Independent Completion Report

Australia Indonesia Partnership for Electoral Support – Interim Program

JULY 28, 2011

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Executive Summary

Introduction

Australia funded a nine month, AUD5 million package of electoral support in 2010-11 that included funding to the UNDP, IFES, The Asia Foundation, Kemitraan, and the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). The review assesses the relevance of the intended outcomes, and the extent to which they were achieved. It also assesses a number of issues to do with the delivery arrangements including, in particular, the partnership model.

Relevance

Overall, the Program's intended outcomes were appropriate – addressing issues that are genuine priorities in the sector. The overall strategies were appropriate, in particular the focus on working closely with and through civil society. All outcomes have the potential for long term impact depending on what strategies are used, and over what time frame.

In most cases, it was hard to assess the *prima facie* feasibility of the intended outcomes as they were not couched in specific terms, and there was no baseline information available. However, all stakeholders (including AusAID) appeared in practice to have reasonable expectations, and a good understanding of the challenges in the sector.

Effectiveness

Outcome 1 – Support to Legislative Amendments

CSOs contributed both to the *process* of debate (through facilitating consultations dialogue, including doing so on behalf of state institutions such as MOHA or Komisi II), and to the *substance* of debate (through the provision of research paper and policy recommendations, and participation in consultations). It is clear that achieving substantive influence over legislation is extremely challenging.

A range of strategies were used to contribute to and influence the policy debate. Advocacy requires a sophisticated range of strategies, targeted to the individual issue. Future support should continue to focus on a robust policy process, but should be better informed by analysis of the policy and political climate to in turn enable better judgments about the feasibility of targeting specific reform objectives.

Outcome 2 – Support to Elections Management Bodies

Progress was achieved in strengthening KPU, however it is difficult to identify specific capacity improvements. This is partly because most of the challenges will be long term, and partly because the Program lacked the kind of qualitative analysis required to rigorously demonstrate capacity improvements.

The AEC has continued to develop a good relationship with KPU; there is significant value in the peer-to-peer relationship. However, KPU faces many fundamental challenges and is not in a strong position to clearly articulate what support it requires. Accordingly, the review team considers that a significantly more strategic

and proactive approach is required. It is critical that the investment that has been made in the relationship between KPU and AEC is used to have difficult conversations about meeting the challenges of reform. A possible starting point for this would be the joint development of an organisational development strategy for KPU.

Outcome 3 – Support to Local Elections

This component produced some useful analysis (which is still in the relatively early stages of debate) and also produced some tangible, operational outcomes. AEC worked with KPU to produce manuals for the 2010 local elections, which appear to have contributed to performance. IFES worked with KPUDs to improve the quality of voters lists in 24 locations.

This work had a short term focus. Sustainability of outcomes, however, can only be achieved through further progress with stabilising the regulatory framework (Outcome 1) and strengthening KPU (Outcome 2).

Outcomes 4 and 5: Support to Gender and CSOs

These outcomes were effectively cross-cutting issues supporting substantive reform under the first three outcomes. A range of useful research and analysis was conducted on women's participation in elections. CSOs were provided with effective support in delivering their programs. However, in both cases it remains premature to discuss genuine *outcomes*. Both areas must continue to be a focus under the forthcoming Program; they are not only important, but experience suggests it is feasible to make useful contributions.

Delivery Arrangements

Overall, the delivery arrangements were effective.

The partnership approach worked effectively between AusAID and partners (with collaborative and flexible delivery), but less effectively amongst the partners themselves. It will be important that the new program adopts more specific expectations about the meaning of partnership, and that management arrangements are clearly established to give effect to the desired partnership model.

The participative approach to M&E was appreciated by partners. All stakeholders complied with their monitoring and reporting requirements. However, more sophisticated M&E will be required to capture the qualitative, and in many cases intangible results of the new program.

Overall

The Program produced the required deliverables and a number of tangible and intangible results were achieved. Beyond that, AusAID engaged effectively in the sector, established useful credibility, learnt a number of valuable lessons, and helped to maintain reform momentum at a critical period. As a result, AusAID will commence the new program in a much better position than had the interim program not been implemented.

Introduction

Program Background

Australia funded a AUD5 million package of electoral support in 2010/11 that included funding to the UNDP, IFES, The Asia Foundation, Kemitraan, and the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC).

This package was an interim program of support, in between Australia's support to the 2009 elections, and the commencement of a long-term program of election support (Australia-Indonesia Electoral Support Program – AIESP), expected to start later in 2011 and run for five years. The interim program began in July 2010, and ran for nine months.

Australia's electoral program in 2010 mainly focused on supporting activities related to the amendment of the electoral laws and strengthening the capacity of electoral management bodies. The interim program also allowed Australia to remain engaged in the sector, and to AusAID to test the partnership model of implementation.

Review Objectives

The objectives of the review are to:

- Meet AusAID's accountability requirements by assessing the extent to which the Program was delivered as expected, and that funds were used effectively to contribute to the expected outcomes; and
- Enable AusAID to capture lessons learned from the Program in order to inform the implementation of the forthcoming long term program of support.

AusAID will be the principal audience for the review, however the document will be shared with GOI and all Program partners.

Review Scope and Methodology

The review assesses the relevance of the intended, and the extent to which they were achieved. It also assesses a number of issues to do with the delivery arrangements including, in particular, the partnership model.

Because the review comprised only six days of consultations across a wide range of Program stakeholders, the analysis focuses on overall strategy and selected implementation issues. It does not examine the technical quality of deliverables or provide analysis of individual activities. This was the only material constraint on the review, but was significant due to the large number of partners and sub-partners involved in the Program.

Priorities areas for analysis (given the intended focus of AIESP) included how best to support KPU (including examining AEC's role in that support), the feasibility of influencing legislative reform, and the effectiveness of the partnership model.

The methodology provided for a desk review of partners' completion reports, followed by interviewing a range of stakeholders to draw on different perspectives

about the performance of the Program.[1] Feedback was then analysed to draw out the common themes that emerged. The focus is on qualitative analysis and learning. There were no material variations from the proposed methodology.

The report is structured around the main review questions and the issues that arise from them, rather than around the individual activities.

The list of persons consulted is at Annex 1. A summary of the individual activity programs, and relevant observations is provided at Annex 2.

Relevance

This section briefly examines the relevance of the five outcome areas. This involves considering two questions: the extent to which the intended outcomes reflect priorities in the sector, and the extent to which they were feasible.

The intended outcomes clearly reflected sectoral priorities. The two consistent themes about reform priorities to emerge from interviews with stakeholders were strengthening the regulatory framework, and strengthening KPU. Essentially, the whole Program fits under these two areas.

Brief comments are made on each intended outcome below.

> **Outcome 1:** The process of amending election laws demonstrates inclusion of a broader base of evidence from technical experts and interest groups.
>
> Particular contributions are expected in the areas of gender, financing, and the division of responsibilities for the management of elections. Intermediary outcomes might include academic (position) papers produced, and decision makers informed and influenced.

Most stakeholders indicated the legislative framework was the single most important issue as it provides the rules for all players in the sector, and in particular provides the basis for the structure and operations of KPU. It was equally clear that the legislation has significant weaknesses that the current round of amendments need to address constructively.

The intended outcome focuses on the *process* of amending the elections laws – demonstrating the inclusion of a broader base of evidence (compared to if the Program had not been implemented). Within the timeframe of the Program, this appears to have been more realistic than couching the objective in terms of achieving a specific policy reform objective. On this basis, the outcome appears to have been feasible (a conclusion supported by the discussion on effectiveness below).

Further the overall strategy of an advocacy-based approach through CSOs was appropriate. The bodies drafting the amendments (either Komisi II of DPR or MOHA, depending on the piece of legislation) are not organisations that can be assisted

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[1] The desk review of the ICR Terms of Reference and the partners' completion reports provided the basis for developing more detailed questions for stakeholders. Interviews comprised a range of standard questions for all stakeholders, plus some that were specific to each stakeholder.

directly. Thus, the focus on ensuring an inclusive process in which external (domestic) stakeholders have the opportunity to provide input seems to have been appropriate.

> **Outcome 2:** Strengthened capacity of KPU and/or Bawaslu. This is particularly in regard to:
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> - Improved capacity of KPU and / or Bawaslu officials to manage the elections process.
> - Increased accessibility of elections information to the KPU and other stakeholders.

Both state and non-state stakeholders agreed that this was the second major priority for reform in the elections sector. That a strong elections sector requires a strong elections management body does not require great elaboration.

Because of the non-specific nature of the intended outcome and the absence of baseline information, it is difficult to make a clear statement about its feasibility.

However, there would be no *prima facie* reason to think that *some* capacity improvements could not be achieved during the timeframe of the Program – particularly as the organisations providing support to KPU (AEC, UNDP, IFES) had been doing so for some time prior to the interim program.

The question of the feasibility of change is, however, a complex one. It will be examined further following the discussion of effectiveness in the next section.

> **Outcome 3:** Improved systems and processes for local elections. This is particularly through:
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> - Improved voters list data quality in targeted areas through capacity building of KPU Kabupaten/kota.
> - Models identified to improve access for people with disabilities.
> - Improved management of KPU Province and Kabupaten/kota elections through use of agreed procedures.

This also falls under the priority area of strengthening the administration of elections. Whereas Outcome 2 addresses long term capacity development at KPU (and Bawaslu), Outcome 3 addresses the shorter term operational challenges associated with the management of local elections during the Program period. Accordingly, it is an area where it is more likely that some tangible, observable outcomes would be achieved.

The intended outcome was couched in fairly modest, operational terms and it was realistic to expect tangible outcomes in this area.

> **Outcome 4:** Gender equity outcomes in the electoral process. This is particularly in regard to:
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> - Improved understanding by women's groups, parliament, and AusAID of gender equity issues in the electoral process; and
> - Specific improvements identified and then taken up by state institutions and non-state organisations which would help to increase gender equity in the electoral process (e.g. ways to increase the opportunities for women to run for office).

Gender is an agreed cross-cutting issue under the Australia Indonesia Partnership and so it was appropriate that the Program include a specific outcome to focus on the challenges associated with improving gender equity in the electoral process. The technical work under this outcome related to Outcome 1 (legislation) and Outcome 3 (processes for local elections).

The activities addressing gender issues largely related to research and analysis. In this respect, it was feasible to expect "improved understanding", as stated in the intended outcome. However, the review team does not consider that it was feasible to expect "specific improvements to improve gender equity" to be taken up by state institutions within the timeframe of the Program.

This would have meant that in less than 12 months, it would have been necessary to complete the relevant research and analysis, debate amongst stakeholders, obtain agreement from relevant stakeholders (either state institutions or parties), and commence implementation. In general, this is too short a timeframe, particularly given the contested nature of many of the issues.

> **Outcome 5:** Capacity building / empowerment of local CSOs. This is particularly in regard to:
> - Improved systems of management (e.g. financial management, project management etc); and
> - Networking and exchange between CSOs.

All stakeholders agreed that civil society plays a critical role in the elections sector. Not only do they play a general role as reform advocates, but they are also recognised as important sources of technical expertise. This feedback was consistent across Program partners, state institutions and Parliamentary expert staff.

All stakeholders – including the CSOs themselves – also acknowledged that CSOs need support, in terms of their internal management practices[2], their technical functions (eg research methodology), and in particular their broader overall strategies including their ability to collaborate and network.

Thus, this intended outcome meets a relevant need. In a sense, it is a supporting outcome that contributes to the achievement of the more substantive electoral outcomes (in particular outcomes one and three).

As with some other outcomes, it is difficult to comment on the feasibility of the intended outcome, as it did not specify what scope or scale of improvements were expected. However it appears that most of the support to CSOs was quite short term in nature (a few months at most), and focused on the delivery of short term products. It is likely to be difficult to achieve any significant shift in capacity in this context, other than to support effective operation during Program delivery.

Summary Comment
The intended outcomes clearly align with priorities, and with the possible exceptions of aspects of the gender and CSO capacity development outcomes, appeared to be feasible. Most of the outcomes did not specify the *scale* of improvements that would be expected, so it will not be possible to make an obvious distinction between successful or unsuccessful initiatives. However, it is still possible to make reasonable judgments about the effectiveness of the work.

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[2] The wording of the outcome focused on "management systems"; however the focus is really on management *practices*, of which the systems themselves are just a part.

Interim programs sometimes have objectives that relate specifically to their transitional or bridging nature. The only such documented objective was for AusAID to test the partnership model of implementation.[3] This is discussed in the *Delivery Arrangements* section. However, it can be assumed that another implied objective would be the extent to which the interim Program provided an effective starting point. This is discussed in the concluding section.

Stakeholders agreed that all the intended outcomes have the potential to contribute to the long term strengthening of elections. However, making this contribution depends on where and when *opportunities to influence* arise, and how they are used. This is a theme in the following sections.

Effectiveness

Outcome 1 – Amendments to Legislation

Interim Program Achievements

Assessing the achievement of this outcome presents some methodological challenges. Clearly establishing whether there was more data and analysis included in the deliberation process because of the Program would require the establishment of a counterfactual, which is not possible to construct in this context.[4]

The review team's simplified approach relied on asking a hypothetical question: what would have happened had the Program not been implemented? Feedback from partners and sub-partners indicates that had Program funding not been available, the research and advocacy tasks would likely not have happened. Thus, it follows (fairly simplistically) that the Program made a contribution to the base of evidence that was available to decision-makers.

Relevant Legislation
▪ Law 22– Electoral Management Bodies
▪ Law 10 – Parliamentary Elections
▪ Law 42– Presidential Elections
▪ Law 32 – Local Elections
▪ Law 2 – Political Parties

Annexes 2 and 3 provide the detail of this contribution. From this, it can be concluded that CSOs contributed both to the *process* of debate (through facilitating consultations dialogue, including doing so on behalf of state institutions such as MOHA or Komisi II), and to the *substance* of debate (through the provision of research paper and policy recommendations, and participation in consultations).

In terms of sustainability, it is too early to draw any conclusion about whether these achievements will influence future policy processes. What is clear, however, is that continued involvement by CSOs will continue to require donor funding.

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[3] This was documented in the FMA9 submission, which sought approval for the Program's funding in April 2010.

[4] This would require comparing the legislative amendment process to another process in which there was no external support. This is not possible within the timeframe available. There would in any case be serious methodological difficulties associated with the comparability of the processes.

Approaches

The TOR for the review asked for analysis of the effectiveness of different advocacy strategies. The word "effectiveness" here is interpreted more broadly to refer to the level of *influence* over decision-makers.

The following strategies were used during the interim program:

- Research and analysis;
- Preparation of policy briefs (with or without specific recommendations);
- Discussions with policy makers;
- Participation in public consultations;
- Facilitation / management of public consultations (including on behalf of state institutions); and
- Media briefings / engagement.

In most cases, more than one strategy was used. The most common *individual* strategy was research and analysis, which for the most part is a prerequisite for any of the other strategies to be useful.

It is not possible on the basis of this review to indicate whether one strategy was any more useful than the other.[5] "Proving" a certain level of influence requires a sophisticated approach to analysis for each individual piece of legislation, issue, or activity. Such analysis was beyond the scope of the review. However, useful feedback was nonetheless obtained from stakeholders about the keys to being effective. The main points are summarised below.

Relationships are the starting point for effective advocacy. There was clear consensus on this point across all stakeholder groups – partners, sub-partners, party staff and MOHA. Without adequate relationships with either decision-makers or other influential stakeholders, there is little chance to obtain the kind of access required to affect decision-making – regardless of the merit of the analysis or recommendations.

Long term engagement is essential. Advocacy does not begin and end with the preparation and dissemination of a piece of policy research or analysis. It must be ongoing – *at least* for the duration of a specific policy or legislative reform process, but ideally longer. This was also an area of clear consensus; it also follows that if relationships are important, a long term approach is essential.

Political interests determine what issues are open to discussion. Issues that are fundamental to party interests cannot generally be debated. Feedback from all stakeholders was consistent on this point. Political interests are the first 'lens' through which policy proposals are considered, and there are clearly many issues in elections legislation that are central to party interests

If, for whatever reason, a policy proposal is *not* considered through this lens of power politics, then there *is* room for advocacy. MOHA and Parliamentary staff indicated that in these situations, MPs will genuinely be looking for input to guide their

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[5] It is also important to note that, at the time of writing, none of the relevant legislation was finalised – so the debate and the content of the legislative amendments are continuing to evolve.

decisions on policy positions – meaning that there *is* scope for advocacy to be effective.

A single, unified message is more effective. Partners and CSOs consistently expressed their concern over the lack of coordination and consensus amongst CSOs in the current environment.

In the early stages of the reform era, there was a high degree of uniformity amongst CSOs; the messages were fairly straightforward as they related to broad democratic principles. However, the focus of the current phase of reform is *consolidation*; the issues are much more complex and technical in nature than a decade ago.

In this environment, it is natural that there would be a greater discrepancy in views amongst CSOs. But failure to have a consistent message undermines impact, and provides opportunity to those resisting reform to use the lack of consensus to justify inaction.

As noted above, it is not possible within the scope of this review to draw conclusions about which activities were the most effective based on actual outcomes achieved. However, based on what stakeholders agreed were important characteristics of effective policy advocacy, the review suggests that the approach could have been stronger. In particular:

> **Experience of Other AusAID Programs in Legislative Reform**
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> Over the last two years, AusAID has funded programs to support the establishment of two new agencies: the Ombudsman's Office, and the National Public Procurement Agency. In both cases, this included providing assistance to the drafting of legislation to provide those organisations with their mandates.
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> In both cases, the programs found that the opportunities to influence the direction of the drafting process was extremely limited.
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> This was the case even though – in both cases – the direct program counterparts were also the agencies responsible for drafting the legislation.
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> The elections program is – for the most part – one step further removed from the process, which serves to further lessen the scope for influence.

- At nine months, the interim program did not allow sufficient time for effective, long term approaches to be planned and developed. Funding ceased for advocacy activities prior to the legislation being finalised. (At the time of writing, none of the legislation had been finalised.)
- There was little evidence of a critical approach by AusAID, partners or sub-partners to assessing the feasibility of influencing legislation up front (eg based on an assessment of political interests, and the relationships and strategies that were available).[6] As a result, the number of issues being targeted was arguably too broad, and a number of these were quite likely issues on which there was little prospect of achieving any significant influence.[7] (See Annex 3.)

Lessons for the Long Term

The initial discussion on effectiveness interpreted the outcome narrowly – ie, it focused on the inclusiveness of the process only. However, as the focus shifts to the longer term program, it becomes necessary to reframe this objective more broadly.

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[6] Some of this may well have been done informally, but based on information available to the review team, there was no formal analysis.

[7] For example, the issue of independent chairpersons for KPU was a political issue, and no recommendations from sub-partners were accepted. See Law 22 at Annex 3.

Looking to the longer term, it is possible to view the objective in two ways:

- Strengthening the policy *process* by enhancing the role of evidence in that process, and the role of CSOs in bringing evidence into the discussion. The focus here is on strengthening the fundamentals of the policy making process for the long term.
- Targeting specific legislative or policy reform *content*. The focus here is on the extent to which desired policies are actually reflected in the substance of legislative reform.

These two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, but they do involve tradeoffs in the short term. For example, if the focus is on the *process* outcome, then AusAID's approach would be very hands off. The program would support the engagement of CSOs, but would be less concerned with the technical content of their proposals, or the extent to which they present a united front.

If the focus is on the *policy* outcome, then AusAID may need to be more closely involved in deciding which particular issues it will support advocacy for, and perhaps support more direct advocacy – which may or may not involve support to or capacity development for CSOs. This would involve a sharper focus on technical elections issues.

The review team considers that both the *process* and *policy* aspects are important. Balancing these would require an approach along the following lines.

Begin with careful 'due diligence'. This involves *selecting issues to focus on carefully*, which in turn requires:

- An analysis of the overall *importance* of the issue to the elections sector: what contribution will it make to improving democratic governance?
- A rigorous assessment of *feasibility*: is it possible to achieve any significant influence in relation to the issue? This requires a rigorous stakeholder mapping exercise, examining the various interests that will affect the policy process, the sensitivity of the issues concerned, and the relationships (with influential stakeholders) that can be used to achieve influence.

If the due diligence is done up front, AusAID should then be able to retain its 'hands off' approach, focusing on empowering CSOs (as has been the case in the current program).

Use an appropriate range of strategies. This must involve ensuring that the advocacy approach is sophisticated and tailored to the context. Strategies will depend on, among other things, the nature of:

- The specific policy issues in question;
- The relationships and access that reform advocates have at their disposal;
- The specific characteristics of the policy process (eg who is drafting the legislation);
- The political context and the interests of different stakeholders; and
- The consultation process being used to develop the legislation.

In particular, several stakeholders indicated that it is important to have a clear understanding of the information needs of decision makers, and 'package' policy proposals in a format that is useful to them. For example, lengthy academic texts are not likely to be effective. (Importantly, this point was highlighted by party staff.)

Commit to the long term. As discussed, the advocacy process requires long term engagement. This also recognises building the relationships requires a long term effort.

Even though the current round of legislative amendments is expected to be concluded in the coming months, it can safely be assumed that the process of revising elections legislation will continue after the next elections. Thus, it will be important to use the period between the conclusion of the current round of amendments and the next election to anticipate the issues on which advocacy will be required, and begin (or maintain) the relationship building and dialogue processes so that the Program and its stakeholders are well positioned to advocate effectively when the formal processes begin.

Recommendation 1: *The Program[8] should consider a more active involvement in selecting what issues ensure an effective balance between supporting a robust policy process, and contributing to specific reform objectives. Resources should then be committed for the long term.*

Outcome 2 – Support to Elections Management Bodies

Interim Program Achievements
It is methodologically difficult to assess "strengthened capacity": no baseline information was available, and there was no formal definition of specific "capacities". Accordingly, the following observations are general in nature.

Unfortunately, while KPU staff (both Commissioners and senior Secretariat staff) commented on the usefulness and importance of a number of initiatives under the Program, they were unable to identify any specific capacity improvements during the last year (or indeed, over the last two or three years).

Notwithstanding this, there was some good progress achieved. The following discussion highlights some of the key activities.

First, *BRIDGE training* for KPU staff received consistent feedback from a wide range of stakeholders – both within and outside KPU. This training program is viewed extremely positively. However, no information was available on the specific results of the training in terms of improved knowledge or practice. It is understood that BRIDGE includes an evaluation methodology – it will be important to use this to ensure that the benefits of the training are properly captured.

Second, the AEC facilitated a series of *Communication Connection Classes*. Currently, there are seven sessions per week, attended by around 85 staff (see details on page 1 of Annex 2). Feedback from KPU indicates that these classes are extremely popular.

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[8] In the context of all recommendations, "The Program" refers to the forthcoming Australia Indonesia Electoral Support Program (2011-2015).

On the face of it, there is little reason to think that English training should be a priority for KPU. KPU stated that English skills enable staff to access international literature on elections. However, translating relevant literature into Bahasa would be a more effective and efficient approach.

The AEC indicated that benefits include the improvement of communication between (English-speaking) AEC staff and KPU staff, and ensuring that KPU staff who will be undertaking overseas work placements have the required language skills.

The most significant benefit of the sessions from the AEC's perspective is that they provide an alternative forum in which elections issues can be discussed. The less formal environment makes it easier to bring up difficult issues, and to involve a wide range of staff in those discussions.

The review team agrees that there is merit in this argument; the provision of such discussion forums can be a useful way to share learning, promote discussion, and build organisational culture.

However, as long as the sessions are 'packaged' as language classes, their real value is hard to assess. None of the potential benefits listed above have been captured in a structured way. Given the profile of the sessions, and the amount of staff time they consume[9], it will be important to correct this. As long as this is done, and the costs remain minimal, there is no reason that the sessions should not continue.

Recommendation 2: *The AEC should work with KPU to 'rebrand' the Communication Classes to strengthen the focus on substantive elections issues, and develop a simple framework for assessing the contribution they make to the development of KPU.*

Implementing this recommendation *may not necessarily* involve any substantive change to the classes themselves. However, only when there is a better framework in place for analysing their usefulness will this become clear. (The challenge associated with capturing information about intangible benefits such as those of the communications classes is discussed further in the section on *M&E for the Future Program*.)

Third, both the AEC and UNDP undertook significant work to improve internal and external *communication* at KPU. Stakeholders agree[10] that communication is a major issue for KPU. It is a large, complex, geographically distributed organisation. Communication is critical to ensure effective and consistent operations, to maximise coordination, and to ensure that the public is properly informed.

The AEC's work focused on the iPortal – an intranet portal designed to facilitate internal information exchange. Feedback from both AEC and KPU indicates that

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[9] As outlined in Annex 2, the sessions consume around 95 person hours per week (in terms of participants). This is, in the view of the review team, a significant amount of time for a resource-constrained organisation. In addition, a KPU officer (seconded to AEC) works full time on coordinating the courses, with oversight from AEC staff.

[10] UNDP, AEC, IFES (the three organisations who worked with KPU during the interim program) all made this point.

while progress was achieved in designing the system, there is not yet adequate buy in or technical capacity for KPU to take the system forward.

UNDP worked on the Electoral Resource Information Centre (ERIC). Similar to the AEC, UNDP report that this work is not yet adequately established within KPU and that additional support will be required to take properly operationalise the centre.

Achieving management reform at KPU is clearly a difficult task, as these initiatives attest. Given the importance of communication, it will be necessary for this work to continue, with a focus on ensuring that:

- All work on communications (especially where information systems are involved) is properly integrated and sits clearly within an overall communications strategy.
- The work maintains an appropriate pace in the context of KPU ownership and capacity. This will clearly main that more time must be allocated than was originally expected.

Recommendation 3: *Before funding any further work related to communications systems in KPU, the Program should take stock of current initiatives and ensure that future activities are properly integrated, and properly matched to KPU's needs and capacity.*

Fourth, IFES and UNDP facilitated a workshop on *strategic planning* at KPU. This appears to be an area where KPU staff have had little exposure. Feedback about the workshop from KPU staff was positive.[11] However, this was just an introduction – the process of developing a robust planning framework and embedding these practices into an organisation tends to require a long term effort.

Even though this was a relatively small activity in the context of the whole program, it is mentioned here as it is potentially an area where significant future support could be provided. This is discussed further in the following sections.

Outcome 3 – Support to Local Elections

Interim Program Achievements
This outcome was arguably the one with the most tangible outcomes. Two in particular stand out.

First, the AEC worked with KPU to produce *manuals* for the 2010 local elections. Stakeholders agree that manuals are essential for the proper, consistent management of elections at polling booths. Without them, elections officials would have to rely on legislation, which is not drafted for the purposes of operational support, and is open to differing interpretations.

112,500 manuals were distributed across 118 electorates; AEC report that additional manuals were downloaded and printed at other destinations (at KPUD's own initiative). This suggests strong demand.

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[11] It was mentioned by the Commissioners as a significant event, without the issue being raised by the review team.

The AEC conducted observation missions to thirteen locations to which the manuals were distributed; they reported that the manuals were in use and that none of those locations reported any anomalies. Unfortunately there is no formal comparative analysis available to show performance at locations *without* the manuals, which means that it is not possible to clearly state what difference the manuals made.

However, on balance, it can be concluded that the manuals met an area of clear demand, that they were developed through an effective and consultative process, and that they appear to have contributed to performance.

At the same time, the experience points to some challenges:

- First, the sheer scale of Indonesia presented difficulties. AEC was not able to distribute manuals to all locations where elections were underway. Where it can be shown that a product or initiative is successful, it will be important to ensure that it can be rolled out nationally.
- Second, developing the manuals will be an ongoing exercise; each time relevant legislation is modified, the manuals need to be updated and redistributed. This has the potential to become costly and time-consuming. Ultimately this problem can only be resolved through the stabilisation of the legislative regime. However, at the same time, the process of revising the manuals must continue to involve an explicit capacity development so that KPU does not remain reliant on external support to perform this function.

Recommendation 4: *Where any initiatives (AEC or otherwise) have operational application, the Program should make every effort to roll out implementation nationwide.*

The second tangible outcome related to the improvement to voters lists. IFES worked with KPUDs to improve the quality of voters lists in 24 locations (kabupaten / kota). This involved the use of IFES's application, DP Tools, which is a software package designed to identify errors and duplications in voter lists. IFES reports that across these locations, approximately 9.4% of voter list entries were identified as incorrect, and removed. The approach involved the provision of DP Tools training, and support in applying the software.

As IFES itself has indicated, DP Tools is a stop-gap measure to help improve the quality of voters lists in the absence of a more robust voters list system. [12] Stakeholders agree that the long term solution will be much more complex, and will require a significant advance on GOI's current approach to the voter list.

Other activity under Outcome 3 involved a range of research and analytical work (as shown at Annex 2), including in relation to improving access to voting for those with a disability. However, as with the activities under Outcome 1, while the research has generated some useful debate amongst stakeholders (including policy makers), it is too early to report on significant outcomes in terms of policy reform and implementation.

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[12] The system addresses duplications and errors in voters list (thus limiting opportunity for fraud), but does not address gaps. This would require a much broader approach.

In summary, the results under this outcome were more tangible than those under other program outcomes due to the operational nature of the work. However, the challenge of sustainability remains. Sustainability, in this context, would be the product of capacity. While a capacity assessment was beyond the scope of this review, it is unlikely that capacity is adequate to take the reforms forward independently. In addition, manuals will need to be rewritten following the completion of the current round of legislative amendments, and this is expected to require significant additional support.

The drive for sustainability resides primarily under Outcome 2, and as noted – a long term effort is still required.

Lessons for the Long Term Program

Drawing together the experience under Outcomes 2 and 3, it is important to identify any lessons about future support to KPU.

All stakeholders agreed that a strong KPU is an essential ingredient for a robust and transparent electoral system. However, there was some discussion about the extent to which an external program could meaningfully influence KPU's effectiveness.

Specifically, the concern was raised about whether the context is too political to justify any significant investment in KPU's capacity – at least until the political environment is both more stable and more conducive to a strong, independent KPU. Of particular concern is the possibility that KPU may not be fully independent as a result of possible new legislation that may allow Commissioners to be appointed who are serving members of political parties.

There is merit in these concerns, and the political factors impacting an organisation must always be properly understood.

However, the review team considers that support to KPU should remain a priority. There are many fundamental organisational, management, and operational issues that it must address – regardless of the political environment. Making KPU more robust and internally coherent should also serve to make the organisation more resilient in the face of adverse political circumstances.

Also, it would be a waste to wait for the legislation to provide for a strong KPU before providing assistance. First, the legislation may never be 'ideal'. Second, a good regulatory framework must be accompanied by an effective institution if it is to achieve its objectives, and strengthening KPU will require time.

Further, many of the management fundamentals at KPU that need to be strengthened, regardless of the content of the regulatory framework: basic human resource management (including recruitment), strategic planning, internal communication and control, and operating procedures and policies. A long term, systematic and proactive approach is required to address these issues.

One important reason to maintain closely engaged in KPU is the fact that it is gradually taking control of its own recruitment. Whereas in the past KPU has been allocated staff from agencies on a temporary basis, an increasing percentage of staff are now being directly recruited, and KPU indicates that these staff are likely to have

long term careers at the organisation. There is value in investing in these staff – to give them exposure to different ways of working, develop their skills and awareness, and foster a general appreciation for the principles of democratic governance whose responsibility it is KPU's to uphold.

In summary, KPU faces many fundamental challenges. Unfortunately, it is not in a strong position to clearly articulate what support it requires.[13] While it is clearly very grateful for the support it receives from AusAID and the AEC (with a particular focus on the English classes and Australian work placements), the review team considers that a significantly more strategic and proactive approach is required.

Given the scope of development challenges at KPU, it would be useful for KPU to have an organisational development strategy.[14] Without a strategy, there is no basis for determining priorities, no way of integrating individual initiatives into a coherent whole, and no means of monitoring capacity development or performance progress. An organisational development strategy provides the basis for a specific, shared vision of what progress should look like. It would also provide KPU with a tool to better coordinate donor support.

There is also significant value in the *process* of developing such a strategy. The process, if well managed, can build buy-in to key areas of reform, develop commitment to allocating the resources required, and can be used to identify champions.

Recommendation 5: *The Program, including AEC, should work with KPU to investigate the possibility of assisting KPU to develop an organisational development strategy that focuses on strengthening the organisation's management fundamentals.*

Timing will be an important consideration here, particularly in regard to the appointment of new Commissioners in 2012; it is possible that the new Commissioners would view such a strategy as a useful tool for them.

Finally, there are two *operational issues* that require brief discussion. Stakeholders agree that the voter registry and vote counting system are critical concerns in the lead up to the 2014 election.[15] While there is some sensitivity about donor involvement in these areas, there appears to be little reason why externally-funded programs cannot provide support to the *systems* that underpin the voter register and vote counting system – politically sensitive though they may be. (During the interim program, IFES did just that.)

Recommendation 6: *The Program should look actively for opportunities to provide support to strengthening systems for the voters register and vote counting.*

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[13] When questioned about support requirements, discussion focused on overseas study trips, and donor-funded training. There was no evidence of a genuine organisational development strategy.

[14] While KPU reported that they already had such a plan, further questioning suggested that this was a list of training programs for donor support.

[15] KPU acknowledge the critical nature of the voter register in particular.

The Future Role of AEC

Given the centrality of the AEC to Australia's future support to KPU, it is appropriate to consider their role in a little more detail.

The AEC has been working with KPU for approximately ten years. Both KPU and AEC indicate that the two organisations have developed a strong relationship, which has two notable characteristics:

- It is a *peer-to-peer* relationship, which offers a shared perspective, values and priorities that in turn provide a solid basis for communication and mutual understanding. Such relationships can be very useful in long term reform.
- AEC have consistently emphasised the importance of KPU ownership and trust. AEC staff in Canberra indicated that they wanted KPU to play the driving role in requesting assistance to ensure that they have the required level of ownership. Further, they want to make sure that KPU feels that it is able to confide in the AEC when it faces difficult challenges, with the confidence that the AEC will provide support.

Both of these factors are important, particularly given the challenging environment in which KPU operates. The AEC's approach appears to have provided a level of access that other stakeholders do not have, and are unlikely to be able to replicate.

The AEC also brings an operational understanding of elections management that other stakeholders in the sector cannot bring. These are all significant positives. Drawing on all of these benefits, the AEC has made some important contributions to KPU, as highlighted in the previous section.

It is likely that AEC is in a good position to continue to add value to KPU, and to be the centrepiece of Australian assistance to KPU. However, a slight change in approach may be of value, as outlined below.

The previous section suggested the need for a more robust approach to working with KPU. This implies the need for a more proactive approach from the AEC.

While KPU ownership will always be essential for the success of reform and organisational development initiatives, that does not mean that KPU should remain within its comfort zone in terms of the support it receives.

Indonesia's national elections in 2014 will be a significant challenge and it is essential that Australian support is proactive in helping Indonesia to address these challenges. The implications for Indonesia of a poorly administered election could be extremely serious. It is therefore critical that the investment that has been made in the relationship between KPU and AEC is used to have difficult conversations about meeting the challenges of reform.

The review team believes that it will be necessary for the AEC to play a more proactive role in identifying areas of necessary reform or development, and using its good relationship with KPU to develop senior buy-in to appropriate responses. The AEC may then either provide technical support where appropriate, or facilitate the entry of other organisations to provide support.

Although the AEC is the centrepiece of Australian support to KPU under the new program, it is not necessarily the *only* way support can be delivered. Indeed, other organisations (such as IFES) can bring in experience from other middle income countries, or offer other forms of specialist expertise (such as organisational development, which is not a core function of the AEC). Other organisations can also afford to be less sensitive to political considerations.

AEC has frequently emphasised the importance of maintaining rapport with KPU. However, as important as it is, rapport is not an objective in itself. The AEC should use that rapport to play a more proactive role. This can be done without compromising the quality of the relationship. Indeed, it is the strength of the relationship that should allow it to happen.

Recommendation 7: The AEC should play a more proactive role in working with KPU to identify critical areas for reform or development, and either respond to them directly, or facilitate the entry of other organisations to deliver an appropriate response.[16]

Outcome 4 – Gender

Interim Program Achievements
A variety of work was undertaken under this outcome; however most of it remains at a fairly early stage. As the information box shows, this work was mostly focused on research and analysis. Interestingly, the work targeted change through a number of different avenues: the regulatory framework, political parties, voters, and electoral management bodies.

On the face of it, this appears to be a useful approach. However, as with other outcomes, the review team was not able to review the technical quality of individual pieces of work, so it is difficult to draw conclusions about likely effectiveness over the longer term.

There were, however, some positive indications about the usefulness of the work. The analysis undertaken by Puskapol on the 2009 elections is being used by the State Minister for Women's Empowerment to lobby for regulatory change, and is also being discussed in women's caucus in DPR. Political parties have apparently engaged in discussion about the potential usefulness of the career pathing approaches for women.

> **Gender Activities**
>
> - Report on lessons on participation of women candidates in selected 2010 local elections (Kemitraan);
> - Strategic modelling program to develop career paths in political parties (Kemitraan);
> - Analysis of 2009 elections data regarding women candidates and parliamentarians (TAF);
> - Analysis of gender issues in legislation and national survey (IFES);
> - Public service announcements encouraging women to vote (IFES).

As noted in the discussion on relevance (page 3), the expectation that specific improvements to improve gender equity in the electoral process was not realistic. Unsurprisingly, no such outcomes were reported.

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[16] The implementation of Recommendation 5 would be a useful way to start this; however Recommendation 7 refers to AEC's *overall* approach to working with KPU, not just the development of a strategy.

Lessons for the Long Term

The basic lesson for the longer term is the same as for Outcome 1 – advocacy requires a sophisticated range of strategies and sustained engagement.

Outcome 5 – Strengthening Civil Society Organisations

Interim Program Achievements

As with Outcome 2, the following discussion is necessarily pitched at a general level given the lack of baseline information and the lack of a capacity assessment framework.

In discussions with sub-partners, none specifically identified any fundamental capacity improvements. However, *all* acknowledged the value of the support they received from their respective partners. Feedback suggests that significant support was required to enable to CSOs to meet grant administration requirements. To the best of the team's knowledge, the required standards for financial management were met. Thus, it can be tentatively concluded that partners helped CSOs to meet the requirements of administration under the Program.

Partners also provided a range of assistance on more substantive matters, such as research methodology and advocacy strategies. Again, it is not possible to comment on whether this resulted in any fundamental capacity improvement.

However, by funding the participation of a range of CSOs in the policy process, the Program has enabled CSOs to increase their exposure to and understanding of that process, to build their credibility with decision-makers and other stakeholders, and to learn from the experience of their respective partners. While not 'measurable' in any formal sense, these are useful outcomes.

It was broadly acknowledged that one of the shortcomings amongst CSOs was to do with a lack of collaboration – this view was consistent amongst all Program stakeholders, including CSOs themselves.

On balance, it appears likely that support helped CSOs in the short term (in terms of delivering their activities under the interim program), but it is less likely that significant progress in terms of fundamental capacity improvement. Addressing this kind of issue seriously requires a longer term effort.

Lessons for the Long Term

Stakeholders agree that CSOs will remain important in driving reform. It is also clear that CSOs will continue to require support. As noted above, one of the main challenges is the requirement for improved collaboration.

The complexity of the issues, and the inherent complexity of the stakeholder environment also mean that CSOs require increasingly sophisticated strategies for achieving influence. This is currently a significant challenge for CSOs, and one which will require careful consideration under the new Program.

In summary, two of the key challenges for this will be:

- To assist CSOs to adopt a sufficiently sophisticated range of strategies that take account of the political and technical complexity of the current reform environment; and
- To assist CSOs to collaborate more effectively (with each other and with state institutions) in order to send more consistent messages.

Recommendation 8: The Program (and the Delivery Partner in particular) should ensure that any capacity development for CSOs is sufficiently broad ranging in its scope, is properly resourced, and long term.

Delivery Arrangements

Australian Electoral Commission
In the context of Whole-of-Government aid delivery, it is useful to examine the specific arrangements through which agencies deliver support to determine whether there are any factors that have a particular influence over the nature and quality of support delivered.

Relationship with AusAID
The first point to examine is the nature of the relationship with AusAID. The AEC delivers its support to KPU under a funding arrangement formalised through a Record of Understanding with AusAID. All of AEC's in-country activities are funded by AusAID, although a number of backstopping functions are performed by AEC-funded staff in Canberra. The AEC also has a global strategic partnership agreement with AusAID which provides the overall framework for the AEC's international work.

The ROU provides for an accountability relationship with AusAID, given effect through the requirement for budget approvals and submission of a variety of reports. This appears to operate effectively, subject to the normal challenges associated with any program management relationship. In general, both the AEC and AusAID report that the relationship between the two organisations is effective.

However, an ROU does not typically provide the same basis for performance and accountability that a commercial contract would – nor can it be expected to.[17] It is therefore important to understand the internal management arrangements at AEC, and how they impact on the delivery of services.

Internal Management Arrangements
There are four key observations under this point. First, the AEC's international functions are mandated under the Electoral Act, ensuring senior accountability for and buy-in to international services.

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[17] The ROU for the interim program, based on a brief review, appears to be no exception. There are no specific performance standards or performance management arrangements; there is just a broad description of the AEC's areas of activity. Also worth noting is that ROUs are not strictly legally enforceable, and rely on considerable goodwill.

Second, the implementation of international activities by the AEC requires the approval of the Foreign Minister, which is also an important factor in ensuring appropriate accountability and the attention of senior staff.

Third, the relationship with KPU is clearly a priority for AEC. The peer-to-peer relationship is highly valued given the common interests, values, and priorities that the two organisations share as EMBs.

Fourth, the AEC has reputational risk invested in its international work. The AEC has a strong reputation internationally for its work – including for its BRIDGE training. This provides an incentive for maintaining high standards.

Thus, overall the management arrangements are conducive to effectiveness. However AEC and AusAID will need to continue to work together to ensure an alignment of strategic priorities, particularly in regard to how the relationship with KPU should be leveraged to push the reform agenda more vigorously. (See Recommendation 7.)

Partnership

The interim Program intended to test the effectiveness of the partnership model, which will be the central to forthcoming program. The specific meaning of 'partnership' in the context of the Program was – to the knowledge of the design team – not documented.

However, feedback from AusAID indicates that partnership was broadly meant to:

- Focus on learning – being willing to share strengths and weaknesses or successes and failures without the need to be defensive;
- A collaborative approach to implementation; and
- Respecting strengths and recognising the value of different approaches.

At the initial briefing for the review, it was agreed with AusAID that the team would focus its analysis on what characteristics of partnership emerged in practice, what role they played in the effectiveness of the Program, and what lessons have been learned for the new program. (This in contrast to an approach where a specific model or standard of partnership would be tested.)

Feedback was therefore sought from partners regarding 'partnership' without specifying what AusAID's expectations or intentions were. Themes emerged from discussion about three groups of relationships.

Relationships Between AusAID and Partners

Feedback was positive about this relationship; partners described an approach whereby AusAID provided them with the flexibility to approach tasks as they saw fit, and also provided the flexibility to adjust plans as circumstances changed. This element of trust is critical to an effective partnership.

Notwithstanding the above, most Partners indicated that they would have appreciated more engagement from AusAID (eg attendance at events, feedback on progress).

It seems that Partners were broadly able to share information effectively with AusAID, although reports tended to focus on the positive factors. Building the trust required to have robust discussions about difficult issues does take some time, however the experience of the interim Program was clearly a useful first step.

Thus, broadly, AusAID achieved its intention in its relationships with partners – certainly to the extent that could be reasonably be expected within the time available.

Relationships Between Partners and Sub-partners
Again, feedback was positive, with the characteristics of the relationship between AusAID and partners largely mirrored between partners and sub-partners.

Partners emphasised the importance of a collaborative approach in this respect, particularly given the important role that civil society organisations play in the sector. Sub-partners were positive about the support they received from partners, and the trust in their judgment (demonstrated in the flexibility that was allowed).

Relationships Amongst Partners
Partnership did not manifest itself as clearly in this area. Feedback indicated a lack of formal coordination amongst partners (and their respective sub-partners), and inconsistent levels of less formal cooperation (possibly based on the quality of personal relationships).

Some expected AusAID to play a more active role in facilitating interaction between partners. While feedback about the two monitoring workshops was positive, it was not generally considered that this was a sufficient basis for ongoing coordination. Indeed, the FMA9 for the interim Program indicated that there would be at least quarterly roundtable meetings for program coordination, and that these would likely increase to fortnightly meetings when legislation was being discussed in Parliament. This did not eventuate.

Overall, the review team considers that interactions between AusAID and the Program's partners; and between partners and sub-partners reflected some good collaboration, information sharing, and trust. However, there was little evidence or feedback provided that demonstrated the same characteristics between the partners.

Why partnership in the elections sector?

Building relationships with stakeholders is essential in order to contribute to and influence decision-making processes. Without solid relationships, it is impossible to have either the credibility or access required to influence reform.

Responsiveness. The sector is complex, dynamic, and sensitive. This therefore requires the ability to change strategies quickly, and take advantage of opportunities as they arise. A partnership approach that is based on long term objectives and strong relationships will be better positioned to deliver this responsiveness.

Local CSOs are key drivers of electoral reform. To maintain their own credibility, they must be allowed to chart their own strategic direction, rather than respond to the requirements of other organisations. A partnership approach provides for this.

Democratic reform must be *a domestic process*: it cannot be directed from outside. AusAID's approach must therefore be to support and facilitate; this is again consistent with a partnership approach.

Finally, partnership provides an effective basis for *risk management*. When organisations' mandates and objectives are aligned, they in effect share the same risks, which lessens the requirement for AusAID to take on too much risk for itself.

Partnership Under the New Program

The interim program's trialling of the partnership approach represents a good starting point for the longer term program. However, it will be important to take account of the following points.

First is the need to be specific about what partnership means so that expectations can be aligned between all parties involved in the Program. It will also allow the effectiveness and value of the partnership approach to be monitored in a more structured way.

Second, having made the definition clear, it will be important to ensure that specific management arrangements are set up to give effect to partnership, and that those arrangements are properly resourced. A partnership approach requires a very high standard of collaboration, and this will have resource implications.

Third, it will be essential that the new program invests in developing long term relationships. Clearly, this was not possible during the interim program. However, the establishment of long term relationships and long term funding agreements (in particular with sub-partners) will be a prerequisite for the kind of long term, strategic action that is critical to success in this sector. (This applies to the relationship with the AEC also.)

Recommendation 9: AusAID should work with Program stakeholders to ensure that the definition of partnership (and the management arrangements that will support it) are made explicit, and that adequate provision is made for developing long term relationships (including with sub-partners).

Monitoring and Evaluation

Design of M&E Framework

The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the Program identified five overarching outcomes to which activities were expected to contribute. It then provided a framework for reporting, outlined all stakeholders' responsibilities, and recommended the implementation of two workshops to review progress and share learning.

The M&E Framework did not provide detailed questions or indicators for either the individual outcomes or activities. While this provided partners with flexibility, it did not provide guidance on how to structure the qualitative analysis.

The nature of the issues was such that the type of analysis required was quite sophisticated. It may have been useful to provide a more detailed framework to provide guidance on possible tools for this analysis. However, it is recognised that this may have been difficult to achieve within the resources available.

Implementation of M&E Framework

Overall, the quality of analysis and reporting by partners was satisfactory. They provided descriptions of what was delivered, and provided informative discussion about outcomes. Partners indicated that the reporting requirements allowed adequate 'space' to discuss the qualitative issues to do with the progress of the

various activities. It did not have unnecessarily onerous compliance-focused or quantitative reporting requirements.

A significant positive was the participative approach to M&E – this was appreciated by all partners, and appears to have helped to foster the collaborative spirit within the Program.

However, as discussed above, many of the issues that affect progress in the elections sector are not easy to analyse. Analysing issues such as influencing legislation, contributing to the quality of debate, building ownership of organisational reform requires sophisticated methodology.

As a result, many reports – while they provided useful information – were not able to place their discussion of such issues within a rigorous analytical framework that provided a good understanding of the progress and context of activities.

The purpose of this argument is not to criticise either the framework design or implementation (both of which were acceptable in the context of the resources available and the timeframe of the Program). Rather, the point is to highlight the need for sophisticated approaches in the forthcoming program.

AusAID also delivered its stated responsibilities under the M&E Framework, including hosting the review workshops. AusAID conducted a relatively large number of monitoring visits during the Program, which appears to have provided a good understanding of the substance of the Program – something that was noticed by Partners. However, it is less clear whether it gave AusAID a sufficient understanding of the *adequacy of progress.* (See further discussion below.)

Gender Analysis

The TOR requested a comment to be made on the extent to which M&E captured the gender outcomes of the Program. The Program had a specific gender outcome, and this has been discussed under Outcome 4. (Because no substantive outcomes were achieved, little comment could be made.)

All partners – regardless of whether their activities included any 'specific' gender activities, reported on gender issues. For the most part, this reporting documented gender participation in the respective activities (eg attendance at Focus Group Discussions, participation in workshops etc). However, this was a fairly limited approach.

Recommendation 10: The Program should include provision for specialist gender analysis, so that subsequent reporting can be informed by a proper understanding of the issues, rather than a simple 'equal participation' focus.

Such analysis requires specialist expertise, so it will important to consider the most effective way of resourcing this for the Program as a whole – such as with a gender adviser. Experience from the interim Program suggests that there are areas of genuine need and opportunity in relation to gender issues that need to be properly understood.

M&E Lessons

Among other things, the Program demonstrated that there are a great many intangible outcomes that are essential prerequisites to the achievement of material and sustainable improvements to the management of elections in Indonesia. Discussing intangible results is often anecdotal, and is sometimes presented almost as an apology for not being able to show tangible results within a given period of time.

However, with good methodology, the significant value of the intangibles can be clearly demonstrated. Some of the intangible issues relevant to this program include: the quality of collaboration amongst CSOs; the level of trust and quality of dialogue and between CSOs and state institutions; the confidence and commitment of KPU staff to fulfil its mandate; the benefits that arise from the English language classes at the KPU; the level of public confidence in the electoral institutions; the respect of the parties and candidates for democratic process; the impact of political interests on elections legislation. The list could go on.

There will also be a requirement for robust methods of qualitative analysis, such institutional or capacity assessments, capturing the benefits of work placements, training (including BRIDGE) and so on.

Properly understanding these issues provides the basis for understanding the adequacy of progress, which is an essential part of effective M&E. It will be essential that M&E under the new program adopts a sophisticated approach that provides a robust structure for analysing these sorts of issues, and placing them clearly and logically within the context of the program's objectives.

Recommendation 11: The Program should include a sophisticated Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the forthcoming Program that provides adequate tools for qualitative analysis, and for promoting understanding of the many intangible factors that drive longer term outcomes.

Risk Management

The FMA9 identified the risk management strategy for the program. The analysis identified two risks.

The first was the risk associated with the political sensitivities of working in the elections sector. The risk management strategy focused on the selection and approval processes for partner activities, and AusAID remaining 'hands off' in relation the content of partners' work. These appeared to be appropriate strategies in structuring the Program.

However, there appears to have been no clear strategy for managing this risk *during implementation*. It would have been useful to have risk assessments tailored to each activity to provide for this, which would have in turn allowed the development of a more tailored monitoring strategy.

Interestingly, there were two occasions on which sub-partners approached the media without AusAID approval. A risk assessment undertaken with partners following the acceptance of their proposals may have anticipated this risk and alerted partners to AusAID's likely concern over media issues.

The second was the risk associated with overlapping or contradictory activities given that the Program was being implemented by five partners. The risk management strategy was to have at least quarterly roundtable meetings to coordinate, becoming more frequent as the program progressed. However, this did not eventuate.

The lack of collaboration was a weakness across the program, and so it is clear that a more effective strategy needs to be developed and implemented. This has been discussed under the *Partnership* heading above.

Overall, the approach to risk management could have been more robust. In particular, it would have been useful to have specific dialogue with Partners about risks and responses. More structured risk analysis would have informed AusAID's monitoring activity, ensuring the (significant) monitoring effort was correctly focused.

Having said that, the effective implementation of the partnership approach (particularly between AusAID and Program partners) was a useful risk management strategy as it provided a management environment in which concerns could be raised with the reasonable expectation of a collaborative response.

Recommendation 12*: The Program should adopt clear risk management processes that involve a participative approach amongst Program stakeholders.*

Conclusions and Value for Money

Overall Achievements

Overall, the Program's intended outcomes were appropriate – addressing issues that are genuine priorities in the sector. The overall strategies were appropriate, in particular the focus on working closely with and through civil society.

All have the potential for long term impact depending on what strategies are used, and over what time frame.

It is hard to assess the feasibility of the intended outcomes as they were not couched in specific terms, and there was no baseline information available. However, all stakeholders (including AusAID) appeared in practice to have reasonable expectations, and a good understanding of the challenges in the sector.

It is important to remember that this was an *interim* program. While the intended outcomes documented in the M&E Framework provided important strategic focus, they are not the *sole* outcomes of the Program. Importantly, interim programs also serve to position program stakeholders for the successor program.

With this in mind, the review team makes the following observations about the *overall* achievements of the Program.

First, the deliverables included in partners' proposals were essentially delivered on time and within budget. While there were minor delays and variations – many of which arising from the fact that the passage of legislation was significant delayed in DPR – the bulk of the Program was delivered as expected.

Second, a small number of *tangible* results were achieved – principally under Outcome 3. These related to the work on the voter register and the development and distribution of local elections manuals.

Third, a larger number of *intangible* results were achieved. Some of those are specific to the intended outcomes, and will provide a foundation for the new program to build on. These include:

- The development of debate on a range of issues relevant to the regulatory framework for elections; and
- The empowerment of CSOs to engage in useful policy debate; and
- The continued development of the relationship between KPU and the AEC, and the growth in dialogue on a range of elections issues.

Other intangible results related to the overall positioning of AusAID for the new program:

- AusAID has achieved effective engagement in the sector and established credibility as a valuable contributor. One of the key reasons for this credibility is that AusAID has been actively engaged several years prior to the next national elections (at a time when many other donors have disengaged);
- Learning key lessons, for example in relation to the timeframes for reform and the range of strategies required for advocacy;
- AusAID has helped to maintain the reform momentum, again at a time when the issues are not high on the public agenda. This will position AusAID well for solid progress as the elections draw nearer; and
- AusAID will also commence the new program on a more shallow learning curve than had the interim program not been implemented.

In short, the interim program has provided a confident starting point for the new program.

Value for Money?

Whether or not this constitutes 'value for money' is ultimately a matter for AusAID to decide. The role of this review is to clarify exactly what has been achieved so that AusAID can make that assessment reasonably.[18]

However, one question that does arise is whether the same outcomes could have been achieved at lesser cost? While in some ways this is a hypothetical question, two observations do present themselves.

Program Expenditure (approx)	
AEC	AUD 496,000
UNDP	AUD 1,400,000
IFES	AUD 815,000
TAF	AUD 869,000
Kemitraan	AUD 333,600

The UNDP activity was by far the highest proportion of expenditure. The work was a subset of the UNDP's broader multi-donor elections support program, which was coming to its conclusion. This work was possibly of lesser value in terms of positioning AusAID for the future program given that UNDP is unlikely to be involved.

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[18] In theory, other approaches might include some comparative assessment or cost benchmarking. However, this was beyond the scope of this review.

The trade-off should have been that the funding would have produced 'stand alone' results, particularly given the volume of expenditure, and the fact that the activities were the conclusion of a long term engagement. However, while a detailed review of deliverables was beyond the scope of the review, this appears not to have been the case – particularly in the work at KPU. (See Annex 2 for details.)

Second, as discussed above and as demonstrated in Annex 3, the list of issues on which advocacy was supported was very long. It is likely that for many of these issues, the scope for achieving any significant influence was limited. However, this would have been difficult to judge from the outset.

Nonetheless, it is likely that AusAID would have been able to spend less on the above two areas and still have achieved the same general outcomes.

Final Comments

Almost all of the program's activities have some potential to achieve long term impact. The question more to do with *how* the work should be taken forward. The two key messages for the long term are:

- Do clear analysis up front to ensure that there is sufficient overlap between what is *desirable* and what is *feasible*.
- Having determined where effort should be focused, commit to long term action with an appropriate range of strategies and relationships.

These two messages are themes throughout the recommendations.

Finally, there is a fundamental tension between focusing on the electoral cycle (and the next election) and longer term development. Many of the challenges in the sector require a long term focus, and these have been discussed at length. Too strong a short term or operational focus (Outcome 3 in the interim program) could detract from the longer term institutional issues that must be addressed (Outcomes 1 and 2 in the interim program).

However, if the 2014 elections are not well managed, the implications could result in not only a setback for elections reform, but in fundamental setbacks to the consolidation of democracy.

Clearly a sensible balance must be struck. This balance should be explicit; understanding how the program is balanced must be a deliberate consideration in the work planning process, and these decisions must be made with a good understanding of developments in the sector as a whole.

Recommendation 13*: The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the forthcoming Program should include an approach to monitoring developments in the elections sector that allows decisions to be made about the appropriate balance between short term operational objectives, and long term development objectives.*

A summary of recommendations is provided overleaf. Priority recommendations are highlighted.

Summary of Recommendations for New Program

> **Recommendation 1:** *The Program should consider a more active involvement in selecting what issues ensure an effective balance between supporting a robust policy process, and contributing to specific reform objectives. Resources should then be committed for the long term.*

Recommendation 2: *The AEC should work with KPU to 'rebrand' the Communication Classes to strengthen the focus on substantive elections issues, and develop a simple framework for assessing the contribution they make to the development of KPU.*

Recommendation 3: *Before funding any further work related to communications systems in KPU, the Program should take stock of current initiatives and ensure that future activities are properly integrated, and properly matched to KPU's needs and capacity.*

Recommendation 4: *Where any initiatives (AEC or otherwise) have operational application, the Program should make every effort to roll out implementation nationwide.*

> **Recommendation 5:** *The Program, including AEC, should work with KPU to investigate the possibility of assisting KPU to develop an organisational development strategy that focuses on strengthening the organisation's management fundamentals.*

Recommendation 6: *The Program should look actively for opportunities to provide support to strengthening systems for the voters register and vote counting.*

> **Recommendation 7**: *The AEC should play a more proactive role in working with KPU to identify critical areas for reform or development, and either respond to them directly, or facilitate the entry of other organisations to deliver an appropriate response.*

Recommendation 8: *The Program (and the Delivery Partner in particular) should ensure that any capacity development for CSOs is sufficiently broad ranging in its scope, is properly resourced, and long term.*

Recommendation 9: *AusAID should work with Program stakeholders to ensure that the definition of partnership (and the management arrangements that will support it) are made explicit, and that adequate provision is made for developing long term relationships (including with sub-partners).*

Recommendation 10: *The Program should include provision for specialist gender analysis, so that subsequent reporting can be informed by a proper understanding of the issues, rather than a simple 'equal participation' focus.*

> **Recommendation 11:** *The Program should include a sophisticated Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the forthcoming Program that provides adequate tools for qualitative analysis, and for promoting understanding of the many intangible factors that drive longer term outcomes.*

Recommendation 12: *The Program should adopt clear risk management processes that involve a participative approach amongst Program stakeholders.*

Recommendation 13: *The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the forthcoming Program should include an approach to monitoring developments in the elections sector that allows decisions to be made about the appropriate balance between short term operational objectives, and long term development objectives.*

Annex 1 – Persons Consulted

Government of Indonesia

Prof. Dr. H. A. Hafiz Anshary AZ, M.A	Elections Commission Chairman
Bambang Eka Cahya Widodo, S.IP, M.Si	Bawaslu Chairman
Endang Sulastri	Elections Commissioner
Farida Fauzia	Head of Human Resource Bureau, KPU
Makmur Marbun	Ministry of Home Affairs
Ujang	KPU staff on secondment to AEC Jakarta
Kartika	KPU staff on secondment to AEC Jakarta
Rd. Siliwanti	Director for Communication and Politics, Bappenas
Otho Hadi	Bureau for Communication and Politics, Bappenas

Program Partners

Muhammad Husain	UNDP Program Manager
Mareska Mantik	UNDP Project Officer (former)
Setio Soemeri	Kemitraan
Utama Sandjaja	Kemitraan
Peter Erben	IFES
Admira Salim	IFES
Hana Satriyo	The Asia Foundation
Natalia Warat	The Asia Foundation

Australian Electoral Commission

Bronwen Shelley	Director International Services, AEC
Chris Morris	Assistant Director International Services, AEC
Michael Maley	Special Adviser, Electoral Reform and International Services, AEC
Patrick Satie	Australian Electoral Commission, Jakarta
Yudhi Yuniarsyah	Australian Electoral Commission, Jakarta
Erika	Australian Electoral Commission, Jakarta

Program Sub-partners

Titi Anggraini	Perludem
Hadar Gumay	CETRO
Dra Ariani	PPUA Penca
Ketut Erawan	Institute for Peace and Democracy

Gunadjar	Yayasan Manikaya Kauci
Sulastio	Indonesian Parliamentary Center
Yulianto	KRHN
Sri Budi Eko Wardhani	Puskapol
Yuna Farhan	FITRA
Daniel Zuchron	JPPR

Parliamentary Staff

Nuruzzaman Amin	DPR Expert Staff (PKB)
Aderia	DPR Expert Staff (Demokrat)
Fibrant Negarakertagama	DPR Expert Staff (PKS)
Sekar	DPR Expert Staff (Golkar)

AusAID

Victoria Coakley	Democratic Governance Unit, AusAID
Elizabeth St George	Democratic Governance Unit, AusAID
Doddy Kusadrianto	Democratic Governance Unit, AusAID
Ade Ganie	Democratic Governance Unit, AusAID
Rebecca McLaren	Performance and Quality Unit, AusAID
Diastika	Knowledge Sector, AusAID
Iwan Sriwidiyanto	Economic Governance, AusAID
Anna Dyason	Economic Governance, AusAID

Other Consultations

Diman Simanjuntak	USAID
Jonathan Muir	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Carolyn Langley	Commonwealth Ombudsman's Office

Annex 2 – Program Delivery Summary

Australian Electoral Commission

Outcome 2 – Strengthened capacity of KPU and / or Bawaslu	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved[19]*
- Australian Federal Election observation and study mission - Developed KPU intranet – information support services. Developed system and provided training to support - Delivery of Communication Connection Classes (CCC)	- Relationship building between KPU and AEC is universally acknowledged as being strong. KPU highly values the relationship, the communication classes, and opportunity for work placements. - Communication classes provide a good alternative forum for raising a variety of elections issues. - KPU intranet – system was broadly designed but implementation is stalled.
Observations[20]	
- Overall, program delivery aligned with expectations – minor variations and delays but no material variations. - CCC classes were originally an initiative of the KPU, and AEC have scaled it up at KPU's request. This initiative is extremely popular with KPU staff. There are currently 7 sessions per week: Twice-weekly Basic English for junior and mid level staff; once-weekly Intermediate English for junior and mid level staff; Twice weekly session for senior staff (including Commissioners); and twice weekly sessions for staff who will be travelling to Australia for a work placement. Approximately 85 staff are registered for the sessions. - The courses are inexpensive but consume a large amount of staff (both AEC and KPU). It will be important that better information about their usefulness is gathered; currently, discussion of benefits is somewhat anecdotal. - The work on the KPU intranet portal (KISS) was not completed. Internal communications is a major issue at KPU and this work is quite appropriate. However, while initial feedback on the system has been collected, it is not in a position at this stage to move forward into implementation, and certainly not without further external support. Senior KPU staff were not able to comment on the portal's status. - AEC's overall approach emphasises the importance of ownership by KPU, and strong emphasis is placed on the value of the peer-to-peer relationship. This relationship is important to both organisations as an objective in itself. There is value in such relationships; the shared perspective, purpose and culture afforded by a specialist peer relationship provides an excellent starting point for information exchange	

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[19] This heading refers to achievements relevant to the intended outcome. The information is drawn from Partner reports on the review team's interviews.

[20] Observations comment on the quality of evidence available to support the outcome, and elaborate on any issues relevant to understanding the outcomes.

and shared learning. However, it is important to harness the benefits of that relationship by taking a strategic and proactive approach to supporting KPU. This is discussed further in the narrative.	

- The placement of KPU staff in both the AEC Jakarta office and the Canberra office is a popular initiative. Demonstrating what can be achieved by a well-established EMB has the potential to be a motivating factor, and provide specific direction on reform initiatives. However, it is important that the benefits of these placements be properly captured, and – in particular – that KPU has explicit strategies in place for realising the benefits of such placements, which represent a significant investment. This is discussed in the narrative.
- No baseline information to enable a rigorous discussion of capacity improvements. Staff were largely unable to specify specific capacity improvements over the last 12-18 month period.

Outcome 3 – Improved systems and processes for local elections

What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
- Production of local elections manuals, and distribution to selected locations (112,500 across 118 electorates). - Observation of local elections and use of manuals.	- Manuals were used during targeted local elections (see top page 3 of AEC CR). AEC reports indicate that there were no reported irregularities in voting in areas using the KPPS manuals. - Feedback from range of other stakeholders confirm usefulness of manuals.

Questions / Observations

- Both the AEC and KPU viewed the manuals as a significant achievement. Kemitraan and IFES also commented positively on their value. Without manuals, officials would have to rely on legislation, which is not drafted for the purposes of providing operational guidance. The manuals provide the basis for consistency of legislative interpretation. The process of developing the manuals was a collaborative one, and also involved technical input from CSOs (engaged as writers). KPU have since been printing and distributing the manuals themselves.
- The review team attempted to determine the extent to which the manuals had been integrated into the broader body of procedural guidance at KPU, as well as integrated into training and other human resource development materials. However, KPU's overall management frameworks (ie, not specifically related to the manuals) appear still to be fairly nascent. Developing a fuller body of guidance and an integrated management approach to ensuring consistency and effectiveness of procedures will be a long term effort. (KPU reported that the manuals *were* incorporated into KPU's standard training, however this could not be verified.)
- Evidence about their usefulness is somewhat anecdotal by formal evaluation standards. (While the AEC did collect data about their use, there was no formal comparative analysis of the performance of polling locations that did *not* use the manuals). However, on the balance of feedback received, it can reasonably be concluded that the development and implementation of the standards was significant.
- The observation of local elections in an important factor in helping AEC to develop a sound understanding of operational challenges.

Kemitraan

Outcome 1 – the process of amending elections laws demonstrates inclusion of a broader base of evidence from technical experts and interest groups	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ Public consultation reports on the multi-stakeholder inputs for the revision of Law 22 on EMBs – ran 5 public consultations, and consolidated feedback to make recommendations on Law 22. ▪ CSO monitoring on the deliberation of revised Law 22 – used a network of CSOs to monitor proceedings and consultations, identify issues and formulate responses. ▪ Formulated policy briefs on the draft revisions (Law 22) for Komisi II. Six briefs developed.	▪ Allowed a more inclusive process for revising Law 22 – better input for CSOs, and monitoring allowed more active engagement. ▪ Strong engagement with DPR, including through meeting with faction leaders. ▪ 4 of 6 policy briefs were accepted by DPR for inclusion in the Law (see below).
Observations	
▪ None of the legislation is finalised, so not possible to draw final conclusions about the process, or the influence of Program stakeholders. ▪ Komisi II incorporated recommendations of four briefs on: the nomination process, criteria for Commissioners, structure for KPU, recruitment of Secretariat staff by KPU. However, it appears that these recommendations were largely non-controversial. Briefs on independence of Commissioners and state-sponsored supervision were not accepted. It was not possible within the terms of this review to conduct more thorough analysis on the influence of the briefs (including whether the same, or similar outcomes would have been achieved without Program support). ▪ Collectively, this Program used a range of strategies to understand and influence the process, including a specific process for monitoring deliberations. ▪ Kemitraan indicated in discussions that individual relationships played a key role in ensuring access to key staff. ▪ It was expected that the Law would be passed in December 2010. However, political deadlock meant that did not happen. Advocacy therefore continued beyond the initial period.	
Outcome 4 – Gender equity outcomes in the electoral process.	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ Report on lessons on participation and nomination of women candidates in selected regions (during 2010). ▪ Development of strategic modelling program to increase	▪ Initial stages of debate only, although development of career modelling for women in politics has involved initial discussion with political parties and women's groups.

women's representation in office.	

Observations
▪ The cadre development model provides a strategy for career development for women in politics. Its target audience is principally political parties, and the model is tailored to meet the particular political needs of parties. For example, it focuses on the political benefits of viewing women not only as 'voters' but as potential candidates of significant value. ▪ This work is in the early stages of development, but represents a useful angle on promoting the participation of women in politics by taking an approach that focuses on potential political, rather than regulatory requirements (which of course still have their place).

Outcome 5 – Capacity building or empowerment of local CSOs.	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ Development of CSO networking model (as described under Outcome 1 above) ▪ Implementation support to subpartners.	▪ Civil society gained experience and lessons learned from participation in the process.

Observations
▪ Subpartners indicated that collaboration with Kemitraan was good (although length of engagements was fairly brief). ▪ Slow approval of proposals slowed down the advocacy process. ▪ General feedback from Kemitraan (supported by some other subpartners) that general coordination amongst CSOs is weak. ▪ No baseline information to enable a rigorous discussion of capacity improvements.

The Asia Foundation

Outcome 1 – the process of amending elections laws demonstrates inclusion of a broader base of evidence from technical experts and interest groups	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ Analysis and recommendations on financing for KPUDs. (FITRA) ▪ Assessment of electoral process to provide lessons learned (JPPR) – elections observation in ten districts. Produced observation report and disseminated findings to KPUDs. ▪ Gender analysis (below) also had policy implications relevant to Law 2 on political parties. (Puskapol)	▪ Elections funding recommendations were presented to MOHA in Feb. Further follow up invited. FITRA's recommendations have been accommodated in current draft of Law 32. Discussion between FITRA and MOHA apparently confirmed that analysis undertaken by both organisations produced similar conclusions. ▪ JPPR's findings were "noted" by MOHA, which is preparing the relevant legislative amendments. ▪ Puskapol's research and recommendations featured prominently in discussions on Law 2, although not included in final draft. However, research is apparently being used by women's caucus in DPR to continue to advocate for gender equity issues.
Observations	
▪ It appears that the availability of robust research was useful to decision-makers. ▪ Puskapol's recommendations on gender issues (Law 2 – political parties) were ultimately not included in the final draft prepared by Komisi II. They were retained at the end of the final public consultation session, however were removed in subsequent drafting.	
Outcome 4 – Gender equity outcomes in the electoral process.	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ Detailed analysis of 2009 elections data regarding women candidates and parliamentarians, with recommendations on how to improve gender equity. Findings & recommendations presented to government in Dec 2010. (Puskapol)	▪ Robust research now available to demonstrate the effectiveness of affirmative action policies such as zipper system and quotas in affecting electoral performance for women candidates. ▪ Research being used by State Minister for Women's Empowerment.
Observations	
▪ Extension period allowed an additional national seminar that involved 130 participants.	
Outcome 5 – Capacity building or empowerment of local CSOs.	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ Provided technical and management support to 3 CSOs in	▪ JPPR and FITRA presented their analysis to MOHA together, which

implementing activities above, including research methodology and writing / presentation.	assisted with showing a 'united front'.

Observations
■ Feedback from TAF sub-partners positive about support received – helped to strengthen both technical and management capacity. Also reported that TAF encouraged collaborative engagement between CSOs and state institutions (ie MOHA). ■ TAF indicate that significant support required for NGOs with strengthening methodology, and ensuring that analysis is pitched correctly – not simply as an interesting policy discussion, but as more targeted advocacy. Developing CSOs will be a long term task. ■ No baseline information to enable a rigorous discussion of capacity improvements.

IFES

Outcome 1 – the process of amending elections laws demonstrates inclusion of a broader base of evidence from technical experts and interest groups	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*

▪ Review and analysis of electoral legal framework:
   o Analysis of law 32 and facilitation of public consultations by MOHA (Perludem);
   o Analysis of laws 10, 42 (Cetro)
▪ National survey on election system features
	▪ Law 32: Effective collaboration between Perludem and MOHA: MOHA requested Perludem to provide draft recommendations and assistance with drafting for law on local executive elections, as well as assistance with facilitating public consultations. Some of these included in current draft of amendment. "Rich debate".
	▪ Law 10 & 42: Cetro used findings in meetings with DPR faction leaders and Komisi II meetings, focusing on election systems (MMP) and electoral justice system.
	▪ KPU used the survey findings in discussions with President's Office regarding independence of KPU.

Observations	
▪ None of the legislation is finalised, so not possible to draw final conclusions about the process, or the influence of Program stakeholders. ▪ Positive feedback from MOHA regarding role of IFES and Perludem in helping to facilitate the consultation process, as well as on substance technical inputs provided. ▪ There was a difference of view between IFES and Cetro regarding whether or not the overall design of the electoral system should be included in analysis and discussions. While IFES preferred that this not be a focus of discussion, it did not intervene to prevent such work given that the objective of the Program was to ensure an inclusive process, rather than to pursue a specific policy reform objective. ▪ Survey findings addressed some particularly interesting issues: favourable perception of KPU, people agreed with statements about the danger of political influence on KPU and believe that the election results reflect the vote. These are positive things to build on, particularly in relation to working with KPU. ▪ No specific claims made regarding actual contribution to the current drafts of amendments (consistent with specific wording of objective). ▪ Feedback from stakeholders (MOHA, Perludem, and IFES and anecdotally from party staff) suggests that CSOs, state institutions and parties can collaborate effectively to influence policy debate.	

Outcome 2 – Strengthened capacity of KPU and / or Bawaslu, particularly in regard to electoral management processes and information availability	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ National survey on support for key election system features and awareness of KPU	▪ KPU used results to present to President and Secretary of State during coordination meetings. Used as basis for request for additional budget and to emphasise importance of on time disbursal of budget, which have big impact on problems with voter registry and public information in local elections (issues highlighted the survey).
Observations	
▪ The research itself appears to have been useful. Was not examined in further detail by review team, although the potential of the survey to provide baseline information for forthcoming should be examined.	

Outcome 3 – Improved systems and processes for local elections, particularly through voters list data quality, identifying models for improved access for people with disabilities, and improvement management by KPUDs.	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ DPTools training and support delivered to selected districts to correct voter register errors. ▪ Facilitated discussions about electronic voting. ▪ Public Service Announcements on proper ballot marking for local elections. ▪ Identifying and piloting new technology for people with disabilities. Produced book (subpartner PPUA Penca) and participated in several discussions.	▪ Improvements to voters lists in targeted areas (14 districts) following application of DPTools. Appears to be successful application of software. ▪ No specific data available about impact of PSA. ▪ Debate / discussion about the disability access issues. Generated some interest, but this work is in its early stages.
Observations	
▪ DPTools is a proprietary IFES tool that is used to 'clean' data, and applied to voter register data it serves the purpose of identifying errors and duplications. (Obviously as it relies on existing data, it does not address omissions.) The tool is available for use by any organisation, however the reporting here focused on locations that received targeted support from IFES. It is a short term fix to voter registry problems, but a useful one. Stakeholders (including KPU and AEC) agree that the voter register is a critical area, and in the absence of more fundamental solutions being immediately available, this work is extremely valuable.	

Outcome 4 – Gender equity outcomes in the electoral process, through improved understanding by stakeholders of gender equity issues, and take up of specific improvements to increase gender equity.	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ Legal analysis and national survey all incorporated gender analysis. ▪ Survey included questions on women's awareness, participation and empowerment. ▪ Cetro analysis on Laws 10 and 42 included discussion on open list vs zipper system, parliamentary threshold, voter registration. ▪ Public Service Announcements to encourage women to vote, and to vote independently.	▪ Identification of a range of gender issues including public support for 30% threshold for women candidates.
Observations	
▪ It was premature to consider whether any specific improvements have been taken up to improve gender equity. In the short term, these activities focused on generating debate (see discussion under Outcome 1). It is not possible at this point to speculate about potential broader outcomes.	
Outcome 5 – Capacity building or empowerment of local CSOs, in terms of improved management systems, and networking and exchange between CSOs.	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ Support on contract mgt, M&E ▪ Technical support on "CSO network programming" and analysis of survey results	▪ Satisfactory financial management reporting. ▪ Sub-partners undertaking regular M&E activity such as completion of participant evaluation forms at all events (except media events)
Observations	
▪ Sub-partners provided positive feedback about the quality and scope of support they received from IFES. ▪ However, they also pointed to an increasing lack of coordination amongst civil society organisations (a point with which IFES concurs). ▪ Discussions indicated that there can be a trade-off between short term advocacy effectiveness and capacity development for CSOs. ▪ Key area for CSO development is to improve collaboration. ▪ No baseline information to enable a rigorous discussion of capacity improvements.	

UNDP

Outcome 1 – the process of amending elections laws demonstrates inclusion of a broader base of evidence from technical experts and interest groups	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ Policy paper on Law 22 (including FGDs) ▪ Public discussion on Law 22 – engaged decision makers ▪ Pemilukada study report – recommendations for GOI on addressing administrative shortcomings of local elections	▪ Assisted with KPU's submissions to MOHA and DPR on Law 22. ▪ Policy study will be used as a basis for facilitating discussion with stakeholders on policy formulation, including Law 22
Observations	
▪ None of the legislation is finalised, so not possible to draw final conclusions about the process, or the influence of Program stakeholders. ▪ A range of discussion with stakeholders, including KPU, Bawaslu, MOHA and CSOs. However, little detail was available on the scope or nature of those consultations. ▪ This outcome was not examined in detail by the team. (UNDP also focused primarily on achievements in KPU.)	
Outcome 2 – Strengthened capacity of KPU and / or Bawaslu	
What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
▪ Training at KPU: Implemented BRIDGE program – tailored to KPU. ▪ Delivered "Pancasila in our place" to KPU and other stakeholders. ▪ Electoral Resource Information Centre (ERIC) – helped to establish, pilot and operationalise centre ▪ Workshop to introduce methodology for strategic planning (with IFES) ▪ Training for Panwaslu to do with new responsibilities in relation to dispute settlement. ▪ Needs assessment for Bawaslu and response plan / Operational training for Bawaslu on dealing with public and media ▪ Development of tools and training for participatory election monitoring with Bawaslu and NGOs. Piloted the training. ▪ Study and discussion on strengthening voters' registration list. Discussed with KPU and MOHA.	▪ Assistance with procedures and internal management at KPU. ▪ ERIC formally established by KPU. ▪ Successful piloting of participatory elections monitoring, with potential for expansion of the model. ▪ High level of support and ownership in KPU for BRIDGE.

Observations
- ERIC appears to have been a major initiative. Communication is a major challenge at KPU given its size and geographic distribution.   - Although formally adopted by KPU in March 2011, feedback from a range of stakeholders (including UNDP itself) suggests that ERIC still requires significant further development. It is a structure intended to improve communication – both internally and externally (including to comply with the new Freedom of Information requirements).   - AEC work on the i-Portal (now likely to be taken over by IFES) also addressed communication at KPU. It would be useful for a stocktake of all assistance targeting internal communication to be undertaken to ensure that the work is taken forward in a systematic, integrated way, with due attention to KPU buy-in, management capacity, and resourcing.   - Positive feedback from Bawaslu about the piloting of participatory election monitoring in Papua and Aceh. Other stakeholders agree (and international practice suggests) that such monitoring is an important part of an effective, credible elections system.   - BRIDGE has been regarded by a broad range of stakeholders (including KPU) as a significant success.

Outcome 3 – Improved systems and processes for local elections

What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
- FGD to discuss resolving the missing link between Bawaslu and Panwaslu at provincial level. - Training of provincial former provincial Panwas members to assist in bridging the missing link	Recommendations developed, with implementation of some short term options.

Observations
This outcome was not further examined by the team.

Outcome 5 – Capacity building or empowerment of local CSOs.

What was Delivered	*Outcomes Achieved*
- Other than participatory election monitoring activity noted above (Outcome 2), no specific activity under this objective. (Activities were not implemented via subpartners.)	N/A

Observations
In discussions, UNDP agreed CSOs are key players in electoral reform, and generally have good credibility. Particularly important role in elections monitoring.

Annex 3 – Summary of Work Related to Legislation Under Interim Program

Law	Partner	Strategies	Key Issues	Outcome
22/2007 – Electoral Management Bodies	Kemitraan / CSO network	▪ Public consultations ▪ Formal and informal lobbying of parties (including leadership) ▪ Preparation of policy briefs for Komisi II ▪ Monitoring process of deliberations	▪ Independence of Commissioners ▪ State-sponsored supervision ▪ Nomination process for Commissioners ▪ Structure of KPU ▪ Selection criteria for Commissioners ▪ KPU recruitment	▪ 4 of 6 policy briefs were accepted by DPR (ie, included in draft amendment)[21] ▪ Broader engagement in process
	UNDP	▪ Focus Group Discussions ▪ Public consultations, including KPU, CSOs and academics ▪ Policy paper	▪ Electoral management ▪ Institutional capacity of KPU ▪ Human resource management at KPU ▪ Information and communication requirements ▪ Planning and budgeting systems	Discussion of recommendations by MoHA, KPU, and DPR; were extensively used by DPR.
10/2008 – Parliamentary Elections	IFES / CETRO	▪ Stakeholder discussions ▪ Media engagement	▪ Election system design ▪ Establishment of special election court ▪ Parliamentary thresholds ▪ Administration of voter list ▪ Political finance	Findings were used to inform discusssion in Komisi II meetings.
42/3008 – Presidential Elections	IFES / CETRO	▪ Stakeholder discussions ▪ Facilitated consultations ▪ Engaged media for public education		Findings were used to inform discusssion in Komisi II meetings.

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[21] First two recommendations were not accepted.

Law	Partner	Strategies	Key Issues	Outcome
32/2004 – Local Elections	IFES / Perludem	▪ Built relationships with MoHA ▪ Organised stakeholders consultations. ▪ Provided policy recommendations.	▪ Direct elections of local executive heads ▪ Simultaneous administration of local elections and/or reduction to single round of elections as a means to reduce costs ▪ Revision of nomination system to allow for independent candidates; ▪ Stipulation that only parties with seats can nominate candidates; ▪ Establishment of a law enforcement mechanism to enforce laws on campaign financing and political contribution ▪ Strengthened role of Constitutional Court instead of devolved responsibility through the use of special courts as currently proposed by the Ministry of Home Affairs.	MoHA requested that Perludem provide draft text for 32/2004 amendments. Some of its recommendations incorporated.
	TAF / FITRA	▪ Analysis / research on elections financing ▪ Prepared policy paper ▪ Discussions with stakeholders / sharing analysis with MOHA ▪ Participation in consultation forums	▪ Hold provincial and district elections at the same time; ▪ Restrict the number of working groups in the regional election committee (KPUD); ▪ Reduce number of polling station organizers; ▪ Central government should standardize the unit costs of regional elections, including the honorarium for election organisers; ▪ Abolish the vote counting committee at the sub-district (kecamatan) level (PPS); ▪ Optimize polling stations by increasing the number of voters they can handle.	Recommendations included in current draft of amendments by MOHA (at February 2011)

Law	Partner	Strategies	Key Issues	Outcome
Law 2 on political parties	TAF / Puskapol	■ Research on female participation in elections ■ Discussions with stakeholders ■ Participation in consultation forums	■ Recommendations regarding affirmative action requirements (quotas), zipper system.	Wide discussion of issues, but recommendations not accepted.

Annex 4 – Ratings

Criteria	Rating (1-6)	Key Points
Relevance	5	■ Areas of focus were clearly priorities. ■ Lack of specificity in outcomes (and lack of baseline) made it difficult to determine whether the intended outcomes – at the outset – were feasible (and thus whether subsequent performance was satisfactory).
Effectiveness	4	■ A small number of tangible results; a larger number of intangible results that provide the basis for further progress under the forthcoming program. ■ Not possible to examine technical quality of deliverables within time available for the review.
Efficiency	4	■ Program was delivered on budget, with no major variations from workplans. ■ Likely that similar outcomes could have been achieved at lesser cost. (This criterion was not a major focus of the analysis, consistent with the TOR.)
Sustainability	N/A	■ Program was an *interim* program that intended to provide the basis for further assistance. There was limited sustainability of the outcomes achieved, however it was not necessarily expected that they *would* be sustainable.
Gender Equality	4	■ Some useful research analysis on activities that specifically targeted gender. ■ Weak treatment in reporting; simplistic focus on women's participation rather than specific gender *issues*.
Monitoring & Evaluation	4	■ Framework broadly appropriate to context – but partners struggled to adequately analyse the many intangible results. ■ Generally good information and analysis provided. ■ Adequate information for accountability purposes.
Analysis & Learning	5	■ Useful analysis available to inform new program.

Satisfactory		Less that satisfactory	
6	Very high quality	**3**	Less than adequate quality

Satisfactory		Less that satisfactory	
5	Good quality	**2**	Poor quality
4	Adequate quality	**1**	Very poor quality