## Independent Review of Australia’s Humanitarian Logistics Capability

## Background

A Humanitarian Logistics Framework was developed in 2011 to underpin DFAT’s (then AusAID’s) commitment to respond within 48 hours of a request and to be able to respond to simultaneous emergencies in the Indo-Pacific region. The purpose of the Framework was:

*To facilitate timely, effective and flexible delivery of Australian humanitarian assistance through the provision of appropriate high-quality humanitarian supply chain logistics support.*

The Framework consists of five components:

i) Procurement of Emergency Relief Supplies and Equipment

ii) Storage and Handling of Pre-positioned Supplies and Equipment

iii) Humanitarian Freight and Transport Logistics

iv) Deployment Support

v) Specialist Logistics Personnel and Expertise

While each component was to rely on a mix of delivery mechanisms and partnerships, two core arrangements were established to underpin the Framework: a contractual arrangement with a commercial logistics provider and a technical agreement with the World Food Program (WFP) – Humanitarian Relief Depot (UNHRD) network.

With the impending conclusion of these two arrangements (June 2018), the alignment of Australia’s consular and humanitarian response responsibilities and outcomes of the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, DFAT decided it was timely for the Framework to be independently reviewed.

## 2. Review Methodology

The Independent Review was a rapid desk-based assessment. It largely focussed on an analysis of key documents produced throughout the life of the Framework, supported by interviews with interlocutors able to comment on either the Framework itself or components of it. No field visits were undertaken, though teleconferences were held with key posts. The Review was guided by a set of key questions. The Review’s Terms of Reference are at Annex 1 and the list of persons consulted at Annex 2.

## 3. Summary of Findings

The Framework did bring a more strategic and joined-up focus to the role humanitarian logistics plays as a key element of Australia’s response to emergencies in the Indo-Pacific region. It provided DFAT with a core arrangement with a commercial provider (HK Logistics, now Palladium Group) that has performed well over the intervening years and a set of partnerships that allowed DFAT to both broaden its geographic reach and its capacity to respond to simultaneous emergencies in the region.

In terms of the anticipated outcomes set out in the Framework, the Framework did contribute to an increased Australian capacity to respond effectively to humanitarian emergencies in the immediate region and further afield. It certainly resulted in an improved supply chain logistics and staging area capability for emergency response in the Pacific. It has also contributed to increased capacity of selected Pacific disaster management organisations. Importantly it brought a more disciplined focus to the resourcing and budgets needed to support Australia’s increased engagement in humanitarian response.

What is less clear is how much the Framework itself was the key on-going driver in achieving these outcomes. The Framework was very much a product of its time and did not function as a ‘living’ document but it was a key step along the way in achieving these outcomes.

Some components underpinning the Framework performed better than others. The commercial arrangement with Palladium provided useful substance under all five components, though questions continue to be raised about its cost effectiveness and expanding reach. The warehouse network has made a substantial contribution to DFAT’s effectiveness in emergency response but even here it has evolved significantly over time with the winding up of warehouses in Indonesia. The membership of the UNHRD network has not worked in the way it was articulated in the Framework but has nevertheless allowed DFAT to extend and maintain its reach outside of the Pacific. Relations with other partners (whole of government and NGO) were in many ways untouched by the Framework and continued to evolve positively at an organisation to organisation level.

## 4. Detailed Findings

**4.1. Findings at the Framework Level**

**4.1.1.** At its core, the Framework represented a more strategic approach to the role of logistics in humanitarian emergency responses. It brought together a logical and coherent set of capacities that DFAT could draw on and attempted to identify and shape a set of relationships with key partners involved in responses.

**4.1.2. Effectiveness of the Framework at the macro or overall framework level was undercut by:**

***4.1.2.A. Poor recognition and socialisation***. While many of the informants interviewed as part of this review were aware of some components of DFAT’s approach to humanitarian logistics and while some acknowledged a more strategic approach to these issues on the part of DFAT, very few were aware that such a Framework even existed. This is partly a reflection of the decision taken by the then AusAID to not formally publish the Framework and changes in operating context and personnel over time but it also demonstrates that the Framework was never a ‘living document’ that was seen to guide action.

***4.1.2.B. Overly complex and elaborate framework structure***. The Framework document states “The Humanitarian Logistics Framework does not fit the model of a program or activity with clearly defined components, activities and defined deliverables. Rather, it is an integrated set of arrangements and partnerships assembled to provide flexible and responsive logistics support for the delivery of in-kind emergency relief assistance, primarily on an ad hoc basis.” (p10) Despite such a clear statement of a more strategic intention, the Framework included a set of more program like management arrangements and tools that were unnecessary and cumbersome.

* 1. *Framework level performance management*. The Framework set out a performance management framework but it is not clear from documents sighted or interviews that this performance information was ever collected or aggregated to provide a perspective on the Framework’s performance. An examination of the Framework level performance indicators and those articulated for component level performance does not show any clear ‘line of sight’ between the two.
  2. *Framework level risk management*. The Framework explicitly states (p26) that reliance on a range of partners required proactive risk management, sets out processes for managing these risks and articulates a traditional risk matrix. The matrix identifies four (4) key risks, sources of those risks, impact, risk treatment and responsibility for managing the risk. In practice, the risk matrix is not a useable document. Its allocation of responsibility for risk is unclear, identifying a mix of individual program areas, general desks and posts and Agency, Departmental and broad partner level. For example, allocating risk to “ADF” is not a meaningful way of treating risk. The framework also articulates a set of steps to manage risk throughout the life of the Framework but as with performance management, it is not clear from the documents sighted or from interviews that this process of risk management occurred in a consistent manner.

***4.1.2.C. Complex implementation arrangements***. The Framework relied on a set of management arrangements that were relatively complex and which were variable in their implementation.

1. *Allocation of responsibility within AusAID/DFAT*. The emergency response section has maintained on-going responsibility for the Framework since its inception. All interlocutors commented on this as a positive aspect, noting it has provided a consistent point of contact within the Department for the contractor and other WOG, NGO and international partners. One area where the allocation of responsibility was less clear related to in-country warehouse facilities, where the framework set out shared responsibility for the warehouses in Jakarta, Port Moresby and Lae. This resulted in some mixed messaging around management of those warehouses (this is a separate issue to the changed operating context for warehouses that is discussed below). The Framework also stated the need for “a higher level of engagement, coordination, liaison, monitoring, evaluation and general rigour on (then) AusAID’s part”. (p21) This was largely met through the establishment of a dedicated Logistics Officer position. While this was seen by partners as a strong positive (see above), it is not clear if the level of ongoing resourcing for the role within the Humanitarian Division matched the ambition and complexity of the Framework.
2. *UNHRD Technical Agreement*. The instrument used to formalise the partnership with UNHRD was a technical agreement with the World Food Program (WFP) that sat beneath the broader Strategic Partnership Agreement the then AusAID had with WFP. The technical agreement stated that “the parties would meet at approximately six months from the signature of this agreement and thereafter not less than annually to review this Agreement…”. This regime of meetings never eventuated with the key reason cited on DFAT’s part being a key ongoing focus on management of the commercial period offer. See below for comment on the effectiveness of the UNHRD partnership.
3. *Coordination with the ADF*. The Framework identified working with the ADF as a key component for the implementation of the Framework and proposed that a formal annex on Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief be included under the then Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between then AusAID and the Department of Defence. This never eventuated and the use of SPAs was discontinued. This reflected the changed management arrangements decided by Government for the aid program and the way in which DFAT works with WOG partners. While all interlocutors spoke favourably of the strong and practised working relationship between DFAT and the ADF over logistics, this positive relationship was not driven by the Framework itself.

**4.2. Findings at the Component Level**

The nature of this review precluded an in-depth examination of each component and each element within those components but it was possible to form some clear judgements nevertheless.

**4.2.1 Procurement of Emergency Relief Supplies and Equipment**

The Framework established two mechanisms for the procurement of relief supplies and equipment: a Humanitarian Logistics Period Offer (originally held by HK Logistics and by Palladium Group through its acquisition of HK Logistics) and membership of the UNHRD Network. The logic behind the choice of the two mechanisms was that it “….it broadens AusAID’s options, increases the range of off-the shelf and specialised items and services available, increases the range of potential suppliers, and facilitates value-for-money comparisons”. (p11) This was achieved but mainly flowed through the period offer.

**4.2.1.A. Since the establishment of the Framework the UNHRD Network has been used on only a few occasions.** UNHRD was first used in the response to Tropical Cyclone Haiyan in the Philippines and has only been used in four other responses (Mt Sinjar in 2014, Burma Floods in 2015, Nepal earthquake aftershocks in 2015 and Sri Lanka floods in 2017).

It is evident that membership of the UNHRD has provided increased options in terms of accessing relief supplies and the breadth of supplies available. However, the tempo of UNHRD use and the fact that a significant component of the cash advance provided to UNHRD in 2013 remains to be drawn down suggests that it has been less useful in facilitating value for money comparisons with the commercial provider.

**4.2.1.B.** **HKL/Palladium has generally performed strongly.** The commercial contractor’s strong performance in the procurement of emergency relief supplies and its extensive network in the Pacific was commented favourably on throughout interviews. It was also positively referenced in after action reviews for Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and Tropical Cyclone Winston in Fiji. The ODE’s evaluation of Australia’s response to Tropical Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu highlighted similar positive findings around the performance of HK Logistics (p45). The mid-term review of the Period Offer held by HK Logistics (and now Palladium Group) in 2014/15 noted that the provider “adhere(s) to Australian Government Guidelines for the procurement of goods and freight services and they have a recorded system of three quote assessments”. Nothing examined in this rapid assessment would change this view.

There have been examples where comparison have been conducted between UNHRD and the Period Offer (Nepal earthquake, procurement of Mobile Storage Units and the proviso of zodiac boats to Sri Lanka) but it remains that value for money (see below) has come largely from procedures and systems at the Period Offer level and not from the overall Humanitarian Logistics Framework level. As such, the success of this component of the Framework has been partial.

**4.2.2. Storage and Handling of Pre-positioned Emergency Relief Supplies and Equipment**

The Framework set out three mechanisms for this component: warehousing and storage-related services through the period offer, membership of UNHRD and access that provided to its five regional storage depots and provision of mobile storage units to Pacific Disaster Management organisations.

At its height, DFAT maintained a network of five warehouses in Brisbane (main warehouse), Sydney (overflow capacity for Brisbane), Jakarta, Lae and Port Moresby. The Brisbane and Lae warehouses also offer space for all members of the Humanitarian Partnership Agreement (HPA), the Red Cross societies (Australia and PNG); and in Brisbane for UN partners UNFPA and WFP. Through UNHRD DFAT had access to another five (5) depots located in Europe, Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Malaysia.

It was intended that the storage and warehouse related services provided through the Framework would enhance Australia’s capacity and reach, including through access to the UNHRD’s extensive supply chain.

The usefulness of this extensive network has declined over time. In practice, the UNHRD depots in Dubai and Subang in Malaysia have been used infrequently and the others not at all. DFAT’s need for in-country warehouses has also changed over time with the warehouse in Indonesia being closed as “it no longer represented value for money or add(ed) significant value in Indonesia”. The on-going usefulness of the warehouses in PNG has also been questioned by the post in Port Moresby. The warehouse in Brisbane continues to play a pivotal role in Australian responses in the Pacific and was acknowledged as such by interviewees. It should be noted that changing views on the usefulness or otherwise of the warehouses overall has not been impacted by the management of the warehouses by HKL/Palladium which was acknowledged by the mid-term review of the Period Offer and from response at interview as being positive. This most likely reflects changes in the broader operating context and policies around emergency responses (e.g. localisation).

**4.2.3.** **Humanitarian Freight and Transport Logistics**

The Framework identified the Period Offer as the main vehicle for the provision of humanitarian freight and transport logistics with UNHRD seen as an option to access secondary transportation.

**4.2.3.A.** In practice, the Period Offer (and the commercial provider) has been very successful in this regard as acknowledged in after action reviews (Haiyan, ODE evaluation on Cyclone Pam), mid-term review of the period offer and interviews.

**4.2.3.B.** The second freight and transport option identified in the Framework (UNHRD) did not prove as effective with concerns raised about UNHRD’s effectiveness in transporting supplies for the Nepal earthquake after-shock response (Family kits deployed by sea freight from Subang to Nepal via Calcutta needed to be returned to Subang due to delays in Calcutta and further complications at the border crossing into Nepal) and the Sri Lankan Floods in 2017 (provision of zodiac inflatable boats).

**4.2.3.C.** The Framework stated that the third option identified (ADF’s logistics capabilities) was a Ministerial level decision and depended on strategic considerations as well as ADF operational requirements. See below for further discussion of the role played by the ADF.

**4.2.4.** **Deployment Support**

**4.2.4.A**. The Period Offer was the key means of delivering on this component of the Framework. Nothing was identified in this rapid assessment that would question the generally positive findings of the mid-term review of the period offer. All members of the CRT interviewed as a part of this review held very positive views of the usefulness of the period offer and of proactive and supportive role played by the commercial provider (HKL/Palladium Group).

There have been some fifty (50) separate service orders issued under the period offer for deployment support, a reflection of the flexibility and responsiveness of the period offer in this regard. The process of reviewing each service order through a Final Tasking Report (carried out by the contractor) and Contractor Performance Assessments (carried out by DFAT) has been useful in maintaining and improving quality.

**4.2.4.B.** Where this aspect of the period offer has been less successful is in terms of understanding where, when and how other WOG partners can access support though this component. This has been a consistent finding, identified in the mid-term review of the period offer and in after action reviews for Haiyan and Winston. While the Framework certainly envisaged WOG partners being able to access deployment support this has not eventuated to any great regard. This may reflect a lack of familiarity on the part of WOG partners but also indicates the need for greater clarity around both scope and processes.

**4.2.4.C.** A second concern raised in interviews with CRT members related to whether the boundaries of the period offer were inadvertently being extended (e.g. in-country support). While this may be a legitimate concern, it is also the case that this responsiveness and flexibility have also been a part of on-going innovation in the implementation of the Framework. It is a matter for the Department to identify and draw boundaries around what constitutes legitimate deployment support.

**4.2.5. Specialist Logistics Personnel and Expertise**

The Framework identified three (3) mechanisms to access specialist expertise: the period offer, the UNHRD network and other sources such as Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief (RedR Australia). In practice, specialist personnel and expertise has largely been accessed through the period offer. It is likely that this reflects largely changes in the level of need and emerging geographic focus of relief operations. DFAT has also been able to draw of other mechanisms, such as the Australian Civilian Corp (ACC), to deploy logistics expertise in the region.

## 5. Significant Issues

**5.1.** **Flexibility, innovation and change**

The Humanitarian Logistics Framework was very much a product of its time. Its ambitious reach, extensive components and characterisation of the associated partnerships underpinning it all related to a time where the Australian aid program and the humanitarian budget was growing rapidly. The Framework was predicated on this situation continuing.

Other changes have occurred over the life of the Framework that reduced its effectiveness as a stand-alone Framework. These included: changed management arrangements for the delivery of the Australian aid program; increased country capacity, particularly in Asia but also in the Pacific, that has seen a change in the way in which emergency responses are framed and managed; and changes in thinking around humanitarian emergency response with concepts of localisation and cash transfer coming to the fore.

Core aspects of the Framework have maintained their relevance: the value of an explicit focus on and resourcing of logistics as an essential element of humanitarian emergency response and the fundamental notion of partnership that both extends reach and improves effectiveness continue to resonate. But the Framework itself was too complex, too rigid and too much a product of its time. As the operating environment evolved, the Framework effectively dropped from sight with attention focussing on those elements that retained some usefulness.

**5.2. Coordination with the ADF**

The key relationship with the ADF in the delivery of humanitarian emergency response has been a constant since the Framework was established. ADF’s capacity and operational requirements have shaped the ADF’s degree of involvement in humanitarian response on a case by case basis. This will continue.

The existence of the formal Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between then AusAID and the Department of Defence shaped thinking about how the Framework would relate to the ADF. The intention to incorporate a humanitarian emergency response annex under the SPA reflected this more formalistic approach to WOG partnerships pursued by AusAID at that time. With the incorporation of the aid program (and humanitarian program) into DFAT, this formal architecture was replaced by a more mature relationship between key Departments.

It is instructive that despite the disappearance of the formal architecture, the operational relationship between DFAT and ADF remained strong. This doesn’t mean that there have not been issues of contention and difference at times. What it does show is that continued dialogue, familiarity from working and training together and open communication provide the real basis for a productive relationship. Mechanisms such as the regular ADF secondment to DFAT and the establishment of the Whole of Government Humanitarian Logistics Working Group have been key aspects of this.

**5.3. Value for Money**

At the Framework level value for money was assumed to flow from having a range of delivery choices under all components other than Deployment Support. For example, under Component 1 (Procurement of Emergency Relief Supplies) it was presented that having both the Period Offer and membership of UNHRD would “...increase the range of potential suppliers, and facilitate value for money comparisons”. (p11). In other components, the range of ‘delivery options was expanded to include ADF and RedR.

For such an approach to drive value for money the choices would need to be genuine. However, each was significantly different the other. In effect, each component had a different comparative advantage. The period offer mechanism had capacities and characteristics which were different to the UNHRD network which were different to the ADF which were different to partners such as RedR. Each had a useful role to play but there was no real choice between them as delivery options (though noting that there has been some limited comparisons undertaken between the period offer services and those available through UNHRD). As such there was no creative tension to drive value for money.

By default, value for money considerations and questions tended to focus on the period offer and the performance of the commercial contractor. This was not surprising as the operation of the period offer was of a commercial nature and was more amenable to a more financial approach to value for money.

**5.4. Protection, gender and disability inclusion**

The inclusion of series of cross cutting issues in the Framework appears as more a ‘tick-the-box’ approach rather than an attempt to genuinely integrate them into operations. For example, many interlocutors did not see a clear or easy link between humanitarian logistics and issues of social protection, gender and disability inclusion. None questioned that supplies provided as part of a response needed to be considered from these perspectives or that the approach to distribution of supplies needed to address them as well, but it was not clear how the Framework would achieve or progress this.

The Framework was formulated at a point in time and the approach to these ‘cross-cutting’ issues reflects this. The focus through the Framework has been on the prepositioning and deployment of humanitarian supplies and expertise to a country, not on distribution which is through NDMO and other humanitarian agencies. The thinking around the importance of such issues has been evolving but the Framework, a static document, could not reflect this. Going forward, a re-examination of how these issues are best addressed in humanitarian responses would be timely.

## 6. Recommendations

**6.1.1. The need for a continuing framework**

A major value of the Framework was that it brought a strategic appreciation to the role that logistics had to play in supporting the Department’s (and Australia’s) capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies. It also explicitly acknowledged that this role needed to be resourced. Its major failing was to attempt to encapsulate this strategic approach in an overly rigid Framework that included unnecessary layers of management and reporting. In many ways, it was formulated in a way that was difficult to implement.

*Recommendation 1: That the strategic role played by logistics in humanitarian emergency response be re-articulated and updated by DFAT considering new approaches and new thinking post the World Humanitarian Summit and that it be captured in a way that enables it to evolve over time. Any update should include an explicit consideration of the resources needed support logistics and the way in which priorities such as disability inclusion, gender and protection are best addressed.*

**6.1.2. Humanitarian Logistics Period Offer**

In practice, the Period Offer has been the main means of implementing the Framework. It has provided the substance to all the components of the Framework. This rapid assessment has confirmed the main findings of the mid-term review, is in accord with the views of most interviewees and is consistent with after action reviews and evaluations. The Period Offer has been a success and the commercial provider delivering it has performed very well. Going forward, it should form the core of any redesigned approach to the logistics aspect of DFAT’s humanitarian emergency response. Whether and how far it should move beyond the current scope of the Period Offer is a matter for future judgement.

*Recommendation 2: The Humanitarian Logistics Period Offer should form the basis for the re-design of DFAT’s approach to logistics support for humanitarian emergency response.*

**6.1.3. The UNHRD Network**

The role envisaged for membership of the UNHRD Network in the Humanitarian Logistics Framework has not eventuated. UNHRD has been used in only a limited number of responses and has proved to be variable in its performance. A significant amount of the original cash advance remains to be drawn down. However, many interlocutors pointed to the broader range of benefits that have attached to UNHRD Network membership, including providing DFAT with a broader geographic reach beyond the Pacific.

*Recommendation 3: DFAT should review or examine whether Australia’s ongoing membership of the UNHRD Network is the most effective means of delivering geographical reach beyond the Pacific.*

## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

**Independent Review of Australia’s Humanitarian Logistics Capability**

**Terms of Reference**

1. **Background**

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is responsible for leading the Australian Government’s response to international humanitarian crises. While we support efforts globally, our focus remains firmly on the Asia- Pacific region.

Australia has a range of specialist capabilities to respond to humanitarian crises, grouped into three broad categories:

1. Australian personnel deployed to provide humanitarian expertise
2. Humanitarian emergency relief supplies
3. Partnerships with local and international humanitarian organisations that have capacity to deliver support in line with Australia’s humanitarian priorities.

A Humanitarian Logistics Framework was developed in 2011 to underpin DFAT’s (then AusAID’s) commitment to respond to crises within 48 hours of a request and to respond to simultaneous emergencies in the Indo -Pacific region. The purpose of the framework was:

*To facilitate timely, effective and flexible delivery of Australian humanitarian assistance through the provision of appropriate high quality humanitarian supply chain logistics support.*

Two core arrangements were established to deliver on this purpose:

* a contractual agreement with a commercial logistics provider (Palladium Group) to provide: specific logistics personnel to manage all DFAT requirements during preparedness and response times; secure and manage warehousing in Australia, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Indonesia; and respond to ‘ad hoc’ requests to cover preparedness work and response deployments from Australia, PNG and Indonesia; and
* a technical agreement with the World Food Programme (WFP) – UN Humanitarian Relief Depot (UNHRD) network to expand and support Australia’s reach into Asia further afield, if required. The UNHRD agreement provides DFAT with free secured storage of prepositioned relief supplies at the UNHRD Subang Depot in Malaysia

The implementation of the framework has evolved over the six years of operation, responding to recommendations in After Action Reviews and the shifting Australian political landscape. With the conclusion of the two major arrangements which underpin the framework in June 2018, the alignment of Australia’s consular and humanitarian response responsibilities and outcomes of the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 it is timely for DFAT’s logistics framework to be independently reviewed and refreshed.

1. **Review of the Humanitarian Logistics Framework**

To review DFAT’s achievement of outcomes described in the Humanitarian Logistics Framework as guided by the following questions:

* Achievements – what was achieved under the Framework and did the key arrangements deliver on time, on budget and to the extent envisaged?
* Effectiveness - Have we achieved outcomes that we expect over the lifetime of the Framework?
* Efficiency - Did the Framework direct the appropriate use of Australia’s and our partners’ time and resources to achieve outcomes?
* Relevance - Was this the right thing to do?
* Gender Equality – Did the Framework and implementing arrangements make a difference to gender equality and empowering women and girls?
* Monitoring and Evaluation – Did the M&E system generate credible information that was used for management decision-making, learning and accountability purposes?
* Sustainability - Will the benefits last?
* Risk - How was risk managed during the life of the Framework? Are there any legacy risks that need to be managed after completion, especially in relation to the contractual arrangements, and how will these be managed?
* Inclusion – did the Framework and contractual arrangements consider people with disabilities in the planning and implementation of DFAT’s approach to humanitarian logistics?
* Innovation – is there any evidence of innovative approaches and products?
* Lessons – what are the key lessons learnt and key recommendations for the new Logistic Framework?

1. **Deliverable**

Based on desktop research (Attachment 1), and meetings with key stakeholders (Attachment 2) draft a report of no more than ten (10) pages addressing each of the questions above including key recommendations for a new Logistics Framework.

1. **Coordination and direction**

A DFAT activity manager will be responsible for the direction and supervision of the review and supporting information requests and organising meetings as required with relevant stakeholders.

The review consultant will have the autonomy to propose recommendations for DFAT consideration.

1. **Specifications of the consultant**

DFAT is seeking to engage a consultant/s who has demonstrated experience in reviewing programs in the humanitarian sector and an understanding of DFAT’s quality standards

1. **Next Steps**

Finalisation of Review

On receipt of the report, DFAT will provide a management response. Both the review report and DFAT’s management response will be public documents.

Preparations for Design

Based on the Review documents, DFAT will prepare and submit a Concept Note for internal approval. The Concept Note will inform the design of a new Logistics Framework and supporting implementation partnerships. A consultancy firm may be engaged to assist DFAT with the design process.

**Attachment 1 – key documents**

The consultant is expected to draw on the following documents to inform the consultations and finalise a review report:

* AusAID 2011 Humanitarian Logistics Review Report
* AusAID 2011 Humanitarian Logistics Framework
* Humanitarian Logistics Period Offer (Palladium)
* Humanitarian Logistics Activity Reports (Palladium)
* Technical Agreement: Provision of services of the Humanitarian Response Depot Network (UNHRD)
* Contractor Performance Assessments
* Aid Quality Checks and Partner Performance Assessments
* After Action Reviews from TC Haiyan, TC Pam and TC Winston
* ODE report: Humanitarian in the Pacific: An evaluation of the effectiveness of Australia’s response to Cyclone Pam

**Attachment 2 – Key stakeholders**

The consultant will meet with representatives from the following organisations to inform the independent review:

* Australian whole-of-government departments and agencies – DFAT (Canberra, PNG, Indonesia and Pacific Posts), Defence, EMA, Department of Health
* Australian State entities – NCCTRC (AUSMAT), and NSW Fire and Rescue, Qld Fire and Emergency Services (DART / USAR)
* Private enterprise – Palladium (previously HK Logistics)
* DFAT’s Australian Humanitarian Partners and Australian Red Cross
* UN agencies – UNHRD
* Relevant DFAT Posts/Desks – Indonesia and PNG given warehouse facilities; Fiji and Vanuatu given recent responses

Where possible teleconference facilities should be used to minimise costs and as appropriate roundtables with stakeholders should be considered.

## Annex 2: List of consultations

**Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade**

* Ms Julie Stalker, Senior Humanitarian Logistics Officer – Logistics
* DFAT Crisis Response Team members:
  + Craig Kentwell
  + Celia Hevesi
  + Cameron Noble
  + Casey Semone
* DFAT Posts:
  + Fiji – Ray Bojczuk
  + Indonesia – Charles Thursby-Pelham

**Australian Defence Force**

* LtCol Scott Hill, Amphibious Taskforce Group Commander

**DFAT’s Humanitarian Logistics Provider**

* Palladium (formerly HK Logistics):
  + Gavan Gordon – Director Logistics
  + Matt Everitt – Logistics Senior Manager
  + Angela Fox – Logistics Support Officer