

**Mid-term Review Report**

**A Light-Touch Quasi-Independent Mid**-**Term Review of the Programme on Elimination of Violence against Women and Children Viet Nam (EVAWC)**

By

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with support from

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However, the findings and recommendations expressed in this report are of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations, DFAT, or any other organizations or individuals consulted in the MTR process.

# Acronyms

AWP Annual workplan

CCHIP Center for Creative Initiative on Health and Population

COVID-19 Coronavirus disease 2019

CPD Country Programme Document

CSAGA Center for Studies and Applied Science in Gender, Family, Women and Adolescents

DCA Department of Children Affairs (MoLISA)

DDG Deputy Director-General

DFA Department of Family Affairs (MoCST)

DFAT Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

DG Director-General

DIM Direct Implementation Modality

DoCST Department of Culture, Sports and Tourism (subnational level)

DoJ Department of Justice (subnational level)

DoLISA Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (subnational level)

DV domestic violence

DVPC Domestic Violence Prevention and Control

EoP end-of-programme

EVAWC Elimination of Violence against Women and Children in Viet Nam 2021–2025

GBV Gender-based violence

GBVNet Gender-Based Violence Network

GED Department of Gender Equality (MoLISA)

GoAU Government of Australia

GoVN Government of Viet Nam

GSO General Statistics Office of Viet Nam

HoA Head of Agency

HPPMG Harmonized Programme and Project Management Guidelines

ITA International Technical Adviser

M&E Monitoring and evaluation

MEL Monitoring, evaluation, and learning

MELF Monitoring, evaluation, and learning framework

MoCST Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism

MoJ Ministry of Justice

MoLISA Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs

MPS Ministry of Public Security

MTR mid-term review

NA National Assembly

NIM national implementation modality

NIP national implementing partner

ODA official development assistance

ProDoc Programme Document

PUNO Participating United Nations agency

RRF resources and results framework

RRG Regional Reference Group

SDG Sustainable Development Goals

TC Technical Committee

ToR Terms of Reference

UN Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

VAC violence against children

VAW violence against women

VAWC violence against women and children

VFU Viet Nam Farmers’ Union

VNMNet Viet Nam Men Network

VWU Viet Nam Women’s Union

# Executive summary

**Background**

The Programme on Elimination of Violence against Women and Children in Viet Nam 2021–2025 (EVAWC) is a joint programme of three United Nations agencies, namely the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), partnered with the Government of Viet Nam (GoVN) and supported by the Government of Australia (GoAU). This five-year EVAWC (2021–2025) contributes to the goal that women and children in Viet Nam, including those most vulnerable, can live a life free of violence through strengthened prevention strategies and multisectoral responses.

A light-touch and quasi-independent mid-term review (MTR) was conducted in the final year of the programme to assess progress against the EVAWC outputs and outcomes, and lessons learned, including what has worked and what has not worked. It will inform Viet Nam’s actions and priorities over the next five to ten years to eliminate violence against women (VAW) and violence against children (VAC), with a focus on the intersection of VAW and VAC. The MTR will also inform the United Nations agencies, DFAT and the GoVN counterparts on adjustments to the programme targets and implementation in the final year.

Being a “light touch”, this MTR places a strong focus on selected aspects of programme performance, including relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and coordination. Notably, this MTR looks forward to providing lessons learned and suggestions for future programming and short-term adjustments in the remainder of EVAWC. The MTR was mainly based on qualitative perceptions of relevant stakeholders collected through intensive consultation with all the programme partners at the central level and a field visit to Da Nang city. Being a quasi-independent MTR, the findings and recommendations in this report were subject to several rounds of comments in written forms, meetings to collect feedback, and validation workshops with relevant stakeholders.

**Main findings**

**Relevance and coherence**

EVAWC was found to be fully relevant and aligned to the commitments, strategies, legal and policy frameworks of Viet Nam in the prevention of and responses to VAW and VAC. It contributed to enhancing the legal and policy frameworks of the country in the area of domestic violence (DV), gender-based violence (GBV), VAW, and VAC. The programme was responsive to the mandates of the key GoVN agencies that have the state management authority in the areas of DV, GBV, and violence against women and children, particularly the Ministry of Labour – War Invalids and Social Affairs (MoLISA) and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MoCST). EVAWC contributed to addressing gaps and bottlenecks of providing VAWC-related support services to survivors of violence in terms of enhancing systems and capacity for service provision. The programme also contributed to changing social norms and harmful practices being barriers to access to support services for survivors of violence. In the context that support services for survivors of violence in Viet Nam remain limited in both coverage and quality, EVAWC was assessed to be responsive to the needs of direct beneficiaries.

The programme was fully aligned with the strategies and priorities of the United Nations and DFAT. It was a realization of the DFAT cooperation strategy with Viet Nam, a continuation of the cooperation between the United Nations, Australia, and the GoVN in eliminating VAW and VAC. The design of EVAWC was built on the results and lessons learned from several cooperation initiatives between the United Nations, DFAT, and GoVN agencies. At least 20 project interventions to address VAW and VAC prevention and response in an integrated way, as well as those in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, were reviewed to draw lessons for designing EVAWC. Therefore, the programme was found to be complementary to the existing initiatives and mandates of the GoVN agencies.

**Effectiveness**

The physical progress of the programme was hampered by delays and difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (during the inception phase), the official development assistance (ODA) management requirements, and differences in the work procedures across the United Nations agencies. The lack of required project approval with MoLISA and MoCST was a game-changing factor that seriously undermined the programme performance. Encountering such challenges, the programme partners managed to accomplish significant achievements. Contribution to enhanced legal and policy framework, capacity development, and impressive outreach of communication were highly appreciated by the programme stakeholders.

The programme has structured its activities around 18 outputs, covering different aspects of the programme interventions. At the time of this MTR, EVAWC has completed or exceeded the 2025 targets of 14 outputs and is on track to complete 3 outputs. There was only one output where the programme may be off track. However, there were gaps in progressing towards the expected outcomes. Out of the four outcomes envisaged by the programme, EVAWC has been on track in achieving only one outcome – on contribution to the legal and policy frameworks on VAW and VAC. For the other two outcomes – on enhancing systems, capacities, and service provision and on strengthened data availability for based-approach to prevent and respond to violence – reaching the targets may be unlikely. Setting very ambitious targets was an important reason for this gap in achieving these two outcomes. Accessing progress towards outcome three of the programme was not possible due to the lack of both targets and data required to inform progress.

**Efficiency**

There was evidence suggesting the cost efficiency of the programme. It was first noted that funding allocation of the programme was made to the most needed areas, focusing on enhancing provision of services (response) for survivors of violence and awareness-raising, behaviour change communication (prevention). Utilizing the existing partnerships as instruments to implement EVAWC activities in the presence of ODA management regulations was another strategy to avoid delay as well as save the cost of the programme implementation, as the existing structures and personnel could be utilized. Finally, the adoption of the United Nations–European Union cost norms that were developed to ensure high value for money of development aid were important elements of ensuring cost-effectiveness.

Disbursement rates of funds were found to be lower than expected. By the end of 2023, the programme has spent only 47.8 per cent of its total budget. It implies that more than a half of the total programme budget (i.e. 52.2 per cent) was left for 2024. Given the disbursement in the previous years and continued challenges by the ODA management regulations, extraordinary efforts by the United Nations agencies and other programme partners in 2024 are required to ensure full utilization of the resources available. Notably, low disbursement combined with high achievement of outputs suggest that there might be a room to go deeper into some key activities of the programme.

The efficiency of the programme was undermined by the lack of cooperation and coordination between the United Nations agencies for interventions at the subnational level. Even in Da Nang city, where all the three United Nations agencies have worked in the EVAWC programme, coordination in partnerships and implementation of activities were constrained. Regarding the cost for management and coordination, the actual cost level was lower than expected. However, this low management cost was mainly due to the absence of the International Technical Adviser position. This, coupled with the issue with chairmanship of the Technical Committee – being a structure to facilitate the programme coordination and implementation – has undermined the programme management and coordination.

**Coordination**

Encountering different challenges for implementation, the programme partners have coordinated in different arrangements and efforts to address these challenges. The programme partners have adopted different strategies to respond to the ODA management regulations. A switch to the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) was made in the absence of project approvals with some key government partners. This, however, introduced extra workload for the United Nations agencies while eroding the background for national ownership. The use of existing partnerships was also adopted to implement the activities without delays. However, it turned out to be a temporary solution and cannot be used for all activities. Service contracts were also adopted as a fast-track strategy to engage some implementing partners. However, it was only effective for small and one-off activities. There was room for EVAWC to adopt a more effective response to the ODA regulations.

Differences in work procedures and regulations of the United Nations agencies exist. A programme governance structure was put in place to navigate these differences. However, some major features of this structure were constrained. Notably, participation of MoLISA and MoCST senior management in the EVAWC Steering Committee was limited to an informal level due to the lack of project approvals required with these two ministries. The positions of the Technical Committee Chair and International Technical Adviser were left unfilled for extended periods. These factors also undermined the contribution of the governance structure to the programme performance. Having DFAT as a programme partner generated value adding through expertise, both within the DFAT office in Hanoi and in Australia in general. Notably, the roles of DFAT in facilitating partnership “health checks” were critical to “trouble-shooting” and this was highly appreciated by the programme partners. However, these efforts seem to be inadequate to address differences in work procedures and regulations of the United Nations agencies.

**Lessons learned**

The MTR highlighted six lessons learned. First, the ODA management requirements cannot be underestimated. Flexibility observed in the past was no longer available under the current regulations. The ODA management requirements should be treated as given. Any future interventions should consider these factors for planning the timeframe and adopting implementation modalities. Second, differences among the United Nations agencies in work procedures and regulations should not be underestimated when designing a joint programme. Agreeing on coordination mechanisms is important before entering a joint programme. Third, reaching a clear division of labour based on the comparative advantage of the programme partners is another important lesson to ensure the programme performance while being able to utilize and leverage expertise across the United Nations agencies.

Putting the GoVN agencies in the driver's seat is a very important lesson for any future interventions. For EVAWC, the lack of required project approval for MoLISA and MoCST was seen by the MTR consultants as a game changer that undermined participation and decision-making of the key GoVN agencies in the programme implementation. The fifth lesson was to invest sufficiently for coordination. Being a complex and multiple stakeholder joint programme, coordination efforts should be sufficiently invested in terms of both staffing and funding. Finally, setting realistic targets is very important to monitor the programme progress to ensure effectiveness and efficiency.

**Recommendations**

**For the remaining programme cycle**

The four recommendations were made as below:

* Revising the target indicators is recommended to (i) ensure outcome indicators can be assessed within the data sources available by the programme completion and (ii) increase the target for key outputs indicators. **Target**: PUNOs and DFAT. **Priority**: High. **Time**: September 2024
* Consolidate the stock of existing knowledge products generated by the programme to date. Once consolidated, share the lessons learned to other stakeholders and beneficiaries. **Target**: UNFPA with input from PUNOs. **Priority**: Medium. **Time**: December 2024.
* Design the concept note for end-of-programme (EoP) to ensure that sufficient data will be available to inform the programme outcomes and impacts. A strong survey component needs to be planned to inform the outcomes of the programme. **Target**: PUNOs and DFAT. **Priority**: Medium. **Time**: September 2024.
* Project scenario of budget utilization by the programme completion to explore proposal to extend the programme by 12 months, as well as experiment with innovative approaches to deepen capacity development and behaviour change communication. **Target**: PUNOs and DFAT. **Priority**: Extremely high. **Time**: September 2024.

**For future programming**

* **Continue the second phase of the programme**. The MTR strongly recommends to the United Nations, DFAT, and GoVN counterparts to continue another phase of the programme to complete the agenda that has been started but is unfinished in the current EVAWC. In the next phase of the programme, keep the current focus and additional priorities, including digitalization of services, strengthening coordination mechanisms for addressing VAW and VAC, and enhance alignments to international standards.
* **For adapting to the ODA regulatory framework**, four recommendations were made. (i) Develop a Programme Document (ProDoc) for the next phase of the programme as a portfolio of different projects, implemented through national implementation modality (NIM) with the national implementing partners (NIPs). (ii) Allow an 18-month inception phase to give sufficient time for going through the procedures required; develop the programme governance structure and foundation; and build the capacity of the project management staff. (iii) Invest in a neutral and powered coordination team. (iv) Define the role of DFAT to be a strategic partner that encompasses providing the technical chair of the programme, leading the learning arrangements, and mobilizing international expertise.
* **For making joint programme work better**, three recommendations were made. (i) Define what kind of information is required and how this information should be made available to meet the requirement of the coordinating PUNO and report to the donor. (ii) Agree on the role of the coordinating agency, the requirements for coordination, “coordination” ways of working, and division of labour. (iii) Ensure joint activities and joint advocacy agendas in the annual workplans (AWPs) of the next programme; ensure that the PUNO will work in the same cities or provinces when going to the subnational level, which is important to maximize impacts.

For the recommendations for the next phase of EVAWC, the followings apply: **Target**: the United Nations agencies, DFAT, GoVN partners, other programme partners. **Priority**: High. **Time**: June 2026.

# 1. Introduction

1. **EVAWC programme**. The Programme on Elimination of Violence against Women and Children in Viet Nam 2021–2025 (EVAWC) is a joint programme of three United Nations agencies, namely the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (the coordinating agency), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), which partnered with the Government of Viet Nam (GoVN) and the Government of Australia (GoAU). With a total budget of US$7,229,833 (original) and US$6,595,389 (adjusted in 2023) to be implemented in four years, EVAWC contributes to the goal that women and children in Viet Nam, including those most vulnerable, can live a life free of violence through strengthened prevention strategies and multisectoral responses (see Annex 1 for background information of EVAWC provided in the Terms of Reference – ToR). Addressing violence against women (VAW), violence against children (VAC), and the intersections of VAW and VAC represents a special feature of EVAWC’s programme design. This is also a challenge for the programme partners to unpack this feature and transform the design into operational workplans for practical interventions.

2. **Slow start of EVAWC**. EVAWC was scheduled to start from June 2021 but experienced a slow start due to several factors. Restrictive social distancing under the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) rendered it difficult to organize face-to-face meetings and, more importantly, to engage with the GoVN partners whose top priorities were response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The delay was also caused by differences in work procedures and regulations of the three participating United Nations organizations (PUNOs). Most notably, the GoVN’s new regulations on official development assistance (ODA), coupled with a constrained political context for decision-making, have caused lengthened approval processes for the EVAWC project proposals with the key GoVN counterparts, both at the national and subnational levels. This problem has not been resolved yet and, consequently, PUNOs faced no other choice but to act as “traditional” Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) for many activities, meaning that the UN agencies became implementers of EVAWC instead of national counterparts. Finally, how to address both VAW and VAC, and the intersections of these two forms of violence in one programme was a major technical challenge, and there are limited, albeit growing, evidence-based examples to draw on. This technical challenge also translated into a complex programme structure with several GoVN agencies engaged in the programme implementation. Therefore, it took longer than expected for the programme partners to explore options and finalize intervention strategies. Under such circumstances, several activities were delayed.

3. **This mid-term review**. This mid-term review (MTR) took place in the context of the draft baseline survey report not yet being finalized and an end-of-programme (EoP) evaluation already in the pipeline for early 2025. As highlighted in the ToR, “*noting that the Project is in its final year and that a final evaluation is scheduled for 2025, the Steering Committee also agreed that a light review exercise would be achievable and appropriate with a focus on informing GoVN medium and longer-term priorities and efforts to eliminate VAW and VAC with a focus on the intersections*” (p.2). With this, the MTR was described in the ToR as being a “light-touch and quasi-independent” MTR (see the ToR in Annex 1 of the report). This MTR assessed progress against the EVAWC outputs and outcomes, lessons learned, including what has worked and what has not worked. It was expected that the MTR would inform Viet Nam’s actions and priorities over the next five to ten years to eliminate VAW and VAC with a focus on the intersection of VAW and VAC. The MTR would also inform the United Nations agencies, DFAT and the GoVN counterparts on adjustments to the programme targets and implementation in the final year.

4. **Structure of the MTR report.** This review report mirrors the evaluation report templates used in the United Nations system. Section 2 provides background information on EVAWC. The purpose, objectives, and scope of the MTR are presented in section 3. Section 4 discusses the review questions, approaches and methods used in this MTR, and some limitations of these approaches. Key findings of the MTR are presented in section 5, which consists of five subsections focusing on relevance/coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, coordination, and lessons learned. Section 6 provides conclusions drawn from the key findings. Finally, section 7 discusses the short-term recommendations before the programme completion (in subsection 7.1) and recommendations for the next phase of the programme (in subsection 7.2). Some relevant information is provided in the annexes.

# 2. EVAWC background

5. **Context of the EVAWC programme**. VAW and VAC remain high in Viet Nam. Over 2,000 cases of child abuse are officially reported every year, of which 75 per cent are sexual abuse according to official administrative data. However, this is only the tip of the iceberg. According to the 2019 National Study on Violence Against Women in Viet Nam, two out of three women have experienced at least one form of physical, sexual, economic or psychological violence, emotional abuse or controlling behaviour, from their intimate partner in their lifetime. It is estimated that 4.4 per cent of surveyed women had experienced sexual violence before the age of 15. According to a 2020 report, Measuring Sustainable Development Goal Indicators on Children and Women, 72 per cent of Vietnamese children aged 1–14 experience violent discipline by household members. In this context, VAW and VAC have been increasingly recognized by the government as major challenges. In response, the Government of Viet Nam (GoVN) has strengthened national policy and legislative commitments and frameworks, including the Law on Domestic Violence Prevention and Control (2022), the Law on Children (2016), the Law on Gender Equality (2006) and implemented several national intervention programmes.

6. **EVAWC programme**. In that context, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) of Australia have partnered with UNFPA, UNICEF and UN Women (United Nations agencies) to implement a joint programme ‘Elimination of Violence against Women and Children in Viet Nam 2021–2025’. The programme is focused on the violence that women and children experience in the family, while acknowledging and linking to efforts to address both gender‐based violence and VAC more broadly. According to the design, the programme has a total budget of AU$9.5 million (equivalent to US$7,229,833). The three United Nations agencies contributed additional funding of US$3,723,570 (which was equivalent to 51 per cent of the DFAT grant).[[1]](#footnote-1) This funding was allocated according to the ratio of 30:40:30 for 2022, 2023 and 2024, respectively. The EVAWC programme was a continuation of the DFAT-funded project, “Supporting Interventions to Eliminate Violence against Women and Children in Viet Nam under COVID-19 Emergency Context”, which was successfully co-implemented by UNFPA, UNICEF and UN Women in the period 2020–2021.

7. **Objectives and outcomes**. The project contributes to the goal that women and children in Viet Nam, including those most vulnerable, can live a life free of violence through strengthened prevention strategies and multisectoral responses. The programme focuses on:

* conducive policies and resources to prevent and respond to VAW and VAC,
* strengthened and effective multisectoral systems and capacity to provide quality essential services for victims and survivors of violence,
* violence prevention, gender inequitable and harmful social norm changes, and
* improved evidence and knowledge to inform approaches and interventions to prevent and respond to violence.

The programme intervention logic consists of four key outcomes, each with specific outputs, outlined as follows:

* **Outcome 1**: Evidence-based laws and policies, increased resource allocation, and strengthened coordination and accountability structures are promoted and supported to prevent and respond to violence against women and children, in line with national and international standards and commitments.
* Output 1.1: Legal, regulatory and policy frameworks relating to prevention and response to violence against women and children are strengthened to ensure coherence, alignment with international norms and standards, and inclusion of all forms of violence.
* Output 1.2: Political commitment and resources are increased to support the implementation of laws and policies on gender-based violence (GBV), violence against women (VAW), and violence against children (VAC).
* Output 1.3: Strengthened multisectoral government and stakeholder coordination and accountability mechanisms and partnerships are in place to prevent and respond to violence.
* **Outcome 2**: A strengthened and more effective multisectoral response (including systems, capacities, and service provision) delivers increased access to quality essential services for victims and survivors of violence.
* Output 2.1: Increased capacities for evidence-based programming for violence prevention and response.
* Output 2.2: Multisectoral service provision of VAW and VAC is strengthened, including through integrated VAW–VAC services, especially for vulnerable and marginalized groups, and inclusive of men and boys.
* Output 2.3: Strengthened social welfare and support systems for violence prevention and response.
* Output 2.4: Increased access to gender-responsive and child-sensitive justice for survivors of violence.
* Output 2.5: More effective coordination of GBV response in humanitarian and emergency settings is ensured.
* **Outcome 3**: More effective violence prevention and gender and social norm change are promoted through innovative evidence-based communication, awareness-raising, advocacy, and community mobilization.
* Output 3.1: Evidence-based multisectoral communications, awareness raising, and advocacy promote gender and social norm change, decreased acceptance of violence, and increased reporting of VAW and VAC.
* Output 3.2: Community mobilization and engagement of social and mass organizations and private sector in innovative violence prevention interventions support strengthened social and gender norm change.
* Output 3.3: Targeted engagement of parents, men and boys, and adolescents is increased for violence prevention and promotion of healthy, respectful relationships.
* **Outcome 4**: Improved research, data collection and analysis, and knowledge exchange inform an evidence-based approach to prevent and respond to violence.
* Output 4.1: Increased availability, analysis and use of prevalence and administrative data on VAW and VAC.
* Output 4.2: Knowledge exchange and South–South and triangular cooperation increase understanding and use of evidence on VAW–VAC intersections and effective interventions.

The funding allocation ratio was projected by design at 15:45:30:10 across outcome 1 to 4 respectively.[[2]](#footnote-2) With this, outcome 2 to enhance systems and capacity for provision of quality services for victims and survivors of violence was most resource-consuming in the EVAWC programme.

8. **EVAWC scope and focus**. The EVAWC focuses on VAW and VAC in the family, given that the family is a primary site of violence and of perpetuating the intergenerational cycle of violence. VAW and VAC in families are seen in the broader context of gender-based violence (GBV), and violence against women and children (VAWC) in the wider society, including sexual harassment or violence in public places and violence experienced in the cyber environment. Therefore, the programme interventions include activities that directly address family violence as well as activities that address violence against women and children in the wider society that contribute directly or indirectly, to addressing violence in family settings. One important feature of the programme is a focus placed on the interlinkages and intersections between these two forms of violence. Challenges in addressing these interlinkages and intersections were acknowledged in the programme design (see the Programme Document (ProDoc), pp. 30–32). The programme prioritizes the following interlinkages between VAW and VAC: shared risk factors and social norms that condone VAW and VAC in the family; co-occurrence of VAW and VAC in family settings; engagement of adolescents to prevent and respond to VAW and VAC in the family; addressing compounding consequences of VAW and VAC; and breaking the intergenerational cycle of violence in family settings.

9. **EVAWC theory of change**. A full description of the programme theory of change was included in the ProDoc. A part of this theory of change, focusing on the change pathways is reproduced the following paragraphs to provide a summary of the programme intervention logics.[[3]](#footnote-3)

10. *IF* (i) legal, regulatory and policy frameworks relating to prevention and response to VAWC are strengthened to ensure coherence, alignment with international norms and standards and inclusion of all forms of violence; (ii) political commitment and resources are increased to support the implementation of laws and policies on GBV/VAW/VAC; (iii) multisectoral government and stakeholder coordination and accountability mechanisms and partnerships are in place to prevent and respond to violence;

11. *AND* (iv) capacities are increased for evidence-based programming for violence prevention and response; (v) multisectoral service provision of VAW and VAC is strengthened, including through integrated VAW-VAC services, and for vulnerable and marginalized groups including men and boys; (vi) social welfare and support systems for violence prevention and response are strengthened; (vii) there is increased access to gender-responsive and child-sensitive justice for survivors of violence; (viii) coordination of GBV response in humanitarian and emergency settings is effective and ensures access to essential services for victims and survivors;

12. *AND* (ix) Evidence-based multisectoral communications, awareness-raising, and advocacy promotes gender and social norm change, decreased acceptance of violence and increased reporting of VAW and VAC; (x) community mobilization and engagement of social and mass organizations and private sector in innovative prevention interventions supports strengthened social and gender norm change; (xi) targeted engagement of parents, men and boys, and adolescents is increased for violence prevention and healthy, respectful relationships; (xii) social and mass organizations are increasingly engaged in innovative violence prevention and social norm change interventions;

13. *AND* (xiii) there is increased availability, analysis and use of prevalence and administrative data on VAW and VAC; (xiv) knowledge exchange and South–South and triangular cooperation increases understanding and use of evidence on VAW–VAC intersections and effective interventions.

14. *THEN*, the four outcomes described above will be realized.

15. **EVAWC inception phase**. A six-month inception phase between June and December 2021 was allowed to operationalize the programme design. This inception phase aimed at the development of joint workplans, finalization of the monitoring and evaluation framework and resources and results framework (RRF), in-depth technical discussions, selection of geographic focus areas and identification of target audiences and beneficiaries, finalization of governance and management arrangements including development of ToR and recruitment of personnel, and development of partnerships between United Nations and government and implementing partners. This inception phase prepared the readiness for the programme partners for full project implementation afterwards.

16. **EVAWC governance structure**. The programme governance structure was finalized in the Inception Phase based on the principles outlined in the ProDoc. Accordingly, the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) comprises seven members: the Head of Agency (HoA) of the United Nations agencies, DFAT Development Counsellor, and Director-General (DG) or Deputy Director-General (DDG) of the two key government partners, the MoLISA (Gender Equality Department – GED, Department of Children Affairs – DCA), and MoCST (Department of Family Affairs – DFA). According to the original design, the PSC was co-chaired by the Representative of UNFPA – the coordinating agency of the project and the representative of the MoLISA GED. Since late 2023, it was agreed that the responsibility for chairing the PSC was rotated among PUNOs and GoVN partners (UNFPA and MoCST DFA; UNICEF and MoLISA DCA; UN Women and MoLISA GED). The PSC carries the decision-making power for the EVAWC. The PSC meets annually or at the call of the co-chairs to decide directions, approve work planning, and other strategic issues. A ToR for the PSC was developed and agreed during the inception phase.[[4]](#footnote-4)

17. **Programme coordination**. To support the implementation of the programme, the Technical Committee was established as a coordinating body. The Technical Committee (TC) comprises 15 members who are technical staff of participating partners, and two programme staff. It was agreed that the UNPFA’s Assistant Representative would be the chair of the TC.[[5]](#footnote-5) The two programme staff, including one International Technical Adviser (ITA) and a Project Associate, being permanent members of the TC, are responsible for daily coordination of the programme implementation (and therefore they were usually referred to as the EVAWC Coordination Team). The TC is mainly responsible for aiding the PSC in decision-making related to the programme implementation; quality assurance for all project outputs and products; reviewing inputs to the resources and results framework (RRF), AWPs, progress reports, etc.; support for coordination of the programme implementation; and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

18. **EVAWC partners**. An extensive list of partners, consisting of the key GoVN agencies, mass organizations, and civil society organizations (CSOs), was identified in the ProDoc. After the inception phase, the multiple implementing partners to be engaged were finalized in the workplans, including GoVN agencies such as MoLISA, MoCST, MoET, Ministry of Health (MoH), Ministry of Information and Communication, Ministry of Planning and Investment, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Ministry of Justice (MoJ); key justice institutions such as Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuracy; mass organizations including Viet Nam Women Union (VWU), Viet Nam Farmers’ Union (VFU), Viet Nam Chamber for Industry and Commerce; and CSOs including Center for Studies and Applied Science in Gender, Family, Women and Adolescents (CSAGA), Light Community Health Development Institute, Gender-Based Violence Network (GBVNet), Viet Nam Men Network (VNMenNet), Center for Creative Initiative on Health and Population (CCHIP); and private sector (such as Ho Guom Garment Company, Sao Thai Duong Group, other Women’s Empowerment Principles signatory companies.[[6]](#footnote-6) Among these multiple partners, MoLISA and MoCST – being the state management authorities in the areas of DV, GBV, VAW and VAC – were identified in the ProDoc to be the main partners of the programme.

19. **Programme implementation modalities**. This programme is a joint initiative of UNFPA, UNICEF and UN Women. Under the programme agreement with DFAT, UNFPA is the agency responsible for project administration and management on behalf of the three PUNOs. It was envisaged in the ProDoc that the implementation of this programme will be undertaken using NIM and involve multiple stakeholders (as noted above). It was expected that PUNOs would utilize existing arrangements with their respective governments and CSO partners whenever possible to minimize establishment of new projects that require a lengthy approval process according to the GoVN regulations on ODA management. Nevertheless, new projects were required with the key GoVN agencies, including MoLISA and MoCST – being the two key ministries having mandates on domestic violence (i.e. MoCST DFA), GBV (i.e. MoLISA GED), and VAC (MoLISA DCA). Accordingly, these key GoVN agencies responsible for DV, GBV, VAW and VAC would be NIPs and most of the other ministries and national partners played the roles of co-implementing partners. The Harmonized Programme and Project Management Guidelines (HPPMG) jointly developed in 2010 by the GoVN and the United Nations (UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA) for the management and implementation of the United Nations-supported programmes and projects was adopted to guide the programme implementation and management.

20. **National and subnational-level interventions**. At the national level, EVAWC activities were mainly in terms of policy advocacy, communications, research and knowledge-sharing. At the subnational level, the ProDoc envisaged that joint support interventions focusing on community mobilization and service provision would be carried out in the same cities and provinces in order to promote synergies and maximize reach and impact. At the design level, no provinces or cities were identified. Instead, selection criteria were set that prioritized provinces/cities with strong political commitment and support to prevent and respond to VAWC, having existing interventions that can be built on, having vulnerable groups at a risk of being left behind, high levels of prevalence of violence, and availability of services. The ProDoc further envisaged that the programme will target the same cities and provinces to maximize the potential impacts. It was expected that provinces or cities would be jointly identified by PUNOs and the programme partners during the inception phase.

# 3. Purpose, objectives, and scope

21. **Purpose**: This MTR was commissioned to assess progress against the EVAWC outputs and outcomes, take stock of lessons learned, including what has worked and what has not worked, in reference to the evolving programming context.

22. **Objectives**: The primary objective is to provide evidence and analysis from EVAWC to inform Viet Nam’s actions and priorities over the next five to ten years to eliminate VAW and VAC with a focus on the intersections of VAW and VAC. The secondary objective is to advise the United Nations agencies, DFAT and the GoVN counterparts on adjustments to project targets and implementation in the final year. The review will also elicit GoVN views on the project (including alignment and contribution to address VAW and VAC priorities of the GoVN, the partnership with United Nations agencies and the GoAU).

23. **Scope**: As prescribed in the ToR (see Annex 1), this MTR covered the activities planned and implemented from January 2022–December 2023 and includes the EVAWC inception phase (June–December 2021). Specific attention was paid to joint activities and United Nations agencies’ support at national and subnational levels. Selected province(s) to be included in the review will be discussed and agreed upon. The review will cover interventions financed from the project resources, including the contribution from the United Nations agencies. One important feature of this MTR exercise is that it should be light touch and quasi-independent. As this is not a conventional MTR, it is important to clarify the implications of this feature to the scope of this MTR below.

24. **A “light touch” MTR**. The ToR did not prescribe the notion of being a “light touch”. As the EoP evaluation was already in the pipeline for early 2025, it was understood that the EoP will offer a full account of the programme evaluation. The standard OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria augmented by those required by DFAT and the United Nations agencies would be fully addressed by the EoP exercise. To make this MTR value-adding, considering the link between this MTR and the coming full EoP evaluation, the MTR consultant team defined the “light touch” as being an MTR (i) with a strong focus on selected aspects of programme performance; (ii) that is based mainly on qualitative perceptions of relevant stakeholders and quantitative indicators from existing secondary sources; (iii) that is forward-looking to provide lessons learned and suggestions for next phase of programming and short-term adjustments in the remainder of EVAWC; and finally (iv) that is feasible given the limited timeframe allocated for this MTR. This understanding provided a background for proposing the methodologies to respond to the indicative review questions listed in the ToR.

25. **A “quasi-independent” review**. Being quasi-independent was pursued by a close collaboration between the MTR consultant team and a Regional Reference Group (RRG), which is made up of three experts nominated by the United Nations regional offices of UNFPA, UNICEF and UN Women and the DFAT Regional Gender Adviser. The RRG was expected to provide quality assurance, M&E and technical expertise from an international perspective to help inform and strengthen the work of the MTR team. In addition, a close consultation between the MTR consultant team and the programme partners was required to ensure that the methodologies and findings best reflect the programme context and performance. Findings and recommendations of the MTR consultants would be subject to comments and validation from RRG and EVAWC programme partners. The MTR Manager, who is the International Technical Adviser in the TC, would provide technical support and other facilitation as needed. Annex 2 provides a chart on the MTR process that reflects when technical guidance and inputs from the RRG and EVAWC programme partners are expected. This helpfully demonstrates a good visualization of being “quasi-independent”.

# 4. Review methods and approaches

## 4.1 Review questions

26. With the above purpose, objectives, and scope, the ToR prescribed indicative review questions under the four evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and coordination. Based on the broad questions suggested in the ToR, the MTR consultants “decomposed” these questions through the lens of being light touch to make specific review questions. Additional questions to inform the programme coherence, lessons learned, and recommendations were also added. In addition to being “light touch”, this decomposition of review questions was made based on potential usefulness and feasibility of the answers. With this process, the review questions are provided below.[[7]](#footnote-7)

## Relevance/coherence

*The extent to which the EVAWC Programme corresponds to beneficiaries’ requirements, the country’s needs and priorities, and the needs of partners including the related strategies of the GoAU*

* Q1. To what extent does EVAWC correspond to the country’s needs and priorities, those of the main GoVN counterparts (MoLISA, MoCST), as well as strategies and priorities of the GoAU and the United Nations agencies?
* Q2. To what extent does EVAWC correspond to the needs of direct beneficiaries, including those during the COVID-19 pandemic?
* Q3. To what extent does EVAWC complement the existing policies of the GoVN, interventions of the United Nations agencies, and other initiatives of GoAU in Viet Nam, and interventions of other partners in the field of VAW and VAC?

**Effectiveness**

*The extent to which the EVAWC Programme outputs have been achieved/are expected to be achieved, and the extent to which these outputs have contributed to the achievement of the project outcomes, the key drivers/factors of success*

* Q4. To what extent has EVAWC achieved or is likely to achieve the outcomes and outputs identified in the monitoring, evaluation, and learning framework (MELF)? Are there outcomes and outputs that EVAWC has not achieved or might not achieve? What are the main reasons? Are there unintended results produced by EVAWC?
* Q5. How have the delay and slow start (caused by COVID-19, differences in work procedures and regulations of the PUNOs, the GoVN’s ODA regulations) affected the progress towards EVAWC outcomes?

**Efficiency**

*The extent to which EVAWC Programme outputs have been achieved with the most efficient and effective use of resources (funds, expertise, time, administrative costs, etc.)*

* Q6. Has the programme output been achieved with the most efficient use of resources? Has the funding allocation been prioritized to the most needed and impactful activities?
* Q7. Has EVAWC invested sufficient expertise and resources for programme management and coordination? How has the programme management structure contributed to the programme efficiency?

**Coordination**

*The extent to which the coordinating United Nations agency has been an active member of and contributed to the coordination mechanisms of EVAWC, as well as the participating United Nations agencies and stakeholders and governance mechanisms, including the technical and steering committees*

* Q8. How has EVAWC been coordinated to address the factors that caused delay and slow start in the EVAWC implementation (as above)?
* Q9. How has EVAWC been coordinated for work planning, implementation processes, especially planning and execution of joint activities, as well as monitoring and learning? How has expertise (in-house and external) been mobilized to address key technical challenges of EVAWC?
* Q10. To what extent has the governance structure contributed to the programme performance? What is the value added of having in-depth engagement of DFAT as a programme partner in addressing coordination and technical challenges?

**Lessons learned and recommendations**

* Q11. What could be learned, both in technical and management terms, from the EVAWC programme implementation?
* Q12. What are the priorities of the GoVN in addressing VAW and VAC, as well as the intersection of the two, in the medium and long term? What will be the roles of international donors? What should be the delivery modality for future interventions in VAW and VAC? What are prerequisites for effective coordination?

## 4.2 Approach and methodology

### 4.2.1 Review approaches

27. This MTR will adhere to the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the United Nations system, UNEG Ethical Guidelines and Code of Conduct. With this, the evaluation approach is a combination of the following:

28. **Credibility approach**. The MTR was guided by the principle of credibility to ensure that the best evidence available is utilized appropriately to generate evidence-based findings and recommendations that the programme partners are confident to act upon. In practical terms, the MTR utilized all sources of information that was made available to this evaluation, either from secondary sources or primary data collection methods (see below).

29. **Participatory approach**. Data collection for the analysis in this MTR was participatory, ensuring that perspectives of different stakeholders were considered in combination with the existing data sources available from the programme reports, meeting minutes, annual workplans, and other relevant documents. Lists of questions were shared to all the stakeholders before the interviews or small group meetings. While the discussions were structured to these questions, all ideas and perspectives raised by the respondents were accepted and used for the analysis.

30. **Human rights-based approach**. Within this MTR, consultation with rights holders being victims and survivors from violence was not a focus due to the complexity of making arrangements for such consultation (see the discussion in subsection 4.2.2.2 below). This should be the subject for the thorough assessment planned at the end of the programme. For the current MTR, the focus was instead placed on duty bearers, including the United Nations agencies, GoVN partners, mass organizations, and other service providers. It is acknowledged that this was only a partial application of the human rights-based approach, but going further in this direction was not possible in the current review.

31. **Gender equality and women’s empowerment approach**. A gender lens was also used in this review to ensure that all stages of the evaluation are gender-sensitive. A gender lens was used with a particular focus on assessing the strategies adopted by the programme partners in engaging women and men in different interventions to prevent and respond to VAW and VAC. The MTR placed an emphasis on assessing how has promoting formal gender equality through legislative and policy advocacy has been pursued, and how harmful social and gender norms that perpetuate violence and unequal power relations between women and men have been addressed through the series of awareness-raising activities and behaviour change communication.

### 4.2.2 Review methods

32. The MTR adopted a combination of desk review and stakeholder consultation. A comprehensive desk review of the existing data sources that were shared by the EVAWC management was made and initial findings from this review provided a background for planning the stakeholder consultation, which was held at both the national and subnational level. The essences of these methods are summarized below.

**4.2.2.1 Desk review**

33. This was an important part of a light-touch MTR. In most generic terms, the desk review will inform the evaluation questions (above) by referring to the existing secondary data. This desk review was started after the Introduction Meeting on 7 March 2024. Being a light-touch MTR, existing secondary data sources were utilized by the MTR consultants to reduce requirements for primary data collection. Types of secondary data used in this desk review are provided below. A list of the key documents used was provided in Annex 3 of the report.

**Types of Secondary Data and Sources:**

* **Relevant statistics and survey results on VAW and VAC:**  
  Statistics and surveys of GoVN (General Statistics Office (GSO)), United Nations agencies, etc.
* **Existing literature on interventions in the field of VAW and VAC, especially the intersection between the two types of violence:**  
  RRG, PUNOs
* **EVAWC programme design documents (programme documents, partnership framework; RRF; ToR for Steering Committee, Technical Committee; partnership ways of working, etc.):**  
  EVAWC Coordination Team
* **Annual workplans and progress reports with updated programme M&E table (up to March 2024):**  
  EVAWC Coordination Team
* **EVAWC knowledge products: studies, assessments, policy briefs, advocacy workshop presentations, etc.:**  
  EVAWC Coordination Team, PUNOs
* **Capacity development materials: training agenda, training materials, post-training assessment reports, list of participants:**  
  EVAWC Coordination Team, PUNOs
* **Communication campaign materials: key communication messages, media coverage, other materials produced for the campaigns:**  
  EVAWC Coordination Team, PUNOs
* **Meeting minutes or summary of key meetings of the EVAWC PSC as well as those of the TC meetings (when available):**  
  EVAWC Coordination Team, PUNOs
* **Other data sources (e.g. the baseline survey report for EVAWC, other relevant materials shared by the programme partners and stakeholders during consultation):**  
  EVAWC Coordination Team, PUNOs, RRG, GoVN counterparts, statistics, etc.

**4.2.2.2 Stakeholder consultation**

34. **Consultation with key stakeholders**. The purpose of this qualitative assessment was to seek perceptions of the EVAWC stakeholders and beneficiaries on evaluation questions relevant to them. These perceptions were triangulated with data from the secondary sources to inform the MTR findings and recommendations. This consultation was made at the central level and through a field visit to Da Nang city – being the only location where all PUNOs have had interventions within the programme workplans (in addition to the existing partnership with Da Nang city through other initiatives).

35. **Consultation at the national level**. At the central level, consultations with DFAT, PUNOs, and the EVAWC Coordination Team were prioritized before consulting with other partners. This was to ensure that the MTR consultants could acquire information regarding all types of the programme interventions. Based on this, consultation with other partners who were usually engaged in the programme implementation in specific areas or activities was undertaken. Meetings with the programme implementing partners were possible with the facilitation of PUNOs to their respective partners in the programme. With this facilitation, the MTR consultant teams were able to consult with all the programme stakeholders at the central levels, including the representatives from MoCST’s DFA, MoLISA’s GED and DCA, MoH, MoET, VWU, VWU’s Center for Women Development, VFA, Viet Nam Lawyer Association, University of Public Health, Viet Nam National Children Hospital, GBVNet, VNMenNet, CSAGA, and CCHIP.

36. **Field visit to Da Nang city**. A visit to one programme province was suggested in the ToR. However, focusing on one province might not be most desirable and give an accurate picture across the implementation sites. Results from the EVAWC baseline survey report suggested notable differences (although whether such differences are statistically significant were not informed – see DEPOCEN, 2024 for further information) across Da Nang city and Dien Bien province – the two locations selected for the baseline survey.[[8]](#footnote-8) Therefore, the consultants proposed at the inception phase of this MTR to visit Da Nang – being one major city, and Dien Bien – being one poor province. In practice, due to administrative procedures required to organize the field visit, it was only possible to visit Da Nang city. During this one-week visit, the consultant met with all the programme stakeholders, including the representatives from the Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (DoLISA), the Department of Culture, Sports and Tourism (DoCST) and City Police Department, VWU and VFU of the City, District People’s Committee of Cam Ledistrict, Ward People’s Committees of Hoa Phat ward (Cam Le district), and Hoa Cuong Bac ward (Hai Chau district), and the representative office of CSAGA in Da Nang city – the host of the Anh Duong House in the city.

37. **Number of people met**. With this stakeholder consultation process, the consultants met with 61 people, 80 percent of whom were female. Among the stakeholders consulted, 26 per cent were from the United Nations agencies and DFAT; 28 per cent were representatives from the GoVN ministries; 10 per cent were from mass organizations and CSOs; and 32 per cent were from Da Nang city. Some of the stakeholders were met with more than once. For instance, the representatives from the United Nations agencies were met at the kick-off meeting, orientation, consultation on the review questions, and different workshops or meetings to get feedback from the MTR findings and recommendations. This reflects a diversity of implementing partners and stakeholders of EVAWC at both central and provincial level. A list of people met during the field visit is provided in Annex 3 of the current report.

38. **Approaches for data collection**. Collection of primary data was made through a series of in-depth interviews and small group discussions with stakeholders. For the stakeholders at the central level, lists of questions were shared with the stakeholders through the introduction letters of PUNOs and through emails to the focal points assigned by the stakeholders. Meetings were conducted using both face-to-face and virtual platforms, depending on preferences of the stakeholders. For stakeholders in Da Nang city, lists of questions were sent as part of the UNFPA introduction letters to the city authorities and respective agencies. All the meetings in Da Nang were face-to-face (with the exception of one phone interview). The case study approach was also proposed by the MTR consultant during the inception phase. The Anh Duong House in Da Nang – the one-stop services centre – was targeted. However, at the time of the field visit, CSAGA Branch in Da Nang was preparing for a registration procedure required by the local authorities to return Anh Duong House to full operation. Therefore, Anh Duong House was not able to offer accommodation services for survivors of violence. As such, although social workers of the CSAGA Branch were still consulted, it was not possible to meet with any survivors of violence supported by Anh Duong House. Therefore, a case study approach was not pursued.

39. **Data analysis**. Data collected from both primary and secondary sources was triangulated to draw findings from different angles and perspectives. In most cases, the consultant started the analysis with secondary data sources to partially identify potential findings. When analysing secondary data, the triangulation approach applied to compare different reports and documents with information collected from the stakeholder consultation to ensure the findings were correct. Different opinions from the United Nations agencies, implementing partners, and other stakeholders were triangulated to formulate the findings. One challenge for this analysis was the incompleteness of the programme M&E data. M&E arrangements was the subject of discussion in subsection 5.2 when reviewing the programme effectiveness. At this stage, the MTR consultants noted that M&E data and knowledge products were not systematically compiled and maintained. Therefore, validating or providing additional narrative on the figures reflected in the donor progress reports, for instance, was not always straightforward.

### 4.2.3 Some limitations of the methodologies

40. **Lack of voices of victims or survivors from violence**. This was acknowledged as a limitation of the current MTR. As discussed in paragraph 38, no direct interactions with the victims or survivors of violence supported by the programme were possible during the MTR process. In fact, the MTR consultants intended to have a “light-touch” approach with survivors of violence during the visit to CSAGA’s Anh Duong House in Da Nang. However, as explained in paragraph 38, this was not realized as Anh Duong House was in the registration process required by the local authorities to offer full support services. Therefore, the intention to meet with survivors of violence was not feasible. To address this limitation, the MTR consultants tried to get a good understanding of the services offered by Anh Duong House and VWU’s CWD Peace House when consulting with the staff from CSAGA and CWD. In addition, some stories capturing feedback from the survivors published by UNFPA and its partners were also referred to.[[9]](#footnote-9) Voices of victims and survivors from violence supported by the programme should be captured by the EoP to be conducted in early 2025.

41. **Attribution of the programme interventions**. This was a challenge encountered by the MTR consultants. In fact, a large part of the EVAWC funding and activities was “integrated” into the workplans of the existing programmes or projects of the United Nations agencies. That was prescribed in the programme design. It was expected that PUNOs would utilize existing arrangements with their respective governments and other partners, when possible, to avoid a lengthy approval process according to the GoVN regulations on ODA management. For instance, the EVAWC work implemented by UNICEF in collaboration with MoH or MoET to prevent and respond to VAC was integrated into the existing Country Programme 2022–2026 that covered the separate projects with these two ministries for a long time. Therefore, the results in VAC control and preventions observed in the EVAWC period might also be attributed to other activities of UNICEF in these partnerships. Similar examples were also found with, for instance, UNFPA in its long-term partnership with MoCST or UN Women in partnership with VWU or MoLISA’s GED. In this context, some results reported to EVAWC might also be attributed to other activities under such long-term partnerships. However, the MTR consultants were not able to address this attribution issue and the limitation remains. This is something to consider for further review in the final evaluation.

# 5. Key findings

## 5.1 Relevance and coherence

42. **Summary**. Findings on relevance and coherence are summarized below.

* EVAWC was found to be fully relevant and aligned to the commitments, strategies, legal and policy frameworks of Viet Nam in the prevention of and responses to VAW and VAC.
* EVAWC was responsive to the mandates of the key GoVN agencies that have the state management authority in the areas of domestic violence, GBV, and VAWC (particularly MoLISA and MoCST).
* EVAWC contributed to addressing gaps and bottlenecks to providing VAWC-related services to survivors of violence and therefore was responsive to the needs of direct beneficiaries.
* EVAWC was fully aligned with the strategies and priorities of the United Nations and DFAT. It was a realization of the DFAT cooperation strategy with Viet Nam, a continuation of the cooperation between the United Nations, Australia, and the GoVN in eliminating VAW and VAC.
* The design of EVAWC was built on the results and lessons learned from several cooperation initiatives between the United Nations, DFAT, and GoVN agencies. It was found to be complementary to the existing initiatives and mandates of the GoVN agencies.

***Q1. To what extent does EVAWC correspond to the country’s strategies and priorities, those of the main GoVN counterparts (MoLISA, MoCST), as well as strategies and priorities of the GoAU and the United Nations agencies?***

43. **EVAWC being fully relevant and responsive to Viet Nam’s international commitments to sustainable development**. Viet Nam has committed to the international conventions that directly address violence against women and children, including the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Since the early stages of its transformation into a market economy, Viet Nam has embarked on sustainable development pathways with international commitments to the Millennium Development Goals and then the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) since 2015. The current Social and Economic Development Strategy (SEDS) (2021–2030) and the Social and Economic Development Plan (2021–2025) are aligned to and integrate the SDGs. The EVAWC programme by design contributes directly to the implementation of SDG targets 5.2 and 16.2.[[10]](#footnote-10)

44. **EVAWC programme being aligned with the legal and policy frameworks of Viet Nam in the prevention of and response to violence against women and children**. These strong commitments of Viet Nam to prevent and respond to VAW and VAC have been realized in legal documents as well as policy frameworks. Regarding legal documents, the Law on Prevention and Control of Domestic Violence (2007, amended 2022), the Law on Gender Equality (2006), the Law on Children (2016, to replace the previous Law on Care, Education, and Protection of Children) and other related documents (i.e. the GoVN decrees, ministerial circulars) have been promulgated over the past decade. These have created legal background for the prevention of and responses to violence against women and children. For the policy framework, the GoVN has pursued, to name a few, the Programme on Gender-based Violence Prevention and Response 2021–2025; the National Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Violence against Children and Child Abuse 2020–2025; the National Strategy on Family Development through 2020 with a 2030 vision, and so on. As it will be highlighted in subsection 5.2 of this report, the EVAWC programme was found to both enhance the legal and policy frameworks on VAWC as well as to support the implementation of the existing frameworks.

45. **EVAWC being responsive to the mandates of key GoVN agencies**. Violence against women and children in family settings is in the mandate of two ministries: MoLISA and MoCST. In particular, Article 26 of the Law on Gender Equality assigns MoLISA to “examine, inspect and handle violations, complaints and denunciation against violations of gender equality”. Within MoLISA, the GED is the agency responsible for gender equality, including in the family sphere. Article 36 of the Law on Domestic Violence Prevention and Control gives MoCST the state management authority for inspecting and checking implementation of the law. In the MoCST structure, the DFA is mandated in domestic violence and therefore should be the focal point for the implementation of the law. Article 82 of the Law on Children assigns the responsibility to MoLISA for oversight of the implementation of the law. The DCA has the mandate of promoting children’s rights and undertaking child protection activities respectively. The EVAWC engaged these departments in the two ministries as key implementing partners. The DG or DDG of these departments were supposed to be (rotating) co-chairs of the PSC; middle-level management personnel of these departments were members of the programme TC. Consultation with the representatives from the departments confirmed that the EVAWC contributed directly to their mandates.

46. **EVAWC being a realization of the DFAT strategy and cooperation with Viet Nam**. Advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment is a core part of the work of DFAT. The DFAT Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy sets three mutually reinforcing priorities, including (i) enhancing women’s voices in decision-making, leadership and peacebuilding; (ii) promoting women’s economic empowerment; and (iii) ending violence against women and girls.[[11]](#footnote-11) DFAT’s Child Protection Policy and its Preventing Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment Policy further reflects this commitment with a zero-tolerance approach. A global Ambassador for Women and Girls was appointed by the GoAU in 2011 to advocate for gender equality, including ending violence, internationally. Australia’s Ambassador for Gender Equality visited Viet Nam in May 2024 to share the Australian approaches and discuss priorities in ending VAWC with the GoVN agencies.[[12]](#footnote-12) In Australia’s current Development Programme to Viet Nam, Australia works with partners “to tackle domestic violence in Viet Nam and ensure that women, ethnic minorities and people with disabilities are not left behind in recovery efforts”.[[13]](#footnote-13)

47. **EVAWC being relevant to priorities of the United Nations agencies in Viet Nam**. Regarding UNICEF, EVAWC was aligned to one of the four components in the current Country Programme Document (CPD) 2022–2026, which was “every child and adolescent is protected from violence, exploitation and abuse”.[[14]](#footnote-14) For the previous CPD 2017–2021, EVAWC contributed its part to the outcome of ensuring a functioning child protection system staffed by qualified service providers. With regard to UNFPA, EVAWC was aligned to the Country Programme in the current two cycles of 2017–2021 and 2022–2026. Under the previous cycle (when EVAWC was designed), EVAWC contributed to outcome 3.1: “Enhanced policy environment to prevent gender-based violence and harmful practices and enable the delivery of multisectoral services through strengthened partnership with social organizations”. In the current cycle 2022–2026, EVAWC was aligned to two of the six programme results areas, including “Transform harmful attitudes towards gender equality, GBV, harmful practices including in humanitarian and development nexus (Prevention)” and “Multisectoral response to address GBV and harmful practices (Response).”[[15]](#footnote-15) EVAWC was also aligned with the priorities of UN Women in Viet Nam. The Strategic Note 2022–2026 identifies “a more just, safe, and inclusive society” being one of the three priority results. Under this priority, UN Women supports the government to “design and implement evidence-based strategies that target youth, men and boys to prevent violence against women. Additionally, UN Women will support the development of guidelines and coordination structures to provide quality essential services to women survivors of violence.”[[16]](#footnote-16)

***Q2. To what extent does EVAWC correspond to the needs of direct beneficiaries, including those during the COVID-19 pandemic?***

48. **EVAWC responding to the concerningly high prevalence of VAWC in Viet Nam**. As mentioned earlier, consultations with survivors of violence were not held as part of this MTR. Despite these limitations, the relevance of EVAWC to the needs of direct beneficiaries could be concluded using the existing information. Notably, figures from the national survey on prevalence of violence against women 2019 supported by UNFPA and DFAT indicated that two-thirds of women reported experiencing at least one form of violence in their lifetime by their husband or intimate partner; one-third of women had experienced such violence in the last 12 months prior to the survey; and 13.3 per cent of women had experienced sexual violence by their husbands in their lifetime.[[17]](#footnote-17) Regarding VAC, GSO and UNICEF (2021) suggested that approximately 72 percent of children experienced some form of violence at home by their parents or caregivers. It was also reported that young women and adolescent girls are significantly more likely to experience non-partner violence than older women. Both the two studies indicated that vulnerable groups of women and children (such as those in the poor households in the rural and mountainous areas, women with disability, ethnic minority women, or female migrants…) are more likely to be at risk of violence. Women and children were at greater risk of violence during the COVID-19 pandemic. A rapid assessment by UNICEF, UNFPA and UN Women with support from DFAT in 2020 reported that two out of three children experienced some form of violence during the pandemic and more than one in three women experienced at least one form of violence during that period.[[18]](#footnote-18)

49. **EVAWC expanding the limited availability of quality services to support survivors of VAWC**. From a supply side, while political commitment to ending violence against women and children is strong, violence prevention and response remains underfunded. UN Women and MoLISA (2019) highlighted the lack of human resources and capacity including among front-line workers in the healthcare, police, justice and social work and child protection system, especially at the subnational level. Although there are a number of sub-law documents (such as the GoVN decrees, ministerial circulars) on social workers, there have been no laws recognizing social work as a profession in the public system, and outlining standards of practice, professional qualifications of social workers, and mechanisms for licensing and registration of professional social workers.[[19]](#footnote-19) Encountering constraints in resources, capacity, legal framework and institutions, the quality of social work services and social work professionalism was not ensured. Social services including shelters, legal assistance, counselling, and mental health and psychosocial support are limited and fragmented, and longer-term support for rehabilitation and reintegration is lacking. In this context, EVAWC provided a timely response to enhance systems, capacities, and service provision to increase access to quality essential services for victims and survivors of violence (i.e. outcome 2 of EVAWC – see section 2 for more details). This was evidence of being responsive to the needs of direct beneficiaries.

50. **EVAWC aiming to change social norms and harmful practices being barriers to access to support services for survivors of violence**. From a demand side, widespread social norms constrained women from reporting violence or seeking redness through the justice system. Maintaining family harmony and addressing domestic violence in the “closed-door setting of the family” are among the norms that prevent women from reporting violence or seeking legal measures to protect themselves and their children against violence.[[20]](#footnote-20) These norms are widely practised in different forms. Reconciliation or mediation in response to cases of violence are usually encouraged by different stakeholders, formal or informal. In addition, awareness of availability of support services, limited legal awareness to invoke the rights also constrained victims and survivors of violence from accessing the services that are available. Therefore, MoLISA, GSO, and UNFPA (2020) reported that one in two women who had experienced violence had never told anyone about it, and 90.4 per cent never sought assistance from police or the authorities.[[21]](#footnote-21) In this context, awareness-raising and behaviour change communication was designed as one of four outputs of EVAWC. As it will be discussed in subsection 5.2, the programme has reached a significant number of people through different communication campaigns. This provides another background for assessing EVAWC being relevant to the needs of victims and survivors of violence (even without the opportunities to listen to voices of survivors of violence during this MTR process, as discussed in subsection 4.2.3).

***Q3. To what extent does EVAWC complement the existing policies of the GoVN, interventions of the United Nations agencies, and other initiatives of the GoAU in Viet Nam, and interventions of other partners in the field of VAW and VAC?***

51. **EVAWC being built on results and lessons learned from the existing initiatives of the United Nations, DFAT, and other partners**. During the design process of EVAWC, the existing interventions of the United Nations agencies, DFAT, and government counterparts were reviewed to find opportunities for synergizing and incorporating lessons learned. An extensive list of 20 initiatives, both individual and joint among the United Nations agencies, was described in the EVAWC ProDoc (see Annex 3 of this report). These were the interventions to address VAW and VAC prevention and response in an integrated way, as well as those in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The lessons drawn from these interventions emphasized, among others, the challenge of integrating VAW and VAC; a rationale for stronger focus on violence prevention that addresses root causes and drivers of VAWC; alignment of laws and policies with international normative standards and ensuring all forms of violence are included; and lack of professional social workers and dedicated child protection personnel at all levels; lack of evidence to advocate for changes towards a more conducive environment for VAWC preventions and control. Consultation with the consultant who was engaged in supporting the design process indicated that this review process, particularly the lessons learned, was an important background for building the focuses and implementation strategies of the EVAWC programme (see the EVAWC ProDoc for more details).

52. **Confirmation of relevant implementing partners on complementarity of EVAWC to their existing interventions.** The representatives of MoLISA GED and DCA, and MoCST DFA who were consulted in this MTR have been long-term partners of the PUNOs in most of the interventions reviewed during the EVAWC design (see Annex 3 of this report). Therefore, EVAWC has been seen as a continuation of the existing cooperation with DFAT and the United Nations in the prevention of and response to VAWC. MoCST appreciated the support in terms of providing technical inputs for the development of Decree 76/2022/ND-CP on the implementation of the Domestic Violence Prevention and Control (DVPC) Law; MoLISA GED highlighted the EVAWC support to revise the Law on Gender Equality; and MoLISA DAC indicated appreciation of the programme support to develop an intersectoral cooperation mechanism on VAC that was signed by the four ministries on VAC.[[22]](#footnote-22) These were among several pieces of evidence collected from the stakeholder consultation for complementarity of the programme support to the existing mandates of the key national stakeholders. Similar evidence of coherence was also found through consultation with mass organizations (i.e., VWU, VFA) and CSOs (e.g. CSAGA, GBVNet) during the MTR process.

## 5.2 Effectiveness

53. **Summary**. Findings on effectiveness are summarized below.

* Encountering several challenges, the programme partners managed to accomplish significant achievements. Contribution to enhanced legal and policy framework, capacity development, and impressive outreach of communication were highly appreciated by the programme stakeholders.
* With regard to the output targets, as of 31 March 2024, EVAWC has completed or exceeded the 2025 targets of 14 output indicators and is on track to complete 3 indicators. Only indicator 4.1.1 of the programme was found to be off track.
* There are, however, gaps in progress to achieving the expected outcomes. While achieving outcome 1 is likely, achieving outcomes 2 and 4 may be unlikely. Accessing progress toward outcome 3 was not possible due to the lack of both targets and data required to inform progress.
* The physical progress of the programme was hampered by delays and difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (during the inception phase), the ODA management requirements, and differences in the work procedures across the United Nations agencies. The lack of required project approval with MoLISA and MoCST was a game-changing factor that seriously undermined the programme performance until countermeasures were put in place, though this was later in 2023 and therefore this MTR cannot fully reflect the impact of these countermeasures.

***Q4. To what extent has EVAWC achieved or is likely to achieve the outcomes and outputs identified in the MELF? Are there outcomes and outputs that EVAWC has not achieved or might not achieve? What are the main reasons? Are there unintended results produced by EVAWC?***

54. **Several factors caused extended delays in the programme implementation**. The programme implementation has encountered profound challenges that caused extended delays. These factors are interruptions by the COVID-19 pandemic, requirements of ODA management regulations, and coordination challenges. The COVID-19 lockdown and restrictions on travels and convening meetings continued until the second quarter of 2022, causing a slow start of the programme. The ODA management regulations required the United Nations agencies to develop separate project proposals for each of the key implementing partners. The approval process for these project documents was prolonged, and projects with key GoVN partners, including MoLISA and MoCST, were not yet approved as of this MTR. Without such approvals, these agencies were constrained from any formal engagement with the programme, including implementation of activities. Finally, differences among the United Nations agencies in work procedures and regulations were reported to be another challenge for the programme implementation. The impacts of these factors on the programme implementation were profound. Details on these challenges and how these affected the programme performance are the subject of a subsequent question in this subsection. It is, however, important to highlight these factors before embarking on this analysis to contextualize the assessment of programme effectiveness.

55. **Significant achievements observed in such a challenging context**. Encountering several factors that caused delays and difficulties in the programme implementation, EVAWC has secured significant achievements under all four outcomes. Regarding outcome 1, EVAWC contributed to the revision for the DVPC Law and the development of Decree 76/2023/ND-CP on the implementation of the DVPC Law through supporting studies and a consultation workshop to collect technical inputs from several stakeholders. With the programme technical support, the Law on Justice for Minors was included in the 2024 plan of the National Assembly, while revision of the Law on Gender Equality (2006) was under consideration of the GoVN. Under outcome 2, nearly 43,000 GoVN officials improved capacity to develop and deliver programmes on GBV, VAW, and VAC; 4,500 service providers have increased knowledge and capacity to deliver quality and coordinated essential services for survivors of VAW and VAC. Notably, 29.5 million people were reached through the programme-supported campaigns for changing harmful social norms and gender stereotyping. Further programme highlights are listed below.[[23]](#footnote-23)

**EVAWC Programme Highlights:**

* Contribution to the revision of the DVPC Law and Decree 76/2023/ND-CP on the implementation of the DVPC Law.
* The Law on Justice for Minors was included in the plan of the National Assembly 2024; revision of the Law on Gender Equality was under consideration of the GoVN.
* Two circulars on the human resource structures for social workers in the health and education sectors (Circular 03/2023/TT-BYT; Circular 20/2023 TT-BGDDT).
* 43,000 GoVN officials with improved capacity to develop and deliver programmes on GBV, VAW and VAC.
* 4,500 service providers that have increased knowledge and capacity to deliver quality and coordinated essential services for survivors of VAW and VAC.
* 20,000 education officials improved skills on child protection and life skills with a focus on prevention of violence, exploitation, trafficking, etc.
* 29.5 million people reached through campaigns for changing harmful social norms and gender stereotyping.
* 27,500 women, men, girls, and boys regularly attend community programmes to promote gender-equitable norms, attitudes, and behaviours.

*Source: compiled from the EVAWC donor progress reports*

56. **EVAWC achieving the expected output indicators**. There are 18 indicators to inform 13 outputs of EVAWC in the programme M&E table. Using the information available as of 31 March 2024, progress against these 18 output indicators was assessed using a traffic light measurement. Accordingly, green bsymbolizes achieving the target; yellow stands for achievements were made but reaching the targets was inconclusive; red indicates limited progress was seen and achieving the targets was unlikely. Results from this assessment are summarized in Table 1 below (see Annex 5 for more details). It shows that out of 18 output indicators, as of 31 March 2024, the programme has completed or exceeded the 2025 targets of 14 indicators. Of these 14 indicators, 7 indicators were well exceeded. The programme has been very close to completion of the three indicators (i.e. indicators 1.1.1, 2.1.3, and 3.2.1). Indicator 4.1.1 was the only indicator where the programme was found to be off track. It is again noted that this achievement of almost all output indicators was made under factors that severely affected the programme performance and contributed to a slow start and other delays.[[24]](#footnote-24)

# Table 1. Assessing the Physical Progress of EVAWC as of 31 March 2024

| **Output indicators** | **March 2024** | **Target 2025** | **Status** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **OUTCOME 1:**  **Outcome Indicator 1.1:** Number of laws and/or policies on gender equality and/or ending GBV/VAW/VAC developed or amended in line with international standards | MTR:  Likely beyond 2025 | 3 | N/A |
| **Indicator 1.1.1:** Number of policy recommendations reflected in revised policies and related national programmes on VAWC/GBV/DV | 5 | 6 | Met Target |
| **Indicator 1.2.1:** Number of policy briefs on budgeting for child protection and/or GBV prevention | 1 | 1 | Met Target |
| **Indicator 1.2.2:** Number of guidelines and instructions on gender-responsive budgeting for VAW prevention and/or budgeting for child protection | 2 | 2 (at  least) | Met Target |
| **Indicator 1.3.1:** Number of guidelines and/or  protocols/Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) developed for national and/or subnational multistakeholder coordination mechanisms | 10 | 8 (at  least) | Met Target |
| **Indicator 1.3.2:** Partnership strategy/approach in place to support programme implementation | 5 | Yes | Met Target |

| **Output indicators** | **March 2024** | **Target 2025** | **Status** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **OUTCOME 2:**  **Outcome Indicator 2.1:** Percentage of GBV victims seeking assistance from any support service | MTR:  Unlikely | 50%  (by 2026) | N/A |
| **Indicator 2.1.1:** Number of government officials with strengthened capacities to develop and deliver programmes that prevent and respond to GBV/VAW/VAC | 21,443 | 3,315 | Far Exceeds Target |
| **Indicator 2.1.2:** Number of women’s rights groups and relevant non-governmental organizations/Community-based organizations (CBOs) representing groups facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination/marginalization that have strengthened capacities and support to design, implement and monitor | 19 | 6 | Exceeds Target |
| **Indicator 2.1.3:** Number of training documents/handbooks adopted by sectoral agencies to be used nationwide | 5 | 6 | Met Target |
| **Indicator 2.2.1:** Number of service providers that have increased knowledge and capacity to deliver quality and coordinated EVAWC essential services to survivors of violence | 2,390 | 600 | Far Exceeds Target |
| **Indicator 2.2.2:** National guidelines or protocols for essential services developed and/or strengthened that specifically address the needs of women and girls who are survivors of violence and facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination | 4 | 3 | Met Target |
| **Indicator 2.3.1:** Number of social services workers who have received training on VAW and/or VAC with United Nations support | 4,500 | 1,065 | Far Exceeds Target |
| **Indicator 2.4.1:** Number of legal practitioners who have received training on gender-responsive and child-friendly services for survivors of VAWC | 985 | 345 | Exceeds Target |
| **Indicator 2.5.1:** Functioning inter-agency GBV coordination mechanisms/bodies at national and subnational levels | 4 | 3 | Met Target |

| **Output indicators** | **March 2024** | **Target 2025** | **Status** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **OUTCOME 3:**  **Outcome Indicator 3.1:** Proportion of men and women, boys and girls who agreed with one or more reasons why intimate partner violence and/or corporal punishment was justifiable | N/A | TBC | N/A |
| **Outcome Indicator 3.2:** Proportion of men and women, boys and girls who demonstrate gender-equitable attitudes | N/A | TBC | N/A |
| **Indicator 3.1.1:** Number of people reached by campaigns challenging harmful social norms and gender stereotyping | 29.5 | 9  million | Exceeds Target |
| **Indicator 3.2.1:** Number of women’s rights groups and relevant NGOs/CSOs that have strengthened capacities and support to design, implement and monitor innovative prevention programmes to address GBV/VAW/VAC | N/A | N/A | Met Target |
| **Indicator 3.3.1:** Number of women, men, girls and boys who regularly attend community programmes to promote gender-equitable norms, attitudes and behaviours | 10 | 11 | Far Exceeds Target |

| **Output indicators** | **March 2024** | **Target 2025** | **Status** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **OUTCOME 4:**  **Outcome Indicator 4.1:** National statistics related to VAW and VAC incidence and prevalence are available and are disaggregated by income, sex, age, ethnicity, disability and geographical location | MTR: Unlikely | Yes | N/A |
| **Indicator 4.1.1:** Contextualized methods and standards developed/adapted at national level to produce prevalence and/or incidence data on VAW and VAC. System and protocols in place to collect and use administrative data on VAW and VAC, in line with international standards and across different sectors | 14,568 | 5,610 | N/A |
| **Indicator 4.2.1:** Number of government-to-government, civil society organization-to-civil society organisation (CSO) and service provider-to-service provider engagements on violence prevention and response facilitated | N/A | N/A | Met Target |

*Notes: (i) "Met Target" indicates that actual figures meet the target values; (ii) "Exceeds Target" indicates that actual figures are approximately twice the target values; (iii) "Far Exceeds Target" signifies that the achievement significantly surpasses the expected level.*

*Source: compiled from the programme M&E table updated to 31 March 2024*

57. **Gaps towards achieving the expected outcomes**. While progress towards outputs was evident, how such progress has contributed to achieving the expected outcomes was not straightforward. EVAWC aims to achieve four outcomes, which are measured by five indicators (see Table 1). Out of these five indicators, only one indicator could be informed by the programme-generated data (i.e. indicator 1.1 on the number of laws and/or policies developed or amended in line with international standards). For other indicators, external data sources are required to inform the progress. Notably, it was anticipated in the inception phase of the programme that these sources would not be available within the programme cycle. This renders it difficult for this MTR to assess the progress of the expected outcomes. The MTR consultants, however, provided assessment of whether these outcomes are likely to be achieved based on relevant narratives, as summarized in Table 2 below. With this, this MTR concluded that (i) achieving outcome 1 is likely but it might go beyond the programme cycle; (ii) reaching outcome 2 is unlikely as the target outcome indicators were not realistic; (iii) progress against outcome 3 was not possible to assess due to lack of targets assigned to the outcome indicators and the lack of data available to track changes over time; (iv) outcome 4 requires long-term interventions, and achieving this outcome under the current programme cycle may be unlikely. Overall, there were gaps in achieving the expected outcomes.

# Table 2. Progress towards the expected outcomes

| **Output indicators** | **Target 2025** | **MTR assessment** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **OUTCOME 1:**  **Indicator 1.1:** Number of laws and/or policies on gender equality and/or ending GBV/VAW/VAC developed or amended in line with international standards  **Narrative:**  ● EVAWC contributed to the DVPC Law (2022) through the support for studies and consultation workshops to provide technical inputs to the draft law. International standards were provided during the consultation process.  ● EVAWC contributed to the ongoing process for development of the Law of Justice for Minors (included in the Legal Development Plan of the National Assembly (NA) in 2024). International standards and best practices were provided. It is noted that one draft law is usually approved after submission to the two congress meetings of the NA. Therefore, promulgation in 2025 is likely.  ● EVAWC advocated for the revision of the Law on Gender Equality. It was subject to the GoVN decision before submission to the NA for approval on adding to the Legal Development Plan of the NA in 2025. This might be added to the NA plan for 2025. Promulgation in 2026 may be the soonest possible and it certainly goes beyond the current EVAWC cycle. | 3 | Likely (beyond 2025) |
| **OUTCOME 2:**  **Indicator 2.1:** Percentage of GBV victims seeking assistance from any support service  **Narrative:**  ● This is a high-level indicator and out of control of EVAWC. Data will not be available before the completion of EVAWC. It is uncertain when the next VAW survey will be conducted. Based on the first two rounds conducted in 2010 and 2019, the next round may be conducted in 2029.  ● A baseline for VAW victims, based on the VAW Survey 2019, was very low. Only 9.4 per cent of women who have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by a husband or partner have sought help from formal authorities.  ● Another baseline for VAC victims, based on a rapid assessment on VAW and VAC under COVID-19, was very low. Percentages of children have experienced violence who have sought help from the police was 58.7 per cent; from a shelter: 6.7 per cent; a helpline: 6.7 per cent; or a health station: 5.3 per cent  ● There are several barriers (e.g. gender and social norms, stigma to report violence, availability of essential services, capacity of service providers) for GBV survivors to seek formal assistance. These barriers cannot be addressed within the timeframe and resources of EVAWC.  ● Given this, aiming from a very low baseline (e.g. 9.4 per cent) to 50 per cent within a five-year period might be unrealistic. It would also be more accurate to clarify whether this includes if the programme encourages survivors to seek support from informal support, such as friends, relatives, teachers, and so on, given that GBV survivors are more likely to first seek help or disclose violence to informal sources of support. | 50%  (by 2026) | Unlikely |
| **OUTCOME 3:**  **Indicator 3.1:** Proportion of men and women, boys and girls who agreed with one or more reasons why intimate partner violence and/or corporal punishment was justifiable.  **Indicator 3.2:** Proportion of men and women, boys and girls who demonstrate gender-equitable attitudes.  **Narrative:**  ● No specific targets were assigned and therefore assessing the progress towards these outcome indicators is not possible.  ● As indicated in the programme M&E table, data to assess these two indicators is not available within the EVAWC cycle. The next VAW survey may be conducted in 2029 (and it remains uncertain when and how this could be done). Lack of project approval with MoLISA constrained an anticipated survey on VAWC in the current programme cycle.  ● The EVAWC baseline survey conducted in 2023 did not collect information required to inform these outcome indicators. ● Nevertheless, the figures on outreach of awareness-raising and behaviour change communications were impressive: (i) about 29.5 million were reached through campaigns for changing harmful social norms and gender stereotyping; (ii) 23 million impressions and 50,000 engagements were generated across United Nations and youth-oriented communication platforms. These outputs should produce some significant outcomes in terms of raising public awareness of VAW and VAC. Therefore, a yellow bubble was proposed by the MTR consultants to indicate that the programme might achieve the target, but it is inconclusive due to data availability. | TBC | Inconclusive due to lack of targets and data |
| **OUTCOME 4:**  **Indicator 4.1:** National statistics related to VAW and VAC incidence and prevalence are available and are disaggregated by income, sex, age, ethnicity, disability and geographical location.  **Narrative:**  ● The VAW survey remains the major instrument to provide statistics on VAW and VAC, and the plan for the next survey is not yet finalized.  ● The Survey on the Sustainable Development Goals on Children and Women in Viet Nam (which was Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) series of UNICEF) provided additional sources of information (i.e., attitudes towards domestic violence) but VAW and VAC was not a focus.  ● In addition to these surveys, there have not been new survey instruments in the national statistics system to inform DV, GBV, VAW, and VAC.  ● With the programme support, a guideline on data collection for the National Programme on Prevention and Response to GBV 2021–2025 was developed. This is a technical guidance and not binding. | Yes | Unlikely |

58. **Limitations in MEL arrangements being a constraint for assessing the progress**. One factor causing a difficulty in assessing the result was limitations of the monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) arrangements. Some key indicators in the MELF were linked to the data sources that are not available during the programme cycle. For instance, for the outcome indicators under output 3, it was noted in the MELF that data to inform these indicators would not be available in the programme cycle. This was not a good practice. As a result, assessing the progress towards the expected outcomes was constrained by data availability. In the programme M&E table 2022–2025 (an annex of the first donor progress report), this issue was anticipated. However, no actions were taken, for instance, to revise the outcome indicators and/or identify alternative data sources for ensuring data availability required for an assessment of the expected outcomes. In addition, a baseline survey was planned in the programme RRF, and it was actually carried out in the middle of 2023 (although the final report was not available at the time of starting this MTR). However, informing the outcome indicators at the baseline, in the absence of the other data sources to track progress towards outcomes 2 and 3, was not in the scope of the baseline survey.[[25]](#footnote-25) In the absence of external data sources to account for the programme contribution to the expected outcomes, collecting sufficient information to inform the programme’s outcomes 2 and 3 represents a challenge for the EoP.

59. **No unintended results being observed**. Due to the delays caused by the three factors mentioned in paragraph 54, the EVAWC programme management has responded to these factors through different measures (which are the subject of discussion under the next review questions). This adjustment process has not produced unexpected outputs. This might be linked to the fact that the programme partners adhered to the activities in the approved workplans. When implementing activities in the workplans, detailed proposal and budgetary estimates were developed for each activity and, through that process, outputs from the programme activities were under the control of the programme partners. In terms of unintended outcomes, the MTR consultants were not aware of any unintended outcomes that could be observed from the relevant documents as well as the stakeholder consultations.

***Q5. How have the delay and slow start (caused by COVID-19, differences in work procedures and regulations of the PUNOs, the GoVN’s ODA regulations) affected the progress towards EVAWC outcomes?***

### 5.2.1 The COVID-19 pandemic and impacts on the EVAWC progress

60. **Delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic**. EVAWC has experienced nearly a year delay under the COVID-19 pandemic. The programme started in June 2021 when Viet Nam was in a near-complete lockdown. Although social distancing measures were steadily lifted from the last quarter of 2021, travel restrictions remained until the second quarter of 2022.[[26]](#footnote-26) Relying mainly on online platforms for meetings and communications for nearly a quarter of the four-year programme cycle caused EVAWC to have a slow start. The first donor report dated 31 March 2022 shows that the deliverables produced in the period from June 2021 to March 2022 were the foundational documents for the programme implementation required in the inception phase.[[27]](#footnote-27) Constraints in convening meetings with the GoVN agencies due to social distancing and their top priorities being on responding to the COVID-19 emergency were reported as factors that negatively affected the work process and caused delays in approval of some programme foundational documents. For instance, the draft ToRs for the PSC and TC were circulated for review in July 2021. But approval was not possible until February 2022. The inception phase works were therefore extended until March 2022.

### 5.2.2 The ODA management regulations and impacts on the EVAWC progress

61. **Challenges by the ODA management regulations**. Six months after the EVAWC launching, Decree 114/2021/ND-CP dated 16 December 2021 was promulgated to “consolidate” the regulatory framework for the state management of official development assistance (ODA). It was a replacement of Decree 56/2020/ND-CP, which was effective during the programme design with additional guidance on project proposal and approval process. Decree 114/2021/ND-CP and Decree 80/2022/ND-CP are the two sub-law documents that provide oversight ODA funding and non-ODA grants to Viet Nam. One of the major features of these regulations was the requirement for the recipient agencies, either public, private, or CSO sectors, to undertake a new approval process for any ODA or non-ODA grant received. Therefore, the United Nations agencies were required by the new regulations to proceed with the EVAWC with multiple projects, one project per each implementing partner of EVAWC. In addition, an umbrella project –with one main coordinating agency and many co-implementers – was no longer possible.[[28]](#footnote-28) For some partners with which the United Nations has already secured partnerships within the current country programme cycle of 2022–2026 and where EVAWC activities were included in those partnerships, seeking approval for new projects was not required. Using these existing partnerships was therefore the strategy envisaged in the ProDoc to avoid delay. This strategy worked for UNICEF with some GoVN partners such as MoH, MoET, VFU, and so on. However, as EVAWC activities were not in any approved programmes with MoLISA and MoCST, engagement of the two ministries in the programme requires compliance with the new Decree 114/2021/ND-CP. For UNFPA, the partnership signed with the VFU was expected to be instrumental for implementation of UNFPA activities with MoCST and other organizations. However, this arrangement has not fully functioned due to the lack of legal background for MoCST to receive ODA funding from VFU without a due approval process made within the ministry. This introduced additional delays to the EVAWC implementation.

62. In addition to the requirement for ODA project approval in Decree 114/ND-CP, it should also be noted that organizing workshops or conferences with “international elements” (in the form of having international funding and/or having participation of international delegates), either on-site or online, was subject to the approval process governed by Decision 06/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister dated 21 February 2020. The approval process is not complicated, but it takes time to prepare and get approval. As meetings, workshops, and training courses are among major means of the programme implementation, this requirement by Decision 06 requires sufficient time for planning these activities. As a result, complying with this regulation also added further delay in some activities of the programme.

63. **Lack of required project approval disabling the engagement of key GoVN partners**.MoLISA and MoCST, the two state management authorities in DV, GBV, VAW and VAC, were envisaged to be the main NIPs. Their engagement is undoubtedly critical for the programme success. However, as of this MTR, the projects with MoCST and MoLISA have not been approved yet. This prevented these agencies from a formal participation in the programme decision-making process. Consultation with the representatives from MoLISA GED and DCA, and MoCST DFA, indicated that participation of the DG and DDG in the EVAWC PSC as well as any other events organized by EVAWC was “informal” and on a “personal basis”. Similarly, the engagement of the technical staff from MoLISA and MoCST in the programme TC was also informal. Their participation in the EVAWC programme was not assigned by the respective ministries due to a lack of project approval. Therefore, this participation does not carry the legitimacy and power of state management authorities. Therefore, the “approval” of the programme foundational documents in the inception phase was not formal from the GoVN side as the GoVN members of the PSC were not official. More importantly, the two ministries were unable to act as implementing partners (without project approval) and therefore unable to implement any roles or activities envisaged in the design. The expected positions of being NIPs were not realized without the required project approvals. The programme design envisaged the role of the programme “owners” to be MoLISA and MoCST , as they are the state management authorities in DV, VAW, and VAC. In practice, these agencies became “recipients” or “beneficiaries” of the programme results. In other words, the lack of required project approvals for the EVAWC partnership with MoLISA and MoCST largely impeded the programme design at the expense of national ownership and sustainability. With this, the principles stated in the Partnership Ways of Working, such as “Put the Government partners in the driver’s seat” and “Aim to have Government agencies coordinate”, were constrained. To the MTR consultants, this was a “game changer” for the programme governance and implementation. This certainly has exerted negative impacts on the programme performance and sustainability.

### 5.2.3 Differences in work procedures of PUNOs and impacts on the EVAWC progress

64. **Differences among PUNOs in work processes**. The first donor progress report recognized that “*lessons learned from previous projects as well as from the inception phase of this project reveal that the UN agencies’ procedures, working processes and regulations are different, often time consuming, and highly centralized in their HQs, causing delays in programme implementation*”.[[29]](#footnote-29) Indeed, differences across the United Nations agencies in work procedures and internal regulations exist. According to the design, UNFPA is the coordinating PUNO and signatory to the financial agreement with DFAT. The United Nations to United Nations Agreement was then used to transfer the funding from UNFPA to UNICEF and UN Women. Being the lead United Nations coordinating agency, UNFPA is responsible for reporting to DFAT and programmatic leadership. This requires certain administrative efforts from UNICEF and UN Women to provide information and reports that are inline with the requirements of the coordinating agency. However, such adjustments were difficult as the agency staff were used to the procedures of their organizations and therefore adjustments to provide information required by the coordinating agency were constrained. More importantly, these work procedures and regulations were centralized at the headquarter level and therefore adjustments were out of control at the country-team level.

65. **Challenges in navigating among the differences in work procedures**. Although this challenge was acknowledged in the inception phase, addressing these differences appeared to be difficult. Efforts of the UN agencies and DFAT to respond to these challenges were observed but the problem was not solved. As a matter of fact, these differences, which led to delaying the programme implementation, were reflected again in the second donor progress report for the period from January to December 2022, and the latest one from January to December 2023. Consultations with the responsible staff from the United Nations agencies indicated that it was a long process for the personnel involved to adapt to differences in work procedures across the United Nations agencies. It was also perceived that such differences were steadily resolved during the programme implementation. It required additional time and efforts from the staff assigned to implement EVAWC to reach agreements when there were differences in procedures as well as to accommodate the resultant requirements, especially in terms of reporting. The MTR consultants found that there was a gap among the PUNOs in terms of what adjustments were needed for overall programme coordination. This gap might have been addressed if an exercise were carried out to map what kind of information was required by the coordinating agency and how this information was required (when, in which form, etc.) and the type of information that would be available from the centralized systems of the other PUNOs. Based on that mapping, it would be easier to identify how the information from the other PUNOs could be extracted to feed the reporting requirements of the lead coordinating agency.

## 5.3 Efficiency

66. **Summary**. Findings on efficiency are summarized below.

* Funding allocation of the programme was made to the most needed areas, focusing on enhancing provision of services (response) for survivors of violence and awareness-raising, behaviour change communication (prevention).
* Utilizing the existing partnerships as instruments to implement EVAWC activities in the presence of ODA management regulation and adoption of the United Nations–European Union cost norms were important elements of ensuring cost-effectiveness.
* Disbursement rates of funds were found to be lower than expected but not for all the United Nations agencies. Low disbursement combined with high achievement of outputs suggests that there might be room to go deeper into some key activities of the programme.
* The efficiency of the programme was undermined by the lack of cooperation and coordination between the United Nations agencies for interventions at the subnational level.
* A relatively high cost for management and coordination was envisaged in the ProDoc. The actual management cost was lower than the level expected. However, this low management cost was mainly due to the absence of the International Technical Adviser position. This, coupled with the issue with chairing of the TC, has undermined the programme management and coordination.

***Q6. Has the programme output been achieved with the most efficient use of resources? Has the funding allocation been prioritized to the most needed and impactful activities?***

67. **Priorities in funding allocation**. As described in section 2 with background information on EVAWC, the funding allocation ratio for the four outcomes of EVAWC was, according to the design, 15:45:30:10 for outcome 1 to outcome 4, respectively. After the inception phase, the actual ratio agreed was 19:41:32:9: This funding allocation reflects the priorities to enhance services (in terms of systems, capacities, and availability) to survivors of VAW and VAC (response) as well as awareness-raising and behaviour change communication (prevention). Feedback from some key stakeholders consulted by the MTR consultants suggested that this funding allocation was reasonable and responsive to the country’s context. The GoVN representatives noted that prioritizing provision of services as well as raising public awareness and facilitating behaviour changes should continue to be the focus for further cooperation in prevention and response to DV, GBV, VAW, and VAC. However, it does not mean the importance of enhancing the legal and policy frameworks was underestimated. In fact, 19 per cent of the funding was allocated to this focus. The stakeholders consulted appreciated the programme contribution to the DVPC Law and other frameworks. Aligning these frameworks to international standards and good practices was suggested as a priority area for funding allocation.

68. **Cost-effectiveness of the implementation strategies**. Using the United Nations–European Union cost norms was one element of the implementation strategy that contributed to the programme cost-effectiveness. The United Nations–European Union cost norms were used as the basis for budgeting activities. These tripartite cost norms were jointly developed by the GoVN, the United Nations and European Union based on good practices in costing the activities for development aid projects. The cost norms reflect differences across regions and provinces, based on market rates of typical expenditure items. It was generally understood that these United Nations–European Union cost norms were a measure to ensure value for money as well as harmonization between the GoVN and donors in financial management. Value of money was also ensured through adoption of the United Nations procurement procedures for goods and services required for the EVAWC implementation. In addition, it was noted that the United Nations agencies have integrated many EVAWC activities in the existing programmes or projects with the national partners as a response to the ODA management regulations (see the discussion in paragraph 61). This strategy also contributed to the programme efficiency because EVAWC outputs could be delivered using the capacities and arrangements of the existing programmes or projects.

69. **Disbursement rates being lower and expected**. Low disbursement rates were observed. In the first year of implementation after the inception phase, the disbursement rate was only 57.3 per cent. This has increased to 76.4 per cent in 2023. Among the three United Nations agencies, only UNFPA has managed to maintain high disbursement rates. The challenges highlighted in subsection 4.2 were determinants of these low disbursement rates. It should be noted that funding allocation for 2023 accounted for 40 per cent of the total programme funding, but the disbursement rate was not as high as expected. Having low spending rates in the first two years of the programme implementation created high pressure on disbursement in 2024. With the disbursed figures of 2022 and 2023, the programme has spent only 47.8 per cent of its total budget.[[30]](#footnote-30) This implies that more than half of the total programme budget (i.e. 52.2 per cent) was left for 2024 and all of this budget was in fact put on the 2024 AWP. Given the disbursement in the previous years and the lack of project approval with the key GoVN agencies (see paragraph 63), the MTR consultants argued that extraordinary efforts by the United Nations agencies and other programme partners in 2024 are required to ensure full utilization of the resources available. Otherwise, the programme might not fully utilize the allocated resources.

# Table 3. Disbursement rates by agencies (%)

| Agencies | 2022 | 2023 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| UNFPA | 100 | 94.5 |
| UNICEF | 9.5 | 55.9 |
| UN Women | 67.7 | 76.7 |
| Programme coordination and management | 48.7 | 78.7 |
| **Overall disbursement** | **57.3** | **76.4** |

*Source: compiled from the donor progress reports*

70. **Potential links of disbursement rates on the programme delivery**. It was a puzzle to observe low disbursement rates but high rates of completion of the programme outputs. Seeking a satisfactory answer to this puzzle was challenging. The MTR consultants suggested two factors that could lend some explanation. First, it was noted that many EVAWC activities were integrated into the existing “sister” programmes or projects of the United Nations agencies with the national counterparts. This might partly explain why the expected outputs were achieved with a level of resources lower than the one required without these existing partnerships. Second, there is a possibility that the targets for the programme outputs were set at conservative levels. It may be linked to the uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic during the Inception Phase. Meetings, training, and travels are critical for the programme implementation, but it was uncertain during the inception phase when social distancing and travel restrictions would be removed. Therefore, setting some conservative targets for the programme performance might have been a reasonable strategy.

71. More importantly, with the level of resources left after achieving the target outputs, there is an opportunity for the programme to deepen the quality of some programme delivery. For instance, enhancing provision of services to support survivors of VAW and VAC should go deeper than providing capacity-building support observed under the programme’s outcome 2. For capacity-building activities, a modular approach might be tried to produce more impacts than the levels that could be generated through on-and-off training. Accordingly, capacity development would be seen as a process. In that process, some training sessions are provided and there are other activities in between the training sessions to encourage self-learning, learning by doing, and practices. Instead of focusing on individual capacity development, organizational capacity development for the target service providers might also be executed. On a similar note, behaviour change communication might go deeper than organizing events or marathon campaigns. Follow-up efforts after communication campaigns for dialogue and reflections are important. Clearly, going deeper in some important outputs is more costly.[[31]](#footnote-31) But the depth and quality of the programme results could be enhanced.

72. **Efficiency being undermined by lack of convergence at the subnational level**. The EVAWC ProDoc envisaged joint support interventions in the same cities and provinces when it goes to subnational level. This direction potentially contributes to efficiency, as it enables synergy and maximizes the potential outreach and impacts. However, this direction has not been fully followed. There was a discussion during the Inception Report that the programme would provide intervention in the 10 selected cities and provinces.[[32]](#footnote-32) As of this MTR, Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City were the only two locations outside Ha Noi where all three PUNOs are working together; Dien Bien was the location targeted by UNICEF and UN Women; Thanh Hoa was targeted by UNFPA and UN Women. For the other cities and provinces selected, convergence was not observed. Again, the ODA management regulations were found to be a constraint. Under Decree 114/ND-CP, the same procedures apply for any agencies at the subnational level to receive ODA funds. Acquiring approval at the subnational level was found to be as challenging as it was at the national level. The lack of convergence across the United Nations agencies in subnational targeting was a factor that undermined the programme performance from an efficiency perspective.

73. **Efficiency being hampered by lack of synergy in Da Nang city.** As discussed in subsection 4.2.2, a field visit to Da Nang city was organized in this MTR process. In the city, UNFPA worked through the partnership with the city VFU with a focus on support to the “Fatherhood Club” at the ward or commune level to enhance awareness and behaviour change regarding DV, GBV, VAW, and VAC. UN Women continued its partnership with the city VWU, which has been developed for more than 10 years under previous engagements. In the current EVAWC, the interventions focused on the “Male Pioneer Club”, which shared similarities with the VFU’s “Fatherhood Club”, capacity development, and communication. UNICEF has integrated the EVAWC activities into an overarching partnership with the City People’s Committee on the Child Friendly City Initiative (CFCI) Programme.[[33]](#footnote-33) The CFCI ProDoc was approved in February 2023 but actual activities by DoLISA, being the major implementing partner, started in March 2024. Based on the consultation with these partners, the MTR consultants found no linkages between the three United Nations agencies in implementing EVAWC activities in the city. Cooperation among the main local partners (i.e. DoLISA, VFU, VWU) for implementing the programme activities was limited. Some key agencies with the state management authority in DV or GBV, such as DoCST, were not engaged in the programme as a partner. A representative from DoCST confirmed that the department assigned a few staff to attend training courses hosted by DoLISA and this was the only activity that DoCST was involved in. The case of Da Nang city suggested, even in one location targeted by all PUNOs for EVAWC interventions, opportunities for joint interventions and coordination have not been effectively utilized. This hampered the efficiency of the programme work at the subnational level.

***Q7. Has EVAWC invested sufficient expertise and cost for programme management and coordination? How has the programme management structure contributed to the programme efficiency?***

74. **High level of management and coordination cost in the design**. According to the project design, cost for management and coordination accounted for 18 per cent of the total budget. This includes 6 per cent allocated to staffing for programme coordination; 11 per cent to staffing for the programme implementation of PUNOs; and 1.67 per cent for M&E. This 18 per cent appeared to be within a reasonable range for initiatives with a strong focus on technical assistance like EVAWC. On top of this 18 per cent, there was 8 per cent charged to the overhead cost of the United Nations to cover indirect costs of operations at the headquarters and country level and one percent charged to the United Nations coordination levy. Based on these figures, 73 per cent of the programme budget was left available for implementation of activities.

75. **The actual cost for programme management being lower than the level envisaged in the design**. In practice, the programme management and coordination costs were lower than the level envisaged in the ProDoc. Using the financial figures from the donor progress reports, the management and coordination costs were only 14.7 per cent and 7.2 per cent in 2022 and 2023, respectively. However, this should not be interpreted as evidence of efficiency or cost saving. In fact, this low management and coordination cost was due to the vacancy of the International Technical Adviser (ITA) position – which was a permanent position in the programme TC. Although the process of recruiting for this position was started during the inception phase and a high number of qualified applicants applied for the position, it was not until October 2023 that the recruitment was concluded. The process was prolonged due to the lengthy process of negotiation with the shortlisted candidates. There was also a concern that the position was costly while some of main responsibilities could be “internalized” to the key implementation staff of the United Nations. The recruitment process by the United Nations was terminated in 2022 without conclusion. In efforts to strengthen the programme coordination, the recruitment was resumed through DFAT in 2023, based on the previous ToR with additional revisions from the United Nations. With this, the ITA position was left vacant until October 2023, when DFAT’s recruitment process was concluded. The delayed recruitment of the ITA was the reason for the low ratio of management and coordination cost. Therefore, the low cost for programme management and coordination observed should be best interpreted as slow disbursement of the management budget rather than an indication of efficiency.

76. **Slow disbursement of the cost for programme management and coordination being suboptimal**. According to the ToR for the TC and that of the ITA position, the ITA has multiple roles, including integrating and monitoring cross-agency activities; policy engagement and advocacy for the EVAWC programme; and provision of sound, evidence-based VAWC technical advice to ensure achievement of programme outcomes. The absence of this ITA position seriously undermined the operation of the TC as well as the programme coordination in general. It was noted that the Chair of the TC had only exercised its roles in the early stage of the programme implementation. According to the ToR of the TC, the UNFPA Assistant Representative was the TC Chair. The MTR consultants learned that there were concerns about assigning UNFPA the Chair as he or she might represent the UNFPA perspectives and therefore cannot ensure neutrality. Discussion about this chairship was held in the early stages, but differences in views and opinions were not solved. As a result, the UNFPA Assistant Representative stepped down and the TC Chair has been vacant since then. This issue coupled with the delayed recruitment of the ITA has hampered the management and coordination tasks (see subsection 5.4 below for further discussions).

## 5.4 Coordination

77. **Summary**. Findings on coordination are summarized below.

* Adapting to lockdown or social distancing caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was incorporated in the programme design. Further coordination to respond to COVID-19 after the inception phase was not required.
* Responses to the ODA management regulations should have been more satisfactory. Switching to DIM introduced extra workload for the United Nations agencies while eroding the background for national ownership. Using existing partnership was a temporary solution and cannot be used for all activities; service contracts were effective for small and on-and-off activities. There was ample room for EVAWC to adopt a more effective response to the ODA regulations.
* Differences in work procedures and regulations of the United Nations agencies exist. A programme governance structure was put in place to navigate these differences, but some major features of this structure were constrained, causing the difficulty in coordination to be unresolved. These factors also undermined the contribution of the governance structure to the programme performance.
* The programme work planning was participatory and smoothly coordinated. Joint activities were encouraged in the early stages but diminished over time due to complexity and the burden of going through differences across the United Nations agencies in executing joint activities. While in-house expertise was well mobilized, the programme might benefit from a stronger engagement of external expertise in unpacking technical challenges, especially the ones on the intersections between VAC and VAW.
* Having DFAT as a programme partner generated added value through expertise, both within the DFAT office in Ha Noi and Australia in general. Roles of DFAT in facilitating partnership health checks were critical to “trouble-shooting”.

***Q8. How has EVAWC been coordinated to address the factors that caused delay and slow start in the EVAWC implementation (as above)?***

### 5.4.1 Responses to COVID-10 pandemic

78. **EVAWC being well prepared for the pandemic**. Difficulties caused by the lockdown and other social distancing measures (between lockdown periods) in the inception phase of the programme were noted in subsection 5.3. It was noted that EVAWC was designed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Lessons learned in responding to the pandemic from the pilot project “Supporting interventions to eliminate violence against women and children in Viet Nam under the COVID-19 emergency context in 2020” of the three United Nations agencies and other relevant projects were incorporated in the project design (see Annex 3 for the list of the projects reviewed during the design). Therefore, adapting to lockdown or social distancing was “built-in” in the programme design. Using online platforms as a means of working, taking the challenges in implementation in the presence of restrictions in terms of travels or public meetings, were the main responses of the EVAWC management. Since the second quarter of 2022, further COVID-19 responses were not required as the programme partners were adapted to the new normal and, more importantly, all social distancing measures were removed a few months after the completion of the inception phase.

### 5.4.2 Response to the ODA management regulations

79. **Switching to the United Nations agencies to be direct implementers**. In the absence of the project approvals with key GoVN agencies, the United Nations agencies responded to the lack of required project approvals by switching from NIM to DIM after the inception phase. This has important implications for the programme implementation. Notably, DIM requires additional burdens on the United Nations staff assigned to EVAWC. The MTR consultants did not find evidence of a negative impact on the quality of the programme implementation, but the impact of switching to DIM on workload was evident while staffing allocated to EVAWC remains unchanged. Most notably, switching to DIM hampered the national ownership of the key GoVN agencies. As highlighted above, MoLISA and MoCST senior management and technical staff were engaged in the programme governance structures and relevant activities on an informal and personal basis. National ownership and sustainability cannot be built on that basis.

80. **Other responses to the lack of required project approval.** The potential impacts of the ODA regulations were noted and discussed by the United Nations agencies, DFAT, and key partners at the meetings of the PSC and TC, as well as other ad hoc discussions. Some measures were taken to address the challenges. Integrating the EVAWC activities into the existing projects in the country programme 2022–2026 that have already been approved was the most important strategy. This has been instrumental for the programme implementation. However, this strategy was also at the expense of the programme visibility and that of the donor. The stakeholders from the existing partnerships utilized for the programme implementation were not aware of the EVAWC programme or the role of DFAT as both a programme partner and donor. More importantly, not all activities could be integrated into the existing projects of the PUNOs. Activities with key GoVN agencies such as MoLISA and MoCST required new project approvals and therefore cannot be addressed by this strategy. In efforts to address this issue, UNFPA tried to integrate the roles of MoCST (and other ministries) in the partnership with VFA that was recently approved. In fact, as indicated by the representative from MoCST, VFA has transferred funding to MoCST for implementing designated activities. However, this arrangement did not operationalize as the background for umbrella projects is no longer available in the current ODA regulatory framework. After internal consultation within the respective departments of MoCST, it was decided that MoCST had no legal background to utilize this transfer.

81. **The service contract being another response to the ODA management regulations**. Service contracts to engage some implementing partners were utilized, when possible, to avoid the approval process required by the ODA regulations. This strategy was adopted to engage mass organizations, CSOs, and other service providers. In most cases, this took place in terms of a service contract where the contractor was assigned to perform certain activities in the EVAWC workplans. However, it was only applicable for small grants for short-term and/or on-and-off interventions. Therefore, the usefulness of this strategy was limited to some activities. It also has an effect on the programme efficiency as the signatories were not exempt from VAT for these contracts. Most notably, this “going around” (instead of taking appropriate efforts to comply with the regulations) strategy might carry an operational risk for the United Nations, DFAT, as well as the service providers as it might be interpreted as a strategy for “avoiding” the ODA regulations.

82. **Requirements of the ODA regulatory framework probably being underestimated.** It should be noted that requirements under Decree 114 were not new to the programme. Similar requirements for project approval were mandated in Decree 56/2020/ND-CP, the pre-successor of Decree 114/2021/ND-CP. These requirements remain essentially the same between the two decrees. Discussion with the consultant engaged to support the design of EVAWC confirmed that the requirements were noted and discussed when finalizing the ProDoc. The MTR consultants argued that these requirements were somehow underestimated. This underestimate might be linked to the fact that the United Nations agencies have maintained the existing partnerships with all the GoVN partner agencies in EVAWC. As discussed in subsection 5.1, EVAWC was built as a continuation of several interventions of the UN and the national partners. Therefore, difficulties in getting approval (if required) for existing partnerships might not have been anticipated. Notably, there was a flexibility in applying ODA management rules in the past and the UN agencies are experienced with that flexibility. In that context, there might be a tendency to assume “business as usual” and under-estimate the requirements of the new ODA regulatory framework. Indeed, it was suggested in the ProDoc that “*the three UN agencies will utilize existing arrangements with their respective government and CSO partners without establishing a new project, so as to ensure the speed and effectiveness of delivery*” (p. 58 of the ProDoc signed by HoAs). However, it turned out to not be a well-grounded assumption. The reality indicated that the programme cannot take a business-as-usual approach under the new ODA regulatory framework.

83. **More effective responses to the ODA regulations being required**. In the presence of the strategy of utilizing existing arrangements, efforts to develop new project proposals with the key programme partners were not prioritized. The MTR consultants found that if priorities were placed for the development of new projects proposals with MoCST and MoLISA (both GED and DCA) for the approval process in the early stages of EVAWC, potential impacts of the ODA regulations would have been more effectively mitigated (or even avoided). The MTR consultants further argued that the ODA regulations represent some core values that are consistent with the Hanoi Statement on Aid Effectiveness. Most importantly, ODA is treated as a source of state budget, using one single system for funding management. These are also consistent with the existing principles jointly agreed between the United Nations and the GoVN in the HPPMG 2010. Therefore, more grounded responses to the ODA regulations should be adopted. Measures to avoid the approval procedures required should only be applied as a last resort and temporarily.

### 5.4.3 Responses to differences in work processes and regulations

84. **Addressing differences in the work processes**. Differences across the United Nations agencies in work procedures and regulations are obvious. What is required is to establish governance structures and implementation arrangements for the programme partners to navigate these differences. Indeed, efforts of the United Nations agencies and DFAT, together with the key national partners, were in place to address these differences. Difficulties related to differences between the requirements of UN Women in timing and types of financial reporting and those of UNFPA were addressed by DFAT’s agreement to treat UN Women’s financial reports separately. Differences in the timing of the reports among the United Nations agencies and between UNFPA and DFAT were also addressed during the inception phase. Most importantly, the programme governance structure was established. The key elements of this structure consisted of the PSC, TC, and WoWs. The Partnership Health Check was introduced by DFAT as an innovative approach to ensure that WoWs are followed, learning opportunities for refresh and refocus are utilized to improve the programme performance. A luncheon between the United Nations HoA and DFAT senior representative was also initiated to provide an informal platform for “trouble-shooting”, ensuring optimal programme integration across the United Nations agencies and DFAT. In addition, other ad hoc arrangements in terms of meetings, either formal or informal, planned or unplanned, were also put in place. With these arrangements, it seems that measures required for smooth implementation were all in place after the inception phase.

85. **Fully functioning of the programme governance structure being constrained.** Operationalizing the programme governance structure was, however, challenging. There were factors that undermined the functioning of the programme governance structure, including (i) lack of formal engagement of MoLISA and MoCST in the programme governance; (ii) constraints for effective execution of the coordination by the lead United Nations coordinating agency; and (iii) factors that undermined the effectiveness of TC in the programme coordination.

86. Most notably, the lack of formal engagement of MoLISA and MoCST (seriously eroded the functioning of the PSC, being the highest decision-making power of the programme. Based on the consultation with the representatives from MoLISA and MoCST, the project proposal with MoCST is likely to get approval in the foreseeable future. However, whether the one with MoLISA would be approved was not foreseeable given the current institutional dynamics at the ministry that might constrain the decision-making process needed to get approval. Therefore, the problems caused by the lack of required project approval might not be solved by the programme completion.

87. UNFPA was the lead United Nations coordinating agency and should have been sufficiently “empowered” to coordinate. The first donor progress report noted, “*As every agency has its own point of view, strategies, interests and practices, harmonizing and accommodating those of all the parties involved is always difficult*” (p. 12). This called for a strong coordinating role to facilitate discussions and compromise. The MTR consultants found a gap in expectation among the PUNOs. As UNFPA was the signatory in the strategic partnership agreement with DFAT to finance EVAWC, it might expect PUNOs that entered the programme through the United Nations-to-United Nations (U2U) contract to be implementing partners of UNFPA. Therefore, it was sometimes expected that the UNFPA work procedures and reporting requirements applying for implementing partners should be adopted. This, however, was not the expectation of the other PUNOs. This might lend a background for factual difficulty in harmonizing the differences across the United Nations agencies, as noted in the first donor progress report. Assessing the foundational documents developed or approved during the inception phase does not give a clear indicator of how UNFPA could execute its coordinating role. The partnership WoW reaffirmed the coordinating roles of UNFPA envisaged in the ProDoc by adding, “*Coordinating UN Agency; Overall program reporting and financial management; Program management team lead by Dep Rep and Technical Coordinator*” (p. 4). However, further unpacking of these key words was not provided. Consequently, the issue was prolonged. As noted in the 2022 donor progress report, “*UNFPA has been operating to carry out coordination functions without due empowerment*” (pp. 29–30).

88. The TC was supposed to be the key instrument for the programme coordination. The TC functions were, however, undermined by some factors. In the approved ToR for the TC, the UNFPA Assistant Representative was the TC Chair. The MTR consultants learned that the TC chairship was only executed in the early stages of the programme implementation. Notably, the role was left vacant after the step down of the TC Chair stepped down. The MTR consultant assumed that the UNFPA programme specialist assigned to the programme might be *de facto* TC Chair, but this role was not confirmed by UNFPA nor other United Nations agencies. In addition, as highlighted before, the TC membership statuses of technical staff from MoLISA and MoCST was not official due to the lack of required project approval. This hampered the potential contribution of the TC members from MoLISA and MoCST. Finally, as discussed in subsection 5.3, the delayed recruitment of the ITA – another key role in the TC was another factor that partly disabled the TC in carrying out its roles and responsibilities.

***Q9. How has EVAWC been coordinated for work planning, implementation processes, especially planning and execution of joint activities, as well as monitoring and learning? How has expertise (in-house and external) been mobilized to address key technical challenges of EVAWC?***

89. **Smooth work planning process being in place**. The RRF was the first foundational document developed in the inception phase. This served as the background for annual work planning. It also provided a basis for the development of the programme results framework for monitoring and evaluation purposes. The stakeholders consulted during the MTR process indicated that the work planning process was participatory. The United Nations agencies coordinated with the implementing partners to propose activities for annual workplans. Descriptions and indicative budgets stated in the RRF were the basis for making activity proposals. The proposed activities were then compiled by the TC and additional consultation with the implementing partners was made before finalizing the 52

draft workplans for submission to the PSC. It was, however, found that the annual workplans (AWPs) were loaded with a high number of activities. For the AWPs between 2022 and 2024, there was a total of 287 activities approved. This means that, on average, each United Nations agency handles nearly 32 activities per year. This high number of activities was found to be suboptimal as it represents a heavy workload for the United Nations staff concerned.

90. **Facilitation of joint activities**. The ProDoc stated that joint activities were to be prioritized in this work planning process. This was reflected in the approved RRF, where a column for co-implementing agencies was included (although at the time of the MTR that column was still left empty). In practice, joint activities were observed in the AWPs. However, the number and relative share of these joint activities have decreased over time. In the AWP 2022, of the total 131 activities approved, 24 activities (or 18.3 per cent) were found to be joint activities (i.e. with co-implementing agencies identified). In the AWP 2023, out of 89 approved activities, 12 were joint activities (or 13.5 per cent) among the United Nations agencies. In the AWP 2024, 15 activities were identified in the list of 67 approved activities. It seems that the differences among the agencies in terms of financial procedures and reporting contributed to difficulties of implementing joint activities. In addition, handling joint activities was more burdensome for the United Nations staff, as it was suggested during the stakeholder consultation. According to the MTR consultants, in the context of being overloaded with the switch to DIM and the high number of activities in the AWPs (as above), the joint activities probably become less preferable.

91. **MEL arrangements being inadequate**. One important consequence of differences in the work procedures among the United Nations agencies was seen on the MEL arrangements. With a high number of activities being undertaken by multiple partners, EVAWC has produced a growing stock of data and knowledge products. These were, however, not adequately captured. The MTR consultants found that while each agency has properly reported M&E figures to its own system, consolidating these figures and the knowledge products was not adequately managed. The MTR consultants had difficulties in collecting figures on outputs produced by activities or accessing knowledge products (e.g. assessment reports, policy briefs, capacity development materials). Based on the limited data available to the MTR consultants, it does not seem that the M&E figures were sufficiently disaggregated (except sex-disaggregated for data on capacity-building activities) to inform how different vulnerable groups were reached by the programme. In addition, the MTR consultants also found that learning arrangements for sharing good practices and lessons learned were limited. Learning activities (under outcome 4) through study visits were highly appreciated by the interviewed stakeholders. However, these learning activities are different from the learning arrangements that are part of the MEL system. The partnership health checks provided good opportunities for learning, but these were confined to the programme partners.[[34]](#footnote-34) Learning outreach of the programme was limited. Enhancing the MEL arrangements is critical to informing the programme progress and performance at the completion.

92. **Mobilizing expertise and gaps in addressing technical challenges**. It was generally perceived that EVAWC had a complex design with the four shared outcomes to address VAW, VAC, and the intersection between these two types of violence. While the United Nations agencies and their partners have experience in DV, GBV, VAW, or VAC, addressing the intersection between VAW and VAC was seen by all stakeholders to be a major challenge. This was also an area of limited, albeit growing, good practices internationally. The ProDoc provided a comprehensive discussion of this intersection and suggested focuses for interventions in the intersection between VAW and VAC. However, these need to be operationalized by concrete implementation strategies, workplans, and M&E to assess the impacts on both types of violence. The programme progress in this direction, as perceived by key stakeholders consulted in this MTR, was modest. Except for some interventions with adolescents, interventions around the intersections between VAW and VAC were not identified in the AWPs. As indicated by some United Nations personnel, it was not until recently that the programme partners had a better understanding of what types of interventions should be implemented. The programme would have benefited from a stronger engagement of a pool of experts from Australia or other countries to share experience and/or provide technical guidance and inputs for the programme in this direction as well as capacity-building of agency staff and partners on opportunities and strategies for integrating VAW and VAC programming.

***Q10. To what extent has the governance structure contributed to the programme performance? What is the added value of having in-depth engagement of DFAT as a programme partner in addressing coordination and technical challenges?***

93. **Constrained functioning of the governance structure**. As discussed under review question 9, the programme governance has not been at full operation as expected due to (i) lack of formal engagement of the GoVN counterparts in both PSC and TC – being a result of the absence of required project approval with MoLISA and MoCST; (ii) lack of functioning of the TC Chair; and (iii) late arrival of the ITA (for consolidating the programme coordination). Nevertheless, the programme governance structure did contribute to the programme performance. Without formal engagement of the representatives from MoLISA and MoCST, the PSC managed to execute its power of approving AWPs. The PSC meetings and other forms of interaction beyond the meetings provided a platform to discuss strategic issues on the programme direction and implementation. Although the TC functioning was affected by the chairship, especially after the Chair stepped down, the TC meetings were the platform for the United Nations agencies, DFAT, MoLISA, and MoCST to update progress and discuss issues and problems encountered. Given the challenges encountered by the programme, these TC meetings were important opportunities to address these challenges. Notably, the annual partnership health checks were found to be an effective and useful mechanism for the programme partners to openly discuss what went wrong and explore options for remedies.

94. **Value added by DFAT being a programme partner**. DFAT was both the donor and a programme partner in EVAWC. The value add of DFAT being a programme partner was generated through at least two channels. Notably, DFAT has strong in-house expertise on gender equality in its Ha Noi Office. This consists of a First Secretary-Development, a Senior Social Development and Gender Adviser, and a Gender Specialist, who were all members of the programme TC. This in-house expertise has been a source of technical advice and inputs for the United Nations agencies and the national partners during the programme implementation. This value added was confirmed by the United Nations staff consulted during the MTR process. In addition, there was a pool of expertise from Australia in the field of GBV, VAW, and VAC that the programme could mobilize through various capacities. The first AWP 2022 identified activities that would draw from this pool of expertise. A study visit to Australia was scheduled in the AWP 2024 to learn about the policy framework, workforce, and service delivery of integrated services on VAC and VAW. This will be another opportunity for the programme partners to learn relevant experiences from Australia. Conducting the partnership health check was reported to be another value add of DFAT being a programme partner.

## 5.5 Lessons learned

95. **Summary**. Some lessons learned drawn from the EVAWC programme are: (i) adapting to the ODA management requirement; (ii) agreement on coordination, work procedures and reporting before entering a joint programme; (iii) reaching a clear division of labour based on the comparative advantages of the programme partner; (iv) roles of the GoVN agencies in the driving seat are critical; (v) setting realistic targets on SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound) indicators required for informing the programme performance in a timely manner.

***Q11. What could be learned, both in technical and management terms, from the EVAWC programme implementation?***

96. **Adapting to the ODA management requirements**. Lessons from EVAWC suggested that these regulations cannot be underestimated. Some temporary or “situational” measures could be applied in the short term for specific purposes. However, these measures should not be overused as these are not sufficient to implement complex initiatives. More importantly, it might carry an operational risk when trying to “avoid” the requirements of the ODA regulatory framework. Legitimate measures should be adopted in responding to the country’s legal requirements. The ODA management requirements should be treated as given. Any future interventions should consider these factors for planning the timeframe, adopting implementation modalities that work properly under these requirements.

97. **Agreement on coordination before entering a joint programme**. Differences among the United Nations agencies in work procedures and regulations exist and can be profound. Therefore, such differences should not be underestimated when designing a joint programme. Conducting a joint programme does not mean that one agency needs to adjust their corporate rules or work procedures. Such adjustments should not be expected by the coordinating agency. What is needed is for participating agencies to provide information required for a coordinating agency to compile and develop the programme-level report to donors and other relevant stakeholders. For this to happen, the coordinating agency should state clearly the type of information, reports needed and timing for these inputs. This will be the basis for the participating agencies to explore how these could be provided, and whether extra steps and staffing might be needed to accommodate these reporting requirements. The recent UNSDG Guidance Note on a New Generation of Joint Programmes (October 2022)[[35]](#footnote-35) provides well-structured guidance on designing, implementation, adjustment, and learning from joint programmes, and should be used as a reference source for further joint programmes. Another option for addressing this coordination challenge is for DFAT to specify requirements for reporting to all the PUNOs while the coordinating agency remains tasked with overall reporting according to the donor’s requirements.

98. **Reaching a clear division of labour based on the comparative advantage of the programme partners**. The major benefit of having a joint programme is to utilize and leverage expertise across the United Nations agencies. Therefore, a division of labour based on the comparative advantage of each agency is crucial. Accordingly, the United Nations agencies should take the lead in areas where their comparative advantages are strongest. Otherwise, if the participating agencies overlap in their expertise, roles and responsibilities, the benefit of having a joint programme would diminish. It is obvious that one agency might have different areas of expertise and therefore comparative advantages over different fields. However, if each partner leads certain themes that do not overlap with the other partners, it will provide a good basis for coordination and the accountability framework for the programme result. If there are themes that more than one agency could lead, negotiation is required on who leads the themes and who steps back.

99. **Roles of the GoVN agencies in the driving seat**. The importance of having GoVN agencies in the driving seat was further proved in the current EVAWC. The lack of a legitimate background for MoLISA and MoCST to participate in the PSC, TC, and implement the programme activities had serious consequences for the programme performance. This partly undermined the programme governance as well as programme implementation. The lack of required project approval for MoLISA and MoCST was seen by the MTR consultants as a game changer. The importance of the GoVN agencies being in the driving seat was acknowledged and incorporated in the ProDoc. However, this was not operationalized in the presence of the ODA management regulations. More importantly, as highlighted above, more legitimate responses should have been in place to adapt to the new ODA regulatory framework. This is an important lesson learned for any future interventions of the United Nations and DFAT.

100. **Sufficient investment for coordination**. Being a complex and multiple stakeholder joint programme, coordination efforts should be sufficiently invested in terms of both staffing and funding. Differences in work procedures and regulations across the United Nations agencies are another reason for investment in coordination. An effective coordination team should stand in between the United Nations agencies as well as other programme partners to mediate differences in strategies and views of different programme partners. In the current EVAWC, the chairship of the TC and late arrival of the ITA hampered the effectiveness of coordination arrangements, which were below the level expected for a complex and multiple stakeholder initiative like the EVAWC programme. This is another lesson learned for future programming.

101. **Realistic targets and SMART indicators in MEL**. Setting realistic targets is very important to monitor the programme progress to ensure effectiveness and efficiency. In the current EVAWC, setting very ambitious targets appeared to be unrealistic. Targets should be based on evidence-based strategies and well grounded. In addition, any indicators that inform the programme process and results should be SMART. Putting some indicators that are not time-bound within the programme cycle makes it difficult to monitor programme performance in terms of the expected outcomes. Most importantly, when encountered by external factors that fundamentally change the programme context or design (such as the lack of project approval for MoLISA and MoCST), the programme design and targets should be reviewed.

# 6. Conclusions

102. **Conclusion 1**. The EVAWC programme was found to be fully relevant and aligned to the commitments, strategies, and legal and policy frameworks of Viet Nam in the prevention of and responses to VAW and VAC. The programme interventions were responsive to the mandates of the key GoVN agencies (i.e. MoLISA and MoCST in particular) that carry the state management authority in the areas of DV, GBV, and VAWC. With this, the programme contributed to addressing gaps and bottlenecks of provision of prevention programming and response services for survivors of VAW and VAC, and therefore was responsive to the needs of direct beneficiaries. It was also found that the programme was fully aligned with the strategies and priorities of the United Nations and Australia. The programme was a realization of Australia’s cooperation strategy with Viet Nam and a continuation of the cooperation between the UN, Australia, and the GoVN in eliminating VAW and VAC. The design of EVAWC was built on the results and lessons learned from several initiatives between the United Nations, DFAT, and GoVN agencies. It was therefore consistent with the existing initiatives and mandates of the GoVN agencies.

103. **Conclusion 2**. The programme started during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown and encountered several challenges on other fronts. However, the programme partners managed to accomplish significant achievements. Contributions to enhance legal and policy frameworks, capacity development, and impressive outreach of communication were highly appreciated by the programme stakeholders. In terms of reaching the output, as of 31 March 2024, EVAWC has completed or exceeded the 2025 targets of 14 output indicators and is on track to accomplish 3 indicators. There was only one indicator, related to improving data availability on VAWC, where the programme was found to be off track. There are, however, gaps in achieving the expected outcomes. While achieving outcome 1 is likely, achieving outcome 2 and 4 may be unlikely in the current programme cycle. Accessing progress towards outcome 3 was not possible due to the lack of both targets and data required to inform progress. The physical progress of the programme was hampered by difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (during the inception phase), the ODA management requirements, and differences in the work procedures and regulations across the United Nations agencies. The lack of required project approval with MoLISA and MoCST was a game-changing factor that seriously undermined the programme performance.

104. **Conclusion 3**. The MTR found that the funding allocation of the programme was made to the most needed areas, focusing on enhancing provision of services (response) for survivors of violence and awareness-raising, behaviour change communication (prevention). These areas accounted for 75 per cent of the total budget for the programme implementation. Utilizing the existing partnerships as instruments to implement EVAWC activities and adoption of the United Nations–European Union cost norms were important elements of the implementation strategies for ensuring cost-effectiveness. However, disbursement rates were found to be lower than expected. By the end of 2023, the programme has disbursed only 48.7 per cent of the total budget. Given this, it might not be likely for the programme to fully utilize the resources available unless extraordinary efforts were made for improvement disbursement in 2024. Low disbursement combined with high achievement of outputs suggests that there might be an opportunity with the remaining budget to go deeper into some key activities of the programme, such as capacity development of stakeholders or behaviour change communication. The efficiency of the programme was undermined by insufficient cooperation and coordination between the United Nations agencies for interventions at the subnational level. A relatively high cost for management and coordination was envisaged in the ProDoc. The actual management cost was lower than the level expected. However, this low management cost was mainly due to the prolonged vacancy of the ITA position. This coupled with the issue with the TC Chair have undermined the programme management and coordination.

105. **Conclusion 4**. Adapting to lockdown or social distancing caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was incorporated in the programme design. Therefore, the programme was “resistant” to the pandemic and further coordination to respond to COVID-19 after the inception phase was not required. However, responses to the ODA management regulations were the areas for improvements. Switching to DIM introduced extra workloads for the United Nations agencies while eroding the background for national ownership. Using existing partnership was an instrumental solution and cannot be used for all activities. Service contracts were effective for small and on-and-off activities. EVAWC should have adopted a more grounded response to the ODA regulations rather than relying on some “going around” measures.

106. It was acknowledged that differences in work procedures and regulations of the United Nations agencies exist. A programme governance structure was put in place to navigate these differences. However, some major features of this structure were prevented from fully functioning. These factors also undermined the contribution of the governance structure to the programme performance. It was also found that the programme work planning was participatory and smoothly coordinated. Joint activities were encouraged in the early stages but diminished over time due to complexity and the burden of dealing with differences across the United Nations agencies in executing joint activities. While in-house expertise was well mobilized, the programme would benefit from stronger engagement of external expertise in unpacking technical challenges, including in programme design and implementation, especially the ones on the intersections between VAC and VAW. Having DFAT as a programme partner generated added value through expertise, both within the DFAT office in Ha Noi and Australia in general. Roles of DFAT in facilitating partnership health checks were critical to “trouble-shooting”.

107. **Conclusion 5**. Through this MTR process, there were some lessons learned. (i) Adapting to the ODA management requirements through well-planned and grounded responses is needed. Other temporary or special measures might be applied in certain circumstances but should not be overused. (ii) Agreements on coordination mechanisms, work procedures and reporting are essential before entering a United Nations joint programme. (iii) Reaching a clear division of labour based on the comparative advantages of the main programme partners, especially among the United Nations agencies, is desirable to avoid overlaps and therefore mitigate the coordination workload. (iv) Roles of the GoVN agencies in the driving seat are critical for the programme performance. Finally, (v) setting realistic targets on SMART indicators is required for informing the programme performance in a timely way. These are lessons for DFAT, the United Nations, and the national programme partners for the next phase of programming for interventions in the integrated prevention of and response to VAWC.

# 7. Recommendations

## 7.1 Recommendations on adjustments before the programme completion

108. **Recommendation 1: Revise the target indicator**. Revising the target indicators is recommended to (i) ensure outcome indicators can be assessed within the data sources available by the programme completion (which might include the endline survey, as below); and to (ii) increase the target for key output indicators, especially those on capacity development of stakeholders and behaviour change communications to fully utilize the programme budget. **Target**: PUNOs and DFAT. **Priority**: High. **Time**: September 2024.

109. **Recommendation 2: Consolidate and share knowledge products**. Consolidate the stock of existing knowledge products generated by the programme to date. This is to ensure that the stock of studies, legal reviews, policy briefs, training materials, communication materials and products are consolidated and managed in a systematic manner. Once consolidated, share the lessons learned to other stakeholders and beneficiaries. This consolidation should be associated with consolidating the database of the overall programme. **Target**: UNFPA with input from PUNOs. **Priority**: Medium. **Time**: December 2024.

110. **Recommendation 3: Plan the EoP with an endline survey component**. Design the concept note for EoP to ensure that sufficient data will be available to inform the programme outcomes and impacts. Consider the fact that (i) the baseline survey was a knowledge, attitude, and practice survey without being tasked to collect information to set the impact evaluation framework; and (ii) this MTR was light-touch; it is important to design the EoP as the main instrument for impact evaluation. Both quantitative (in the form of a survey) and qualitative approaches should be used. A strong survey component needs to be planned to inform the outcomes of the programme. **Target**: PUNOs and DFAT. **Priority**: Medium. **Time**: September 2024.

111. **Recommendation 4: Project scenario of budget utilization by the programme completion**. Assess the realistic utilization of 52.2 per cent of the programme budget in 2024 (given that only 47.8 per cent of the programme budget was disbursed in 2022 and 2023). Based on the assessment results, (i) explore the proposal to extend the programme by 12 months on the basis of allowing sufficient time for the programme delivery in the context characterized by the new ODA regulatory framework; (ii) experiment with innovative approaches to deepen capacity development (under outcome 2) and behaviour change communication (in outcome 3); and (iii) focus the effort to unpack interventions to address the intersection between VAW and VAC by strong engagement of international experts and increased exposure to good practices through a study visit. **Target**: PUNOs and DFAT. **Priority**: Extremely high. **Time**: September 2024.

## 7.2 Recommendations for the next phase of the programme

***Q12. What are the priorities of the GoVN in addressing VAW and VAC, as well as the intersection of the two, in the medium and long term? What will be the roles of international donors? What should be the delivery modality for future interventions in VAW and VAC? What are prerequisites for effective coordination?***

### 7.2.1 Recommendations for the next phase of the programme

**Target**: PUNOs, DFAT, GoVN partners, other programme partners. **Priority**: High. **Time**: June 2026.

112. **Recommendation 5: Continue to cooperate in another phase of the programme**. Continuing another phase of EVAWC will allow DFAT, the United Nations, and the national partner to complete the agenda started in the current programme cycle. Addressing VAW and VAC is a complex agenda and requires long-term initiatives. There were examples of taking more than a decade to really achieve behaviour change regarding gender and social norms towards VAWC. The current EVAWC has created a good foundation for this continuation. This should be best considered as a well begun but not yet done agenda. Recommendation for a next phase strongly came across from the stakeholder consultations in this MTR process. Incorporate the priorities listed in recommendation 5 in the next phase of the programme. In the next phase, DFAT and the United Nations continue the cooperation and lead the technical assistance for the national counterparts, who are in the driving seat, to implement the programme activities.

113. **Recommendation 6: Keep the current focus with additional priorities**. Keep the existing focuses of the EVAWC in the four outcomes as priorities of the GoVN agencies in the prevention of and response to VAW and VAC. These focuses are to enhance the legal and policy frameworks (including resource allocation and being in line with international standards and good practices) for the prevention of and response to VAWC; strengthen the systems and capacities for provision of services to support survivors of VAWC while deepening the emphasis on quality, evidence-based behaviour change communication that focuses on the intersections of VAW and VAC; make data and evidence available to inform policymaking, programming, and research while facilitating learning. In addition to the existing focuses, the stakeholders consulted in the MTR process also suggested additional elements of these focuses, including (i) support digitalization, especially for service provision to support survivors of VAWC; (ii) support to develop and operationalize coordination mechanisms across different GoVN agencies concerned with DV, GBV, VAW, and VAC; (iii) strengthen exposure to international practices to change the mindset of high-ranking officials at the key GoVN agencies towards DV, GBV, VAW, and VAC.

### 7.2.2 Recommendations for adapting to the ODA regulatory framework

**Target**: PUNOs and DFAT. **Priority**: High. **Time**: June 2026.

114. **Recommendation 7: Have one ProDoc with multiple projects**. Develop a ProDoc for the next programming as a portfolio of different projects, implemented through NIM with the NIPs. Each project in the portfolio will be developed and approved according to the ODA management regulations, while the ProDoc is between DFAT and the United Nations agencies.[[36]](#footnote-36) Each of the programme partners will be NIP. The number of NIPs should be modest (e.g. preferably between six and eight partners, such as MoLISA, MoCST, MoH, MoET, mass organizations, CSOs) to keep the portfolio manageable. This will require a switch to portfolio management (from programme management) and will require a well-designed governance.

115. **Recommendation 8: Allow 18-month inception phase**. Allow an 18-month inception phase to (i) give sufficient time for going through the procedures required by the ODA regulatory framework; (ii) develop the programme governance structure and WoW that are applicable to the portfolio management; (iii) develop other foundational documents for the programme, such as RRF, MELF, workplans, etc.; (iii) provide capacity for the project management staff assigned by NIPs to manage the projects by the implementing partners; and (iv) unpack and develop concrete workplans for interventions to the intersection of VAW and VAC, as well as to provide capacity development for the programme staff and partners on these intervention approaches. During this inception phase, a fast track of activities that could be implemented through service contracts should be in place to ensure flexibility to respond to important opportunities or to “soft start” the programme activities.

116. **Recommendation 9: Invest in coordination**. Invest in a neutral and powered coordination team. Coordinating a portfolio is a challenging task and certainly requires sufficient staffing and resources. Keeping coordination neutral is important and could be ensured by hiring a coordination team that is well versed in but not necessarily a part of the United Nations system structure. Another option is to structure the coordination team under the Resident Coordinator Office. In any case, the coordination team should be sufficiently staffed and resourced. The coordination team must be provided with a convening power to coordinate in a participatory and transparent manner, and this power should be incorporated in the design.

117. **Recommendation 10: Strengthen the strategic partnership role of DFAT**. Define the role of DFAT to be a strategic partner (which is different from implementing partners). Roles and responsibilities of the strategic partner might encompass providing the technical chair of the programme; leading the learning arrangements; mobilizing international expertise to address technical challenges when needed; leading the refresh and refocus (through the partnership health checks); and leading independent evaluation of the programme.

### 7.2.3 Recommendation to make the joint programme work harder and better

**Target**: PUNOs and DFAT. **Priority**: High. **Time**: June 2026.

118. **Recommendation 11: Unpack coordination requirements**. The Coordinating agency should help define what kind of information is required and how this information should be made available to meet the requirement of the coordinating PUNO and report to the donor. This could be done through a mapping exercise to map the reporting requirements of the donor, the coordinating agency and those of the other PUNOs. Based on that mapping, clear reporting requirements are developed and agreed upon.

119. **Recommendation 12: Agree and operationalize coordination ways of working based on a clear division of labour**. Agree on the role of the coordinating agency, the requirements for coordination, “coordination” ways of working, and division of labour. This negotiation should be initiated during the programme design and have been agreed and made available when signing the ProDoc. One possible division of labour could be (i) intersection of VAC and VAW – flagship for implementation and learning: all PUNOs;[[37]](#footnote-37) (ii) data and provision of services for survivors of GBV: UNFPA; (iii) behaviour change communication, CSO engagements: UN Women; (iv) violence against children and adolescents: UNICEF. This division of labour of the United Nations agencies should be operationalized in the partnership with the GoVN, such as UNFPA-MoCST (DFA); UNICEF-MoLISA (DCA); UN Women-MoLISA (GED). One agency might have a comparative advantage in different areas. However, reaching a clear division of labour will be an important prerequisite for cooperation and coordination.

120. **Recommendation 13: Ensure synergy by joint activities, joint advocacy, joint learning**. Ensure joint activities and joint advocacy agendas in AWPs of the next programme. Also ensure that the PUNO will work in the same cities or provinces when going to the subnational level; this is important to maximize impacts. When going to the sub-national level, develop joint project proposals with the city or provincial authorities. In the current complexity of the ODA management regulations, the number of provinces should be kept to a minimum. Invite subnational stakeholders in cities or provinces without projects to attend activities hosted by the central-level agencies (such as capacity development events); this will be a way of expanding the project coverage in appropriate activities without establishing new projects with these locations. Therefore, going to subnational level should be considered only when activities, which must be coherently connected up, need to take place in the subnational levels.

# Annexes

## Annex 1. Terms of Reference for the MTR

**Background**

Globally, violence against women (VAW) and violence against children (VAC) is ubiquitous. They impede the realization of women and children’s human rights, are global health epidemics, and undermine the achievement of sustainable development for all. Unfortunately, Viet Nam is not immune, and VAW and VAC have been increasingly recognized by the government as major challenges. In response, the Government of Viet Nam (GoVN) has strengthened national policy and legislative commitments and frameworks, including the *Law on Domestic Violence Prevention and Control* (2022), the *Law on Children* (2016), the *Law on Gender Equality* (2006), and implemented several national intervention programmes.

Despite these efforts, VAW and VAC remain high. According to the 2019 National Study on Violence Against Women in Viet Nam, two out of three women have experienced at least one form of physical, sexual, economic or psychological violence, emotional abuse and controlling behaviour, from their intimate partner in their lifetime.[[38]](#footnote-38) It is estimated that 4.4 per cent of surveyed women had experienced sexual violence before the age of 15.[[39]](#footnote-39) According to a 2020 report Measuring Sustainable Development Goal Indicators on Children and Women, 72 per cent of Vietnamese children aged 1–14 experience violent discipline by household members.[[40]](#footnote-40) Over 2,000 cases of child abuse are officially reported every year, of which 75 per cent are sexual abuse according to official administrative data.[[41]](#footnote-41)

In response, the Governments of Viet Nam and Australia have partnered with UNFPA, UNICEF and UN Women (United Nations agencies) to implement a joint project, “Elimination of Violence against Women and Children in Viet Nam 2021–2025” (project). The project is focused on the violence that women and children experience in the family, while acknowledging and linking to efforts to address both gender‐based violence and VAC more broadly. The project contributes to the goal that women and children in Viet Nam, including those most vulnerable, can live a life free of violence through strengthened prevention strategies and multisectoral responses. The project comprises four key outcomes:

* **Outcome 1**: Evidence-based laws and policies, increased resource allocation and strengthened coordination and accountability structures promoted and supported to prevent and respond to violence against women and children, in line with national and international standards and commitments.
* **Outcome 2**: A strengthened and more effective multisectoral response (including systems, capacities, and service provision) delivers increased access to quality essential services for victims and survivors of violence.
* **Outcome 3**: More effective violence prevention, gender and social norm change promoted through innovative evidence-based communication, awareness-raising, advocacy, and community mobilization.
* **Outcome 4**: Improved research, data collection and analysis, and knowledge exchange informing evidence-based approaches to prevent and respond to violence.

Under the monitoring, evaluation and learning framework for the project, a mid-term review (MTR) was planned for 2023. However, due to the current ODA management policy in Viet Nam and other issues, many project activities have been delayed. The Steering Committee of the project has responded by shifting the MTR to the first quarter of 2024. Further, noting that the project is in its final year and that a final evaluation is scheduled for 2025, the Steering Committee also agreed that a light-touch review exercise would be achievable and appropriate with a focus on informing GoVN’s medium- to longer-term priorities and efforts to eliminate VAW and VAC with a focus on the intersections.

In response, the Project Technical Committee has conceptualized a **quasi-independent light-touch mid-term review**. It is expected that the review will comprise consultations at the national level (policy) and the subnational level (services).

The review will be conducted by a **Review Team** comprising two national consultants, who will be expected to provide national M&E and technical expertise and Vietnamese language skills.

The Review Team will be fully supported by a **Regional Reference Group** (Reference Group) made up of three experts nominated by the United Nations Regional Offices of UNFPA, UNICEF and UN Women and the DFAT Regional Gender Adviser. The Reference Group is designed to provide quality assurance, M&E and technical (VAW and VAC intersections) expertise from an international perspective to help inform and strengthen the work of the Review Team. It is expected that the nominees from the United Nations Regional Offices will also contribute their expertise of the United Nations system, processes and procedures, and United Nations programme and advocacy approaches. The DFAT Regional Gender Adviser is expected to contribute their gender and DFAT strategy knowledge and expertise.

In country, the Review Team will work closely, through the MTR Manager, with the Project Technical Committee. The Project Technical Committee comprises the project implementing agencies in Viet Nam (UNFPA, UNICEF, UN Women, DFAT, MoLISA and MoCST).

The findings and recommendations from the review, with the inputs from the Regional Reference Group and other stakeholders, will be delivered and published as one final report. UNFPA, as the EVAWC project coordinating agency, is seeking **two national consultants** to design and conduct the MTR of the EVAWC project in conjunction with the Regional Reference Group.

**Intended use and users**

The findings will be used to inform stakeholders about key achievements and progress against the targets as well as suggestions on how to adjust the project targets and implementation as needed. It will also be used to inform GoVN, DFAT and United Nations agencies planning and programming on EVAWC in Viet Nam over the medium to long term. The primary users of the MTR are the participating United Nations agencies, DFAT, and the NIPs, including MoLISA, MoCST, and the project provinces.

**Purpose, objectives, and scope**

**Purpose:** This is a quasi-independent light-touch mid-term review exercise to assess progress against project outputs and outcomes, take stock of lessons learned, including what has worked and what has not worked, and consider and respond to the evolving programming context.

**Objectives:** The primary objective is to provide evidence and analysis from the project to inform Viet Nam’s actions and priorities over five to ten years to eliminate VAW and VAC with a focus on the intersections of VAW and VAC. The secondary objective is to advise United Nations agencies, DFAT and the GoVN on adjustments to project targets and implementation in the final year.

**Scope:** The review will cover project activities planned and implemented from January 2022 to December 2023, and include the project design phase (June–December 2021). Specific attention should be paid to joint activities and United Nations agencies’ support at national and subnational levels. Selected province(s) to be included in the review will be discussed and agreed with the MTR Manager. The review will cover interventions financed from the project resources, including the contribution from the United Nations agencies.

The review is expected to assess progress against project outputs and outcomes and, with the support of the Reference Group, draw on current evidence and interventions about effective approaches to VAW and VAC intersections. It is expected that the review will elicit GoVN views on the project (including alignment and contribution to GoVN VAW and VAC priorities, the partnership with United Nations and Government of Australia), GoVN medium- to long-term priorities on VAW and VAC, and recommendations for strengthening GoVN–partner linkages and outcomes for women and children in Viet Nam.

**Evaluation criteria and preliminary evaluation questions**

The project is expected to be reviewed using the following evaluation criteria:

* *Relevance*: The extent to which the EVAWC project corresponds to beneficiaries’ requirements, the country’s needs and priorities, and the needs of partners, including the related strategies of the Government of Australia.
* *Effectiveness*: The extent to which the EVAWC project outputs have been achieved/are expected to be achieved, and the extent to which these outputs have contributed to the achievement of the project outcomes, the key drivers/factors of success.
* *Efficiency*: The extent to which EVAWC project outputs have been achieved with the most efficient and effective use of resources (funds, expertise, time, administrative costs, etc.).
* *Coordination*: The extent to which the coordinating United Nations agency has been an active member of and contributed to the coordination mechanisms of the EVAWC project, as well as the participating United Nations agencies and stakeholders and governance mechanisms, including the technical and steering committees.

**Design, approach and methodology**

**Design and methodology**: The Review Team, in consultation with the Reference Group and the Project Technical Committee, will design the review plan (methodology and approach). The review plan should be clearly framed and articulated to ensure objectivity and minimize bias.

Given the timeframe, it is strongly suggested that the review consists of a rapid data collection exercise that focuses on a desk review and one-on-one or small group interviews (online and, if possible, in-person) with key stakeholders. In discussion with the MTR Manager and implementing partners, the possibility of a facilitated consultation meeting in Ha Noi can be considered. The Review Team will lead the design and conduct of consultations and then be responsible for documenting and synthesizing the views and perspectives from such consultations.

The possibility to visit a project site/province will be discussed and agreed with the MTR Manager and the Project Technical Committee, and if agreed it will be facilitated by the EVAWC Coordination Team in partnership with the three United Nations agencies. Project documentation will be provided as reference material, including the baseline study, annual donor reports, etc.

It is expected that the Review Team will use various methods to ensure that the analyses and findings are credible, and evidence based. Triangulation techniques should be systematically applied, cross-comparing the information obtained via each data collection method and through different data sources. The review should use validation mechanisms to ensure the quality of any data and information used for analysis, and the Review Team should identify limitations and mitigations.

**Approach:** The review will adopt a participatory and inclusive approach, involving a broad range of partners and stakeholders. The process will require close consultation with United Nations agencies, key national implementing partners, and DFAT. Within the limited timeframe, a multiple‐method approach should be used, including desk review, individual interviews, and small group meetings (in-person and online). The EVAWC Coordination Team will provide a stakeholder list and a list of provincial sites to identify the direct partners and stakeholders. It is also important to be conscious of the role and modalities of the United Nations in-country in the design of the review plan.

The review will follow the guidance on the integration of gender equality and human rights principles in the evaluation focus and process as established in the UNEG Handbook, Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation – Towards UNEG Guidance. The review will also be guided by UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the United Nations system, UNEG Ethical Guidelines and Code of Conduct, and any other relevant ethical codes.

**Collaboration with the Reference Group:** The Reference Group is an active contributor to the review and provides quality assurance and international/regional perspectives and insights. The national consultants will be expected to work cooperatively and collaboratively and utilize the expertise and perspectives of the Reference Group in the design and methodology and preparing the Inception Report; initial findings and recommendations; review of the final draft report; and participation in validation of the final report.

While it is envisaged that there will be sharing and cross-fertilization of information between the Review Team and Reference Group, all findings and recommendations will ultimately be consolidated into *one final report* comprising *one set of coherent findings and recommendations*.

**MTR process and proposed timelines**

| **Key activity** | **Dates** | **National consultant (Lead)** | **National consultant (Member)** | **Tentative tasks for Reference Group** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Online induction/briefing meeting between the Review Team, the Reference Group, the MTR Manager, and the Project Technical Committee. | 21 Feb | Online | Online | Online (2 hrs) |

**INCEPTION PHASE**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Key activity** | **Dates** | **National consultant (Lead)** | **National consultant (Member)** | **Tentative tasks for Reference Group** |
| Design methodology and approach for review and prepare Inception Report.\*  *NB: The Inception Report should articulate the Review Plan*. | 21 Feb to 4 Mar | 4 days | 3 days | Advise on the design (methodology and approach), and input to the Inception Report. (2 days) |
| Submit Inception Report.  Brief the Project Technical Committee and United Nations agencies’ M&E officers on the Inception Report. | 5 Mar | Online | Online | Online  (2 hrs) |
| Inception Report undergoes review by key stakeholders (coordinated by MTR Manager). | 5–12 Mar | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Review stakeholders’ feedback and finalize Inception Report. | 13–19 Mar | 2 days | 1 day | Advise on any major changes to Inception Report (0.5 day) |

**DATA COLLECTION PHASE**

| **Key activity** | **Dates** | **National consultant (Lead)** | **National consultant (Member)** | **Tentative tasks for Reference Group** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Desk review. | 5–20 Mar | 3 days | 3 days | Provide any relevant international/ regional VAC/VAW intersection inputs (2 days) |
| Consultations with GoVN and other stakeholders as per the Review Plan and documentation of views. | 21–29 Mar | 5 days | 5 days | N/A |

**DATA CONSOLIDATION, INITIAL KEY FINDINGS AND FIRST DRAFT REPORT**

| **Key activity** | **Dates** | **National consultant (Lead)** | **National consultant (Member)** | **Tentative tasks for Reference Group** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Consolidation of information and data analysis to draft the initial key findings and prepare initial draft report. | 1–8 Apr | 6 days | 4 days | Review initial draft report (1 day) |
| Project Technical Committee meeting – present initial findings and proposed recommendations contained in the initial draft report. Technical Committee and Reference Group provide real-time feedback about initial findings and proposed recommendations. | 10 Apr | Online | Online | Online: Advise on initial key findings and proposed recommendations (0.5 day) |
| Prepare Draft 1 of the MTR Report. | 10–17 Apr | 5 days | 5 days | N/A |
| Deliver Draft 1 (Eng and Viet). Draft is shared with Project Technical Committee, Project Steering Committee, and Reference Group. | 17 Apr | N/A | N/A | Review Draft 1 of MTR (1 day) |
| Project Steering Committee meeting – present draft report to Steering Committee.  Document feedback from meeting. | 26 Apr | 1 day | 1 day | Reference Group joins Steering Committee meeting and provides feedback/inputs as expert panel (0.5 day) |

**VALIDATION AND FINAL REPORT STAGE**

| **Key activity** | **Dates** | **National consultant (Lead)** | **National consultant (Member)** | **Tentative tasks for Reference Group** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Based on feedback from Steering Committee meeting, prepare the final draft of MTR Report and PowerPoint presentation. | 29 Apr to 3 May | 4 days | 3 days | Advise as needed (1 day) |
| Deliver final draft of MTR Report and PowerPoint presentation (Eng and Viet). | 6 May | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Validation meeting – present final draft MTR Report to meeting and respond to inputs from participants. | Week of 6 May (TBC) | 1 day | 1 day | Online: attend validation meeting (0.5 day) |
| Deliver final MTR Report and a summary PowerPoint presentation, having incorporated any agreed changes from the validation meeting. | 15 May (TBC) | 2 days | 1 day | N/A |

| **Total** | **National consultant (Lead)** | **National consultant (Member)** | **Tentative tasks for Reference Group** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Estimated number of days** | **34** | **28** | **10** |

*\*Note: based on the above table, the details of the workplan (activities, dates, who will implement, estimated costs) should be included in the Inception Report.*

**Final products/deliverables**

* Inception Report includes Review Plan about 10 pages (max), not including annexes
* Draft 1 of MTR Report for comment (English and Vietnamese)
* Final draft of MTR Report (English and Vietnamese), about 25 Pages (max), not including annexes
* PowerPoint presentation on final draft MTR Report for validation meeting (English and Vietnamese)
* Final MTR Report and summary PowerPoint presentation (English and Vietnamese)

Note: Transparency is an essential element of the review. The process for commenting on deliverables (above) will be managed transparently and efficiently and allow the independence, within the review parameters, of the Review Team’s final report. The final report will be publicly accessible.

**Accountabilities**

**Composition of the Review Team**

The national consultants will consist of a **lead** and **team member**. They will have relevant M&E and Viet Nam expertise, including being fluent in Vietnamese with excellent English language skills. The Lead National Consultant should have a strong understanding of Vietnamese government and legal systems which are relevant to this project and the longer-term visioning for Viet Nam on eliminating VAW and VAC. The Lead National Consultant will be expected to work collaboratively and cooperatively with the Reference Group, and to guide and supervise the work of the National Consultant (Team Member).

**The National Consultant (Lead)**

Competencies

* Development sector background
* Excellent analytical/contribution analysis, writing and communication skills
* Excellent ability to lead engagement and consultations with GoVN and state agencies in a cooperative and collaborative manner
* Ability to work with a multidisciplinary team of experts
* Fluent in Vietnamese and excellent written and spoken English language skills

Qualifications and experience

* Minimum of master’s degree in development studies, social sciences, or a related field of VAW and VAC
* Minimum of 10 years’ experience in conducting/managing programme evaluations/reviews
* Experience in mainstreaming and management of cross-cutting themes
* Experience or good familiarity with United Nations work at country level (e.g. policy and legal advocacy efforts)

**The National Consultant (Team Member)**

The key role of the National Consultant (Team Member) will be to support the Lead National Consultant and all phases of the review, including tasks related to the provision of deliverables, translation, and interpretation. They will have to translate the reports into Vietnamese, as well as provide interpretation support to the Review Team. The tasks may also include data/information collection and analysis.

Competencies

* Excellent analytical, writing and communication skills
* Ability to work with a multidisciplinary team of experts (teamwork)
* Excellent problem identification and solving skills
* Fluent in Vietnamese, and excellent English interpretation language skills (spoked and written

Qualifications and experience

* Minimum of master’s degree in gender or a related field
* At least three years of experience in conducting evaluations/reviews/research in gender and development issues
* Familiarity with adolescence or children’s issues will be considered an added advantage

**Role of the MTR Manager**

The MTR Manager is the International Technical Adviser of the project. They will facilitate the relationship between the Review Team and the Reference Group, liaising directly with the Lead National Consultant. They will also manage the relationship between the Project Technical Committee and the Review Team and ensure the quality of the entire review process. In consultation with the Technical Committee, the MTR Manager will be responsible for:

* coordinating preparation of list of documents and materials for the review, including the stakeholders and provincial project site list
* facilitating the initial connections between the Review Team and the Reference Group
* circulating relevant documents to the Technical Committee and Steering Committee in timely manner
* organizing meetings for the review
* coordinating collection of inputs from key stakeholders for the drafts and final reports.

**Roles of Project Technical and Steering Committees**

The Project Technical Committee will act as the national technical reference group for the review, including supporting meetings, consultations, and access to information.

The Project Steering Committee will provide strategic oversight and endorsement of the final report. DFAT will be involved via its membership of both the Technical and Steering Committees.

Each United Nations agency and DFAT Technical Committee member will act as a focal point for their own agency. This focal point will be the main contact point for the MTR Manager during the review and will be responsible for:

* coordinating agency-specific contributions to documents and materials for the review
* coordinating inputs from own agency in a timely manner
* helping to facilitate timely provision of inputs from key GoVN counterparts and stakeholders
* helping to facilitate meetings/visits by Review Team with key stakeholders at national and subnational level.

**Reference documents**

The MTR Manager will select documents to upload into the Google drive (later) for the MTR team.

**Ethical considerations**

The review process should conform to the relevant ethical standards in line with UNEG for research/study/evaluation, including informed consent of participants, privacy, and confidentiality considerations.

The review must be conducted with the highest standards of integrity and respect for the beliefs, manners, and customs of the social and cultural environment; human rights and gender equality; and the “do no harm” principle for humanitarian assistance. The Review Team must respect the rights of institutions and individuals to provide information in confidence. They must also ensure that sensitive data is protected and cannot be traced to its source. They must validate statements made in the report with those who provided the relevant information. The Review Team should obtain informed consent for the use of private information from those who provide it. When evidence of wrongdoing is uncovered, it must be reported to the Office of Audit and Investigation Services.

**Specific condition**

An individual consultancy contract (ICC) will be signed with each national consultant. The individual consultant’s rights and obligations are strictly limited to the terms and conditions of this contract, including its annexes. Accordingly, the individual consultant shall not be entitled to any payment, benefit, subsidy, compensation, or entitlement unless expressly provided in this contract. The ICC is subject to the UNFPA General Terms and Conditions of Individual Consultant Contracts incorporated herein as an integral part hereof and ANNEX 1.

The costs for the individual consultant include key tasks as defined in this ToR, including the cost for data/information collection (if any) and the validation meeting, and any travel expenses for fieldwork inside Viet Nam if it is outside of the national consultant’s province of residence.

**Payment**

Modalities payments will be made in three instalments based on the delivery of outputs, as follows:

* The **first instalment**: upon satisfactory submission of the Inception Report (20 per cent).
* The **second instalment**: upon satisfactory completion of the data collection phase and the submission and presentation to the Project Technical Committee of initial findings/recommendations in initial draft report (20 per cent).
* The **final instalment**: upon satisfactory completion of the final MTR Report and summary PowerPoint presentation, having incorporated any agreed changes from the validation meeting (60 per cent).

Payment will be made in Viet Nam dong using the United Nations exchange rate prevailing at the time of contract signature.

**Note**: If the draft report does not meet the ToR requirements but it is considered that even with major revision United Nations/UNFPA’s quality standards will not be met within a reasonable timeframe, the contract will be terminated, and consultants will not receive further remuneration. Payments will be reduced by 20 per cent if the submission of the final report is delayed by more than 20 days without justifiable reasons. Interested consultant(s)/team is requested to send a financial proposal with breakdown for key budget components and CVs of team member(s).

Before signing the ICC, the consultant shall complete the following:

Interested consultants are requested to register into the UNFPA global consultant roster: [https://consultantroster.unfpa.org/web/consultant‐roster/faqs](https://consultantroster.unfpa.org/web/consultant%E2%80%90roster/faqs)

The consultant shall present the “Fit for work and travel’ health statement from an authorized physician if travel out of Ha Noi is required, the “Permission to Work/Release Letter” from employer/supervisor if currently employed, and complete the following online training courses and submit the certificates to UNFPA before signing the ICC:

BSAFE – <https://training.dss.un.org/course/category/6>

Fraud and Corruption Awareness and Prevention – <https://extranet.unfpa.org/Apps/Antifraud/English/story_html5.html>

PSEA (Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse) – <https://extranet.unfpa.org/Apps/PSEA2017/story_html5.html?lms=1>

## Annex 2. MTR Process

**Pictorial diagram of the EVAWC Programme Mid-Term Review process. The image outlines the key phases of the MTR: (1) Design and Inception, (2) Data Collection, (3) Data Consolidation and Analysis, (4) First Draft Report, (5) Technical Committee (TC) Review, (6) Steering Committee (SC) Review, (7) Final Draft Report, and (8) Validation and Final Report.

Roles and responsibilities are mapped across actors: the MTR Manager (responsible for supervision), National Consultant Lead and Support Team (responsible for conducting the review), EVAWC Technical Committee (review and advisory role), EVAWC Steering Committee (review and final endorsement), and the Regional Reference Group (expert panel role).

Solid lines indicate primary responsibility; dashed lines indicate contribution or advisory inputs. The image illustrates a collaborative, multi-stakeholder process involving supervision, liaison, review, validation, and endorsement functions across the eight MTR phases.***Note: This MTR process was developed by Vijaya Ratnam-Raman, the International Technical Adviser of EVAWC, and MTR Manager. The reproduction was made with consent from the author.*

## Annex 3. List of people consulted

**DFAT and United Nations**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **Name of stakeholders** | **Sex** | **Organizations** |
| 1. | Matt Jackson | M | UNFPA |
| 2. | Ha Thi Quynh Anh | F | UNFPA Vietnam |
| 3. | Nguyen Thi Nga | F | UNFPA Vietnam |
| 4. | Rana Flowers | F | UNFPA Vietnam |
| 5. | Le Hong Loan | F | UNFPA Vietnam |
| 6. | Nguyen Ngoc Anh | M | UNICEF Vietnam |
| 7. | Caroline T. Nyamayemombe | F | UN Women |
| 8. | Erin Andrea Stern | F | UN Women |
| 9. | Le Thi Lan Phuong | F | UN Women |
| 10. | Tran Thuy Anh | F | UN Women |
| 11. | Majdie Hordern | F | DFAT |
| 12. | Mia Urbano | F | DFAT |
| 13. | Nguyen Thi Thien Huong | F | DFAT |
| 14. | Ingrid FitzGerald | F | EVAWC Design Consultant |
| 15. | Vijaya Raman | M | EVAWC International Adviser |
| 16. | Nguyen Bich Thu | F | Project Coordination Officer |

**GoVN agencies**

| **No.** | **Name of stakeholders** | **Sex** | **Organizations** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 17. | Nguyen Lan Anh | F | MoCST Department of Family Affairs |
| 18. | Nguyen Quoc Nhat | M | MoCST Department of Family Affairs |
| 19. | Nguyen Thuy Hien | F | VWU Center for Women and Development |
| 20. | Dao Thi Vi Phuong | F | VWU Department of Legal Policy |
| 21. | Tran Thi Van Ngoc | F | MoH Department of Medical Service Administration |
| 22. | Pham Tien Nam | M | University of Public Health |
| 23. | Do Minh Loan | F | Vietnam National Children’s Hospital |
| 24. | Nguyen Thi Bich Thuy | F | MoET Department of Political Education and Student Affairs |
| 25. | Le Khanh Luong | M | MoLISA Department of Gender Equality |
| 26. | Nguyen Huyen | F | MoLISA Department of Gender Equality |
| 27. | Dang Hoa Nam | M | MoLISA Department of Children Affairs |
| 28. | Tran Van Thao | M | MoLISA Department of Children Affairs |
| 29. | Kim Thoa | F | MoLISA Department of Children Affairs |
| 30. | Anh Phuc | F | MoLISA Department of Children Affairs |
| 31. | Chi Le | F | MoLISA Department of Children Affairs |
| 32. | Pham Quoc Nhat | M | MoCST Department of Family Affairs |
| 33. | Lan Anh | F | MoCST Department of Family Affairs |

**Mass organizations and CSOs**

| **No.** | **Name of stakeholders** | **Sex** | **Organizations** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 34. | Nguyen Van Anh | F | CSAGA |
| 35. | Thu Thuy | F | CSAGA |
| 36. | Hoang Tu Anh | F | GBVNet |
| 37. | Tran Kien | M | VNMNet |
| 38. | Nguyen Thi Phuong Thao | F | Vietnam Lawyers’ Association |
| 39. | Leu Thi Minh Hue | F | Central Vietnam Farmers’ Union |

**Stakeholders in Da Nang city**

| **No.** | **Name of stakeholders** | **Sex** | **Organizations** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 40. | Luong Thi Dao | F | Da Nang Women’s Union |
| 41. | Nguyen Thu Huyen | F | Provincial Women’s Union Development Support Center, Deputy Head of the Legal Policy Department |
| 42. | Bui Thao | F | Dan Nang Women’s Union |
| 43. | Tran Thi Nam | F | Farmers’ Association of Hoa Cuong Bac Ward (Hai Chau District, Da Nang) |
| 44. | Thai Dinh Bich Thuy | F | Farmers’ Association of Hoa Cuong Bac Ward (Hai Chau District, Da Nang) |
| 45. | Tran Thi Tuyet Ngoc | F | Women’s Union of Hoa Cuong Bac Ward (Hai Chau District, Da Nang) |
| 46. | Nguyen Thi Thu Huong | F | Da Nang DoLISA |
| 47. | Nguyen Thi Thu Ha | F | Da Nang DoLISA, Department of Social Protection and Children |
| 48. | Tran Thi Dieu Hien | F | Da Nang DoLISA, Department of Children and Gender Equality |
| 49. | Nguyen Thi Mai | F | Da Nang DoLISA, Department of Planning and Finance |
| 50. | Nguyen Van Chau | M | Da Nang Social Work Service Center |
| 51. | Tran Hoang Ngoc Tram | F | Da Nang Social Work Service Center |
| 52. | Nguyen Kim Dung | M | Da Nang Farmers’ Union |
| 53. | Nguyen Thi Nga | F | Da Nang Farmers’ Union |
| 54. | Ngo Thi Kim Hong | F | Da Nang Farmers’ Union |
| 55. | Nguyen Thi Nhi | F | Anh Duong House (CSAGA) in Da Nang |
| 56. | Ngo Thi Thuy Trang | F | Cam Le District Women’s Union (Da Nang) |
| 57. | Nguyen Thi Ly | F | DoLISA of Cam Le District (Da Nang) |
| 58. | Nguyen Thuy | F | Hoa Phat Ward People’s Committee (Cam Le District, Da Nang city) |
| 59. | Tran Thi Kieu Oanh | F | Hoa Phat Ward People’s Committee (Cam Le District, Da Nang city) |
| 60. | Pham Thuy | F | Da Nang DoCST, Division for Cultural Life and Family |
| 61. | Nguyen Thi Ha Phuong | F | Da Nang City Police Department |

## Annex 4. List of interventions referred to in the ProDoc

| **No.** | **United Nations agencies** | **Programmes or projects** | **Main partners** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | UNICEF, UNFPA, UN Women | Supporting interventions to eliminate violence against women and children in Viet Nam under the COVID-19 emergency context in 2020 | MoLISA, MoCST, MoET, VWU, VFU, CSAGA |
| 2. | UN Women, UNFPA, WHO, UNODC | Essential Services Package for Women and Girls subject to Violence in Viet Nam (2017–2019) | MoLISA, MoCST, MoH, MPS, MoJ |
| 3. | UNICEF, UNFPA, UNESCO | Comprehensive Sexuality Education | MoET |
| 4. | UNICEF | Promotion and Protection of Children’s Rights 2017–2022 | MoLISA |
| 5. | UNICEF | Justice and Legal Empowerment Programme 2017–2022 | MoJ |
| 6. | UNICEF | Strengthened Access to Justice and Protection of Minors in Contact with the Law Project 2017–2021 | MoJ |
| 7. | UNICEF | Integrated Early Childhood Development Project | Dien Bien, Gia Lai, Kon Tum |
| 8. | UNFPA | Joint Project on Building a Model to respond to Violence Against Women and Girls (2017–2020) | MoLISA |
| 9. | UNFPA | Support the development and implementation of evidence and human rights-based policies and programmes on prevention and response to gender-based violence/domestic violence and addressing sex work-related issues (2017–2021) | MoLISA, MoCST, VFU |
| 10. | UNFPA | Strengthening prevention and response to gender-based violence and harmful practices from civil society perspective (2017–2021) | CSOs |
| 11. | UNFPA | Global Programme to Prevent Son Preference and Gender-Biased Sex Selection (2017–2019) | MoLISA, MoH, VFU |
| 12. | UNFPA | Gender-Biased Sex Selection and Related Harmful Practices (2020–2022) | MoLISA, MoH, VFU, CSAGA |
| 13. | UN Women, UNFPA | National Programme on GBV Prevention and Response (2021–2025) |  |
| 14. | UN Women | Engaging men and boys and community mobilization inspired by well-known international model SASA (2014–2020) | VWU in Da Nang |
| 15. | UN Women | National Thematic Project on GBV Prevention and Response (2016–2020) | MoLISA, GSO |
| 16. | UN Women | Change Makers for gender equality | Viet Nam Youth Union |
| 17. | UN Women | Safe Cities for women and girls project to address sexual harassment and sexual violence in public spaces in Ho Chi Minh City (2017–2021) | PPC of Ho Chi Minh City |
| 18. | UN Women | Strengthening the capacity of the justice sector to ensure access to justice for women survivors of VAW in Viet Nam (2016–2020) | MoJ |
| 19. | UN Women | United Nations–European Union Spotlight Initiative to eliminate violence against women and girls in Viet Nam (2017–2021) | MoLISA |
| 20. | UN Women | Safe and Fair: realizing women migrant workers’ rights and opportunities in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) | MoLISA |

*Source: compiled from the EVAWC ProDoc.*

## 

## Annex 5. Shortened programme M&E table updated as of 31 March 2024 Outcome 1: Evidence-based laws and policies, increased resource allocation, and strengthened coordination and accountability structures are promoted and supported to prevent and respond to violence against women and children, in line with national and international standards and commitments

| **Statement of outcomes and output** | **Output indicators** | **Results at Mar 2024** | **Target 2025** | **Status** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome Indicator 1.1:** Number of laws and/or policies on gender equality and/or ending GBV/VAW/VAC developed or amended in line with international standards | N/A | MTR: Likely (beyond 2025) | 3 | Met Target |
| **Output 1.1:** Legal, regulatory and policy frameworks relating to the prevention of and response to violence against women and children are strengthened to ensure coherence, alignment with international norms and standards, and the inclusion of all forms of violence | **Indicator 1.1.1:** Number of policy recommendations reflected in revised policies and related national programmes on VAWC/GBV/DV | 5 | 6 | Met Target |
| **Output 1.2:** Political commitment and resources are increased to support the implementation of laws and policies on GBV/VAW/VAC | **Indicator 1.2.1:** Number of policy briefs on budgeting for child protection and/or GBV prevention | 1 | 1 | Met Target |
| **Output 1.2:** Political commitment and resources are increased to support the implementation of laws and policies on GBV/VAW/VAC | **Indicator 1.2.2:** Number of guidelines and instructions on gender-responsive budgeting for VAW prevention and/or budgeting for child protection | 2 | 2 (at least) | Met Target |
| **Output 1.3:** Strengthened multisectoral government and stakeholder coordination and accountability mechanisms and partnerships are in place to prevent and respond to violence | **Indicator 1.3.1:** Number of guidelines and/or protocols/SOPs developed for national and/or subnational multistakeholder coordination mechanisms | 10 | 8 (at least) | Met Target |
| **Output 1.3:** Strengthened multisectoral government and stakeholder coordination and accountability mechanisms and partnerships are in place to prevent and respond to violence | **Indicator 1.3.2:** Partnership strategy/approach in place to support programme implementation | 5 | Yes | Met Target |

**Outcome 2: A strengthened and more effective multisectoral response (including systems, capacities and service provision) that increases access to high-quality essential services for survivors of violence**

| **Statement of outcomes and output** | **Output indicators** | **Results at Mar 2024** | **Target 2025** | **Status** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome Indicator 2.1:** Percentage of GBV victims seeking assistance from any support service | N/A | MTR: Unlikely | 50% (by 2026) | Below Target |
| **Output 2.1:** Increased capacities for evidence-based programming for violence prevention and response | **Indicator 2.1.1:** Number of government officials with strengthened capacities to develop and deliver programmes that prevent and respond to GBV/VAW/VAC | 21,443 | 3,315 | Far Exceeds Target |
| **Output 2.1:** Increased capacities for evidence-based programming for violence prevention and response | **Indicator 2.1.2:** Number of women’s rights groups and relevant NGOs/CBOs representing groups facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination/marginalization that have strengthened capacities and support to design, implement and monitor | 19 | 6 | Exceeds Target |
| **Output 2.1:** Increased capacities for evidence-based programming for violence prevention and response | **Indicator 2.1.3:** Number of training documents/handbooks adopted by sectoral agencies to be used nationwide | 5 | 6 | Met Target |
| **Output 2.2:** Strengthened multisectoral provision of VAW and VAC services including integrated VAW–VAC services and services for vulnerable and marginalized groups and men and boys | **Indicator 2.2.1:** Number of service providers that have increased knowledge and capacity to deliver quality and coordinated EVAWC essential services to survivors of violence | 2,390 | 600 | Exceeds Target |
| **Output 2.2:** Strengthened multisectoral provision of VAW and VAC services including integrated VAW–VAC services and services for vulnerable and marginalized groups and men and boys | **Indicator 2.2.2:** National guidelines or protocols for essential services developed and/or strengthened that specifically address the needs of women and girls who are survivors of violence and facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination | 4 | 3 | Met Target |
| **Output 2.3:** Strengthened social welfare and support systems for violence prevention and response | **Indicator 2.3.1:** Number of social services workers who have received training on VAW and/or VAC with United Nations support | 4,500 | 1,065 | Exceeds Target |
| **Output 2.4:** Increased access to gender-responsive and child-sensitive justice for survivors of violence | **Indicator 2.4.1:** Number of legal practitioners who have received training on gender-responsive and child-friendly services for survivors of VAWC | 985 | 345 | Exceeds Target |
| **Output 2.5:** Effective coordination of GBV response in humanitarian and emergency settings to ensure access to essential services for victims and survivors | **Indicator 2.5.1:** Functioning inter-agency GBV coordination mechanisms/bodies at national and subnational levels | 4 | 3 | Met Target |

**Outcome 3: More effective violence prevention, and gender and social norm change, promoted through innovative evidence-based communication, awareness-raising, advocacy and community mobilization**

| **Statement of outcomes and output** | **Output indicators** | **Results at Mar 2024** | **Target 2025** | **Status** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome Indicator 3.1:** Proportion of men and women, boys and girls who agreed with one or more reasons why intimate partner violence and/or corporal punishment was justifiable | N/A | Inconclusive due to lack of targets and data | TBC | TBC |
| **Outcome Indicator 3.2:** Proportion of men and women, boys and girls who demonstrate gender-equitable attitudes | N/A | Inconclusive due to lack of targets and data | TBC | N/A |
| **Output 3.1:** Evidence-based multisectoral communications, awareness-raising, and advocacy promote gender and social norm change, reduce acceptance of violence and increase reporting of VAWC | **Indicator 3.1.1:** Number of people reached by campaigns challenging harmful social norms and gender stereotyping | 29.5 million | 9 million | Exceeds Target |
| **Output 3.2:** Community mobilization and engagement of social and mass organizations and the private sector in innovative prevention interventions support strengthened social and gender norm change | **Indicator 3.2.1:** Number of women’s rights groups and relevant NGOs/CSOs that have strengthened capacities and support to design, implement and monitor innovative prevention programmes to address GBV/VAW/VAC | 10 | 11 | Met Target |
| **Output 3.3:** Targeted engagement of parents, men and boys, and adolescents is increased for violence prevention and to encourage healthy, respectful relationships | **Indicator 3.3.1:** Number of women, men, girls and boys who regularly attend community programmes to promote gender-equitable norms, attitudes and behaviors | 14,568 | 5,610 | Exceeds Target |

**Outcome 4: Improved research, data collection and analysis, and knowledge exchange inform an evidence-based approach to preventing and responding to violence**

| **Statement of outcomes and output** | **Output indicators** | **Results at Mar 2024** | **Target 2025** | **Status** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome Indicator 4.1:** National statistics related to VAW and VAC incidence and prevalence are available and are disaggregated by income, sex, age, ethnicity, disability and geographical location | N/A | MTR: Unlikely | Yes | Below Target |
| **Output 4.1:** Increased availability, analysis and use of prevalence and administrative data on VAW and VAC | **Indicator 4.1.1:** Contextualized methods and standards developed/adapted at national level to produce prevalence and/or incidence data on VAW and VAC. System and protocols in place to collect and use administrative data on VAW and VAC, in line with international standards and across different sectors | 1 | 5 | TBC |
| **Output 4.2:** Knowledge exchange and South–South and triangular cooperation increase understanding of and use of evidence on VAW–VAC intersections and effective interventions | **Indicator 4.2.1:** Number of government-to-government, CSO-to-CSO and service provider-to-service provider engagements on violence prevention and response facilitated | 6 | 5 | Met Target |

*Source: compiled from the full programme M&E table of EVAWC.*

1. The contributions of UNFPA, UNICEF, and UN Women were respectively US$1,310,000; US$856,000; and US$1,557,570. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. After the inception phase, this allocation ratio was adjusted to 19:41:32:9 for the outcome from 1 to 4, respectively (see the first donor progress report, June 2021–March 2022) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See the Programme Document (ProDoc) for a full description of the theory of change, which was not reproduced here for brevity. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Proposals to adjust the composition of the PSC to engage at a higher level of the GoVN decision-making (with participation of Vice Ministers of MoLISA and MoCST) were discussed during the programme implementation. The UN Resident Coordinator also joined the PSC to provide a counterpart for the Vice Ministers. However, this change in the composition of the PSC was not finalized. Late approval of new projects with MoLISA and MoCST were reported to be a main reason. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. According to the agreed ToR, the TC comprises UNPFA’s Assistant Representative to be the chair; two staff from each PUNO (one programme specialist and one associate or analyst for UNFPA, UN Women; two programme specialists for UNICEF); three senior positions from DFAT (First Secretary-Development, Senior Social Development and Gender Adviser, Gender Specialist); two programme permanent staff (one International Technical Adviser, one Programme Associate); and three middle-level management staff of MoLISA DAC and GED, and MoCST DFA. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. This paragraph showed an extensive list of the programme partners specified after the inception phase; additional new partners joined the programme implementation as specified in the annual workplans. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. In the Inception Report of this MTR, the consultants proposed a list of 20 review questions to guide the review process. In this report, some of these questions were merged to avoid overlap in presenting the findings. The order of some questions was also changed to ensure better flows for reading. However, this restructure does not affect the contents included in the original questions listed in the Inception Report. The findings of this MTR will be structured to this new list of 12 review questions. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. DEPOCEN (2024). Final Report: Baseline Survey for the Elimination of Violence against Women and Children in Viet Nam 2021–2025. A baseline report commissioned by EVAWC. Hanoi. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. For instance, there was a story of a woman who experienced 20 years of domestic violence. She was then supported by Anh Duong House of CSAGA and shared feedback about her life-changing experience. The full story can be found at https://vietnam.unfpa.org/en/news/life-saving-support-story-mai (accessed 16 June 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. SDG 5.2 (eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation)and SDG 16.2 (End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See more details at <https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment-strategy> (accessed 6 June 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Australia’s Ambassador for Gender Equality visited Viet Nam in late May 2024. Information on the visit and meeting with MoLISA can be found at <https://english.molisa.gov.vn/topic/239765> (accessed 6 June 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See more details at https://vietnam.embassy.gov.au/hnoi/cooperation.html (accessed 6 June 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See more details at <https://www.unicef.org/executiveboard/media/8871/file/2022-PL3-Viet_Nam-CPD-EN-ODS.pdf> (accessed 8 June 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See more details at <https://vietnam.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/cp10_eng_final.pdf> (accessed 8 June 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See page 11 of the UN Women Strategic Note 2022-2026. This can be found at <https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2023/10/strategic-note-brochure> (accessed 8 June 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. MoLISA, GSO and UNFPA (2020). *Results of the National Study on Violence against Women in Viet Nam 2019 – Journey for Change*. Hanoi. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Institute of Preventative Medicine and Public Health of Hanoi Medical University (2020). A Rapid Assessment on Violence Against Women and Children (VAWC) as an Impact of COVID-19 Crisis and Support Needs for Designing Targeted Communication Activities and Responses. A report commissioned by UNICEF, UNFPA, and UN Women. Hanoi. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. There have been discussions on the Law on Social Work but it has not been included in the National Assembly’s agenda. There has been a draft of a GoVN decree on social work since 2022, but the draft has not been completed and approved yet. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. UNICEF, UNFPA, and UN Women (2020). Ending Violence against Women and Children in Viet Nam: Opportunities and Challenges for Collaborative and Integrative Approaches. Bangkok. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. MoLISA, GSO, and UNFPA, Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. This took place in the Decision 2236/QCPH-LĐTBXH-GDĐT-YT-CA dated 16 June 2023 on coordination mechanisms between MoLISA, MoET, MoH, and MPS. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Additional details on these achievements were provided in the donor progress reports for 2021 (for the inception phase), 2022, and 2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. After the draft of the MTR report was available for comments, there were a number of comments suggesting adding further details on activities to support the analysis in this section. These interests in the details were acknowledged by the MTR consultants. However, details on activities or indicators can be found in the programme annual reports. As indicatively suggested in the ToR, the report should be around 25 pages, excluding annexes. Therefore, the MTR consultants preferred to keep the report focused and concise at the programme level rather than going into the details. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Data collection for the baseline survey was possible between May and August 2023, when the EVAWC Programme has reached the mid-term. This might constrain the baseline survey from informing some outcome indicators at the onset of the programme. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. The lift of lockdown was introduced by Resolution 128/2021/NQ-CP dated 11 October 2021 to end “zero-COVID” strategies and introduce measures to adapt to the new normal. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. In addition to these inception phase deliverables, there was only one activity implemented by UNFPA to organize a workshop with different stakeholders on implementation of the National Programme on Domestic Violence Prevention and Control in the New Situation towards 2025, approved by the Prime Minister in early 2022 (UNFPA also contributed to the development of this national programme under another initiative). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. In fact, this type of project was possible in the previous regulations. Under the current Decree 114, this type was not mentioned. It leads to one interpretation that it might still be possible. However, such interpretation is not correct. It was stated clearly in Decree 114 that the regulations apply for all ODA and loans projects in Viet Nam and replace previous legal documents on the state management of ODA. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. EVAWC Donor Progress Report June 2021–March 2022, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. The funding allocation rates for 2022 and 2023 were 30 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. With the disbursement rates of 57.3 per cent and 76.4 per cent, the programme has spent only 17.2 per cent of the total programme budget in 2022 and 30.6 per cent of the programme budget in 2023. These figures add up to 47.8 per cent of the total programme budget. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Further information on awareness-raising and behaviour change communication to prevent VAW could be found in the publications by Prevention Collaborative and UN Women, available at <https://prevention-collaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Awareness-raising-FINAL-20Dec.pdf> (accessed 25 November 2024) and <https://prevention-collaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Behaviour-change-brief-FINAL-20Dec-1.pdf> (accessed 25 November 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. These cities and provinces are Ha Noi, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, Quang Ninh, Dien Bien, Can Tho, Gia Lai, Soc Trang, Bac Lieu and Thanh Hoa. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See further information at https://www.childfriendlycities.org/initiatives/vietnam. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. This was an initiative introduced by DFAT as an annual “refresh and refocus” event. The main purpose was to identify what has worked and what needs improvement in the partnerships for EVAWC. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. UN Sustainable Development Group (October 2022), Guidance Note on a New Generation of Joint Programmes accessed at <https://unsdg.un.org/resources/guidance-note-new-generation-joint-programmes> [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. As discussed earlier, the legal background for an “umbrella” project was no longer possible under Decree 114/2021. Therefore, the ProDoc will be between DFAT and the United Nations agencies only. This ProDoc will be the background to develop separate projects with the national implementing partners for approval as required by Decree 114. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. See the link https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpub/article/PIIS2468-2667(24)00048-3/fulltext (accessed 22 July 2024) for information on evidence-based VAW-VAC programmes that might be useful for unpacking the intervention for the intersection between VAW and VAC. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. MoLISA, GSO and UNFPA (2020). Results of the National Study on Violence against Women in Viet Nam 2019 – Journey for Change. Hanoi. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Viet Nam General Statistics Office and UNICEF (2021). Viet Nam Sustainable Development Goal indicators on Children and Women Survey 2020–2021, Key Indicators. Ha Noi, Viet Nam: General Statistics Office. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. MoLISA (2018). Report at Session 5, National Assembly XIV, <http://baophapluat.vn/dan-sinh/tang-vu-viec-xam-hai-tre-em-397177.html> (accessed 26 December 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)