and Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) activities funded by AIFDR are all verified by mid-term progress reports and end of completion evaluations.

Senior BNPB officials stated AIFDR’s support to demonstration provinces is important as it currently addresses DRM needs that GoI has insufficient resources to tackle. AIFDR has worked closely with BNPB to develop a robust strategy for sub-national level engagement identifying demonstration provinces for Australian investment. AIFDR’s Development Strategy (2012) set the scene for AIFDR to take a geographic focus and a focus on deeper rather than broader initiatives. AIFDR staff report that the document has also been useful to advocate against BNBP requests for support into provinces not identified in the development strategy as demonstration provinces. However, there is little evidence to date, of the ‘demonstrations’ being replicated either within ‘demonstration provinces’ or being taken up by non-demonstration provinces.

AIFDR’s IO, NGO and CSO implementing partners have assisted vulnerable communities to strengthen their disaster preparedness capacities in an estimated 200 communities in 31 districts, often in partnership with local government authorities. Through AIFDR’s partnership with IOM, communities and BPBD’s in seven districts in West Java have developed local risk assessments and DRM plans (Mid-Term Review Oct 2013). Through AIFDR’s partnership with Oxfam, 28 villages in the six districts of Lombok Timur, Lombok Utara, Kota Bima, Flores Timur, Manokwari and Kota Jayapura have developed sustainable DRM networks, and have reinforced DRM capacities at the district level (including contingency plans are now in place). The evaluation of the project found a paradigm shift in many communities from reactive to proactive DRM – a considerable shift in behaviour given the traditional focus on relief and response[[15]](#footnote-15).

**BOX 4: Increasing the Participation of Women and Children with Disabilities in Community-Focused DRM**

Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB) with funding from AIFDR has increased awareness of the specific needs of children with disabilities in community-based contingency planning.

For the first time, the District of Ciamis organised a district level disaster simulation on 29 October 2012. The disaster simulation was based on an earthquake followed by landslide scenario involving more than 1,200 people from district, sub-district and village level (i.e., GoI, NGOs, local emergency team, and community members including children with disabilities).

The disaster simulation provided an opportunity to:

• Train and raise awareness of the local government emergency team, and village level disaster preparedness cadres, volunteers and community

• Test the concept and implementation of early warning system from national level down to the grassroot at the community level including action plan of different institutions and community groups particularly children with disabilities

• Document process and result of ASB project in supporting children with disability to be replicated in neighbouring areas

Irfan, 16 year old child with a hearing impairment: “*I draw what I will do if there is an earthquake. I will hide under the bed column or hide under the table with my hands on the table’s leg. After the earthquake finish, I will go out protecting my head with a bag and continue to carry the bag over my head until I am outside. I will go to the field, away from electricity poles, walls and cliffs. At home I have made a picture of evacuation routes for all my family members”.*

**Source: Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB) Project Report/AIFDR Research and Innovation Grant**

In the era of regional autonomy, Disaster Management Regional Regulations (Perda)[[16]](#footnote-16) can provide a strong legal framework to synergise and strengthen cross-sectorial integration. Through AIFDR’s Partnership with Nahdlatul Ulama (LBI NU) – NU have reportedly influenced district governments in eight target districts in East Java to ratify DRM regulations (Mid-Term Review 2012). The establishment of regional regulations is expected to socialise DRM, generate buy-in to a broader and more proactive DRM paradigm; and encourage coordination between BPBD and regional government taskforces (SKPD). There is no evidence yet to conclusively validate the anticipated impacts of regulations. Follow up analysis should be undertaken examining districts with Perda, and comparing these districts with a similar sized sample of districts without Perda to assess the impact of regulations.

Through the Training and Outreach component, BPBD’s in four target provinces have been supported by a CDSP consultant. The CDSP MTR rated provincial deployments as successful, although highly challenging given weak capacity of the newly created BPBDs. The CDSP MTR team were encouraged by the efforts in the provinces of East Java, South Sulawesi and West Sumatra to establish provincial forums for disaster management that involve a wide range of government and civil society stakeholders. The CDSP MTR believed that the emergence of strong regional DRM fora is a key element of developing capacity in the Governments disaster management system. The review team notes that emergence of strong regional DRM forums is indeed a positive development but not an end in itself. Validation of the success of capacity development inputs by AIFDR would require some deeper assessment of the preparedness of disaster managers than was available to the review team but we suggest that the CDSP MTR finding is, at least, plausible.

***Outcome 3: Partnerships with national, community and international organisations: Partnerships enable sustainable disaster reduction in Indonesia and the region***

Achievements against expected end-of-facility outcome 3 are difficult to assess. The review team did not find a common understanding of what constituted a partnership across AIFDR that might be applied to benchmark the success or otherwise of the range of ‘partnerships’ within AIFDR.

AIFDR engages in a range of partnerships ranging from (i) the joint program management partnership exemplified by the co-directorship management model; and (ii) the technical partnership exemplified by the agreement between Geoscience Australia and five technical agencies to share knowledge and skills; to (iii) the funding partnerships exemplified by grant agreements with NGOs and international organisations. The motivations, value, relative importance and quality of these partnerships differ markedly but each must be underpinned by common principles of mutuality (mutual accountability, mutual respect and mutual responsibility) that may be used to define the benchmarks for successful partnership. For the purposes of assisting the design of a monitoring and evaluation framework for AIFDR Phase 2, the review team recommends a set of principles of partnership should be established between AIFDR and BNBP that allow partnership performance to be assessed. There are a range of recognised good international and domestic practice examples that can be adapted by AIFDR for Phase 2 (see Box 5 for examples of partnership principles).

**BOX 5: Examples of Partnership Principles**

**A: Domestic Example: (Former) AusAID-Defence Strategic Partnership Principles (2009)**

* Recognition of the optimisation of program effectiveness can be enhanced through the identification of and commitment to shared strategic goals.
* The relationship between partners is one of equal partnership, in which the skills, attributes and strengths of each partner are valued by the other.
* The partnership is underpinned by mutual respect, professionalism, honesty, cooperation, the sharing of ideas and open, two‑way communication at all levels.
* Recognition that the roles and functions of partners are guided by their respective responsibilities to Government.
* A commitment to liaison and early and on-going consultation and cooperation in relation to policies and programs in which they have shared interests, underpinned by a desire to optimise the impact of Australian assistance.
* The partners will engage on performance issues, accountability and risk management by drawing the other’s attention to matters likely to impact on their respective policies or program delivery.
* The partners will assist the other with building their capacity in specified and agreed areas of mutual interest.

**B: International Example: Principles of Partnership (2007) developed by the Global Humanitarian Platform as the basis for benchmarking**

**Responsibility**: Humanitarian organizations have an ethical obligation to each other to accomplish their tasks responsibly, with integrity and in a relevant and appropriate way. They must make sure they commit to activities only when they have the means, competencies, skills, and capacity to deliver on their commitments. Decisive and robust prevention of abuses committed by humanitarians must also be a constant effort.

**Complementarity:** The diversity of the humanitarian community is an asset if we build on our comparative advantages and complement each other’s contributions. Local capacity is one of the main assets to enhance and on which to build. Whenever possible, humanitarian organizations should strive to make it an integral part in emergency response. Language and cultural barriers must be overcome.

**Equality**: Mutual respect between members of the partnership irrespective of size and power. The participants must respect each other's mandates, obligations and independence and recognize each other's constraints and commitments. Mutual respect must not preclude organizations from engaging in constructive dissent.

**Transparency**: Achieved through dialogue (on equal footing), with an emphasis on early consultations and early sharing of information. Communications and transparency, including financial transparency, increase the level of trust among orgainsations.

**Result-oriented approach**: Effective humanitarian action must be reality-based and action-oriented. This requires result-oriented coordination based on effective capabilities and concrete operational capacities.

***Source:*** [***http://foodsecuritycluster.net/document/global-humanitarian-platform-principles-partnership-2007***](http://foodsecuritycluster.net/document/global-humanitarian-platform-principles-partnership-2007)

At a macro-level, AIFDR can be said to have delivered on Outcome 3 in terms of establishing a range of programmatically relevant relationships with entities that have a shared purpose. However, the quality of the suite of partnerships as the best available agencies to deliver the AIFDR outcomes was less clear.

**AIFDR’s Range of Partners**

AIFDR’s primary partnership was with BNPB (with political dimensions), and secondary partnerships were in place with a range of government and non-government organisations including: Science Agencies (ITB; BMKG; Badan Geologi); international organisations (ASEAN; UNOCHA; IOM; ARC-PMI; Oxfam; UNDP); and local NGO, CSO and faith-based organisations (LPNI-NU; DELSOS).

It is not clear to the review team how actively AIFDR sought partnerships or whether the facility primarily responded to partnership opportunities as there is no obvious partnership strategy. Initially the evidence suggests AIFDR tapped into existing AusAID and GA partnerships so as to commence programming quickly, and over time a more strategic approach to selecting partners took root.

**AIFDR-BNBP Partnership**

AIFDR’s key partnership with BNPB was never clearly defined by agreed criteria that could be applied to measure its achievement. Australian Officials interviewed believed that the overarching goal of the partnership was to pre-position Australia as the preferred donor in times of crisis and that this would flow on to enhancing the Australia-Indonesia bi-lateral relationship. AIFDR staff cited a number of examples where Australia had been asked by BNPB to support response operations (Mt Kelud/ Sinabung; Manado/ Jakarta flooding; Central Aceh earthquake etc…). AIFDR staff considered these cases supported a finding that the partnership outcome as it related to BNPB had been successfully delivered upon. Although plausible, analysis of DRU activities fell outside the scope of the review and the veracity of these claims remain untested.

The evidence shows AIFDR very effectively supported BNPB to ‘stand up’ as a new agency. It supported development of both BNPB’s organisational and technical capacities - thereby helping to grow its credibility with government, donors and international organisations working in Indonesia’s disaster management sector. BNPB Officials interviewed stated the AIFDR partnership was of great value, and had been highly effective in the way it aligned with BNBP priorities, policies and work plans. The relationship between AIFDR and BNBP was not always easy to manage as both parties admitted at interview. The review team considers AIFDR successfully balanced the need to be responsive to BNPB’s funding requests, while also overtime strengthening the facility’s logic. Both partners report they are highly satisfied with the state of the current relationship.

The review team considers where the partnership has been less successful is its ability to support BNBP to mobilise interest in DRR within GoI line ministries. The review team were advised that BNPB as a comparatively new agency has little leverage with high profile ministries. AIFDR’s investment in building BNPB’s credibility will help improve this situation overtime, but it remains a constraint that should be noted. The facility is providing funding to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for their project, Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction (SCDRR) that aims to support bringing line ministries together with BNPB.

**AIFDR Co-Directorship Model**

Underpinning AIFDR’s primary partnership with BNBP is the co-directorship model. There are mixed views amongst Australian Government officials interviewed as to whether the ‘co-directorship’ model is an effective way of supporting partnership between AIFDR and GoI. One view point is that it cements a genuine sense of ownership by GoI. Whereas, the counter view is that it creates dependence, and although appropriate for Phase 1, is no longer appropriate for AIFDR Phase 2. The review team noted that there was poor communication about AIFDR’s activities across BNPB directorates, which undermines the ownership that co-management was supposed to ensure. Two BNPB Directors interviewed appeared to have very little knowledge about the activities AIFDR was funding. The review team consider an increase in effort is required on the BNPB side to fix internal communication breakdowns.

AIFDR’s implementing partners mostly did not express views either way, with one exception – this partner stated the co-directorship model was ‘ahead of its time’ and represents the way donors should engage with government in middle income countries. In the review teams opinion the model is sensible and consistent with the broad goal of facilitating GoI ownership of its own agendas, and the obvious associated risks can be managed.

BNPB Senior Officials interviewed recommended no change to the model, but do want to see greater clarity around roles and responsibilities of co-directors in Phase 2.

**Disaster risk reduction partnerships with science and technical organisations**

AIFDR has effectively facilitated cooperative partnerships between BNPB and five technical agencies, and helped clarify the respective roles of these agencies resulting in a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Before AIFDR, there was little connectivity between Indonesian science agencies, and between these agencies and BNPB. Officials from these agencies stated AIFDR has facilitated increased dialogue between them – previously interagency communication was limited. Further, the evidence shows there has been a significant shift in the appetite of BNPB for science, leading to more demand for scientific knowledge and analysis by the agency.

**Disaster risk reduction partnerships with NGO’s, CSO’s and faith based organisations**

Through AIFDR’s partnerships with NGO’s, CSO’s and faith based organisations, the facility has delivered much needed resources to five provinces. Project partners’ activities have been verified through monitoring and evaluation reports submitted to AIFDR. Key outcomes of these partnerships are discussed in detail under Outcome 2 (ref to pg 27). AIFDR has strategically chosen to partner with local NGO’s and CSO’s to leverage these partners existing networks and relationships. In principle, implementation through local partners is both effective and efficient as local organisations know their area and culture better than externally recruited expertise. Importantly, capacities and knowledge gained through project implementation is usually retained in the local area.

**AIFDR Partnership with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

AIFDR has provided AUD2.83 million to the ASEAN Secretariat for the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) and implementation of specific elements of the Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) work plan. AIFDR’s support to ASEAN has been described by the Secretariat as “exceptional and well-targeted”[[17]](#footnote-17).

In parallel to this exercise, a review of Australia’s investments in building ASEAN’s disaster management capacity has been undertaken [[18]](#footnote-18). ASEAN is the corner stone of the regions’ disaster management architecture, and it is important Australia continues to nurture its growth so as to cultivate regional disaster management capabilities. To date, Australia has got great equity for its support for the AHA Centre in particular and has, in some senses, even under-leveraged its investment. The review team are firm in their opinion that continued support to ASEAN disaster management aspirations aligns with Australia’s foreign policy interests; complements existing investments in regional DM; and is relevant given the evolving regional architecture.

**AIFDR partnership with the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)**

A recent review of the Australian Aid-OCHA Indonesia partnership found that OCHA was important to BNPB because it is the conduit to international good practice and global expertise[[19]](#footnote-19). Further the review found *“OCHA remains a valuable strategic partner of AusAID in Indonesia*”[[20]](#footnote-20).

Australia provides funding to OCHA (Indonesia) through the Disaster Response Unit (DRU), and through AIFDR. The majority of funding to OCHA (est. $600,000 per annum) is channelled through the former and primarily serves to support the partnership between Australia and OCHA, which lies beyond the scope of this review.

However, AIFDR has separately funded a small number of projects that have aimed to consolidate the relationship between OCHA and BNBP, e.g. contingency planning in four target provincial areas, and senior management training to BNPB. These projects have reportedly been successfully implemented and might, therefore, be deemed to have achieved their aim. Nonetheless, the review team questions the partnership value in real terms of these AIFDR investments given the rather limited amount of funding.

## 2.3 Efficiency

**Efficiency:**

*“A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time etc) are converted to results”.*

*OECD definition*

**To what extent was AIFDR efficient? The assessment of AIFDR’s efficiency focuses primarily on assessing what has changed since the MTR.**

AIFDR’s MTR focused heavily on the question of AIFDR’s efficiency, framing its research question as “*could the same outputs have been delivered with less inputs? Could more outputs have been delivered with the same inputs*?” To make a judgement, the MTR investigated the cost-efficiency of the modality, use of international personnel engaged through the Australian Public Service (including short-term GA advisers), and the volume of small value procurements. This investigation rated AIFDR as ‘less than adequate quality’ for the efficiency criterion - a finding that was contested by AIFDR.

The review team notes the political imperative to showcase Australian expertise. Moreover we note the following with regard to the MTR:

* Implicit in the research question is a level of comparative analysis of alternative modalities and ways of conducting business.
* ‘Quality’ is an effectiveness criterion – not an efficiency criterion.
* Value for money (VfM) cannot be assessed against the efficiency criterion alone – rather it is a composite indicator of economy, effectiveness and efficiency (see, for example the DFID 3E’s model of VfM)

The AIFDR MTR recommended an appraisal of the efficiency of the modality be undertaken to ensure AIFDR resources deliver optimal results that contribute to the facility purpose and goal. As part of the AusAID management response to this, an independent progress review was undertaken of the Indonesian Earthquake Hazard project that included an analysis of the relative efficiency of the use of long-term Government Officials to implement this program. The IEHP IPR draft conclusions highlighted the *“(Government) Officials are more effective for long-term positions (on the ground or combined with regular visits) that focus on building relationships. These officials provide a bridge between counterparts and other capacity building inputs”[[21]](#footnote-21).* Thus, whilst more costly, the IPR concluded that the use of Australian Government officials represented better value for money at this stage.

The review team concurs with this finding but recommends an ‘Indonesian first’ policy be articulated wherein Indonesian expertise is preferred to international expertise. Furthermore, the review team strongly encourages AIFDR to fully document approvals of all deployments of international staff to Indonesia, including justification for not utilising Indonesian expertise on VfM grounds, with the view to making them contestable.

Since the MTR, AIFDR has implemented a range of changes to increase its efficiency. However, AIFDR’s primary effort has been directed to ensuring the selection of implementation modalities and partners for Phase 2 increases the facility’s overall efficiency.

**What has changed since the MTR in terms of AIFDR’s efficiency?**

Overall, the review team found AIFDR has made a range of changes to increase efficiency, namely:

* **Consolidation of AIFDR portfolio:** MTR found AIFDR’s portfolio was widely spread with a large number of contracts with a large number of partners (e.g. 37% of activities were less than $100,000 in value). Post-MTR, AIFDR increased efficiency by consolidating its portfolio of activities - reducing the number of partners and contracts.
* **Facility efforts more tightly focused:** The MTR identified that AIFDR risked failing to attain its end-of-facility objectives if it did not focus its efforts more tightly. Accordingly, it recommended that AIFDR focus its efforts in 3-4 target provinces and explore opportunities to integrate DRR into existing programs. Post-MTR, AIFDR has focused its sub-national level investments in 5 provinces (negotiated with BNPB). All but one province (West Sumatra) had existing AusAID/DFAT programs including AIPD and ACCESS. AIFDR immediately started working with ACCESS on integrating OpenStreetMap into their program. AIFDR should seek to further expand opportunities for integrated DRR programming with complementary aid initiatives in Phase 2.
* **Establishment of CDSP:** The MTR identified a range of risks to the achievement of the end-of-facility outcomes and purpose including ineffective capacity development approaches. On the back of the MTR, the CDSP was established. A very conscious decision was made by AIFDR management to maintain control of the program by keeping management ‘in-house’. The rationale for retention in-house was that AIFDR would not have had control over where resources were directed if it was sub-contracted to an external agency such as UNDP. CDSP was a good strategic direction for AIFDR as it is clear capacity building is key to GoI’s efforts to reduce and better manage disaster risk. The review team considers greater cost efficiency would have been achieved by outsourcing the management of CSDP. Whether political gains offset cost efficiencies is a matter for conjecture.
* **Facility narrative developed:** The MTR found many AIFDR activities lacked a development rationale that links them to the facility logic. It stated that *“this increases the risk arising from fragmentation because it uses resources less likely to contribute to AIFDR outcomes or purpose”[[22]](#footnote-22)*. The MTR recommended AIFDR develop a development strategy that provides direction for partners and activities and ensures alignment with national and BNBP plans. In response, AIFDR produced a Development Strategy (referred to previously in this report) that assisted the facility to focus on deeper rather than broader initiatives. The strategy practically grouped together ongoing funded programs and initiatives in geographic areas each of which operated on varying timelines. The review team were advised by AIFDR staff the strategy was not as useful as perceived in the MTR recommendations as a tool for developing 18-month rolling plans. Moreover, it made more sense to report against BNPB’s annual plans identifying the BNPB priorities to which each of the activities related.

**What has been retrained since the MTR?**

* **Australian Aid management of facility retained:** The MTR found that AusAID/Australian-Aid management of the modality incurred significant costs in complying with mandatory Australian Government standards (security, office fit out, IT etc) that reduce its cost efficiency. Post-MTR, AIFDR remained an Australian Aid managed facility and therefore these costs continued to be incurred. The review team were not in a position to make an assessment of the current efficiency of the modality as it was outside the ToRs to cost and compare alternative models. However, we note that outsourcing management of AIFDR may reduce staffing costs but increase risks if compliance becomes optional.
* **Co-directorship model retained:** The MTR raised the issue of competing demands for time of senior BNBP leaders as a risk to achievement of end-of-facility outcomes. The co-directorship model meant decisions had to be made by both Australian and Indonesian officials. Given that BNPB Senior Leadership often had many competing demands for their time (including several disaster responses to manage), joint decision-making often took time. On this basis, co-directorship may be regarded as an inefficient and possibly duplicative decision-making model. However, its value in generating ownership may be seen to offset this.

## Monitoring and Evaluation

Facility-level monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management (see next section) are glaring weaknesses within AIFDR. The M&E system is outputs-based, and many of the indicators are not particularly helpful for accountability or learning purposes. Data reviewed is in many cases inaccurate as the same data sets appear under several components; in other cases, data is simply absent against a large number of indicators (e.g. the ‘Corporate Pillar’ has data inputted against just 1 out of 5 indicators). The Training and Outreach component is an exception, with complete data.

For outcome-based, program monitoring and assessment, AIFDR relies on project/activity level evaluations (commonly completed by partners/with some AIFDR commissioned evaluations in the mix) but these are not compiled into facility level data. The development of the M&E framework was outsourced to an external evaluation specialist. However, AIFDR Senior Management, recognising early on that the system was not useful, did not take steps to rectify the problem, and they should have done so. Instead, AIFDR’s energies in this regard were directed to ensuring that facility level M&E was a core element of the design for Phase 2. Overall, AIFDR’s facility level M&E is inadequate to provide the type of quality evidence that would make assessments of VfM of the facility defensible.

## 2.4 Knowledge Management

Associated with the weaknesses in facility-level M&E, AIFDR’s knowledge management appears to have been ad hoc. The evidence suggests AIFDR was better at facilitating the exchange of information and sharing of knowledge between its partners than incorporating facility learning internally. For example, AIFDR routinely arranged for its partners to provide project progress updates to BNPB. This allowed BNPB to provide policy direction to AIFDR partners so that they aligned with national government priorities. According to a range of AIFDR partners, these open exchanges with BNPB were invaluable, and lay the foundations for trust and collaboration. At the activity level - the CDSP has recently developed a stand-alone knowledge management system. In addition, many of AIFDR’s implementing partners have knowledge management systems – including Oxfam, ARC-PMI, and IOM etc. Overall, the speed of establishing partnerships and programs was so quick that it inhibited incorporation of facility learning.With that said, the review team considers AIFDR could have addressed this issue far more propitiously and therefore, rates AIFDR’s knowledge management as less than adequate for systemic learning purposes.

# 3. Evaluation Criteria Ratings

The ratings against the evaluation criteria are presented in the table below. Impact was outside the scope of this evaluation.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Criteria**  | **Rating (1-6)** | **Comments**  |
| **Relevance**  | **5** | **High relevance against development goals.** The impacts of natural disasters in Indonesia have time and time again reversed economic and social development gains. Consequently, investing in reducing disaster risk, and strengthening community preparedness capacities to respond to disasters makes good development sense. Reducing disaster risk is one of the 11 priorities of GoI’s medium-term development plan (2010-2014). AIFDR has supported the genesis and early years of Indonesia establishing its national disaster management system. Australian support has been deployed at a critically important time when other donors were only providing relatively minor support.  |
| **Effectiveness**  | **5** | **Highly effective.** Despite the enormous challenges the review team has had pinning down a program logic. AIFDR’s portfolio post MTR appears well defined, targeted and its focus on capacity development and sub-national level engagement highly appropriate. AIFDR appears to have had a ‘rocky’ start but has evolved into a credible DRM & DRR facility with solid achievements made across all of its core components: risk and vulnerability; partnerships; and training and outreach. There is now clear evidence of ‘genuine’ interconnectivity between components. The evidence suggests AIFDR can claim to have made a significant contribution to increasing BNPB’s capacity to perform its mandated function, and a contribution (albeit less conclusive) to increasing community and local government capacities in the five demonstration provinces (West Sumatra; East Java; West Java; South Sulawesi; Nusa Tenggara Timur).  |
| **Efficiency**  | **4** | **Adequate efficiency.** The review team notes the political imperative to showcase Australian expertise, and efforts made to address issues regarding AIFDR’s efficiency raised in the MTR. The review teams rating is based on efforts made post MTR to consolidate the facility’s portfolio of activities by reducing the number of partners and contracts; and tightening its geographic focus through the selection of 5 target provinces.  |

Additional ratings provided:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Monitoring and Evaluation**  | **2** | **Less than adequate standard of facility level M&E.** AIFDR’s facility level M&E system is weak, and is considered by the review team as not particularly helpful for accountability or learning. The system has not been updated by all AIFDR work streams as indicators reportedly were superseded in some cases. AIFDR’s weak facility level M&E should have been addressed by AIFDR’s Senior Management Team.AIFDR’s project level M&E was solid with individual mid-term and final evaluations conducted on all programs supported by AIFDR.  |
| **Knowledge Management**  | **2** | **Less than adequate standard of knowledge management.** AIFDR had no formal knowledge management system in place and therefore missed opportunities for facility learning. AIFDR appears to have been better at facilitating the sharing of knowledge between its partners than incorporating facility learning appropriately internally. |

# 4. Lessons Learnt

This section of the report outlines the key lessons learnt from Phase 1 considered relevant to the implementation of AIFDR Phase 2.

**1. Lack of facility level narrative:** AIFDR lacked a facility level narrative until the production in mid 2012 of the facility’s Development Strategy. This document sets out AIFDR’s overall purpose, and what AIFDR’s strategy for achieving success in the DRM & DRR space in Indonesia would look like. Four out of AIFDR’s five years (Phase 1) its facility level purpose was not well documented and unclear to many of its project partners. It will be important AIFDR develop a clear facility level narrative for Phase 2 to ensure other donors and partners are clear about its overall purpose thereby supporting good coordination and harmonisation.

**2. Changing goal posts creating confusion:** The review team identified 4 different sets of expected outcomes for AIFDR. As previously mentioned, the first set of expected outcomes appear in the initial design commissioned in 2009; a second set were developed by AIFDR’s Management Team in 2011 drawing on lessons learnt from the previous two years; a third set appears in AIFDR’s Development Strategy (mid 2012); and a fourth set are contained in AIFDR’s Quality at Implementation Report (dated 13 Jan 2012). The result is enormous confusion in terms of what AIFDR was trying to achieve. In Phase 2 it will be important the AIFDR team better manage any change to the program logic by ensuring changes are well documented and the rationale for change clearly recorded and communicated to relevant parties.

**3. AIFDR took a long time to integrate its components*:*** Evidence suggests AIFDR components were not well integrated until late 2011-2012. With more time spent upfront on design, and drawing on the right technical skill sets earlier, AIFDR would have delivered a stronger program logic sooner. A large investment has been made in the design for Phase 2 that should reduce the risk of weak connectivity between components.

**4. A partnership strategy is needed for Phase 2:** AIFDR has established a range of partnerships with government and non-government organisations. Its key partner is BNPB. The facility has no partnership strategy, or agreed criteria for measuring partnership success. It is critically important in Phase 2 AIFDR confirm the type of partnership it aims to have with BNPB, and criteria for measuring partnership success.

**5. Weak monitoring of AIFDR by AusAID Senior Management:** Theevidence gathered by the review team suggests AIFDR was not closely monitored by AusAID Senior Management at Post in Jakarta and in Canberra. From an organisational management perspective AIFDR, appears to have been treated more as a ‘stand-alone’ or outlier program than as a component of the broader Australian Aid Program portfolio. Consequently, AIFDR appears to have not been required to comply with standard AusAID program design, management and quality assurance processes.

**6. AIFDR-BNPB Partnership potentially restrictive:** Close alignment with BNPB’s priorities and work program restricts AIFDR’s capacity to engage with a range of GoI line ministries (BAPPENAS; Finance and Urban Planning etc) to support implementation of the Hyogo Framework priority areas for action for disaster resilient nations and communities. The Hyogo Framework advocates for a shift from a sectoral approach (confined to NDMO’s) to a whole of government approach to DRR ie, DRR is a cross cutting issue that requires cross sectoral engagement. It will be important for AIFDR in Phase 2 to support BNBP to mobilise interest in DRR within GoI line ministries.

**7. Weak facility-level monitoring and evaluation:** AIFDR’s facility level M&E was poor throughout Phase 1. As previously mentioned, AIFDR’s Senior Management Team should have addressed problems with the facility’s M&E system, but did not. The design for Phase 2 addresses AIFDR’s weak M&E. It will be important in Phase 2 that quality systems are not only developed, but are used to track performance, and measure aid impact.

**8. Missed opportunities for facility learning due to weak knowledge management:**As previously discussed, AIFDR’s knowledge management was poor, and opportunities for more effective facility level learning were lost. It will be critically important in Phase 2 that knowledge management systems and processes are firmly in place and a culture of learning is fostered.

**9. Leveraging resources and collaborating with the broader bi-lateral program is also critical for achieving results:** AIFDR Phase 1 appears to have not been well integrated within the broader bi-lateral development program. Increased effort should be made in Phase 2 to foster cooperative and mutually beneficial relationships with other programs to help build a constituency for integrated DRR across the entire program. The most obvious entry point is DFAT’s other investments supporting Indonesia’s decentralisation agenda. AIFDR has commenced some small scale joint programming with ACCESS – hopefully this can be built upon in Phase 2.

# 5. Moving Forward

**Aid Investments aimed at reducing and managing disaster risk make good humanitarian and development sense**

It is not yet clear whether Indonesia’s new President-Widodo harbors similar aspirations to SBY as a champion for DRR, indeed, or whether it will retain the same high-level profile within the new policy environment. BNBP may continue to operate as a stand-alone agency, or may be integrated into a large central ministry (ie, Home Affairs). If integration were to occur, there may be a real opportunity to raise the profile of DRR to a broader WOG audience by leveraging the profile and political weight held by Home Affairs. Irrespective of where BNBP will sit within GoI - aid investments that help to reduce disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters; strengthen community disaster preparedness capacities; and strengthen disaster resilience make good humanitarian and development sense.

**Strong foundations are in place for AIFDR Phase Two**

Although born from a political initiative in 2009, AIFDR has evolved into a credible disaster reduction and disaster management facility with clear development objectives and a solid track record of achievements. AIFDR has successfully positioned Australia as a lead donor in the disaster management space - leveraging this position, plus knowledge and relationships gained through Phase 1, it is well positioned to build on previous successes. AIFDR Phase 1 began the journey of ‘end to end programming’ through investments in science, tools and capacity development. The right foundations are in place for AIFDR Phase 2 to populate the tools, and socialise them with disaster managers and communities. Sub-national level investments supporting linkages between local government, civil society and communities will be critical to the task head.

Recommendations:

Acknowledging the design for AIFDR Phase 2 addresses many of the facility’s weaknesses identified in this review - the review team make the following recommendations

for Phase 2:

Recommendation 1: Develop a facility level narrative for Phase 2 to provide clarity of purpose. The narrative should provide direction for partners and activities and ensure alignment with national and BNBP plans. It will be important the facility narrative spells out the facility’s program logic, and documents any changes made to it over the course of Phase 2. This recommendation relates to Lesson Learnt 1 and 2.

Recommendation 2: Develop a Partnership Strategy jointly with BNBP to guide the AIFDR-BNBP Phase 2 partnership. The strategy should articulate the type of partnership, partnership principles, and criteria for measuring the partnership. A partnership strategy could be developed through a facilitated workshop between the partners in the lead up to Phase 2. There are a range of international and domestic examples of partnership principles that can inform the development of AIFDR specific principles. This recommendation relates to Lesson Learnt 4, and BNBP’s request for greater clarity around the role and responsibilities of co-directors in Phase 2.

Recommendation 3: Include a DRR research agenda in Phase 2 whereby AIFDR funds research into issues such as:

(1) Research into the sustainability of DRR initiatives particularly at sub-national level.

(2) Documenting good community disaster resilience practices/approaches.

These examples are indicative only, as part of the development of a DRR research agenda will be the identification of research priorities that align with AIFDR’s goal, and GoI policies and workplans. This recommendation relates to Lessons Learnt 8.

Recommendation 4: AIFDR Phase 2 should actively seek to leverage resources and collaborate with the broader bi-lateral program to help build a constituency for integrated DRR across the program. The most obvious entry point is DFAT’s other investments supporting Indonesia’s decentralisation agenda. AIFDR Phase 2 should strategically approach this task by exploring obvious synergies with programs with a footprint in AIFDR’s five target provinces. This recommendation relates to Lesson Learnt 9.

# Annex 1: Terms of Reference

**Independent Review of the 1st phase of the
Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR)**

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**Introduction**

1. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade will undertake an independent review **–Part 1 -** of the 1st phase of the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR). AIFDR’s initial 5 year program concluded on 30 June 2013. A major scale-up to a sectoral program had been designed but due to Australian Government budget decisions in 2013, a smaller program called AIFDR-2 is currently under preparation for a January 2015 start. This review will ensure that future support aligns with the emerging priorities of the new Australian Government, and feed into the implementation of AIFDR-2.
2. The independent review will include a review of Australian support for ASEAN disaster management (DM) **– Part 2 -** currently funded through DFAT’s bilateral disaster management program with Indonesia. This part of the review will include the finalisation of a draft concept note to guide Australia’s future investment in ASEAN DM, to ensure that any future support aligns with Australia’s evolving interests in regional DM and the emerging priorities of the new Australian Government. Separate TORs for the writing of the concept note on the scope, size and ongoing DFAT management arrangements of Australia’s support for ASEAN DM can be found in **Part 2** of this document.
3. Duration, phasing and timing for the independent review of the 1st phase of AIFDR and the finalisation of a concept note to guide Australia’s future investment in ASEAN DM can be found in **Part 3** of this document.

**Background**

1. AIFDR’s initial 5 year program concluded on 30 June 2013. We are currently in a transition year prior to a new program commencing in January 2015. A major scale-up had been planned and a design completed but due to Australian Government budget decisions in 2013, a smaller program is currently being designed. AIFDR is a joint initiative by the Australian and Indonesian governments to “Strengthen national and local capacity in disaster management in Indonesia and create a more disaster resilient region”.
2. During the 1st phase, AIFDR undertook activities in five program areas: risk & vulnerability (implemented by Geoscience Australia); training & outreach; partnerships; research & innovation; and emergency and humanitarian response. AIFDR uses a co-director model - one from DFAT and one from Indonesia’s National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) - and an Executive Committee (DFAT and BNPB) meets twice yearly to provide program oversight and direction.
3. AIFDR uses Australian and Indonesian science to identify and define natural disaster hazards in Indonesia. AIFDR works closely with BNPB and Indonesian science institutions to improve hazard modelling and develop evidence-based disaster management tools such as real time earthquake shake maps and the disaster scenario development tool InaSAFE. These activities complement AIFDR’s suite of disaster management capacity building programs at national level with BNPB and with Provincial and District Disaster Management Agencies (BPBDs). Through partnerships with NGOs and CSOs, AIFDR supports community resilience to disasters in a number of provinces, including NTT, South Sulawesi, East and West Java, Papua and West Sumatra. We also work in partnership with ASEAN and key UN agencies to strengthen DM across the region.
4. AIFDR’s mid-term Independent Progress Review (IPR) was completed in September 2011 and found that: AIFDR is of high relevance to the Indonesian development context and the Australian development program, that good progress is being made towards effectiveness and sustainability, and that while time efficiency is considered good, the cost-efficiency of the AIFDR modality should be assessed.
5. This review will provide important lessons to inform the implementation of Australia’s new disaster management program, which is expected to commence in 2015.
6. The cost of the activity will be approximately $60,000 and is expected to take up to 45 days to complete.
7. The independent review of the 1st phase of AIFDR and the writing of a concept note to guide Australia’s future investment in ASEAN DM will be conducted within one exercise as they are within the skill set of a single consultant and it represents value for money.

**Part 1 – Independent Review of the 1st phase of AIFDR**

**Purpose and objectives**

1. The three objectives of the Independent Review of the 1st phase of AIFDR are:
* to assess key program deliverables and key development outcomes of relevance to the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Government of Australia (GoA);
* to evaluate and assess AIFDR’s partnership with Indonesia’s National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and other key partners (such as ASEAN, UNDP, NGOs and CSOs) in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency;
* to support the implementation of Australia’s new disaster risk management program for Indonesia (AIFDR 2), including the science program delivered by Geoscience Australia, by capturing and documenting key lessons learned.

**Review methodology**

1. An independent DM specialist with experience in evaluation and design will be selected to undertake a thorough document review of all program and project evaluations and conduct interviews and consultations with key stakeholders. This specialist may be supported by a relevant DFAT official from Canberra.

**Key Stakeholders**

* Indonesia’s National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and selected provincial and district disaster management offices (BPBDs);
* Other relevant Indonesian ministries and agencies such as Bappenas;
* Indonesian science agencies;
* selected implementing partners including ASEAN, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Oxfam and the Australian Red Cross (ARC).

**Key Documents**

* Mid-term AIFDR Independent Progress Review (IPR) – September 2011;
* Mid-term review - Capacity Development Support Program – June 2013;
* Independent mid-term review - NU’s disaster management program in East Java – October 2012;
* All reviews/evaluations produced by Geoscience Australia as part of AIFDR’s Risk and Vulnerability program;
* Independent evaluation of Build Back Better program – March 2011;
* Mid-term review – Oxfam’s Building Resilience in Eastern Indonesia – June 2011;
* Internal final evaluation – UNDP’s Safer Community for DRR – November 2011;
* Independent evaluation – Mercy Corp’s Resilient Village (RAGAM) program – May 2012;
* Mid-term review – ARC’s Strengthened Disaster Coordination and Response in East Indonesia – December 2012;
* Internal review of Research and Innovation program;
* Project progress reports, back-to-office reports, internal assessments, work-plans and budget plans, media coverage and web-based articles; and
* ASEAN-Australia Cooperation Arrangement and associated documents such as progress and financial reports.
* Records of ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management – Dialogue Partner meetings; East Asia Summit meetings; ASEAN Technical Working Group meetings; AADMER and associated documents; AADMER phase 2 strategy; ASEAN publications related to regional DM.

**Scope of services**

1. The independent DM specialist will plan and conduct the review which will consist of a thorough document review and interviews with key stakeholders. The independent DM specialist will assess AIFDR’s performance against the review questions outlined in Paragraph 14. The independent review team will:
* conduct a thorough document review and analysis based on the existing documentation;
* identify any missing information in relation to answering the key questions outlined in Paragraph 14;
* explore (through interviewing/consulting with AIFDR, BNPB, ASEAN and key implementing partners) any possible documentation/reports that become additional sources of information;
* conduct interviews and meetings with key stakeholders;
* produce synthesis to the reports/documents in answering the review questions;
* present the first draft independent review for discussion, comment and feedback; and
* finalise the independent review of the 1st phase of AIFDR.

**Review Questions**

1. What are the key lessons learned from the 1st phase of AIFDR in terms of:
* AIFDR-2 implementation?
* Mainstreaming DM in Australia’s development program to Indonesia?
* DM practice across Indonesia?
* Key outcomes of relevance to GoI, and are they still relevant with a new Indonesian President to take office in late 2014?
* Key outcomes of relevance to GoA, are they still relevant in light of the emerging priorities of the new Australian Government?
* Features of good partnership with BNPB and other key partners?

**Reporting Requirements**

1. The independent DM specialist is required to submit the following Reports:
* **First Draft independent review**: addressing the key questions above by late September 2014
* **Final Draft independent review**: accommodating feedback from DFAT (AIFDR) and GoI (BNPB) by 31 October 2014

# Annex 2: Evaluation Plan

**Evaluation Plan for the Independent Review of the Australia–Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (Phase 1)**

**Background**

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has requested assistance to undertake an independent review of Phase 1 of the Australia–Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR).

AIFDR represents Australia’s largest bilateral commitment to reducing the impact of disasters and is a joint initiative by Australian and Indonesian governments which commenced in April 2009.

The goal of AIFDR is to *“strengthen national and local capacity in disaster management in Indonesia and promotion of a more disaster resilient region”*. AIFDR undertook activities in five program areas: risk & vulnerability (implemented by Geoscience Australia); training & outreach; partnerships; research & innovation; and emergency and humanitarian response.

AIFDR’s initial 5 year program concluded on 30 June 2013. DFAT are currently in a transition year prior to a new program commencing in January 2015. A major scale-up had been planned and a design completed but due to Australian Government budget decisions in 2013, a design for a smaller program is currently being finalised.

**Purpose of the Evaluation**

There are two main drivers behind this evaluation. First, to provide an independent performance review of Phase 1 of AIFDR (‘accountability driver’). Two, to draw out lessons learnt from Phase 1 that are relevant to facility learning to inform Phase 2 (‘learning driver’).

This evaluation aims to assess AIFDR Phase 1 achievements against AIFDR’s program logic, and identify and analyse lessons learnt from Phase 1.

**Approach and Methodology**

The evaluation framework is informed by the facility logic presented in Annexure 1. This demonstrates the 3 programmatic elements of the facility and the contribution they were expected to make to the achievement of the facility purpose and goal.

The evaluation will use a qualitative mix-method approach. This approach involves document analysis, and semi-structured interviews with a modest number of key stakeholders in Australia (Canberra) and Indonesia (Jakarta).

The evaluation team has been tasked by DFAT to commit significant time during the inquiry process to analysing lessons learnt that will be relevant to AIFDR Phase 2. The ToRs for this independent review refer to a series of questions the evaluation team should aim to address. Questions extracted from ToRs are included below.

*What are the key lessons learned from the 1st phase of AIFDR in terms of:*

* *AIFDR-2 implementation?*
* *Mainstreaming DM in Australia’s development program to Indonesia?*
* *DM practice across Indonesia?*
* *Key outcomes of relevance to GoI, and are they still relevant with a new Indonesian President to take office in late 2014?*
* *Key outcomes of relevance to GoA, are they still relevant in light of the emerging priorities of the new Australian Government?*
* *Features of good partnership with BNPB and other key partners?*

**Primary Intended Users**

The primary intended users of the evaluation are DFAT and BNPB staff responsible for finalising the scaled down design for Phase 2, and staff responsible for Phase 2 implementation. Secondary users will include DFAT Canberra (Humanitarian and ASEAN Directorate), Geoscience Australia, and potentially other donors and development partners working in the DRM/DRR space in Indonesia.

**Limitations**

The evaluation will be conducted by a two person team over a short time frame (with 6 working days in Jakarta, Indonesia). Broad stakeholder consultations are not within the scope of this evaluation. The team comprises of two sector specialists, namely: Lisa Roberts (an independent consultant engaged off DFAT’s Aid Advisory Services Disaster Management and Humanitarian Panel) and Steve Darvill (DFAT’s Humanitarian Adviser based in Canberra). AIFDR staff will provide logistical and language translation support to the evaluation team during Jakarta based consultations.

**Key Evaluation Questions**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Key evaluation questions** | **Sub-evaluation Questions** | **Inquiry Methods Used to Answer the Questions** |
| **Relevance** | **To what extent was AIFDR resources allocated to the most appropriate and relevant activities given the hazard profile, national and local capacities and development context in Indonesia?**  | What value has AIFDR added to supporting partnerships at regional, national and local level for sustainable disaster reduction in Indonesia and the region?What value has AIFDR added to the understanding of disaster risk and vulnerability of disaster managers, and promotion of innovative approaches to reducing risk?What value has AIFDR delivered in terms of improvements in disaster risk management planning at regional, national and local levels?  | Document review; semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and AIFDR staff. |
| **Effectiveness** | **To what extent has AIFDR achieved its intended end-of-program outcomes?** **Have there been unintended outcomes associated with AIFDR that need to be examined?** | *Outcome 1: Better understanding of risk and vulnerability (disaster managers in priority areas of Indonesia and the region have an improved understanding of disaster risk and vulnerability):* * How has AIFDR contributed to increasing understanding of disaster risk and vulnerability among disaster managers?
* What is the evidence that disaster managers have increased knowledge of DRR and what evidence is available that they have applied it in practice?

*(What changes have you seen in this area? Have you got a specific example of increased DRM knowledge and/or innovation you would like to discuss?)**Outcome 2: Better able to reduce disaster risk in practice (Disaster managers and vulnerable communities in demonstration provinces of Indonesia are better prepared to reduce impacts through disaster management planning and practice)** How were disaster managers and vulnerable communities DRM operational practices improved as a result of AIFDR?
* What improvements to DRM operational practices have resulted in communities and disaster managers being able to reduce disaster impacts?

*(What changes have you seen in this area? Have you got a specific example of enhanced local level disaster management capacity you would like to share?)**Outcome 3: Partnerships with national, community and international organisations (partnerships enable sustainable disaster reduction in Indonesia and the region)** What types of partnerships did the facility form at international, national and community level?
* How did these partnerships help to contribute to sustainable disaster reduction in Indonesia and the region?

*(What changes have you seen in this area? Have you got a specific example of an effective AIFDR partnership you would like to discuss?)* | Document review; semi-structured interviews with key informants |
| **Efficiency** | **Were AIFDR’s inputs timely and well targeted?**  | What were the successes and challenges involved in the different parts of AIFDR’s management system: * Co-Directorship model
* Financial management
* Procurement and contracting (particularly grants mechanism)
* Staffing
* Roles, responsibilities and communication lines between GoA and GoI

How did AIFDR select and support GoI institutions (BNPB and science institutions agencies) to bring about durable change to DRM policies and practices in Indonesia?How did AIFDR select and support UN/INGO/CSO partners to enable sustainable disaster reduction at the sub-national level in Indonesia? | Document review; semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders (BNBP) and AIFDR staff.  |

**Data Collection and Analysis**

A range of documents will be reviewed by the evaluation team and evidence extracted from these documents will be fed into phase 4 of the evaluation process (ie, ‘data analysis and interpretation’ stage). Given the short time frame allocated for this evaluation not every document provided by DFAT will be reviewed. Only a select sample of documents will be reviewed, and the selection will be made by the evaluation team in consultation with AIFDR staff. The evaluation team will aim to interview all key stakeholders and AIFDR staff in person where possible. Some of the interviews will occur in Australia (Canberra), but the majority will take place in Indonesia (Jakarta). Results from the interviews will be documented, categorised, reviewed and themes and issues identified.

The team reserves the right to return to selected key stakeholders to clarify responses and ask additional questions if necessary in the process of testing the results through the triangulation of data sources.

**Evaluation Steps**

The evaluation will occur over a series of steps as outlined below.

Step 1: Agreement on Evaluation Plan

Step 2: Document Review

Step 3: Interviews with key stakeholders and AIFDR staff (Jakarta and Canberra)

Step 4: Data Analysis and Interpretation

Step 5: Clarification and testing of results

Step 6: Preparation of Independent Review Report

Step 7: Presentation of Evaluation Findings, and Lessons Learnt

**Evaluation Workplan**

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| --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Task**  | **Dates** |
| Inception and Planning Confirmation of evaluation team membership. | 2 June – 18 June 2014 |
| Evaluation Plan  | 20 June 2014 (Draft)/ Final TBC |
| Evaluation Plan Meeting – Evaluation Team (Lisa Roberts) to work with AIFDR Staff in JKT to clarify theory of change/or program logic; and reach agreement on evaluation approach; evaluation questions, general expectations.  | 27 June 2014 |
| Evaluation Team to meet in JKT to finalise Interview Questions  | 29/30 June 2014  |
| Document review  | From 10 June 2014 (documents provided by DFAT to evaluation team) |
| Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and AIFDR staff - Jakarta | 30 June – 4 July 2014  |
| Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders – Canberra  | TBC  |
| Data analysis, interpretation, and testing of findings | Est. 7 – 9 July 2014 (insufficient time frame - to be discussed) |
| Submission of Draft Independent Review  | 11 July 2014 (as per ToRs/to be discussed) |
| Submission of Final Independent Review | 25 July 2014 (as per ToRs) |

# Annex 3: List of People and Organisations Consulted

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| **Location**  | **Organisation**  | **Representative**  |
| Jakarta  | DFAT | Simon Merrifield, Australian Ambassador to ASEAN |
|  | DFAT  | Pat Duggan, Counsellor ASEAN DFAT Development |
|  | DFAT  | Jean-Bernard Carrasco, Minister Counsellor DFAT Development |
|  | DFAT/DRR | Jeong Park, Development DRR Adviser |
|  | DFAT/DRR | Ben O’Sullivan DFAT Disaster Response Unit Manager |
|  | DFAT/AIFDR | Jon Burrough, Counsellor DFAT and AIFDR Co-Director |
|  | DFAT/AIFDR | Dominic Morice, Partnerships Manager  |
|  | DFAT/AIFDR | Jason Brown, Training and Outreach Unit Manager |
|  | DFAT/AIFDR | David Robinson, Risk and Vulnerability Manager; |
|  | DFAT/AIFDR | Elia Surya, Corporate Unit Manager; |
|  | DFAT/AIFDR | Henry Pirade, Program Manager Partnerships Unit; |
|  | DFAT/AIFDR | Widya Setiabudi, Senior Program Manager, Training and Outreach. |
|  | DFAT/AIFDR | Radhietya Hadikusuma, Program Manager, Risk and Vulnerability |
|  | BNBP | Ir. Dody Ruswandi, Deputy Secretary of BNBP |
|  | BNBP | Ir.B. Wisnu Widjaja, Deputy of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, Co-Director AIFDR |
|  | BNBP | Ir. Tri Budiarto, Deputy of Emergency Response |
|  | BNBP | Dr. R. Sugiharto, Head of Bureau, Law and Cooperation |
|  | Climatology and Geophysics Agency (BMKG) | Pak Masturyono |
|  | UNDP | Kristanto Sinandang, Head of Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit |
|  | UNOCHA | Rajan Gengaje, Head of OCHA Indonesia.  |
|  | UNOCHA | Titi Moektijasih, Humanitarian Affairs Analyst, OCHA Indonesia.  |
|  | Australian Red Cross  | Sacha Bootsma, ARC Indonesian Country Manager |
|  | Australian Red Cross | Godril D Yuwono, Senior Program Coordinator ARC |
|  | Oxfam | Nanang Dirja, Oxfam  |
|  | Oxfam | Ade Sudiarno, Oxfam  |
|  | IOM | Denis Nihill, Chief of Mission, Indonesia  |
|  | IOM | Peter Kern, Program Manager |
|  | LPBI-NU | Pak Muhammad Ali Yusuf, Finance and Administration Manager and two other NU representatives  |
|  | CDSP Project Consultants  |  |
|  | ASEAN Secretariat  | Alicia Bala, ASEAN Deputy Secretary General |
|  | ASEAN  | Larry Maramis, Director of Cross-sectoral Cooperation, |
|  | ASEAN | Fenny Chandra, Programme Officer, ASEAN-Australia Cooperation for the Implementation of AADMER Work Programme 2010-2015 |
|  | AHA Centre | Said Faisal,Executive Director of AHA Centre (ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management) |
|  | Philippines Mission to ASEAN | Noel Novicio, DHOM |
|  | Japanese Embassy | Ms Takako, Head of Development, Japanese Embassy |
|  | US Mission to ASEAN  | Jennifer Wilson, ASEAN Affairs Program Manager |
|  |  | Harlan Hale, Regional Adviser Disaster Assistance, USAID |
|  |  | Kurt Leffler, US ASEAN Military Adviser |
| Bandung | Geology Agency of Indonesia/Badan Geologi (BG) | Pak Hendrasto, Head of Vulcanological Centre  |
| Bandung | Geology Agency of Indonesia/Badan Geologi (BG) | Ibu Sri Hidayati, Sub-unit EQ Mitigation, PVMBG |
| Bandung | Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) | Pak Irwan Meilano, GREAT Coordinator/plus academic representatives from ITB  |
| Canberra  | DFAT | Craig Maclachlan a/FAS SE Asia Mainland Division |
|  | DFAT | Mark Sawyers (EAS/ARF) |
|  | DFAT | Vanessa Wood (ASEAN) |
|  | DFAT | Anita Dwyer, Director, Effectiveness and Risk Management Section, Analytical and Effectiveness Branch |
|  | DFAT | Thanh Le, Director, Humanitarian Response |
| Canberra  | EMA | Chris Collett, Assistant Secretary Crisis Coordination BranchEmergency Management Australia |
|  |  | Matt Hayne, AS/ex-AFIDR co-director |
| Canberra  | GA | Dr Trevor Dhu, ex-Head of AIFDR Risk and Vulnerability  |

# Annex 4: List of Documents Reviewed

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| --- | --- | --- |
| **DFAT Policy** | **Australian Aid Policy** | Commonwealth of Australia, DFAT, *Australian aid: promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability, June 2014.*  |
| **AIFDR** | **Design Documents** | AIFDR Design (2009) (Phase 1 Design)AIFDR Design (2013/4) (Phase 2 Design): Volume 1 Program Design Document, and Volume 2 Annexes |
| **Facility Level Strategy & Review Documents** | AIFDR Independent Progress Review (AIFDR Mid-Term Evaluation) (10 September 2011)AusAID/AIFDR Management Response to AIFDR Mid-Term Evaluation (2011)Development Strategy: AIFDR *‘Enhancing Disaster Management Capacity in 5 Indonesian Provinces: NTT, South Sulawesi, East Java, West Java and West Sumatra’* (Draft) |
| **AusAID/DFAT Internal Quality Documents** | Quality on Implementation Report for AIFDR (Aidworks: 11 Dec 2008 @ $21,200,000), plus Quality on Implementation Report for AIFDR (Aidworks: 11 Dec 2008 @ $32,597,364)Quality on Implementation Report for AIFDR (Feb 2014) |
| **Partnerships**  | United Nations: Donor Field Monitoring Questionnaire (2014) on Humanitarian Effectiveness (Completed)ODSG Field Mission to Indonesia: Mission Report (22-26 April 2013)United Nations Development Program (UNDP): UNDP Commissioned, Final Report: Capacity Assessment and Capacity Development at BNBP (date?)UNDP, Table: Areas of Convergence for EPDRR/SCDRR2 and CDSPUNDP & GoI, Final Report for Project ‘ Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction (SC-DRR) in Development Project (25 Oct- 30 Nov 2011)UNDP & NDMA, ‘Enhancing Policy and Planning for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (EP-DRR): Inception Report (1 May – 30 June 2013)UNDP: EP-DRR: Mid-Term Review Report, Prepared for SC-DRR Phase II Project BoardUNDP & NDMA, ‘Enhancing Policy and Planning for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (EP-DRR) Quarterly Progress Report (reporting period: 1 July – 30 Sept 2013), Nov 2013UNDP & NDMA, ‘Enhancing Policy and Planning for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (EP-DRR) Quarterly Progress Report (reporting period: 1 Oct-31 Dec 2013), Feb 2014UNDP & NDMA, ‘Enhancing Policy and Planning for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (EP-DRR) Quarterly Progress Report (reporting period: 1 Jan – 31 March 2014)International Organisation for Migration (IOM):IOM Inception Report: Strengthening DRR Capacity and Promoting Community Resilience in West Java (report dated January 2013)IOM Six-monthly Progress Report: Strengthening DRR Capacity and Promoting Community Resilience in West Java ((Report 1)IOM Six-monthly Progress Report: Strengthening DRR Capacity and Promoting Community Resilience in West Java (Report 2)LPBI-NU:Mid Term Review Report of Project ‘Advocacy in Disaster Management Institutions in Eight Regencies (Kabupaten) in East Java’ (2012)Oxfam: Final Evaluation of Project “Building and Deepening Resilience in Eastern Indonesia” (2014)AIFDR/Independent Evaluations: AIFDR “Build Back Better Campaign” Final Evaluation Report (March 2011/Guy Janssen and Donna Holden)Mercy CorpsRAGAM Evaluation Plan for Final Review of Project ‘A Pilot for Earthquake Safe Reconstruction in West Sumatra’ (project implemented by Mercy Corps/evaluation commissioned by AIFDR) |
| **Research & Innovation Grant Projects** | Completion Report on World Relief Project: ‘Reducing Risk of Disasters in 15 Indonesian Villages through Community Based Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness (DMP) Planning’Completion Report on Daya Annisa (local NGO) Project: ‘Integration of BBDRR into Sustainable Livelihoods Program’ (post-earthquake/focus on Bawuran & Seloharjo Villages in Bantul-Jokjakarta)Completion Report on Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB) Project aimed at increasing resilience among children with a disability in DRR (project objective: to empower and establish active participation of women cadres in community-focused DRR in 14 villages in Ciamis, West Java).Completion Report on DELSOS (local NGO) Project: ‘Supporting Families to Save Mothers and Children’ in Fores Timur/district in Flores Island/East Nusa Tenggara Province Completion Report on University of Gajah Mada funded research on the ‘Impacts of Mount Merapi eruption on the local community taking into consideration cultural and anthropological conditions’ |
| **Risk & Vulnerability** | Pamphlet: ‘What is InaSAFE’ Jakarta Post Media Clip Volcano 5 MOU Agreement Between Indonesia’s BNBP and Science Agencies: Cooperation Advancement and Research in Earthquake Disaster Risk Mitigation Final report on ‘Earthquake Damage Model for Building in Indonesia’ (Research conducted by ITB and Geoscience Australia/funded by AIFDR)AIFDR/Geoscience Australia (Dr Phil Cummins), ‘Development of Earthquake Hazard Information in Indonesia’ (Annual Progress Report for 2010 – 2011)AIFDR/Independent Progress Review of the Indonesian Earthquake Hazard Project, 5 November 2012Completion Report, ‘Further Development and Implementation of Volcanic Ash Modelling in Indonesia’ (Adele Bear-Crozier, Geoscience Australia)Annual Project Report 2011-2012 ‘ Developing Better Information for Tsunami Preparedness (AusAID and Geoscience Australia) |
| **Training & Capacity Building**  | AIFDR Commissioned, Indonesian Sub-National Disaster Management Capacity and Training Needs Analysis, (April – June 2010)Capacity Development Support Program: Mid Term Review for BNPB and AIFDR (Draft Final Report), August 2013 |
| **ASEAN** | **ASEAN**  | ASEAN Declaration on Enhancing Cooperation in Disaster Management Malaysian Prime Ministers Speech: The Opening Session of the National Colloquium on Malaysia’s Chairmanship of ASEAN 2015 (8 May 2014)Report on ASEAN Capacity Building Forum on Risk Assessment: Bridging Science and Practice in Disaster Risk Management Towards Community Resilience (19-22 March 2013, Bangkok)Report on ASEAN Knowledge Sharing Workshop on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction in Education (18-19 February 2011, Malacca, Malaysia) |
| **AADMER** | ASEAN Strategy and Priorities for AADMER Work Programme Phase 2 (2013-2015): including Work Programme Phase 2 Strategy and all Concept Notes 1 – 21)Flagship and Priority Projects under AADMER Work Programme Phase 2 (List of Concept Notes)AADMER Work Programme – Phase 1: Accomplishment Report (Nov 2013)List of Activities: Implementation of the ASEAN-Australian Cooperation for the AADMER Work Programme 2010-2015 (Produced by ASEAN Secretariat Staff)Quarterly Progress Report: AIFDR Support to ASEAN and AHA Centre – Training and Knowledge Management Project (December 2012)Quarterly Progress Report: AIFDR Support to ASEAN and AHA Centre – ASEAN-ERAT Project (December 2012)Quarterly Progress Report: AIFDR Support to ASEAN and AHA Centre – AHA Centre Operationalization (July 2012 – November 2012)Quarterly Progress Report: AIFDR Support to ASEAN and AHA Centre – AHA Centre Operationalization (December 2012 – April 2013)Quarterly Progress Report: AIFDR Support to ASEAN and AHA Centre - AADMER Work Programme (May 2014) Quarterly Progress Report: AIFDR Support to ASEAN and AHA Centre – ASEAN Secretariat Capacity Building (May 2014) |
| **AHA Centre** | AHA Centre, ‘Conquering the Perfect Storm: Lessons Learnt on ASEAN Response of Typhoon Haiyan’ (early draft) |
| **DRM REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS** |  | Diagram of Overlapping East Asia Pacific Communities  |
| AusAID Commissioned Report, ‘Disaster Management in the East Asia Summit’ (Martin Studdert; Neil Greet; Jeong Park), July 2011 |
| Updated DFAT 2014-15 Regional Disaster Activities Matrix |
|  | Concept Paper: Multi-year Strategic Exercise Plan Workshop (concept paper outlined proposal by USA and Malaysia for an ARF workshop on creating a multi-year plan and exercise planning norms. |

1. RPJMN 2010-2014 National Medium-Term Development Plan [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015* retrieved from: <http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Source GFDRR Country Profile for Indonesia (2010) and GFDRR Indonesia Country Program Update (2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Source of data: "EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, University catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Bel." Data version: v11.08 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Source of data: "EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, University catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Bel." Data version: v11.08 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. For more information see: [*Indonesia: National action plan for disaster risk reduction 2010-2012 (RAN-PRB)*](http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/policies/v.php?id=26346) and [*Indonesia: National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2011-2013)*](http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/policies/v.php?id=28912)*,* National Agency for Disaster Management, Indonesia retrieved from [*http://www.unisdr.org/partners/countries/idn*](http://www.unisdr.org/partners/countries/idn)*.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. HFA Para 14.1 ‘*Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation*’. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (2010) Country Profile for Indonesia, pg.10. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The review team was informed by one of the original authors of the concept note that it was only ever intended to be the starting point for AIFDR and that further development, refinement and definition were anticipated once AIFDR began operations. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Record of AIFDR Review Consultations (2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. AIFDR’s Development Strategy (2012) [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Source: *Economic costs of disasters from:* http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/?cid=80 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See separate report, DFAT Concept Note: Australia’s future investment in ASEAN Disaster Management (2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See Executive Summary of Final Evaluation of Project “Building and Deepening Resilience in Eastern Indonesia” (2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. A note of terminology. ‘Perda’ commonly refers to laws produced by local governments — whether provincial, district or city, or legislative or executive. However, in strict legal terms, *Perda* refers specifically only to laws passed by local legislatures, whether provincial, district or city*.* A reference to a provincial *Perda*, for instance, is a reference to a law enacted by a provincial parliament. “By contrast, laws passed by the head of the executive arm of a local government — governors (in provinces), regents (in districts) and mayors (in cities) — are generally referred to as regulations of heads of regions (*Peraturan Kepala Daerah*) or more specifically as *Peraturan Gubernur* (governor regulation), regent regulation (*Peraturan Bupati*) and mayoral regulation (*Peraturan Walikota*)” source: *Butt, S (2010), Regional Autonomy and Legal Disorder: The Proliferation of Local Laws in Indonesia (Abstract), Sydney Law Review vol. 32: 177* [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Review team meeting with ASEAN Secretariat on 3 July 2014 in Jakarta. ASEC representatives in attendance: Alicia Bala, ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General; Larry Maramis, Director of Cross-sectoral Cooperation; Fenny Chandra, Programme Officer, ASEAN-Australia Cooperation for the Implementation of AADMER Work Programme 2010-2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See Further DFAT Concept Note: Australia’s Future Investment in ASEAN in Disaster Management (August 2014), S, Darvill and L, Roberts [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Joint Review Report on AusAID OCHA Indonesia Partnership June/July 2013, Jeong Park (AusAID) and Titi Moektijashi (OCHA Indonesia) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Ref, above report at pg. 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. AIFDR/Independent Progress Review of the Indonesian Earthquake Hazard Project, 5 November 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. AIFDR MTR page 18 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)