**FINAL REPORT**

***EVALUATION OF***

***AUSTRALIA’S ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE***

***TO***

***PAPUA NEW GUINEA***

***2015-2017***

**19 JULY 2018**

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**Abbreviations**

ACC: Australian Civilian Corps, superseded by Australia Assists (AA)

ADF: Australian Defence Force

AEC: Australian Electoral Commission

AEM: Assistant Electoral Manager  
ANU: Australian National University

CSO: Civil Society Organisation

DFAT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

DPA: Department of Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University

ESP: Electoral Support Program

EU: European Union

GESI: Gender and Social Inclusion

GoPNG: Government of Papua New Guinea

IFES: International Foundation for Electoral Systems

IPPCC: Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Commission

JSS4D: Justice Services and Stability for Development Program

LLG: Local Level Government

LPV: Limited Preferential Voting

ODE: Office for Development Effectiveness

PNG: Papua New Guinea

PNG CLRC: Papua New Guinea Constitutional and Law Reform Commission

PNGEC: PNG Electoral Commission

TI: Transparency International

TSM: Temporary Special Measures

WILSP: Women in Leadership Program

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Australian aid has provided approximately $15 million in electoral assistance to Papua New Guinea (PNG) in 2015-17, implemented through a combination of long-term capacity building assistance to the PNG Electoral Commission (PNGEC) and short-term assistance for the delivery of the national election in 2017. In concert with the recommendations from DFAT’s internal 2014 Strategy, electoral assistance was provided throughout the five-year electoral cycle between PNG national elections 2012 and 2017. Australia’s engagement was relatively modest in the years immediately after the 2012 election and scaled up from late 2015. Australia’s assistance (excluding logistical support from the ADF) formed a small component of the overall costs of delivering an election in PNG in 2017, estimated at 14% of the funds the Government of PNG budgeted for the election, or 9% if Government of PNG security spending is included.[[1]](#footnote-1) The investments funded by DFAT considered during the evaluation include:

* The AEC-PNGEC Twinning Program, implemented by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)
* The PNG Electoral Systems Strengthening Project implemented by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
* Adviser deployments through the Australian Civilian Corps (ACC)
* Adviser deployments and other assistance provided through the Governance Partnership.

Several other Australian programs provided election-related assistance in niche areas. While these affiliated programs were touched on during the evaluation, they were not considered in detail.

This evaluation focussed on assessing the overall effectiveness of Australia’s electoral assistance to PNG from 2015-17, with a view to informing the scope and nature of Australia’s future electoral support. It assessed the effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and gender equality of the Australian Government’s electoral support to PNG during the two-year period 2015-17 with reference to the:

* Principles and objectives set out in DFAT’s Internal Electoral Support Strategy 2015-18 (Strategy, 2014)
* Responses to the priorities, requests and requirements of the PNG Electoral Commission (PNGEC) with specific reference to PNG’s 2017 national election.

In conducting the evaluation, the objectives of Australia’s electoral assistance were difficult to clearly identify. This challenge was also identified in the 2013 independent evaluation of Australia’s electoral support in PNG (DFAT, 2013), and similarly for other countries where electoral assistance has been provided (DFAT ‘Making it Count’, 2017). The 2014 Strategy identified four priority areas that have been used as objectives for the purposes of this evaluation:

1. Support PNG to maintain an accurate **electoral roll**
2. Increase the PNG Electoral Commission’s **capability to deliver elections**
3. Support efforts to strengthen **voter awareness** in PNG
4. Support **electoral reform** in PNG.

An additional fifth objective of promoting **women’s participation** in the electoral process can be inferred from the increased focus on women’s leadership and representation issues by both governments since 2012, and as reflected in this evaluation’s Terms of Reference.

The above five objectives were used to structure the evaluation and to respond to the high-level evaluation question: *how and to what extent has Australia’s electoral support contributed to the delivery of well-managed elections in PNG?* Objective 2 was divided into two parts: Increasing the PNGEC’s capability to deliver elections and support actual election delivery. An additional area of investigation included in the evaluation was the role of the implementing partners in the delivery of electoral support.

In assessing the above areas, it was found that there were significant challenges to the effectiveness of Australia’s contribution in supporting well-managed elections in PNG. However, given the scale of Australia’s contribution, and the counterfactual argument that the elections in PNG may have been more problematic without this support, the contribution made was assessed as being reasonable under difficult circumstances. The evaluation determined that Australia should continue to invest in electoral support, but that future support should adopt a greater emphasis in ensuring that aid is fit for context, appropriate in its ambitions and able to be upscaled as opportunities for effective support arise.

Key constraints to Australia’s electoral support were identified throughout the electoral cycle. Such constraints have emanated largely from factors outside the control of the Australian Government. Challenges in PNGEC funding and capacity to deliver elections; election delivery logistical challenges; slow progress in progressing gender and social inclusion; concerns with the integrity of the electoral roll; lack of cohesive voter awareness strategies and limitations in capabilities to drive electoral reform were identified in this report. Given the extent of the constraints identified, and the scale of Australia’s electoral support, the program of support appears to have been delivered in a sufficiently efficient and cost-effective manner.

The evaluation found that Australia’s support was appreciated by the PNGEC and that it appeared to be aligned to its electoral needs. There was specific value derived from the contribution made in the immediate lead-up to the elections. Key delivery partners often worked well in endeavouring to respond to PNGEC’s needs and contributed to the objectives of Australia’s support. The mix of implementing partners used, and the approach to electoral-cycle support, appeared to work reasonably well in a challenging context. There is room for improvement in delivery partner strategic planning and co-ordination. Given the broader challenges of capacity building in the PNG context, the evaluation has suggested that further capacity building efforts should be carefully planned and executed.

In this context, the evaluation recommends that Australia should continue to provide electoral assistance to PNG with a focus on a whole-of-cycle approach to electoral assistance. Support should, however, be flexible in the out years given the need for a realistic approach in response to likely restricted GoPNG funding to the PNGEC. Australia’s assistance should be designed with an awareness that contextual challenges make the whole-of-cycle approach an ideal that may be difficult to follow without an inbuilt ability to adapt.

The evaluation identified a gap in applying program design principles to electoral support. This was also identified as a barrier in previous evaluations (DFAT, 2013; DFAT ‘Making it Count’, 2017). The evaluation thus recommends that DFAT prepare a new investment design to guide its elections support to PNG over the future electoral cycle (2018-2022). The Electoral Support Design Document would outline program aims, objectives and anticipated outcomes over the election cycle, and determine the nature and focus of required inputs over the cycle. This approach would provide a more intentional framework to guide program implementation, while still allowing for ongoing changes to be made to the focus and direction of the program over time.

To bring the AEC twinning program into line with the standardised processes governing other institutional partnerships between Australia and PNG, it has been recommended that the AEC become a partner in the Institutional Partnerships Program (IPP). The draft IPP design requires a diagnostic assessment be undertaken of the PNGEC’s institutional capacity and a three-year rolling work plan be developed. Such a workplan would then be integrated within, and be informed by, the overall electoral support program design. The consolidation of management arrangements for the various electoral support modalities was recommended to increase co-ordination and reduce duplication. The AEC (as an IPP partner) could coordinate with a managing contractor that in turn manages contracted providers such as IFES and individually contracted advisers. The AEC would report directly to the High Commission. All other electoral support modalities would then report to the Australian High Commission with the managing contractor undertaking responsibility to coordinate such reporting. Despite this arrangement, DFAT posting cycles mean that few A-based staff working on electoral support in the High Commission now will be in place for the next election in 2022. It is imperative that DFAT continue to build its expertise in the area of electoral support to PNG to ensure there is sustainable electoral assistance capability outside any single program.

Given what appears to be a tendency towards increased decentralisation of electoral administration, it has been recommended that future electoral support should carefully consider opportunities to engage at the provincial level. Future support should also be delivered in a manner that accounts for the significant differences in electoral issues that exist between the different regions in PNG.

A range of recommendations were made in relation to the five objective areas of Australia’s support to the PNG electoral process. All recommendations involved a continuation of some degree of Australian support albeit with a more targeted and strategic orientation. In areas of capacity building of the PNGEC, support for election delivery, support to improve the electoral roll and electoral reform it has been recommended that Australian assistance should remain positioned at a modest level in order to support PNGEC-led initiatives and to be able to respond to specific PNG requests that have strong prospects of success. In areas of gender and social inclusion and voter awareness it has been recommended that Australia invest in supporting research and evaluation, mechanisms for effective co-ordination and the strategic identification of opportunities to both better understand and instigate progress in these related areas. In ensuring the representation of women in PNG’s Parliament, a multi-faceted approach is required, spanning advocacy for the introduction of temporary special measures; candidate training; supporting women in PNGEC to progress and develop their skills and supporting broader community attitudinal change.

1. **BACKROUND TO EVALUATION**

This evaluation report assesses the overall effectiveness of Australia’s electoral assistance to Papua New Guinea (PNG) over the two-year period from 2015-17, in order to inform the scope and nature of Australia’s future electoral support to PNG. The evaluation assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and gender equality of the Australian Government’s electoral support to PNG over the period 2015-17 with reference to the:

* Principles and objectives set out in DFAT’s Internal Electoral Support Strategy 2015-18 (DFAT Strategy, 2014)
* Responses to the priorities, requests and requirements of the PNG Electoral Commission (PNGEC) with specific reference to the PNG’s 2017 national election.

The primary users of the evaluation findings, as outlined in the Evaluation Terms of Reference (2017) include DFAT, the Australian Electoral Commission and the PNG Government (including the PNGEC).

**1.1 The Context**

Australian aid provided approximately $15 million in electoral assistance to PNG in the 2015-17 period, implemented through a combination of long-term capacity building assistance to the PNGEC and other PNG agencies, and short-term assistance for the delivery of the national election in 2017. The investments funded by DFAT that are considered during the evaluation include:

* The AEC-PNGEC Twinning Program, implemented by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)
* The PNG Electoral Systems Strengthening Project implemented by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
* Adviser deployments through the Australian Civilian Corps[[2]](#footnote-2)
* Adviser deployments and other assistance provided through the Governance Partnership.

Several other Australian programs provided election-related assistance in niche areas, such as:

* Support to women candidates (through the Women in Leadership Support Program (WILSP), implemented by the Department of Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University)
* Human rights training for Royal PNG Constabulary officers (through the Justice Services and Stability for Development Program (JSS4D, implemented by the Australian Federal Police)
* Media training for journalists (through the Media Development Initiative, implemented by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation).

The evaluation’s scope precludes analysis of every component of Australia’s electoral assistance, though the WILSP is considered below in the context of promoting women’s participation. The evaluation scope also excludes consideration of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) contribution.

Australia provided electoral assistance throughout the most recent five-year electoral cycle in PNG (between national elections in 2012 and 2017). The adoption of a whole-of-cycle approach and the focus on election delivery in the provision of electoral assistance were consistent with the recommendations of the DFAT Internal Election Support Strategy (Strategy, 2014) and the DFAT Elections Handbook (DFAT, 2017c). Australia’s engagement was relatively modest in the years immediately after the 2012 election and was scaled up from late 2015 (Table 1).

**Table 1 ­– Australian electoral assistance 2013-2018**




Table notes: The Governance Partnership includes funding for two observation missions that were overseen by the Partnership. All figures are best-possible approximations from various documents. ESP 3 was the last phase of the electoral strengthening program from the prior electoral cycle. The $15 million estimate provided in the text above is based on an estimate of the AEC spend from 2015 onwards, plus spending on IFES, the Australian Civilian Corps and the Governance partnership.

Electoral assistance represents a relatively small component of Australia’s support for effective governance in PNG (Table 2).

**Table 2 – Australian effective governance support and electoral assistance in PNG 2011-2018 ($M)**




Table note: annual electoral assistance totals involve estimated breakdowns of multi-year grant totals. Note that Table 2 differs from Table 1 in that Table 2 is based on financial years so as to fit in with other aid data. Effective governance figures are based on governance and law and justice spending as reported in DFAT Aid Program Performance Reports (APPRs), 2017-18 data not available.

Australia’s assistance is also a small component of the overall costs of delivering an election in PNG. Although exact calculations prove difficult, as an approximation, the sum total of electoral assistance funded by Australian aid since 2014 (AU $16.3 M) is approximately 14% of the amount of money the Government of PNG budgeted for the election, or 9% if Government of PNG security spending is included.[[3]](#footnote-3)

The next national election in PNG is scheduled for 2022. In the meantime, a referendum is scheduled for Bougainville. Local Level Government (LLG) elections are likely to be held in the second half of 2018.

**1.2** **Objectives of Australian assistance**

The objectives of Australia’s electoral assistance were difficult to clearly identify from the documentation available. The challenge in identifying objectives for the delivery of electoral support was also identified in the 2013 Independent evaluation of Australia’s electoral support in PNG (DFAT, 2013), and similarly for other countries where electoral assistance has been provided (‘Making it Count’ DFAT, 2017). The 2014 Strategy identified four priority areas:

* Support PNG to maintain an accurate **electoral roll**
* Increase the PNG Electoral Commission’s **capability to deliver elections**
* Support efforts to strengthen **voter awareness** in PNG
* Support **electoral reform** in PNG.

An additional objective of promoting women’s participation in the electoral process can be inferred from the increased focus on women’s leadership and representation issues by both governments since 2012, and as reflected in the evaluation’s Terms of Reference. The Australian Government's commitment and objectives for empowering women and girls and promoting gender equality in the Indo-Pacific region are outlined in *Australian aid: promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability* (DFAT, 2014).

Stakeholders and documents referred to the broader objectives of Australian support that have been informed by the interests of both countries. These included maintaining stability in PNG through the peaceful transfer of power and promoting democracy through elections that are seen to be credible by the bulk of Papua New Guineans. While some stakeholders stated that Australian support should aim to ensure PNG’s elections are free and fair, the evaluation considers this to be an unrealistic objective given the relatively modest scale of Australia’s electoral assistance, the wide range of external factors that can impact on the quality of elections, and the fact that ultimate responsibility for delivering elections rests with the PNG Government.

It was difficult to assess the connections between objectives, outputs and outcomes in the absence of a theory of change and program logic for electoral assistance. A gap in applying program design principles to electoral support has been previously identified as a barrier to evaluation (DFAT, 2013; DFAT ‘Making it Count’, 2017).

There is more work to be done by DFAT and the AEC, and by the PNGEC, in examining and reaching consensus as to the extent and type of electoral support the Australian Government should provide in the lead-up to the 2022 elections, thereby articulating agreed aims, objectives, outputs and anticipated outcomes for that support. It is anticipated that this evaluation report and its associated recommendations will be useful in informing that dialogue and that a useful design for electoral support 2018-2022 will follow.

* 1. **Elections and electoral administration in PNG**

In undertaking an analysis of the effectiveness of Australia’s aid to the PNG electoral process, it is useful to identify issues that Australian aid might have had some chance of mitigating in an electoral cycle and contextual challenges that are difficult to shift through aid. Issues with the machinery of elections (the roll, polling etc.) are important to consider in conjunction with challenging contextual issues that lie outside the core machinery of elections but have an impact upon electoral quality. Contextual issues that limit the representation of women in political decision-making realms are also important to identify and consider.

The PNGEC can be commended in undertaking the significant logistical challenge of a national election in 2017. However, election observer reports (TI, 2017; EU 2017; Commonwealth, 2017) identified a range of serious problems related to the conduct of the 2017 election. The PNGEC itself has proactively identified a number of areas it wishes to improve upon for its future elections (PNGEC, 2017). There is scope for future improvement in electoral quality in PNG.

Importantly, significant challenges to electoral quality emerged from domestic constraints within PNG. In the lead up to the elections, informants reported that the PNGEC was severely under-funded and under-resourced by central government with funds being released very late in the process (AEC, 2016; ACC, 2017; PNGEC, 2017). In particular, issues related to insufficient and late domestic funding contributed to a number of the identified electoral challenges. Papua New Guinea’s broader political economy also generates significant challenges for well-run elections (DFAT, 2013; Wood, 2015).

1. **Methodology**

The Evaluation Team comprised three members: Anne Markiewicz, Terence Wood and Marc Livsey. Anne Markiewicz is an evaluation consultant with experience working in PNG and the Pacific. Terence Wood is a Research Fellow at the Development Policy Centre at ANU undertaking research on Melanesian politics and electoral quality in Melanesia. Marc Livsey of DFAT’s PNG Governance and Performance Section was the DFAT participant and managed the evaluation. The team was assisted by Rob Sutton (Second Secretary) and Lindsay Lambi (Assistant Policy Officer) of the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby.

The evaluation methodology involved ascertaining the perspectives of the Australian Government (DFAT in PNG and Canberra) and implementation partners such as IFES and the AEC and the PNGEC (Head Office and two Provincial Offices). In addition, the perspectives of other stakeholders such as civil society, the media and other analysts and commentators were canvassed (See Appendix 3 for list of stakeholders interviewed). Desk review of selected available documentation provided further data for the evaluation (see Appendix 4 for references). DFAT M&E Standards (2017a) supported the identification of a small number of high level exploratory key evaluation questions related to the specific information needs of stakeholders. Appendix 1 outlines the key evaluation questions that guided the evaluation, and the relevant stakeholders and documentation considered against each evaluation question.

Field work was conducted in Port Moresby and two provinces. The provinces were Eastern Highlands (Goroka) and East New Britain (Kokopo). These two provinces were selected to provide a Highlands/Islands comparison and to provide a comparison between provinces with different electoral contexts and potential differences in electoral quality. Variables considered in undertaking a comparison included the state and use of the electoral roll, the extent of election preparedness, the degree of safety and orderliness in the conduct of elections, the degree of voter awareness and the extent to which women were able to participate and to vote without interference.  Learning from both success and failure was a feature of the evaluation methodology.

Three ‘Findings Workshops’ were held at the conclusion of the fieldwork to present preliminary findings and consider options that could be used to guide the formulation of policy relevant recommendations. The first workshop was held with the PNGEC, followed by a workshop later that day with DFAT in PNG. A final workshop was held with DFAT in Canberra.

The evaluation faced the inevitable challenges of constraints in the time and resources made available for such a complex and politically sensitive evaluation. There were also challenges faced in data availability that constrained assessments being made in some domains such as efficiency. To ameliorate this, the evaluation team relied heavily on the findings from past evaluations and reviews for guidance, building from prior knowledge. It was also important for the evaluation to consider the role of Australia’s electoral assistance within the broader dynamics of the bilateral relationship and cooperation to promote effective governance. The series of findings workshops held with the PNGEC, DFAT Post in PNG and DFAT Canberra, where a range of forward looking options were presented for discussion, aided this process.

There were additional challenges in verifying and assimilating the range of perspectives encountered during fieldwork given that many of the stakeholders interviewed provided their own interpretation of events, either portraying a more positive picture than seemed to be the case or casting a grim picture to support significant electoral reform. There seemed to be polarities in the views expressed that were dependent on the informant’s role and position in relation to the elections. While this is the case with many evaluation projects, this appeared to be more pronounced in this evaluation due to its highly political nature. As a consequence of this dissonance, the risk for the evaluation is that different stakeholders are likely to want to see the evaluation producing different types of findings and recommendations, according to their role, position and interests. In response to these challenges, the evaluation has undertaken extensive triangulation of the range of available documentation (such as past evaluations and observer reports) to support the assessment of the competing interests and perspectives.

**3. EVALUATION FINDINGS**

**OVERARCHING EVALUATION QUESTION: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS AUSTRALIA’S ELECTORAL SUPPORT CONTRIBUTED TO THE DELIVERY OF WELL MANAGED ELECTIONS IN PNG?**

In responding to this overarching evaluation question, a number of different aspects of electoral support were identified for investigation and assessment, in line with the principles outlined in the DFAT Internal Election Support Strategy for 2015-18 (2014):

* PNGEC’s organisational capacity
* Election delivery
* PNG ‘s Electoral Roll
* Gender and Social Inclusion
* Voter Awareness
* Electoral Reform

Findings for each of the identified aspects to achieving well managed elections in PNG are outlined below and highlighted in bold. The findings are followed by recommendations for each aspect with associated justification and potential challenges. Three options were identified for each aspect and subsequently tested in findings workshops to support one option for recommendation.

**3.1 Increase the PNGEC’s Capability to Deliver Elections**

A longstanding problem for the PNGEC has been its capacity to both deliver elections and to manage electoral processes in the years between elections (DFAT Independent Evaluation, 2013; Notarpietro et al., 2003). Logistically, geographical remoteness and ruggedness of terrain have compounded the capacity challenges faced in running elections. The PNGEC has not been alone amongst government departments and similar entities in PNG in facing institutional capacity challenges. Significant capacity gaps have been identified across many PNG government departments (ACIG, 2014). The PNGEC has acknowledged it has capacity gaps, particularly in areas of human resource management and finance. Stakeholders generally concurred that the PNGEC was weak on human resources and operational capacity.

The task of raising institutional capacity is complicated by the fact that electoral quality is a function, not only of performance in the PNGEC in Port Moresby, but also of performance of provincial electoral officials. Moreover, the actual task of delivering elections is dependent on the capacity of temporary electoral workers. Electoral officials involved in election delivery were often described as working under considerable pressure and spoke of serious threats against them and their family members (in Eastern Highlands Province), as well as significant verbal abuse (in East New Britain Province).

Previous assessments have found that while assistance may have raised the capacity of individuals and improved specific systems, it had not been as effective in raising the overall institutional capacity of the PNGEC. Additionally, past gains associated with capacity building work have often not been sustained over time (Arghiros et al., 2017; DFAT Independent Evaluation, 2013). **In line with earlier evaluations, this evaluation also found only limited evidence that reported capacity gains from support provided in prior elections had been sustained.** In instances, stakeholders spoke of having to rebuild capacity that had been built prior to the 2012 election.

Assistance provided to the PNGEC during the period covered by this evaluation falls into three broad categories: training, manuals and technical support. Each of these areas is covered in turn. Following this, a specific aspect of technical support, the development of a PNGEC Corporate Plan, is focused upon.

**Training**

PNGEC staff in Port Moresby received training and mentoring through the AEC twinning program in the lead up to the 2017 elections via mechanisms including PNGEC staff observing elections in Australia, on-the-job training, training courses for PNGEC staff in Port Moresby on operational matters, and informal discussions and contact between counterpart officials. Further training was also conducted by IFES and Australian Civilian Corps deployees.[[4]](#footnote-4) PNGEC staff in Port Moresby commented on the value of the training, were generally appreciative of it and viewed it as helpful.

Training for provincial electoral staff and electoral officials involved different variants of cascading models of training, in which specific officials were trained and tasked with relaying training.Australian-funded personnel (primarily the AEC and IFES) were involved in this work, alongside PNGEC staff from Port Moresby.Some provincial stakeholders described having benefitted from this training and were appreciative of it. However, some electoral officials identified issues with the cascading training system, noting that at times mistaken interpretations of procedures by trainers would then be passed on to those that they trained. Instances of insufficient timeframes for training were also identified. **Concerns with the effectiveness of train-the-trainer approach warrant further attention if used again for future elections.** As one provincial stakeholder who participated in training observed:

*The cascading model of training is not as effective as it introduces errors in translation. It causes misunderstandings to accumulate. The training was too short, too last minute.*

That the training delivered was generally appreciated speaks to its utility for specific individuals and as a means of strengthening relationships. Moreover, the specific problem of short timeframes, was a function of the late release of GoPNG funding in 2017 rather than an inherent deficiency of the train the trainer model. **However, given ongoing institutional capacity issues, broader problems with train the trainer models, and ongoing issues of sustainability, there is scope for further optimisation.**

**Manuals**

Electoral staff received AEC produced resources including training manuals and electoral journals for polling officials to use and were generally appreciative of these resources. However, the issue of the complexity of the manuals was raised by some stakeholders, as was the fact they were written in English which is not always spoken by all polling officials. The extent to which these issues hampered electoral officials in their use of the manuals appears to have varied between different parts of the country depending on local electoral capacity. **A clear priority for future work involving manuals is to ensure these tools are written and designed to be readily understood by electoral officials.**

**Technical Support**

Ongoing finance and ICT systems support has been provided to the PNGEC through the Australian-funded Governance Partnership facility. Financial systems support has focused on assisting the strengthening of processes associated with procurement, financial management, reporting and budgeting. ICT support has focused on electoral management systems (systems which manage data in areas such as the candidate registration, results and polling logistics[[5]](#footnote-5)). Support associated with communications and logistics was also provided via the Governance Partnership facility in the leadup to the pre-election period and during the election. In these areas, support was intended to both assist directly with processes and to help build capacity within the PNGEC.

**Generally, this support appears to have been successful in directly contributing to improved performance in the targeted areas.** Stakeholders within the PNGEC generally expressed their appreciation for this support. The financial systems adviser and the ICT adviser demonstrated a good understanding of the PNG context.The ICT systems adviser played an important role in preparing election results for the judiciary in the wake of elections as part of the electoral petitions process. The same adviser was also using data usefully to help prepare for the LLG elections. Their analysis of roll data could also prove very helpful in the future if roll-improvement work is to be undertaken. Available reports indicate that the communications advisers appeared to have assisted in the strengthening of the PNGEC’s media response during a challenging election period. Their work, however, appears to have been hampered by the short periods of time spent in PNG (Abt Associates 2018). Limited available evidence, from reports and stakeholder interviews, suggests logistical support provided through the Governance Partnership functioned adequately (Abt Associates 2018).

**In all the areas above, it is unclear which benefits at the institutional-level will be sustained in the longer term.** Challenges with ensuring sustainable outcomes from capacity building efforts are not new and not necessarily reflective of any specific issues associated with the nature of the support provided in the 2015-17 period.

**As finance and ICT capacity is integral to organisational functioning, continued assistance in these areas through the Governance Partnership facility and by advisers with strong PNG contextual knowledge, appears justifiable.** Such support would need to be consistent with the broader strategy of assistance for the next electoral cycle. A form of **communications and logistics support may also be justified in advance of the 2022 election. The logistics support could be integrated with the Australian Civilian Corps undertaking.**

**Corporate Plan**

Following the 2017 election, IFES provided assistance to the PNGEC to develop a new Corporate Plan (IFES, 2017). Although not yet signed off, the Plan was mentioned in the PNGEC’s draft report to parliament on the elections (PNGEC, 2017). The development of the Corporate Plan involved a lengthy participatory process. The level of participation appears to have been a strength, although several interviewees described the amount of time devoted to the process as excessive, particularly given competing needs such as preparation for the 2018 Local Level Government (LLG) elections. The Corporate Plan was a significant undertaking for IFES, consuming 195-consultant days. The Plan was spoken about favourably by PNGEC staff when asked directly about the document, but not referred to as a document that would be used to guide the PNGEC’s work or engagement with its partners. While the development of the Corporate Plan appears to have been an inclusive process with team-building benefits, and while activities associated with the development of the Plan may have helped crystallise lessons from the 2017 election, the Plan is yet to be tested as useful through its implementation. **The time spent on the development of such documents is probably not justifiable against the benefits and therefore should not be prioritised as an area for future Australian electoral assistance.** As one stakeholder commented: ‘Every department in the country has a corporate plan on a shelf covered in dust’.

**Overall**

These findings do not indicate that electoral assistance has brought with it no capacity development benefits. **Given the apparent success of some of the work, it is likely that without the input of electoral assistance, capacity would have been lower.** The persistence of capacity gaps is reflective of broader contextual constraints not remediable through capacity building strategies alone (DFAT Independent Evaluation, 2013; Wood, 2015). **In this context, capacity building efforts can serve as a useful counterbalance, even if not transformative of their own accord.**

However, examples such as the Corporate Plan indicate a need for capacity-related work to be strategically focused on areas where it is possible for electoral assistance to bring the greatest benefits. **A careful strategic focus is necessary if capacity building is to be efficient and maximise value for money.**

**Importantly, ongoing relationships developed through capacity building efforts have the potential to allow external actors working on electoral assistance to better understand the nature of the electoral challenges.** Additionally, as discussed further in the section on election delivery, **relationships established through capacity development work assisted considerably with the delivery of short-term electoral assistance provided in 2017.**

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CAPACITY BUILDING FOR ELECTION DELIVERY**

**•** Ongoing technical assistance associated with the PNGEC’s capacity should be continued. But capacity building efforts should be undertaken cognisant of the crucial role of provincial electoral staff in ensuring that elections are successfully run. Reflecting this, future capacity building work should be designed in a manner that ensures provincial needs are met. It should also be tailored to reflect regional variations within PNG.

• A diagnostic assessment should also be undertaken to ascertain areas where that assistance can most usefully be targeted. Assessments should focus both on need and actual constraints faced by the PNGEC. It should not be assumed that all needs can be met with further training.

• To maximise value for money, technical assistance should focus foremost on areas that are crucial to organisational functioning such as financial management, or which are central to election delivery, such as the electoral roll. Efforts should not be expended on areas that are tangential to election delivery such as corporate planning activities.

• Capacity building should also be designed to strengthen ongoing relationships between implementing partners, the aid program, and the PNGEC. Capacity building should be undertaken with the understanding that strengthened relationships will deliver benefits above and beyond raising the capacity of individual staff. It should also be understood that work around capacity has an important role to play in international actors’ own learning and understanding of the PNG electoral context.

• Coordination between the different organisations providing the assistance should be carefully managed in line with broader strategic planning to ensure individual implementing partners are delivering in a coordinated way and in-line with their respective strengths. (Note that specific recommendations for implementing partners engaged in capacity building are covered in the section on implementing partners.)

**Rationale:**Although previous decades of electoral support indicate that there are limits to what such assistance can achieve, it is likely that ongoing assistance can improve electoral quality to an extent. Assistance also provides the basis for an ongoing partnership between PNG and Australia on electoral issues. This partnership is required to help maximise Australia’s understanding of PNG’s electoral needs. Experiences from 2017 show that such a partnership has the potential to facilitate a more effective short-term increase in electoral engagement in the lead up to elections.

**Challenges:**

Given that some capacity issues cannot be resolved through the mechanisms that Australia has available to it, a key challenge will be the limitations of capacity support in building institutional capacity. To an extent, such challenges can be mitigated by establishing strong ongoing relationships with the PNGEC and ensuring that assistance is both strategically planned and carefully tailored to needs that can realistically be met.

**3.2 Support Election Delivery**

As in previous elections, Australia provided short-term assistance specifically to assist the PNGEC deliver the 2017 national election.In this context, ‘short-term’ assistance is used to distinguish assistance focused directly on the election from ongoing assistance designed with broader goals in mind.[[6]](#footnote-6) Short-term assistance generally commenced within the year immediately prior to the election and was focused on electoral mechanics. The short-term assistance associated with the 2017 election can be separated into two areas: logistical assistance and assistance with election day results transmission and reporting. Each area is reported on in turn.

**Logistical Assistance**

A major component of Australia’s electoral assistance to PNG in 2017 came in the form of transport provided by the Australian Defence Force (ADF). This evaluation has not been tasked with assessing the effectiveness of this assistance. It is worth noting, however, that this assistance was viewed positively by all PNG stakeholders who commented on it. Aside from ADF work, the Australian Civilian Corps deployees provided the most significant form of short-term assistance. The first Australian Civilian Corps deployee arrived in August 2016. Seven deployees were present at the time of the election (ACC, 2017).[[7]](#footnote-7) The assistance provided was first and foremost logistical, although capacity building components were included (ACC, 2017). Work undertaken by deployees included developing logistical plans, warehouse management, procurement and conveyance of some electoral materials.

It is unlikely the short-term logistical assistance provided in 2017 will have any sustained benefits, given that similar work undertaken in 2012 did not appear to result in election capabilities that were transferred to the 2017 election (ACC, 2017). **The benefits of the short-term logistical support, however, were clearly appreciated by both PNG and international stakeholders and in this respect, can largely be viewed as a success. Moreover, short-term logistical assistance appeared to fill an important gap and was generally valued and effective.** Some stakeholders commented that the 2017 elections would not have taken place if it were not for the efforts of the Australian Civilian Corps deployees, including to ensure schedules for transporting voting materials worked well, and the PNGEC warehouse functioned effectively. One provincial stakeholder commented:

*Australian electoral assistance is always valued. Without the critical support elections would have been a failure… elections would fall over without Australian assistance*

Stakeholders noted that assistance provided through Australian Civilian Corps was better calibrated than was the case in 2012.Specifically, similar benefits were brought by a smaller number of deployees and PNG stakeholders indicated that they appreciated the less intensive presence. As would be expected, however, deployee efforts were not sufficient alone to ensure an outright logistical success for the elections and many challenges remained in mounting the 2017 election.

Some PNG stakeholders suggested that the perceived neutrality of the Australian Civilian Corps deployees (along with the ADF) provided an advantage. The effectiveness of the ACC deployment was enabled, in part, by the fact that all of the deployees had previous experience working in Melanesia, and five deployees had worked on previous elections in PNG (ACC, 2017). Other stakeholders also noted that the contextual knowledge possessed by Australian Civilian Corps deployees as well as their contacts were useful for the overarching electoral program.

**Results Transmission and Reporting**

Other key assistance provided that was focused on election delivery came through the work of IFES. IFES was responsible for leading the development of three different tools intended to play an important role as ballots were counted (IFES, 2017). The first of these was a tablet-based results transmission system that was intended to relay election results from counting centres to PNGEC in Port Moresby. The second was an on-line results reporting tool.[[8]](#footnote-8) Both tools worked together as the results transmission system produced the data subsequently used for results reporting. **Neither of the tools functioned well** (DFAT AQC, 2018).The third tool was the mobile-phone based polling station reporting tool. The Australian funded phones purchased for this tool were (with few exceptions) not returned to the PNGEC post-election (PNGEC, 2017).

**The causes of the tools’ failings included user error, inconsistent use, technical problems and transmission issues (AEC, 2017).**[[9]](#footnote-9) The results reporting tool failed to report on full election results in a comprehensive way and was difficult for end users to use. More readily accessible electoral results were available on Facebook and via some PNG online media sources (Fraenkel, 2017). Complete results are still not available from the results website. One Australian stakeholder noted that the online reporting system used in 2007 was more user-friendly, albeit less aesthetically appealing. In part, the online reporting tool suffered through inconsistent use of the results transmission mechanism, but also from its own design limitations. Amidst the logistical challenges of the polling period in PNG, it may be unrealistic to expect perfect results transmission and reporting. However, **the failings in 2017 also speak to tools that were not well designed for the context.**

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUPPORTING ELECTION DELIVERY**

* Australia should continue to provide short-term logistical support through the Australian Civilian Corps (and also the ADF) in lead up to and conduct of elections. (More detail is provided on Australian Civilian Corps later in the document.)
* Issues with polling day technology should not preclude use of such technology in the future. In other recent elections in PNG, reporting and transmission technology has been used with some success. Given PNG’s geographical constraints, such technology can provide for more rapid and accurate provision of results. However, technology needs to be carefully designed so it works within the bounds of available capacity. Technology should be tested thoroughly in advance.
* Reporting tools should be designed to provide ease of use and maximum electoral transparency.

**Rationale**

Short-term logistical assistance appeared to fill an important gap and was generally valued and effective. The benefit in helping to ensure the PNGEC delivers national elections outweighs concerns about its sustainability. Continued engagement on results transmission and reporting, albeit adopting a more cautious context-oriented approach, can be justified on the basis that such tools are important for electoral integrity. International assistance can usefully reduce some electoral risks by supporting these areas and an implementing partner focused on contextual challenges in PNG could assist with the development of more successful technologies in the future.

**Challenges**

It is possible that even successful engagements, such as that of the Australian Civilian Corps, may struggle in the absence of contextual knowledge. To overcome this challenge, previous experience in PNG should become a pre-requisite for deployees in future electoral support work.

**3.3 Strengthen Gender and Social Inclusion**

The Australian Government has made a commitment to improve the political, social and economic opportunities of women living in the Indo-Pacific region (DFAT, 2014).  DFAT’s investment in promoting gender equality in the Pacific is primarily delivered through the Pacific Women Shaping Pacific Development program (*Pacific Women*, 2018). One intended outcome area is that women, and women’s interests, are increasingly and effectively represented and visible through leadership at all levels of decision-making.

Support programs for women candidates and for women members of Parliament in the Pacific are being delivered through *Pacific Women. Pacific Women i*s managing the Women in Leadership Support Program’ (WILSP) in PNG.

Support was provided by IFES aimed at enhancing the position of women in the PNGEC administration. Further support was provided by IFES and the AEC to contribute to the improved safety of women as voters. IFES also provided voter awareness gender messaging and this is discussed further in the section of the report dealing with voter awareness.

**Women as Candidates**

The representation of women in the PNG political sphere has been identified by many commentators as a major challenge and attempts to create reserved seats in Parliament for women have not been successful. Despite a record number of 179 women candidates (DPA, 2017), no women were successful in being elected in 2017. Since independence, only seven women have served as members of parliament, with three of these elected in 2012.

Australian aid supported candidate training for women during the lead up to the 2012 elections. However, candidate training did not recommence until January 2017 through the ‘Women in Leadership Support Program’ (WILSP) funded for five years and managed by *Pacific Women*, together with a Reference Group formed to facilitate information sharing. In line with good practice, this initiative provides strategies for women candidates to adopt throughout the electoral cycle, not just at the end (DFAT ‘Making it Count’, 2017). Given this program’s commencement close to the 2017 elections, it has placed its focus on the 2022 elections. Despite this late start, 47 candidates attended the first module of training and it was reported that some of these candidates performed well during the elections (DPA, 2017). However, candidates reported challenges associated with community gender norms and women being disadvantaged by having less access to money and patronage in order to compete with male candidates on equal terms. Such impediments are not likely to be shifted through candidate training initiatives.

It appears there was a gap in programmatic support for women candidates during the period 2013 and 2017. This has since been corrected through the adoption of a whole-of-election cycle approach for supporting women candidates in the lead up to the 2022 election. The effect of the previous gap in candidate support is difficult to determine in light of the range of other factors that may have mitigated against successful outcomes for female candidates in the PNG context. It is thus worthwhile investing in the ongoing evaluation of WILSP to determine its effectiveness in contributing to successful outcomes for women candidates in 2022.

**Given the stated importance of candidates commencing their election strategies early in the electoral cycle, the late start for candidate training in 2017 was an impediment to success. The longer-term approach to candidate training now adopted is an important corrective measure.**

**Women in PNGEC Administration**

Stakeholders reported improvements in the gender balance within PNGEC with appointments of women for director-level and management positions, and as Provincial Assistant Electoral Managers (AEMs). However, despite these improvements stakeholders reported that there is still a glass ceiling for AEMs and other women in the PNGEC. IFES supported a gender assessment of the PNGEC to guide Gender Equity and Social Inclusion (GESI) programming. However, due to staffing freezes the appointment of an internal GESI focal person remains an unfilled position (IFES, 2017). IFES also introduced various accompanying strategies such as supporting the recruitment of women as temporary election workers (IFES, 2017). Despite these efforts, in 2017 only 16 per cent of poll workers were women (PNGEC, 2017). **These results demonstrate the inherent challenges faced by many donor initiatives in translating plausible affirmative action strategies into sustainable outcomes for women in the face of entrenched societal and institutional beliefs and barriers.** Some interviewees argued that despite some setbacks, sustained efforts may produce incremental changes over time.

**Women as Voters**

An initiative that developed policy guidelines for the operation of separate polling booths and queues for men and women on polling day was instigated on a large scale for the 2012 national elections, but reportedly not implemented widely in practice (DFAT Independent Evaluation, 2013). A key recommendation following the 2013 election was to better implement PNG's policy of gender segregated queuing. For the 2017 election, the AEC and IFES encouraged application of this policy. However, inconsistency in practice prevailed. The two lines policy was viewed by some provincial informants as unnecessary, while other informants viewed it as crucial, especially in the Highlands. Even in areas where it was viewed as crucial, stakeholders reported that the practice was inconsistently used.

**In parts of the country where one day polling was in place, this was identified as a factor that compromised women’s safety due to the large disruptive crowds that congregated around polling places. Large crowds were also believed to have discouraged many women from voting. Insufficient numbers of polling places to service large geographic areas, such as the Highlands, reportedly resulted in crowd formation and thereby reduced the safety of women as voters.**

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

* Given the need to advance opportunities for women to be elected in the 2022 national election; strategies to effectively support women in the PNGEC and as AEMs; and the implementation of measures to ensure safety for women during elections; gender and inclusivity should be prioritised in the new Electoral Support Design Document.
* Candidate training has been funded to prepare women candidates for the 2022 elections. This should continue across the coming electoral cycle. The program should also gather evidence on an ongoing basis as to the benefits of participation with longitudinal tracking of outcomes for women candidates over time. Findings generated should be widely shared with other *Pacific Women* leadership programs for mutual learning, and such sharing supported by the Women in Political Leadership Reference Group.
* Consideration should be given to identifying and supporting a broader base of capable and motivated women candidates at the sub-national level who may go on to contest nationally.
* Opportunities to advance the case for the introduction of Temporary Special Measures (TSMs) should be identified and capitalised upon as they arise. The PNG Government’s formal 18th month review of the electoral system provides one such entry point for advocacy on TSMs.
* WILSP and its Reference Group could identify ancillary supports from allied gender programs to raise female candidate profiles, build their grassroots support base and support them to develop strategies for raising campaign finance.
* Linkages with other *Pacific Women* programs attempting to positively shape community attitudes toward women participating in the political sphere, in government and business, and as active community citizens, should be identified and built upon. Such initiatives could include gender programs operating in other Pacific contexts. Where such programming exists, findings from research and evaluation need to be widely shared for mutual learning and potential transferability.
* Linkages could also be developed with initiatives that are not specific to improving women’s participation in electoral processes but have a broader remit such as the Pacific Islands Australia and New Zealand Electoral Administrators Network (PIANZEA); Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE); and other electoral programs operating through the AEC.
* Further strategies to support women in the PNGEC and AEMs should continue to be explored, scoped and introduced. Following needs analysis, women should be linked to appropriate training and leadership/management development programs that can be accessed to further build their skills and competencies and position them for career advancement within the organisation. In instances, these programs may be available through the Pacific Leadership and Governance Precinct, based at the University of Papua New Guinea.
* Efforts should be made to explore ways of ensuring women’s safety during polling (such as for the Highlands multiple days for voting rather than one day voting and more polling stations which cater to fewer voters)
* Further efforts should be made to ensure the application of the PNGEC’s policy on gender segregated queuing, especially in polling areas where large crowds emerge due to one day polling.

**Rationale:**

Candidate support for women was largely absent in the electoral cycle preceding the 2017 election. The effect of this gap is not clear, but it could have contributed to a poorer result for women at the polls. Gaining a better understanding of the value of candidate training initiatives delivered over the election cycle would make a positive contribution. There is value in exploring new ways to assist female candidates to succeed, such as forming links with allied programs that are attempting to shape community attitudes toward women in positions of power and support women’s ambitions and endeavours. There is also value in exploring better ways to improve connectivity amongst women’s organisations that are aligned to the same objectives but approaching these objectives from different vantage points. There is scope for the identification of improved strategies to support women in PNGEC and AEMs to further progress in their careers and to achieve gender equality within the PNGEC. There is also potential to consider all aspects of the voting process (even if not in areas considered to be traditionally targeted at women, the disabled or other social groups) that reduce safety during polling and dissuade participation in voting.

**Challenges:**

The recommendations are resource-intensive in a context where results for women candidates and women in the public sector may not be positive or informative.

**3.4 Support PNG to maintain an accurate Electoral Roll**

At the time of the 2017 election, 5,062,298 names were on the national electoral roll (PNGEC, 2017). Legally, people can only vote if their names are on the roll and voters can only vote in the ward they are enrolled in. In law, such requirements make the roll integral to electoral quality in PNG. In practice, the roll is important, although the reasons for its importance vary. In many parts of the country, the roll is used as intended, and the absence of an individual’s name on the roll will prevent them from voting.[[10]](#footnote-10) In other parts of the country, typically, but not exclusively in the Highlands, the roll is not used on polling day and invididual voters’ ability to vote or not depends on community approval or similar factors. In these parts of the country the roll remains important as it usually determines how many ballot papers are provided to polling stations. This, in turn, determines how many people can vote in specific areas (Notarpietro et al., 2003; Wood, 2015; TI, 2017; EU, 2017; Commonwealth, 2017; ANU, 2012). The importance of the roll renders it crucial for the delivery of well run elections. The roll’s importance also means it is not infrequently a target of those who wish to manipulate the electoral process (Wood, 2015).

Stakeholders agreed that problems with the accuracy and use of the electoral roll have been ongoing since at least the mid-1990s. Consequently, the roll became inflated, with turnout implausibly high (nearly 120 per cent of the estimated voting age population voted in 2002) (Wood, 2017). Prior to the 2007 general elections, roll quality improved considerably, but there was deterioration between 2007 and the 2012 general election (DFAT Independent Evaluation, 2013). The growth of the roll between 2012 and 2017 was less than was the case between 2007 and 2012 (PNGEC, 2017).

During the period 2012-2017, Australian aid delivered assistance to the PNGEC in support of an improved electoral roll. This support was a continuation of that which had been provided since at least the turn of the millennium (DFAT Independent Evaluation, 2013). Post-2012, assistance took the form of advice from the AEC (predominantly earlier in the electoral cycle) and IFES (closer to the election). The AEC, and subsequently IFES, provided advice on roll improvements and updates, a process which involved decentralisation of data compilation for the first time (DFAT PPA, 2017). The AEC provided strategic advice to PNGEC leadership, and day-to-day advice to PNGEC officials, on a range of election management issues including the roll.

**Although roll issues do not appear to have been as acute as they were in some previous elections (particularly 2002), issues with the roll in 2017 were still substantial, and was the highest priority area of concern raised by stakeholders interviewed.** Roll issues were also identified as a significant risk to elections in observer reports. In instances, roll problems allowed voters to vote more than once. In other instances, they caused voters to be disenfranchised (TI 2017; EU 2017; Commonwealth, 2017). As some provincial stakeholders commented:

*Lots of people want the roll to be accurate but there are many roll problems and the biggest challenge of all is the inflated roll that allows people to vote more than once. If this issue could be addressed, it would solve about half of the election issues. The highest priority is to fix the common roll.*

*The system failed to enrol voters who were eligible to vote, people were interested but couldn’t vote. The disenfranchised voters tended to be the younger voters.*

It is not clear the extent to which the roll issues that emerged were accidental and the result of inadvertent error, or the result of deliberate interference, although some stakeholders reported both factors may have been present. Roll issues identified by stakeholders interviewed included:

* **Roll inflation**: Estimates suggest that for 2017, in at least a fifth of open electorates, the roll was higher than estimates of voting aged population based on the 2011 census suggested it should be.[[11]](#footnote-11) Some stakeholders suggested this stemmed from poor maintenance of the roll. In instances, roll inflation allowed ineligible people to vote and other voters the opportunity to vote more than once.
* **Possible roll manipulation**: In 2017, for the first time, responsibility for roll compilation/data entry was decentralised to district and provincial centres. Some stakeholders raised concerns that this process, along with existing local issues in updating the roll, had allowed for interference with the integrity of the roll, including through the application of pressure on officials as they conducted the update exercise.
* **Unexpected removal of names from the roll**: The final electoral roll was missing large numbers of names that had been included on prior versions of the roll. Some stakeholders identified the problem as having stemmed from software-assisted roll cleaning as the roll was finalised[[12]](#footnote-12). Provincial stakeholders suggested that part of the issue may have been roll cleaning software not recognising local naming conventions (family members sharing common names). Removal of names from the roll was reported as a contributing factor to the disenfranchisement of substantial numbers of voters, and the resultant increased tensions in some polling stations (TI, 2017; EU, 2017; Commonwealth, 2017). Stakeholders in East New Britain emphasised the attention that had been paid to ensuring individuals and villages/wards with similar names were accurately entered on the roll, only for many to be removed from the final version received back from Port Moresby. Cleaning of the roll immediately prior to the election was not directly assisted by electoral assistance.
* **Restrictions in being able to enrol and change enrolments:** Stakeholders also commented on the limited number of Form 11 forms which restricted the ability to enrol new voters and to rectify issues such as voters being allocated to the wrong wards.
* **Variable use of the roll during polling:** Multiple stakeholders confirmed observer reports that in a significant number of polling places, particularly in the Highlands, it was common practice not to check names against the roll.
* **Roll verification problems:** There were also widespread reports of a failure in the use of an online application designed to allow voters to check whether their names were on the roll.[[13]](#footnote-13)
* **Funding constraints**: Stakeholders including the PNGEC itself acknowledged that the late provision of funding and under-funding to the PNGEC prevented it from fully implementing roll update and verification processes (PNGEC, 2017).

**To a large extent the issues identified above are difficult for a donor to influence and this fact makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of Australia’s contribution in assisting PNGEC with the electoral roll.** Despite the constraints, PNGEC stakeholders expressed appreciation of the assistance provided by the AEC and IFES on the roll. **The specific problems that did occur were not attributed to AEC or IFES[[14]](#footnote-14).** Nor was there any evidence in the documents reviewed to suggest their advice or actions contributed to the issues. It is possible that problems with the electoral roll would have been more acute without international assistance. **Australia’s assistance may have contributed somewhat to roll quality. However, this assistance was largely outweighed by the problems identified above.**

Although it is difficult to state clearly Australia’s contribution to countering roll-related issues in PNG’s 2017 election, there are some clear lessons for future work in this area.

**The first lesson is that the roll is important to electoral quality in Papua New Guinea.** This was underscored both by observer reports and by stakeholders in East New Britain who emphasised the problems the roll cleaning caused them on polling day. The intensity of efforts to manipulate the roll in parts of the Highlands was also emphasised by other stakeholders.

**The second lesson is to be cautious in supporting new technological solutions** in the light of the problems experienced with innovations such as the roll checking tool and electronic results reporting (discussed later in the report). PNGEC has expressed its intention to utilise biometric technologies and other innovations as it moves to improve the roll in the future (often as part of integrated roll and polling systems) (PNGEC, 2017). Such technologies are currently being assertively promoted by a number of international companies. In theory, these technological advances may lead to a more accurate roll, and also bring polling day improvements. However, in practice, the track record of such innovations in other developing countries has been very mixed (Wrong, 2013)[[15]](#footnote-15). Insufficient capacity to maintain complex systems, unreliable power supply and communications technology, and the potential for manipulation, all potentially complicate the process of adopting new roll and voting technology.

**A third lesson is to carefully identify any unintended consequences that may emerge before engaging in support of any future electoral reforms.** Even apparently benign changes to the electoral process, such as the decentralisation of roll compilation, can have negative consequences once interacting with local power dynamics in some areas.

**A final lesson is that the roll is used very differently in different parts of the country.** In the Highlands in particular, it is often not drawn upon at all on polling day. Elsewhere its use varies but in some parts of the country it is still important to polling day procedure (TI, 2017; EU, 2017).

These lessons have practical ramifications for DFAT in its ongoing engagement. Given the roll’s importance, **there is a need to continue to work in partnership with the PNGEC as it navigates the challenges associated with compiling and maintaining an adequate roll.** There is a risk that if Australia continues to engage with the roll it leaves itself open to criticism about roll problems in future elections. However, the importance of the roll outweighs this risk. Also, disengagement does not mean Australia will be free of the risk of criticism (in this instance for failing to help). If they are appropriately informed of the country context and past experience, implementing partners funded through electoral assistance can provide advice that will help the PNGEC as it makes decisions in areas such as roll technology. Implementing partners can also help sustain PNGEC capacity.

**This partnership should be continued across the electoral cycle.** As the 2012-17 electoral cycle demonstrated, decisions about roll-related changes are likely to occur in at various points throughout the electoral cycle. Ongoing engagement will also help foster relationships and understanding on behalf of external actors. **Reflecting particular sovereignty sensitivities around the roll in PNG, and the political incentives that mitigate against roll improvement, Australian-funded assistance should be kept at a low level unless circumstances demand it. However, there should be a degree of flexibility built into Australia’s engagement in this area.** Australia should be ready to increase engagement if GoPNG involvement focuses on practicable solutions to problems and if sufficient resources are available to significantly improve the roll.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ELECTORAL ROLL**

* Australian electoral assistance should continue to engage with roll-related issues. Work should involve sustained partnerships and should continue across the electoral cycle.
* Assistance should be limited in the first instance, focused on advice and some technical input. Australia should not drive or be seen to lead efforts to improve the roll.
* Engagement should only be increased if the Government of Papua New Guinea provides sufficient resources to significantly improve the roll and if domestically driven solutions are viewed as practicable.

**Rationale:**

The rationale for ongoing engagement of Australia with the PNGEC on roll improvement strategies is based on the centrality of the roll to the electoral process. It also acknowledges the magnitude of the challenges faced by the PNGEC in maintaining and accurate roll. If roll quality deteriorates further, it is likely this will contribute to significant additional electoral issues and public dissatisfaction at the next national election. By maintaining its engagement, Australia can continue to assist the PNGEC through the provision of targeted advice and technical assistance. By ensuring that such advice and assistance is very carefully tailored to context and flexible, Australia can ensure that its engagement is likely to have a net benefit.

**Challenges:**

Given the most important determinants of roll quality are foremost products of decisions made by the GoPNG and the PNGEC, Australia may find itself constrained in the benefits it can bring to bear through its assistance. To an extent such challenges should be mitigated by establishing strong ongoing relationships with the PNGEC and ensuring advice and assistance is cognisant of local context. However, efforts to provide advice and technical assistance will not be effective without corresponding capacity and resources within the PNGEC to implement such assistance.

**3.5 Support efforts to strengthen Voter Awareness**

Australian aid has provided ongoing and continued support to voter awareness activities. In the lead up to the 2017 elections, IFES assisted the PNGEC’s Information and Community Awareness Branch to develop a voter education strategy using a mixture of print and multi-media products as well as accessing social media such as Facebook. The new strategy included voter awareness products that emphasised people rather than use of cartoons.

A confluence of factors of varying significance in different parts of the country appeared to mitigate the success of the voter awareness strategies employed. **Barriers identified included distribution failures, messages not sufficiently customised for different provincial audiences and messages that were considered to be too complex and ambitious for the PNG context.** Distribution issues within the PNGEC limited the effectiveness of some of these products, such as posters. In Eastern Highlands Province, unopened boxes of posters were observed lining the wall of the electoral office as the delivery had arrived after polling day.

The voter awareness strategy differed from that adopted for both the 2007 and 2012 elections where the Electoral Support Program (ESP) also facilitated community awareness through the media and advertising. Funding was also channelled through Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). It was estimated that around $4.5 million had been provided to CSOs over the period 2000-2012 to carry out voter awareness activities at election time (DFAT Independent Evaluation, 2013). IFES had anticipated that the new voter education strategy would run alongside traditional CSO outreach (IFES, 2017). However, funding for CSOs, which was to have been provided by the government of Papua New Guinea, did not occur in the lead-up to the 2017 elections. Many stakeholders interviewed in the provinces visited during the evaluation lamented the absence of such funding:

*Our CSOs drafted their plan for voter awareness only to find there were no funds for this exercise. In the absence of CSOs, campaign teams were claiming to do voter awareness, telling people who to vote for. Awareness should be done by certified CSOs, they can use posters and speak to people in their local languages.*

**The outcomes derived from the different approaches employed for voter awareness utilised in 2012 as compared with 2017 are unclear, making it difficult to argue the merits of one approach over the other.** There appears to be a knowledge gap regarding the merits of the different approaches delivered in 2012 and 2017. The AEC and IFES have suggested the need for a better understanding of both past and existing voter awareness strategies (AEC, 2016; IFES, 2017). A voter education project targeting women in Bougainville (2016-17) has used community facilitators to deliver community awareness workshops. **An evaluation of this project could potentially inform broader voter awareness strategies and provide greater evidence as to the merits of utilising CSOs for voter awareness.**

This lack of clarity regarding outcomes is compounded by the limited customisation of messaging for different contexts within PNG. Some products developed were focussed on the provision of voter information, instructing people as to how to vote formally with the aim of reducing informality rates awareness. Some products focussed on civic education, encouraging voter understanding of, and participation in, electoral processes. Other forms of messaging focused on encouraging behaviour change to reduce incidents of violence and intimidation and to increase women’s safe participation. From the provincial visits conducted it appears that **different provinces may have required different strategies and that a one-size-fits all approach across the country was not going to be as effective as a tailored approach**. In the Highlands, for example, the required focus of messaging was oriented to the reduction of negative behaviours whereas for the Islands, the required focus of messaging was better oriented to increasing voter information and civic education in order to increase participation in voting.

It was suggested that to increase voter awareness there should be clearer, realistic objectives that differentiate between shorter-term information as to how to vote and longer-term efforts at attitudinal change and that these should occur alongside a more coherent relationship with CSOs and potentially greater links with the Department of Education (DFAT Independent Evaluation, 2013). In looking forward to 2022, the PNGEC has identified the need for a greater level of civic education for young people, targeting Grades 10-12 as well as tertiary level students. PNGEC have also suggested that an electoral resource centre is established for members of the public to visit for civics education. The feasibility and merits of introducing civics education into the school curriculum at senior levels, and the benefits of establishing a civic education centre in Port Moresby, are difficult to establish in the PNG context where resource constraints are likely to mitigate against effective implementation. **More concerted efforts to better understand the efficacy of different electoral awareness strategies is thus recommended**.

The option of withdrawal from the delivery of voter awareness strategies due to concerns as to their effectiveness may result in increased informality rates[[16]](#footnote-16), reduced participation and increased violence and intimidation. **Continuing to deliver voter awareness strategies without sufficient understanding as to their comparative effectiveness and value does not appear to be justifiable**. Therefore, the proposal is for greater investigation into this area by mounting a specific voter awareness project.

**RECOMMENDATION****S FOR VOTER AWARENESS**

**•** There should be testing of the varying approaches to voter awareness by comparing CSO funded engagement, print and multi-media products, media campaigns, and other approaches to evaluate the effectiveness of the different strategies and their applicability to different contexts. This project could be undertaken on a modest basis during a by-election or over a series of by-elections. The voter awareness project in Bougainville could also contribute to the development of a deeper evidence-base. Though there are inherent challenges in generalisability given PNGs’ diversity, such a project could focus on Highland/Island differences to ensure transferability of learnings.

• The overall objectives of voter awareness need to be sharpened to identify whether the purpose of supporting voter awareness is to provide education regarding the mechanics of voting; to deliver civic education that promotes democratic processes; to advance gender equality through messaging; or to ameliorate coercive and intimidating behaviours before, during and following elections.

• Once the purpose and objectives for messaging are determined (how to vote, motivating people to vote, and/or encouraging positive voter behaviour) it is suggested that the strategies developed are clearly articulated and customised to the context.

• Efforts should also ensure that operational funding for the dissemination of voter awareness products is well scoped during the development of voting awareness products to maximise opportunities for distribution.

**Rationale**

This recommendation supports the development of an evidence-base to better inform effective voter awareness strategies. It is important to add to the knowledge base as to what works in areas of enhancing voter awareness, civic engagement and behaviour change (DFAT ‘Making it Count’, 2017). It is important to ensure products developed are duly distributed.

**Challenges:**

This requires an investment to be made in marshalling the project. It may be challenging to establish specific and clear outcomes that can be attributed to the different types of voter awareness being tested. There are doubts that the extent and nature of problematic behaviours manifest during elections can be successfully addressed through voter awareness strategies alone**.**

**3.6 Support Electoral Reform in PNG**

Electoral reform in PNG is highly complex, contested and broad-ranging. Following the 2017 election the PNGEC outlined an expansive agenda ranging from improved voting systems, review of electoral boundaries, counting system improvements, increase in the numbers of electoral commissioners and the introduction of postal voting (PNGEC, 2017). There has been a formal public announcement of an 18-month legal review being led by the PNG Constitutional and Law Reform Commission (PNG CLRC). Other stakeholders raised further reforms such as reserved seats for women and measures to reduce the high numbers of candidates. However, despite much public discussion, limited electoral reform has taken place to date (or over the past electoral cycle). While development partners have limited capacity to shape this agenda, they have retained a significant interest in electoral reform to the extent that it affects election delivery.

Australia’s involvement in electoral reform during the period 2015-17 focussed on supporting the re-convening of PNG’s Interdepartmental Election Committee (IDEC) as a whole-of-government coordination mechanism. Australia also advocated for the PNGEC to activate the Elections Advisory Committee (EAC) to provide external advice to the Electoral Commissioner. Stakeholders interviewed generally welcomed the roles played by the IDEC and EAC, though EAC members resigned before the first results were known, citing a lack of information from the PNGEC. While it appears that the EAC’s impact on electoral quality through formal means was less than anticipated, its engagement in the broader public domain helped foster discussion and debate around electoral issues. These two committees provide positive examples of Australia applying influence to improve electoral processes. Australia’s engagement on reform issues was considered by stakeholders to be appropriately pitched given the sensitivities surrounding electoral systems and reforms, PNG’s sovereign responsibility to deliver elections and the uncertainty of the benefits to be derived from engaging in reform[[17]](#footnote-17).

Post-election, there appear to be opportunities for Australia to engage in modest new ways to facilitate PNG-led reform. Firstly, there is the PNG Government’s formal review of PNG’s electoral framework involving the PNGEC, the PNG CLRC, and a number of government agencies. This process will require technical advice on the legal and practical implications of such reform options, which could be provided through Australian assistance and informed by Australian views on reform options.  Secondly, Australia could support reform-minded actors such as the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Commission (IPPCC), PNG CLRC and CSOs to develop feasible reform options and campaign for change in areas of mutual interest, such as mechanisms to guarantee women’s representation in Parliament. Finally, Australia could continue to look for public and private opportunities to selectively advocate for improved electoral processes, as with the IDEC and EAC examples above.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENGAGEMENT IN ELECTORAL REFORM**

• The design of the next phase of Australia’s electoral assistance should identify the principles and objectives of Australia’s influence in this area, and how best it can align with other elements of Australia’s electoral assistance.

• Continue to look for opportunities to support PNG-led electoral reforms with strong prospects of success and with potential to strengthen election delivery. This could take place through the provision of technical advice that informs the PNG Government’s formal review of its electoral framework.

**•** Support the development of feasible reform options in areas of mutual interest and continue to identify opportunities to selectively advocate for improved electoral processes.

**Rationale:**

Reforms to PNG’s electoral laws could potentially benefit not only electoral administration but also promote more meaningful engagement by citizens in electoral processes. However, the practicalities of implementing some reforms make them challenging, even if desirable. For this reason, there is a need for practical contextually-informed input from electoral experts. As one of PNG’s key electoral partners, Australia’s careful engagement on electoral reform and engagement with electoral stakeholders could be valued inputs into this process.

**Challenges:**

Australia’s engagement must be pragmatic, neutral and evidence-based to ensure lines are not crossed into areas of sovereign responsibility or intense elite contestation of PNG’s election laws and regulations. Australia’s support should not substitute for PNG-led reform agendas.

**3.7 Implementing Partners**

This section details the roles played by the key implementing partners associated with Australian electoral assistance to PNG in the lead-up to the 2017 election.[[18]](#footnote-18) The purpose of the section is to offer a succinct summary of each partner and to identify their achievements alongside potential areas for improvement. Two overarching findings, based on the observations of a number of interviewees, can be made in relation to the collective performance of the implementing partners during the period of the 2017 elections. **The first was that the partners (particularly the AEC and IFES) did not always coordinate well through either formal or informal co-ordinating mechanisms.** This point was made by a number of interviewees including those not from the two organisations. **The second observation is that the organisations’ work could have been more effective and efficient if it were guided by a clear overarching and cohesive strategy that ensured their various roles were complementary.**

**AEC**

**The foremost strength of the AEC is its ongoing relationship with the PNGEC, and the partnership that comes from the twinning relationship between electoral commissions.** Through various different modalities the AEC, or AEC staff, have developed a relationship with the PNGEC that spans numerous elections. Although it is more difficult to cultivate institutional relationships than it is individual relationships between electoral officials, **there have been clear benefits identified in maintaining an ongoing institutional partnership and in the peer to peer relationship between electoral commissions. Benefits include increased contextual understanding and strengthened communications.** Through its ongoing interactions with the PNGEC,[[19]](#footnote-19) the AEC has to some extent become a repository of institutional knowledge that assists not only its own electoral assistance work, but also the work of other Australian entities involved in electoral strengthening work in PNG. AEC deployees who were in PNG for the election displayed a detailed knowledge of the country context and electoral challenges. **The strengths and achievements of the AEC warrant a continued relationship.**

**However, there are some concerns about the AEC’s future engagement. Specifically, these concerns relate to limitations in the organisation’s recently adopted practice of only releasing staff to PNG for periods of six months or less.** Given the need for long-term relationship building, and for the development of contextual knowledge on behalf of AEC staff, this is a significant limitation. Strategies for overcoming this limitation will have to be adopted if the AEC is to fully and usefully engage in the future. It is understood that the AEC is actively reconsidering the tenure of future deployments.

The AEC expressed its desire to be included as a partner in the Institutional Partnerships Program (IPP).This appears to be a sensible move. If this does occur, the draft IPP design requires that a diagnostic assessment be undertaken of the PNGEC’s institutional capacity and a three-year rolling work plan be developed. **A workplan developed by AEC should provide a cornerstone for capacity support to PNGEC and be integrated within, and be informed by, an overarching program design.**

**IFES**

Stakeholders acknowledged the role IFES played in assistance with the 2017 election.[[20]](#footnote-20) Its engagement was generally appreciated by the PNGEC. **IFES brought useful benefits by virtue of being an international organisation and through its international knowledge.** There were major problems, however, with the results transmission and results reporting tools that IFES played a central role in designing. Such problems may have been avoided with greater attention to country context. **Concerns with IFES’s knowledge of the PNG context more broadly were raised by some stakeholders, although it should be emphasised that IFES’s contextual knowledge improved with time.** Also, IFES’s work on the corporate plan involved a greater use of resources than would have been devoted to such a task if adopting a more strategic approach to the allocation of those resources.

Some international stakeholders also reported early issues stemming from limited coordination between IFES and other international actors, although it was reported that coordination improved.

**There is potential for IFES to play a positive role in future electoral work in PNG.** The benefits of such work will be maximised if IFES’s work is coordinated as part of broader strategic management of all international actors, and if IFES focuses to a greater degree on tailoring all future activities to the particular challenges and strengths of the PNG context.

**The Australian Civilian Corps**

The deployment of the Australian Civilian Corps deployees was positively received by the PNGEC in 2017 and an improvement on the experiences of large numbers of deployees in 2012.[[21]](#footnote-21) **The deployment brought not only logistical assistance to PNG, but also valuable contacts for the ADF and other international actors providing electoral assistance.** The improvements between 2012 and 2017 stem largely from a smaller deployment and a lighter touch response on Australia’s behalf, that had been planned better, earlier. This provided improved value for money and was seen as less overbearing by PNG stakeholders. Other than in exceptional circumstances, this approach should be emulated in the future. The ACC’s **performance in 2017 also benefitted from deployees with experience in PNG.** Future engagement should be designed to ensure that similar experiences are drawn upon.

**The Governance Partnership**

At the time of the evaluation, the Governance Partnership was involved in the provision of technical assistance in areas of finance, ICT and data systems. During the election period, it also provided limited support for logistics and technical assistance for the PNGEC in the area of media communications.[[22]](#footnote-22) As detailed earlier in this report, **support provided to date appears to have been successful, particularly in the case of the assistance focused on finance and ICT.** **The benefits of the work are not necessarily likely to be sustained if the technical assistance is withdrawn**. However, this issue is not unique to the Governance Partnership engagement. The current Governance Partnership facility advisers demonstrated a very good understanding of the PNG context and this was a clear strength.

**Despite sustainability issues, there is a strong case for continuing support in areas of finance and ICT systems given their centrality to the ongoing functioning of the PNGEC.** Given the contextual knowledge possessed by the current Governance Partnership facility advisers, the Governance Partnership would seem to be a logical vehicle for continuing this support.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS**

* The Electoral Support Design Document that will structure Australian assistance over the next electoral period should include a specific plan that outlines the roles of the various implementing partners and structures their coordination. The AEC (if becoming an IPP Partner) could co-ordinate with a managing contractor that in turn manages contracted providers (such as IFES) and individually contracted advisers.
* AEC engagement should be continued. The AEC’s role should form the centrepiece of the electoral assistance partnership between Australia and PNG, with the AEC playing a central role in building enduring relationships. For this to occur, the AEC needs to improve the tenure of the deployment model it currently adopts. The AEC (if an IPP Partner) should (subject to PNGEC approval) work together with the Governance Partnership on the development of a capacity development workplan for the PNGEC. The AEC should continue to report directly to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
* Following the LLG elections, other than work on the Bougainville referendum, IFES’s role should be driven by demand for electoral support and the fit with the broader Electoral Support Design Document. It should also articulate with the AEC’s identified scope and tasks. If IFES demonstrates a continued ability to coordinate with other international actors alongside an increased understanding of the PNG context, it may have a role to play as an organisational partner. In future tendering processes for electoral support services, proven contextual knowledge should be an important selection requirement.
* The Governance Partnership facility advisers should be maintained in an ongoing manner on finance and ICT work. However, as the Electoral Support Design Document and the diagnostic assessment of the PNGEC are undertaken, the possibility of reducing or realigning resources devoted to these areas during some of the inter-election years could be investigated. This should be done cognisant of the risks associated with data and systems deterioration.
* Barring exceptional circumstances, support provided by the Australian Civilian Corps should be of a similar magnitude to that provided in 2017. The Australian Civilian Corps advisers should be selected with priority given to their experiences working in the PNG (or similar Melanesian) context.
* The LLG elections may place significant resource demands on the PNGEC and, although these elections are not central to Australia’s electoral engagement, there is potential value in having implementing partners in place that can assist, particularly given the LLG elections are likely to take place in the near term. Until the LLG elections, implementing partners working on areas of relevance to the LLG elections should be maintained.

**Rationale:**

Clear and agreed roles and responsibilities between providers will maximise the long-term partnership between Australia and PNG in its electoral work, ensuring a cost-effective division of labour that utilises each implementing partner on the basis of its respective strengths. If able to overcome the limitations of using short-term deployments, the AEC is a natural long-term partner for the PNGEC, as it is able to cultivate ongoing relationships and facilitate knowledge exchange. If it tailors its work to the PNG country context, IFES (or a similar entity) has the potential to contribute its international and electoral expertise. The Governance Partnership facility is a useful vehicle for providing specialist adviser support in crucial target areas, particularly if able to offer support that is informed by adviser contextual knowledge. As the successor program to the Australian Civilian Corps. Australia Assists could continue to provide essential logistical support for PNG’s 2022 national election. If provider support is informed by a design document, it can be structured to ensure value for money by focusing on areas where input is most needed. Such support can also be calibrated to provide optimal ongoing electoral assistance throughout the current electoral cycle, rather than using resources on activities not required during the inter-election period.

**Challenges:**

There are challenges in developing mechanisms for partner coordination that will need to be addressed in the Electoral Support Design Document. Coordination with the PNGEC may also be potentially challenging. Working alongside the AEC may provide an opportunity to address the co-ordination challenges. A final challenge will be managing the uncertainty of an electoral cycle shaped to a significant extent by GoPNG funding. Planning for a flexible electoral cycle approach is the best available solution to this challenge.

**4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The high-level evaluation question as to how and to what extent Australia’s electoral support has contributed to the delivery of well-managed elections in Papua New Guinea has been responded to by considering the following components to electoral support:

* PNGEC’s organisational capacity
* Election delivery
* Gender and Social Inclusion
* PNG’s Electoral Roll
* Voter Awareness
* Electoral Reform
* Implementing Partners

In assessing the above areas, it was found that there were significant challenges to the effectiveness of Australia’s contribution in supporting well-managed elections in PNG. However, given the scale of Australia’s contribution, and the counterfactual argument that the elections in PNG may have been more problematic without this support, the contribution made can be assessed as being reasonable under difficult circumstances. The evaluation determined that Australia should continue to invest in electoral support. Future support should, however, adopt a greater emphasis in ensuring that aid is fit for context, appropriate in its ambitions and able to be upscaled as opportunities for effective support arise.

Key constraints to Australia’s electoral support have been identified throughout the electoral cycle. Such constraints have emanated largely from factors outside the control of the Australian Government. Concerns with constraints in PNGEC funding and capacity to deliver elections; election delivery logistical challenges; slow progress in progressing gender and social inclusion; concerns with the integrity of the electoral roll; lack of cohesive voter awareness strategies; and limitations in capabilities to drive electoral reform have all been outlined and discussed in this report.

The evaluation found that Australia’s support was appreciated by the PNGEC and that it appeared to be aligned to its electoral needs. There was specific value derived from the contribution made in the immediate lead-up to the elections. Key delivery partners worked well in endeavouring to respond to PNGEC’s needs and contributed to the objectives of Australia’s support. The mix of implementing partners used, and the approach to electoral-cycle support, appeared to work well in a challenging context. There is room for improvement in delivery partner strategic planning, co-ordination and length of deployee tenure. Given the broader challenges of capacity building in the PNG context, further capacity building efforts should be carefully planned and executed.

**Overall Strategic Recommendations**

**Electoral Support Program** **Design**

1. That **DFAT prepare a new** **investment design** to guide its elections support to PNG over the future electoral cycle (2018-2022). An Electoral Support Design Document should be developed to outline program aims, objectives and anticipated outcomes over the election cycle, determining the nature and focus of required inputs over the election cycle. It is accepted that such a Design Document would need to allow for adaptation according to changing priorities and circumstances in both Australia and in PNG. The document should, however, endeavour to articulate a more intentional framework to guide program implementation, while still allowing for ongoing changes to be made to the focus and direction of the program over time. The document should balance prescriptiveness with open-ended flexibility and provide a middle-ground response that achieves the correct balance required for a politically and contextually sensitive program of this type. The document should be designed to be operational rather than overly-conceptual and structured to provide a practical road-map for DFAT to guide the way forward.

**Continued whole-of-cycle electoral support**

1. **Australia should continue to provide electoral assistance to PNG**. Such support should continue to adopt a focus on electoral assistance over the whole-of-cycle. Support should be flexible in the out years given the need for a realistic approach in response to likely restricted GoPNG funding to the PNGEC. Australia’s assistance should be designed with an awareness that contextual challenges make the whole-of-cycle approach an ideal that may be difficult to follow without an inbuilt ability to adapt.

**AEC-PNG Twinning Program**

1. The inclusion of the AEC as a partner in the Institutional Partnerships Program (IPP) is supported. If this occurs, the draft IPP design requires that **a diagnostic assessment be undertaken of the PNGEC’s institutional capacity and a three-year rolling workplan be developed**. Such a workplan should be integrated within, and be informed by, the overall electoral support program design.

**Specialist Election Expertise** **within DFAT**

1. **DFAT should** **build its expertise within the governance unit** in order to maintain its knowledge base in the area of electoral support to PNG. This recommendation aligns with the Making it Counts evaluation that recommended DFAT should build sustainable electoral assistance capability outside any singe program (Making it Count, 2017).

**Enhanced Co-ordination and Consolidation**

1. The **consolidation of management arrangements** **for the various electoral support modalities** is warranted to increase co-ordination and reduce any areas of duplication. The AEC (as a potential IPP partner) could coordinate with a managing contractor (PGF), that in turn manages contracted providers such as IFES and individually contracted advisers. All electoral support modalities would then report to the Australian High Commission with the PGF undertaking responsibility to coordinate such reporting. This recommendation is consistent with the ‘Making it Count’ evaluation report (2017) and its recommendation that electoral support should be located within DFAT’s wider strategy for effective governance in a country, and more clearly integrated with other governance programs, supported by effective coordination, management and diplomatic engagement.

**Provincial Engagement**

1. Given the ongoing process of decentralisation, a focus should be placed on provincial engagement on the basis that electoral quality is largely determined at the provincial level. **Electoral assistance should be informed by, and responsive to regional variation.** In this context, it is recommended that future electoral support should carefully consider opportunities to engage at provincial and regional levels, acknowledge the importance of provincial electoral commissions and respond to the variation between regions.

**Operational Recommendations**

Specific recommendations have been made throughout the report related to elections delivery, as follows. See specific sections for rationale and challenges associated with each of the recommendations:

**Capacity building of PNGEC**

1. **Ongoing technical assistance associated with the PNGEC’s capacity should be continued.** A diagnostic assessment should also be undertaken to ascertain areas where that assistance can most usefully be targeted (see Recommendation 3). Assessments should focus both on need and actual constraints faced by the PNGEC. It should not be assumed that all needs can be met with further training. To maximise value for money, technical assistance should focus foremost on areas that are crucial to organisational functioning such as financial management, or which are central to electoral delivery, such as the roll. Effort should not be expended on areas such as corporate plans.
2. **Capacity building should also be designed to strengthen ongoing relationships between implementing partners, the aid program, and the PNGEC**. Capacity building should be undertaken with the understanding that strengthened relationships will deliver benefits above and beyond raising the capacity of individual staff. It should also be understood that work around capacity has an important role to play in international actors’ own learning of the PNG electoral context. The capacity assessment and subsequent planning exercises should also be undertaken cognisant of the **crucial role of provincial electoral staff** in ensuring that elections are successfully run. Reflecting this, future capacity building work should be designed in a manner that ensures provincial needs are met. It should also be **tailored to reflect regional variations within PNG.**
3. **Coordination between the different organisations providing the assistance** should be carefully managed in line with broader strategic planning to ensure individual implementing partners are delivering in a coordinated way and as per their respective strengths.

**Support to Election Delivery**

1. Australia should continue to provide **short-term logistical support** through the Australian Civilian Corps (and also the ADF) in lead up to and conduct of elections.
2. Issues with polling day technology should not preclude use of such technology in the future. Given PNG's geographical constraints, such technology can provide for more rapid and accurate provision of results. In other recent elections in PNG, reporting and transmission technology has been used with some success. However, **technology needs to be carefully designed** **so it works within the bounds of available capacity**. Technology should be tested thoroughly in advance. **Reporting tools should be designed to provide ease of use and maximum electoral transparency.**

**Gender and Social Inclusion**

1. Given the need to advance opportunities for women to be elected in the 2022 national election; strategies to effectively support women in the PNGEC and as AEMs; and the implementation of measures to ensure safety for women during elections, **gender and inclusivity should be prioritised in the new Electoral Support Design.**
2. Opportunities to **advance the case for the introduction of Temporary Special Measures (TSMs**) should be identified and capitalised upon as they arise. The PNG Government’s formal 18th month review of electoral system provides one such entry point for advocacy on TSMs.
3. Candidate training has been funded to prepare women candidates for the 2022 elections. This should continue across the coming electoral cycle. The program should also gather evidence on an ongoing basis as to the benefits of participation with longitudinal tracking of **outcomes for women candidates over time**. Findings generated should be widely shared with other *Pacific Women* leadership programs for mutual learning, and such sharing supported by the Women in Political Leadership Reference Group. Consideration should be given to identifying and supporting **a broader base of capable and motivated women candidates at the sub-national level** who may go on to contest nationally. WILSP and its Reference Group could identify **ancillary supports from allied gender programs** to raise female candidate profiles, build their grassroots support base and support them to develop strategies for raising campaign finance.
4. **Linkages with other *Pacific Women* programs** attempting to positively shape community attitudes toward women participating in the political sphere, in government and business, and as active community citizens, should be identified and built upon. Such initiatives could include gender programs operating in other Pacific contexts. Where such programming exists, findings from research and evaluation need to be widely shared for mutual learning and potential transferability. **Linkages should be encouraged across and between *Pacific Women* and other programs**, particularly the governance programs, and with relevant PNG Government agencies with an interest in supporting women’s political representation.  **Linkages could also be developed with initiatives that are not specific to improving women’s participation in electoral processes but have a broader remit** such as the Pacific Islands Australia and New Zealand Electoral Administrators Network (PIANZEA); Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE); and other electoral programs operating through the AEC.
5. Further **strategies to support women in the PNGEC** and AEMs should continue to be explored, scoped and introduced. Following needs analysis, women should be linked to appropriate training and leadership/management development programs that can be accessed to further build their skills and competencies and position them for career advancement within the organisation. In instances, these programs may be available through the Pacific Leadership and Governance Precinct, based at the University of Papua New Guinea.
6. Efforts should be made to explore ways of **ensuring women’s safety during polling** (such as for the Highlands multiple days for voting rather than one day voting and more polling stations which cater to fewer voters). Further efforts should be made to ensure the application of the PNGEC’s policy on gender segregated queuing, especially in polling areas where large crowds emerge due to one day polling.

**Electoral Roll**

1. Australian electoral assistance should **continue to engage with roll-related issues**. Work should involve sustained partnerships and should continue across the electoral cycle. Assistance should be limited in the first instance, focused on advice and some technical input. Australia should not drive or be seen to lead efforts to improve the roll. Engagement should only be increased if GoPNG provides sufficient resources to significantly improve the roll and if domestically driven solutions are viewed as practicable.

**Voter Awareness**

1. There should be **testing of the varying approaches** to voter awareness by comparing CSO funded engagement, print and multi-media products, media campaigns, and other approaches to evaluate the effectiveness of the different strategies and their applicability to different contexts. This project could be undertaken on a modest basis during a by-election or over a series of by-elections. Though there are inherent challenges in generalisability given PNGs’ diversity, such a project could focus on Highland/Island differences to ensure **transferability of learnings**.
2. The **overall objectives of voter awareness** **need to be sharpened** to identify whether the purpose of supporting voter awareness is to provide education regarding the mechanics of voting; to deliver civic education that promotes democratic processes; to advance gender equality through messaging; or to ameliorate coercive and intimidating behaviours before, during and following elections. Once the purpose and objectives for messaging are determined (how to vote, motivating people to vote, and/or encouraging positive voter behaviour) it is suggested that the **strategies developed are clearly articulated and customised to the context.** Efforts should also ensure that **operational funding for the dissemination** **of voter awareness products** is well scoped during the development of voting awareness products to maximise opportunities for distribution

**Electoral Reform**

1. The design of the next phase of Australia’s electoral assistance should identify the **principles and objectives of Australia’s influence in this area**, and how best it can align with other elements of Australia’s electoral assistance.
2. Australia’s electoral assistance should **continue to look for opportunities to support PNG-led electoral reforms** with strong prospects of success and with potential to strengthen election delivery. This could take place through the provision of technical advice that informs the PNG Government’s formal review of its electoral framework. Australia’s electoral assistance should support the development of **feasible reform options in areas of mutual interest** and continue to identify opportunities to selectively advocate for improved electoral processes.

**Implementing partners**

1. The Electoral Support Design Document that will structure Australian assistance over the next electoral period should include a specific plan that **outlines the roles of the various implementing partners and structures their coordination**. See Recommendation 5 above on the potential role of the AEC (if becoming an IPP Partner) in undertaking co-ordination with a managing contractor that in turn manages contracted providers (such as IFES) and individually contracted advisers.
2. **AEC engagement should be continued**. The AEC’s role should form the centrepiece of the electoral assistance partnership between Australia and PNG, with the AEC playing a central role in building enduring relationships. For this to occur, the AEC needs to improve the tenure of the deployment model it currently adopts. The AEC (if an IPP Partner) should (subject to PNGEC approval) work together with the Governance Partnership on the **development of a capacity development workplan for the PNGEC** (as outlined in recommendation 3 above).
3. Following the LLG elections, other than work on the Bougainville referendum, IFES’s role should be **driven by demand for electoral support and the fit with the broader** **Electoral Support Design Document**. It should also articulate with the AEC’s identified scope and tasks. If IFES demonstrates a continued ability to coordinate with other international actors alongside an increased understanding of the PNG context, it may have a role to play as an organisational partner. In future tendering processes for electoral support services, proven contextual knowledge should be an important selection requirement.
4. The **Governance Partnership facility advisers should be maintained** in an ongoing manner on finance and ICT work. However, as the Design Document and the diagnostic assessment of the PNGEC are undertaken, the possibility of reducing or realigning resources devoted to these areas during some of the inter-election years could be investigated. This should be done cognisant of the risks associated with data and systems deterioration.
5. Barring exceptional circumstances, support provided by the **Australian Civilian Corps should be of a similar magnitude to that provided in 2017**. The Australian Civilian Corps deployees should be selected with priority given to their experiences working in the PNG (or similar Melanesian) context.
6. The LLG elections may place significant resource demands on the PNGEC and, although these elections are not central to Australia’s electoral engagement, there is potential value in having implementing partners in place that can assist, particularly given the LLG elections are likely to take place in the near term. **Until the LLG elections, implementing partners working on areas of relevance to the LLG elections should be maintained.**

**APPENDIX 1 EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Effectiveness Questions** | **Stakeholders for specific Focus** | **Supporting Documents** |
| **Meta Evaluation Question** | | |
| How and to what extent has Australia’s electoral support contributed to the delivery of well-managed elections in Papua New Guinea? | * DFAT perspectives (PNG Branch, Governance Branch, ODE, AHC PNG) * Contracted agency perspectives (PNG Governance Partnership, *Pacific Women*, IFES, ANU) * PNG perspectives (Electoral Commissions, Parties and Candidates, Defence and Police, Civil Society) * AEC Canberra * Other Donors/Contributors (MFAT, UNDP, ACC deployees) * Other analysts/commentators (ANU, TI, EU, Commonwealth) | * DFAT Strategies: PNG Electoral Support 2015-18; Effective Governance 2015 * One Year Out assessments AEC (2016) * Post-election assessments: (TI Report 2017; ACC Completion Report; EU election observer report, Commonwealth Observer Group Report 2017) * Evaluations (ODE Evaluation 2006-16; DFAT Evaluation of Australia’s Electoral Assistance 2000-2012) * DFAT-IFES Grant Agreements * DFAT-AEC Record of Activity Schedule * Aid Quality Checks 2015- 2017 * Partner Performance Assessments – IFES * AEC and IFES reporting to DFAT |
| How well was Australia’s support aligned to PNG’s electoral needs? | * DFAT Post PNG Program Managers * PNG perspectives (Electoral Commissions, Parties and Candidates, Defence and Police, Civil Society) * DPA ANU | * One Year Out assessments AEC (2016) * Post-election assessments: (TI Report 2017; ACC Completion Report; EU election observer report; Commonwealth Observer Group Report 2017) * 2012 Evaluation Report * AEC and IFES reporting to DFAT |
| How effectively did key delivery partners contribute to the objectives of Australia’s support? | * DFAT Post PNG Program Managers * Contracted agency perspectives (PNG Governance Partnership, *Pacific Women*, IFES, ANU) * AEC * Australian Civilian Corps | * DFAT-IFES Grant Agreements * DFAT-AEC Record of Activity Schedule * Aid Quality Checks 2015- 2017 * Partner Performance Assessments – IFES * AEC and IFES reporting to DFAT |
| What were the key constraints to Australia’s electoral support?  Are there additional areas where Australia should prioritise providing support in the future? | All Stakeholder perspectives | * One Year Out assessments AEC * Post-election assessments: (TI Report 2017; ACC Completion Report; EU election observer report, Commonwealth Observer Group Report 2017) * Evaluations (ODE Evaluation 2006-16; DFAT Evaluation of Australia’s Electoral Assistance 2000-2012) * AEC and IFES reporting to DFAT |
| **Efficiency Questions** | **Stakeholders for specific Focus** | **Supporting Documents** |
| Was Australia’s electoral support implemented in an efficient and cost-effective way?  Considering mix of implementing partners used, approach to electoral-cycle support comparted to previous surge-style support | * DFAT Post PNG Program Managers * Contracted agency perspectives * PNG perspectives * AEC Canberra * Other Donors/Contributors * Other analysts/commentators | * DFAT Strategies: PNG Electoral Support 2015-18; Effective Governance 2015 * One Year Out assessments AEC (2016) * Post-election assessments: (TI Report 2017; ACC Completion Report; EU election observer report; Commonwealth Observer Group Report 2017) * Evaluations (ODE Evaluation 2006-16; DFAT Evaluation of Australia’s Electoral Assistance 2000-2012) * DFAT-IFES Grant Agreements * DFAT-AEC Record of Activity Schedule * Aid Quality Checks 2015-2017 * Partner Performance Assessments – IFES * AEC and IFES reporting to DFAT |
| **Sustainability Questions** | **Stakeholders for specific Focus** | **Supporting Documents** |
| To what extent has Australia’s electoral support built the capacity of the PNGEC and other PNG Government stakeholders in the long term? | * DFAT Post PNG Program Managers * Contracted agency perspectives * PNG perspectives – national and provincial * AEC Canberra * IFES * Other Donors/Contributors * Other analysts/commentators | * DFAT Strategies: PNG Electoral Support 2015-18; Effective Governance 2015 * One Year Out assessments AEC (2016) * Post-election assessments: (TI Report 2017; ACC Completion Report; EU election observer report; Commonwealth Observer Group Report 2017) * Evaluations (ODE Evaluation 2006-16; DFAT Evaluation of Australia’s Electoral Assistance 2000-2012) * AEC and IFES reporting to DFAT |
| **Gender Inclusiveness Questions** | **Stakeholders for specific Focus** | **Supporting Documents** |
| How and to what extent has Australia’s electoral support increased participation of women in the electoral process?  What opportunities exist to strengthen support for the participation and empowerment of women and people with a disability in the electoral process? | * DFAT Post PNG Program Managers * Gender Program DFAT Canberra * Pacific Women PNG * DPA ANU * PNG perspectives * Other Donors/Contributors * Other analysts/commentators * NRI | * DFAT Strategies: PNG Electoral Support 2015-18; Effective Governance 2015 * Post-election assessments: (TI Report 2017; ACC Completion Report; EU election observer report; Commonwealth Observer Group Report 2017) * Evaluations (ODE Evaluation 2006-16; DFAT Evaluation of Australia’s Electoral Assistance 2000-2012) * AEC and IFES reporting to DFAT |
| **Unanticipated Issues** | All Stakeholders |  |

**Appendix 2 Stakeholders Interviewed**

**DFAT Canberra**

* Andrew Gavin, John Cullen, Lisa McCracken, Anthony Mason, Governance and Political teams
* Jacinta Overs, Office of Development Effectiveness
* Geoff King

**DFAT PNG**

* **Bruce Davis, High Commissioner**
* Caitlin Wilson, Deputy High Commissioner
* Jennifer Mason, Counsellor (Political)
* Brendan Peace, Counsellor (Subnational Development)
* Simon Dawkins, Second Secretary (Economic)
* Gina Wilson, Counsellor (Law & Justice)
* Alison Gow, Second Secretary (Law & Justice)

**PNGEC**

* Patilias Gamato, PNG Electoral Commissioner
* Reuben Kaiulo, Special Adviser
* John Kalamoroh, Deputy Commissioner
* Simon Sinai, Deputy Commissioner
* Kila
* Margaret Vagi

**PROVINCIAL OFFICES – EASTERN HIGHLANDS**

* Samson Akunali, Provincial Administrator
* Steven Kaupa, Provincial Election Manager
* Lucy Gideon, Assistant Provincial Election manager
* Simon P
* James Piapia, Zone A Highlands Co-ordinator
* Livi Koki, Elections Advisory Committee Member
* Terry Warigi, Returning Officer
* Jurere Marco, Assistant Returning Officer

**PROVINCIAL OFFICES – EAST NEW BRITAIN**

* Levi Mano, Deputy Provincial Administrator
* Oscar Pidian, Member Provincial Elections Committee
* Thomas Monep, Bapal, Peter Lapin Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers
* Theresa Sam, Assistant Returning Officer
* Danley Puapena, Provincial Election Steering Committee Secretariat
* Joap Voivoi, Election Manager

**IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS**

**AEC**

* Skye Rogers, Sarah and Amy
* Jennifer Burgess (former AEC)

**IFES:**

* Paul Rowland, Chief of Party
* Robert Irish, Deputy Chief of Party

**Governance Partnership**

* Johanne Bawden
* Tony Carby

**ACC**

* Roger Wheatly
* Franck Boulay

**Royal PNG Constabulary (RPNGC)**

* David Seine, Provincial Police Commander Eastern Highlands
* Anton Billie, Assistant Police Commissioner, Joseph Tabali, Provincial Police Commander, Daniel Kyvar, Kokopo Police Station Commander

**Australian Defence**

* COL David Buller, Head of Australian Defence Staff
* Jennifer Howitt

**Media**

* Agnes Inape, Manager (NBC Eastern Highlands)
* Mapun Pidian (NBC East New Britain)

**Election Experts/Commentators:**

* ANU: Bill Standish, Julien Barbara, Steve Hogg, Therese Meki, Kerryn Bake, Joanne Ridolfi, Nicole Haley
* Transparency International PNG: Arianne Kassman, Executive Director; Richard Kassman; Yuambari Haihuie
* Dr Thomas Webster, Mary Fario and Sara Kaut-Nassenbaum PNG National Research Institute
* Ray Kennedy, UNDP
* Fr Mathias Lopa, Caritas PNG East New Britain Representative
* Kennedy, Emmanuel and Madeline, Registrar of Political Parties

**Pacific Women Shaping Pacific Development Program**

* Richelle Tickle, Country Manager

**Female Candidates**

* Julie Soso, Former Governor and Goroka Regional Candidate, 2017 National Election
* Julienne Leka-Maliaki, Rigo Open Candidate, 2017 National Election
* Rufina Peter, Central Provincial Candidate, 2017 National Election

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1. Author calculations based on Australian electoral spending reflected in Table 1 and PNGEC data (PNGEC, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The Australian Civilian Corps finished in December 2017 and was replaced by the Australia Assists. Australia Assists deploys Australian specialists to work with governments, multilateral agencies and communities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural disasters and conflict. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. 2014 is chosen as a start point because, earlier assistance is unlikely to have been focused on the 2017 election. Australian figures exclude the costs of the ADF for which data were not available. If estimated ADF costs are included, the percentage might very approximately be in the vicinity of 15%. PNG figures exclude government of PNG spending on regular operational costs for the PNGEC. Figures based on author calculations of Australian spending and PNG data (PNGEC, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Australian Civilian Corps deployees were primarily involved in logistical training in the immediate lead up to the election. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The ongoing assistance is now, in part, focused on the 2018 LLG elections. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Naturally, there is overlap between the two areas of work. The distinction is made here to enable clarity of reporting. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Two additional deployees had some involvement in 2016 but were not able to complete their planned deployments. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The on-line results reporting tool can be found at <http://results.pngec.gov.pg/#results>. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. It should be noted that results transmission issues did not undermine electoral integrity as results were also transmitted, after the fact, through other means. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Voters whose names have been allocated to a different ward to the ward they currently live in may also be prevented from voting, either because they cannot find, or travel to, the ward they are enrolled in, or because they are prevented from doing this by threats of violence (an issue in some parts of the country). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Estimates are based on census data (Papua New Guinea National Statistics Office, 2013) scaled to reflect population growth, contrasted with roll data from the PNGEC (PNGEC, 2017). As a comparator, census data are imperfect owing to issues with the 2011 census. For this reason the estimates can be taken as suggestive only. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The term roll cleaning refers to the process through which the names of voters, which should not be on the roll are removed. In instances, this involves removing names of people who have enrolled twice. In other instances, it involves removing the names of voters who are either dead or ineligible to vote. The process, may also involve the reallocation of voters who have inadvertently been enrolled in the wrong ward. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. This online application was not funded with electoral assistance and should not be confused with the SMS roll application that IFES were associated with. The SMS roll application was not developed owing to an insufficient GoPNG funding to the PNGEC. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The AEC also assisted with Photo Roll trials in five locations in PNG in 2014. As this exercise falls outside the period covered in this evaluation it has not been included here. Significant challenges were associated with these trials in some parts of the country (DFAT AQC, 2017) are indicative of the importance of contextual fit in choice of technology. IFES provided advice on the decentralisation of roll compilation (DFAT AQC, 2016; DFAT PPA, 2017). Decentralisation brought significant challenges in parts of the Highlands and some of these risks were anticipated by other international actors (DFAT PPA, 2017). It is not likely IFES played a determinative role in the decision around decentralisation; however, a better appreciation of contextual challenges by IFES would have been beneficial. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Technological innovations can play a beneficial role in the electoral process. The New Zealand funded electronic payment system for Temporary Election Workers encountered some problems but was regarded as largely successful by most stakeholders. It facilitated payments for roughly 75% of the temporary electoral workforce (PNGEC, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. In 2017, 1.61% of ballots were invalid. This compares with 2012 where the informality rate was slightly higher at 1.94%. The rate of invalid votes thus fell slightly in 2017 when compared with 2012 (PNGEC Report to Parliament, 2017). It is difficult to attribute this reduction in informality rates to voter awareness strategies as voters may have become more familiar with LPV after another election cycle. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. For example, while Australia provided relatively intense reform support in the years leading to PNG’s 2012 national election, a significant surge in support was still required to deliver the election. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. It does not cover the ADF as an assessment of their assistance was not within the remit of this evaluation. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. From January 2015 to May 2018 (inclusive) a total of 45 AEC staff visited Port Moresby, including staff from the AEC-PNGEC Twinning Program, staff assisting with specialised projects, and senior staff providing mentoring and participating in the PNG-Development Partners Steering Committee. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Over November 2015 to March 2018 IFES had a small presence based in Port Moresby (one adviser from November 2015-June 2017, and two advisers from June 2017-present). This was supplemented by 13 short term international advisers who made 41 visits to PNG between November 2015-March 2018 for an average duration of 27 days. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. The Australian Civilian Corps deployed nine members to PNG between October 2016 and August 2017 for durations of between two and ten months. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The current Governance Partnership deployment involves one person working on finance advice and one on ICT systems advice. During the election one person was engaged on logistics and two consultants were engaged on media work. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)