



Impact Evaluation of the Zimbabwe Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)

Final Report to the World Bank

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AA	Administrative Agreement
AfDB	African Development Bank
AIAS	African Institute for Agrarian Studies
A-MDTF	Zimbabwe Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund
ASTRG	Agrarian Sector Technical Review Group
BEAM	Basic Education Assistance Module
BEAT	Barefoot Education for Africa Trust
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CFU	Commercial Farmers' Union
CIDA	Canada Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development
CLaRP	Comprehensive Land Reform Programme
CN	Concept Note
CZI	Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
EMA	Zimbabwe Environmental Management Agency
EMGTRG	Economic Management and Governance Technical Review Group
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FINNIDA	Acronym for the predecessor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland
FY	Fiscal year
GFR	Grant Funding Request
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HRBSTRG	Human Resources/Basic Services Delivery Technical Review Group
IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management Information System
IM	Information Management
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IPSAS	International Accounting Standards
ISN	Interim Strategy Note
ITRG	Infrastructure Technical Review Group
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency

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LEDRIZ	Labour and Economic Development Institute of Zimbabwe
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAMID	Zimbabwe Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization, and Irrigation Development
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MEWC	Zimbabwe Ministry of Environment, Water, and Climate
MFED	Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MLGPWNH	Zimbabwe Ministry of Local Government, Public Works, and National Housing
MLRR	Zimbabwe Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement
MMMD	Zimbabwe Ministry of Mines and Mining Development
MoHCW	Zimbabwe Ministry of Health and Child Welfare
MOTID	Zimbabwe Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development
MOWAGCD	Zimbabwe Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development
MPWLSW	Zimbabwe Ministry of Public Works, Labour, and Social Welfare
MSMEs	Zimbabwe Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises
MTR	2010 Mid Term Review of the A-MDTF
MWRDM	Ministry of Water Resources Development and Management
NAC	Zimbabwe National Action Committee
NANGO	Zimbabwe National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations
NCCRS	National Climate Change Response Strategy
NCU	National Coordinating Unit, subsidiary of the NAC
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSDS	National Statistics Development Strategy
NSPS	National Social Protection Strategy
NSS	Zimbabwe National Statistical System
NWP	National Water Policy
OP	Operational Policy
PC	A-MDTF Policy Committee
PDL	Poverty Datum Line
PFMS	Public Finance Management System
PICES	Poverty Income Consumption and Expenditure Survey
PPIAF	Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PTF	Policy Task Force of the GoZ's National Action Committee
SAP	Statutory Accounting Principles
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SERA	USAID Strategic Economic Research and Analysis Programme
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

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SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SMP	IMF Staff Monitored Programme
SMUs	World Bank Sector Management Units
SPTRG	Social Protection Technical Review Group
SWAp	System-wide approach
TA	Technical Assistance
TF	Trust Fund
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRG	Technical Review Group
TTL	World Bank Task Team Leader
UCAZ	Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WLWRSa	Women's Land and Water Rights in Southern Africa
WSP	World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme
WSS	Water Supply and Sanitation
ZAIP	Zimbabwe Agriculture Investment Plan
ZAIP-TF	Zimbabwe Agriculture Investment Plan Task Force
ZASMC	Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners Council
ZCFU	Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers' Union
ZFU	Zimbabwe Farmers' Union
Zim ASSET	Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation
Zim-ACP	USAID Zimbabwe Agriculture Competitiveness Programme
ZimFund	Zimbabwe Multi-Donor Trust Fund
ZIMREF	Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund
ZIMSTAT	Zimbabwe National Statistics Office
ZINWA	Zimbabwe National Water Authority
ZLGA	Zimbabwe Association of Local Governments
ZMWF	Zimbabwe Microfinance Wholesale Facility
ZNCC	Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce

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Executive Summary

The World Bank hired Castalia to carry out an impact evaluation of the Zimbabwe Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF, or “the Fund”). The A-MDTF’s performance was assessed against the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) evaluation criteria. The six criteria used in this evaluation are: relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, efficiency/accountability, and lessons learned.

The evaluation found that the A-MDTF succeeded overall in fulfilling its mandate. The Fund was, and remains, relevant to its key stakeholders: the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ)—and by extension, the people of Zimbabwe—as well as donors. The Fund achieved most of its targeted results, and delivered impacts that are generally in line with expectations. However, the Fund did not operate as efficiently as it could have.

As the A-MDTF winds down in 2014, there are five key lessons that donors should consider in designing the Fund’s successor, the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF). Donors should consider linking analytical work with programmatic funding, so that analyses can lead directly to investments. ZIMREF should be designed to facilitate even closer coordination of all donors in Zimbabwe, to help channel efforts and magnify impact. ZIMREF should also be based on a robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework, which in turn will help donors scale up efforts to “tell the full story” of how ZIMREF-led activities produce positive impacts in Zimbabwe. Donors should also work with the World Bank to fine-tune administrative processes, so that ZIMREF can operate even more efficiently than the A-MDTF.

The A-MDTF was—and remains—relevant to the needs of stakeholders (Section 4). The A-MDTF’s strategic objectives closely aligned with the strategic objectives of the World Bank’s Interim Strategy Notes I and II for Zimbabwe. This means that the Fund fit well within the World Bank’s overarching strategy for continued engagement in Zimbabwe. The A-MDTF also met the needs of its core stakeholders: the GoZ and donors. The Fund was “demand-driven,” relying on well-defined processes for matching the priorities of both groups. Analytical work was supported mainly on topics where shared priorities existed.

The A-MDTF was effective and made an impact—some impacts have been sustained, or are likely to deliver sustained benefits (Section 5). This conclusion was drawn from evaluating the Fund’s performance against the two targets for programme-level impact, and by assessing the individual performance of a representative sample of 11 activities. The sample provided a deeper level of analysis; these activities produced most of the outputs, outcomes, and impacts that were expected. Overall, we found that the Fund generally achieved its desired results: (1) help the GoZ build capacity so it can respond when donors re-engage fully; and (2) keep the donors abreast of and coordinated on key development challenges in Zimbabwe.

The A-MDTF was effective in delivering the **outputs** and **outcomes** that its activities were designed to produce. This conclusion is based on two findings. First, the activities in the sample produced nearly all of the outputs and outcomes that were expected. Eight of the 11 activities in the sample (72 percent) produced all target outputs, while 10 of the 11 activities in the sample (91 percent) yielded all desired outcomes. Secondly, the Fund chose activities where there were shared priorities among the donors and the GoZ (the Fund was relevant). We relied on this approach because of limitations in programme-level reporting—Annual Reports only indicated what outputs and outcomes were produced by the activities, not what was **expected** from them.

The A-MDTF was also moderately successful in stimulating **impacts** in Zimbabwe. Nine of the 11 activities in the sample delivered activity-level impacts that contributed to the Fund's overall objectives. For four of these activities, the impacts that were achieved were different from what was specifically targeted. This was likely because the Fund did not accurately predict what impacts would be achieved; it does not suggest that the activities were unsuccessful. Many of these impacts were also **sustained**. Six of the 11 activities in the sample (54 percent) delivered sustained benefits (or are likely to deliver sustained benefits)—and one more activity may do so, once its outputs are produced.

The A-MDTF could have been more efficient in fulfilling its mandate (Section 6).

The Fund's operational model was generally appropriate. Its funding levels, project mix, and delivery models were all highly appropriate, though the Fund could have set more realistic time frames for implementing the activities (given the political economy of Zimbabwe), and human resources could have been better staffed. Funds were disbursed efficiently, were spent in accordance with World Bank procurement procedures, and were accounted for using the World Bank's accounting rules for trust funds.

While the Fund documented key findings well, it did not disseminate these widely. The website was not routinely updated, and even donors did not have easy access to many of the outputs that were produced. Furthermore, the M&E framework was weak, which hampered efforts to demonstrate the impact of the Fund, both to donors and to external parties.

Based on the conclusions from this evaluation, we recommend that donors consider **five main lessons** as the A-MDTF winds down and they look to design ZIMREF:

- 1. Consider linking analytical work with programmatic funding (Section 7.1.1).** A core limitation of the A-MDTF was that it could not procure goods and services to actually implement the recommendations or findings arising from the analytical work (donors call this “programmatic funding”).¹ This limited the impact of many outputs, because the GoZ faces severe fiscal constraints and because non-contributing donors may not have the same priorities as those contributing to the A-MDTF. Should donors decide not to provide programmatic funding through ZIMREF, closer coordination with programmatic funds (such as ZimFund) could help link analytical work with the implementation that is needed to effect change
- 2. Facilitate even closer coordination of donors (Section 7.1.2).** The Fund did well in coordinating the efforts of contributing donors, as well as some non-contributing donors (such as UNDP and UNICEF). However, more can be done to coordinate with programmatic funds (such as ZimFund), and to coordinate with—or be kept aware of—the development interventions of BRICS² donors, such as the Chinese (who are particularly active in Zimbabwe). For example, work programmes could be synchronised so that ZIMREF-funded analytical work leads directly to programmatic funds being spent by ZimFund to implement the recommendations or findings derived from the analysis. In addition, informal dialogue with the missions of BRICS

¹ For example, the Fund was able to provide technical assistance to the GoZ to overhaul its computerised financial management platform, but the Fund could not purchase needed hardware and software upgrades. Although in this case, the Fund was able to leverage its support to secure programmatic funding from outside donors.

² Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS)

countries in Zimbabwe could achieve the goal of promoting coordination, without explicitly defining a more formal arrangement.

3. **Ensure that a robust M&E framework is in place, and that it is used (Section 7.1.3).** The A-MDTF did not have a robust framework to monitor and evaluate the performance of the Fund at a programme level. To ensure that ZIMREF makes the greatest impact—and that this impact is tracked—donors should agree on a well-defined M&E framework at the outset, complete with meaningful, measurable indicators of ZIMREF's progress. They should also ensure that this framework, once defined, is actually used to help communicate the achievements of ZIMREF
4. **Increase dissemination efforts and improve the quality of communication (Section 7.1.4).** The A-MDTF could also have been more effective in communicating the findings from supported activities, and other key achievements of the Fund. Even before the A-MDTF winds down, the Secretariat should post all outputs that are fit for public consumption on the Fund's website. It could also consider establishing a public information centre to help disseminate the outputs produced to-date. Under ZIMREF, donors should ensure that the Secretariat has the capacity to disseminate the outputs and communicate key findings timely, widely, and strategically
5. **Fine-tune administrative processes to boost ZIMREF's operational efficiency (Section 7.1.5).** The Fund did not always operate as efficiently as it could have. For example, donors lacked access to a repository where they could obtain copies of the outputs their contributions had paid for. The Fund also did not define a programme-level approach to mitigating risk, and it often set completion timeframes and disbursement windows that may have been too aggressive given the political economic environment. Many of these issues could be solved through minor adjustments to administrative processes. This includes taking steps to increase the availability and transparency of records (A-MDTF funded outputs and internal progress reports), adopting best practices for mitigating project risk, building more flexibility to better respond to minor contingencies, and working with the World Bank to improve the Secretariat's ability to deliver services to donors.

1 Introduction

The Zimbabwe Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF) was established in 2008 in response to the protracted political and economic fragility facing Zimbabwe since the late 1990s. The A-MDTF (“the Fund”) is supported by 13 donors³ and administered by the World Bank.

The key objectives of the Fund are two-fold: to improve the capacity and accountability of the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ), and to enable the World Bank and international donors to remain abreast of the development challenges in Zimbabwe. By achieving these objectives, the Fund donors aim to facilitate stakeholder dialogue and reform policies that will eventually lead to increased economic growth and stability in Zimbabwe.

To achieve its goals, A-MDTF funds analytical studies, technical assistance and expert placements, data and information management system support, and knowledge exchanges for Government stakeholders. Activities are carried out across three “thematic areas” including economic management and governance, agriculture, and infrastructure.⁴

As the Fund winds down activities and concludes disbursements by 31 December 2014, the World Bank and A-MDTF donors want to understand what the Fund did well, and what lessons can be applied for the planned scale-up of the Fund. Specifically, Castalia was engaged to evaluate the relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and efficiency of the Fund to date. During this assignment, we also drew lessons and made recommendations for improvements to the Fund.

This Impact Evaluation Report explains the findings of our evaluation. The report begins with an overview of the A-MDTF, explaining more about the Fund’s activities and how these are linked to the desired objectives (Section 2). Next, we briefly explain our methodology for completing this evaluation (Section 3). Sections 4 through 6 present our analysis and conclusions on the relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and efficiency of the Fund. Lessons learned and recommendations for the successor to the A-MDTF are provided in Section 7. Additional details from the evaluation that were not included in the body of this report are located in Appendix A through Appendix I.

³ The donors are the World Bank (through its LICUS trust fund), and the aid agencies from Australia, Canada, Denmark, the European Union (EU), Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US).

⁴ The Fund previously had four other thematic areas: (i) private sector development, (ii) governance and anti-corruption, (iii) human resources/basic service delivery, and (iv) social protection. All four were folded into existing thematic areas or cancelled.

2 Overview of the A-MDTF

Since the late 1990s, Zimbabwe has suffered from protracted fragility induced by recurrent cycles of political and economic crises. More than a decade of economic decline has severely compromised basic service delivery, public sector capacity, infrastructure maintenance, and the investment climate for the private sector.

Zimbabwe has been in arrears with the World Bank since October 2000. As a result, it has been unable to access regular development assistance from the World Bank, and other major international finance institutions. Rather than fully disengage from Zimbabwe, the World Bank has prepared an interim strategy for continuing to operate in a limited capacity, so that it can resume normal Bank operations when conditions are right. For the fiscal years 2005–2007, 2008–2009, and 2013–2015, the World Bank has prepared Interim Strategy Notes (ISN I, II, and III, respectively) that lay out a roadmap for closing knowledge gaps and facilitating dialogue on Zimbabwe's key development needs.

The A-MDTF was established as part of this roadmap. It was designed to (i) improve the capacity and accountability of the GoZ, and (ii) enable the World Bank and international donors to remain abreast of the development challenges there. These outcomes will facilitate quick re-engagement of the donor community with the GoZ when it is no longer in arrears and economic conditions warrant. The A-MDTF supports the objectives of the ISNs through:

- Analytical work on the key development issues facing Zimbabwe
- Development of suitable instruments enabling Zimbabwe to respond quickly to changing country conditions
- Facilitating donor coordination.⁵

Since its inception in 2008, the A-MDTF has allocated US\$21.9 million for its activities.⁶ These funds are split between two trust funds: US\$14.0 million under the new trust fund (TF071603), and US\$7.9 million under the old trust fund (TF071603), which was replaced after restructuring took place as a result of a Mid Term Review (MTR) in 2010. Each donor's contributions to the Fund are listed in Table 2.1, sorted from the largest contributor to the smallest.

Table 2.1: Donor Contributions to the A-MDTF (US\$)

Country	Old TF	New TF	Total Transfers
United Kingdom	\$1,285,322	\$5,985,000	\$7,270,322
Australia	\$940,000	\$1,410,000	\$2,350,000
Denmark	\$864,000	\$1,260,000	\$2,124,000
Sweden	\$945,000	\$1,050,000	\$1,995,000
The Netherlands	\$270,000	\$1,699,300	\$1,969,300
United States	\$200,000	\$1,500,000	\$1,700,000
Norway	\$580,000	\$1,011,009	\$1,591,009

⁵ Zimbabwe A-MDTF. July 2011. "Operational Guidelines." P. 6.

⁶ Zimbabwe A-MDTF. 2014. "Annual Report 2013." P. 1.

Country	Old TF	New TF	Total Transfers
Finland	\$1,292,000	-	\$1,292,000
The European Union (EU)	\$476,000	\$816,000	\$1,292,000
The World Bank	\$1,000,000	-	\$1,000,000
Germany	\$510,000	\$340,000	\$850,000
Canada	\$465,000	-	\$465,000
Switzerland	-	\$300,000	\$300,000

Source: Zimbabwe A-MDTF. 2014. "Annual Report 2013." Page 29.


Note: Values in this table are approximate. Contributions are reported in the currency of the transfer (in many cases, the donor's local currency). To convert to US\$, we relied on exchange rates as of 10 July 2014.

A-MDTF is currently winding down activities, and is scheduled to finish all disbursements by 31 December 2014.

A-MDTF Thematic Areas

The A-MDTF allocates funds to specific thematic areas to focus efforts. The old fund had seven thematic areas, but these were later reduced to three thematic areas based on recommendations in the 2010 Mid Term Review. Figure 2.1 below illustrates this consolidation.

Figure 2.1: A-MDTF Thematic Areas



Note: The 2010 Mid Term Review recommended cancelling the Human Resources/Basic Services Delivery (HRBSTRG) and Social Protection (SPTRG) thematic areas to avoid duplicating efforts already pursued by other donors in Zimbabwe.

As illustrated in the figure, the old Fund's seven thematic areas were eliminated or consolidated into three key areas:

- **Economic Management and Governance**—focuses on building capacity and strengthening institutions to support good governance and economic management, particularly after the decade-long crisis and hyperinflation. Activities often focus on budget support, poverty analysis, trade competitiveness, and supporting small businesses. This thematic area grew out of the old Fund's Economic Analysis, Private Sector Development, Social Protection, and Governance and Anticorruption areas.
- **Agriculture**—focuses on strengthening national dialogue on agriculture development. Activities offer on technical assistance and analytical support to produce investment frameworks for small farmers, food security studies, and land reform analysis. This thematic area also existed in the old Fund.
- **Infrastructure**—targets future economic growth for Zimbabwe by investing in infrastructure development, including energy, information and communications technology (ICT), transport, water, and sanitation sectors. Activities often focus on impact studies of investment in various projects, and technical assistance. This thematic area also existed in the old Fund.⁷

Economic Management and Governance is by far the largest thematic area of A-MDTF, receiving 56.4 percent of total funds. Infrastructure is the second largest thematic area (21.6 percent of funds), and Agriculture is the smallest (13.0 percent of funds).


Activities of each thematic area are led by a Technical Review Group (TRG), which includes specialists in the thematic areas. Thus the new Fund included three TRGs: Economic Management and Governance Technical Review Group (EMGTRG), Agriculture Sector Technical Review Group (ASTRG), and Infrastructure Technical Review Group (ITRG).

A-MDTF Activities

Across the three thematic areas of the new trust fund, the A-MDTF supports four key types of activities. The old trust fund supported seven types of activities, but given feedback from the 2010 Mid Term Review these were consolidated into four key activities, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.

⁷ A-MDTF, 2011 *Operational Guidelines*, P. 7

Figure 2.2: A-MDTF Types of Activities



Note: Although “pilots” were kept in the design of the new TF, no pilot activities were implemented.

Source: A-MDTF. 2009 *Operational Guidelines*. P. 5 and P. 13-14

Under the new trust Fund, the four types of activities include the following:

- **Analytical studies**—core diagnostic reports to support strategic planning and policy dialogue; diagnostic reports to support the preparation, implementation, and evaluation of donor investments; and sector-specific advisory reports
- **Technical assistance (TA) and expert placements**—assisting in policy formulation, programme implementation, and capacity building in GoZ ministries
- **Data and information management (IM) systems**—support to the GoZ to develop systems and databases that help capture information and manage the flow of data to support effective and efficient public policy
- **Knowledge exchanges**—workshops, conferences, and field visits aimed at enhancing country knowledge, improving capacity, and enabling better coordination among development partners.⁸

As explained in Figure 2.2, while pilots were still a type of activity offered by the new Fund, no pilot activities were funded under the new Fund. Thus, it is not counted above.

A-MDTF so far has funded a total of 51 activities.⁹ Table B.1 (in Appendix B) lists each activity by an ID number that we have assigned for the purposes of our evaluation, the type of activity, its thematic area, and the funds allocated (in US\$).

⁸ A-MDTF. 2011 *Operational Guidelines*. P. 13–14.

Organization and Governance of the A-MDTF

The A-MDTF is governed by a three-tier structure consisting of:

- A **Policy Committee (PC)**, comprising representatives of each of the A-MDTF donors, including a representative of the World Bank
- The **A-MDTF Secretariat (“the Secretariat”)**, comprising World Bank staff located in the Harare office in Zimbabwe
- Three **Technical Review Groups (TRGs)** with expertise in one of the three thematic areas (EMGTRG, ITRG, and ASTRG). The TRGs are composed of donors’ representatives with expertise in the respective thematic areas, as well as non-contributing donors (such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and other key stakeholders (at times, including certain GoZ officials).

The highest level of authority in the A-MDTF is the Policy Committee (PC). The PC, sets priorities for using A-MDTF funding, and approves activities. Activities are also identified and recommended by the three TRGs, given their technical specializations in the Fund thematic areas, but ultimately are approved by the PCs.

Once an activity is approved, the Secretariat disburses funds from the “Parent Trust Fund” to individual “Child Trust Funds” for each activity, and oversees the management of resources for activities. The Secretariat plans and carries out the procurement and monitoring systems for all activities.¹⁰ The TRGs also monitor the progress of activities and the technical work performed, and liaise with Government officials. Most A-MDTF funded activities are carried out by consultants, although some work is executed directly by World Bank sector experts.

A more detailed explanation of the organization and governance of the A-MDTF is provided in Section 6.1. Also see the detailed diagram in Appendix D.

A-MDTF Theory of Change


It is best practice for donor-funded programs and trust funds to design a Theory of Change that establishes the linkages between a programme’s planned activities, and the desired effects. Specifically, a Theory of Change explains how a programme’s resources (**inputs**) will fund **activities** and **outputs**, which should lead to the desired **outcomes** and eventual **impacts** that the programme is trying to achieve.

The A-MDTF defines such a Theory of Change in its Operational Guidelines. We illustrate this Theory of Change in Figure 2.3.

⁹ 43 activities were listed in the TOR and the remaining eight activities were identified by Castalia through reviewing programme documents, including the Mid Term Review. These additional eight activities were confirmed with the A-MDTF Secretariat.

¹⁰ Except for activities funded by a recipient-executed child TF (RETF), of which there was just one in the A-MDTF.

Figure 2.3: A-MDTF Theory of Change



Source: Castalia figure based on information in “Operational Guidelines”. Zimbabwe A-MDTF. July 2011. P. 31

Figure 2.3 illustrates the activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts that the A-MDTF plans to achieve. However, not all of the activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts illustrated in the diagram are included in the correct category. We provide recommendations for improvements to the A-MDTF Theory of Change in Section 7.1.

To illustrate how the A-MDTF Theory of Change should work, we use the example below of Activity 1.02 Determinants of the Productivity and Sustainability of Zimbabwe Irrigation (see Appendix A.1 for more details). For this activity, the A-MDTF allocated US\$300,000 in donor funding (**inputs**) for a group of consultants to perform a study on small-scale irrigation in Zimbabwe; conduct a diagnostic analysis of investment returns on irrigation schemes; and facilitate discussions on investment options with the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation, and Irrigation Development (MAMID) (**activities**). The **output** of this activity included a report to the MAMID explaining the proposed pre-investment framework. The Theory of Change then predicts that the MAMID will use this output to identify policy reforms and other actions that the GoZ needs to take to attract and maintain investment in the irrigation sector (**outcome**). The desired long-run impact is for the Government to apply this roadmap to create an operating environment that is conducive to increased investments in irrigation (**impact**).

3 Evaluation Methodology

Our methodology for evaluating A-MDTF involved three key stages:

- Project Inception and Refining the Methodology
- Data Gathering
- Data Analysis.

In the following sections, we further explain this three-stage methodology, focusing, in particular, on the data gathering and analysis stages.

3.1 Project Inception and Refining the Methodology

During this first stage, we completed an initial review of the objectives and scope of the A-MDTF. We then clarified each of the evaluation questions listed in the Terms of Reference (TOR) given our clarified understanding of the objectives, scope, and activities of the A-MDTF. The output of this stage was the Inception Report, delivered on 25 July 2014.

We then refined our approach to include two types of analysis:

- Top-down, “programme-level” approach
- Bottom-up, “activity-level” approach.

A mix of both methods was used depending on the evaluation question. Sometimes both levels of analysis were used, and other times only one level was applicable. For instance, some evaluation questions were only relevant at the programme level, such as “What were the Trust Fund’s critical success factors and how did the Fund perform against these?” For these questions, we gathered data on the Fund from annual reports and operational guidelines, and by interviewing A-MDTF Secretariat staff.

Other questions were relevant to specific activities, for instance, “Are there any unintended benefits or contributions made by the implementation of the A-MDTF activities?” To answer these questions, we looked at the performance of specific A-MDTF funded activities.

As defined in the TOR, this evaluation of the A-MDTF from 2008 to 2014 covers 43 A-MDTF funded activities.¹¹ Given the scope of work and budget for this evaluation, we were unable to review the performance of all 43 activities. Instead, we adopted a sampling approach to provide a robust representation of the Fund’s performance overall.

Sampling approach

Given the “population” of 43 A-MDTF activities, our team selected a stratified sample of 11 activities based on five criteria of key importance to the Fund’s activities:

- **Thematic area**—(i) agriculture, (ii) economic management and governance, or (iii) infrastructure
- **Type of activity**—(i) analytical studies, (ii) technical assistance (TA) and expert placements, (iii) data and IM systems, or (iv) knowledge exchanges
- **Recent or older activities**—activity was funded under (i) the new trust fund (TF) or (ii) the old TF

¹¹ Note that to date the Fund has supported 51 activities, but the ToR defines the scope of this evaluation as limited to these 43 activities.

- **Closed or ongoing activities**
- **Activity value**—expressed in US\$ allocated to each activity.

The size of the sample was based on our team’s recommendations during the technical proposal, on suggestions from the A-MDTF Policy Committee, and on the need to provide a balance of having a detailed activity-level evaluation but still finishing within a reasonable time limit and budget.

To select this sample of 11 activities, first the share of the population of activities was calculated under each key criterion. Based on the distribution of the population across these criteria, we then attempted to select a sample of 11 activities that represented the population shares. Because there are five different criteria under consideration, we were unable to completely match the distributions.

Table 3.1 below illustrates the share of the population of activities under each of the key criteria, and the share of the sample of activities. As the table shows, we succeeded in matching the population of activities somewhat—that is, the sample is generally representative of the population of activities.

Table 3.1: Representativeness of the Sample of Activities

	Share of Population (%)	Share of Sample (%)
Thematic Area		
Agriculture	27.9%	27.3%
Economic Management & Governance	48.8%	45.5%
Infrastructure	23.3%	27.3%
Activity Type		
Analytical Study	51.1%	38.5%
TA and Expert Placements	33.3%	46.2%
Data and IM Systems	11.1%	15.4%
Knowledge Exchanges	0.0%	0.0%
Trust Fund		
Recent (New TF)	76.7%	72.7%
Older (Old TF)	23.3%	27.3%
Status		
Closed	65.1%	72.7%
Ongoing	34.9%	27.3%
Activity Value (US\$)		
1st Quartile (\$3,990 to \$149,702)	23.3%	27.3%
2nd Quartile (\$149,702 to \$200,000)	25.6%	27.3%
3rd Quartile (\$200,000 to \$351,250)	25.6%	27.3%
4th Quartile (\$351,250 to \$3,275,000)	25.6%	18.2%

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Note: Stratified sample was representative of the population as of the Inception Report. Some activities may have closed since then.

Source: Classification of activities by type was based on our high-level understanding of the primary purpose of the activities. Accordingly, we have not categorized any of the activities in the ToRs as a “knowledge exchange”.

The list of activities selected for the sample is presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Sample of Activities

ID	Activity Name	Thematic Area	Activity Type	Trust Fund	Status [†]
1.02	Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation	Agriculture	Analytical Study	New	Closed
1.03	Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP	Agriculture	TA & Expert Placements	New	Closed
1.12	Study on Land Reform	Agriculture	Analytical Study	Old	Closed
2.02	Support to 2014 Budget Preparation	Economic Management & Governance	TA & Expert Placements	New	Closed
2.04	Poverty Analysis	Economic Management & Governance	TA & Expert Placements	New	Ongoing
2.10	Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme	Economic Management & Governance	TA & Expert Placements	New	Ongoing
2.16	ZIMSTAT - System Wide Approach to Statistics	Economic Management & Governance	Data and IM Systems	New	Closed
2.17	Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	Economic Management & Governance	Data and IM Systems	Old	Closed
3.05	Flexible Technical Assistance for Infrastructure	Infrastructure	TA & Expert Placements	New	Ongoing
3.07	National Water Policy	Infrastructure	TA & Expert Placements	New	Closed
4.01	Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	Social Protection	Analytical Study	Old	Closed

Note: [†] As of the submission of the Inception Report, when the sample was selected.

Source: We assigned ID numbers to activities for the purposes of this evaluation (see Section 3.2).

3.2 Data Gathering

During the second stage of our methodology, we gathered data through two main exercises: (i) document reviews, and (ii) field visits and interviews. Both exercises are described below.

Document reviews

Documents on A-MD'TF funded activities and operations were provided by the Secretariat. A comprehensive list of documents reviewed is provided in Appendix G (see Table G.1).

During the document reviews our team also devised a numbering scheme to label each activity with a unique identifier code to distinguish activities. Although we later discovered the A-MD'TF already has a unique numbering system (which relies on the child TF numbers), these numbers are not always presented alongside activities in key programme documents, and were, therefore, difficult to track. Thus the numbering scheme developed by our evaluation team is used throughout this evaluation report.

The first digit of our numbering scheme refers to the Technical Review Group (TRG): 1=ASTRG; 2=EMGTRG; 3=ITRG. The next two digits refer to the specific activity, and the final two digits specify the document number. Programme documents under this scheme begin with "0.00" and are followed by the two-digit document number.

Field visits and interviews

Interviews were held with 35 stakeholders of the A-MD'TF to gather information on the Fund's operations, design, activities, and performance. External stakeholders interviewed included 12 GoZ ministries and agencies and nine non-state actors. Within the A-MD'TF, we met with the Programme Manager, the Finance Officer, the sector World Bank Task Team Leaders (TTLs), two of three TRGs, and the PC. Among the donors, we spoke with 11 staff representing six donors.¹² A full list of interviews conducted is located in Appendix H. Key stakeholders were identified by our evaluation team, in consultation with the Secretariat.

Interviews were held in person and over the phone. One of our team members (Mr. John Miller) travelled to Harare, Zimbabwe to join our two local team members, Dr. Lighton Dube and Ms. Nomasomi Mpofu, from 4 August 2014 through 13 August 2014 to conduct interviews. Follow-up interviews were held through mid-September, including in-person interviews conducted by Ms. Ikepo Oyenuga, a Senior Evaluator on our team.¹³

Our team designed structured questionnaires to use during interviews with each key stakeholder (such as the A-MD'TF Secretariat, GoZ ministries, donors, and other stakeholders with knowledge of the activities). Examples of these questionnaires are provided in Appendix I.

3.3 Data Analysis

The data that our evaluation team gathered—both quantitative and qualitative—during document reviews and stakeholder interviews were aggregated in Microsoft Excel and synthesised to produce the key findings in this report. Quantitative data were analysed to understand questions such as the nature of fund disbursements (how funds were spent), the appropriateness of timeframes (if the Fund's activities were concluded on time), and

¹² These donors were Australian Aid, the European Union's EuropeAid, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

¹³ Ms. Oyenuga was in Harare for another assignment.

so on. Qualitative, anecdotal evidence was summarised in a matrix matching our evidence and key findings for each pair of a given activity or evaluation question.

We also produced a series of diagrams that helped us examine the Fund's design and processes. These diagrams were informed by programme-level documents, such as the Operational Guidelines, as well as interviews with members of the PC and the Secretariat

Based on the analysis performed in this stage of the evaluation, we drew conclusions on the extent of the Fund's relevance to key stakeholders; the effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of activities in its portfolio; and how efficiently it fulfilled its mandate. As we drew conclusions for these evaluation criteria, we also identified lessons that the donors could learn from the Fund's experience, and made recommendations for future development interventions in Zimbabwe.

4 Relevance

Evaluating the relevance of the A-MDTF means checking that the objectives and approach of the Fund are aligned with the needs of beneficiaries, and with the goals of other stakeholders. The Fund's key stakeholders are the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ)—and by extension, the people of Zimbabwe—as well as donors. Other stakeholders include non-contributing donors (such as UNDP and UNICEF) and non-state actors (such as NGOs) that are active in the same thematic areas as the Fund.

This may seem simple and unnecessary; however, this step is essential. The DAC guidelines have rightfully listed this due diligence as the first step in conducting an evaluation. If the Fund's stated objectives were not aligned with what the GoZ and donors expected, then it is unlikely that the Fund will have achieved its objectives. To determine whether the Fund was relevant, we focused on two questions:

- To what extent has the A-MDTF helped to implement ISN I and II strategic objectives?
- How closely are the A-MDTF objectives and approach aligned to key stakeholder needs?

In the second question, we interpreted “approach” to mean **how** the Fund planned to support the objectives of its key stakeholders—that is, the thematic areas that the Fund focused on.

4.1 Did the A-MDTF Help Implement ISN Strategic Objectives?

The A-MDTF was conceived as a key component of the World Bank's strategy for engagement in Zimbabwe from fiscal years 2005 to 2009, as defined in ISNs I and II.¹⁴ To determine the relevance of the Fund, it is therefore important to check that the Fund's objectives aligned with those of the ISNs.

As shown in Table 4.1, the objectives of the A-MDTF closely aligned with those of ISNs I and II. The Fund's objectives were clearly defined in the Operational Guidelines and were confirmed by the Secretariat during stakeholder interviews. We therefore conclude that the A-MDTF was well aligned to implement the strategic objectives of ISNs I and II.

Table 4.1: Strategic Objectives of the A-MDTF and the ISNs

A-MDTF Objectives	ISNs Objectives
Lay the groundwork for re-engagement by donors and the World Bank in Zimbabwe through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Analytical work on the key development challenges facing Zimbabwe ▪ Development of suitable instruments enabling Zimbabwe and donors to respond quickly to changing country 	ISN I (2005–2007) To facilitate a reversal of the deterioration in economic and social indicators, and a normalisation of relationships and re-engagement with the international community. These were supported through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enhanced in-country partnerships ▪ A strengthened World Bank knowledge base on key policy issues ISN II (2008–2009) To maintain operational readiness for quick re-engagement through:

¹⁴ ISNs are an important component of the Bank's planning processes in fragile states, where the Bank's traditional four-year planning cycle cannot be applied. As mentioned in Section 2, there is also an ISN III, which covers the World Bank's fiscal years 2013 to 2015.

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> conditions ▪ Facilitating donor coordination | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enhanced quality of Government engagement in policy dialogue and reforms, informed by sound analyses ▪ Improved capacity within implementing partners to deliver services |
|---|--|

Sources: The World Bank. 2005. *Interim Strategy Note I*. P. 9.

The World Bank. 2007. *Interim Strategy Note II*. P. 32.

A-MDTF. 2011 *Operational Guidelines*. P. 6.

4.2 Was the A-MDTF Aligned to Stakeholder Needs?

The A-MDTF was designed to be “demand-driven.” This means it was designed to support analytical work on topics where there was a demonstrated need by the GoZ, and where these needs overlapped with the donors’ priorities in Zimbabwe. This demand-driven approach was followed in practice, as the Fund’s objectives and approach were closely aligned with the needs of its stakeholders.

The Fund closely aligned with the Government’s priorities

The choice of thematic areas—both at inception and following the MTR—was intended to match the priorities of the GoZ. In fact, this is one of the five core principles that donors followed¹⁵ from the OECD’s “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States” within the Paris Agenda.¹⁶

The Government’s priorities during the implementation of the A-MDTF were documented in several strategic plans published by the Ministry of Finance: (i) the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP), (ii) STERP II,¹⁷ (iii) the Medium Term Plan (MTP), and the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socioeconomic Transformation (Zim ASSET). The key priorities defined in these documents are summarised in Table 4.2. We compared the GoZ’s priorities over time against the Fund’s thematic areas. All but three of the GoZ’s priorities were targeted by one (or more) of the A-MDTF’s thematic areas, as shown in the TRG column. This analysis revealed that the Fund’s thematic areas closely aligned with the priorities identified by the GoZ.

Table 4.2: Priorities of the GoZ Compared to A-MDTF Thematic Areas

Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP), 2009	TRG
Political and Governance Issues —including reforms to strengthen governance and accountability, promote governance and rule of law, and promote equality and fairness (including gender equality)	EMGTRG
Social Protection [†] —including food/humanitarian assistance, education, health, and strategically targeted vulnerable sectors	SPTRG & HRBSTRG
Stabilisation —including a growth-oriented recovery programme, restoring and stabilising the value of the local currency, increasing capacity utilisation in all sectors of the economy, and ensuring adequate water supply	EMGTRG
Medium Term Plan (MTP), 2011–2015	TRG
Private Sector Participation —introduce public sector initiatives and reforms	EMGTRG &

¹⁵ A-MDTF. 2009. *Operational Guidelines*.

¹⁶ OECD. 2008. “The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action.” <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf> (accessed 28 September 2014).

¹⁷ We were unable to secure a copy of the STERP II, therefore it is not included in our relevance analysis.

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to reduce investor risk, and make Zimbabwe an attractive investment destination. Focus sectors include agriculture, manufacturing, mining, tourism, and finance	ASTRG
Employment Creation and Poverty Reduction [†] —create an enabling and conducive environment for sustainable employment creation, including opportunities for marginalised and vulnerable populations (such as women, youth, and the disabled)	None
Human Development and Social Security [†] —increase access to quality primary health care services, promote gender parity at secondary and tertiary levels of education, enable universal primary education, and protect the poor and vulnerable from facing irreversible welfare losses	None
Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Development —focus on improving infrastructure in energy, water and sanitation, transport, and ICT, among others	ITRG
Good Governance —which is integral to the successful implementation of the MTP. This includes engagement with civil society organisations and the private sector, relying on best practice for consultations with key stakeholders	EMGTRG
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socioeconomic Transformation (Zim ASSET), 2013–2018	TRG
Food Security and Nutrition —restore Zimbabwe to its former status as the “bread basket of Southern Africa,” by creating an enabling environment for investment in the agriculture sector	ASTRG
Social Services and Poverty Eradication [†] —improve service delivery by all public institutions, through a focus on recapitalising, engaging, and retaining skilled manpower	None
Infrastructure and Utilities —rehabilitate assets in water and sanitation, ICT, energy and power supply, and transport	ITRG
Value Addition and Beneficiation —develop and implement policies that encourage increased private sector participation in key sectors such as manufacturing, tourism, mining, and so on	EMGTRG
Governance and Accountability —including fiscal reform measures, and improved public administration, governance, and performance management	EMGTRG

Note: [†] These priorities correspond to the cancelled SPTRG and HRBSTRG, both of which were eliminated because the MTR found that they were duplicative of other donors’ efforts in Zimbabwe.

Sources: GoZ. March 2009. “Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme.” Pp. 8–9. <http://www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/sterp> (accessed 28 September 2014).

GoZ. 2011. “Zimbabwe Medium Term Plan: 2011–2015.” Pp. 1–3. http://www.zimottawa.com/files/pdf/Zimbabwe_MidTermPlan-2011-2015.pdf (accessed 28 September 2014).

GoZ. October 2013. “Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socioeconomic Transformation.” Pp. 10–11. <http://www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/zim-asset> (accessed 28 September 2014).

To confirm our finding, we also asked GoZ officials to confirm if the A-MDTF generally met many of the Government’s key priorities. The officials we interviewed **unanimously** confirmed that the thematic areas chosen by the Fund matched the needs of the GoZ.

The Fund also aligned with donors’ priorities

As previously illustrated in Figure 2.1, at inception the Fund chose seven thematic areas: (i) economic analysis; (ii) private sector development; (iii) governance and anti-corruption; (iv) agrarian issues; (v) infrastructure rehabilitation; (vi) human

resources/basic services delivery; and (vii) social protection. These were based on an initial inventory of donors' interest when the Fund was established, the results of which are shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Interest of Donors in Thematic Areas at A-MDTF Inception

Strategic Objective	Thematic Area (Approach)	Donors Interested
Enhanced Country Knowledge	Economic Analysis	International Monetary Fund (IMF); DFID; UNDP; SIDA; South Africa; CIDA (now known as Canada Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development); USAID; EuropeAid
	Economic "Re-Generation" (Sector-Specific Studies)	China; India; France; United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO); United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO); Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); Australian Aid; USAID
Improved Capacity and Accountability	Health Services Capacity and Accountability	DFID; EuropeAid; UNDP; Global Fund; Netherlands; France; Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS); USAID; International Organisation for Migration (IOM); UNICEF; CIDA; SIDA; JICA; World Bank; Belgium
	Capacity Building in Budgeting	World Bank; The Netherlands
Enhanced Donor Harmonisation	All Thematic Areas	All Donors

Source: A-MDTF. 2010. *Mid Term Review*. P. 8.

Following the MTR, the number of thematic areas was reduced from seven to the current three: (i) agrarian issues, (ii) economic management and governance, and (iii) infrastructure. Donors made this choice following the MTR, which found that two of the thematic areas (social protection and human resources/basic service delivery) were already being adequately supported by other donors outside the A-MDTF. In addition, three separate thematic areas (economic analysis, private sector development, and governance and anti-corruption) were combined into economic management and governance, to seize on potential synergies between these thematic areas.¹⁸

Conclusions on alignment with stakeholder needs

We conclude that the A-MDTF succeeded in choosing thematic areas that were relevant, both to the GoZ and to donors. The A-MDTF routinely examined the priorities of the GoZ—as documented in its strategic economic development plans and confirmed through ongoing dialogue facilitated by the Harare-based TTLs for each sector—to ensure that the Fund's thematic areas remained relevant to the Government's evolving priorities. The A-MDTF also identified donors' interests when the Fund was initially set up, and later these areas were refined to eliminate duplication of efforts among the Fund and other donors in certain thematic areas (for example, the SPTRG and HRBSTRG were cancelled for this reason following the MTR).

¹⁸ A-MDTF. 2010. *Mid Term Review*. P. 39.

5 Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability

Evaluating the A-MDTF's effectiveness, impact, and sustainability is at the core of our evaluation. Answering the questions relating to these Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria allows us to determine if:

- The A-MDTF ("the Fund") achieved what it set out to do (effectiveness)
- The A-MDTF made measurable impacts (impact)
- The impacts delivered are likely to continue after A-MDTF funding ceases (sustainability).

We relied on our sample of activities to answer most of the 11 questions specified in the TOR for these evaluation criteria. Answering these questions at a programme level was more difficult because the annual reports—which represented the most comprehensive record of activities funded by the A-MDTF—did not report the targets for each activity. Thus, we could not assess how the Fund performed against **expectations**. Instead, we assessed the 11 activities in our sample to determine if they did or did not produce a desired result, and then drew conclusions on the performance of the Fund as a whole based on the results from this sample. Where possible, we used what programme-level information was available to support any conclusions that were based on the sampling approach.

Because many of the effectiveness, impact, and sustainability evaluation questions are closely related, we organise our responses accordingly: First, we present our findings on the effectiveness of A-MDTF in achieving targeted outputs and outcomes (Section 5.1). Secondly, we present our findings on the impacts of the Fund (Section 5.2). Thirdly, we respond to the remaining effectiveness, impact, and sustainability questions, which are grouped together in Section 5.3. We conclude by presenting our finding on the **overall effectiveness of the Fund** (Section 5.4).

5.1 What Outputs and Outcomes Were Achieved?

The most basic measure of the Fund's effectiveness is whether it achieved its planned outputs and outcomes.

Each activity funded by the A-MDTF had a unique set of expected outputs¹⁹ and outcomes²⁰—no two activities were exactly alike. As a result, the only way to evaluate whether the expected outputs and outcomes were achieved for the entire Fund would be to have a robust reporting framework that tracks both the planned and achieved outputs and outcomes for **each activity** over time. Such results are commonly tracked by donor programs in a "logframe"—a tool used to track results achieved against targeted outputs and outcomes. Logframes allow donor programs to aggregate data across multiple outputs and outcomes to measure the overall effectiveness of a programme.

¹⁹ The DAC defines outputs as "the products, capital goods, and services which result from a development intervention..."

OECD. 2002. "Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management." <http://www.oecd.org/development/peer-reviews/2754804.pdf> (accessed 22 July 2014).

²⁰ The DAC defines outcomes as "the likely or achieved short-term or medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs."

The A-MDTF did not have a robust reporting framework

The A-MDTF did not have such a reporting framework. Rather, the annual reports (which constituted the most comprehensive record of work carried out under the A-MDTF) only reported the outputs that had been produced to-date and in some cases, either the outputs or the impacts (or both) that had been observed.

Thus, there was no baseline against which to compare programme results, nor were there consistent results reported for all activities. Put another way, the comprehensive programme records tracked the work that had been done, but it never checked if this was the work that **should have** been done.

Methodology for evaluating outputs and outcomes for the sample of activities

Without this type of aggregate reporting framework, it was not possible to evaluate the A-MDTF's overall effectiveness using this standard approach. Instead, we used an alternative approach that used key findings on **effectiveness of the sample** of activities as one of the inputs to determining the overall effectiveness of the Fund. Our conclusions on the Fund's effectiveness—achieving the outputs and outcomes it set out to achieve—are, therefore, presented in Section 5.4.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the A-MDTF at the activity level, we reviewed the concept notes (CNs) for the 11 activities in our sample. Each CN identified the planned outputs (to be produced using the funds allocated), as well as the outcomes that were expected given these outputs. We then compared the planned outputs and outcomes against what was actually achieved, which was determined by reviewing documents (such as the annual reports) and interviewing stakeholders.

The results of our activity-level analysis are provided in Table 5.1. The table presents our understanding of the following:

- Planned outputs at activity inception versus what was actually achieved
- Planned outcomes at activity inception versus what was actually achieved
- A summary of what happened as a result of these outputs and outcomes (the impacts)

For each output and outcome, the table explains what was expected and what was achieved. The cell is highlighted green and marked with a check mark only if the targeted outputs or outcomes were **fully** achieved.

This table is designed to present a holistic picture of what the activity did and how it made a difference. Brief summaries of the activities' scopes and timelines are presented in Appendix A.

Following Table 5.1, we provide a general analysis of the activity data. A more detailed discussion of these activities' impacts, and what they mean for the overall impact of the A-MDTF, is presented in Section 5.2.

Table 5.1: Achievement of Outputs, Outcomes, and Impacts for the Sample of Activities

Activity	Target Outputs	Actual Outputs	Target Outcomes	Actual Outcomes	Impacts—What Happened?
1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation <i>Closed</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final Report Electronic copy of all inventory data collected 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final Report Electronic copy of all inventory data collected 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Define the outline of a strategic investment framework for the irrigation sector (“pre-investment framework”)[†] Enable the GoZ, water users, and donors to identify, select, prepare, finance, and implement specific interventions that respond to the priorities in the framework 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The GoZ has developed a Draft Irrigation Master Plan based on the study The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the EU, and JICA are all making irrigation investments based in part on the framework developed 	<p>The study built on the work carried out for the National Water Policy and the Zimbabwe Agriculture Investment Plan. The GoZ is now using the study to inform the National Irrigation Policy it is developing, which reflects one of the key recommendations to consider both hardware and non-hardware investments in planning. The study also helped the GoZ to realise the need for an irrigation sector working group to improve coordination.</p>
1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP <i>Closed</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revised Draft Zimbabwe Agriculture Investment Plan (ZAIP) for Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) Technical Review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revised Draft ZAIP for CAADP Technical Review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved dialogue with GoZ regarding investment priorities in line with the CAADP process and principles Enhanced country and sector knowledge Improve country capacity Promote donor harmonisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dialogue has been improved with the GoZ, as evidenced by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAMID) leading the process Regional stakeholder consultations supported by this activity have helped build country and sector knowledge and capacity Approval of the ZAIP by the CAADP technical review 	<p>The TA led to the finalisation of the ZAIP and signing of the CAADP compact by the GoZ, donors (the World Bank and the EU), and the private sector. The compact expresses a commitment on the part of all sector stakeholders to work toward achieving the goals of the CAADP framework. The ZAIP is now proceeding to the technical review stage under the CAADP framework, which will be shortly followed by a business meeting with all interested donors and investors to facilitate specific investments.</p>

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Activity	Target Outputs	Actual Outputs	Target Outcomes	Actual Outcomes	Impacts—What Happened?
				(which is underway) will unlock access to donor financing available under the CAADP umbrella.	The ZAIP was also included in the GoZ's latest national development strategy, "Zim ASSET".
1.12 Study on Land Reform <i>Ongoing</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final thematic reports Synthesis report with key policy recommendations for the Comprehensive Land Reform Programme (CLaRP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not applicable—activity is in progress and thematic reports and synthesis report are being finalised. We have seen copies of the draft reports and this activity appears to be on track. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate completion of the CLaRP, including key policy, legal, and regulatory reforms Enhanced country knowledge Improved country capacity for service delivery Improved policy dialogue between GoZ and stakeholders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not applicable—activity is in progress and outputs have not yet been released to external parties 	No impacts have yet been observed, as the activity is ongoing and outputs have not been finalised. However, it is unlikely that noticeable impacts will be made, since the Ministry of Lands (MLRR) has since disengaged from the CLaRP process due to sensitivities. We nonetheless obtained anecdotal evidence that technical experts within the MLRR are reading the various land studies being produced by the A-MDTF.
2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation <i>Closed</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Zimbabwe Growth and Recovery Policy Notes Aide Memoire on constraints and challenges to economic growth; recommendations for setting budget priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 16 Growth and Recovery Policy Notes produced and circulated within the GoZ Aide Memoire to the Ministry of Finance (MFED) and other GoZ ministries, which included, as an annex, the Infrastructure Policy Note produced under 3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inform the GoZ about challenges, opportunities, and policy options for a 2014–2018 recovery plan Improve planning and execution of expenditures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recovery Policy Notes laid out the key challenges, opportunities, and policy options for the GoZ (by sector) The Aide Memoire provides, and dialogue with the MFED provided, concrete steps to improve the planning and execution of expenditures 	This was the fourth consecutive year in which TA was provided to the MFED to produce the GoZ annual budget. The recommendations provided to the MFED were largely reflected in the 2014 budget, with the exception of the civil service wage increases. While the 2013 elections and new constitution bred uncertainty for the GoZ and donors, the continuity of this TA despite the changing political landscape helped

Activity	Target Outputs	Actual Outputs	Target Outcomes	Actual Outcomes	Impacts—What Happened?
					strengthen relationships that had been built over time with the MFED. It also helped signal to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that the GoZ would remain committed to the ongoing staff monitored programme (SMP), which is designed to improve the country's fiscal health.
2.04 Poverty Analysis <i>Closed</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poverty Report Poverty Map Policy Notes (not fully defined in CN) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poverty Report, but not completed by A-MDTF consultants Training on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping techniques 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Produce an updated analysis of poverty in Zimbabwe† Contributed to strengthening evidence-based decision-making and targeting of social sector interventions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Macroeconomic variables from the Poverty Report were used in designing the IMF's SMP The poverty data were used in ZIMSTAT's Household Targeting Survey The GoZ relied on the Poverty Datum Lines (PDLs) from the Poverty Report to support wage negotiations with civil servants' unions The Poverty Report data were key benchmarks in the GoZ's food and nutrition policy launched in 2013 The Ministry of Public 	<p>The Poverty Report has been used by the GoZ to inform other studies or the formulation of policies (we identified at least 5 instances). However, the report was produced without the donors or its consultants being given access to the Poverty Income Consumption and Expenditure Survey (PICES) data by ZIMSTAT. As a result, the consultants were unable to produce the Poverty Map and accompanying Policy Notes that were planned. Instead, the A-MDTF funded an expert review of the Poverty Report, as well as training on GIS mapping techniques for ZIMSTAT statisticians. In this regard, donors consider the activity a failure because lack of access to the data has limited the potential impacts of the TA provided.</p>

Activity	Target Outputs	Actual Outputs	Target Outcomes	Actual Outcomes	Impacts—What Happened?
				Works, Labour, and Social Welfare (MPWLSW) is using the Poverty Report and PICES data to recalibrate its social protection programmes	
2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme <i>Ongoing</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diagnostic study on modernisation of mineral licensing system Roundtable and workshop on mining taxation Scoping study on mining revenue transparency Taxation revenue model and training workshop Ongoing dialogue with the GoZ on mining policy issues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diagnostic study on mineral licensing published Roundtable and workshop on mining taxation hosted Scoping study finalised Taxation revenue model being built, and workshop consisting of high-level tax policy discussion and hands-on training scheduled for October 2014 At least 5 mining sector missions conducted with Washington-based mining sector experts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development (MMMD) gains access to technical expertise that it lacks on key mining sector policy issues, such as taxation, licensing, and revenue transparency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The goal of providing “just-in-time” policy advice and TA was met by responding to the changing needs of the GoZ and the political landscape. Although the relationship was sometimes strained between the World Bank, donors, and the GoZ, the MMMD and the MFED have continued to seek assistance from the A-MDTF on mining policy issues. 	<p>While there have been some promising developments, it has been difficult to produce measurable impacts in the mining sector. The only clear example was the tender issued by the MMMD in collaboration with the Chamber of Mines for a computerised cadastre, which resulted from the diagnostic study on mineral licensing. One unanticipated benefit of the dialogue maintained with the GoZ is that the Army granted World Bank mining experts access to the diamond fields, granting unprecedented transparency into this resource.</p>
2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA to prioritise activities in the National Statistics Development Strategy (NSDS) and validate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA provided to prioritise and validate costing of statistical products in NSDS TA facilitated outreach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved efficiency and effectiveness of Zimbabwe’s National Statistical System (NSS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The NSDS served as a credible roadmap for statistics development over the five-year planning horizon, thus improving the 	<p>The TA lent credibility to the NSDS, which has made it easier for ZIMSTAT to secure donor funding for key statistical products. For example, ZIMSTAT received US\$40</p>

Activity	Target Outputs	Actual Outputs	Target Outcomes	Actual Outcomes	Impacts—What Happened?
<i>Closed</i>	their costing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participation in ZIMSTAT outreach to key stakeholders Inventory of existing funding sources of ZIMSTAT's products Report on NSDS and system-wide approach (SWAp) to statistics produced for donors 	to key stakeholders and inventory of existing funding sources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Report on NSDS and SWAp delivered to donors 		efficiency and effectiveness of the NSS	million from UNDP to carry out the population census, which was part of the NSDS. The NSDS has also helped coordinate the production and consumption of statistics within the GoZ.
2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance <i>Closed</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA in designing and implementing enhancements to the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) A report documenting the TA provided 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All phases of TA concluded TA report delivered to donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enable the GoZ to produce transparent, integrated, validated, accurate, verifiable, and safeguarded financial information pertaining to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The budget Cash management Revenue and expenditure control Financial assets Liabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> By the end of the TA in 2010, the GoZ was able to produce transparent, integrated, validated, accurate, verifiable, and safeguarded financial information pertaining to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The budget Cash management Revenue and expenditure control Financial assets Liabilities 	The IFMIS is now being used to manage all fiscal data, and has greatly improved the transparency of GoZ accounting. The MFED enjoys the ability to view all revenues and expenditures from the global level down to the district level, while donors also reported improved transparency and accountability. The GoZ continues to expand the scope of the system to capture more data, such as enabling live data input and reporting for the district councils (which currently report manually in batches), as well as bringing the accounts in line with international accounting standards (IPSAS). Donor funding is needed to continue the pace of

Activity	Target Outputs	Actual Outputs	Target Outcomes	Actual Outcomes	Impacts—What Happened?
					improvements that have been realised to-date.
3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure <i>Ongoing</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 12 monthly Water Forums hosted 12 Briefing Notes, one per water forum Supporting an international conference on water sector reforms Improving the National Action Committee (NAC) website to capture important knowledge generated in the sector Consultant reports as required by the undefined rapid TA requests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6 periodic Water Forums hosted Support provided for MEWC officials to attend Sanitation and Water for All meeting in Washington, DC 10 Policy Notes published, 4 of which summarised other A-MDTF activities conducted in the water and sanitation sector Rapid assessment on improving water supply in Bulawayo Policy note on climate change mitigation and adaptation for the MEWC Infrastructure policy note and review, in support of activity 2.02 Rapid feasibility assessment to implement performance contracts for ZINWA Support for MEWC officials to visit the regulator and the water 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate dialogue and guide planning to promote coordinated responses to sector challenges Reinforce collaboration across levels, between sectors, and foster collective accountability towards shared goals Facilitate and strengthen multi-donor consultation for water and sanitation policy issues Determine if there are features of other sectors' approaches on which the water and sanitation sector could "piggyback," combining forces to allow greater efficiencies, economies of scale, and innovations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Ministry of Water (MEWC) confirmed the Water Forums facilitated dialogue by providing an opportunity to convene all of the key stakeholders to think about the major challenges facing the water sector The City of Bulawayo, the MEWC, and the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works, and National Housing (MLGPWNH) collaborated to identify viable options to resolve the water supply crisis in Bulawayo, following the rapid assessment TA that was funded by the A-MDTF The donors relied on the ITRG and the Water Forums as a means of coordinating internally and with the 	<p>Based on attendance records for four of the Water Forums, we have determined that they had a major impact by enabling dialogue among all of the key stakeholders in the water sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoZ—MEWC, MLGPWNH, Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), the Prime Minister's office, local municipalities Donors—UNICEF, African Development Bank (AfDB), A-MDTF donors NGOs. <p>The activity also filled the need for flexibility in responding to rapid requests by the GoZ that might not otherwise be supported due to the administrative processes required to approve new activities and their corresponding child trust funds.</p>

Activity	Target Outputs	Actual Outputs	Target Outcomes	Actual Outcomes	Impacts—What Happened?
		utility in Zambia to learn about prepaid meters		GoZ on water sector	
3.07 National Water Policy <i>Closed</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technical Background Documents on 3 topics: (i) Water Resources Management, (ii) Rural Water Supply and Sanitation, and (iii) Urban Water Supply and Sanitation TA to draft the National Water Policy (NWP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 13 thematic papers produced Thematic papers used as basis for the 3 Technical Background Documents, which were produced, disseminated, and consolidated into a policy recommendations document TA provided to the MEWC to prepare the draft NWP, facilitate stakeholder consultations, launch the NWP, and disseminate it 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The GoZ has a comprehensive framework for the protection, development, and management of Zimbabwe's water resources for economic growth and social development in the country's changing circumstances 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comprehensive water policy passed, which provided guidance on institutional, financial, and technical issues that are important to the sector Helped the GoZ identify what knowledge gaps exist in the sector, such as investment planning 	<p>Adopting the policy has led to a series of initiatives within the GoZ to harmonise other policies to conform the sector structure to the NWP. For example, ZINWA is now undergoing an exercise to ring-fence its varied roles as a steward and developer of water resources and provider of water supply services. Parliament is also considering legislation that would enable many of the reforms called for in the NWP. Furthermore, the core components of the NWP have also been adopted by the GoZ in Zim ASSET, signalling a strong commitment to major reforms of the water sector.</p>
4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved dialogue entered into between various stakeholders Specific and targeted feedback meetings with stakeholders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The study enabled a dialogue between donors and the GoZ on how to design social protection programmes, such as the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children and the multi-donor 	<p>The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) whose redesign was informed by this study (and a sister study funded by the A-MDTF) now forms one pillar in the National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS). The PSNP is funded with support from other donors (those outside the A-MDTF), but</p>

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Activity	Target Outputs	Actual Outputs	Target Outcomes	Actual Outcomes	Impacts—What Happened?
Civil Works <i>Closed</i>				Child Protection Fund	without the technical underpinning provided by this study, securing donor funding would have not been possible.

Note: † Indicates a target outcome that was specified in the activity Concept Notes, but which did not meet the DAC definition for “outcome.” We therefore disregarded these target outcomes and, for activity 2.04, we drafted a target outcome based on our understanding of the activity (because otherwise there would be no target outcome to refer to).

The sample of activities generally produced targeted outputs and outcomes

The analysis presented in Table 5.1 demonstrates that the 11 activities in the sample generally produced the outputs and outcomes that were expected. There were three exceptions, each explained below.

Activity 1.12, Study on Land Reform, is still ongoing. Therefore, we cannot yet determine if the targeted outputs and outcomes were achieved. We have seen draft final versions of the thematic reports and synthesis report and we understand that those will be finalised by October 2014.

Activity 2.04, Poverty Analysis, did not produce the exact outputs that were expected, but rather produced different outputs. This was largely because the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) did not grant the consultants hired by the A-MDTF access to the underlying poverty dataset (PICES). As a result, the scope of work was redefined so that the consultants provided TA to ZIMSTAT statisticians to support the quality of their work, commented on the Poverty Report, and provided training on GIS mapping techniques. However, even given the different outputs produced, the target outcomes were still achieved.

Activity 3.05 was generally successful. This activity was designed to be **flexible**, and therefore adaptive to the changing needs of the GoZ. Funds were used from this activity to support at least six small, quick-turnaround requests from the GoZ (in addition to the Water Forums and Policy Notes)—all of which are identified in Table 5.1. However, three sets of target outputs (as defined in the CN) were not fully produced. Only 6 of 12 targeted Water Forums were hosted, and only 10 of 12 targeted Policy Notes for the Water Forums were produced. In addition, we found no evidence of support provided by the A-MDTF to improve the website of the National Action Committee (NAC) for the water sector.

The outputs produced by the sample of activities were high quality

Overall, we found that stakeholders almost unanimously agreed that the Fund's outputs (studies, reports, TA, and other analytical support) were all very high quality and targeted to their needs.

In one instance—support to the GoZ for preparation of the ZAIP and the CAADP (1.03)—the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation, and Irrigation Development (MAMID) and the task team leader (TTL) for the ASTRG both acknowledged that the consultants that were hired lacked sufficient local knowledge of Zimbabwe to provide useful outputs. Even in this case, the problem was quickly resolved by replacing the consultants with new consultants who were able to produce a draft ZAIP to the full satisfaction of the GoZ and the TTL.

As previously mentioned, we present our conclusions on the overall effectiveness of the A-MDTF in Section 5.4, after answering other relevant evaluation questions that are closely related and support our programme-level conclusions in the following sections.

5.2 What Impacts Were Realised?

Five of the evaluation questions specified in the TOR examine the same question in slightly different ways: did activities supported by the A-MDTF deliver any impacts, and if so, what are those impacts? The exact questions are:

- How were the outputs of different interventions used, or what were the plans for utilisation?

- What are the changes stimulated or caused by A-MDTF funded projects, if any?
- To what extent have the activities contributed to sound policy or strategy formulation?
- Are there new initiatives caused by the implementation of the A-MDTF funded projects?
- Are there any unintended benefits or contributions made by the implementation of the A-MDTF activities?

Because these questions are so closely related, we group our responses together in this section. Each question is answered in the sections below, referring to the impact data collected for the 11 activities in our sample (and which were summarised in Table 5.1). Where possible, we also use data collected at a programme-level.

5.2.1 How Were the Outputs of Different Interventions Used?

If the Fund's outputs were used for other purposes or not used at all, this would decrease the likelihood that the intended outcomes and impacts would happen. To assess if the Fund's outputs were used as intended, we asked stakeholders if they found the outputs useful and, if so, how they used them.

For seven of the activities in the sample (64 percent), the outputs were used precisely as expected at activity inception. For example, Activity 3.07 National Water Policy, the concept note explains that donors expected the GoZ would use the Technical Background Documents to inform the drafting of its water policy. Our interviews confirm that this is exactly what happened. We spoke to the TTL for the Zimbabwe Infrastructure Technical Review Group (ITRG) and the Ministry of Environment, Water, and Climate (MEWC) and found that these documents were used to form the country's water policy. In fact, the MEWC referred to these documents as the "backbone" of the National Water Policy.

There were four cases (36 percent), where the outputs were not used at all or where they were not entirely used as expected. These exceptions are explained further below:

- **Study on Land Reform (1.12)**—the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement (MLRR) has disengaged from the A-MDTF due to increased sensitivities surrounding land issues following the 2013 elections. Although this activity is still ongoing and the outputs have not been produced, it is highly unlikely they will be used in any official capacity
- **Support to 2014 Budget Preparation (2.02)**—the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED) used the Aide Memoire and accompanying Economic Growth and Recovery Notes that were produced with A-MDTF funding to help set the GoZ's 2014 budget. However, one notable exception was that the GoZ granted wage increases to civil servants, despite being advised otherwise by World Bank experts
- **Poverty Analysis (2.04)**—ZIMSTAT did not grant the consultants access to the PICES data needed to produce the outputs as intended. Rather, ZIMSTAT prepared the Poverty Report internally with TA from the hired consultants. Instead of receiving a complete Poverty Map, ZIMSTAT statisticians were trained on mapping techniques
- **Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme (2.10)**—We found no clear evidence of the outputs being taken up by the Ministry of

Mines and Mining Development (MMMD), other than the recommendation in a study on licensing regimes to procure a computerised mining cadastre.

This analysis shows that most outputs produced by the activities in the sample were mostly used as planned. However, donors can reasonably expect that not all outputs funded by the A-MDTF will be (or were) used as planned because this is ultimately up to the GoZ. Where possible, being flexible to the needs of GoZ helped to still achieve the desired end result. For instance, with the Poverty Analysis (2.04), the A-MDTF did well to work with ZIMSTAT when consultants were not allowed access to the PICES data. The result was that the Poverty Report was still produced, and some capacity was built within ZIMSTAT by training its statisticians on poverty-mapping techniques.

5.2.2 What Are the Changes Stimulated by A-MDTF Projects?

This question essentially asks what impacts were **observed** as a result of an activity being undertaken. However, to fully understand A-MDTF's success in achieving impacts, we must also consider what impacts were **expected** at activity inception, and how well the A-MDTF performed against these expectations.

The Fund achieved the target impacts defined at the programme-level

At the programme level, the Operational Guidelines specify two impacts that are expected from the A-MDTF:

- Donors and the World Bank remain abreast of, and are coordinated on, key development challenges
- GoZ builds capacity to respond when economic conditions warrant re-engagement of the donor community.²¹

The A-MDTF has generally succeeded in stimulating these two impacts. This is based on the review of programme documents (such as the annual reports and the Mid Term Review) and interviews with donors, Secretariat staff, and GoZ ministries.

For example, during interviews donors consistently mentioned that TRGs and Policy Committee (PC) meetings provided a much needed forum for discussing key development challenges and coordinating donor engagement.

There were also numerous examples of the GoZ's capacity being built as a result of A-MDTF funding, among them:

- Department of Irrigation staff learning to collect data in the field, enabling future studies on other irrigation sector issues (activity 1.02)
- Over 1,800 GoZ finance officers and staff being trained on using the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) system to enter revenue and expenditure data and produce financial reports (activity 2.17)
- The Environmental Management Agency (EMA) learning how to quickly and accurately estimate water quality at geographically disperse sites using remote satellite imaging, in turn slashing personnel costs that would otherwise be required for field visits (activity 3.02).

²¹ A-MDTF, 2011 *Operational Guidelines*, P. 31.

The Fund achieved many of the target impacts at the activity-level

We also attempted to evaluate whether the activities in the sample succeeded in achieving their own, unique target impacts. Impacts that were expected from individual activities included influencing policies, stimulating institutional reforms within key sectors, or informing the design of new government programmes, among others. Five of the 11 activities in the sample (45 percent) succeeded in achieving their **target** impacts, as shown in Table 5.2.²² An additional four activities (36 percent) yielded some impacts, although they were not exactly those that were targeted at activity inception. Expected impacts were identified from the CNs, while impacts achieved were identified from the latest annual report in which each activity appeared. To support these findings, we also drew from information collected during the stakeholder interviews.

We note that though this analysis may suggest the Fund was unsuccessful in yielding desired impacts, we believe it tells another story: that the impacts that were targeted at the outset of the activity may not have been realistically defined. Many of the targeted impacts were **far** “downstream” of the activity itself. For example, one target impact of the National Water Policy (activity 3.07) was to induce “accelerated rehabilitation, improved maintenance, and improved management of water and sanitation infrastructure.” However, because this is an end result that would necessarily take time and would be contingent on many other factors (other than formulation of the policy itself), this may not have been an appropriate target to set. As a result many of the activities yielded positive impacts that contributed to the Fund achieving its overall targets, but strictly speaking may not have fully met the target impacts of the activity.

²² 1.12 Study on Land Reform is ongoing, and therefore we cannot evaluate whether the expected impact has been achieved. However, we believe it is unlikely because the MLRR has disengaged from the CLaRP process. Therefore, it is counted as one of the six activities that did not achieve its expected impact.

Table 5.2: Impacts Stimulated or Caused by Activities in the Sample

Activity	Expected Impacts	Were Expected Impacts Achieved?
1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation	Promote outcome-based planning for the public and private sector irrigation actors, to overcome the planning vacuum or traditional dualistic approaches	No—we found no evidence of outcome-based planning being implemented for the irrigation sector
1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP	Establishment of a framework for joint investment between donors and the GoZ once re-engagement occurs	Yes—CAADP compact signed at a high-level meeting in November 2013
1.12 Study on Land Reform	Rural land resources are more equitably and efficiently utilised in an environmentally sustainable manner	N/A—activity is ongoing and outputs have not yet been produced
2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rationalisation of the Government budgeting process ▪ Inform expenditures target in 2014 IMF Staff Monitored Programme ▪ Possible input to an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) process 	<p>Somewhat—examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The MFED staff became accustomed to working with World Bank experts and other consultants hired by the A-MDTF to provide TA, improving the credibility and technical underpinning of the budget ▪ The engagement of World Bank experts under this activity signalled to the IMF that the new GoZ administration (which won the 2013 elections) was ready to engage on economic issues. As a result, the IMF continued with its staff-monitored programme (SMP) for the GoZ, a critical step toward clearing the public debt <p>We found no evidence of linkages to the I-PRSP process.</p>
2.04 Poverty Analysis	Contribute to strengthening evidence-based decision-making and targeting of social sector interventions	<p>Yes—examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Some of the macroeconomic variables derived from the poverty study (PICES) have been used as part of the IMF's staff monitored programme to improve the fiscal health of the GoZ

Activity	Expected Impacts	Were Expected Impacts Achieved?
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The PICES data were used in the Household Targeting Survey ▪ The GoZ relied heavily on the Poverty Datum Lines (PDLs) derived from the PICES study to support its wage negotiations with civil servants' unions ▪ The PICES data were used as key benchmarks in the GoZ's food and nutrition policy launched in 2013
2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme	Mining sector policies are developed that reflect international best practices and sector-specific know-how	Somewhat—the only example we found was that the MMMD is currently procuring a computerised cadastre, which will be the centrepiece of a reformed mineral licensing regime
2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provision of relevant, timely, and reliable statistics for both national and international users ▪ Policies and programs in Zimbabwe informed by ZIMSTAT's products 	<p>Yes—examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The National Statistics Development Strategy (NSDS) that was supported by this TA is serving as the roadmap for ZIMSTAT's statistical products produced over the five-year period of the strategy (2013–2018) ▪ The NSDS has helped coordinate the varying sources of government statistics. It operationalizes the National Statistical System that is established by law, and the end result is that ZIMSTAT serves as a clearinghouse of statistical information, all of which must meet ZIMSTAT's own quality assurance procedures (which are based on international statistical standards)
2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support the current financial management requirements of the GoZ for the Consolidated Revenue Fund ▪ Support good practice fiduciary requirements for donor-funded projects 	<p>Yes—examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Laid the foundation for future upgrades to the IFMIS and accompanying processes to promote transparency and accountability in public financial management ▪ A-MDTF and the World Bank experts are currently assisting the GoZ in transitioning to accounts that are compliant with International Public Sector Accounting Standards ▪ The EMGTRG has indicated that, from the donors' perspective, transparency in public financial management has “significantly improved”
3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improved management of key sector policy issues 	<p>Somewhat—examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The MEWC has indicated that the Water Forum has led to the adoption of

Activity	Expected Impacts	Were Expected Impacts Achieved?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved water governance Increased long-term sustainability of water resources and service provision 	<p>service-level benchmarking for water supply services throughout the country</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ZINWA is looking to implement performance contracts to improve collection rates
3.07 National Water Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policies that enable increased sustainable water and sanitation service access and sustainable management of national water resources to support economic growth and development Increased financing to the water sector Accelerated rehabilitation, improved maintenance, and improved management of water and sanitation infrastructure 	<p>Somewhat—examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The NWP has started a series of dialogues within the GoZ to harmonise other policies in order to conform the sector structure to the policy The NWP initiated a series of reforms in the water sector, including a ring-fencing exercise within ZINWA to more clearly delineate its varied roles as a steward and developer of water resources, provider of water supply services, among others <p>We found no evidence of increased sector financing, or accelerated rehabilitation and improved maintenance.</p>
4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social protection framework adopted by stakeholders, resulting in a more harmonised and coordinated implementation of social protection activities Specific effective and sustainable programmes targeted for the youths developed Ministries' social protection officers improve the design and implementation of social protection programmes 	<p>Yes—examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Report used in conjunction with sister report on social protection to inform the design of the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, and the multi-donor Child Protection Fund Related social protection programmes that have benefited from the studies are the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) and the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme to address poverty at household levels, particularly those that are labour constrained

Based on our programme and activity-level findings, we conclude that the A-MDTF was moderately successful in stimulating changes (impacts). However, we qualify this conclusion by emphasising that the lack of a programme-level, robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework made it impossible to prove clear links between A-MDTF outputs and the outcomes and impacts that were observed. Document review and stakeholder interviews allowed us to fill some gaps by attributing the impacts described in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 to A-MDTF interventions—but only in some cases. In many others, we were unable to use these techniques alone to demonstrate that an observed impact was solely the result of the A-MDTF intervention.

5.2.3 To What Extent Have the Activities Contributed to Sound Policy or Strategy Formulation?

This question is particularly relevant because of the **analytical** nature of A-MDTF's work. The Fund was designed to lay the foundation for future donor engagements with the GoZ, by supporting analytical work across key thematic areas. If the analytical work led to improvements in policies and strategies, these improvements signal to donors that the GoZ has the capacity and commitment to engage on topics where the priorities of the GoZ and donors overlap.

To answer this question, we investigated whether the outputs that were produced under each of the 11 activities in the sample informed any policies or strategies.²³ We first asked GoZ ministries how the analytical work funded by the A-MDTF may have informed their policymaking decisions. When the ministry stakeholders identified examples, we also asked if they thought the same policies or strategies would have resulted without the analytical work performed with A-MDTF funding.

Our activity-level analysis revealed contributions to policy or strategy formulation resulting from 9 of the 11 activities in the sample (82 percent). Of these nine activities, six provided “major” contributions, meaning that the GoZ stakeholders thought that the analytical work funded by the A-MDTF was the largest factor that contributed to the formulation of the policy or strategy. The remaining three activities provided “minor” contributions, meaning that the analytical work influenced the policy outcome, but was not the largest contributing factor. Only two activities in the sample did not lead to any measurable contributions to policy or strategy formulation:

- 1.12 Study on Land Reform
- 2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme.

The full results of this analysis are presented in Appendix C (see Table C.1).

This analysis suggests that the A-MDTF was largely successful in producing analytical work that ultimately led to the formulation of policies or strategies by the GoZ.

5.2.4 Are There New Initiatives Caused by the A-MDTF Projects?

We understand “initiative” to mean other government or donor-supported programmes and activities. Given this definition, this question is important because it can signal whether the A-MDTF had a lasting and sustainable impact by spurring follow-on activities. These follow-on activities could be more analytical work, similar to that funded by the A-MDTF, or other types of activities, such as investment in key sectors.

²³ Our approach was informed by the framework used by the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility's (PPIAF) Monitoring and Evaluation Methodology.

To answer this question, we first assessed what new initiatives may have been expected at the beginning of the activity. We reviewed the CNs from our sample of 11 activities and interviewed GoZ and donor stakeholders to identify how many activities were expected to have follow-on initiatives.

Based on this review, only 5 of the 11 activities in the sample were expected to produce new initiatives. For example, according to the CN for activity 2.17, donors expected that the initial Zimbabwe Public Financial Management System (PFMS) work might lead the GoZ to continue future development on the IFMIS, enabling increased functionality on the platform.

To confirm that these expected initiatives actually occurred and to identify any unplanned follow-on initiatives, we interviewed the GoZ ministries and donors. The analysis found that 6 of the 11 activities in the sample actually led to new initiatives being undertaken by donors or by the GoZ. For example, as a result of the Water Forums supported by 3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure, the MEWC is seeking to continue the dialogue and sector coordination by convening similar TA forums on a less frequent basis (due to funding restrictions). The full results of this analysis are presented in Appendix C (see Table C.2).

This activity-level analysis, therefore, suggests that the A-MDTF was **moderately successful** in stimulating new initiatives.

5.2.5 Are There Any Unintended Benefits or Contributions Made by the Implementation of the Activities?

The purpose of this question is to understand whether the A-MDTF-supported activities may have led to any benefits or contributions that were not anticipated when donors approved the activity.

To answer this question, we looked for evidence of unintended benefits or contributions resulting from the 11 activities in the sample. Evidence was drawn from reviewing programme documents, and interviewing key Government and donor stakeholders. During these interviews, whenever possible, we also asked questions to determine the level of attribution of these unintended benefits and contributions to the A-MDTF funded activities. This allowed us to conclude if the A-MDTF funded activities were necessary to create these unintended benefits and contributions.

Of the 11 activities in the sample, in just one instance were unintended benefits or contributions identified and attributed to an A-MDTF engagement: 2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme. In this case, the A-MDTF had been funding various studies, workshops, and dialogues on mining sector policy issues, including taxation, licensing, and revenue transparency. During this activity, the World Bank mining experts were unexpectedly granted access to the diamond fields controlled by the Zimbabwe Army, thus allowing these experts to gather more information that helped inform the dialogue. The TTL for the EMGTRG confirmed that this would likely not have happened without the ongoing policy dialogue that was maintained with A-MDTF funding.

We also found two other instances of unintended benefits or contributions attributed to A-MDTF-funded activities that were outside the sample of 11 activities. Both cases were identified through stakeholder interviews:

- **2.08 Small Business Survey**—the Microfinance Wholesale Trust is a donor-funded facility that on-lends to microfinance institutions throughout Zimbabwe. The Trust used the A-MDTF-funded Small Business Survey to

help re-focus its lending programs to respond to the needs of the informal economy, which increasingly dominates the Zimbabwean economy. While this is not a surprising result, it was not anticipated by donors when funding the survey

- **3.02 Water Quality Monitoring Strategy**—this activity was originally designed to enable a rapid assessment of water quality in watersheds using remote sensing techniques, and without requiring costly field visits. As the techniques were developed and validated, the University of Zimbabwe researchers supported by the A-MDTF discovered that the same techniques could also be used to allow a rapid assessment of dam reservoir levels. The EMA is now looking to also implement this application of the remote sensing techniques

Our activity-level analysis yields very limited evidence that the A-MDTF led to unintended benefits or contributions in Zimbabwe. Rather, we found that it was far more common for the activities to achieve what was intended, or less in some cases (as shown in Table 5.1).

5.3 What Were Other Factors Influencing Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability?

The remaining five evaluation questions address different aspects of the effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of A-MDTF-funded activities:

- Are the targeted beneficiaries aware of project interventions meant to assist them? (Effectiveness)
- What are the perceived benefits? (Impact)
- Are the results and impacts of A-MDTF's activities likely to continue after funding has stopped? (Sustainability)
- How effectively did the Fund manage risks related to its activities, including financial risks, reputation risks, political risks, social risks, and environmental risks? (Effectiveness)
- What were the Trust Fund's critical success factors and how did the Fund perform against these? (Effectiveness).

We respond to these five questions in the following sub-sections. Analysis was based on a mix of information collected from the sample of 11 activities and, where appropriate, programme-level information.

5.3.1 Are the Targeted Beneficiaries Aware of Interventions Meant to Assist Them?

For the A-MDTF to have a meaningful impact on the targeted stakeholders, it is important that the stakeholders actually knew about the work A-MDTF was funding. If targeted stakeholders were unaware of the Fund's intervention, they would be less likely to use the documents, training, and other benefits supported by the Fund, thus lowering the Fund's effectiveness.

To answer this question, we identified the Fund's targeted beneficiaries, and determined their level of awareness of the A-MDTF intervention. We interviewed the targeted beneficiaries identified during our field visit to Zimbabwe, asking about their awareness of our sample of 11 activities.

We identified two types of beneficiaries:

- **Direct beneficiaries**—GoZ ministries that were the counterparts for A-MDTF studies, TA activities, knowledge exchanges, or information management system implementations
- **Indirect beneficiaries**—private sector and non-state actors with a vested interest in policies that may have been influenced or supported by an A-MDTF activity. This could include chambers of commerce, farmers' unions, think tanks, or NGOs.

In preparation for our field visit, we assembled a matrix of targeted beneficiaries for the activities in the sample. This matrix included all direct beneficiaries identified in the CNs, as well as indirect beneficiaries that we hypothesised might have had knowledge of the work funded by the A-MDTF²⁴.

In total, we identified 35 unique beneficiaries (both direct and indirect). Of these 35 beneficiaries, we interviewed 24 (68 percent)—due to time restrictions—to determine their level of awareness of A-MDTF-supported activities. For each sample activity, we assessed the level of awareness of all relevant beneficiaries for that particular activity. Certain beneficiaries were interviewed for more than one activity.

From our interviews, we found that a majority of the beneficiaries we interviewed (75 percent) were aware of A-MDTF, and the sample of A-MDTF supported activities. All 16 of the direct beneficiaries we interviewed were aware of the activities we asked about, while 67 percent of indirect beneficiaries (35 of 52) were aware of these activities.²⁵

By thematic area, beneficiaries were most aware of ITRG activities. Of the 10 stakeholders we interviewed about ITRG activities, nine were aware of the activities (90 percent). Of the 23 stakeholders interviewed about ASTRG activities, 18 were aware of these activities (78 percent). Of the 21 stakeholders interviewed EMGTRG activities, 11 were aware of these activities (52 percent). We also asked about the one activity in the sample from the former SPTRG: Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works (4.01). Of the three targeted beneficiaries questioned, two out of three (67 percent) were aware of this activity.

It should be noted here that there was one key beneficiary that we were unable to speak with: MLRR. While the MLRR was a key targeted beneficiary for activity 1.12, Study on Land Reform, we were unable to verify this beneficiary's awareness of the activity due to political sensitivities in Zimbabwe on land reform issues. However, we do have anecdotal evidence from the TTL for the ASTRG and the Barefoot Education for Africa Trust (BEAT) that technical experts within the MLRR are following this work (though no public acknowledgement has been made).

Based on our sampling approach, we conclude that the A-MDTF ensured that direct beneficiaries were aware of the analytical work relevant to them, while indirect beneficiaries were not always aware. The Fund did particularly well in ensuring that both direct and indirect beneficiaries were aware of activities within the ITRG. In general, the A-MDTF failed to engage indirect beneficiaries in the private sector, as well as NGOs

²⁴ Our list was not designed to be exhaustive, given the number of NGOs (at least 1,200) and other indirect beneficiaries operating in Zimbabwe.

²⁵ Although we interviewed 35 unique beneficiaries, we hypothesised that some beneficiaries were aware of more than one activity (we confirmed this was true in many cases). For the purposes of illustrating awareness of activities, we count each beneficiary-activity combination separately.

(particularly those working on civil society issues). Private sector organisations, such as industry and trade associations, did not always have knowledge of the A-MDTF's work. Some NGOs (including the Poverty Reduction Forum Trust) even declined our interview requests because they had no knowledge of the A-MDTF.

5.3.2 What Are the Perceived Benefits?

Having identified which beneficiaries were aware of A-MDTF's activities, we asked them what benefits they received from this sample of activities. Understanding the benefits received by targeted stakeholders is important for defining the impacts achieved by the Fund.

Based on these interviews, we found that the A-MDTF generated two key types of benefits for the targeted beneficiaries:

- **Increased dialogue among stakeholders**—according to target beneficiaries, the Fund fostered dialogue among stakeholders. This was particularly relevant for the agriculture sector, because previously the GoZ had not held consultations for key agriculture issues. Likewise, A-MDTF's activities in the water sector succeeded in facilitating consultations and dialogues among key sector participants
- **Increased technical capacity**—target beneficiaries agreed that the Fund built technical capacity in key government institutions, such as ZIMSTAT, the MFED, and the MEWC. For example, the A-MDTF-funded work with ZIMSTAT led to significant improvements in the quality and credibility of statistical products

A summary of the key benefits identified through interviews with targeted beneficiaries are presented in Table 5.3. Benefits are identified per activity in the sample.

Table 5.3: Perceived Benefits of the Sample of the Activities

Activity	Benefits Identified by Targeted Beneficiaries
1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Department of Irrigation identified two benefits: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The secondment of GoZ staff to the study team helped build capacity to carry out future field-based studies on irrigation issues – The study itself helped the GoZ to realise the need for improved sector coordination on irrigation investments ▪ Zim-ACP said that the study was very helpful because it found that a third of the irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe are fully functional, another third are only partially functional, and the final third are not functional at all. In doing so, it laid bare the challenges to be overcome and the opportunities for donors to engage
1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Permanent Secretary of Agriculture thought that the TA provided a significant boost toward enabling private sector investment in the agriculture sector. He views the ZAIP as an essential precursor to opening up the sector to much needed investment ▪ According to the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS), the process of producing the ZAIP and signing onto the CAADP enabled dialogue among the key sector stakeholders ▪ The BEAT indicated that the ZAIP and CAADP process is the first time in recent memory when the GoZ has held stakeholder consultations in the agriculture sector
1.12 Study on Land Reform	None identified by stakeholders
2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation	None identified by stakeholders
2.04 Poverty Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ZIMSTAT identified three benefits: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – This activity provided the funding that was needed to produce the first analysis of poverty in Zimbabwe since 2001 – The training on mapping techniques that the consultants hired by the A-MDTF helped build the capacity of ZIMSTAT – The participation of the consultants in reviewing and commenting on the study helped improve the credibility of the Poverty Report
2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The MMMD credited the A-MDTF with helping build capacity within the ministry by providing access to technical expertise that would not otherwise be available ▪ The ZASMC indicated that the workshops and studies supported under this activity were useful in that they allowed for networking within the mining sector ▪ The Chamber of Mines perceived two benefits: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The GoZ is tendering a computerisation of the mining cadastral system, which will result in reduced conflicts between miners and farmers, and among miners themselves – The “Diagnostic Study on Modernisation of the Mineral Licensing System” is helping shape the Chamber’s own conceptual thinking

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Activity	Benefits Identified by Targeted Beneficiaries
2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Director General of ZIMSTAT indicated that the involvement of international statistics experts (with A-MDTF support) provided yet another way to underpin the integrity and credibility of the statistical products generated by ZIMSTAT. He emphasized that ZIMSTAT has a high level of technical capacity, but that the TA enabled ZIMSTAT to improve its reputation for providing accurate, independent statistics ▪ Five organisations (ZMWF, FAO, NANGO, UNICEF, and CFU) indicated that the quality of ZIMSTAT’s statistical data and reports has significantly improved over the past two years
2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The training built capacity within the GoZ to enter data and run reports using the IFMIS. Before, users were not using the system efficiently and productively ▪ The MFED is now in a position to analyse the revenue and expenditure from global revenue down to the lowest unit in the Government (except for district councils, which is a forthcoming system upgrade)
3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Director of Water Resources at the MEWC stated that the Water Forum provided a recurring opportunity to convene all of the key stakeholders to think about the major challenges facing the water sector ▪ From the MEWC’s perspective, the peer-to-peer learning visits were highly valuable because they allowed key stakeholders in the water sector understand how sector reforms can be achieved (such as privatisation, introduction of prepaid meters, and so on)
3.07 National Water Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Director of Water Resources at the MEWC identified two benefits: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The Technical Background Documents “provided the backbones of the National Water Policy” – The A-MDTF’s assistance provided an impetus to convene all of the stakeholders in a way that wouldn’t have otherwise occurred ▪ The Director of Urban Authorities at the MLGPWNH stated that prior to the A-MDTF’s support that led to the National Water Policy, the GoZ didn’t have a sector policy. Referring to the constant crises facing the sector, the Director said “we were just constantly fighting fires. Now [that we have a policy], [we] are starting somewhere. It forced us to think about the structural questions...” ▪ ZINWA indicated that without the support from the A-MDTF, it would have taken many more years to generate the knowledge provided by the Technical Background Documents and inputs to the drafting of the National Water Policy
4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The MPWLSW identified three benefits: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – It helped the GoZ take stock of its public works programme and understand whether it was making a difference in the communities where it was being implemented – It enabled reforms to the programme, and the development of an operational manual to ensure that the programme created a meaningful impact – It helped bring donors such as USAID, the UN World Food Programme, DFID, and FAO to participate in the productive community works programme

5.3.3 Are the Results and Impacts Likely to Continue after Funding Has Stopped?

In Section 5.3.2, we identified two impacts that were broadly achieved by the A-MDTF: (i) increased dialogue among stakeholders, and (ii) increased technical capacity in key government institutions. We also identified the specific impacts that were achieved by each activity in the sample (see Table 5.1). Yet, the question remains: how sustainable are these impacts without continued support from the A-MDTF?

To assess the sustainability of impacts from closed projects, we asked beneficiaries if these impacts had, so far, continued after A-MDTF funding stopped. For ongoing projects, we assessed the likelihood that benefits would continue in the future. For instance, if the A-MDTF outputs are currently being used to shape future plans, then the benefits will likely continue. We also asked key stakeholders their view on whether these benefits would be sustained in the future. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4: Likelihood of Sustained Results and Impacts for the Sampled Activities

Activity	Are the Results and Impacts Likely to be Sustained?
1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation	Maybe—Although the targeted impacts have not yet been achieved, the MEWC reports that a National Irrigation Policy is forthcoming, which may implement many of the recommendations contained in this study
1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP	Yes—The ZAIP and signing of the CAADP compact set into motion an ongoing process to fully validate the ZAIP and continue the process toward attracting private investment in the agriculture sector. This will continue independently of any continued support from the A-MDTF donors
1.12 Study on Land Reform	No—The activity is still ongoing, but it is unlikely to produce any impacts because of continuing sensitivities surrounding land reform issues
2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation	No—The activity was a TA that was designed to support the 2014 budget cycle, rather than to produce sustained benefits for the MFED
2.04 Poverty Analysis	No—The largest impacts were realised shortly after the activity was concluded. The analysis contained within the Poverty Report is static and over time its value will decline, therefore it cannot be expected to have sustained impacts
2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme	No—The MMMD indicated that continued donor support is necessary to acquire knowledge of international best practice in the mining sector, and to gain access to technical expertise
2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics	Yes—The NSDS that was developed and finalised with support from this TA is being used by ZIMSTAT to define what products (surveys, censuses, and so on) it produces over the four-year planning horizon (2011–2015) and what resources are required to produce each product. This document will help the agency secure funding so that it can produce high-quality statistics through at least 2015
2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	Yes—Several successor TA activities have been carried out to continue support for developing and deploying new features for the IFMIS. Even once funding ends for these activities, having a robust

Activity	Are the Results and Impacts Likely to be Sustained?
	IFMIS is likely to have lasting impacts for the economy. By enabling accurate and rapid financial reports and improving electronic bookkeeping, the public is likely to benefit from improved government service delivery
3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure	Yes—The GoZ plans to continue the academic seminar format of the Water Forum (although less frequently), even after A-MDTF funding terminates. Having a forum to discuss key sector issues and promote debate on potential solutions will support improved water resource development and water supply in both urban and rural settings. ZINWA is likely to implement performance contracts to boost collection rates, which will improve ZINWA's financial and operating health
3.07 National Water Policy	Yes—The NWP set into motion a restructuring of the water sector, including redefinition of roles and responsibilities among GoZ agencies and parastatals. The GoZ is working to execute this reorganization, which requires harmonisation of other policies, as well as enabling legislation to be passed by Parliament. Once complete, the restructured sector should enable improved service delivery for urban and rural water supply, as well as best practice management of water resource development and water quality
4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	Yes—This initial study has led to a revitalisation of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), and has enabled the GoZ to continue the programme with the support of donors (outside the A-MDTF). Without the technical underpinning provided by this study, it is unlikely that the programme would have secured donor funding to continue operations

In summary, six of the 11 activities (54 percent) have delivered sustained benefits (or are likely to deliver sustained benefits) beyond the duration of A-MDTF funding. One additional activity (1.02) may yield sustained benefits, if its target impact is achieved. Four of the 11 activities (36 percent) are unlikely to produce any sustained benefits—either because no measurable impact was achieved (such as activities 1.12 and 2.10), or because the impacts were never intended to be sustained (such as activities 2.02 and 2.04).

While in some cases the work supported by the A-MDTF was unlikely to be carried forward in the short term without outside donor funding (such as activity 4.01 and 2.17), the benefits of the activity are nonetheless sustainable. This is because absent this initial analysis, these programmes would have lacked the technical underpinning to justify donor support to carry out programmatic work (which cannot be funded by the A-MDTF). In fact, both the PFMS project and the PSNP have benefitted from programmatic funding from outside donors.

Given the analytical and abstract nature of the work supported by the A-MDTF, it is difficult to say with full confidence that its impacts will be sustained. However, based on our assessment of the sustainability of the sample of A-MDTF activities, we conclude that these examples provide credible (though not conclusive) evidence that the Fund has contributed to sustained impacts in Zimbabwe.

5.3.4 How Effectively Did the Fund Manage Risks Related to Its Activities?

Another measure of effectiveness is how well a programme is able to identify and manage its risks. By identifying risks early on, the programme can devise appropriate

mitigation strategies, and thus deliver benefits more effectively. It is also important to check if the programme identified new risks during implementation, and took steps to mitigate them.

Risks to A-MDTF activities can be categorized into three main areas:

- **Financial risks**—such as constraints on donor funding or delays in disbursement
- **Reputation risks**—such as harm to the donors' or the Bank's credibility resulting from contextually inappropriate interventions or policy recommendations
- **Political risks**—such as a lack of GoZ buy-in for specific activities due to political sensitivities.

The TOR also identifies a fourth risk category for the A-MDTF activities: social and environmental risks.²⁶ However, given the analytical, policy-oriented nature of A-MDTF's activities, we did not find this risk particularly relevant to the Fund. Therefore, our analysis does not penalize the effectiveness of A-MDTF for instances where social and environmental risks were not considered.

Risk identification and mitigation at the programme level

To determine how effectively A-MDTF managed risks, we first examined what risks were identified at the programme level, and what plans the Fund had in place to mitigate them.

In its inception documents, which include the Administrative Agreement (AA) and the Operational Guidelines, the Fund never identified any risks or strategies to mitigate risks. The A-MDTF's 2010 Mid Term Review (MTR) did identify the following risks to the Fund:

- Donor harmonisation and coordination
- Slow government response
- Priorities becoming misaligned
- Multiple roles for the World Bank
- Supervision from the field and headquarters (Washington, DC).

However, the Secretariat (in particular, the A-MDTF Manager) was unable to identify how these risks were systematically mitigated across the A-MDTF's portfolio.

Risk identification and mitigation at the activity level

Based on the sample of activities, this evaluation found that the A-MDTF failed to systematically identify risks and risk mitigation strategies when defining and approving activities.

Of the 11 concept notes reviewed for the sample of activities, only three notes explicitly identified risks, and only one concept note defined mitigation strategies (2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance).

²⁶ Social risks can include harm to social groups (particularly the poor) resulting in full or in part from an A-MDTF intervention. Environmental risks can include harm to the environment resulting in full or in part from an A-MDTF intervention.

We also reviewed risks identified in the Grant Funding Request (GFR) documents for the sample of 11 activities. For each A-MDTF activity approved, a corresponding GFR was generated internally for World Bank staff. Each GFR requires a description of potential risks and strategies to mitigate these risks.

Our review of the GFR documents also indicated that A-MDTF did not perform a robust risk-identification or mitigation analysis before implementing activities. Many GFRs identified potential risks to activities, but did not outline mitigation strategies. We also found instances where some risks were identified, but the full range of potential risks was not considered. For instance, GFRs often identified political risks, but did not mention relevant financial or reputational risks. Thus, the risk of exhausting donor funds before finishing the activity (financial) or consultants providing contextually inappropriate recommendations or using politically controversial language (reputational) were not always considered.

Although risks and mitigation strategies were not commonly identified at the beginning of the activity, we did identify two cases (activities 1.03 and 3.07) where risks and mitigation strategies were identified while implementing the activity.

We also note that of all the activities in the sample, 2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance, had the most comprehensive and credible risk mitigation strategy. The activity defined 12 unique risks and corresponding mitigation strategies. It is perhaps not surprising that this activity encountered only minimal implementation problems. The biggest problem was with the consultants hired to carry out training. Even so, the activity's risk management framework helped resolve the problem: the consultants were later debarred from winning future work on PFMS assignments.

Had the A-MDTF used a more robust and systematic approach to identify and manage risks, the Fund may have been more effective. For instance, the lack of a risk management strategy could, perhaps, partly explain why the closing dates and disbursement windows for the Fund were extended on several occasions (more on this in Section 6.1.4). During the programme, activities were often extended due to insufficient buy-in from the GoZ, or because of delays caused by the GoZ counterparts (which may have been indicative of insufficient buy-in or capacity to actively engage with the A-MDTF). Had this risk been identified early on, perhaps some of these extensions could have been avoided. However, we acknowledge that some of these extensions may have happened regardless due to the changing political economy.

Nonetheless, it is important to define risks and mitigation strategies during project inception, so that the risk management processes are institutionalised early on into the activity. This process should be done consistently across all programme activities, and should consider the full range of relevant risks to the programme.

5.3.5 What Were the Trust Fund's Critical Success Factors and How Did the Fund Perform?

Critical success factors are features of the design and operation of the A-MDTF that were necessary for the Fund to perform well, that is, to deliver the expected results (outputs, outcomes, and impacts). Identifying these success factors is critical for understanding what made the A-MDTF effective, so that the factors can be taken into consideration in designing future programs.

These critical success factors were not formally defined by A-MDTF,²⁷ rather, we identified them during our interview with the Secretariat MDTF Programme Manager.²⁸ According to the Manager, the key critical success factors included the following:

- Donor commitment and engagement
- Secretariat understanding of the GoZ bureaucracy and its priorities
- Buy-in from GoZ
- Flexibility of the Fund
- Access to information and a communications strategy
- Availability of local World Bank specialists

We then assessed how the Fund performed on each of these six factors, using information from our document review and stakeholder interviews. The results of this analysis are grouped by success factor below, followed by our general conclusions on this evaluation question.

Donor commitment and engagement

Donor commitment can be measured in terms of financial contributions and the level of participation in the Fund's TRGs and the PC.

Donors had varying levels of financial commitment to the Fund, ranging from US\$300,000 to nearly US\$7.3 million. While contributions ranged, nearly all of the donors who contributed to the old TF also contributed to the new TF. Two donors—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (formerly FINNIDA) and the Canada Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development (formerly CIDA)—opted-out of the new TF, while the World Bank was advised not to contribute (in the MTR) to avoid conflicts of interest as a donor and Fund administrator.

Participation in the Fund also varied. From interviews with the TRGs, the PC, and the Secretariat, we found that some donors were highly engaged in the Fund while others did not participate at all in certain TRGs, and in some instances rarely participated in the PC. These donors generally had smaller in-country staff, and therefore did not have sufficient capacity to actively engage in A-MDTF governance.

Donor participation at both the TRG - and the PC-level is important given the level of responsibility these groups have in operating the fund. In particular, the role of the TRGs is to consider the technical merits of proposals for new activities, and make an informed recommendation to the PC of whether or not to fund the activity. The PC then holds the authority to approve or reject activity proposals, based on the recommendations of the TRGs and the donors' overall priorities, which are expressed within the forum of the PC.

Thus, it is critical for donors with expertise in each of the Fund's thematic areas (infrastructure, economic management and governance, and agriculture) to participate in the TRGs so as to make informed decisions on which activity proposals to pursue. Similarly, it is important for donors to participate in the PC to inform the direction of the Fund and the activities pursued.

²⁷ This was determined after checking with the A-MDTF and reviewing the 2009 and 2011 Operational Guidelines, the Administrative Agreement, and other inception documents.

²⁸ We also asked donors and other Secretariat staff what they thought the critical success factors were, but they did not have any additions to the factors already listed by the Programme Manager.

Secretariat understanding of the GoZ bureaucracy and its priorities

Understanding the needs of the Fund's targeted stakeholders is the first step in designing an effective programme. Without a strong understanding of GoZ's key priorities and needs, and how it operates, it would be difficult to design activities to meet these needs.

To assess how well the World Bank Secretariat understood the GoZ and its priorities, we spoke with GoZ stakeholders. Representatives from five different Government ministries and agencies²⁹ agreed that the World Bank staff had a strong relationship with the GoZ, and that they were able to proactively identify the Government's needs and priorities.

Evaluating the extent to which the A-MDTF's activities were aligned with the needs of GoZ will also be part of our relevance analysis in the next draft of this report.

Buy-in from the GoZ

After pursuing activities aligned with GoZ needs, A-MDTF still needed to get enough Government buy-in to successfully implement activities, and ensure that the end-products would be put to use.

From our conversations with GoZ stakeholders, we found that many ministries and agencies generally felt engaged and actively consulted during the A-MDTF activity conceptualization and implementation stages. For instance, during activity 1.03 to support the Zimbabwe Agriculture Investment Plan (ZAIP), the Secretariat worked closely with the MAMID staff to meet the GoZ's needs. From our conversations with the Permanent Secretary of Agriculture, we understand that the initial consultants selected for the activity were not well-suited to meet the GoZ's objectives for drafting the agriculture investment plan. To resolve the situation, the Secretariat worked with MAMID staff to find consultants that better suited the GoZ's needs; the new consultants worked in close consultation with MAMID staff to draft the ZAIIP

We found similar Government buy-in for the development of the National Water Policy (activity 3.07). Our conversations with the Director of Water Resources at MEWC, and the Director of Urban Local Authorities with the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works, and National Housing (MLGPWNH) revealed that both stakeholders felt "involved from the beginning" in developing the policy. Specifically, they both stated that they were routinely consulted to provide feedback on the technical background documents that were delivered by the consultants, and which served as the "backbone" of the policy.

However, we also found cases where Government buy-in was lacking. For instance, donors and the Secretariat readily acknowledged that the Ministry of Lands was not directly engaged during the analytical work on land-reform issues (including the Study on Land Reform, activity 1.12). This was a sensitive issue in Zimbabwe, and thus inhibited direct engagement with the Ministry. One donor in particular expressed frustration with the Government's overall level of engagement on ASTRG activities, indicating that there were fundamentally differing perspectives between the Government and donors on agricultural policy.

The Secretariat and many of the donors we spoke with acknowledged that the level of GoZ buy-in varied depending on the type of activity and sector. By the donors' own admission, this was somewhat intentional, and done for various reasons.

²⁹ Including the MEWC; the MAMID; the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs); the Environmental Management Agency (EMA); and the Ministry of Public Works, Labour, and Social Welfare (MPWLSW).

Donors often sought a mix of activities with different levels of risk. For instance, the payroll audit and the mining sector activities were considered “high risk, high reward.” As one donor stated, “[we] weren’t sure how far it would go but there was the potential for transformational impact. In many of these cases, it turned out there wasn’t the political will.”

On the other side of the spectrum, support to upgrade and roll-out Public Finance Management System (PFMS) was considered a “low risk” activity. This was because there was a “willing counterpart” and “a lot of support internally [within the GoZ]”.

Flexibility of the Fund

The Flexible TA activities were a particularly relevant and successful vehicle for ensuring that the GoZ’s needs were met in a timely manner.

For example, by allocating some funds to the Flexible TA for Infrastructure activity (3.05), the Fund was able to respond rapidly to the Government’s needs as they arose. This included an assessment of water supply in Bulawayo and the infrastructure policy note to inform the 2014 budget preparation.

Although some flexible activities were implemented, the Secretariat explained that the Fund was not as flexible as it could have been for three main reasons:

- The AA created the additional administrative burden of requiring all donors to re-sign if any one donor decided to increase its contribution
- The AA also created additional administrative burdens to extend the disbursement window (as was done several times given politically-driven delays of activities)³⁰
- The A-MDTF’s mandate limited the types of activities that could be supported.

The MEWC also indicated that the Fund could have been more flexible by responding to requests more quickly, and by being open to funding more types of activities. For example, the MEWC said that the process for reviewing and approving activity concepts is “very onerous and can easily go on forever.” The Ministry said that there were a few instances where requests were made for rapid TA, but the window of opportunity closed before the A-MDTF could complete its internal review processes.

In addition, the MEWC also said that the Flexible TA was sometime “limited in terms of the scope of what it could cover.” As an example, he said that the MEWC wished that the A-MDTF could provide support not only for analysis, but also to help implement the findings and recommendations of the studies.

Access to information and a communications strategy

Disseminating A-MDTF funded reports is important for spreading the findings of A-MDTF supported studies, and thus spreading the intended benefits. It is also important to disseminate A-MDTF information to the donor community to increase donor support.

The donors we interviewed unequivocally agreed that the A-MDTF website was not properly used to publish final reports and other outputs supported by the Fund. Findings from our document reviews also confirmed this result. During the evaluation data

³⁰ These administrative burdens were primarily driven by the need to secure approval from each donor’s headquarters before amending the AA to allow for increased contributions or extended disbursement windows.

collection stage, we faced significant challenges obtaining information on the A-MDTF from web-based sources, including from the A-MDTF website.

Notably, the A-MDTF website is missing two of the three Annual Reports (2011 and 2013), and has only posted 14 reports and other documents. By comparison, we received over 170 non-proprietary documents from the Secretariat for the purposes of this evaluation. Presumably, there are dozens more documents that were produced under the A-MDTF that could have been published online.

Donors also agreed that the A-MDTF lacked a communications strategy to “tell the story” of the Fund, both to the public, and to the donors’ senior management staff. For example, one donor indicated that there was a “mismatch between what donors wanted—short, snappy summaries—and [the long reports produced]”. As a result, the work supported by the A-MDTF “was hard for the embassies here to ‘sell’ back to headquarters.”

Another donor echoed this sentiment, stating that while some studies were confidential or sensitive, “many others could have been more widely communicated.” On the topic of proper tailoring of outputs for various stakeholders, the delegation indicated that they could not send the reports that were being produced as-is to their senior management because “they would never read it.”

As a result of the limited dissemination and often inappropriate communication strategies, the outputs supported by the A-MDTF were likely less effective than they could have been. During our stakeholder interviews, one donor stated that the Fund’s failure to use the website, and to market the studies and outputs appropriately, “limited the potential impact of those analytical pieces.”

Availability of local World Bank specialists

Identifying GoZ needs requires World Bank specialists to be available, and interacting with the Government stakeholders. These local specialists are crucial for achieving effective and well-designed activities targeted to the needs of GoZ.

In general, GoZ stakeholders spoke positively about the level of engagement and availability of local World Bank specialists. For example, the Permanent Secretary of Agriculture said that local World Bank staff would “quiz” MAMID staff to identify the Ministry’s needs. The staff then developed and shepherded activities through the approval process to secure the necessary funds to implement these activities. In particular, the TA for the ZAIP (activity 1.03) was cited as a success.

The EMA also recognized the availability of local World Bank specialists. A representative from the EMA said that a local World Bank technical expert worked with them to identify their needs and to secure funding to carry out urgent analyses. On one occasion, World Bank staff worked with the EMA to quickly analyse mercury pollution in the environment.

According to the Secretariat,³¹ after more local World Bank staff were assigned following the Mid Term Review, the ability of the A-MDTF to respond to requests greatly improved, particularly for rapid TA requests. This view was seconded by the TTL for EMGTRG, “after teams were moved to Harare, it became much easier and rewarding to interface with the GoZ.” The same TTL also indicated that relationships were strengthened between the TTLs and donors once more local staff were assigned.

³¹ Identified through interviews with the Secretariat and by reviewing the A-MDTF Annual Reports.

Unfortunately, donors have indicated that since the recent World Bank restructuring efforts, some local specialists have been withdrawn from the Harare office. Donors claimed this is now stretching the Secretariat's ability to actively engage with the GoZ. Two of the three sector TTLs are now located in Washington.

Conclusions on critical success factors

Based on the evidence presented above for the six critical success factors, we draw the following key conclusions:

- The A-MDTF performed inadequately against the success factor “access to information and a communications strategy.” This result was supported unequivocally by evidence found through document reviews and from interviews
- The A-MDTF performed particularly well against two critical success factors: (1) Secretariat understanding of the GoZ bureaucracy and its priorities, and (2) Availability of local World Bank specialists. We note that these two factors are correlated: having an adequate team of local specialists is likely to increase the level of understanding of the GoZ and its policy priorities. Thus it makes sense that if the Fund performed well on one of these success factors, it would also perform well on the other
- The A-MDTF performed reasonably well against the remaining three critical success factors: (1) donor commitment and engagement, (2) buy-in from GoZ, and (3) flexibility of the Fund. As explained above, evidence from our evaluation indicates that the Fund performed well against these success factors, with only a few minor exceptions.

5.4 Was the A-MDTF Effective Overall?

We found that the A-MDTF was generally effective in achieving its objectives—its target outputs and outcomes. This conclusion is based on the key findings for two questions:

- Did the sample of activities we reviewed achieve their target outputs and outcomes? (effectiveness of the sample)
- Did the Fund spend its resources on the right things? (relevance of the Fund)

We used this approach because the Fund's M&E framework did not provide a response to the basic effectiveness question—were target outputs and outcomes achieved?—for **all** of the activities. Answering the question in this manner would have required comparing the targets established in the CNs for each of the activities in the A-MDTF portfolio against the results reported in the Annual Report. However, this approach was outside the scope of this evaluation.

As our analysis effectiveness throughout this section showed, the sample of activities produced many of the target outputs that they set out to produce, and many of the target outcomes were ultimately achieved. We also found that nine of the 11 activities in the sample also stimulated some of the impacts that were expected by donors. We, therefore, conclude that the sample of activities was effective.

In addition, the Fund did all the right things to ensure that it stayed relevant to the analytical needs of the GoZ. The Fund was closely aligned with the strategic objectives of ISNs I and II, and it was also closely aligned with the needs of donors and of the GoZ (as shown in Section 4). The Fund also relied on a robust process for determining funding priorities, which involved routine consultations with the GoZ (facilitated by

Harare-based World Bank staff), technical dialogue on activity proposals within the TRGs, and higher-level deliberation among the donors within the PC. As we show in Section 6.1.1, while these processes were not always followed exactly, the Fund generally succeeded in ensuring that those activities that enjoyed mutual buy-in from the GoZ and donors actually received funding.

6 Efficiency and Accountability

Assessing the A-MDTF for efficiency and accountability involves checking (i) that the Fund delivered value for money; (ii) that donors can verify how their funds were spent; (iii) that the Fund's design and operations were suitable for its objectives; and (iv) that there were processes in place to ensure the Fund was using least-cost options to achieve expected results. To be efficient and accountable, the Fund needed to have strong systems in place to manage costs, monitor interventions, and disseminate key findings.

Our evaluation of efficiency and accountability is based on the four evaluation questions in the TOR:

- How appropriate has the A-MDTF's operational model and programmatic design been for the stated objectives? (Section 6.1)
- How effectively were activities designed and supervised? (Section 6.2)
- How effectively were funds distributed, used, and accounted for? (Section 6.3)
- How effectively were key findings documented and disseminated? (Section 6.4)

6.1 How Appropriate Was the A-MDTF's Operational Model and Programmatic Design?

The way that the A-MDTF is structured plays a large part in how effectively and efficiently it can achieve its objectives. To answer this question, we examined how the Fund was organised and its rules and processes were defined (Section 6.1.1); how well it staffed the Secretariat (Section 6.1.2); and if it distributed funds appropriately among, and within, activities in its portfolio (Section 6.1.3). We also examined how the Fund set target timeframes for completion (Section 6.1.4); whether it chose the right activities to meet the Fund's objectives (Section 6.1.5); and if the Fund chose the right ways of producing the analytical work (Section 6.1.6).


6.1.1 Organisational structure and governance

We assessed the organizational structure and governance of A-MDTF as defined in the AA,³² and the Operational Guidelines. These documents define the operational framework of A-MDTF, setting out the roles and responsibilities of entities involved in the Fund, and explaining the processes in place for identifying activities for the Fund to support.

Roles and responsibilities within the A-MDTF

The A-MDTF organisational structure consists of three key entities: the Policy Committee (PC), the Secretariat, and the Technical Review Group (TRG). Figure 6.2 illustrates the roles and responsibilities of these key entities.

³² The AA is a legal document executed between the World Bank and the donors.

Figure 6.1: Simplified Organisational Structure of the A-MDTF

Note: This is a simplified diagram of the Fund's organisational structure. A more complete version is shown in Appendix D (see Figure D.1).

As illustrated by its position in the figure, the PC has the highest level of authority in the A-MDTF. The PC is responsible for setting the funding priorities and reviewing proposed activities, and thus guides the direction of the Fund and the activities it supports.

The PC is supported by a Secretariat, which carries out all administrative functions of the Fund and liaises between the PC, the TRGs, and the GoZ. The Secretariat oversees all disbursements of funds and monitors the implementation of activities.

The three TRGs contain specialists in each of the three thematic areas: economic management and governance, agriculture, and infrastructure. Given this expertise, the TRGs provide the technical underpinning for decisions on how the Fund's resources are spent, and they monitor the progress of ongoing analytical work. They offer recommendations to the PC on which activities to support, given the high-level objectives set by the PC.

A more detailed summary of the roles and responsibilities of each of these entities, as well as the staff members included in each entity, is provided in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1: Membership, Roles, and Responsibilities within the A-MDTF

Role	Membership and Responsibilities
Policy Committee (PC)	<p>Composed of one representative per donor; co-chaired by one rotating donor and permanently by the World Bank Country Manager</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Providing strategic guidance on the activities to be funded, and reviewing progress on resource utilisation
Secretariat	<p>Composed of seven World Bank staff, and World Bank Task Team Leaders (TTLs) for each activity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organising meetings of the PC and TRGs, and preparing minutes of their meetings

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Preparing and implementing annual work programmes for the A-MDTF ▪ Managing the A-MDTF's resources, budgets, and programs ▪ Reviewing proposals furnished by the TRGs for funding under the A-MDTF to ensure their suitability for such funding and consistency with the objectives and priorities of the A-MDTF, and approving such proposals ▪ Monitoring the activities funded by the A-MDTF ▪ Maintaining a procurement planning and monitoring system for the approved activities ▪ Handling the Fund's communications and logistics, and together with the TRGs keeping the MFED and other GoZ agencies informed of the A-MDTF's activities
Technical Review Groups (TRGs)	<p>Composed of donor staff, and other development partners; co-chaired by one rotating donor and permanently by the sector TTL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sharing knowledge in the area of its expertise and identifying priorities in these areas for A-MDTF funding ▪ Developing TOR and concept notes for studies and TA interventions in their respective area of expertise, to be carried out by experts recruited by the Secretariat and to be funded under the A-MDTF ▪ Monitoring the progress of the studies and TA interventions in their respective area of expertise ▪ Providing quality assurance and reviewing the outputs of the studies and TA interventions in their respective area of expertise, before their review by the Secretariat for approval and finalisation ▪ Liaising with the Government Sector Working Group, with GoZ officials as appropriate, and other donor groups in Zimbabwe dealing with matters covered by the TRG, as well as promoting synergies among individual donor initiatives in Zimbabwe

Source: A-MDTF. *Administrative Agreement*. Annex 1, Section 2.

As explained in the table, the Secretariat is tasked with several different roles, each of which has responsibilities vital to the operation of the Fund. These roles include the Programme Manager, the Finance Officer, the Procurement Officer, Programme Assistants, the sector TTLs (one per TRG), and the TTLs for each activity (child TF). A complete description of these roles and their responsibilities is presented in Appendix E (see Table E.1).


The Fund had clearly defined roles and responsibilities for donors and the Secretariat, as well as a sensible organisational structure to ensure proper management of the donors' funds. This laid a good foundation for the Fund to fulfil its mandate.

Process for setting funding priorities

To assess the A-MDTF's process for setting the strategic direction of the Fund, and approving activities, we reviewed the Operational Guidelines.

As explained in the Guidelines, each year the A-MDTF is supposed to review its strategy. During this review, the PC identifies funding priorities for the year with support and consultation from the Secretariat, the TRGs, and the GoZ. The A-MDTF revisits these priorities on a quarterly basis to identify any corrections necessary to respond to changing political or economic circumstances. Figure 6.2 illustrates this process.

Figure 6.2: Process for Setting Funding Priorities



Note: Based on the 2011 *Operational Guidelines* . P. 16.


While the process for setting funding priorities was well-defined, our findings indicate that this process was not always followed. We spoke with donor representatives from all three TRGs; three representatives indicated that the PC often did not follow the annual strategy review cycle. One representative commented that there was often “no strategic thought [at the PC level],” and that the TRGs would often prioritise activities at the request of the PC (and outside the prescribed planning cycle), only to have the PC reject the list and request another. In one instance, the PC “spent a year trying to come up with priorities”. Another donor’s representative described the interface between the PC and the TRGs as “cumbersome,” because the donors in the PC did not effectively use the annual strategy review to develop a clear strategic direction.

One representative did, however, comment that the prioritisation exercise went “smoothly,” in part thanks to the interface between the sector TTL and the PC.

Process for identifying and developing activities

After setting priorities, the Fund identifies and develops activities. This process is designed to be “demand-driven”—that is, based on a combination of the key needs of the GoZ and donors’ priorities in Zimbabwe. The sector TTLs are usually responsible for identifying the need for analytical work in Zimbabwe, and then developing activities to meet these needs.

Throughout the process, donors are expected to provide significant input. First, the TRGs are intimately involved in shaping the CNs and determining which are ultimately recommended for approval. Then, the PC has the final authority to approve or reject a CN for funding. Figure 6.3 illustrates this process.

Figure 6.3: Process for Approving Activities

Note: Based on the 2011 *Operational Guidelines*. P. 16.

To be approved for funding, the CNs should contain:

- A plan for how activities will lead to action
- A results framework (with measurable indicators and clearly articulated risks and mitigation measures) and clear M&E arrangements
- A dissemination/communication plan, including how the GoZ will be engaged and an assessment of the level of demand within the GoZ for the work
- An itemised budget and quarterly disbursement plan
- A standard cover sheet, summarising the objectives, scope, budget, and time frame for the activity.³³

Unfortunately not all CNs adhered to this format. For instance, from our review of the sample of activities, we found only one activity (activity 4.01) included a results framework in its CN. None of the activities in the sample included a quarterly disbursement plan, a risk identification and mitigation strategy, or a discussion of cross-cutting issues (such as gender, environment, and governance) in the approved CNs.

Going forward, it will be helpful to ensure all CNs meet the format defined by the A-MDTF. This will not only help the Fund select activities to support, but also to track the success of each activities against the plan.

Conclusions on the governance and organisational structures

The Fund had clearly defined roles and responsibilities for donors and the Secretariat, as well as a sensible organisational structure to ensure proper management of the donors'

³³ A-MDTF, 2011 *Operational Guidelines*. P. 15.

funds. The Fund also did well to define a process for setting funding priorities and identifying activities, though this process was not always followed.

Donor interventions in the future should be sure to closely follow the framework for defining priorities and activities. This will allow a more robust tracking system of activity performance, and will help increase communication across donors when setting funding priorities.

6.1.2 Human resourcing

Evaluating human resourcing means assessing how well the Fund team was staffed—were the right people in the right roles, and were all the right roles in place? We focused this section on an evaluation of how well the Secretariat was staffed, because this was the only part of the Fund’s organisational structure for which staffing was needed.³⁴ An assessment of the consultants hired to perform the A-MDTF-funded work is provided later in Section 6.1.6.

We found that the staff roles for the Secretariat are well-defined³⁵ and appropriate. In particular, the Fund did well to increase the level of responsibility delegated to the Secretariat, as was recommended in the MTR.³⁶

However, we identified two key staff positions that could have helped the Secretariat better fulfil its mandate:

- A part-time M&E specialist
- A part-time communications specialist.

Staffing these positions could have helped fill some of the gaps we identified during our stakeholder interviews. For example, donors indicated that the Fund lacked a communications strategy. According to these donors, a communications strategy could have helped expand the impact of the Fund, both by disseminating A-MDTF-funded outputs to a broader range of stakeholders, and by helping to “sell” the story of the A-MDTF to the donors’ senior management.

Donors and the Programme Manager also indicated that an M&E specialist could have helped donors and the TTLs devise a results framework for activities, so that these results could be tracked accurately and consistently across the A-MDTF portfolio.

We also found that the A-MDTF may not have enough staff overall. For example, three donor representatives in the TRGs suggested to us that they often found difficulties requesting fact sheets or other activity summaries from the Secretariat due to resource limitations. In addition, three donors in the PC indicated that the Secretariat did not adequately synthesise the issues in advance of PC meetings. This meant that the PC often delved into details of specific activities, instead of focusing on the high-level strategic issues. In both instances, donors emphasised this was not a competency issue—rather, it

³⁴ As described in Section 6.1.1, the membership of the PC and the TRGs were defined based on the AA. The PC is composed of donors, and therefore the Fund had no role in selecting who sat on this committee. Similarly, each donor appointed their own staff to sit on the TRGs. Other members of the TRGs included the sector TTLs (who are considered part of the Secretariat, and thus evaluated in this section); outside development partners, such as UNDP and UNICEF; and on occasion, GoZ representatives. Outside development partners and GoZ representatives participated on a volunteer basis, and therefore were not part of the staffing decisions made by the Fund.

³⁵ The staffing needs of the Secretariat are defined in the Operational Guidelines (as briefly described in Section 6.1.1, and detailed in Appendix E).

³⁶ A-MDTF. *Mid Term Review 2010*. P. 31.

was an issue arising from insufficient human resources. In fact, as one donor put it, the World Bank's recent restructuring (in which some staff were recalled to Washington) has "stretched the Secretariat [thinly]."

Overall, the A-MDTF did well to clearly define roles for World Bank staff and TTLs in the Secretariat. The Fund also took the recommendations in the MTR and expanded the role of the Secretariat.

In the future, donors should ensure that all roles allocated to the Secretariat have a specific team member in place to carry out the work. In particular, specialists in M&E and communications should be hired. Processes should also be put in place to scale up the Secretariat during implementation of a Fund, if the donors determine more support is needed.

6.1.3 Funding levels

We examined the funding levels in two ways: (i) how the A-MDTF distributed funds **among** activities, and (ii) how the A-MDTF distributed funds **within** activities. The Fund generally set appropriate funding levels for the activities in its portfolio, and it allocated costs appropriately within each activity.

Distribution of funds among activities

An analysis of disbursements at the programme-level (see Figure 6.4) reveals that most of the programmatic funds went to the EMGTRG (53.5 percent), with just 19.5 percent going to the ITRG, and 13.3 percent to the ASTRG. The Fund disbursed 10.1 percent to for administrative fees and expenses,³⁷ and the remaining 3.6 percent was disbursed to the cancelled SPTRG and HRBSTRG.


However, this distribution of funds is more evenly spread when considering the breadth of issues that were addressed by the EMGTRG—among them, budget formulation, governance and civil service reforms, mining sector policy, and of course the ongoing PFMS TA (which alone totalled nearly \$2.2 million over the duration of the A-MDTF).

We were unable to test whether these allocations were driven by the level of activity within each TRG.³⁸ Nonetheless, the emphasis on activities within the EMGTRG seems appropriate, given the urgent need for macroeconomic and public sector reforms in Zimbabwe. The disbursement of funds to the other existing TRGs (ASTRG and ITRG) could reflect a more opportunistic approach, where openings for engagement with the GoZ may have been limited due to political constraints (such as with land reform)—so activities were only funded where these opportunities closely aligned with donors' priorities as set by the PC.

³⁷ This does not include the cost of staff time incurred by World Bank TTLs that were assigned to manage individual child TFs. These staff costs are embedded in the allocations for each activity (child TF).

³⁸ The Secretariat and the TRGs did not maintain a record of all of the activity proposals or CNs that were considered compared those that were approved.

Figure 6.4: Distribution of Funds by Size of Allocation, Activity Type, and TRG



Source: A-MDTF Secretariat. *Financial Report for Old and New TFs as of 30 September 2014*.

By activity type, the A-MDTF allocated most of its funds to analytical studies (47.9 percent) and technical assistance (29.5 percent).³⁹ The remaining funds were spent on data and IM systems (12.3 percent, of which 93 percent went to the PFMS TA activities), administration (10.1 percent), and knowledge exchanges (0.2 percent).

The A-MDTF generally allocated funds in small amounts; 55.2 percent of activities spent less than \$300,000, and an additional 34.5 percent spent less than \$600,000.

These funding levels were in line with the closest benchmarks we could find: the CAADP MDTF⁴⁰ and the Middle East and North Africa MDTF (MENA MDTF), both of which are World Bank-administered trust funds that largely support analytical work. The CAADP MDTF allocated funds in the range of \$30,000 to \$800,000 for analytical support and TA to support African institutions in adopting and using the CAADP.⁴¹ The MENA MDTF allocated funds in the range of \$30,000 to \$600,000 for analytical support

³⁹ We categorised activities according to the **primary** purpose of the activity. For example, many of the analytical studies and TA activities had validation or stakeholder workshops that could be considered knowledge exchanges; however, we did not categorise these as such because the workshops were not the primary purpose of the activity.

⁴⁰ The CAADP MDTF is a distinct trust fund that exists to support countries that are implementing the CAADP.

⁴¹ The World Bank. April 2012. "Mid Term Review for the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme Multi-Donor Trust Fund (CAADP MDTF)." Page 37. <http://www.nepad.org/system/files/CAADP%20MDTF%20Status%20Report%20Main%20Text%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed 22 September 2014).

and TA to strengthen governance, increase social and economic inclusion, and create an enabling environment for access to jobs (particularly for youth and women)⁴².

The GoZ officials and donors we interviewed, confirmed that the funding levels for individual activities in the sample were sufficient to achieve the desired outputs. These stakeholders also commented that the A-MDTF should have gone farther—by pairing the analytical work with follow-on programmatic funding to implement the recommendations or programmes. While the current framework of the Fund does not allow for providing programmatic fund, donors may want to consider allowing this kind of funding in the future.

Distribution of funds within activities

Among the activities in the sample, most of the funds disbursed were spent on consultants' fees (nearly 65 percent), with World Bank staff costs⁴³ and media/workshop costs making up an additional 27 percent. We calculated these cost allocations based on data extracted from the World Bank's internal accounting system, and provided to us by the Secretariat.

For comparison, we also calculated these relative allocations by cost element for all activities in the A-MDTF portfolio, using the latest financial report to donors produced on 30 September 2014 (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.2: Average Allocation of Costs within Activities

Cost Element	Share of Project Disbursements (%)	
	Activities in the Sample ¹	All A-MDTF Activities ²
Disbursements to Grantee†	-	2.1%
Consultants' Fees	64.4%	54.1%
Contractual Services	1.7%	8.0%
Media & Workshop Costs	12.4%	3.7%
Staff Costs‡	14.4%	19.5%
Travel Expenses‡	7.1%	12.7%

Notes: † Indicates funds that were disbursed to the GoZ as part of recipient-executed (RE) activities once the RE window was opened in 2013.

‡ "Staff costs" means the time spent by the assigned World Bank TTL to manage the activity (it does not include Secretariat staff time, which is not included in project disbursements). "Travel expenses" means travel expenses incurred by World Bank staff traveling for the activities, plus any travel expenses for consultants working on a contract where travel expenses are not bundled in their consulting fees.

Sources: ¹ A-MDTF Secretariat. Internal World Bank Accounts. 18 September 2014.

² A-MDTF Secretariat. *Financial Report for Old and New TFs as of 30 September 2014*.

⁴² The World Bank. November 2013. "MENA MDTF First Annual Report." P. 13. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/256264-1393245927292/MENA_MDTF_First_Annual_Report.pdf (accessed 22 September 2014).

⁴³ Staff costs are defined as time spent by the assigned World Bank TTL to manage and guide the activity.

Consultants' Fees

From Table 6.2, we see that consultants' fees were by far the largest category of spend—64 percent of costs in the sampled activities, and 54 percent across all activities in the AMDTF portfolio. We investigated these costs, to determine if these costs are reasonable.

Specifically, we looked at the average daily rate of the consultants hired for the sampled activities, and found the rates to be reasonable. The AMDTF program team provided daily rates and total consultant costs for ten activities. Seven of these activities were carried out by individual consultants (several consultants hired for each activity); the remaining three were contracted out to consulting firms. The average daily rate for individual consultants in this sample was approximately **US\$570**—which compares well with consulting fees commanded by infrastructure advisory specialists for work in Africa.⁴⁴

Two of the three activities contracted out to firms cost less than US\$200,000 in consulting fees. The third was higher—at US\$345,000, however this was for the most extensive piece of work of the activities in our sample, the PFMS Technical Assistance.

Travel

We also note that the share of travel expenses, both for the sample and for the Fund, may be higher than expected for a “typical” consulting contract (based on our own experience as development consultants). This was because many World Bank staff were not based locally, and therefore were flying in from abroad. For example, the mining sector TTLs are based in Washington, DC and routinely flew to Harare to participate in meetings with the MMMD and other stakeholders. For the activities in the sample, nearly half (49 percent) of the travel expenses were associated with World Bank staff based outside of Harare. An additional 34 percent of these travel expenses were incurred by consultants whose travel expenses were not embedded in their contracts.⁴⁵ This appears to have been a strategic decision, to keep the Fund's operations in Zimbabwe lean, and to fly in specialists as needed. It would be difficult to reduce these costs given the weaknesses in local capacity that we have previously discussed.

Overall, these allocations appear reasonable, given the A-MDTF's emphasis on producing analytical work that also requires close consultation with the GoZ and other stakeholders—however, we were unable to find a relevant benchmark to verify this conclusion.⁴⁶

6.1.4 Time frames

The A-MDTF was established in February 2008, and the first Grant Funding Request (GFR) was approved on 7 July 2008 for the administration and management of the Fund.


⁴⁴ From our experience, consultants typically charge fees in the US\$600 – US\$800 range, per day, for similar assignments. International consultants are more expensive, commanding no less than \$800 per day for such assignments

⁴⁵ A-MDTF Secretariat. Internal World Bank Accounts. 26 October 2014.

⁴⁶ We attempted to gauge these allocations of funds against a relevant benchmark, such as other World Bank-administered trust funds. However, the World Bank does not publish data on how trust fund costs are allocated by cost element in any public database. We were also unable to locate financial reports for other, non-World Bank trust funds that provided sufficient detail to carry out a meaningful benchmarking. For more information on the transparency of World Bank-administered trust funds, *see* World Bank—Independent Evaluation Group. 2011. “An Evaluation of the World Bank's Trust Fund Portfolio: Trust Fund Support for Development.” http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/content/ieg/en/home/reports/trust_funds.html (accessed 22 September 2014).

The closing date was originally scheduled for 31 December 2011. However, following the MTR in 2010, the Fund was recapitalised and a new TF was established. Since the MTR, the closing dates for the old and new TFs have been repeatedly extended to allow for completion of the work programmes, as illustrated in Figure 6.5.

Figure 6.5: Timeline of the A-MDTF



Both TFs have an end disbursement date of 31 December 2014, with work stopping approximately four to six months prior (depending on whether the activities are recipient-executed or Bank-executed). These deadlines were extended because of delays in implementing the activities. From our interviews with the Secretariat and with donors, we understand these delays arose from:

- The exhaustion of funds and delayed replenishment of these funds by donors
- The amendments required to the AA to re-open the recipient-executed window
- The World Bank's internal review processes, including approval of CNs by the Bank's Sector Management Units (SMUs)
- Activity-specific delays—mainly due to the changing political environment, and in particular the 2013 elections. Following the change in government, access to some senior officials was limited (even when GoZ buy-in may have previously existed), thus constraining donors' interest in engaging on certain topics.

These delays are also evident in the sample of activities. In our sample, the average time overrun was 15 months, as illustrated in Table 6.3. Only one project (activity 2.02) was completed prior to the planned completion date.

Table 6.3: Time Overruns for the Sample of Activities

Activity	Time to Completion (months)		Difference (months)	Difference (as % of Planned Time)
	Planned	Actual		
1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation	7	18	11	169%
1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP	16	31	15	98%
1.12 Study on Land Reform	9	31	22	245%
2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation	10	7	-2	(22%)
2.04 Poverty Analysis	5	23	18	359%
2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme	18	47	28	157%
2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics	9	15	6	67%
2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	7	11	3	47%
3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure	3	25	22	734%
3.07 National Water Policy	12	21	9	75%
4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	11	43	31	271%

Source: A-MDTF Secretariat. *Grant Funding Requests for each activity*. 18 September 2014.

Note: Where closing dates were not updated in the respective GFRs, we relied on closing dates published in the 2012 and 2013 Annual Reports, or based on interviews with the sector TTLs.

Given that the changing political environment in Zimbabwe is not a controllable or predictable factor, it makes sense that some of the activities would go over their planned time. Administrative delays also contributed to the time overruns, which may have been controllable.

We conclude that the time frames of the A-MDTF should probably have been estimated more conservatively, though we acknowledge that it is difficult to predict. Furthermore, given the consistent time overruns observed across the sample, it appears that the Fund did not learn from prior delays when setting target completion dates for more recent activities.

Setting accurate time-frames for each activity is important because it affects the overall operations timing of the Fund. The final end disbursement date for the old TF is now three years after the scheduled closing date that was set at the Fund's inception (two years late in the case of the new TF).

6.1.5 Project mix

The distribution of activities at the programme-level (see Table 3.1) appears to be appropriate for the economic and political context in Zimbabwe. The A-MDTF selected a mix of projects that represented the donors' interests in a range of issues across the three thematic areas. At the same time, this mix also reflected varying levels of interest on the part of the GoZ.

For example, the donors indicated that they intentionally selected a mix of projects that balanced risk with potential reward—as measured by the GoZ's explicit interest in the activity. In doing so, donors hoped to maximise impact while hedging portfolio risk. “High risk, high reward” activities included the payroll audit (activity 2.20), mining sector work (activities 2.09, 2.10, and 2.11), and the study on land reform (activity 1.12), among others. Examples of “low risk” activities included the PFMS work (activities 2.12, 2.13, and 2.17), the National Water Policy (activity 3.07), and the support to the ZAIP and CAADP (1.03), all of which had clear levels of commitment from the GoZ.

GoZ agencies who benefited from the A-MDTF unanimously agreed that the right mix of projects was selected to address the GoZ's high priority needs for analytical work. However, these same stakeholders also added that it would have been more helpful if A-MDTF was also able to respond to the follow-on programmatic needs of GoZ.

We conclude that the mix of projects selected for support from the A-MDTF was efficient for mitigating risks, and also relevant to the needs of the GoZ.

6.1.6 Delivery models

To understand if the delivery models used by the A-MDTF were appropriate, we considered three key sets of questions for each activity in the sample:

- Did the activities succeed in imparting knowledge or capacity to the activity's beneficiaries? Did the activity provide knowledge or institutional capacity that wouldn't otherwise exist?
- Did the A-MDTF use the right consultants and activity structures? Did the consultants possess adequate regional and functional expertise? Was the activity structured in a way to fit the vagaries of local institutions, such as the sensitivities facing a GoZ agency or ministry?
- Did the activities make contextually appropriate recommendations? Did the recommendations that were provided reflect an appropriate range of views, such that they were appealing to donors, the GoZ, and other non-state actors (where applicable)?

This activity-level analysis showed that the A-MDTF generally used appropriate and effective delivery models. We based this on the following findings:

- Nine of ten completed activities in the sample succeeded in imparting new knowledge or capacity. The only activity that did not was the PFMS TA (activity 2.17), where the training that were provided failed to build meaningful capacity within the GoZ, partly because the consultants were not effective trainers, and partly because of a “brain drain” (once adequately trained, GoZ employees would leave for better-paying jobs)
- Nine of eleven activities in the sample selected the right consultants and used the right activity structures. In one instance (activity 1.03), inappropriate consultants were initially selected, but were later replaced and the activity was completed to the satisfaction of donors and the GoZ. In

another instance (activity 2.17), the consultants that were hired did not deliver adequate training to the GoZ on the IFMIS system (though they were later debarred from future work)

- All ten completed activities in the sample made contextually appropriate recommendations.

The full results of this analysis are presented in Appendix C (see Table C.4).

6.1.7 Conclusions on the operational model

The evaluation shows that the operational model for the A-MDTF was mostly appropriate.

We found that the funding levels, project mix, and delivery models were all highly appropriate given the needs of the GoZ and donors, and the overall goals of the Fund. However, while the processes for setting funding priorities and approving activities were well-defined, they were not always followed. This does not indicate that the governance and organisational structures themselves were inappropriate, but that these processes should be followed more consistently.

We identified two other important areas for improvement to the operational model: time frames and human resourcing. The consistent time overruns on A-MDTF-funded activities suggests that the time allocated per activity was perhaps not reasonable, taking into account the political risks and administrative processes that can create delays in implementation. A-MDTF did well to improve human resourcing given recommendations in the MTR, but further improvements could be made. These include adding more staff to the Secretariat overall, and, in particular, including a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Specialist and Communications Specialist.

6.2 How Effectively Were Activities Designed and Supervised?

The proper design and execution of a monitoring framework is vital: without it, it is nearly impossible to credibly assess the effectiveness of an intervention. To answer this question, we considered (i) how adequate the indicators that existed were, (ii) how well results were tracked and monitored, and (iii) what improvements (if any) were made to the M&E framework.

The indicators that were defined were inadequate

The Operational Guidelines specify a results framework for the A-MDTF, which defines indicators for the Fund's target outputs and outcomes (see Table 6.4). These indicators are inadequate, however, because they are neither easily measureable nor meaningful.

Table 6.4: Target Outputs and Outcomes

Outputs	Outcomes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Core diagnostic reports disseminated in the following sectors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Economic Management and Governance – Infrastructure – Agriculture ▪ Computerised expenditure controls (IFMIS) rolled out to all GoZ ministries and provinces ▪ Payroll systems strengthened through the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improved country/economic knowledge ▪ Improved policy dialogue with the GoZ and other stakeholders ▪ Enhanced institutional capacity of the GoZ in key areas ▪ Enhanced donor coordination of assistance

- embedding of adequate controls
- Number of knowledge exchange events implemented with government and multi-donor representation
- Policy Notes produced upon GoZ request and disseminated

Source: A-MDTF. 2011 *Operational Guidelines*. P. 31.

While we recognize the inherent challenge in defining a meaningful, measurable results framework when the Fund is supporting such a diverse portfolio of activities, it is vital to more precisely define indicators whenever possible. For example, the MENA MDTF operates in a similarly fragile environment and performs analytical work similar to the A-MDTF. Even so, it has clearly defined indicators for outputs and outcomes that are objectively measurable (see Figure 6.6).

Figure 6.6: Excerpt of the Results Framework for the MENA MDTF

	Results Chain	Indicators	Baseline 2012	1-Jul 2013	Target 2015	Source
OUTCOME	World Bank MENA Portfolio focused on promoting economic and social inclusion and is developed in ways that responds effectively to needs	Doing different things: Cumulative number of person days of employment (Tier II)	4,903,853 (2011)	14,231,217	29,917,327 (2014)	World Bank reporting against MENA Regional Results Frameworks
		Total number of beneficiaries across Bank projects:	N/A	27,800,000	41,800,000	World Bank reporting against MENA Regional Results Frameworks
		Of which labour market programmes	12,830	137,494	233,846	
		Of which safety net programmes (Tier II)	3,597,157 (2011)	4,501,410	7,755,484 (2014)	
		Number of countries with WB supported programs on Open Government <u>OR</u> PFM reform (Tier II)	2 (2011)	13	Monitored (2014)	World Bank reporting against MENA Regional Results Framework (noting the combination of two different indicators: Open Gov + PE/FM activities)
		Doing different things/doing things differently: Cumulative number of pieces of technical and analytical work that informed strategy/policy and stimulated public debate on (but not limited to): gender inclusion, governance, energy and consumption subsidy reform, social protection, youth inclusion, job creation, labour markets (Tier II)	40 (2011)	39	64 (2014)	World Bank reporting against MENA Regional Results Frameworks (although does not exactly equal total of individual figures to avoid double counting)
		Percentage of projects linked to MDTF with gender informed design	NA	55%	75%	MDTF Progress Reports and Activity Descriptions

Source: The World Bank. November 2013. *MENA MDTF Annual Report*..

As briefly mentioned in Section 6.1.1, we found little evidence of results frameworks at the activity level. Only one of the 11 activities in the sample defined a results framework, which clearly articulated the target outputs, outcomes, and impacts, and their corresponding indicators to facilitate ongoing M&E. As a result, to the extent that data were reported at the programme level for the activities, they were not based on any consistent, year-to-year M&E framework.

The tracking and monitoring framework was weak

Because the M&E framework was weak at the programme level, it necessarily weakened the tracking and monitoring of results that occurred. From the Fund's inception in 2008 to 2010, there were no annual reports produced that documented the progress of the A-MDTF and its activities.

The Fund did produce annual reports for 2011 through 2013.⁴⁷ However, these reports each used a slightly different reporting matrix for the activities in the Fund's portfolio. The end result was that the tracking and monitoring of the activities was inconsistent from year-to-year, and so was not robust enough to provide an outside party (such as our evaluation team) an objective assessment of the performance of the Fund against its goals.

At the activity level, the tracking and monitoring of results was no better. Each sector TTL produced their own sets of periodic progress reports for donors, none of which identically matched the reporting matrices used in the annual reports. Notably, these periodic reports were an improvement over what existed before, as they only began in response to a recommendation in the MTR. We also found that internal records, such as the GFRs, were not updated as activities were closed out, making it difficult to verify information as simple as the date on which the final deliverable was sent to the GoZ (the "client"). This meant that the information being collected at the activity level could not have been "rolled up" to the programme level without additional information being collected from the Secretariat, the donors, and the GoZ beneficiaries.

Conclusions on effectiveness of the design and supervision of activities

It is clear that the indicators selected for the A-MDTF and its activities were inadequate. We strongly encourage donors and the World Bank to consider jointly designing a more robust set of indicators in future interventions in Zimbabwe (and in other fragile states). Without adequate indicators, it is difficult to credibly monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of an intervention, which in turn undermines any claims of impact or value for money from a donor intervention.

In turn, because the design of the M&E framework was weak, the process of tracking and monitoring results was also necessarily weak. Annual reports were produced for the three years following the MTR, yet the lack of a consistent framework made comparisons across time impractical. Notably, although donors and the Secretariat agreed that the M&E framework is a design flaw of the Fund, the MTR's only explicit mention of this matter was a recommendation to provide periodic financial and progress reports to the PC (which was done).

6.3 How Effectively Were Funds Managed?

In this question, we explore how well the A-MDTF carried out its fund management and administration activities. Specifically, we discuss the following points: (i) how timely was the A-MDTF's disbursement of funds for activities, (ii) whether it delivered these activities within budget (and according to World Bank procurement procedures), and (iii) whether it properly accounted for the funds held in trust.

⁴⁷ These were not an explicit recommendation in the MTR, but coincided with an increased focus on transparency and accountability, which was emphasised in the MTR.

The funds were disbursed in a timely manner

Funds were generally disbursed in a timely manner, as demonstrated by the disbursement rates, a common metric used by the World Bank in evaluations of MDTFs (see Table 6.5). The disbursement rates for the new TF were reasonable compared with World Bank-administered multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) that support analytical work similar to the A-MDTF⁴⁸. The disbursement rate for the old TF in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 were also reasonable, while the disbursement rate in 2013 stalled. This was likely due to the delayed re-opening of the recipient-executed window, for which some of the remaining funds had been earmarked. The average disbursement rate (calculated from the inception of each TF) was 13 percent for the old TF and 20 percent for the new TF.

Table 6.5: Disbursement Rate of the A-MDTF (as of 30 September 2014)

	FY 2011-12	FY 2012-13	FY 2013-14	Cumulative from Inception
Old TF (created 1 February 2008)				
(a) Receipts	\$8,785	\$5,295	\$3,650	-
(b) Funds Available	\$1,934,871	\$1,398,007	\$1,108,137	\$7,884,638
(c) Disbursements	\$(542,160)	\$(254,969)	\$(51)	\$(6,984,483)
(d) End of Period Balance	\$1,392,711	\$1,143,038	\$1,108,086	\$900,154
(c/b) Disbursement Rate	28%	18%	0%	89%
Average Disbursement Rate				13%
New TF (created 24 November 2010)				
(a) Receipts	\$21,426	\$454,432	\$3,300,124	-
(b) Funds Available	\$6,527,678	\$7,910,005	\$7,498,973	\$15,215,779
(c) Disbursements	\$(1,417,803)	\$(2,472,791)	\$(2,294,971)	\$(11,986,870)
(d) End of Period Balance	\$5,109,875	\$5,437,214	\$5,204,001	\$3,228,909
(c/b) Disbursement Rate	22%	31%	31%	79%
Average Disbursement Rate				20%

Source: A-MDTF Secretariat. Financial Reports.

The funds were spent within budget

Table 6.6 shows that all of the activities in the sample were completed within budget. Notably, activities 1.12 and 2.16 came in significantly under budget—however, both are anomalies. The Study on Land Reform (1.12) is ongoing and therefore has not fully committed its funds. Meanwhile, the scope of activity 2.16 was significantly reduced because the consultant did not require as much time as was budgeted to provide the TA to ZIMSTAT.

⁴⁸ World Bank—Independent Evaluation Group. “Global Program Review: Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.” P. 57. <http://www.globalevaluations.org> (accessed 22 September 2014).

Table 6.6: Budget Analysis of Activities in the Sample (as of 15 August 2014)

Activity	Status	Funds Allocated (US\$)	Funds Spent* (US\$)	Percent Over (Under) Budget
1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation	Closed	\$312,049	\$310,662	(0.44%)
1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP	Closed	\$500,000	\$495,373	(0.93%)
1.12 Study on Land Reform	Ongoing	\$479,500	\$367,742	(23.31%)
2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation	Closed	\$200,000	\$195,482	(2.26%)
2.04 Poverty Analysis	Closed	\$200,000	\$195,428	(2.29%)
2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme	Ongoing	\$235,000	\$209,997	(10.64%)
2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics	Closed	\$25,000	\$13,875	(44.50%)
2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	Closed	\$350,000	\$346,513	(1.00%)
3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure	Ongoing	\$371,080	\$337,884	(8.95%)
3.07 National Water Policy	Closed	\$440,000	\$428,257	(2.67%)
4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	Closed	\$9,932	\$9,780	(1.53%)

Source: A-MDTF Secretariat. 15 August 2014.

Notes: * Funds spent represent the sum of funds disbursed and committed as of 15 August 2014

Furthermore, the Fund used the World Bank's standard procurement procedures for all activities.⁴⁹ These procurement procedures are designed to produce highest-quality services at least cost.

We confirmed with the A-MDTF Finance Officer that the Fund followed all World Bank procurement procedures.⁵⁰ Because these procedures require competitive solicitation of

⁴⁹ This approach was necessary because of the inherent limitations of sampling. Evaluating budget and disbursement data for all of the Fund's activities would require greater data collection and more detailed analysis, which was outside the scope of our assignment.

⁵⁰ These procedures are also referenced in the Operational Guidelines.

services using scoring criteria for both quality and cost, we can be reasonably assured that the consultants that were hired by the Fund provided the highest-quality services at least cost.

The funds spent were accurately accounted for

The A-MDTF accounted for funds held in trust in accordance with all applicable World Bank procedures, including Operational Policy 8 (OP 8), which governs how the Bank engages in fragile states; Operational Policy 14.40 (OP 14.40), which governs how the World Bank administers trust funds⁵¹; and the Trust Fund Handbook, which is an internal document that provides guidance for the structuring and management of Bank-administered trust funds.⁵²

While we did not perform a financial audit (because it was outside the scope of this evaluation), the Fund's accounting practices are subject to a management attestation made annually by the World Bank and its independent auditors for **all** trust funds worldwide.⁵³

Additionally, the Secretariat provided all financial reports that we requested, including the breakdown of costs (by cost element) for each activity in the sample, using the World Bank's SAP accounting platform and internal bookkeeping systems. This gave us reasonable confidence that the Fund was accurately and appropriately accounting for all receipts and disbursements.

The Fund also followed all applicable World Bank procurement procedures, and relied on a full-time procurement specialist located in the Harare office.⁵⁴ While we are unable to independently verify the execution of these procedures, we did find that the Secretariat did not maintain a master procurement plan—though it is specified in the Operational Guidelines.⁵⁵ The Secretariat explained that no plan was maintained because of the inherent challenges associated with maintaining a long-term plan when the Fund's strategic work programme is not defined on a similar long-term basis.

6.4 How Effectively Were Key Findings Documented and Disseminated?

Evaluating whether key findings were documented and disseminated makes sense only for activities that were designed to produce a study or other analytical output. Of the activities in the sample, seven met this criterion—although 1.12 Study on Land Reform is an ongoing activity and, therefore, we cannot answer this question for that activity. These activities were:

- 1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation
- 2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation

⁵¹ The World Bank. *Operational Manual*. <http://go.worldbank.org/4D2JSWFIW0> (accessed 24 September 2014).

⁵² The World Bank. *Trust Fund Handbook*. <http://www.cfpto.org/TFHandbook/> (accessed 31 August 2014).

⁵³ The World Bank. September 2013. "2013 Trust Fund Annual Report." Pages 50–51. <http://go.worldbank.org/L063398O40> (accessed 24 September 2014).

⁵⁴ These procurement procedures include Administrative Manual Statement (AMS) 15.00—which is specifically identified in the Initiating Brief for a Trust Fund (IBTF)—and all other internal World Bank policies and procedures relating to procurement.

⁵⁵ However, this is not a violation of World Bank procurement procedures.

- 2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
- 3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
- 3.07 National Water Policy
- 4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government, and Municipality Civil Works.

The remaining four activities⁵⁶ all constituted “embedded” TA placements where the outputs that were provided were technical reviews, drafting services, and training—outputs that did not lend themselves to documenting findings.

The Fund documented its key findings well

The A-MDTF did a commendable job of documenting the key findings of analyses supported by the Fund. All six of the completed activities in the sample for which key findings would have been expected, actually documented these findings clearly in their respective final reports or outputs. In many cases, these findings were clearly laid out in an executive summary so that even a busy government official could find and understand the key messages.

The Fund did not effectively disseminate these findings

Where the A-MDTF fell short was in sharing these key findings with all the right people. That is, key findings were always **documented**, but the outputs containing these findings could have been disseminated to more beneficiaries.

That said, for all six completed activities for which key findings were documented, these findings were always shared with the direct GoZ beneficiaries. For example, the policy recommendations document produced for the National Water Policy (3.07) was shared with the MEWC, the MLGPWNH, ZINWA, and other GoZ entities. Similarly, the study on determinants of irrigation productivity (1.02) was shared with the MAMID.

However, many of the outputs (and thus, key findings) were never disseminated more widely, to stakeholders outside of the GoZ. Of the six activities in the sample for which key findings were documented, key findings from just two activities were posted on the A-MDTF website (activities 3.05 and 3.07). Even so, not all of the key findings generated by 3.07 Flexible TA in Infrastructure were posted: 4 of the 10 Water Forum Policy Notes were posted, while none of the other key findings resulting from this activity were posted.

During stakeholder interviews, we also asked indirect beneficiaries if they had seen the key findings in writing, or if they were aware of them. We found three primary reasons for which indirect beneficiaries were aware of the key findings:

- Two non-contributing donors—UNICEF and UNDP—were intimately aware of the findings, because they had funded complementary parts of the activity (as in the case of 3.07 National Water Policy), or because they had representatives who participated in the TRGs
- Two donor-affiliated organisations—Zim ACP and SERA—were also aware of the activities, because of connections to USAID representation in the TRGs and on the PC

⁵⁶ These were activities 1.03, 2.04, 2.16, and 2.17.

- Two NGOs—AIAS and BEAT—were also aware of the key findings, because their staff had been hired to carry out the work, or because they had participated in workshops or stakeholder consultations.

However, many private sector organisations (including Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), and Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners Council (ZASMC) were not aware of the key findings for activities in the sample. In addition, the staff we interviewed at the National Association of Non-Government Organizations (NANGO) (which represents over 1,200 NGOs in Zimbabwe) were unaware of key findings, or had even seen any of the studies.

We conclude that the A-MDTF effectively documented key findings whenever applicable, but mostly disseminated these findings within the nucleus of GoZ staff and donors that were intimately involved in the activities.

7 Lessons Learned

As donors and the World Bank look to design the successor to the A-MDTF in Zimbabwe—the Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF)—lessons from the A-MDTF experience should be considered. In this section, we answer the remaining three questions in the TOR:

- What key lessons, both already captured and not yet captured, should stakeholders consider when developing future interventions? (Section 7.1)
- To what extent did the A-MDTF build on the individual and collective strength of the participating partner institutions towards the attainment of objectives and what are recommendations for future engagements? (answered within our discussion on key lessons for donors, Section 7.1.2)
- How did the A-MDTF document, disseminate, and use lessons learned during the implementation phase? (Section 7.2).

7.1 What Key Lessons Should Donors Consider for Future Interventions?

We identified five main lessons that donors should consider in designing ZIMREF (and in some cases for the A-MDTF, as it winds down). Donors should consider:

1. Linking funding for analytical work with programmatic funding to implement the findings of these analytical studies
2. Facilitating even closer coordination of donors—both among those that will contribute to ZIMREF, and those that will not, but will remain active in Zimbabwe
3. Ensuring that a robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework is built and used so that ZIMREF’s performance can be assessed fully and objectively
4. Increasing dissemination efforts and improving the quality of communication to better “tell the story” of the A-MDTF and ZIMREF
5. Fine-tuning administrative processes to boost ZIMREF’s operational efficiency.

7.1.1 Link funding for analytical work with programmatic funding

One of the most common critiques of the A-MDTF—both from the donors and from the GoZ officials we interviewed—was that findings or recommendations generated by some of the Fund’s analytical work were not implemented. In such instances, the GoZ had limited fiscal capacity to self-finance implementation projects, while donors in Zimbabwe may have had other priorities for bilateral engagement with the GoZ.

This funding gap could be resolved—and many more of A-MDTF-supported analyses put to direct use—if donors could consider including “programmatic” funding in ZIMREF. By programmatic funding, we mean grants for capital investments, such as rehabilitation of water and sanitation infrastructure or the purchase of computer equipment to enable the roll-out of the PFMS to all local districts. This type of funding would ensure that the recommendations or findings that are generated by analytical work can be **implemented** through the procurement of services to improve the lives of Zimbabwean citizens. If made available, this programmatic funding could require cost sharing with the GoZ to ensure that its incentives are properly aligned with donors’. Should donors decide not to provide direct programmatic funding through the

AMDTF's successor, closer coordination with programmatic funds (such as ZimFund) could provide an option for implementing these projects. Section 7.1.2 explains this idea in more detail.

7.1.2 Facilitate even closer donor coordination

The A-MDTF succeeded in facilitating strong coordination among contributing donors, and among some partner institutions that did not contribute—such as UNDP and UNICEF. We found just two cases where coordination could have been stronger: (i) the analytical outputs of the A-MDTF could have been more closely linked to investments made by the Zimbabwe Multi-Donor Trust Fund (ZimFund), and (ii) donors could have attempted to coordinate with BRICS⁵⁷ donors (such as the Chinese, who are very active in Zimbabwe). Our findings on donor coordination are presented in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1: Assessment of Donor Coordination Facilitated by the A-MDTF

Finding		Examples
✓	Donors with unique strengths in a specific sector usually led participation in the TRG process	DFID played a lead role in the ITRG, USAID played a lead role in the EMGTRG, and the EU played a lead role in the ASTRG
✓	Donors generally used the A-MDTF to coordinate their efforts on specific analytical topics	We did not find evidence that donors participating in the Fund supported programmes that were duplicative of A-MDTF efforts. We asked about the efforts of both contributing donors, as well as non-contributing donors (such as UNDP and UNICEF) that participate in the governance of the Fund
✓	In at least three cases A-MDTF leveraged funding from other donors to cover programme costs that the Fund itself could not	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ National Water Policy (3.07)—where Australian Aid and UNICEF provided funding for two of the three Technical Background Documents that directly informed the National Water Policy ▪ Poverty Analysis (2.04)—where the PICES survey data used as inputs to the Poverty Report were collected with \$1.9 million in funding from DFID, UNDP, and UNICEF ▪ TA for the PFMS (2.17)—which leveraged \$3.5 million in funding from DFID, AfDB, and UNDP to cover the equipment costs (servers, software, and so on) associated with the necessary upgrades to the SAP platform used by the MFED
✓	The PC and TRG formats were very effective means of coordinating donor efforts, pooling expertise, and facilitating dialogue that wouldn't otherwise occur	The donors unanimously confirmed the usefulness of the PC and TRG in facilitating donor coordination. They indicated these forums were particularly valuable when donors wished to discuss politically sensitive topics, such as land issues or mining sector issues because the PC and TRG provided safe places to have frank conversations
~	The A-MDTF could have worked better with ZimFund	The A-MDTF coordinated on some activities, such as the Water Sector Investment Analysis (3.03) and the Engineering TA to the City of Harare (3.08). In addition, both funds had ad hoc arrangements to keep each other abreast of proposed or ongoing activities. For example, the ITRG reviewed some

⁵⁷ Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS)

		<p>of ZimFund's concept notes to provide input on proposed projects.</p> <p>However, these coordination arrangements could have been more explicit and formal. For example, the MTR recommended establishing a fee-based arrangement for the TTL for the ITRG to also contribute time to the ZimFund. This recommendation was never adopted. There was also no synchronisation of work programmes, so that an analytical output from the A-MDTF could lead directly to implementation (with ZimFund support)</p>
×	<p>The A-MDTF did not coordinate with the block of donors from the BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa</p>	<p>Donors on the ITRG lamented this lack of coordination, given how much investment the Chinese (in particular) have been making in the water sector in Zimbabwe. In some cases, their investments have been counterproductive to the efforts of Western donors that participate in the A-MDTF</p>

Our analysis of donor coordination reveals two key recommendations. First, even if donors choose not to allow programmatic funding in ZIMREF (as we recommended in Section 7.1.1), donors should consider building tighter linkages with ZimFund (or its successor) to ensure that the two funds are more closely coordinated. For example, work programmes could be synchronised, so that funds that are allocated by ZIMREF for analytical work are linked to programmatic funds earmarked by ZimFund to implement the recommendations or findings derived from the analysis.

Secondly, donors should consider how to coordinate efforts with outside donors (such as BRICS countries), or at a minimum, how to remain abreast of their work in order to avoid duplication of efforts. One donor on the ITRG suggested that while the Chinese may be reluctant to participate in a multi-donor arrangement, the A-MDTF donors could still coordinate with the Chinese on a one-on-one basis, with one donor selected to liaise with the Chinese mission in Zimbabwe.

7.1.3 Build a robust M&E framework

The A-MDTF did not have a robust framework to monitor and evaluate the performance of the Fund at a programme level (see Section 5.1). In designing future interventions (such as ZIMREF), donors should ensure the results framework is robust and that there is sufficient capacity to carry out M&E. A robust framework should include:


- **A coherent Theory of Change.** The Theory of Change for the programme should be logical, and should adhere to the standard definitions of inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts.⁵⁸ We provide an example of what this Theory of Change might look like for the A-MDTF in Figure 7.1
- **A comprehensive logframe with adequate programme-level targets.** Once the Theory of Change is defined, it is best practice to define a comprehensive logframe that defines **indicators** that measure the outputs,

⁵⁸ For more information on designing effective results frameworks, see The World Bank—Independent Evaluation Group. 2012. “Designing a Results Framework for Achieving Results: A How-To Guide.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXT/EVACAPDEV/Resources/designing_results_framework.pdf (accessed 25 September 2014).

outcomes, and impacts for the entire trust fund—as well as targets for each of these indicators. To be useful, these indicators should be specific, measurable, accurate, and timely

- **Well-defined M&E processes.** During implementation, the Fund administrator can use this logframe (if properly designed), to track the results against these targets. A logframe improves accountability, facilitates robust monitoring and evaluation, and helps communicate the achievements of the Fund. It can also help the Fund administrator and donors detect any implementation issues early on.

Figure 7.1: Revised Theory of Change for the A-MDTF



7.1.4 Improve how the Fund communicates its achievements

The A-MDTF could have also been more effective in communicating the findings from supported activities, and other key achievements of the Fund. The A-MDTF did not do as well as it could have in disseminating the knowledge generated, either internally with donors' senior management, or externally with broader stakeholders. As a result, donors missed a crucial opportunity to "tell the story" of the A-MDTF.

One immediate improvement that the Fund can make is to update its website⁵⁹ with all outputs (analytical studies, TA final reports, policy notes, and so on) that are approved for public release.⁶⁰ The Fund could also consider establishing an **information resource centre** at the World Bank office in Harare (and in possibly one or two other suitable locations throughout Zimbabwe). This resource centre could offer hard copies of key outputs, such as the Public Expenditure Notes (2.25) that have already been printed, and provide access to electronic copies of all outputs.

In designing ZIMREF, donors should consider requiring the World Bank to include a part-time communications specialist as a core member of the Secretariat. To ensure that the ZIMREF website is properly maintained, this specialist should be capable of basic website updates. The specialist should also have expertise in developing key messages for high-level government officials. This is particularly important for activities involving land reform issues, the mining sector, and other politically sensitive topics, where buy-in from these officials is necessary for meaningful impacts to be made.

7.1.5 Boost operational efficiency of the Fund

The Fund could have also operated more efficiently and effectively if a few minor, but important administrative processes had been adopted. These are grouped into the following four sub-sections.

Increase access to, and transparency of, records for donors

Donors need to have access to the outputs (reports) that they have paid for. A common complaint was that even the co-chairs of the TRGs⁶¹ did not have copies of the outputs produced by the Fund. This particularly impeded the on-boarding process for new members of the TRGs or the PC, where having access to these records could have ensured a smooth transition. Before the A-MDTF closes, it should provide copies of all outputs produced to-date to the contributing donors.⁶²

Donors should also have access to the internal records that will help them understand how the Fund is performing. In designing ZIMREF, donors should ensure that they are granted self-service access by the Secretariat to all of the Fund's important records.⁶³

⁵⁹ The A-MDTF website can be found at <http://go.worldbank.org/1EDGI695T0>.

⁶⁰ According to the World Bank's Policy on Access to Information. *See* World Bank. 2013. "Policy on Access to Information." <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/07/17952994/world-bank-policy-access-information> (accessed 8 October 2014).

⁶¹ The donors who rotated in this capacity

⁶² This should be facilitated by the recommended updates to the A-MDTF website, assuming the Secretariat adopts that recommendation.

⁶³ "Self-service" means that donors should not need to request documents from the Secretariat. Rather, donors should be able to access these files themselves.

These records include the outputs of activities, relevant monitoring reports (such as periodic progress reports prepared by the sector TTLs), and financial reports.⁶⁴

In addition, the files should be clearly organized and labelled so that outside parties (such as new donor staff, evaluators, researchers, and so on) can accurately identify all documents related to a specific activity. For example, during the data collection stage of our evaluation, we discovered instances where Annual Reports referred to the same activity using a different name. All documents contained within the Fund's filing system—such as CNs, internal progress reports, Annual Reports, and outputs—should reference the appropriate child TF numbers assigned to the activities in the Fund's portfolio. Improved organization will ensure that the monitoring, evaluation, and communication of the Fund's activities will be consistent and transparent.

Adopt best practices for mitigating project risk

The Fund did not have a good risk mitigation strategy (Section 5.3.4), which partially contributed to implementation delays. A better approach would have been to produce a risk identification matrix and mitigation strategy for each activity. This would have demonstrated that the potential risks are known, and that there are steps that could be taken to minimize their potential impact on the successful implementation of the Fund.

Similarly, the Fund did not centrally monitor procurement of consultants, although it is specified in the Operational Guidelines (Section 6.3). While we did not identify any specific examples of negative effects, having a master procurement plan is generally considered a best practice to mitigate any implementation delays resulting from procurement challenges. Even if the Secretariat cannot maintain a long-term procurement plan, a short-term plan could help monitor the procurement status for all activities that have been approved or are in the pipeline (within a given year's work programme), and to identify any potential issues in the procurement process.

These should continue to be design features contained in ZIMREF's operational guidelines. Furthermore, donors should verify that the Secretariat has fulfilled these requirements, before the first disbursements of funds are made at the inception of the Fund, and periodically thereafter (this could be done as part of the Annual Report).

Build more flexibility to better respond to minor contingencies

The closing date of the Fund was repeatedly extended due to implementation delays. Among the activities in the sample, all but one took longer than expected at inception (Section 6.1.4). During interviews with the sector TTLs, we discovered that many of these delays were associated with the political economic environment, which could have been managed through a risk mitigation strategy.⁶⁵ Longer timeframes for completing the activities would also have been appropriate, to accommodate any unforeseen delays. Setting timeframes that were too aggressive led to unnecessary transaction costs associated with (i) amending the Administrative Agreement (AA) to extend the closing date, and (ii) amending World Bank contracts with the hired consultants.⁶⁶ Going forward, donors should consider setting longer timeframes, both for ZIMREF itself and for each activity that is approved.

⁶⁴ Donors currently have access to financial reports through the World Bank's Client Connection website. However, the Secretariat stated in its Annual Reports that donors did not use this feature.

⁶⁵ As previously mentioned, many of the activities in the sample did not have such a strategy.

⁶⁶ Each amendment to the AA required the signed approval of each donor, which led to delays due to the donors' internal concurrence processes.

In addition, the Secretariat and donors both claimed that the AA was unable to accommodate minor contingencies—such as when donors wished to contribute additional funds, or when the end disbursement date needed to be extended due to activity implementation delays. For each contingency, the AA was amended accordingly and each donor had to re-sign the amended agreement. If possible, ZIMREF donors and the World Bank should try to structure a more flexible agreement, to avoid the delays and costs associated with these amendments.

Improve services provided by the Secretariat to donors

The Secretariat provided quarterly financial reports to all donors. For any interim financial reports, the Secretariat trained donors on using the World Bank's Client Connection portal to obtain real-time data. This was intended to reduce administrative time spent responding to *ad hoc* requests. However, the Secretariat reported in the MTR and the 2011 Annual Report that donors did not use this system, but instead requested the Secretariat to produce interim reports. The Operational Guidelines of ZIMREF should explicitly mention the availability of the Client Connection portal to service these needs. This will ensure that the Secretariat's time is spent wisely.

In addition, donor representatives on the PC complained of instances where the Secretariat had not adequately prepared for PC meetings. Specifically, they indicated that the Secretariat sometimes failed to fully synthesise the decisions to be made, so that the PC could focus on strategic decision-making instead of details relating to specific activities. Assuming there is a PC in the ZIMREF design, the Operational Guidelines should clearly define how the Secretariat should prepare for these meetings.

7.2 How Did the Fund Document and Use Lessons Learned?

The A-MDTF had an explicit mechanism for documenting lessons learned for the operation of the Fund, and monitoring whether these recommendations were later adopted. The Fund adopted many (but not all) of the lessons that were learned during implementation.

The first time that lessons were documented for the A-MDTF was in the MTR in 2010. The Annual Reports in 2011 through 2013 continued to do so, in addition to reporting on the implementation status for prior years' recommendations.

Many of the lessons in the MTR addressed the structure of the A-MDTF, and how to improve effectiveness and operational efficiency. The majority of these recommendations were adopted. For example, the number of thematic areas supported by the Fund was reduced from six TRGs to the current three TRGs (see Figure 2.1). Similarly, the types of activities supported by the Fund were consolidated. As mentioned in Section 2, the prior activity definitions (some of which overlapped, such as studies and surveys) were streamlined into five core activity types: (i) analytical studies, (ii) TA and expert placements, (iii) support for data and IM systems, (iv) knowledge exchanges, and (v) pilots. In addition, the Secretariat was strengthened, and the roles and responsibilities of all members of the Fund's organisational structure were clarified. This was done in response to the MTR's recommendation that the World Bank assign more, qualified staff to fulfil the Secretariat's mandate; and that the responsibilities of the various groups (the PC, the Secretariat, and the TRGs) should be clearly defined.

However, not all lessons in the MTR were adopted. For example, the MTR called for "a detailed monitoring matrix of all activities to keep track of procurement stages." No such matrix was ever developed. Similarly, the MTR recommended improving communications, by (i) developing a strategy (in consultation with communications experts from the World Bank), (ii) enhancing the website to serve as a dissemination tool,

and (iii) targeting dissemination of analytical work to key stakeholders (beyond the direct beneficiaries). While the Secretariat developed a communications strategy, they did not achieve the expected results: the website is still not kept up-to-date and the wider dissemination was never realised.

We also reviewed lessons (and accompanying recommendations) that were documented in the 2011, 2012, and 2013 Annual Reports. While the Fund took action on many of these recommendations, the results sometimes fell short. For example, in the 2011 Annual Report, it was recommended that the Secretariat should review each CN for environmental and gender issues (where possible). The 2012 Annual Report indicated that this was never done, and our own review of CNs for the activities in the sample confirms this. Appendix F presents a full analysis of which lessons learned were documented in the MTR and Annual Reports—and whether the recommendations were implemented.

Appendix A: Summaries of Activities in the Sample

A.1 Determinants of the Productivity and Sustainability of Zimbabwe Irrigation (1.02)

The A-MDTF allocated \$300,000 to produce a study defining the investment and policy options for improving the productivity and sustainability of the irrigation sector in Zimbabwe. The study was divided into three parts:

- A desk study of literature on small-scale irrigation in Zimbabwe
- A diagnostic analysis of the determinants of investment returns for an agreed subset of smallholder irrigation schemes, including a field survey of these schemes
- A detailed discussion of investment options for improving income generated from smallholder irrigation schemes, and sustainable management of the schemes under review (and similar schemes).

The intended beneficiary was the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation, and Irrigation Development (MAMID), and particularly the Department of Irrigation (a semi-autonomous entity within the Ministry).

The original timetable is presented below.

Table A.1: Planned Timeframe for Study on Determinants of the Productivity and Sustainability of Zimbabwe Irrigation

Tasks	Target Dates
Approval of Concept Note	November 2011
Recruitment of Consultants	December 2011
Inception Report	January 2012
Desk Study	February 2012
Data Collection and Diagnostics	March–April 2012
Draft Report	April 2012
Validation Workshop	May 2012
Final Report	June 2012

Source: Zimbabwe A-MDTF. 2011. *Concept Note for Activity 1.02 Determinants of the Productivity and Sustainability of Zimbabwe Irrigation*.

A.2 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards Preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP (1.03)

The A-MDTF allocated \$500,000 to help the GoZ draft the Zimbabwe Agricultural Investment Plan (ZAIP), in line with the country's commitments under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) to allocate at least ten percent of the national budget in pursuit of a sustained agricultural growth rate of six percent.

The four consultants to be hired by the A-MDTF would work in close collaboration with staff from the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation, and Irrigation Development

(MAMID), and under the supervision of the ZAIP Task Force (ZAIP-TF), which was created by the GoZ to direct the preparation of the investment plan. They would support the ZAIP process through to the Technical Review stage, when the CAADP would review the draft ZAIP and recommend additional revisions to comply with the programme.

The intended primary beneficiary of the activity was the MAMID, and specifically the ZAIP-TF. Secondary beneficiaries include:

- Donors with a vested interest in investing in agriculture in Zimbabwe (such as the EU, DFID, USAID, and the development programs of Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and the UN)
- Farmers' unions, NGOs, and private enterprises in the agriculture sector.

The original timetable is presented in below.

Table A.2: Planned Timeframe for Support to the GoZ for the ZAIP and CAADP

Tasks	Target Dates
Approval of Concept Note	June 2011
Recruitment of Consultants	June–July 2011
Detailed Roadmaps for Developing the Investment Plan and Compact Signing	June–July 2011
Review and Updating of Existing Documentation, Consultations with Key Stakeholders, and Drafting of the Investment Plan	July–August 2011
Investment Plan Developed	August–September 2011
Initial National Stakeholder Meeting to Review Plan Draft	October 2011
Technical Review	November 2011
Revision/Refinement of Investment Plan Based on Technical Review	December 2011–January/February 2012
Business Meeting	March 2012

Source: Zimbabwe A-MDTF. 2011. *Concept Note for Activity 1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards Preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP*.

A.3 Study on Land Reform (1.12)

The A-MDTF allocated \$473,000 for analytical studies and technical assistance (TA) to help the GoZ design and implement the Comprehensive Land Reform Programme (CLaRP), a Government-driven process whose goal is to consolidate the land reform programme in the following ways:

- Adopting and implementing land tenure policies and regulations
- Reforming the land survey process and land administration structures and regulations
- Completing the backlog on land valuation and compensation for past acquisitions, and streamlining policies and procedures for future acquisitions

- Strengthening the land dispute and conflict resolutions systems, structures, and procedures
- Building capacity within the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement (MLRR), the intended beneficiary of this activity.

The funds were allocated to hire teams of national and international consultants to assist in writing background papers in six thematic areas: (1) land tenure; (2) land valuation and compensation; (3) land conflict/dispute resolution; (4) land administration; (5) land use planning and productivity; and (6) land survey, registration, and cadastre. These background papers would be validated in stakeholder workshops before being finalized, and used to draft policy briefs to inform the CLaRP.

The original timetable is presented in below.

Table A.3: Planned Timeframe for Study on Land Reform

Tasks	Target Dates
Approval of Concept Note	February 2012
Recruitment of Consultants	March 2012
Initial Consultation/Planning Workshops	March 2012
Draft Thematic Papers Circulated for Review	April 2012
Thematic Workshops for Validation	April 2012
Final Thematic Reports	May 2012
Draft CLaRP Design Document for Review	May 2012
Final CLaRP Design Document	June 2012

Source: Zimbabwe A-MDTF. 2012. *Concept Note for Activity 1.12 Study on Land Reform*.

A.4 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation (2.02)

The A-MDTF allocated \$200,000 to provide technical assistance to the GoZ in formulating its 2014 budget. The work was carried out by World Bank staff economists, with support from consultants.

It consisted of producing 16 Growth and Recovery Policy Notes, each one focused on a specific sector, such as mining, agriculture, civil service, land reform, education, and so on. These notes informed an Aide Memoire submitted to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, which outlined key challenges and constraints for economic growth, as well as recommendations for setting budget priorities.

The intended beneficiary is the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED), which is tasked with submitting the annual budget to Parliament for its consideration.

There was no concept note produced for this activity, as it was a continuation of TA for budget preparation performed in prior years. The timeline below is reconstructed based on an interview with Nadia Piffaretti, the former TTL for the EMGTRG.

Table A.4: Planned Timeframe for Support to 2014 Budget Preparation

Tasks	Target Dates
Approval of Activity	January 2013
Drafting of Growth and Recovery Policy Notes	Mid-2013
Growth and Recovery Policy Notes Finalised and Circulated to the GoZ Line Ministries	September 2013
Aide Memoire and Infrastructure Policy Note Delivered to MFED	December 2013

Source: Nadia Piffaretti, Senior Economist (The World Bank). 28 August 2014. Personal Interview.

A.5 Poverty Analysis (2.04)

The A-MDTF allocated \$200,000 to produce an updated poverty analysis of Zimbabwe. The analysis was to be based on the latest baseline survey of income, consumption, and expenditure patterns conducted by the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT)—the 2011 Poverty, Income, Consumption, and Expenditure Survey (PICES).

The analysis was designed to produce three outputs: (i) a report describing the demography of poverty in Zimbabwe, (ii) a poverty map that linked the survey results with geographic data, and (iii) policy notes that described the nature of poverty in various sectors (such as agriculture, healthcare, education, mining, and so on). The analysis would be executed by a combination of consultants to be procured by the World Bank and the Bank's own staff.

The intended beneficiaries of the activity were ZIMSTAT, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion. After inception, both ministries merged to form the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, MFED. Downstream beneficiaries would have included other government ministries and parastatals that design and implement poverty alleviation or reduction programs, such as the Ministry of Public Works, Labour, and Social Welfare, as well as donors and development partners.

The original timetable is presented below.

Table A.5: Planned Timeframe for Poverty Analysis

Tasks	Target Dates
Activity Initiation Summary (AIS) Sign-Off	June 2012
Concept Note Review (EMGTRG Review)	September 2012
Desk Review, Mission, and Report Drafted	April 2013
Decision Meeting and Review of Draft Report	May 2013
Client Comment and Finalization of Draft	August 2013
Final Delivery to Client	September 2013
Activity Completion Summary (ACS)	October 2013

Source: Zimbabwe A-MDTF. 2012. *Concept Note for Activity 2.04 Poverty Analysis*.

A.6 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme (2.10)

In 2010, the A-MDTF allocated \$180,000 to provide “just-in-time” analytical and advisory support on high priority policy issues requiring urgent action by the GoZ. As envisioned, this advisory programme would advise on (i) mining taxation policy and (ii) mining revenue transparency. The initial work was scheduled to take place over a two-year period beginning January 2011 and concluding June 2012.

As the political economic environment changed and reallocated funds became available through the A-MDTF, the scope of work for this activity evolved. The mining revenue transparency work was separated into a distinct A-MDTF activity with its own budget, after an initial workshop on mining revenue transparency in October 2011 that was supported by the Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme. In addition, the allocation was increased to \$235,000, to allow for an expanded scope of work that also included licensing and domestic procurement in the mining sector (in addition to the ongoing taxation work).

This new work and additional funding allocations were agreed to on an informal basis via e-mail communications, instead of a formal concept note being drafted and approved. The revised scope of work was scheduled to be completed by June 2014.

The intended beneficiaries were the Ministry of Mining and Mining Development and the Ministry of Finance. Downstream beneficiaries could include the commercial and small-scale miners, who would benefit from taxation reforms and other mining sector policies.

A.7 ZIMSTAT—System-Wide Approach to Statistics (2.16)

The A-MDTF allocated \$25,000 for technical assistance to help the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) validate its National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS) for 2011–2015. The NSDS is a strategic roadmap for the statistical products (surveys, censuses, and so on) that ZIMSTAT will produce over the 5-year planning horizon. To help secure funding for the various components of this roadmap, ZIMSTAT requested the input of an independent statistical expert to review the priorities and costing of the NSDS.

The direct beneficiary of the TA was ZIMSTAT, although downstream beneficiaries include the users of the data that would be produced under the NSDS. ZIMSTAT has identified the following types of statistics users: government agencies and parastatals; parliament; the private sector; researchers; farmers; the media; civil society organisations; the general public; and development partners and international organisations⁶⁷.

The original timetable is presented below.

Table A.6: Planned Timeframe for TA to ZIMSTAT

Tasks	Target Dates
Concept Note Review	August 2011
Desk Review, Mission, and Report Drafted	September–November 2011
Decision Meeting and Review of Draft Report	November 2011
Client Comment and Finalization of Draft	December 2011

⁶⁷ Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT). 2011. “National Strategy for the Development of Statistics: 2011–2015.”

Final Delivery to Client	December 2011
Activity Completion Summary (ACS)	December 2011
Source: Zimbabwe A-MDTF. 2011. <i>Concept Note for Activity 2.16 ZIMSTAT—System-Wide Approach to Statistics</i> .	

A.8 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance (2.17)

The A-MDTF allocated \$710,500 to provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED, formerly Ministry of Finance, to reconfigure and strengthen the GoZ's budgeting, budget execution, financial control, and reporting system—the Public Finance Management System (PFMS). The PFMS is a deployment of the SAP enterprise resource planning platform, an industry-standard package used by the private and public sector alike.

The PFMS had become inoperable during the hyperinflation crisis in 2008 and 2009, as the system was not built to accommodate the number of hyperinflationary digits. Out of necessity, budget execution, budget control, and recording of transactions became manual processes. Activity 2.17 was designed to help the MoF reactivate and reconfigure the system so that it could once again be used to computerise the GoZ's fiscal accounting and control functions.

At the conclusion of the TA, the SAP system should have been capable of:

- Supporting the GoZ's cash budget, including integrated budget control
- Accounting for all foreign currency transactions in one ledger for the Consolidated Revenue Fund
- Automating bank account reconciliations
- Performing accounting and controlling functions for the National Development Fund, a separate account for donor funds.

The activity's workflow was split into two phases, with two cross-cutting activities: (i) providing support for on-the-ground process and systems users, and (ii) building capacity to manage future changes to processes and systems. The tasks for each phase are specified in the timeline below.

Table A.7: Planned Timeframe for the PFMS Technical Assistance

Tasks	Target Dates
Call Centre Support	May 2010
Change Management and Skills Transfer	May 2010
Phase I: Process and System Enhancements	
Assessment	September 2009
Design of Processes and Corresponding Systems Enablement	October 2009
Building and Configuration of Process and Systems Enhancements	November 2009
Implementation of Process and Systems Enhancements	December 2009
Phase II: Preparation of Accounting Staff to Operate Enhanced PFMS	
Go-Live and Roll-Out Support	

New Process Designs and Systems Enablement

| May 2010

Source: Zimbabwe A-MDTF. 2009. *Concept Note for Activity 2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance*.

Note: The activity completion date is erroneously identified as May 2009 in the concept note. We assume that this should be May 2010.

A.9 Flexible Technical Assistance for Infrastructure (3.05)

The A-MDTF allocated \$300,000 in funds for three purposes: (i) to fund a series of Water Forums that facilitated dialogue within the Zimbabwe water sector and with international practitioners on pressing issues; (ii) to respond to rapid technical assistance requests from the GoZ with a per-request scope less than \$50,000; and (iii) to provide support to the National Action Committee (NAC) and its subsidiary National Coordinating Unit (NCU) in improving their current networking and knowledge management of the water sector.

There were six Water Forums hosted. The Water Forums were originally scheduled to occur monthly for one year (12 meetings); although in practice they were convened less frequently (every two to three months). Topics included:

- “Providing 24/7 Water Supply: Lessons from eThekwin Municipality (South Africa)” hosted on October 2012
- “Modelling the Water Sector in South Africa and Zimbabwe” hosted on December 2012
- “Zimbabwe’s New National Water Policy: Responding to Challenges to Create a Foundation for Sustainable Growth” hosted on 30 January 2013
- “The Future of Sanitation in Harare and Other Cities: Perspectives on Possible Pathways to Recovery” hosted on 11 April 2013
- “The Beitbridge Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation Project” hosted on 26 June 2013
- “Enhancing Water and Sanitation Services through Performance Contracts: Lessons from Africa” hosted on 23 January 2014.

The rapid TA requests that were met by the Flexible TA for Infrastructure activity included:

- 10 policy notes produced under the Water Forum branding, and five more planned
- Rapid appraisal of Bulawayo water supply as emergency response to what city officials called a “crisis”
- Policy note on climate change for MEWC
- Infrastructure policy note and review, as an input to the 2014 GoZ budget preparation
- Rapid assessment of the potential for performance contracts for ZINWA’s operations
- Funding for a delegation from MEWC to attend the Sanitation and Water for All meeting in Washington, DC.

The target beneficiaries were various GoZ ministries with responsibilities within the water sector. These include:

- Ministry of Environment, Water, and Climate (MEWC), formerly the Ministry of Water Resources Development and Management (MWRDM)
- Ministry of Local Government, Public Works, and National Housing (MLGPWNH)
- Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development (MOTID), formerly the Ministry of Transport, Communications, and Infrastructure Development
- Ministry of Energy and Power Development
- Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA)
- Environmental Management Agency (EMA)
- Urban and rural councils, such as the City of Harare.

The Flexible TA for Infrastructure child trust fund opened in September 2012 and was intended to be depleted by December 2013.

A.10 National Water Policy (3.07)

The A-MDTF allocated \$300,000 to provide TA to the Ministry of Water Resources Development and Management (MWRDM) in formulating a draft National Water Policy (NWP). The A-MDTF's contribution was matched with \$70,000 from UNICEF and \$50,000 from the Water and Sanitation Programme (WSP).


The work was divided into two phases. Phase I involved drafting Technical Background Documents, one in each of three focus areas:

- Water Resources Management
- Rural Water Supply and Sanitation
- Urban Water Supply and Sanitation.

In Phase II, the Policy Task Force (PTF) of the GoZ's National Action Committee (NAC) drafted the NWP based on the policy recommendations contained in the Technical Background Documents. In addition:

- The PTF received technical assistance from the same consultants to help draft the policy
- The PTF received technical assistance from the World Bank's technical experts in the form of comments on drafts of the policy, as well as participation in stakeholder meetings.

The direct beneficiaries of the activity are the GoZ, and particularly the ministerial members of the water sector National Action Committee (NAC). The governance of the water sector in Zimbabwe is presented in Figure A.1, which illustrates the roles played by the GoZ, donors, and other stakeholders.

Figure A.1: Coordination of the Water Sector in Zimbabwe

Source: The World Bank/UNICEF/WSP. April 2012. "Consolidated Recommendations for a National Water Policy for Zimbabwe." Page 11.

The original timetable is presented below.

Table A.8: Planned Timeframe for Completion of the National Water Policy

Tasks	Target Dates
Endorsement of the Concept Note (TRG, NAC, World Bank)	22 August 2011
Secure project funding	22 August 2011
Phase I: Preparation of Technical Background Documents	
Establish technical team and sub-sector leaders	22 August 2011
Appointment of consultants	1 September 2011
Prepare outline of Technical Background Documents	15 September 2011
Data gathering and sub-sector reports	September–Mid-October 2011
Consultation and drafting of Technical Background Documents	December 2011–January 2012
Final Technical Background Documents to Client	15 February 2012
Phase II: Preparation of Water Policy by NCU	
Draft outline of policy paper	Not specified in CN
Draft policy paper	–
Stakeholder consultation and feedback	–
Final policy paper	–

Source: Zimbabwe A-MDTF. 2011. *Concept Note for Activity 3.07 National Water Policy*.

A.11 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government, and Municipality Civil Works (4.01)

The A-MDTF allocated \$400,000 to conduct two analytical studies to inform the design and implementation of social protection policies and interventions. One of the studies focused on adapting a proposed food-for-work (“public works approach”) programme to private sector projects, as well as Government and municipality civil works. That is, a consultant was hired to identify projects that could be amenable to the proposed food-for-work scheme.

The intended beneficiary of the study is the Ministry of Public Works, Labour, and Social Welfare (MPWLSW), which is tasked with designing social protection policies and interventions, including the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), under which the proposed food-for-work scheme would be implemented. Downstream beneficiaries would include the private and governmental entities that benefit from the civil works undertaken through the PSNP, as well as the poor that benefit from the resulting cash transfers

The study was to be completed within 1.5 months of beginning, but no later than December 2010. This timeframe matched the target completion timeframe for the sister study focusing on the design of the food-for-work programme itself.

Appendix B: Portfolio of All A-MDTF Activities

Table B.1: Portfolio of Activities Supported by the A-MDTF

ID	Activity Name	Activity Type	TRG	Funds Allocated (US\$) [‡]
1.01	Zimbabwe Building Agricultural Markets: Constraints and Opportunities in Contract Farming for Smallholder Agricultural	Analytical Study	ASTRG	\$187,951
1.02	Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation	Analytical Study	ASTRG	\$312,049
1.03	Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)	TA	ASTRG	\$500,000
1.04	Livestock sector analysis and development of an investment framework for Smallholder Livestock Production in Zimbabwe	Analytical Study	ASTRG	\$200,000
1.05	Food Security Study	Analytical Study	ASTRG	\$200,000
1.06	Technical Review of priority Land Reform Issues in Zimbabwe	Analytical Study	ASTRG	\$479,500
1.07	Support to the Valuation Consortium	Data and IM	ASTRG	\$292,950
1.08	Flexible TA for the Agriculture Sector	TA	ASTRG	\$300,000
1.09	Achieving Household and National Food Security	Analytical Study	ASTRG	\$16,000
1.10	Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector Assessment	Analytical Study	ASTRG	\$178,217
1.11	Baseline Study of Agrarian Sector	Analytical Study	ASTRG	\$12,000
1.12	Study on Land Reform	Analytical Study	ASTRG	\$58,243
1.13 [†]	Improving Input and Output Markets for Smallholder Farmers in Zimbabwe	Analytical Study	ASTRG	\$3,990
1.14 [†]	National Agriculture Conference	Knowledge Exchange	ASTRG	\$40,133
2.01	Support to 2013 Budget Preparation	TA	EMGTRG	\$149,702
2.02	Support to 2014 Budget Preparation	TA	EMGTRG	\$200,000
2.03	Trade and Competitiveness Notes	Analytical Study	EMGTRG	\$400,000
2.04	Poverty Analysis	TA	EMGTRG	\$200,000
2.05	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP)	TA	EMGTRG	\$50,000
2.06	Flexible TA in Economic Management and Governance	TA	EMGTRG	\$200,000
2.07	Wage Bill and Civil Service Reform	TA	EMGTRG	\$200,000

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ID	Activity Name	Activity Type	TRG	Funds Allocated (US\$)‡
2.08	Small Business Survey	Analytical Study	EMGTRG	\$487,387
2.09	Zimbabwe Mining Revenue Transparency	Analytical Study	EMGTRG	\$225,000
2.10	Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme	TA	EMGTRG	\$235,000
2.11	Zimbabwe Minerals Inventory and Revenue Projections Study	Analytical Study	EMGTRG	\$180,000
2.12	Zimbabwe Public Financial Management System (PFMS) TA Phase 3	Data and IM	EMGTRG	\$548,914
2.13	Zimbabwe PFMS Local Consultancy Support	Data and IM	EMGTRG	\$1,324,000
2.14	Technical Assistance to Zimbabwe State Procurement Board	TA	EMGTRG	\$269,127
2.15	Support to Public Investment Management	TA	EMGTRG	\$149,702
2.16	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT)—System Wide Approach to Statistics	Data and IM	EMGTRG	\$13,875
2.17	Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	Data and IM	EMGTRG	\$165,000
2.18	Zimbabwe Integrated Fiduciary Assessment	Analytical Study	EMGTRG	\$300,000
2.19†	City of Harare Manpower Audit	Analytical Study	EMGTRG	\$80,000
2.20†	Payroll Audit	Analytical Study	EMGTRG	\$3,275,000
2.21	Technical Assistance to the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General	TA	EMGTRG	N/A
2.22	Analytic work to support re-engagement and stabilization in Zimbabwe	TA	EMGTRG	\$270,000
2.23†	Support to 2012 Budget Preparation	TA	EMGTRG	N/A
2.24†	Support to 2011 Budget Preparation	TA	EMGTRG	N/A
2.25†	Public Expenditure Notes	Analytical Study	EMGTRG	\$166,000
3.01	Dam Safety Study	Analytical Study	ITRG	\$309,588
3.02	Water Quality Monitoring Strategy	Analytical Study	ITRG	\$195,000
3.03	Water Sector Investment Analysis	Analytical Study	ITRG	\$615,000
3.04	Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy	TA	ITRG	\$685,000
3.05	Flexible Technical Assistance for Infrastructure	TA	ITRG	\$300,000
3.06	Energy Sector Investment Options Study	Analytical Study	ITRG	\$400,000
3.07	National Water Policy	TA	ITRG	\$428,256
3.08	Engineering TA for City of Harare	TA	ITRG	\$431,655

ID	Activity Name	Activity Type	TRG	Funds Allocated (US\$) [‡]
3.09	Tariff Study	Analytical Study	ITRG	\$335,000
3.10 [†]	Water Study Tour—Ministry of Water Resources Development and Management (MOWRDM) & City Engineers	Knowledge Exchange	ITRG	\$47,000
4.01 ^Δ	Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	Analytical Study	SPTRG	\$9,932
4.02 ^Δ	An analysis of Government and NGOs Public Works/Food for Work approaches in Zimbabwe	Analytical Study	SPTRG	\$15,750

Notes: [†] Refers to the eight activities that were discovered by reviewing programme documents and confirming them with the A-MDTF Secretariat. All other activities not marked by this symbol were listed in the Terms of Reference.

^Δ These two activities were part of the Social Protection thematic area, but this thematic area was eliminated during the restructuring of the A-MDTF following the 2010 Mid Term Review.

[‡] Using the programme documents in our possession, we were unable to determine the funds allocated for three activities. The funds allocated for these activities are marked “N/A”.

Appendix C: Additional Data Collected for Sampled Activities

Table C.1: Contributions to Sound Policy/Strategy Formulation

Activity	Contributions to Sound Policy or Strategy Formulation
1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation	Major—The GoZ is using the results of the study to help inform the design of a National Irrigation Policy. The TTL indicated that the Department of Irrigation within the MAMID “highly appreciated” the work because it helped the GoZ understand why productivity of irrigation had been steadily declining
1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP	Major—The TA provided to the GoZ to develop its Agricultural Investment Plan was instrumental. By the Permanent Secretary’s own admission, the draft language provided by the consultants was adopted in nearly its entirety into the final ZAIP
1.12 Study on Land Reform	None—Land issues are highly sensitive and the Ministry of Lands has been reluctant to engage directly with the A-MDTF or donors on these matters
2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation	Minor—In its 2014 budget, the Ministry of Finance largely followed the advice provided in the Aide Memoire and accompanying Growth and Recovery Notes, with one significant exception: civil service wage reform. In this instance, the GoZ ignored the World Bank experts’ recommendations
2.04 Poverty Analysis	Minor—ZIMSTAT indicated that the PICES data and the Poverty Report were used: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ By the Ministry of Finance in producing its 2014 budget ▪ By the GoZ to support its stance in wage negotiations with civil servants ▪ By the President in his Food and Nutrition policy announced in 2013
2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme	Minor—The Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme has provided useful TA and analysis for the GoZ, although there is little evidence of the work leading to specific policies or strategies in the mining sector
2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics	Major—The scope and cost validation provided by the TA helped provide credibility to the NSDS, which is now being used by ZIMSTAT as its statistics product roadmap over the current five-year planning horizon
2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	Major—The improvements to the underlying IFMIS and accompanying public financial management processes enabled informed decision-making by the GoZ, such as the formulation of its annual budget and prioritisation of public services
3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure	Minor contributions to policy or strategy formulation, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Numerous GoZ officials and donors indicated that the Water Forums convened using funds from this activity provided an opportunity for the key stakeholders to discuss the major challenges facing the water sector, although we were unable to attribute

Activity	Contributions to Sound Policy or Strategy Formulation
	<p>specific policies or strategies arising from these discussions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The rapid assessment of water supply for the City of Bulawayo enabled the city government to identify options for improving supply and to help secure financing for a groundwater investment study ▪ The infrastructure policy note and review was provided to the Ministry of Finance as an attachment to the Aide Memoire to support the preparation of the 2014 budget, and was used to allocate scarce resources across potential investments in infrastructure ▪ The policy note on climate change is being used by the MEWC to develop its National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) that will mainstream climate change thinking into planning for all key economic sectors ▪ ZINWA intends to implement performance contracts to increase their collection rate, based on a rapid assessment of the potential for performance contracts that was funded by this activity
3.07 National Water Policy	Major—The TA provided under this activity played a vital role in influencing the National Water Policy as adopted in 2013. The technical background documents formed the “backbone” of the policy’s key components (according to the MEWC), and the draft language provided in the second phase of the TA was adopted nearly in its entirety for the final NWP (according to the TTL for the ITRG)
4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	Major—The studies directly informed the GoZ’s review of its public works programmes, as the MPWLSW worked to revive these programmes after the economic collapse of 2008. The productive public works programme whose design was informed by these studies is now one pillar in the National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS), which also includes the (1) harmonised social cash transfer programme, (2) the health assistance programme, (3) the BEAM, and (4) support to the elderly and the handicapped

Table C.2: New Initiatives Realised from the Sampled Activities

Activity	Expected Initiatives	Actual Initiatives
1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP	The GoZ continues through the Technical Review process of the CAADP, ultimately leading to a business meeting facilitated by CAADP to match donors with specific investments in the validated ZAIP	The GoZ is actively working to conclude the CAADP Technical Review process, so that the business meeting can be held and investments can begin
2.04 Poverty Analysis	A revised approach to social protection schemes to reflect the latest insights provided through the poverty analysis	MPWLSW is now retargeting its social protection programmes, including BEAM and other components of the National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS), to match the latest demographics of poverty highlighted in the Poverty Report
2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics	Implementation of the National Statistics Development Strategy (NSDS)	The NSDS is currently serving as the roadmap for ZIMSTAT's work over the current five-year planning horizon, including guiding its efforts to secure funding from donors to produce statistical products
2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	Continued development and expansion of the PFMS system capabilities to accommodate additional monitoring functions	The IFMIS has continued to expand since this initial TA to accommodate increased functionality (new SAP modules), and to enable more users within the line ministries and at the district level to be able to input data and run financial reports
3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure	None—given the fluid nature of this activity, specific follow-on initiatives were not identified in the CN for this activity	The MEWC is looking to continue the Water Forum in some manner through sector working groups, potentially with donor funding
3.07 National Water Policy	Operationalization of the policy, including enabling legislation and policy harmonization	The GoZ is now working to harmonise related water sector policies. In addition, enabling legislation is being considered by Parliament
4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	A food for work component as part of the Productive Safety Net Programme	The Productive Safety Net Programme was reformed following the studies, and continues to operate with donor support

Table C.3: Analysis of Targeted Beneficiaries and Their Awareness of Activities in the Sample

Activity	Targeted Beneficiaries (Explicitly Identified or Hypothesised)	Direct (D) / Indirect (I)	Interviewed (✓) / Aware (green shading)
1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation	MAMID	D	✓
	USAID Zimbabwe Agriculture Competitiveness Programme (Zim-ACP)	I	✓
	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)	I	✓
	Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers' Union (ZCFU)	I	
	Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU)	I	✓
	Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU)	I	✓
	Women's Land and Water Rights in Southern Africa (WLWRSA)	I	
	African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS)	I	✓
	Barefoot Education for Africa Trust (BEAT)	I	✓
1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP	MAMID	D	✓
	FAO	I	✓
	ZCFU	I	
	CFU	I	✓
	ZFU	I	✓
	WLWRSA	I	
	Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI)	I	✓
	Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC)	I	✓
	AIAS	I	✓
	Zim-ACP	I	✓
	BEAT	I	✓
1.12 Study on Land Reform	MLRR	D	

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Activity	Targeted Beneficiaries (Explicitly Identified or Hypothesised)	Direct (D) / Indirect (I)	Interviewed (✓) / Aware (green shading)
	FAO	I	✓
	AIAS	I	✓
	Zim-ACP	I	✓
	BEAT	I	✓
	CFU	I	✓
	WLWRSA	I	
	Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale for Sustainable Mining Council (ZASMC)	I	✓
	UNDP	I	✓
2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation	MFED—Budget Office	D	
	National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO)	I	✓
	Poverty Reduction Forum Trust	I	
	CZI	I	✓
	ZNCC	I	✓
	Chamber of Mines	I	✓
	Labour and Economic Development Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ)	I	
2.04 Poverty Analysis	ZIMSTAT	D	✓
	MPWLSW	D	✓
	SERA	I	✓
	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	I	✓
	UNICEF	I	✓
	NANGO	I	✓
	Poverty Reduction Forum Trust	I	

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Activity	Targeted Beneficiaries (Explicitly Identified or Hypothesised)	Direct (D) / Indirect (I)	Interviewed (✓) / Aware (green shading)
	ZASMC	I	✓
	LEDRIZ	I	
2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme	MMMD	D	✓
	CZI	I	✓
	ZNCC	I	✓
	Chamber of Mines	I	✓
	ZASMC	I	✓
2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics	ZIMSTAT	D	✓
	SERA	I	✓
	ZCFU	I	
	CFU	I	✓
	ZFU	I	✓
2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	MFED—Office of the Auditor General	D	✓
	All GoZ ministries' finance offices	D	
3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure	MEWC	D	✓
	ZINWA	D	✓
	Ministry of Transport, Communications, and Infrastructure Development	I	
	Ministry of Energy and Power Development	I	
	EMA	I	✓
	City of Harare	I	✓
	UNICEF	I	✓
	UNDP	I	✓

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Activity	Targeted Beneficiaries (Explicitly Identified or Hypothesised)	Direct (D) / Indirect (I)	Interviewed (✓) / Aware (green shading)
3.07 National Water Policy	MEWC	D	✓
	ZINWA	D	✓
	MLGPWNH	D	✓
	UNICEF	I	✓
	WLWRSA	I	
	Zimbabwe Association of Local Governments (ZLGA)	I	
	Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe (UCAZ)	I	
	Institute of Water and Sanitation	I	
4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	MPWLSW	D	✓
	UNICEF	I	✓
	ZLGA	I	
	UCAZ	I	
	City of Harare	I	✓

Table C.4: Analysis of the Delivery Models Used by Activities in the Sample

Activity	Imparted New Knowledge or Capacity?	Use of Appropriate Consultants and Activity Structures?	Made Contextually Appropriate Recommendations?
1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation	✓ The report provided a diagnostic of irrigation productivity that the MAMID had explicitly requested because it did not understand why some irrigation schemes worked better than others. MAMID staff also learned how to enumerate and carry out future field studies on irrigation issues.	✓ The consultant hired was “very knowledgeable and experienced in issues specific to Zimbabwe,” according to the MAMID. The consultant worked collaboratively with staff during secondment. The workshop was well attended (80+ participants), which helped validate the findings.	✓ The study encouraged the MAMID to expand their definition of investment to include both “hardware” and “software” (such as planning and coordination processes). The study also recommended including water users’ associations in the investment planning process, and providing guidance to beneficiaries of irrigation investment so they know how to use these new irrigation tools.
1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP	✓ The ZAIP imparted some institutional capacity by providing a roadmap for the MAMID to secure financing for key sector investments, although the Permanent Secretary acknowledges that the agency is badly in need of skilled employees.	✓ The sector TTL and the Permanent Secretary both acknowledge that the initial consultants hired to help draft the ZAIP were not sufficiently knowledgeable on the local context, but they were later replaced and the ZAIP process was successfully completed. The regional consultations formed a key part of this activity’s success by including the perspectives of many of the sector’s stakeholders.	✓ The consultants’ draft of the ZAIP provided a pre-investment framework that was consistent with the four pillars of the CAADP. This feature was important because the ZAIP paved the way for the GoZ signing a compact joining the CAADP.
1.12 Study on Land Reform	N/A—this activity is ongoing and the outputs have not yet been published	✓ The sector TTL and the BEAT both claim the consultants selected have a deep knowledge of land issues in Zimbabwe. These documents are designed to provide a resource that technical experts within the MLRR can informally rely on—an important feature of the activity’s design because the MLRR has been averse to explicit coordination with donors due to political sensitivities.	

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Activity	Imparted New Knowledge or Capacity?	Use of Appropriate Consultants and Activity Structures?	Made Contextually Appropriate Recommendations?
2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation	<p>✓</p> <p>The Aide Memoire and the accompanying Economic Recovery and Growth Notes provided a technical underpinning for budget formulation that the GoZ lacked.</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>The activity relied on sector expertise from the World Bank, which was packaged and disseminated to the GoZ line ministries by the TTL for the EMGTRG. This structure minimised the profile of the donor support that was provided for the budget formulation process (to hedge against political risk), while still providing a strong technical foundation upon which GoZ officials could make budget decisions.</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>The Aide Memoire and accompanying growth notes recommended the highest priority investments needed to stimulate economic recovery and growth. In doing so, it signalled area where donors and the GoZ could collaborate to achieve shared objectives (such as improvements in public financial management, water infrastructure, and so on).</p>
2.04 Poverty Analysis	<p>✓</p> <p>The activity imparted knowledge through the TA provided to ZIMSTAT to validate its analytical methods used in the Poverty Report, and it built capacity by training ZIMSTAT on poverty mapping techniques.</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>The GoZ ultimately refused to grant access to the PICES dataset for the activity to be carried out as originally planned—even though this was a risk that was identified during inception. Had a frank discussion on the approach been held at the beginning of the activity, a different approach might have been used (such as a secondment of ZIMSTAT to defuse any mistrust or tensions that may have given rise to the dataset not being shared)</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>Once the format for the TA was sorted out, the consultants and World Bank experts provided good comments on the Poverty Report, which ZIMSTAT said supported the credibility and integrity of the work. The training provided on mapping techniques was exactly what ZIMSTAT wanted.</p>
2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme	<p>✓</p> <p>The programme produced several outputs that provided knowledge that the MMMD would not have otherwise obtained. For example, knowledge on international practices regarding local procurement, a diagnostic on the mineral licensing regime, and a training and report on mining taxation and an accompanying revenue optimisation model.</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>The MMMD was happy with the choice of consultants and World Bank TTLs, all of which were all recognised experts. The TTLs, MMMD, and Chamber of Mines all mentioned that the Ortega report on the mineral licensing regime was outstanding and well-received. The MMMD, Chamber of Mines, and ZASMC all said the consultations were highly useful, particularly to help identify the issues and challenges associated with a domestic procurement</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>The studies and policy dialogue that have been supported by the A-MDTF have produced appropriate recommendations. For example, the MMMD is now procuring a computerised cadastre (a key recommendation of the Ortega report). We also found that the recommendations in the various reports and aide memoires were appropriate for the context of facilitating dialogue on mineral policy.</p>

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Activity	Imparted New Knowledge or Capacity?	Use of Appropriate Consultants and Activity Structures?	Made Contextually Appropriate Recommendations?
		policy.	
2.16 ZIMSTAT— System Wide Approach to Statistics	✓ ZIMSTAT said it learned about international standards for statistics development, although this wasn't necessarily the objective of the activity.	✓ ZIMSTAT stated that the consultant hired by the A-MDTF (Dr. McGill) was very knowledgeable, and ZIMSTAT was very pleased with his comments and review of the NSDS.	✓ The consultant's recommendations helped prioritise the components of the NSDS, and validate their costing. Both the donors and ZIMSTAT said this was exactly what was needed.
2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS Technical Assistance	Although trainings were provided as part of this initial PFMS activity, the trainings were considered poor quality by the GoZ and donors. The TTL suspects this was because the consultants preferred to continue to receive contracts for additional work on the IFMIS, rather than build sufficient internal capacity. Of those GoZ employees that were adequately trained, many ended up leaving to find better paying jobs.	According to the TTL, the technical consultants that helped bring the IFMIS back online were very competent and appropriate for the work executed on the IFMIS (which was the primary objective of this activity). However, the training issues indicate that the selected consultants were not completely appropriate for all of the activity's objectives	✓ The recommendations made by the technical consultants helped successfully bring the IFMIS back online.
3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure	✓ The Water Forums and policy notes shared new knowledge with a mix of water stakeholders in the sector, including GoZ ministries and parastatals. Other outputs—such as the rapid TA to the City of Bulawayo and the infrastructure policy note—also provided useful (and needed) knowledge.	✓ The sector TTL stated that the consultants selected (or the World Bank sector experts, in some cases) were always knowledgeable, and the activities were always structured in response to a rapid need. The sector TTL commented that “the flexibility of this activity was its best feature.”	✓ The recommendations were demand-driven and therefore contextually appropriate.
3.07 National Water Policy	✓ The Technical Background Documents and synthesis policy recommendations accumulated knowledge that, as one ZINWA official stated, “would have taken [the GoZ] years to acquire.”	✓ The MEWC, ZINWA, MLGPWNH, and the sector TTL all indicated that the consultants were knowledgeable. Donors and the MEWC thought that the mix of a consultant-driven process to produce the Technical Background Documents, followed by a GoZ-driven process in	✓ The policy recommendations made in the Technical Background Documents were mostly adopted verbatim.

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Activity	Imparted New Knowledge or Capacity?	Use of Appropriate Consultants and Activity Structures?	Made Contextually Appropriate Recommendations?
		drafting the National Water Policy, was very productive.	
4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works	✓ The MPWLSW stated that the study helped the GoZ understand that there was little being done by the private sector to support public works programmes, and that the public works programme itself was in need of an overhaul.	✓ The MPWLSW indicated that the consultants were knowledgeable, and the format of producing a study was useful because it served as evidence that the GoZ could point to when reforming its public works programme.	✓ Both donors and the GoZ agreed that the recommendations in the study provided the basis for a re-design of the public works programme.

The flowchart illustrates the A-MDTF process, starting with Applicants (Donor Staff, GoZ, Academia, Civil Society) at the bottom. Applicants submit a Cover sheet and Concept Note (CN) within Donor Priorities to the 3 Technical Review Groups (TRGs). The TRGs, consisting of ASTRG, ITRG, and EMGTRG, review applications and recommend for approval or rejection. Approved applications are sent to the Secretariat, which manages the Fund and ensures smooth operation. The Secretariat reports to the Policy Committee (PC) and provides guidance and direction. The PC, composed of all contributing donors, sets principles and priorities. The Secretariat also oversees the implementation of activities, submitting reports and outputs to the PC. The Secretariat interacts with Child TFs for each activity, managed by World Bank TTLs, which receive US\$ from Old TF (TF070941) and New TF (TF071603). The Secretariat also interacts with Consultants, Service Providers, and Vendors, who interact within contractual obligations. The Consultants, Service Providers, and Vendors provide Contract and Fiduciary and Substantive Reports to the Secretariat. The Secretariat also interacts with the Applicants, who interact within contractual obligations.

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Appendix E: Excerpts from the Operational Guidelines

Table E.1: Roles and Responsibilities of the Secretariat

Secretariat Function	Roles	Responsibilities
Management, Operational, and Administrative Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Manager ▪ Finance Officer ▪ Procurement Officer ▪ Programme Support Officers/Assistants ▪ Additional consultant support as necessary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Organise meetings of the PC and TRGs, and prepare meeting minutes ▪ Prepare and implement annual work programmes ▪ Manage the Fund's resources, budgets and programs, including through the A-MDTF website ▪ Review proposals furnished by the TRGs for funding under the A-MDT to ensure their suitability for such funding and consistency with the objectives and priorities of the A-MDTF, and approve such proposals ▪ Maintain a procurement planning and monitoring system for activities, and ensure the World Bank's fiduciary responsibilities are met ▪ Handle communications regarding the A-MDTF and together with the TRGs keep the GoZ informed ▪ Support TRGs to prepare forward work programmes and obtain PC endorsement for these programmes ▪ Coordinate work of the TRGs to avoid overlaps and gaps, and advise on cross-cutting issues such as service delivery, gender, and environment ▪ Handle communications and publish relevant documents through the A-MDTF website and the Donor Centre ▪ Exercise quality control over proposals and outputs relating to analytical work and other activities, tapping into World Bank quality assurance systems, and available donor technical skill ▪ Ensure that activities proposed by the TRGs are consistent with the A-MDTF guidelines, objectives, and priorities ▪ Prepare progress reports and other reports, as needed ▪ Manage the Zimbabwe Transition and Recovery activities
Sector Task Team Leaders (TTLs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Three TTLs, one for each TRG ▪ All those responsible for a Child Trust Fund under the A-MDTF ▪ In exceptional circumstances, the A-MDTF Manager 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Help develop a strategy for the TRGs ▪ Provide a link to wider sector knowledge in the Bank and apply it to the work of the TRGs ▪ Support TRGs to prepare forward work programmes and obtain PC endorsement for the work ▪ Prepare proposals/CNs on behalf of the TRGs, and ensure that they are consistent with the A-MDTF guidelines, objectives, and priorities ▪ Oversee the procurement process and prepare the appropriate documentation between the World Bank and the vendor to be hired for implementation ▪ Supervise activities within their TRGs—exercising quality control to Bank Standards through the whole project cycle,

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	will assume the role of the TTL to facilitate implementations	<p>starting from initial TOR through review of works in progress to final outputs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Be accountable for ensuring that the Bank's fiduciary responsibility is met in relation to the Child TF they oversee ▪ Lead a peer review exercise of analytical proposal and products to ensure they: (i) reflect current thinking in the thematic area, (ii) incorporate relevant feedbacks, and (iii) are supportive of follow-up actions ▪ Undertake progress reporting and monitoring of the achievement of the A-MDTF outcomes and objectives are carried out ▪ Coordinate with other TRG TTLs to help avoid overlap and gaps, and advise on cross-cutting issues such as gender and environment ▪ Report to the TRG and the Manager of the A-MDTF on implementation progress
Sector Technical Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Technical support recruited to support the TRGs in delivering the work programmes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support the TTL and TRG in developing a strategy for the sector, including through dialogue with the GoZ and donors ▪ Provide a link to wider sector knowledge in the World Bank and apply it to the work of the TRGs ▪ Support TRGs to prepare forward work programmes and obtain PC endorsement for the work ▪ Support TTLs in design, oversight, and implementation of the A-MDTF activities

Source: A-MDTF. 2011 *Operational Guidelines*. Pp. 11-12.

Appendix F: Analysis of Implementation of Recommendations

Table F.1: Implementation Status of Recommendations from the MTR and Annual Reports

Source	Recommendation	Was Action Taken?	If Yes, Was It Satisfactory?	Notes
MTR	Scope of the A-MDTF should be recalibrated to focus on a tighter nucleus of issues (PFM, agrarian, infrastructure, investment climate, civil service reform, mining), with better synergies with other donors (including the ZimFund), and building capacity	Yes	Yes	Formal coordination with ZimFund was not as good as it could have been. Coordination was also limited with other donors' bilateral initiatives (such as USAID-ZimACP and USAID-SERA)
MTR	AMDTF should focus on five core activities: (1) Analytical studies, (2) Data and IM systems, (3) Knowledge exchanges, (4) TA and expert placements, (5) Pilots	Yes	Yes	Pilots were ultimately dropped because of donors' aversion (see p. 4 of 2011 Annual Report)
MTR	Coverage of standalone work should be deepened by limiting the focus to a few sectors: (1) Economic Management and Governance, (2) Infrastructure, and (3) Agrarian. Gender & environment will be cross-cutting and mainstreamed into these areas, while Social protection and Human development will be left to other donors currently working in this space	Yes	Yes	Gender and environment were never taken up
MTR	Governance structure should be reconfigured to become more effective and efficient, and to better align with the ZimFund when it is created. Reforms include: (1) Eliminate the TAG, (2) Close dialogue with GoZ aid coordination structures, (3) World Bank co-chairs of TRGs to join PC as observers, (4) Rotation of PC co-chair by new donor rep every 6 mos.; World Bank co-chair to be permanent, (5) Rotation of donors as co-chair of TRG, (6) One World Bank TTL for each TRG, (7) Secretariat should consist of senior World Bank staff with “strong leadership and interpersonal skills”, and (8) Work programme and activity approval process redefined accordingly (to these recommendations)	Yes	Yes	
MTR	Roles and functions of the PC, TRG, and Secretariat need to be more clearly defined (see p. 41 of MTR)	Yes	Yes	
MTR	Expansion of Secretariat to include: (1) 4 technical staff (Manager + 3 sector TTLs); (2) STC/ETCs hired to assist as needed with communications and financial	Yes	No	No communications staff hired

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Source	Recommendation	Was Action Taken?	If Yes, Was It Satisfactory?	Notes
	management; (3) World Bank provides regular administrative support, including access to World Bank experts and knowledge (increased role for World Bank support); (4) Activity TTLs should be fully trained on AMDTF OG and managing Bank-executed TFs (including AMS 15 covering World Bank procurement processes)			
MTR	Financial management and progress reporting processes need to be streamlined to provide clearer and consistent information updates, both internally and externally, in line with Bank procedures. (1) Full review of all budget line items to rationalize the projects in the pipeline, and potentially free up funding; (2) Financial management and forecasting becomes a core responsibility of the A-MDTF Manager (w/ admin support from World Bank); (3) Creation and use of financial reporting templates for donors; (4) Develop and use Progress report templates for PC to track progress	Yes	No	Financial updates needed to be more streamlined and easier for donors to process. Donors did not make use of Client Portal for self-service access to financials
MTR	Procurement should be improved by: (1) Developing a detailed monitoring matrix of all activities to keep track of procurement stages; (2) TTLs should prepare TORs and assemble evaluation team in advance of selection; Selection of consultants to be done by experts, not just committee of TRG; (3) IBTF, OG, and AAs revised to allow for procurement of equipment essential to consultant and service delivery, w/o violating bilateral restrictive measures	Yes	No	Full-time procurement staff hired, but no master procurement matrix maintained
MTR	TA and Expert Placements are a core activity for the A-MDTF and need to be marketed more aggressively, and actually executed (the demand is there)	Yes	No	TA seemed sufficient, but perhaps not expert placements
MTR	All work under the A-MDTF needs to be linked to future investments, policy reform, or other transformational processes in support or preparation of future action. (1) TRG co-chairs need to have a formal responsibility to keep GoZ sector groups fully informed of A-MDTF activities; (2) Capacity building activities should be replicated in other areas; (3) A-MDTF should embark on pilots; (4) A-MDTF should gear itself to support the ZimFund, to ensure no repetition and that the two instruments lead to maximum impact	Yes	Yes	There was no link with ZimFund, and pilots were never carried out
MTR	A-MDTF needs to ramp up its communication strategy to improve policy uptake and dialogue. (1) A revised communications strategy is developed and delivered, with support from Communications Professionals within the Bank; (2) Secretariat focuses on improving policy uptake and implementation of analytical work through targeting communications and dissemination of products; (3) Website to be enhanced to serve	Yes	No	Website was reportedly updated, and a communications strategy was defined, but results were lacking

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Source	Recommendation	Was Action Taken?	If Yes, Was It Satisfactory?	Notes
	as a better communication and knowledge sharing tool; (4) Tech members of TRG and PC to be more active conduits through which AMDTF activity and knowledge is disseminated among donors			
2011 AR	The PC shifts to a more strategic policy oversight role. Specific changes recommended: PC reverts to monthly meetings, and the Secretariat takes a more active role in filtering topics so they are limited to strategic issues	Yes	No	Secretariat did not succeed in clarifying roles of the PC and TRG, and overlaps persisted between the two donor groups. Also a need to reduce frequency of meetings (from monthly to quarterly)
2011 AR	The monitoring and implementation matrix should be improved so Secretariat and TRG co-chairs better understand the progress and issues, and can identify issues to elevate to PC for consideration	Yes	Yes	
2011 AR	Simplify the approval processes for activities so that TRGs are not constrained and the PC focuses on strategic issues instead of activity details	Yes	No	Some donors in the TRGs reported frustration with the
2011 AR	Add a contingency of 10% to be managed by the sector TTL, to avoid approval from PC for minor amendments to activity financing	Yes	Yes	This is when the Flexible TA activities began
2011 AR	Extend closing date of Fund to 31 December 2013	Yes	No	Did not meet intended purpose of extension (b/c closing date of old TF was not lined up with closing date for new TF)
2011 AR	Cap on World Bank staff time in AA should be increased to reflect increased size and lifespan of the AMDTF (from \$1.8 million to \$2.5 million)	Yes	Yes	Staff time now capped at 10% of donors' contributions
2011 AR	Efforts by the Secretariat should be redoubled to address the remaining MTR recommendations	No		Some recommendations (such as the communications strategy) have not been sufficiently addressed
2011 AR	Sector Management Units (SMU) of the World Bank should provide a timely response and enhance their role in reviewing CNs and peer-reviewing final products	Yes	No	SMU still causes delays in reviewing CNs, even though TTLs give deadlines for CN reviews and set the review dates in advance
2011	Secretariat should review each proposal for environmental and gender issues (where	Yes	No	Need to develop criteria for proposal

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Source	Recommendation	Was Action Taken?	If Yes, Was It Satisfactory?	Notes
AR	possible)			review that includes gender and environment assessment
2011 AR	Donors should make use of the Client Portal, where financial data is posted	Yes	No	Donors did not use the Client Portal
2011 AR	Secretariat should restructure its division of labour to be task-oriented, rather than assigning particular staff to liaise with specific donors	Yes	Yes	
2011 AR	Any assessment of the AMDTF should take into consideration funds leveraged by the AMDTF that helped further its impact. For example, the PFMS work leveraged donor funds for infrastructure and should be attributed in part to the AMDTF	Yes	No	Annual reports and other reviews did not fully account for leveraged funds in the impacts identified
2012 AR	Re-open the RE window, to help spend the remaining funds available in the old TF	Yes	Yes	The RE window closed in 2010 following the MTR, because the GoZ wanted interventions in specific areas, which would have required RE funding (which donors didn't want). As of 30 June 2013, RE window re-opened
2012 AR	Revitalize the communication strategy to ensure access to information and increased awareness of World Bank activities in Zimbabwe	No		This has been a recurring recommendation since the MTR that has not been adequately addressed
2012 AR	Review proposals to include environment and gender issues	No		These issues will be included in OG for ZIMREF (instead of this TF)
2012 AR	Reconfigure the TRGs to accommodate gov't participation after (if) the RE windows is re-opened	No		We did not find evidence that the TRGs were reconfigured to include GoZ representation on a routine basis
2013 AR	Devise ways at the program level to ensure activities have access to the data they need from the GoZ	No		We were unable to determine if this was done, both because the recommendation was vague, and because the 2014 annual report has not yet been produced
2013 AR	Prioritize projects with a strongly demonstrated GoZ buy-in, and provide commensurate funding (while recognizing exceptions may need to be made)	No		We were unable to determine if this was done, both because the recommendation

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Source	Recommendation	Was Action Taken?	If Yes, Was It Satisfactory?	Notes
				was vague, and because the 2014 annual report has not yet been produced
2013 AR	Donors and the World Bank should jointly develop mechanisms to ensure predictability of resources (to prevent delayed implementation because of fund exhaustion)	No		We were unable to determine if this was done, both because the recommendation was vague, and because the 2014 annual report has not yet been produced
2013 AR	Ensure Harare-based staff or STCs are available to facilitate continual engagement with the GoZ	No		The sector TTIs are no longer based in Harare due to the Bank's restructuring efforts
2013 AR	Ensure that the Fund is flexible enough to respond to the volatile political environment	No		We were unable to determine if this was done, both because the recommendation was vague, and because the 2014 annual report has not yet been produced
2013 AR	Develop a robust and inclusive communication strategy, and all major reports should be summarised and distributed “timely and widely”	No		This has been a recurring recommendation since the MTR that has not been adequately addressed

Sources: A-MDTF. *Mid-Term Review*. Pp.37–45.

A-MDTF. *2011 Annual Report*. Pp.3–5, 17–19.

A-MDTF. *2012 Annual Report*. Pp. 6, 9–10.

A-MDTF. *2013 Annual Report*. Pp. 2–5.

Appendix G: Desktop Review List

We have catalogued all unique documents received from the Secretariat during the evaluation, using the activity- and document-numbering scheme described in Section 3.2. The inventory below includes programme-level documents, as well as documents that relate to specific activities in the A-MDTF portfolio. We will submit this inventory, along with copies of all files received, on a USB memory stick at the conclusion of the evaluation.

Table G.1: List of Documents Reviewed for the Evaluation

ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
0.00.01	AMDTF Midterm Review June 2010	2010	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.02	AMDTF Annual Report 2011	2012	Annual Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.03	AMDTF Annual Report 2012	2013	Annual Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.04	AMDTF Annual Report 2013	2014	Annual Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.05	IBTF Request Number 2500	2008	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.06	MDTF Operational Guidelines 090723	2009	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.07	MDTF Operational Guidelines 110705	2011	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.08	World Bank Zimbabwe ISN I	2005	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.09	World Bank Zimbabwe ISN II	2007	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.10	ITRG Summary Report 3 June 2014	2014	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.11	STERP	2009	Related GoZ Publication	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.12	MidTermPlan 2011-2015	2011	Related GoZ Publication	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.13	ZIM-ASSET	2013	Related GoZ Publication	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.14	Ext Fin Report New TF 120430	2012	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.15	Ext Fin Report New TF 121031	2012	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.16	Ext Fin Report New TF 121231	2012	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.17	Ext Fin Report New TF 130331	2013	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
0.00.18	Ext Fin Report New TF 130930	2013	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.19	Ext Fin Report New TF 131031	2013	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.20	Ext Fin Report New TF 140131	2014	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.21	Ext Fin Report New TF 140430	2014	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.22	Ext Fin Report Old TF 120430	2012	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.23	Ext Fin Report Old TF 120630	2012	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.24	Ext Fin Report Old TF 121031	2012	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.25	Ext Fin Report Old TF 121231	2012	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.26	Ext Fin Report Old TF 130331	2013	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.27	Ext Fin Report Old TF 130930	2013	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.28	Ext Fin Report Old TF 131031	2013	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.29	Ext Fin Report Old TF 140430	2014	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.30	Proposal for LICUS Contribution to AMDTF	2008	Inception Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.31	Int Fin Rpt New TF 140831	2014	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
0.00.32	Int Fin Rpt Old TF 140831	2014	Other Monitoring Report	0.00 Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF)
1.01.01	MDTF Contract Farming Study FINAL	2012	Final Report	1.01 Zimbabwe Building Agricultural Markets: Constraints and Opportunities in Contract Farming for Smallholder Agricultural
1.02.01	Final Report Irrigation Zimbabwe WB May 2013	2013	Final Report	1.02 Determinants of the Productivity and Sustainability of Zimbabwe Irrigation
1.02.02	CN Irrigation Study 11_11	2011	Inception Report	1.02 Determinants of the Productivity and Sustainability of Zimbabwe Irrigation
1.02.03	GFR	2011	Inception Report	1.02 Determinants of the Productivity and Sustainability of Zimbabwe Irrigation

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
1.03.01	CAADP ZAIP Final-Validated	2013	Final Report	1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards Preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP
1.03.02	ZAIP Mission Aide Memoire 7-10 June 2011	2011	Aide Memoire	1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards Preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP
1.03.03	Zimbabwe CAADP Compact	2013	Related GoZ Publication	1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards Preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP
1.03.04	CN ZAIP_CAADP	2011	Inception Report	1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards Preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP
1.03.05	GFR	2011	Inception Report	1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards Preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP
1.04.01	Livestock Volume I - FACTS AND ANALYSIS FINAL	2013	Final Report	1.04 Livestock Sector Analysis and Development of an Investment Framework for Smallholder Livestock Production in Zimbabwe
1.04.02	Livestock Volume III - APPENDICES FINAL	2013	Final Report	1.04 Livestock Sector Analysis and Development of an Investment Framework for Smallholder Livestock Production in Zimbabwe
1.05.01	Zimbabwe Food Grain Economy Final 2014	2014	Final Report	1.05 Food Security Study
1.06.01	CN for A-MDTF Support to Tech Rev Land ZW	2013	Inception Report	1.06 Technical Review of Priority Land Reform Issues in Zimbabwe
1.06.02	Tech Rev of Land Reform - Inception Report	2014	Inception Report	1.06 Technical Review of Priority Land Reform Issues in Zimbabwe
1.07.01	CN Val Con Support	2013	Inception Report	1.07 Support to the Valuation Consortium
1.07.02	Val Consortium - Inception Report	2013	Inception Report	1.07 Support to the Valuation Consortium
1.08.01	CN Flex TA Ag		Inception Report	1.08 Flexible TA for the Agriculture Sector
1.08.02	Dumisani Kutwayo Ag ZW Coffee Strategy II	2013	Inception Report	1.08 Flexible TA for the Agriculture Sector
1.08.03	CN Walter Chambati AIAS Proposal		Inception Report	1.08 Flexible TA for the Agriculture Sector

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
1.08.04	Zim Coffee Sector Dev Strategy 2013-2018	2013	Final Report	1.08 Flexible TA for the Agriculture Sector
1.09.01	Achieving Household and National Food Security in Zimbabwe	2009	Final Report	1.09 Achieving Household and National Food Security
1.10.01	Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Assessment Study Final Report	2010	Final Report	1.10 Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector Assessment
1.11.01	Agrarian Sector Baseline Study Final Edited	2009	Final Report	1.11 Baseline Study of Agrarian Sector
1.12.01	Final Land Reform Edit CLEAN 2009	2009	Final Report	1.12 Study on Land Reform
1.12.02	CN Support to CLaRP	2012	Inception Report	1.12 Study on Land Reform
1.12.03	Land Administration	2014	Final Report	1.12 Study on Land Reform
1.12.04	Land Conflict Paper	2014	Final Report	1.12 Study on Land Reform
1.12.05	Land Studies Synthesis Paper	2014	Final Report	1.12 Study on Land Reform
1.12.06	Land Survey	2014	Final Report	1.12 Study on Land Reform
1.12.07	Land Tenure Paper	2014	Final Report	1.12 Study on Land Reform
1.12.08	Land Use Policy	2014	Final Report	1.12 Study on Land Reform
1.12.09	Land Valuation and Compensation	2014	Final Report	1.12 Study on Land Reform
1.12.10	GFR	2012	Inception Report	1.12 Study on Land Reform
1.13.01	Improving Input and Output Markets for Smallholder Farmers in Zimbabwe	2009	Final Report	1.13 Improving Input and Output Markets for Smallholder Farmers in Zimbabwe
1.14.01	Proceedings of the National Agriculture Stakeholders Conference Final Report 30 Nov 2009	2009	Final Report	1.14 National Agriculture Conference
2.01.01	Aide Memoire for the Multi-Sectoral Mission (10252012)	2012	Aide Memoire	2.01 Support to 2013 Budget Preparation
2.01.02	Annexes for the 2012 Multi-Sectoral Aide Memoire	2012	Aide Memoire	2.01 Support to 2013 Budget Preparation
2.02.01	Aide Memoire 2014 Budget Preparation (07222013)	2013	Aide Memoire	2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
2.02.02	Letter to Manungo re Aide Memoire Prep of the 2014 National Budget	2013	Aide Memoire	2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation
2.02.03	Consolidated Growth and Recovery in Zimbabwe 100413	2013	Final Report	2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation
2.02.04	2014 National Budget Statement	2013	Final Report	2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation
2.02.05	GFR	2013	Inception Report	2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation
2.03.01	Creating Incentives for New Dynamism in Zimbabwe's Merchandise Exports	2014	Final Report	2.03 Trade and Competitiveness Notes
2.03.02	The Opportunities and Constraints for Stronger Regional and Global Integration of Zimbabwe	2014	Final Report	2.03 Trade and Competitiveness Notes
2.03.03	Trade Report Overview	2014	Final Report	2.03 Trade and Competitiveness Notes
2.03.04	Empowerment through Services Trade Reform	2014	Final Report	2.03 Trade and Competitiveness Notes
2.04.01	CN - AMDTF Poverty Analysis 120926-1	2012	Inception Report	2.04 Poverty Analysis
2.04.02	Poverty Analysis 2013	2013	Final Report	2.04 Poverty Analysis
2.04.03	ZIMSTAT PICES Report	2013	Related GoZ Publication	2.04 Poverty Analysis
2.04.04	GFR	2012	Inception Report	2.04 Poverty Analysis
2.08.01	FinScope MSME Survey Zimbabwe 2012	2013	Final Report	2.08 Small Business Survey
2.08.02	Small Business Survey AM August 16-20 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	2.08 Small Business Survey
2.08.03	Small Business Survey re Letter Draft AM Oct 3-4 2011	2010	Aide Memoire	2.08 Small Business Survey
2.08.04	Small Business Survey AM Mission Oct 3-4 2011	2010	Aide Memoire	2.08 Small Business Survey
2.09.01	Mining Sector AM 29 Apr - 4 May 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	2.09 Zimbabwe Mining Revenue Transparency
2.09.01	Mining Sector AM 29 Apr - 4 May 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.09.02	CN Zim Mining Rev Transparency TA	2013	Inception Report	2.09 Zimbabwe Mining Revenue Transparency
2.09.03	CN ZMRT	2012	Inception Report	2.09 Zimbabwe Mining Revenue Transparency
2.09.04	CN Restructuring ZMRTI		Inception Report	2.09 Zimbabwe Mining Revenue Transparency

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
2.09.05	CN ZMRT	2011	Inception Report	2.09 Zimbabwe Mining Revenue Transparency
2.09.06	ZMRT CN Long Description	2011	Inception Report	2.09 Zimbabwe Mining Revenue Transparency
2.10.01	Diagnostic Study on Modernization of the Mineral Licensing System in Zimbabwe	2010	Final Report	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.02	Draft AM for the Mining Mission 10-22 Sept 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.02	Draft AM for the Mining Mission 10-22 Sept 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	2.11 Zimbabwe Minerals Inventory and Revenue Projections Study
2.10.03	Mining AM 27 May - 4 June 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.03	Mining AM 27 May - 4 June 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	2.11 Zimbabwe Minerals Inventory and Revenue Projections Study
2.10.03	Mining AM 27 May - 4 June 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	2.09 Zimbabwe Mining Revenue Transparency
2.10.04	Mining Sector AM 17-22 Mar 2014	2014	Aide Memoire	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.05	TOR_Financial Modeling_140118	2014	Inception Report	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.06	Zim mining - Inception Report Final 27 Aug 2013	2013	Inception Report	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.07	Zimbabwe P124618 Revised CN	2010	Inception Report	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.08	Zimbabwe Roundtable-Workshop on Mining Taxation	2011	Inception Report	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.09	Global trends in mining procurement	2014	Final Report	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.10	Increasing domestic procurement in mining	2014	Final Report	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.11	Taxation Workshop Report November 2011	2011	Aide Memoire	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.12	ZMRTI Scoping Paper	2014	Final Report	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.10.13	GFR	2011	Inception Report	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme
2.11.01	Draft AM for the Mining Mission 10-16 Nov 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	2.11 Zimbabwe Minerals Inventory and Revenue Projections Study
2.11.01	Draft AM for the Mining Mission 10-16 Nov 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
2.12.01	CN PFMS TA Phase 3 - 8 Nov 2010	2010	Inception Report	2.12 Zimbabwe PFMS TA Phase 3
2.13.01	PFM 2013 First Quarter Newsletter	2013	Other Monitoring Report	2.13 Zimbabwe PFMS Local Consultancy Support
2.13.02	PFM Fourth Quarter Newsletter 2013	2013	Other Monitoring Report	2.13 Zimbabwe PFMS Local Consultancy Support
2.13.03	PFM Second Quarter Newsletter 2013	2013	Other Monitoring Report	2.13 Zimbabwe PFMS Local Consultancy Support
2.13.04	PFM Third Quarter Newsletter 2013	2013	Other Monitoring Report	2.13 Zimbabwe PFMS Local Consultancy Support
2.14.01	Ramboll Final Report	2012	Interim/Draft Report	2.14 TA to Zimbabwe State Procurement Board
2.15.01	CN Public Investment Mgmt	2011	Inception Report	2.15 Support to Public Investment Management
2.15.02	TA to State Procurement Board ICM	2013	Other Monitoring Report	2.15 Support to Public Investment Management
2.16.01	Private Sector Development Tourism Sector Mission 19-25 Sept 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	2.16 ZIMSTAT - System Wide Approach to Statistics
2.16.02	CN - TA ZIMSTAT-SWAp	2011	Inception Report	2.16 ZIMSTAT - System Wide Approach to Statistics
2.16.03	NSDS	2011	Related GoZ Publication	2.16 ZIMSTAT - System Wide Approach to Statistics
2.16.04	GFR	2011	Inception Report	2.16 ZIMSTAT - System Wide Approach to Statistics
2.17.01	PFM TA Support to MoF - TAG Proposal	2009	Inception Report	2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS TA
2.17.02	GFR	2010	Final Report	2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS TA
2.18.01	Zim CIFA Attachment 1 PFM Report 9 July 2012	2012	Final Report	2.18 Zimbabwe Integrated Fiduciary Assessment
2.18.02	Zim CIFA Attachment 2 CPAR 9 July 2012	2012	Final Report	2.18 Zimbabwe Integrated Fiduciary Assessment
2.18.03	Zim CIFA Main Report 9 July 2012	2012	Final Report	2.18 Zimbabwe Integrated Fiduciary Assessment
2.23.01	Joint AM for Multi-Sectoral Mission to Support 2012 Budget 3-21 Oct 2011	2011	Aide Memoire	2.23 Support to 2012 Budget Preparation
2.24.01	Economic Mission Draft AM 25 Oct - 5 Nov 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	2.24 Support to 2011 Budget Preparation
2.25.01	Public Expenditure Note - Managing Government Wage Bill for Sustained Recovery 11 Aug 2010	2010	Final Report	2.25 Public Expenditure Notes

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
2.25.02	Public Expenditure Note - Strengthening Institutions for the Prep of Govt Budgets 11 Apr 2011	2011	Final Report	2.25 Public Expenditure Notes
3.01.01	AM Water Mission 28 Nov to 14 Dec 2011	2011	Aide Memoire	3.01 Dam Safety Study
3.01.01	AM Water Mission 28 Nov to 14 Dec 2011	2011	Aide Memoire	3.07 National Water Policy
3.01.01	AM Water Mission 28 Nov to 14 Dec 2011	2011	Aide Memoire	3.09 Tariff Study
3.01.01	AM Water Mission 28 Nov to 14 Dec 2011	2011	Aide Memoire	3.08 Engineering TA for City of Harare
3.01.02	Dam Safety Summary Report 21-01-13	2013	Final Report	3.01 Dam Safety Study
3.01.03	Water Mission AM 21 March to 6 April 2012	2012	Aide Memoire	3.01 Dam Safety Study
3.01.03	Water Mission AM 21 March to 6 April 2012	2012	Aide Memoire	3.08 Engineering TA for City of Harare
3.01.03	Water Mission AM 21 March to 6 April 2012	2012	Aide Memoire	3.07 National Water Policy
3.01.04	Water Mission AM 1 Oct to 22 Nov 2012	2012	Aide Memoire	3.01 Dam Safety Study
3.01.04	Water Mission AM 1 Oct to 22 Nov 2012	2012	Aide Memoire	3.07 National Water Policy
3.01.04	Water Mission AM 1 Oct to 22 Nov 2012	2012	Aide Memoire	3.09 Tariff Study
3.01.04	Water Mission AM 1 Oct to 22 Nov 2012	2012	Aide Memoire	3.08 Engineering TA for City of Harare
3.01.05	Water Mission AM 19-26 Oct 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	3.01 Dam Safety Study
3.01.05	Water Mission AM 19-26 Oct 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	3.08 Engineering TA for City of Harare
3.01.05	Water Mission AM 19-26 Oct 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	3.09 Tariff Study
3.01.05	Water Mission AM 19-26 Oct 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	3.07 National Water Policy
3.01.05	Water Mission AM 19-26 Oct 2010	2010	Aide Memoire	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.01.06	20140117_TA to ZINWA for Dam Safety Assessment Follow Up Report	2014	Other Monitoring Report	3.01 Dam Safety Study
3.02.01	Water Quality Strategy Draft AM Feb 24 to March 8 Mission 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.02 Water Quality Monitoring Strategy

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
3.02.01	Water Quality Strategy Draft AM Feb 24 to March 8 Mission 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.02.02	Water Quality Monitoring Strategy Final Report	2014	Final Report	3.02 Water Quality Monitoring Strategy
3.02.03	AM on Water Quality Strategy March 2-14 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.02 Water Quality Monitoring Strategy
3.02.03	AM on Water Quality Strategy May 2-14 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.03.01	WSIA Aide Memoire Jan-June 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.03 Water Sector Investment Analysis
3.03.02	ECA WSIA Full Technical Report	2013	Final Report	3.03 Water Sector Investment Analysis
3.03.03	ECA WSIA Summary Report	2013	Final Report	3.03 Water Sector Investment Analysis
3.03.04	Water Sector Mgmt AM June 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.03 Water Sector Investment Analysis
3.03.05	WSIA AM 22 May 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.03 Water Sector Investment Analysis
3.03.06	WSIA Training Workshop Report	2014	Final Report	3.03 Water Sector Investment Analysis
3.04.01	Harare Water Aide Memoire January 2014	2014	Aide Memoire	3.04 Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy
3.04.02	AM for Let to Finance re TA to City of Harare Oct 2012 to June 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.04 Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy
3.04.03	Greater Harare WSSP Aide Memoire Oct 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.04 Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy
3.04.04	GHWSIP_Draft Investment Plan Report_Volume I	2014	Interim/Draft Report	3.04 Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy
3.04.05	GHWSIP_Draft Investment Plan Report_Volume II	2014	Interim/Draft Report	3.04 Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy
3.04.06	ZIM_GHWSIP_Report_Final_ExecutiveSummary_WB	2014	Final Report	3.04 Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy
3.04.07	ZIM_GHWSIP_Report_Final_VolumeI_WB	2014	Final Report	3.04 Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy
3.04.08	ZIM_GHWSIP_Report_Final_VolumeII_WB	2014	Final Report	3.04 Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy
3.04.09	Policy Note - Greater Harare WSS 26 June 2014	2014	Other Monitoring Report	3.04 Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy
3.05.01	AM for Let re Bulawayo Appraisal Mission of February 11-14 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.02	Revised AM - Bulawayo Water Sector Mission Feb 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
3.05.03	ZWF 1 -- Durban Water Oct 2012	2012	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.04	ZWF 2 -- Investment Frameworks Nov 2012	2012	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.05	ZWF 3 -- National Water Policy - Jan 2013	2013	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.06	ZWF 4 -- Sanitation in Harare Apr 2013	2013	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.07	ZWF 5 -- Beitbridge Jun 2013	2013	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.08	ZWF 6 -- Tariff Study Sep 2013	2013	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.09	ZWF 7 -- Engineering TA to Harare Oct 2013	2013	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.10	ZWF 8 -- Dam Safety Nov 2013	2013	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.11	ZWF 9 -- Infrastructure Policy Review Dec 2013	2013	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.12	ZWF 10 -- Performance Contracts Jan 2014	2014	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.13	CN Flexible TA Infrastructure	2012	Inception Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.14	AM Water Mission 6-20 Dec 2012	2013	Aide Memoire	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.14	AM Water Mission 6-20 Dec 2012	2013	Aide Memoire	3.07 National Water Policy
3.05.15	Water Forum Participation Lists	2013	Interim/Draft Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.16	Climate Change and Water Resources	2014	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.17	ZINWA Performance Contracts	2014	Final Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.05.18	GFR	2012	Inception Report	3.05 Flexible TA for Infrastructure
3.06.01	Energy Sector AM 24 June to 6 July 2012	2012	Aide Memoire	3.06 Energy Sector Investment Options Study
3.06.02	Energy Sector AM April 2013	2013	Aide Memoire	3.06 Energy Sector Investment Options Study
3.07.01	National Water Policy UWSS Services AM	2011	Aide Memoire	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.02	AM Irrigation Mission October 2011	2011	Aide Memoire	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.03	Brief on National Water Policy	2011	Final Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.04	National Water Policy Recommendations	2012	Final Report	3.07 National Water Policy

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
3.07.05	National Water Policy Recommendations Annex	2012	Final Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.06	NWP Thematic Paper 3 - Sept to Oct 2011	2011	Final Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.07	Water Resources Devt and Mgmt Background Paper for Zim NWP 022712	2012	Final Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.08	Final Report Paper 4	2012	Final Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.09	Murungwe Thematic Paper 2	2011	Final Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.10	National Water Policy Feb 2013	2014	Related GoZ Publication	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.11	National Water Policy AM 31 July to 12 Aug 2011	2011	Aide Memoire	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.12	Thematic Paper 1 Rafik comments Dec 4	2012	Final Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.13	Thematic Paper 5 - Final	2012	Final Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.14	UWSS Background Paper -- DRAFT for discussion	2012	Interim/Draft Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.15	Small Towns WSS background paper	2012	Final Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.16	National Water Policy CN August 18	2011	Inception Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.17	20140117_National Water Policy Follow Up Report	2014	Other Monitoring Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.07.18	GFR	2011	Inception Report	3.07 National Water Policy
3.08.01	TA to Harare - Final Report by Arup Jan 2013	2013	Final Report	3.08 Engineering TA for City of Harare
3.09.01	ECA Zim Urban Water Tariffs Dec 2011	2011	Final Report	3.09 Tariff Study
3.09.02	20140117_Tariff Study Follow Up Report	2014	Other Monitoring Report	3.09 Tariff Study
4.01.01	Social Protection Baseline Report	2009	Final Report	4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works
4.01.02	ADAPTING THE PWA in Private Sector Projects government and Municipal Civil Works March 2010	2009	Final Report	4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works
4.01.03	SP MDTF Concepts 17 Feb 2010	2010	Inception Report	4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works

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ID #	Document Title	Year	Document Type	Associated Activity
4.02.01	MDTF Preliminary Research Study for National Productive Safety Net Programme December 2009	2009	Final Report	4.02 An Analysis of Government and NGOs Public Works/Food for Work Approaches in Zimbabwe

Source: Some Aide Memoire documents are repeated several times in this list because they are associated with several A-MDTF activities. In such cases, the document is listed with each activity with which it is associated.

Appendix H: List of Stakeholders Interviewed

The evaluation team conducted a field visit to Harare from 5 August 2014 through 14 August 2014. Follow-up interviews were conducted through 18 September 2014, both in-person and by phone with stakeholders in Harare and Washington. Table H.1 lists all of the stakeholders we spoke with.

Table H.1: Stakeholders Interviewed for the A-MDTF Evaluation

Stakeholder	Topics/Activities Discussed	Contact Name(s)
Programme-Level Interviews (grouped by type of stakeholder)		
A-MDTF Secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A-MDTF history, structure, governance, lessons learned, and similar high-level topics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ms. Chrissie Kamwendo Ms. Priscilla Mutikani
A-MDTF Finance Officer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A-MDTF finances and budgeting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. MacDonald Nyazvigo
A-MDTF Policy Committee (PC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structure, governance, and performance of the A-MDTF from the donors' perspective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Manuel Mutrux (SDC) Dr. Robin Milton (DFID) Mr. Peter Lindenmayer (Australian Aid) Mr. Mats Bengtsson (Embassy of Sweden)
A-MDTF Economic Management and Governance TRG (EMGTRG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structure, governance, and performance of the A-MDTF from the TRG's perspective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Crispin Mawadza (World Bank) Mr. Seedwell Hove (World Bank) Ms. Ana Peña (EU) Mr. Josh Smith (USAID) Mr. Phil Johnston (DFID)
A-MDTF Infrastructure TRG (ITRG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structure, governance, and performance of the A-MDTF from the TRG's perspective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eng. Colin Benham (DFID) Mr. Abednego Chigumbu (UNICEF)
Task Team Leader (TTL) for the A-MDTF Infrastructure Technical Review Group (ITRG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overview of the infrastructure activities funded by the A-MDTF Structure, governance, and performance of the A-MDTF from the TTL's perspective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Mike Webster
TTL for the EMGTRG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overview of the economic management and governance activities funded by the A-MDTF Structure, governance, and performance of the A-MDTF from the TTL's perspective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ms. Nadia Piffaretti (former TTL, through July 2014)
TTL for the ASTRG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overview of the agriculture activities funded by the A-MDTF Structure, governance, and performance of the A-MDTF from the TTL's perspective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Omar Lyasse
United States Agency for International Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agriculture and economic management/governance issues in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. John Macy

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Stakeholder	Topics/Activities Discussed	Contact Name(s)
(USAID) Economic Growth Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Zimbabwe Performance of the A-MDTF in coordinating donors 	
USAID Strategic Economic Research and Analysis (SERA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economics and public finance issues in Zimbabwe Performance of the A-MDTF in coordinating donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Daniel Ndlela
UN Development Programme (UNDP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structure, governance, and performance of the A-MDTF, with a particular emphasis on donor coordination 2.04 Poverty Analysis 3.05 Flexible TA in Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Amarakoon Bandara
UNICEF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structure, governance, and performance of the A-MDTF, with a particular emphasis on donor coordination 2.04 Poverty Analysis 2.16 3.07 National Water Policy 4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Abednego Chigumbu Ms. Ndangariro Moyo
African Development Bank (AfDB) / Zimbabwe Multi-Donor Trust Fund (ZimFund)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance of the A-MDTF in coordinating donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ms. Emmanuele Nzabanita Eng. Herbert Nyakutsikwa Eng. Stephen Dihwa
National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Awareness of the A-MDTF portfolio, and impact of the Fund from the NGO perspective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Cephas Zinhumwe
Activity-Level Interviews—GoZ Entities (grouped by sector)		
Zimbabwe Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation, and Irrigation Development (MAMID)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. R. J. Chitsiko Mr. C. T. Bwenje
MAMID—Department of Irrigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mrs. Soneni E. Nyamangara
Zimbabwe Statistics Office (ZIMSTAT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.04 Poverty Analysis 2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Mutasa Dzinotizeyi Mr. Nelson Tamuinga Mr. Ronald Mhlanga
Zimbabwe Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SME issues in Zimbabwe 2.08 Small Business Survey† 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Tabani Shoko
Zimbabwe Ministry of Mines and Mining Development (MMMD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Charles Tahwa

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Stakeholder	Topics/Activities Discussed	Contact Name(s)
Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED)‡	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.17 Zimbabwe PFMS TA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Sadwel Kanyoza Mr. Robson Mupati
Zimbabwe Environmental Management Agency (EMA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3.02 Water Quality Monitoring Strategy† 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ms. Petronella Shoko (EMA) Prof. Christopher Magadza (Univ. of Zim.)
Zimbabwe Ministry of Environment, Water, and Climate (MEWC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3.05 Flexible Technical Assistance (TA) for Infrastructure 3.07 National Water Policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. TinayeShe Mutazu
Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3.07 National Water Policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Theodore Nherera Ms. Margaret Tinago
Zimbabwe Ministry of Local Government, Public Works, and National Housing (MLGPWNH)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3.07 National Water Policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ms. Nyarai Priscillah Mudzingo
City of Harare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3.04 Greater Harare Water and Sanitation Strategy† 3.05 Flexible TA in Infrastructure 3.07 National Water Policy 3.08 Engineering TA for City of Harare† 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dr. Tendai Mahachi Mr. Matthew Marara Eng. Hosiah Chisango
Zimbabwe Ministry of Public Works, Labour, and Social Welfare (MPWLSW)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4.01 Feasibility Study for Adapting the Public Works Approach in Private Sector Projects, Government and Municipality Civil Works 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Laxon Chinhengo
Activity-Level Interviews—Non-State Actors (grouped by sector)		
African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agriculture sector issues in Zimbabwe 1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation 1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP 1.12 Study on Land Reform 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prof. Sam Moyo
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance of the A-MDTF in coordinating donors 1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation 1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. David Mfote
Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agriculture sector issues in Zimbabwe 1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Charles Taffs

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Stakeholder	Topics/Activities Discussed	Contact Name(s)
	irrigation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP 2.16 ZIMSTAT—System Wide Approach to Statistics 	
Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agriculture sector issues in Zimbabwe 1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mrs. Theresa Makomva
Barefoot Education for Africa Trust (BEAT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agriculture sector issues in Zimbabwe 1.02 Determinants of the productivity and sustainability of Zimbabwe irrigation 1.03 Support to the Government of Zimbabwe towards preparation of its Agriculture Investment Plan and the CAADP 1.12 Study on Land Reform 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prof. Mandivamba Rukuni
Zimbabwe Microfinance Wholesale Facility (ZMWF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Microfinance and SME issues in Zimbabwe 2.08 Small Business Survey† 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Brian Zimunhu
Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale for Sustainable Mining Council (ZASMC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mining sector issues in Zimbabwe 2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Wellington Takavarasha Mr. Milton Matambo
Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mining sector issues in Zimbabwe 2.10 Zimbabwe Mining Sector Policy Advisory Programme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Isaac Kwesu Mr. Davy David Matyanga
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) ^Δ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Private sector perspectives on public policy issues in Zimbabwe, and awareness of A-MDTF portfolio 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Joe Chirowodza Mr. Kupakwashe W. Midzi
Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) ^Δ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Private sector perspectives on public policy issues in Zimbabwe, and awareness of A-MDTF portfolio 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Ken H. Chikonzo

Notes: A meeting was scheduled with the Agrarian Sector TRG (ASTRG) for 7 August 2014, but no members attended. We instead spoke with Mr. John Macy (USAID), who the Secretariat suggested as one of the most knowledgeable and active members of the ASTRG that was still based in Harare.

† Indicates activities or topics that were volunteered by stakeholders during interviews.

‡ Nobody from the MFED was available to discuss activity 2.02 Support to 2014 Budget Preparation.

^Δ Indicates stakeholders for whom we had prepared questions for specific activities, but we discovered that they had no specific knowledge of the A-MDTF portfolio of activities.

Appendix I: Examples of Interview Questionnaires

The following questionnaires indicate the types of questions that we asked of different stakeholders during our field visits, and during follow-up interviews. We prepared questions for four broad groups of stakeholders, distinguished by their level of knowledge of the A-MDTF:

- **Direct and indirect beneficiaries of activities**—entities such as the relevant GoZ ministries that were direct counterparts to the implementation of an activity, as well as non-governmental entities (such as NGOs, private sector associations, and so on) that would have knowledge of certain activities (see Table I.1)
- **A-MDTF TTLs and project managers**—A-MDTF Secretariat staff that were responsible for overseeing the implementation of activities, including the sector TTLs (see Table I.2)
- **Senior A-MDTF managers**—A-MDTF Secretariat staff, such as the Programme Manager and the Finance Officer, that would have knowledge of the high-level objectives and performance of the Fund but not necessarily detailed knowledge of any specific activity (see Table I.3).

In the following tables, we present questionnaires that we prepared for one activity: 2.04 Poverty Analysis. In advance of the field visit, we prepared similar sets of questionnaires that were tailored for **each** of the stakeholders we intended to interview.

Table I.1: Questionnaires for Implementation Partners

Applicable Stakeholder(s)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) 	
Criterion	Questions
Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <p>No questions</p> <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Has the Poverty Report been finalized? If so, was it a useful analysis of poverty in Zimbabwe? How would you rate the outputs in terms of their quality and usefulness to you? ▪ What exactly were the poverty report, the poverty map, and the policy notes used for? ▪ Were there any policy recommendations arising from the poverty analysis? Were they adopted? If any policy decisions were made as a result of the poverty analysis, were there other factors that influenced the outcome of the policy decisions? ▪ Did the poverty analysis activity enable future analyses to continue without additional support? Were any analytical techniques learned by ZIMSTAT staff? ▪ For how long do you expect the poverty analysis will remain used and useful by the GoZ and other stakeholders? ▪ What problems, if any, did you encounter during implementation of the activity?
Relevance	A-MDTF Programme

	<p>No questions</p> <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How high of a priority was this assignment, given your overall needs? What are your agency's other high priority needs? What informed the decision for you to participate in this specific activity? How useful and relevant was the technical assistance provided by the World Bank in improving the quality of your poverty analysis?
Efficiency and Accountability	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <p>No questions</p> <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think sufficient resources (staff, software, etc.) were dedicated to this activity to achieve the level of support you were expecting? If not, why do you think this happened? Do you think the amount of time allocated to complete the TA was appropriate to accomplish the objectives? If not, why were these time frames unreasonable? Was this kind of analysis a high priority for you? Why or why not? Do you think the TA was appropriately structured or tailored to your needs? Did you receive sufficient support to understand the results of the poverty analysis?
Lessons Learned	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you have any general recommendations on how to improve the A-MDTF? <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were any donors engaged in supporting the poverty analysis work? What changes would you recommend to how the poverty analysis was managed and executed? If there was procurement of third-party goods or services, what improvements would you recommend to the procurement process?

Applicable Stakeholder(s)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agency official responsible for participation in 2.04 Poverty Analysis Zimbabwe Ministry of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agency official responsible for participation in 2.04 Poverty Analysis 	
Criterion	Questions
Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <p>No questions</p> <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How did your agency use the poverty report, the poverty map, and the policy notes used for? How would you rate the outputs in terms of their quality and

	<p>usefulness to you?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Were any recent policies on poverty alleviation informed by the poverty analysis activity? Were there other factors that also influenced the outcome of these policy decisions? ▪ For how long do you expect the poverty analysis will remain used and useful by your agency?
Relevance	<p>A-MDTF Programme No questions</p> <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ How high of a priority was this assignment, given your overall needs? What are your agency's other high priority needs? What informed the decision for you to participate in this specific activity?
Efficiency and Accountability	<p>A-MDTF Programme No questions</p> <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Do you think sufficient resources (staff, software, etc.) were dedicated to this activity to achieve the level of support you were expecting? If not, why do you think this happened? ▪ Do you think the amount of time allocated to complete the TA was appropriate to accomplish the objectives? If not, why were these time frames unreasonable? ▪ Was this kind of analysis a high priority for you? Why or why not? ▪ Do you think the TA was appropriately structured or tailored to your needs? ▪ Did you receive sufficient support to understand the results of the poverty analysis?
Lessons Learned	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Do you have any general recommendations on how to improve the A-MDTF? <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Were any donors engaged in supporting the poverty analysis work? ▪ What changes would you recommend to how the poverty analysis was managed and executed? If there was procurement of third-party goods or services, what improvements would you recommend to the procurement process?

Table I.2: Questionnaire for TTLs

Applicable Stakeholder(s)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A-MDTF Secretariat <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TTL for Economic Management and Governance 	
Criterion	Questions
Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What aspects of the A-MDTF design and implementation do you think were particularly effective? <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were any policy recommendations adopted as a result of this activity? The concept note did not identify any project-specific risks. Did you identify any risks prior to or during the activity, and if so, how did you mitigate them? Did you encounter any problems during project implementation? At the outset of the project, what impacts did you expect? Did you expect these impacts to be sustained beyond the duration of the activity? What were the plans for using the poverty report, poverty map, and policy notes? Were these outputs used, and were they used as envisioned? If not, do you know why? Are you aware of any initiatives that resulted from this activity?
Relevance	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How important do you think the activities funded by the A-MDTF in the EMG thematic area are, relative to the country's overall development needs? Among the activities supported in this thematic area, how would you rank their relative importance?
Efficiency and Accountability	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What were your tasks or responsibilities with regard to activities under the purview of the EMGTRG? What skills were required? Did you have the necessary staff to support you? <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What role did you play in managing this activity? What were your responsibilities with regard to overseeing this project? Did you feel sufficient resources were dedicated to this project to achieve the objectives of the poverty analysis? Were the implementation time frames reasonable? Did the project succeed in delivering knowledge and/or institutional capacity that ZIMSTAT lacked? Did you feel that the activity provided the right mix of policy recommendations? Was the activity appropriately structured to meet the needs of ZIMSTAT and the GoZ? What results indicators existed for this activity? How were these indicators tracked and the performance of the activity monitored? For any procurement that occurred under this activity, what procedures did you follow?

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How were the results of the poverty analysis disseminated? Did you feel that the right people received the right kind of information?
Lessons Learned	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What could the A-MDTF have done differently for activities within the EMG thematic area to yield stronger results? Do you have any general recommendations on how to improve the A-MDTF? <p>2.04—Poverty Analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were any donors engaged in supporting the poverty analysis work? What changes would you recommend to how the poverty analysis was managed and executed? If there was procurement of third-party goods or services, what improvements would you recommend to the procurement process?

Table I.3: Questionnaire for A-MDTF Senior Managers

Applicable Stakeholder(s)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A-MDTF Secretariat <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programme Manager 	
Criterion	Questions
Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What do you think were the critical success factors for the A-MDTF? What were the risks facing the A-MDTF, such as financial risks, reputation risks, political risks, social risks, and environmental risks? How did you manage these risks? Were any systemic problems encountered during implementation? What did the A-MDTF plan to achieve in terms of impact and sustainability? Do you believe that the Fund generally achieved these targets?
Relevance	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How would you characterise the objectives of the A-MDTF?
Efficiency and Accountability	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How would you characterise the organizational structure of the A-MDTF? What were the roles of the various teams (TRGs, PC, Secretariat)? What roles do donors play other than through the PC? How would you characterise the processes governing the setting of budget allocations and approval of projects? How well do you think those processes work? What do you believe are the strengths and weaknesses of the Fund's operating structure with respect to the A-MDTF's objectives? What are the ideal staffing requirements to operate the A-MDTF? What skills are required, how many staff members, and what are their roles?

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ What processes did you follow to fill the A-MDTF's staffing needs?▪ What are the programme-level indicators of performance? How were these indicators tracked and monitored?
Lessons Learned	<p>A-MDTF Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ What are key lessons learned that you have identified from your involvement in implementing the A-MDTF?▪ Did you find any lessons learned recommended in prior monitoring reports (such as annual reports, the MTR, and so on) easier to act on than others? Why?▪ How do you think the A-MDTF has performed with regard to coordinating donors to meet the Fund's objectives?



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