Timor-Leste Development Cooperation Report 2010

May 2011

## Summary

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This Development Cooperation Report summarises the bilateral aid program’s progress in 2010 towards the objectives of the Timor-Leste Country Strategy. Reports on the program’s performance in previous years are available on the Australian Agency for International Development’s (AusAID) website.

Context

Having achieved a third year of relative stability the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) has signalled its intention to move rapidly towards growth and development for all. The Prime Minister and most Cabinet members spent much of 2010 drafting the Strategic Development Plan (SDP) and discussing it with communities throughout the country. The Prime Minister intends the SDP to set out the vision of Timor-Leste’s priorities to 2030.

While the draft plan has been tightly held, and is not scheduled for release until mid-2011, an early summary, presented to the April 2010 Development Partners meeting, clearly indicates a focus on increased spending on major infrastructure development to drive continued economic growth. This was confirmed by the creation of two new special funds in the 2011 Budget—the US$599 million Infrastructure Fund (which accounts for most of the $688 million capital budget) and the US$25 million Human Capital Development Fund.[[1]](#footnote-2) The Prime Minister’s determination to set government priorities without interference from outsiders, highlighted in last year’s Development Cooperation Report (DCR), continued, with ongoing development of the SDP taking place without the engagement of development partners.

Government expenditure has increased significantly over the past decade. Budgeted expenditure rose from only US$64 million in 2001–02 to US$660 million in 2010. Budgeted expenditure in 2010 was almost identical to 2009, but revisions to the budget increased available funds to US$838 million, a 23 per cent increase on the previous year. Reported budget execution rates increased from 71 per cent in 2001–02 to 91 per cent in 2010.[[2]](#footnote-3) Through the 2011 Budget the GoTL plans to significantly increase its expenditure to US$1.3 billion, a 56 per cent increase on its final Budget for 2010.

Some important development indicators are improving. Between 2007 and 2009, the proportion of the population living below the poverty line fell by an estimated nine percentage points (from 49.9 to 41 per cent).[[3]](#footnote-4) This represents a correction of the sharp spike in poverty occasioned by conflict in 2006 and 2008—while moving in the right direction, poverty remains above 1999 levels (36 per cent).[[4]](#footnote-5) The economy continues to grow rapidly, fuelled by government spending, although this is largely concentrated in Dili. It is estimated that the economy grew by 9.5 per cent in 2010, compared to 13 per cent in 2009.[[5]](#footnote-6) Growth of between 7 and 10 per cent is forecast for 2011.[[6]](#footnote-7) Estimated annual average growth has been above 10 per cent since negative growth in 2007. Growth in per capita gross domestic product has been slower given the country’s annual population growth of more than 2 per cent.[[7]](#footnote-8) Public financial management (PFM) systems are improving, especially in the Ministry of Finance (MoF).

Nevertheless, great challenges remain. Illiteracy rates are high, and most children drop out of school before completing their basic education.[[8]](#footnote-9) Unemployment and under-employment remain high—70 per cent of those employed are engaged in informal work and thus highly vulnerable.[[9]](#footnote-10) Plentiful oil money means public spending is growing rapidly, but the quality of expenditure is questionable and the double-digit growth rates will not be sustainable in the absence of private sector growth. In spite of skills gaps, the public service has grown rapidly since 2002, and payroll costs more than tripled between 2008 and 2011. Although good progress on disability inclusiveness was made with the drafting of the National Policy on Disability, people with disability remain largely hidden, due to high levels of stigma and discrimination.

The handover of responsibility for policing from United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste to Timorese institutions proceeded without incident during 2010 and early 2011. The longer-term trends in public safety are as yet unclear and as a post-conflict country, Timor-Leste retains the potential for suffering security shocks or crises. Presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2012 may test the community’s commitment to peaceful resolution of differences and the *Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste’s* (PNTL) ability to respond effectively to disturbances.

Another potential stressor is food security. Extended rains in 2010 meant that while some farmers increased crop volumes, others experienced flooding and losses, including of seed stocks. Food security has always been precarious: more than half of children under five years of age in Timor-Leste are stunted and a third of women have inadequate nutritional status.[[10]](#footnote-11)

Communities are therefore ill-prepared for any lengthening of the annual ‘hungry season’ experienced when their grain stores are exhausted.

Timor-Leste’s Constitution provides for the decentralisation of public administration. Draft local government laws produced in 2009 propose decentralised municipal governments at the level of the current districts. However, the Government has deferred decentralisation until after 2012 and has struggled to strengthen governance at sub-national level. At the same time, 2010 saw the Government continue to flood the districts with money through grant packages, including the Decentralisation and Development Package for procurement of small-scale infrastructure and budgeting for the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Suco Program. This indicates continuing government interest in spreading the country’s wealth to the districts.

The global financial crisis and other international events have affected the ability of some of Timor-Leste’s traditional donors to remain engaged, at least to previous levels. Multilateral relationships are changing: the United Nations plans to draw down its mission in 2012; and Timor’s increased gross national income means it has dramatically less access to grant funds from the international financial institutions. As a result, both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are shifting their focus to infrastructure lending. Donor coordination at sectoral level improved over 2010, chiefly driven by donors.

Program objectives

Australia is the largest donor in Timor-Leste and our development assistance in 2010 is equivalent to approximately 11 per cent of the State Budget.[[11]](#footnote-12) The spread of Australian assistance (excluding that implemented through the Australian Federal Police) is outlined in Figure 1 below. Australia is an increasingly influential leader in several sectors of focus for the program and is engaged in constructive policy discussion with relevant ministries. However, the highest levels of Government continued to have few incentives to engage in policy discussion with Australia. AusAID’s relationship with the Prime Minister warmed towards the end of 2010 with the Prime Minister keen to discuss innovative ideas to address the Government’s top priorities. But to influence Timor-Leste in its future spending pattern and ensure real results in alleviating poverty, AusAID must position itself as a useful partner in implementing the forthcoming SDP.

**Figure 1: Estimated AusAID Timor-Leste expenditure (2010-11)[[12]](#footnote-13)**



## Expenditure

Table 1: Estimated expenditure in 2009–10

| Objective | $ million | % of bilateral program |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Health | 9.5 | 9.4 |
| Education and youth employment | 7.6 | 7.5 |
| Rural water, sanitation and hygiene behaviour change | 14.1 | 13.8 |
| Infrastructure | 5.2 | 5.1 |
| Agriculture productivity and food security | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Public sector and democratic governance | 7.1 | 7.0 |
| Public financial management | 6.5 | 6.4 |
| Resilience to natural emergencies | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Violence against women | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Policing capacity (Australian Federal Police) | 34.7 | 34.1 |
| Justice (AusAID) | 8.3 | 8.2 |

Progress against objectives

In 2010 Australia changed how it analyses aid performance in Timor-Leste. In a number of areas, we moved from analysing progress of Australian-funded programs to examining overall progress in a sector. Sector performance frameworks were developed for sectors in which we (i) intend to make a significant, long-term contribution to systemic reform and (ii) can clearly state the *shared development outcomes* to which Australia is significantly *contributing*. This DCR rates and discusses shared progress against these shared development outcomes, drawing on the indicators and performance questions set by the relevant sector performance framework. The quality of Australia’s *contribution* to these outcomes is also discussed, but the rating is focused on shared progress rather than Australia’s progress alone. This shift towards rating shared progress against shared outcomes represents an acceptance that Australia and Timor-Leste also share accountability for progress. Where shared progress is inadequate, this brings into question whether Australia is doing the right thing in the sector, or whether we should change our approach.

In sectors where sector performance frameworks have not yet been developed, outcomes statements are drawn from the 2009 DCR, which are based on the Australia – Timor-Leste Country Strategy. Although many of these sectors have multiple outcome statements, one overall rating was agreed for each, as the shared outcome statements may change when sector performance frameworks are developed. These overall ratings were agreed as part of the 2010 DCR drafting process. Sector performance frameworks for some of these sectors will be developed in 2011.

Table 2: Ratings of progress in 2010 towards the objectives of the Timor-Leste program[[13]](#footnote-14)

| Objective | Rating in 2010 | Relative to previous rating |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Country strategy objective 1: Strengthen basic health and education service delivery** |
| *Health* |
| Adequate and predictable national and district operational budgets for health |  | Not applicable |
| Quality preventative and promotive health services which reflect resources available |  | Not applicable |
| Equitable distribution of an adequate number of skilled and motivated health workers |  | Not applicable |
| Improved health sector procurement and logistics |  | Not applicable |
| *Education and youth employment* |
| By 2015 quality basic education is available for children, and dropouts are almost reduced to zero. |  | Not applicable |
| By 2012, at national, regional and school levels there is the capacity to provide effective and efficient education management against the strategic plan.  |  | Not applicable |
| A tertiary and vocational education competency framework is developed to support recognition of Timor-Leste qualifications and create stronger links with the labour market. |  | Not applicable |
| **Country strategy objective 2: Increasing employment** |
| *Rural water, sanitation and hygiene behaviour change* |
| District and central authorities improve planning and resourcing for sustainable and equitable delivery of rural water, sanitation and hygiene services |  | Not applicable |
| Increase in government and community capacity to build, rehabilitate and maintain water supply systems |  | Not applicable |
| Increase in government and community capacity to improve hygiene and sanitation practices |  | Not applicable |
| *Infrastructure*> Improved budget execution of the Government of East Timor’s capital works program> Improved capacity of the Ministry of Infrastructure for capital works procurement> Rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads |  | Unchanged |
| *Agricultural Productivity and Food Security* |
| Improved food security through increased productivity of major food crops |  | Not applicable |
| Increased access to rural financial services |  | Not applicable |
| **Country strategy objective 3: Improving government accountability, transparency and integrity** |
| *Public sector and democratic governance*> To help establish and develop central agencies, in line with GoTL’s public sector reform agenda> To help establish and implement a regulatory framework for, and enable provision of training to, the public sector> To build functional formal political institutions and respect for democratic processes> To build effective relations between the state and communities |  | Unchanged |
| *Public financial management*> To strengthen systems and processes in the areas of planning, budgeting, public expenditure management and revenue administration in the MoF > To build human resource capacity within the MoF  |  | Unchanged |
| **Country strategy objective 4: Building the foundations of a safer community** |
| *Resilience to natural emergencies* |  | Not applicable |
| *Combating violence against women* |  | Not applicable |
| *Policing capacity and justice* |  |  |
| Helping to build the foundations of a more effective and accountable police service |  | Unchanged |
| Achieve fair and timely access to justice for children, women, and men in Timor-Leste |  | Not applicable |

Note:

 The objective will be fully achieved within the timeframe of the strategy.

 The objective will be partly achieved within the timeframe of the strategy.

 The objective is unlikely to be achieved within the timeframe of the strategy.

## Sector: Health

### Sector context

In the 10 years following Independence, Timor-Leste has made good progress towards establishing a functioning health system. It has a basic health workforce, physical infrastructure and a pharmaceutical supply system. There is reliable evidence that some health indicators are improving, particularly child and neonatal mortality rates due, for example, to an increase in the proportion of births attended by skilled health workers and immunisation rates.[[14]](#footnote-15) Trends in providing basic health service delivery for women are generally positive. For example, in 2003 only 13.9 per cent of women received four or more antenatal check ups; by the end of 2009 this was 55 per cent.[[15]](#footnote-16)

Despite significant gains in the sector, health outcomes remain poor. Timorese still continue to die in high numbers from common and preventable diseases, including malaria and respiratory illness. In 2009 life expectancy at birth was around 62 years.[[16]](#footnote-17) The country is unlikely to meet any of its health-related MDGs by 2015, and women and children are disproportionately affected by poor health. It is estimated that Timor-Leste's maternal mortality rate is still somewhere between 440 and 557 deaths per 100 000 live births, while the infant mortality is around 44 deaths per 1000 live births.[[17]](#footnote-18) Adequate nutrition also remains a serious problem, with rates of stunting for children under the age of five at 58 per cent and wasting at 19 per cent in 2009.[[18]](#footnote-19) These figures represent an increase over the past six years, meaning that the MDG of a 50 per cent reduction in the prevalence of underweight children under five years of age by 2015 will be hard to achieve.

Compounding the problem are poor literacy rates and hygiene practices, along with poor infrastructure, including lack of clean water supply and basic sanitation facilities, especially outside Dili. While a network of primary and some specialist health-care facilities exists, the rural population still has difficulty accessing care when they need it due, in large part, to distance and the poor quality of rural roads. Available services are also under-used for a range of social and cultural reasons.

Shared progress

The health care system in Timor-Leste is funded by the GoTL, a range of development partners and the private sector. The Government’s vision is that all Timorese will have access to primary health care by 2030. The Government is developing a new National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011–30 (NHSSP) (due for release in the second half of 2011) to replace the existing Health Sector Strategic Plan 2008–12 (HSSP), which focused in the short term on achieving the MDGs. The new NHSP outlines national health priorities and strategies, including the need to strengthen collaboration between the Ministry of Health and its development partners within the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

Australia is the largest donor in the health sector. Other key players include the World Bank, which manages a multi-donor trust fund, through which AusAID provides support for the HSSP, together with the Cuban Medical Brigade, United States Agency for International

Development and non-government organisations (NGOs). Most development partners operating outside the trust fund are supporting projects and activities that also contribute to the HSSP.

Progress in the sector would benefit from stronger government leadership, particularly on the issue of donor coordination, together with reduced fragmentation and a real commitment from all players to achieving results. The achievement of high-quality health outcomes across Timor-Leste has been hampered by the proliferation and poor coordination of donor activities with well over 100 donor-funded, health-related projects being delivered through the Ministry of Health and NGOs.

 Australia’s investment in the sector has been significant. We invested around $10.9 million in the sector in 2009–10, which constituted approximately 16 per cent of donor funding and 9 per cent of total health spending in the country, but our support has been fragmented. We have worked principally through the multi-donor trust fund, but also delivered bilateral projects supporting specialist surgical services, the World Food Programme’s maternal and child health feeding program and through selected NGOs, especially for family planning activities. But we have arguably acted as a financier of activities (especially through the multi-donor trust fund) rather than an active development partner, and we do not have the influence in the sector that should reasonably be expected from our investment.

*Adequate and predictable national and district* ***operational budgets*** *for health*

National and district **health budgets** are neither adequate nor predictable. Encouragingly, actual health budget execution has increased, however Timor-Leste’s annual health budget allocation remained steady at US$35 million for the last few years, and declined as a proportion of the country’s overall budget, from 10.8 per cent in 2005–06 to 5.6 per cent in 2010.[[19]](#footnote-20) The reasons behind this decline are not clear. It is of concern that salary expenditure is increasing at the expense of goods and services funding. Increased salary expenditure is also generally difficult to draw back from later. Compounding this is the need to add more than 700 trainee doctors to the payroll, and increasing demand for pharmaceutical and family planning commodities.

Australia continues to support the MoH’s Planning and Finance Directorate to prepare annual budgets and plan for the equitable distribution and growth of the workforce. We also commissioned analysis in 2010 of the bottlenecks affecting service delivery. This work identified issues such as lack of funding and autonomy at district level, an overly-centralised purchasing system, and slow and confused acquittal procedures.[[20]](#footnote-21) It has led to development partners working with the Government to simplify acquittal and disbursement systems to increase funds available for health service delivery. The Ministry of Health and MoF are working together to improve the PFM, through plans for annual reforms in financial management systems to improve health delivery starting in mid-2011. This will inform the Government’s decentralisation agenda in coming years.

*Quality preventative and promotive* ***health services*** *which reflect resources available at the district level*

While there is still room for improvement in the quality of services, the use of health promotion and curative services has slightly increased due to the monthly *Servisu Integrado Saude Communitaire* (SISCa), or village-level health outreach services. SISCas are mobile health clinics that visit more than 450 villages each month to provide pre and post-pregnancy care for women and babies, family planning services and treatment of common illnesses.

In 2010, 71 per cent of Timor-Leste’s monthly SISCa visits benefited from Australian support. SISCas play a key role in maintaining a family health register, providing immunisations, antenatal care, and nutrition information, and family planning and reproductive health advice. The vast majority are run with technical, logistical and transportation support from international and local health NGOs, contracted by the Ministry of Health with Australian funds. This direct funding has brought health services closer to people. We also provided vehicles and motor bikes to facilitate service delivery in the districts.

Timor-Leste’s 2009–10 Demographic and Health Survey indicated that 71 per cent of women in-country want to delay their next pregnancy by at least two years, or have no more children.[[21]](#footnote-22) Australia is helping address this significant unmet need for family planning by supporting NGOs to provide sexual and reproductive health counselling, family planning commodities and clinical services, as well as ante-natal and post-natal and newborn care. In 2010 alone, 142 732 Timorese women of reproductive age across eight districts accessed Australian-funded family planning advice and services.[[22]](#footnote-23)

Australia has trained 21 nurse anaesthetists, through the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons. They are the only nurse anaesthetists practising in Timor-Leste and are now based primarily in district referral hospitals assisting with basic and comprehensive emergency obstetric care, including caesarean sections.

*Equitable distribution of an adequate number of skilled and motivated* ***health workers***

A University of New South Wales report estimates 4000 health professionals are currently working in Timor-Leste.[[23]](#footnote-24) The workforce remains fragmented and incomplete, however, due to an unfinished workforce planning and information system. The Cuban Medical Brigade provides the largest number of health workforce and about 700 students are studying medicine in Cuba. The challenge for Timor-Leste is how to integrate the newly trained doctors into the health system. Australia and the World Bank have been trying to engage the Ministry of Health on these issues, especially in light of the pressures on workforce planning and budgeting discussed above.

In 2010, 50 Timor-Leste doctors, nurses, surgeons and health managers undertook health studies in Australia, Fiji, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. In addition, Australia has trained 54 midwives in Timor-Leste to Diploma 3 level, making them the most qualified in the country. Under the Australia – Timor-Leste Program of Assistance for Surgical Services, Australia is supporting surgical training for three Timorese through a mix of in-country and overseas training units.

*Improved health sector* ***procurement and logistics***

While the number of health facilities which regularly report having no pharmaceutical drugs (stock outs) dropped from 40 per cent to approximately 17 per cent between 2008 and 2010, significant concerns remain.[[24]](#footnote-25) The Essential Drugs List is too long, the GoTL’s budget allocations for pharmaceuticals are decreasing, and poor planning means the Government is conducting expensive emergency procurements too regularly. Australia has supported a tracer drugs list for assessing the number of districts reporting having no pharmaceutical drugs and the European Union have provided long-term support to the central pharmaceuticals and medical equipment warehouse. We are concerned, however, that a gap will be left by the impending completion of the European Union’s program.

Management consequences

> Australia will reshape its major health programs behind the new NHSSP. A key focus will be strengthening our commitment to service delivery (particularly maternal and child health) and transitioning towards greater sector harmonisation, where Australia will take a lead role in donor coordination. It will also involve addressing unsatisfactory monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. This will include re-designing the World Bank-supervised HSSP-SP[[25]](#footnote-26), the efficiency and effectiveness of which has so far been disappointing. The re-design will address the constraints and bottlenecks to service delivery at central and district levels.

> Australia will undertake policy discussion with the MoF on the issue of budget allocations for health and with the Ministry of Health around the quality of health spending. Australia will aim to influence PFM reforms and recommend that funds required for the growing salary budget do not displace recurrent costs required for district-level service delivery. This will involve preparing a ‘roadmap’ for strengthening MoH’s financial management systems (for example, operational procedures, supporting information technology systems), a fiduciary risk assessment to inform consideration of increased use of government systems, and engaging credible technical assistance to manage and implement this change process.

> Australia will help to strengthen pharmaceutical and medical supply chain management through a new program of support for the NHSSP, including through assistance for improved coordination in the procuring, warehousing, distributing and managing supplies.

> Australia and the GoTL will expand the evidence base for health policy development. This will involve supporting MoH’s new Research Department to establish a joint operational agenda with its new partner. the Menzies School of Health Research. The school will focus on: research barriers to improving nutrition and reducing maternal deaths; comparative analysis of district performance; results-based financing; and an improved pharmaceutical system.

> Australia will work with the GoTL on a multi-sector response to improve nutrition in Timor-Leste, through our support to health, education and food security, drawing on the findings of the research outlined above.

## Sector: Education and youth employment

Sector context

Timor-Leste will not achieve Millennium Development Goal 2 by 2015. Basic education enrolment improved from 67 per cent in 2005 to 86 per cent in 2010. [[26]](#footnote-27) Unfortunately secondary enrolment rates have not improved, nor have primary completion rates—with only 73 per cent of students completing grade 5.[[27]](#footnote-28) Illiteracy, particularly in adults, remains high. Gender ratios tell a mixed story: they are almost equal at primary level and improving at tertiary level, but at the secondary level there are three boys enrolled for every girl.

Quality of education is of greater concern than access to it. An Early Grade Reading Assessment conducted in 2010 identified worrying shortfalls: 70 per cent of students at the end of grade 1 could not recognise a single word and only 30 per cent of students at the end of grade 3 could read to an international standard.[[28]](#footnote-29) These are not easy figures to turn around.

However, 2010 saw some positive developments in the policy environment: The Ministry of Education, with Australian support, hosted an annual joint review of the sector to encourage greater coordination and developed an ambitious National Education Strategic Plan 2010–30.

The outcomes against which shared progress is rated below are drawn from the National Education Strategic Plan 2010–30 outcomes, which Australia contributes to.

Shared progress

Australian support to the education sector has been through two main programs—the Education Sector Support Program and, to a lesser extent, the Youth Employment Promotion Program. Both programs finish during 2011–12. The Education Sector Support Program has primarily focused on building the Ministry of Education’s staff and systems capacity, while Youth Employment Promotion Program focuses on developing a technical and vocational education and training framework, providing opportunities for short-term employment, and careers counselling.

While the focus of these programs was relevant to the needs of the sector at inception, the GoTL and donors have increasingly acknowledged the need for more focus on gains at service delivery level, where learning achievement and improvements in the educational status of children have been minimal.

*By 2015 quality* ***basic education*** *is available for children, and dropouts are almost reduced to zero*

Strong progress has been made in increasing enrolment rates at basic level. Learning achievement in schools, however, continues to be of significant concern. This problem is driven by complex factors that are not well understood, including teaching quality, language of instruction, classroom infrastructure and materials, and high drop out and repetition rates. Change will come slowly, making it unlikely that the GoTL will achieve this outcome by 2015.

In 2010 Australia assisted the Government to increase basic education quality by supporting the provision of Tetum and Portuguese language supplementary learning materials to every school and child in the country. Further, 313 classrooms were rehabilitated and 84 classrooms

constructed by the Government, with Education Sector Support Program technical support, throughout 2010.

*By 2012, at the national, regional and school levels there is the capacity to provide effective and efficient* ***education management*** *against the strategic plan*

Medium-term government budget allocations to the sector are uncertain, which threatens the roll-out of the Ministry of Education’s strategic plan. However, with Australia’s support, budget execution for the entire ministry, including salaries, capital development, minor capital and good and services has improved to approximately 98 per cent in 2010. [[29]](#footnote-30) Additionally, Australian support has assisted in the deployment of the Education Management Information System, which allows the Ministry of Education to collect critical data on the education sector and provide grounds for stronger evidence-based policy, planning and budgeting. However, this is not yet informing management decisions within the ministry. Its procurement, PFM and logistics systems also remain weak. The ministry still highly depends on technical assistance. This needs to be acknowledged as unavoidable for the medium term or addressed by exploring new ways to build local capacity.

In 2011, the Government plans to implement the *Escola Basica* (school cluster) initiative which seeks to reform the way schools are managed to ensure greater responsibility at the service delivery frontline of the school and regional level. The initiative will focus on child-centred learning and seeks to improve distribution of learning materials and school meals. This significant reform will be a clear test of the Ministry of Education’s relatively weak procurement, logistics and distribution systems.

*A* ***tertiary and vocational education competency framework*** *is developed to support recognition of Timor-Leste qualifications and create stronger links with the labour market.*

In 2010 the Government undertook its first ever National Labour Force Survey, which will provide a valuable evidence-base for policy development. The Government also developed the National Qualifications Framework, which indicates the minimum standards to be met for completing recognised and accredited tertiary-level qualifications (including at secondary technical and vocational levels) and should, over time, ensure teaching qualifications are based on standardised levels of competency.

Australia contributed technical assistance and funding to support the National Labour Force Survey and the initial development of the National Qualifications Framework. Australia also continued to support the National Labour Force Development Institute to establish an industry driven, competency-based tertiary qualification system. A key priority for 2011 will be the development of a pool of qualified trainers to deliver these qualifications. The National Labour Force Development Institute is increasingly operating with a much-decreased reliance on international technical advice.

Management consequences

Jointly with New Zealand, Australia will embark on a change in strategic focus through the design of a new sector program for Timor-Leste that will ensure:

* A delivery strategy by the end of 2011 to guide AusAID’s engagement in the sector, particularly the development of a new program of ongoing support to replace the Education Sector Support Program.
* A package of interim measures to support the early implementation of the National Education Strategic Plan and cover capacity needs between the conclusion of existing donor programs and the start of new ones.
* A research agenda to identify the needs of the sector and assist in the development of more effective and targeted programs by all donors.
* More direct policy engagement with the Ministry of Education and other development partners, supported by an education adviser.
* Assistance to the Ministry of Education to ensure the core components of the National Education Strategic Plan can be implemented effectively.
* A stronger focus on gains at service delivery level and on achieving tangible gains in literacy and the learning achievement of children. This will include creating conditions for more equitable access to education (for example, rural students and girls), including stronger engagement in teacher training, curriculum development, school management and learning materials.
* A multi-sector response to improve nutrition in Timor-Leste, through support to education, health and food security.

## Sector: Rural water, sanitation and hygiene behaviour change

Sector context

Access to safe water is improving with increased government commitment, but in rural areas only 63 per cent of the population have access to adequate water supply and only 39 per cent have access to improved sanitation.[[30]](#footnote-31) However, if the current investment by the Government and development partners is maintained, it is possible for Timor-Leste to achieve the Millennium Development Goal for access to safe water by 2015.[[31]](#footnote-32) Australia is the largest donor in the sector and the only donor working within the GoTL.

Shared progress

*District and central authorities improve* ***planning and resourcing*** *for sustainable and equitable delivery of rural water, sanitation and hygiene services*

In 2010, the GoTL demonstrated its commitment to the sector by approving an increase in budget allocation for rural water (US$8.9 million in 2011, up from US$5.7 million in 2010)

and sanitation (US$760 000 in 2011, up from US$200 000 in 2010).[[32]](#footnote-33) It also allocated funding for water system maintenance for the first time in 2011 and funded the employment of 88 additional staff at sub-district level (previously Australian-funded)—due in part to Australia’s influence.

The Government also drafted a National Sanitation and Water Policy, revised its National Rural Water Guidelines, and delivered major improvements to monitoring and information management systems in the sector—all strongly supported by the RWSSP. Australia is also helping the Government to plan how it can adapt to climate change by assessing the impact on water resources.

However, there is still some way to go to improve annual planning, particularly at district level, and the absence of multi-year financial planning limits ongoing certainty.

A positive mid-term review of the RWSSP and the sector in 2010 encouraged Australia to shift its support toward using government financial and procurement systems for greater impact. The review noted there are a large but appropriate number of advisers given the low capacity of government. The Joint Adviser Review in 2010 confirmed this but also identified a number of advisers who could be phased out as government capacity increases.

Australia has made strong contributions to gender equality and inclusiveness of people with disability in the water and sanitation sector. The latter is included in needs analysis, regular stakeholder mainstreaming workshops and integration into the GoTL sanitation policy and programming. Australian support has promoted the active involvement of women and men in all design and maintenance activities, and promoted women as community facilitators and members of the water user groups.

*Increase in government and community capacity to build, rehabilitate and maintain* ***water supply*** *systems*

In 2010 more than 60 000 additional people in rural areas in Timor-Leste received access to improved water supply.[[33]](#footnote-34) However, there is still some way to go in ensuring that systems are good quality and maintained. A 2009 study in two districts found that 70 per cent of rural water supply infrastructure was not fully functioning one year after construction.[[34]](#footnote-35) Reasons include: poor design; unqualified contractors; inadequate materials and supervision; weak community involvement in the design, construction and operation; and irregular maintenance. These risks were heightened when the Government decided to deliver water supply through its Decentralisation and Development Program because of the program’s weak selection of contractors, weak supervision and poor quality work.

Of the 60 000 additional people in rural areas receiving access to improved water supply. 6000 benefited from Australian-constructed water systems and 19 000 from government constructed systems drawing on Australian support with surveying and design. Australia also helped the GoTL develop a monitoring system with data on the functionality of 90 per cent of the rural water supply systems. Australia has been training and supporting community-based

 water user groups to manage and maintain water systems. Women’s participation in these groups has increased from 18 per cent to 38 per cent. Australia’s support for the monitoring system, the 88 sub-district staff, and the increasing number of water user groups has significantly increased the capacity to manage and monitor water systems. If appropriate resources are provided for operation and maintenance then more systems should remain functioning.

*Increase in government and community capacity to improve* ***hygiene and sanitation*** *practices*

The Government implemented community sanitation programs in 162 villages (out of a total 2228 villages). Fifty five of these (17 directly supported by Australia) declared themselves ‘open defecation free’, with all people using latrines instead of encouraging the spread of disease by defecating in the open. While these figures are small, progress is expected to accelerate. In 2010 Australia provided around 7000 people with improved sanitation and promoted behaviour change of 1000 people to use hand-washing facilities with soap.

In addition, Australia funded a number of Australian NGOs in 2010 that collectively provided more than 4000 people with improved access to rural water supply and/or sanitation.

Management consequences

In 2011 Australia will design a new phase of support to rural water, sanitation and hygiene in Timor-Leste that will:

* Support greater government leadership, management and implementation. In early 2011 Australia will begin analysis to identify potential areas where Australia can work through government systems and the associated risks and benefits of doing so. This will inform decisions on potentially making greater use of government financial and human resources and management systems for greater sustainability.
* Emphasise resourcing and developing an effective rural water supply maintenance system and encouraging the Government to shift to multi-year financial planning for the sector.
* Engage with the Government on reform and improvement of government systems, including the procurement, supervision and quality of capital works.

## Sector: Infrastructure

Objectives:

* Improved budget execution of the Government of East Timor’s capital works program
* Improved capacity of the Ministry of Infrastructure for capital works procurement
* Rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads

Sector context

Since the widespread destruction of infrastructure during the post-referendum conflict in 1999 and the 2006 crisis, little rehabilitation has occurred and infrastructure continues to deteriorate. Major economic infrastructure is absent or entirely inadequate. There is no national power grid and there are regular power outages. The nation’s roads, bridges and irrigation systems have suffered from high levels of rainfall, lack of maintenance and poor-quality public works. A roads survey in 2010 found that around 90 per cent of rural roads were in bad or very bad condition.[[35]](#footnote-36)

Shared progress

The Government allocated more than 40 per cent of its 2011 budget to economic infrastructure (about US$550 million).[[36]](#footnote-37) In recent years around 80 to 90 per cent of the infrastructure budget has been executed.[[37]](#footnote-38) While this seems high, little infrastructure improvement can be observed on the ground and the quality of public works is poor. A significant share of infrastructure funds has been devoted to a large purchase of electricity generation and transmission equipment (more than 80 per cent of the 2011 economic infrastructure budget).

Government policy on procurement of infrastructure works has changed regularly and is still uncertain, particularly in light of planned decentralisation reforms. While the Ministry of Infrastructure retains responsibility for most of the country’s infrastructure planning, most of the infrastructure budget is procured outside of its control. For example, small projects are procured at district level through the Prime Minister’s Decentralisation and Development Program. The Government plans to establish a National Development Agency in 2011 which will likely have a large role in overseeing infrastructure development. Donors have sometimes added to the confusion, recently supporting several policy and planning exercises in the sector despite weak government ownership.

Australia’s ADB-managed program is building the MoI’s capacity to implement the infrastructure budget. The program has helped the Ministry of Infrastructure develop useful tools like a project monitoring and control system, databases to estimate project costs and building codes. In 2011, it will support these further to ensure they are institutionalised and used by the government. Also, a scholarship scheme was established in 2010 and 15 students sent to Indonesia to study. However, the program’s impact has been constrained by the shift of control over procurement away from the MoI, and a mid-term review in 2010 identified a number of adviser positions that had not been effective. In response, the program was restructured to focus adviser inputs around specific tasks that build on successful elements of the program.

Australia is supporting the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads that connect villages to major road networks. The International Labour Organization-managed program (TIM-Works) uses labour-based approaches to generate employment, and has demonstrated their viability and cost effectiveness. During 2010 the program rehabilitated 150 km of road, maintained 679 km and provided 11 472 people with short-term employment (average 30 to 60 days). This brings the program total since 2008 to 240 km road rehabilitated, 1751 km maintained and 25 480 people employed. The program has injected around US$2 million into local communities and has given some villages vehicle access to the outside world which, in turn, has given villagers access to health, education, and economic services. Australia is also supporting the International Labour Organisation’s Youth Employment Program which is

 employing people to undertake unskilled maintenance of rural roads. During 2010 around 1500 km of roads were maintained under this program employing nearly 13 000 workers.[[38]](#footnote-39) Both programs work with Government but outside of the MoI, which limits their ability to influence road works at scale.

Management consequences

* Australia is developing a new program with the International Labour Organization to establish a rural road rehabilitation and maintenance system in the Ministry of Infrastructure. A focus on rural roads is appropriate given that other donors have focused on national roads. Australia will lead policy discussion and donor coordination in this sub-sector. The program will build on the experience of TIM-Works to integrate the labour-based approach into the Ministry of Infrastructure. The new program will balance tangible results with building ministry capacity to better manage its own resources. The program will have the flexibility to respond to a changing institutional environment and encourage better inter-agency coordination.
* Australia is supporting the establishment of a Major Projects Unit in the MoF. This will include policy advice and a fund to enhance the selection, preparation and implementation of major infrastructure projects such as ports and road networks. Australia support is contingent on the GoTL proceeding with its stated policy of engaging the services of an international firm to act as a procurement agent for all major government procurement. Improved capacity is needed in this area as the government is rapidly increasing funding for large projects and lacks the capacity to manage the procurement process.
* During 2011 Australia will clarify its approach to the infrastructure sector. A delivery strategy will consider how the GoTL is placed to implement its upcoming SDP, which is likely to feature major infrastructure development, and whether there is a case for Australia to contribute funding for major infrastructure.

## Sector: Agriculture productivity and food security

Sector context

In Timor-Leste 80 per cent of the country’s poor depend on subsistence agriculture for their livelihood. Over the seven years to 2009 agricultural gross domestic product grew at a real average rate of 4.2 per cent, based on official estimates, but this is from a low base.[[39]](#footnote-40) Reduced food production was expected in 2010 because heavy rains and floods damaged crops and irrigation systems and prevented some farmers from planting new crops. Recent indications are that these impacts were less severe than expected during 2010 but harvests in 2011 are likely to be affected. The International Monetary Fund estimates that agricultural gross domestic product grew by 0.5 per cent in 2010.[[40]](#footnote-41) Low agricultural productivity means that food security is an ongoing issue. The 2007
Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards identified that households’ experience a ‘hungry season’ of an average of 3.2 months of low food consumption during the year. Food insecurity

contributes to malnutrition. The 2010 Demographic and Health Survey revealed that 58 per cent of children under the age of five years are stunted and 45 per cent underweight. These are increases since the 2003 survey. The 2010 survey also found that 27 per cent of women are malnourished and 3 in 10 pregnant women are anaemic.

Shared progress

*Improved food security through increase productivity of major foodcrops*

The natural conditions for agriculture in Timor-Leste, including rainfall patterns and land quality, are challenging. Agriculture is also hampered by poorly-coordinated and often counterproductive government policies and inadequate infrastructure. The government has in the past subsidised the distribution of significant quantities of imported rice which reduces incentives for domestic food production. The government is also freely distributing agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertiliser which could undermine the development of sustainable markets for inputs, as well as Australia’s efforts to establish a seed production and distribution system in Timor-Leste.

These broader factors undermine Timor-Leste’s food security factors. Australia’s main food security program—Seeds of Life (SoL)—is performing well. However, it is still making the transition to a scale where it can have a significant and impact on food security. SoL works in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to evaluate and release higher yielding crop varieties (maize, rice, peanuts, cassava and sweet potato). Yield advantages in research and demonstration trials ranged from 24 per cent to 159 per cent.[[41]](#footnote-42) Food security is improving in communities where demonstration trials are undertaken. Farmers use their increased yields to supplement food sources and sell excess product to meet other household needs (for example, medical services). The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries’ staff capacity to produce, store and distribute seed is slowly improving.

Improved crop varieties were distributed to up to 21 000 farming households during the 2009–10 wet season and to up to 11 000 households during the 2010–11 wet season. It is estimated that between September 2008 and the end of phase two of SoL in January 2011 improved varieties were distributed to 25 000 farming households, benefiting around 150 000 individuals.[[42]](#footnote-43) These farmers would have passed on these crop varieties to even more farmers. Future work under the SoL will focus on up scaling distribution and accessing more farmers to meet more of the country’s needs.

Around one quarter of farms in Timor-Leste are managed by women. Women are actively targeted under the SoL. More than 60 per cent of farmers attending SoL demonstration field days were women.[[43]](#footnote-44) In 2010 the SoL produced a report outlining climate change impact and adaptation issues for the agriculture sector in Timor-Leste.

Australia, working through the Food and Agriculture Organization, is also assisting to build the MAF’s capacity to prevent and control infectious diseases in livestock. This included establishing a veterinary laboratory facility.

*Increased access to rural financial services*

The microfinance sector in Timor-Leste is young but growing steadily. Australia, working through United Nations agencies, is assisting the poor in rural areas of Timor-Leste to access financial services (saving and microcredit) by building the capacity of local microfinance institutions. During 2009 and 2010 the number of microfinance clients in Timor-Leste increased by around 21 000.[[44]](#footnote-45) However most of this growth was in the government-sponsored microfinance institution which was not directly supported by Inclusive finance for the under-served economy (INFUSE). In 2010 the GoTL introduced a new regulation for the microfinance industry aimed at providing greater protection to depositors. Our program helped facilitate consultation with the microfinance industry and will assist institutions to comply with the new regulation in the future. Australian support has also helped microfinance institutions strengthen their management systems and improve their financial sustainability. The two microfinance institutions directly supported by INFUSE have achieved financial self-sufficiency and were achieving positive returns on their assets.[[45]](#footnote-46)

Management consequences

* During 2011 Australia will seek a larger impact on the long-term constraints to agricultural productivity and food security through new and expanded interventions and stronger policy discussion. Australia, working with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and other donors, will closely monitor short-term food security (including storage) and work with government and other donors to provide assistance if required. Australia will engage in discussion with the GoTL on issues relating to food security, such as agricultural policies and subsidies. Australia will use multiple points of engagement on policy issues. However, it will be important to have realistic expectations of what policy changes are likely in the short term. Australia will also work with the Government on a multi-sector response to improve nutrition in Timor-Leste, through our support to health and education.
* A new phase of SoL started in February 2011 for five years to expand the program to the whole country and significantly upscale the distribution of improved crop varieties. The new phase aims to establish a sustainable seed system managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and incorporating community-based and market-based seed production and distribution. It will be important to ensure new elements of the program are effectively implemented and that the M&E framework captures robust data on the food security impacts of increased seed distribution. One of the great challenges will be to build the ministry’s leadership and capacity.
* Australia’s Multi-Country Market Development Facility is expected to start in Timor-Leste in 2011, analysing markets to identify opportunities to make them more competitive and accessible to poor men and women. The facility will greatly expand Australia’s analytical capacity and outreach into agriculture and other sectors.
* In 2011 Australia will review its assistance to Timor-Leste for livestock disease prevention and control, focusing on the government’s ability to sustain the laboratory facility. This review will inform Australia’s decision about whether to provide more assistance. The Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) will also begin a livestock-management project in 2011 in partnership with an Indonesian university.
* A mid-term review of the United Nations microfinance program will be finalised in March 2011. Australia, as a member of the program’s management board, will address review recommendations. The Australian-funded Pacific Microfinance Initiative implemented through the International Finance Corporation has funding allocated to provide assistance in Timor-Leste. Australia will ensure this initiative is well coordinated with the United Nations microfinance program and other development partners working in microfinance in Timor-Leste.

## Sector: Public sector and democratic governance

Objectives:

* To help establish and develop central agencies, in line with GoTL’s public sector reform agenda
* To help establish and implement a regulatory framework for, and enable provision of training to, the public sector
* To build functional formal political institutions and respect for democratic processes
* To build effective relations between the state and communities

Sector context

Progress in strengthening public sector capacity in Timor-Leste was mixed in 2010. The Government’s new Human Capital Development Fund, set up under the 2011 National Budget, will intensify human resource development, with an allocation of US$25 million in its first year and rising to US$45 million by 2015 to fund a range of training and scholarship opportunities. But workforce numbers and salary costs continue to grow: to 26 093 civil servants in 2010 (from 21 954 in 2008) at a bill of US$72 million (up from US$33.6 million in 2008). This is rapid expansion by international standards and Timor-Leste’s civil servant-to-population ratio is now among the highest in the region.

The Government’s public sector reform agenda— introduced in 2008 as part of the ‘Year of Administrative Reform’—has established new institutions and mechanisms to improve the civil service. But the ongoing absence of a strategic plan for the public sector—to determine overall size, shape and cost—is increasingly problematic. The need for a stronger framework extends to the Government’s use of consultants financed from the state budget, with expenditure on professional services increasing 136 per cent since 2008 to US$53.7 million in 2010 (separate to the wages and salaries bill). Furthermore, building a workforce with the requisite skills—at both the basic and highly-specialised ends of the spectrum—remains a key challenge for the GoTL.

An emerging democratic culture continued to be evident in Timor-Leste in 2010, with robust parliamentary debate and scrutiny from parliamentary committees, the media and civil society. The Prime Minister travelled across the country in 2010 to consult on his government’s SDP. However a mission led by Australian governance advisors concluded that although the Constitution guarantees citizen participation in public matters, decision making remains highly centralised within government. Despite some strong voices against corruption within civil society, there are not yet clear channels of interaction between government and citizens.

Further analysis undertaken in 2010 recommended that Australia reconsider its governance portfolio and develop an approach linking our support in public sector reform, democratic governance and PFM. As with other sectoral programs, this approach requires a sharper focus on improving service delivery to involve citizens as active participants—thereby strengthening the citizen-state relationship.

Shared progress

Public sector reform

Australia’s public sector support program has seen a period of strategic drift in which it has supported almost the full range of Timor-Leste agencies on a suite of issues ranging from food security and nutrition through to disability inclusive development. To rectify this disparity, the program’s ‘Additional Initiatives’ stream of sub-projects ended in 2010 and focus continued on support to (i) central agencies, in line with GoTL’s public sector reform agenda and (ii) a regulatory framework for, and enabling provision of training to, the public sector.

Helping establish and develop central agencies, in line with GoTL’s public sector reform agenda

The mandate for reforming Timor-Leste’s public sector resides predominantly with the Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management and the Civil Service Commission (CSC). These agencies were therefore the main recipients of Australian support under this objective in 2010.

Australian support to the CSC in 2010 helped it place controls around Timor-Leste’s expanding civil service which has been a key cause for concern in recent years. In 2010 the CSC instituted a recruitment freeze for 2011 while taking forward a process for converting ‘temporary’ positions (that account for about half of all public service jobs) into permanent positions. Australian technical assistance helped CSC drive these reforms.

We also helped strengthen the CSCs corporate functions so it can better meet its mandate. With Australian support, the commission produced a five-year strategic plan, submitted its first annual report to Parliament and consolidated internal structures through developing new operational procedures in 2010. The CSC is also actively addressing disciplinary issues, with 164 cases investigated in 2010. In addition, the CSC suspended the salaries of more than 363 officers who had abandoned their employment and terminated the salaries (or employment) of 29 officers. The Disciplinary Directorate’s caseload is expected to grow following Australia’s recent provision of work equipment.

While our support to the Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management has been limited to date, in 2010, the Council of Ministers approved a new organic organisational structure for the agency with legal input from Australia. The new structure establishes clearer

areas of responsibility and lines of accountability that will enable more effective management of the Government’s future decentralised development agenda.

Helping establish and implement a regulatory framework for, and enabling provision of training to, the public sector

The National Institute for Public Administration is primarily responsible for developing the capacity of Timor-Leste’s civil service by delivering training and capacity development support across government. In 2010, the institute successfully piloted a Senior Management Course with 18 participants. The pilot drew on local experts to help deliver the seven modules and provide expert advice during the training. The National Institute for Public Administration also delivered the Administrative Assistants course to 300 civil servants (in addition to the 200 who participated in the 2009 pilot). While Australia provided direct assistance to both initiatives, a review we commissioned found it will be critical to strengthen the institute’s internal organisation and learning facilities to sustain and expand these training courses in line with GoTL expectations.

In 2010 Australia helped the GoTL broker a whole-of-government approach to training by helping establish an interagency Training and Development Consultative Committee, jointly chaired by the CSC and the institute. This committee will inform the development and dissemination of new policy on civil service training. It has prepared a draft decree law on training and development, as well as a scholarship and study assistance policy, for approval by the Council of Ministers. This framework will help strengthen skills development across the civil service through a standardised management approach and provide an important mechanism to mobilise the GoTL’s new Human Capital Development Fund.

In 2010 Australia expanded the number of available Australian Development Scholarships by 50 per cent, from 20 to 30 scholarships annually, expanded marketing approaches and hosted the first-ever exhibition of Australian and New Zealand universities. Working closely with the CSC, we also established a new Government Internship Program for returning Australian and New Zealand scholarship graduates, to be piloted in 2011 with five interns across a range of ministries.

Democratic governance

Australia continued to support a range of small-value initiatives related to democratic governance in 2010, including support to Parliament, media, electoral systems and civil society. Achievements included improved legal drafting and analysis skills in Parliament, through an intensive program led by Indonesian professors and incorporating Portuguese language skills. Australia also continued support to a Gender Resource Centre in Parliament as well as female members of Parliament and permanent committees to work on gender-sensitive legislation.

Our long-term support to Timor-Leste’s electoral management authorities continued, with the Australian Electoral Commission providing Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections training to 94 representatives from government and civil society organisations to help them promote public understanding of, and support for, electoral processes. Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections was awarded a 2010 United Nations Public Service Award.

Management consequences

* Building on analytical groundwork in 2010, Australia will develop a governance delivery strategy to link our support in public sector reform, democratic governance and PFM. This strategy will sharpen our focus on improving service delivery by involving citizens as active participants—thereby strengthening the citizen-state relationship. This will guide the re-design of our public sector reform program and rationalise our democratic governance portfolio.
* Australia will work with the GoTL to integrate this governance approach of promoting community involvement in service delivery across all sectors in which we provide support. We will report on this against individual sectors and against a governance delivery strategy to be developed.
* The governance delivery strategy will also guide ongoing discussion around: GoTL leadership of a public administration reform strategy and support for the mandates of the CSC and INAP; the Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management’s management of decentralised funding; and the MoF-led technical assistance policy—explained further below—to ensure more discipline around the Government’s use of professional services and development partners’ use of advisers.

## Sector: Public financial management

Objectives:

* To strengthen systems and processes in the areas of planning, budgeting, public expenditure management and revenue administration in the MoF
* To build human resource capacity within the MoF

Sector context

A recent International Monetary Fund Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessment found that Timor-Leste has made overall solid progress in strengthening PFM systems in just a very few years with improvements measured in 12 of the 29 applicable indicators.[[46]](#footnote-47) The improvements are often modest, but underpinned by real changes in work practices, legislation and information technology systems. Most notable are the gains made in the comprehensiveness of fiscal information, fiscal transparency, funding predictability, timeliness and quality of bank reconciliation and financial statements. Legislative scrutiny and the external audit process also improved.

The gains achieved and relative strengths of the MoF are, however, diminished by gaps in the PFM system elsewhere. There is no independent, external auditor, internal audit is almost non-existent and budget planning and implementation capacity in line ministries remains weak. There has also been some major slippage in performance, for example on orderliness of the budget process, capacity of the MoF to do medium-term fiscal planning, development of sectoral investment strategies and multi-year budgeting. The flow of funds to service delivery units remains problematic. Issues of emerging corruption in procurement and tax administration remain a concern. Overall, the GoTL has not kept a consistent approach to PFM reform, with major decentralisation and relaxation of controls in some areas (for

example, procurement, cash handling and large sub-national grants mechanisms such as the MDG Suco Program) contrasted with centralisation of decision-making powers in others (for example, planning and budgeting, particularly capital expenditure) . This has led to inconsistency and inefficiency across the broader PFM system.

Shared progress

With Australian support through the World Bank-supervised Planning and Finance Management Capacity Building Program (PFMCBP), the MoF took some positive steps in 2010. This included implementing a major reorganisation of the ministry, strengthening public expenditure management by simplifying and streamlining of treasury systems and processes and increasing delegation of authority to line ministries. Further progress included improved revenue management—with increased transparency in tax administration and reinforcing petroleum tax administration—and a gradual improvement in macroeconomic planning. Advisers have made significant contributions over the past 18 months to MoF’s overall capacity

However, the challenges are large and growing. Capacity of civil servants remains very low, with continued heavy reliance on technical assistance across the ministry. The MoF faces two competing pressures. On the one hand, the ministry must address the lack of basic skills among civil servants and focus on building core skills such as numeracy, literacy and basic accounting. On the other hand, the huge ambition of the Government to fast track development with increased expenditure highlights the need for high-level policy advice around investment decisions, along with implementation support to make it happen. The PFMCBP has struggled to do both well, and the review recommended taking a more clearly defined approach to challenges at each end of the capacity spectrum. Australia supported a new approach in the MoF, indicating that we expect to see a more coherent approach to the use of technical assistance.

Management consequences

* Assist the MoF to develop a policy on capacity building and the use of technical assistance in March 2011. It is expected that this policy will flow through and impact on the PFMCBP through its redesign in late 2011.
* Keep working to identify opportunities to build MoF’s client service and outreach capacity through bilateral engagement with the MoF and through the 2011 redesign of the PFMCBP. This means ensuring more attention on the quality of PFM systems in line ministries.
* Ensure that the MoF strategic plan is used as the basis on which future assistance is designed, and that it adopt a more realistic and pragmatic approach to balancing institutional and individual capacity.
* Continue to improve the current limited bilateral engagement in key areas, particularly in relation to infrastructure investment and decentralisation. As the PFMCBP is redesigned in the latter half of 2011, Australia will need to carefully shape its engagement in PFM reform and ensure strong linkages with our broader public sector development strategy.

## Sector: Resilience to natural emergencies

Sector context

Timor-Leste experienced an extended wet season reflecting La Niña-related weather patterns with two significant episodes of flooding in late June to early July (affecting 923 families) and early August (affecting 1044 families). While many districts were affected, the impact on families and homes and the long-term impact on agricultural land was assessed as limited. However, the flooding highlighted inadequate access to emergency shelter for displaced victims, which will worsen as the population grows. There are unclear roles and responsibilities within the various parts of government with a mandate in relation to disaster risk reduction and emergency response. A variety of different agencies have an operational mandate in relation to emergency response, including the National Disaster Management Directorate, PNTL, the armed forces and the Ministry for Security and Defence.

Shared progress

In 2010 the National Disaster Management Directorate’s strategic plan was approved and its budget increased significantly. With 60 staff now in place, the directorate is increasingly well placed to implement its workplan, although human resource capacity and budget allocation are both still constraints.

The Government responded well to localised emergencies, with limited international assistance. Through Australian funding, the International Organization for Migration and NGOs based in the districts provided support in the form of transport and volunteers to evacuate victims, and distribute the Ministry of Social Solidarity’s food and non-food items in coordination with District Disaster Management Committees. The International Organization for Migration provided logistical support in coordination with Ministry of Social Solidarity, while the United Nations provided air support to conduct assessments.

Our support through the International Organization for Migration to improve the long-term capacity of communities and the Government to reduce the risks from disasters continues. A whole-of-government disaster risk management workshop in 2010 revealed a lack of coordination in responding to natural emergencies due to a wide variety of agencies with overlapping mandates.

Management consequences

* With Australia’s current disaster risk reduction project due to be completed in late 2011, we will review the sector and our funding to consider how to improve disaster preparedness measures and coordination at national and community levels.

## Sector: Combating violence against women

Sector context

According to Timor-Leste’s 2009–10 Demographic and Health Survey more than 1 in 3
Timor-Leste women (39.2 per cent) have experienced physical or sexual violence, with current husbands or partners being the key perpetrators. Of these women, about 1 in 5 (24 per cent) seek help—usually from family members. Support services are not adequate enough to address the extent of the problem and only 1 per cent of affected women access these services.

Although domestic violence was recognised as a specific crime (separate to assault) by the Penal Code promulgated in 2009, it remains a largely hidden problem. Only 4 per cent of women who experience violence seek help from the police.[[47]](#footnote-48)

Shared progress

In 2010Australia continued to work with the Timor-Leste’s Government, legal institutions and civil society through the Justice Facility to tackle the problem of violence against women and girls from two angles. Firstly, interventions were targeted to prevent violence against women and girls. Secondly, efforts were made to ensure those affected by violence have access to justice and appropriate support services. Australia’s Justice Facility provided 20 grants to local civil society groups to work on these efforts—an increase on the previous year. This support meant that 462 persons benefited from legal and support services in 2010. Additional support, such as advocacy by men’s groups and youth drama performances, increased community awareness about violence against women and girls to change attitudes and prevent violence. An evaluation in 2010 concluded that the grants are being generally effectively managed, complemented by our significant organisational development support. This support reinforces efforts through the AFP’s Timor-Leste Police Development Program to strengthen the capacity of the police to respond to gender-based violence through developing an investigations training manual and training officers of the police’s Vulnerable Persons Unit.

The Law Against Domestic Violence was promulgated in June 2010, after years of existence in draft form, with support from a number of stakeholders, including Australia. The law creates and strengthens mechanisms for preventing domestic violence and promoting the rights of victims, and builds on the criminalising domestic violence and various sexual crimes under the Penal Code.

To action the rights established in this law, the Government prepared a draft ‘gender justice policy’ in 2010 with support from Australia. Preparing such a policy was one of the Government’s National Priority objectives in 2010 and aligns with the Justice Sector Strategic Plan 2011–30. This policy brings together seven strategic areas for intervention: data collection; prevention strategies; legislation; criminal procedure; court processes and facilities; services for victims; and gender equality for employees in the legal system. The policy was referred to the Minister for Justice for final review and approval.

Management consequences

* In 2011 Australia will continue its dual focus on preventing violence against women and girls, while ensuring that those affected have access to justice and support services. In regard to prevention, Australia will continue to support local organisations working in the districts to change community attitudes, for example through community radio and youth theatre, training with men’s groups, educating about domestic violence legislation and strengthening child-protection networks.
* In 2011 Australia will work to expand reach of existing victim support services by addressing the lack of infrastructure for these services. We will build on current support for the limited number of existing ‘safe rooms’ and ‘safe houses’ with a major program of capital works to establish safe-room facilities attached to the five referral hospitals in Oecusse, Suai,

Maliana, Maubisse and Baucau. The safe rooms will provide crisis and follow-up care for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault and child abuse. Over time, and by providing training, the intention is to expand safe-room services to include counselling, medical care, forensic examination and documentation of injuries for prosecution purposes.

* An evaluation of Australia’s Justice Facility in the second half of 2011 will examine the effectiveness of Australia’s interventions to reduce violence against women and inform the mechanisms for ongoing support.

## Sector: Policing capacity and justice

Australia’s role

The Australian Federal Police implement the Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP), which supports the development of PNTL as well as assisting the Office of the Secretary of State-Security and the Office of the Prosecutor-General (OPG). The program’s overarching aim is to help the GoTL establish a policing capability where the governance, values and operational characteristics of PNTL support increasingly strengthened the rule of law in an emerging democracy. Australia has made significant efforts to help Timor-Leste develop such a police force. With the draw-down of the United Nations Police presence, and the hand over of police leadership to the PNTL in all districts in 2010, the success of these efforts is increasingly being tested. TLPDP’s role is to build the capacity of the PNTL and does not include any security or policing role.

Complementing this role, AusAID is working through a bilateral Justice Facility to improve service delivery in the sector. This AusAID-funded facility works with key sector institutions, particularly the Ministry of Justice and the OPG, to strengthen their administration, leadership, human resource management and budget and financial management**.**

Shared progress

In 2010 positive progress was made by the GoTL, PNTL and Australian Federal Police towards creating an effective and accountable police service. The PNTL’s 2010 Annual Action Plan prioritised key elements for the organisation: administration, operations, legislation, training, discipline and infrastructure. In response, TLPDP identified five priority capacity building outcomes that it will work towards during the 2010–14 program: (i) the Police Training Centre; (ii) PNTL supervision and management; (iii) PNTL investigations capability; (iv) sustainable administrative systems for PNTL and the Secretary of State-Security ; and (v) provision of sufficient and appropriate training, infrastructure and enabling tools to support capacity development of the PNTL, the Secretary of State-Security and OPG.

There were incremental improvements in the PNTL’s organisational robustness and effectiveness in 2010, with improvements to basic training, investigations training and greater opportunities for advanced police management training.

The TLPDP made significant contributions to progressing these priorities in 2010. A key enabler for all five priorities was the creation within the TLPDP of a program evaluation and development team, which has started to benchmark capability across the PNTL to ensure adequate indicators are available to assess progress.

The Police Training Centre—the key institution that delivers training to PNTL officers—has progressed towards accreditation as a learning institution. National accreditation is a

significant outcome, given that it links police training and education explicitly to national plans to develop and improve the average level of education. The $4.3 million renovation of the Police Training Centre’s infrastructure, training rooms and accommodation has started. This is progressing on schedule and is scheduled to be completed in 2012–13. Once complete the centre will have live-in accommodation for 250 members, and should be sufficient to provide the infrastructure the PNTL needs to conduct the training required to support ongoing development into a resilient national police.

With PNTL supervision and management, significant progress has been made towards the development and national accreditation of the diploma-level executive police management program. The first of these programs has started, and it is intended that all 256 commissioned PNTL officers will have completed certificate four to diploma level by 2014.

For investigations training, three levels of accredited training (for the PNTL investigations units and the prosecutors of the OPG) has been developed, and the first of the level one courses has started. All 260 PNTL investigators, along with all OPG prosecutors, should have completed one or more levels of training by 2014. These courses aim to address some significant issues that have occurred between the PNTL and OPG with coordinating and preparing cases, and the consequential negative effects on perceptions of the PNTL.

Contribution to the development of sustainable administrative systems is at an early stage. The intent is to support the PNTL’s human resources, finance, planning, and logistics administrative systems to, in turn, support improved its operational capability. Technical assistance has been delivered to the PNTL’s career regime and promotions process. Career progression and promotion has been a significant issue for the PNTL, and improving processes is expected to lead to significant improvements in staff moral and retention.

 The last priority outcome area,—providing training, infrastructure, and enabling tools to support capacity development—includes a significant number of projects that the TLPDP will carry out to assist PNTL development that are not covered under the other four priority areas. A total of 187 projects were initiated in 2010, with 151 completed. These included projects designed to improve PNTL forensic capability through the provision of training and equipment. Improvements in training PNTL investigators in crime-scene management and physical evidence examination will provide the PNTL with an improved capability to collect evidence and provide the OPG with adequately prepared briefs of evidence.

In 2010 in the justice sector more generally, the GoTL, with AusAID support, achieved a number of milestones to improve sectoral coordination and service delivery. The Government formally launched its Justice Sector Strategic Plan to guide priorities across the sector. Further the Government continued to roll out its case tracking management system. This enables justice institutions to track and report accurately on cases, helping improve transparency and coordination. AusAID also helped extend judicial services to the districts through the completion of eight prosecutors’ houses and support to two mobile court sessions.

Management consequences

* Within the TLPDP, two key risks are being managed as the program moves into its 2011–12 cycle. The first, lack of sufficient accurate data on PNTL progress, is being addressed through developing and implementing benchmarking and coordinated by the program evaluation and development team. This will give the TLPDP greater situational awareness and allow the developmental program focus to be adjusted and refined in response to PNTL organisational

issues as they are identified. The second key risk area is the sustainability of these training programs without direct TLPDP support. Progress was made on embedding PNTL-led training into the PTC, investigations and management programs. However as this is the first year of this effort the gains in capacity to sustain training were smaller than those in the infrastructure and delivery of training areas. As the programs become established and bedded down in 2011 and beyond, the TLPDP will increasingly focus on ensuring they are sustainable within PNTL training capability.

* An evaluation of Australia’s Justice Facility will be conducted in the second half of 2011 on the effectiveness and sustainability of support provided to the justice sector. This evaluation will guide management decisions on AusAID’s role in the sector following completion of the Justice Facility in 2013.

Program quality

## Discussion of Quality at Implementation ratings

8

**Quality of initiatives 2009 and 2010**

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

High quality

Acceptable/moderate quality

Needs improvement

No. initiatives

2009

2010

Overall, the quality of initiatives is roughly similar to 2009, with more than half still needing improvement (see figure above).[[48]](#footnote-49) The great majority (75 per cent of this half) will be re-designed in 2011, drawing on the considerable delivery strategy work undertaken in 2010. The other 25 per cent will end.

By criteria, 2010 Quality at Implementation (QaI) ratings told a mixed story:

* About 80 per cent of initiatives were rated sufficiently **relevant**. This will strengthen in 2011 as new designs drive greater alignment with GoTL directions and the Australia Timor-Leste Country Strategy 2009–14 and as less relevant initiatives end.
* 2010 saw little change from 2009 on **effectiveness**: initiatives were split roughly equally between making inadequate, adequate and good quality progress toward their objectives.
* On **M&E**[[49]](#footnote-50), mid-performers improved in 2010, while weak initiatives (more than half the portfolio) did not. One in 5 initiatives had poor M&E systems.
* More than a third of initiatives were highly **efficient**—an improvement on 2009. However, 42 per cent of initiatives were still unsatisfactory, including all World Bank-supervised initiatives.
* **Sustainability** scores were disappointing and significantly worse than in 2009.[[50]](#footnote-51)Almost 65 per cent of initiatives were unsatisfactory, and 20 per cent rated poor.
* Reflecting tougher ratings, **gender equality** scores dropped dramatically in 2010, with half of initiatives rated inadequate and 28 per cent poor.

These scores merit further interpretation. Almost two-thirds of initiatives were within a year of completion in 2010, which meant that shortcomings in effectiveness and sustainability were easier to highlight, but harder to address. Australia reformed programs where immediate changes were possible (for example, PSCDPs overuse of advisers), however, the rewards of putting strong effort into diagnosing program shortcomings and discussing new approaches with partners (for example, more appropriate use of the trust fund modality by the HSSP-SP) will not be reaped until programs are re-designed in 2011. Lower scores may also indicate improved staff awareness of the logical connections between actions and outcomes and how programs can better address the underlying factors affecting gender equality.

## Major quality successes, issues and challenges

Before the agreement of the five-year Australia Timor-Leste Country Strategy in 2009, Australia’s aid program to Timor-Leste was spread thinly across a high number of low-value activities. Since then, major efforts have been undertaken to reduce the number of initiatives and reform the program to align with the strategy. Despite this, a program ‘health check’ conducted in 2010 revealed the number of low-value activities remained high.

This year Australia shifted how we analyse aid performance in Timor-Leste. We moved from analysing program progress to overall sector progress. Sector performance frameworks were developed in sectors where we intend to make a long-term contribution to shared development outcomes with the GoTL. This DCR reflects this new approach.

Engagement and policy influence with the GoTL, particularly with the Prime Minster, remained a challenge for Australia’s aid program in 2010. However this relationship warmed towards the end of the year. Emerging, high-level government decisions and changing government landscape (in regard to small scale infrastructure funds) required flexibility in sectoral support.

Australia worked with the GoTL to broaden the spectrum of capacity development approaches used through the aid program. Australia and the GoTL reviewed all adviser positions and committed to reducing reliance on advisers across the program.

## Crosscutting themes

### Capacity development approaches

QaIs indicate that Australia’s current capacity development efforts in Timor-Leste are mostly ill-defined and have little impact on institutional performance, often because original intentions were too ambitious. The experience from the PFMCBP suggests that Timor-Leste’s context frequently justifies capacity substitution, at least in the medium term. This is appropriate in a fragile state that—despite weak skills and systems—must sustain stability by delivering short-term tangible gains (for example, services and public order) to citizens. However, while advisers play a valuable role, there has been an over-reliance on the adviser-counterpart model as a way to build capacity. The focus on this model to build capacity will continue to scale back in 2011, and the full range of capacity-development options will be considered. The GoTL has asked Australia to help it prepare a new technical assistance policy, reflecting our reputation for new thinking in capacity development. This new policy will enable the GoTL and donor partners to address different elements of capacity—policy, in-line work and developing Indigenous systems and skills.

### Adviser effectiveness

We will continue to shift our focus to the full range of capacity-development options, rather than just relying an adviser-counterpart model. In 2010 we reduced advisor numbers in line with commitments between the governments of Australia and Timor-Leste and joint assessments of need and effectiveness. The ratio of national to international technical assistance, and average adviser remuneration, are ahead of the AusAID mean. AusAID’s public sector reform program made particular headway: it started more appropriate selection processes that prioritised capacity development skills, instituted more rigorous advisor monitoring and began engaging more national advisors. But concerns about advisor effectiveness and technical assistance overuse remain in health, infrastructure, education and PFM. Actions are underway, including: supporting MoF’s technical assistance policy and capacity-building plan; rationalising the Asian Development Bank infrastructure program; and re-shaping our health and education engagement through re-designs in 2011.

### Service-delivery focus

A related issue emerging across many initiatives is the need to re-orient our systems to strengthen support toward improvements in service delivery, especially in the districts. This is currently particularly hard to accomplish in health, education and public sector reform. Further, to ensure sustainable services, we need to connect top-down state provision of services with bottom-up community involvement in how these are provided. Making this happen will require careful thinking in 2011 design processes. We should also learn from the lessons of the water and sanitation program, given that its mid-term review highlighted a good balance between central institutional capacity building and service delivery and suggested the program is a positive example of community involvement in service delivery.

### Gender

Australia was a key supporter of the Timor-Leste draft gender justice policy and civil society work to reduce violence against women and girls in 2010. Although strong progress towards gender equality has been made in some service delivery sectors, such as rural water and sanitation and maternal health, QaIs indicate that in other sectors Australia must improve efforts to systematically address gender issues. An evaluation of Australia’s small-value support to increase women’s political participation, provided through United Nations Women, revealed disappointing results and Australia will review this support, In 2011 we will sharpen our focus on integrating gender across all sectors of Australian support, to promote real change for women in the districts. All evaluations and designs in 2011 will have a specific focus on improving gender equality. The gender focal point at post (AusAID’s Dili office) will continue to lead these efforts, guided by a visit from AusAID’s senior gender adviser. Australia will encourage other donors to harmonise support to gender across all sectors, as we take on the role of chair of the gender donor coordination group in 2011, Disability

In 2010 we supported Timor-Leste’s first Strategy for Community Based Rehabilitation (Disability Services), helped community health posts to ensure people with disability are included in the strategy, and funded the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons to increase the number of surgeries for people with disability. We also focused our disability mainstreaming efforts in water and sanitation, including a needs analysis, regular stakeholder mainstreaming workshops and integration into GoTL’s sanitation policy and programming. These efforts will increase in 2011, with Timor-Leste one of two focus countries for implementation of Australia’s ‘Development for All’ strategy. Additional funding from the disability budget measure will be provided for disability-specific initiatives, in addition to further consideration of options for mainstreaming disability across existing sectoral programs. This will build on work accomplished to date and will be supported by the Regional Specialist, Disability-Inclusive Development (Asia). In addition to ensuring good practice disability-inclusive development, programming decisions will be informed by post management capacity and prioritising mainstreaming during the analysis and design phase (as opposed to retrofitting).

### Nutrition and food security

Timor-Leste’s nutrition crisis and food security situation is of enormous concern to both countries. In 2011 Australia will work with the GoTL to ensure a multi-sector response to malnutrition incorporating all sectors—particularly health and education. This will complement efforts in agricultural productivity and food security, such as monitoring short-term food security, providing assistance when required and improving crop yields.

### Aid effectiveness

We continued to support GoTL’s leadership of the g7+ agenda through the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in 2010. This is providing fragile states with a critical voice in the international aid effectiveness debate. In 2010 and early 2011 the GoTL and donors benchmarked current practice against principles of aid effectiveness as a platform for improvements over time.

*Coordination:* Australia led consensus building among leading donors around the 2010 Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting with some success. But within sectors progress was uneven. New GoTL strategies in education, health and PFM created impetus for coordination and a platform for multi-donor designs in 2011. Substantive discussion and exchange between donors and the GoTL on PFM received a boost from the mid-term review of the PFM program. These achievements were in spite of weak GoTL architecture for donor coordination (national priority working groups), which may strengthen under the forthcoming GoTL SDP and aid policy.

*Use of government PFM systems:* To ensure greater sustainability of service delivery through greater government ownership, Australia took early steps to align work with the Government’s PFM systems, including in line agencies. In water and sanitation, health and education, we are analysing the Government’s PFM systems to inform their strengthening and to inform decisions about their potential use through new methods designed in 2011. Decisions about potential use of government PFM systems will involve balancing the fiduciary risks against the development risks of not using these systems.

*Managing for results:* 2010 saw real progress in getting government’s information systems up and running—an important platform for harmonisation. The Labour Force Survey was launched; the MoF instituted an integrated financial management information system; and a water information system now provides information on coverage, functionality and gaps. On the other hand, the health management information system remained disappointing, not least due to the 4000 data entry points health workers are required to submit, and there is still a way to go in agriculture and roads. Further, sustaining these new systems with the GoTL and linking them to decisions remained a challenge.

### Policy influence

As noted in several QAIs, challenges were posed throughout 2010 by emerging, high-level GoTL decisions like investing in heavy oil electricity generators and instituting multiple procurement approaches to more rapidly execute its capital budget. A recently agreed bilateral annual discussion between the two governments is an opportunity for constructive high-level engagement around these issues. To be heard on policy issues, Australia needs to improve its ability to provide timely, innovative and practical approaches to high-priority problems. Further, we will work to position ourselves as a useful partner in implementing the forthcoming SDP.

Within sectors of program focus, we continue to try to increase the influence of line agencies (for example, health and education) on overall government resource allocation and strategy. This contributed to improvements to GoTL’s water and sanitation allocation. Recently commissioned analysis of PFM systems across key sectors (and discussion with the GoTL about the findings) and designs of new ways of operating in 2011 offer real opportunities to ensure policy engagement becomes part and parcel of the way we work.

### Results focus

No delivery strategies were completed in 2010 and all lagged behind designs. However, the drafting process informed several initiative concepts in early 2011. Key sector performance review discussions were held for the first time. These aligned with draft delivery strategies and aimed to assist more systematic articulation and tracking of the national changes to which our initiatives and policy discussion are contributing.

Some initiatives reversed strategic drift in 2010. For example, a mid-term review helped rein in the scope of our ADB-supervised infrastructure support, and in public sector reform we ended an ‘Additional Initiatives’ stream of disparate activities.

Several initiatives made positive reforms to their M&E approaches. However, unclear outcome reporting remained an issue in 11 of 13 QAIs. Inadequate performance information is a particular issue for the ADB, and most World Bank-supervised initiatives suffered from gaps in program logic. Despite improvements to the management of these programs in 2010, there is still some way to go for these inputs to produce better results.

### Manageability

**Total value and number of active initiatives by scal**

12

9

3

5

1

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

< $3 million

$3—$10 m

$10 - $20 million

$20 - $50 million

> $50 million

Spending proposal (FMA Reg

9/10) $million

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Number of initiatives

Spending proposal (FMA Regulation

 9/10) $m

Number of initiatives

More than a third of initiatives are under $3 million in size, totalling only 3 per cent of the program’s approved funds. The number of activities will be further reduced when half of the program’s initiatives end in 2011 and as a quarter more close in 2012. This represents an opportunity to improve the manageability of the program.

This opportunity is most obvious in the governance portfolio (incorporating PFM, public administration and democratic governance), which includes 10 initiatives—more than double any other portfolio. Five of these are under $3 million each, including two that carry disproportionate workloads. This portfolio will be rationalised in forthcoming delivery strategy and design work.

## Progress against 2010 management consequences

| **Objectives** | **Progress**  | **Explanation** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Re-set the relationship with the GoTL**AusAID will initiate annual high-level consultations, and explore options for more formally setting out bilateral commitments under the partnership agreement. AusAID will specify our expectations of mutual accountability, and agree clear benchmarks for each other’s performance, drawing on the undertakings in our country strategy, and the priorities set out in the GoTL’s SDP. |  | In February 2011 the governments of Australia and the GoTL agreed to an annual high-level discussion—a major step forward for the relationship. Agreement on the scope and process for these discussions will be determined in 2011. |
| **Identify entry points for discussion**AusAID will undertake analytical work (for example, a Drivers of Change study) to identify the entry points and obstacles to improved policy discussion with the GoTL. In doing so, AusAID will ask questions such as:Where are the strongest incentives for reform, and where do reform efforts seem least likely to succeed? How can external actors support good policy decisions and strong program interventions? |  | The Adviser Review, PFM systems analysis, and a large number of initiative evaluations identified opportunities for policy dialogue. These were picked up in delivery strategies and concepts for new programs, and will be taken forward as part of 2011 design discussions with the GoTL.  |
| **Improve policy discussion capacity**Current resourcing levels at post are modest in comparison to other significant programs, and our ability to engage in evidence based policy dialogue is limited. We need to secure quality advice and support from the thematic groups and, ideally, from in-house advisers. We will strengthen our access to high-level skills in economics/PFM, education and health. |  | Secured in-house PFM expertise in Dili, but the need for in-house advisers in other sectors (especially education and health) was not met in 2010.  |
| **Work with the Word Bank to find new ways of operating in low capacity environments**The World Bank is a valued partner. However, AusAID and the World Bank rate its programs poorly. We will analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the trust fund approach, especially its reliance on government implementation, and will work with the World Bank to adapt its approach to better meet the fragile, low capacity context. For instance, we will seek commitment from the World Bank to place senior program managers in the field to strengthen its support for implementation. We will also formalise improved approaches to Australian participation in program management as part of upcoming mid-term reviews. |  | Additional in-country resources and some rationalisation was achieved in some programs in 2010, but there remains a need for broader analysis on the appropriateness of World Bank ways of working in fragile settings.  |
| **Clarify program logic**Many of our programs continue to suffer from crowded and unclear outcome statements, and weak logic connecting inputs to outcomes. We will systematically assess each of our programs to improve design, and ensure that as new activities are brought forward, we emphasise simplicity and a clear, logical path to results. |  | With assistance from external expertise, there were real improvements in staff awareness of program logic. Leaps in logic underpinning some programs were also highlighted. Addressing these require significant reforms as part of 2011 design processes. |
| **Signal our willingness to gradually transition to use of government systems**The GoTL has a strong agenda to move from program assistance to budget support. However, country systems are very weak and do not provide an adequate level of fiduciary assurance to donors. Signalling a serious commitment to this will underscore our willingness to push the relationship’s reset button.We will work with other interested donors (for example, the European Community) and the GoTL to agree on a roadmap of reforms needed to move to use of country systems. We will use existing analysis (for example, PEFA) and commission diagnostic work (with government) where necessary.Where appropriate we will consider using ring-fenced and incremental ways of using country systems. |  | Significant achievements have been made with the MoF to articulate a roadmap for moving toward greater use of country systems, linked to the MoF’s strategic plan. Discussions around initiative evaluations, the early stages of designs, and PFM analyses also allowed us to signal our commitment to alignment. 2011 will be an opportunity to put this into action, drawing on AusAID’s corporate guidance on working in partner systems. |
| **Reduce the use of technical assistance**We will continue to reduce the numbers of technical advisers, and pursue a more innovative approach to capacity development. |  | We are on track to meet the targets for reduced technical assistance agreed to by both governments , but further discipline will be required in 2011. Ground-breaking discussions with the MoF in 2010 laid the foundation for developing an innovative and tailored GoTL technical assistance policy. It will be critical to apply this to 2011 designs. |

Management consequences

## Program-wide

Australia followed up on constructive discussion with Prime Minister Gusmao in late 2010 and will continue to do so in early 2011. This marks a positive shift towards re-setting the aid relationship between the two countries. A high-level partnership and will be established and regular discussion held on policies and programs in light of the GoTL’s forthcoming SDP. To be an effective partner, Australia must demonstrate credibility and flexibility in aligning its work with this plan.

The program expects to deliver six major designs in 2011, covering almost all priority areas of Australia’s support, including health, education, and water and sanitation. This presents a major opportunity to shift how Australia works and ensure all interventions are in partnership with the GoTL and designed to achieve real results. All designs will be informed by strong analysis and contain clear program logic. This major endeavour will require dedicated staff resources for design work—including the creative use of staff across Canberra and Dili and additional management and advisory resources.

Despite efforts to reform, the program is still fragmented. Australia must ramp up efforts to improve the manageability of the program and ensure a deeper level of engagement across fewer sectors. The number of initiatives under $3 million in value will therefore be halved in 2011. A high priority will be accorded to strengthening the program’s corporate backbone in line with AusAID’s corporate reform agenda.

1. Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, State Budget 2011, Budget Book 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. AusAID estimates based on Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Budget Execution Reports. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. World Bank, A 2009 update of poverty incidence in Timor-Leste using the survey-to-survey imputation method. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Ibid, [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. The economy is measured in terms of non-oil gross domestic product excluding the United Nations mission. Asian Development Bank *Asian Development Outlook 2011*, pp. 230; Statement by International Monetary Fund staff Representatives on the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 19 January 2011; and Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, State Budget 2011, Budget Book 1, p. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. The lower forecast is from the International Monetary Fund Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation, 3 December 2010, p. 8. The higher forecast is from the *Asian Development Outlook 2011*, pp. 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, State Budget 2011, Budget Book 1, p. 26; International Monetary Fund Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation, 3 December 2010. According to the IMF, average annual population growth for 2000–09 was 2.4 per cent. The World Bank’s World Development Indicators database gives a higher average growth rate of 3.7 per cent over the same period. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Education Management Information Systems 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Timor-Leste Labour Force Survey 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey 2009–10. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Based on Australia’s 2010–11 budget for overseas development assistance to Timor-Leste of AU$102 700 000 and Timor-Leste’s 2010 (mid-year rectified) State Budget of US$837 981 000. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Comprises the $69 million estimated official development assistance expenditure from AusAID only. It does not include official development assistance expended by the AFP, which is estimated at $33.7 million for 2010–11. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Changes to the way Australia analyses aid performance in Timor-Leste in 2010, including through the DCR process, mean most ratings cannot be compared to 2009. We have moved towards assessing shared progress between Australia and the GoTL towards shared development outcomes as explained in the *Results of the Timor-Leste program* section below. In addition, unlike last year, progress against the broad ‘community safety’ objective in the country strategy is broken down to its constituent parts: ending violence against women, building resilience to natural emergencies, and supporting access to justice. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey 2009–10. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. World Bank Development Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste>, accessed 10 June 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Estimates from the GoTL Demographic and Health Survey 2009–10 and Timor-Leste’s Health Management Information System, Ministry of Health, 2008–09. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey 2009–10. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Calculations based on GoTL budget data. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Kathy Whimp, Analysis of bottlenecks to service delivery in Timor-Leste, 2010 (for AusAID). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey 2009–10. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Marie Stopes International. *Annual Report*, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Augustine Asante, John Hall and Graham Roberts, *A Review of Health Leadership and Management Capacity in Timor-Leste,* 2011, University of New South Wales [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Fabian Kong, *Analysis of the pharmaceutical sector*, 2010 (for AusAID and the World Bank). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Health Sector Strategic Plan—Support Project. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. *National Education Strategic Plan 2010–30*, Ministry of Education. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. *An Analysis of Early Grade Reading Acquisition*, World Bank, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Ministry of Education, *Review of financial management processes*, report prepared as part of the Education Sector Support Program mid-term review, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. World Health Organization and United Nations Children's Fund *Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and Sanitation Coverage Estimates*, 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. Mid-Term review of the RWSSP, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Timor-Leste General State Budget for 2011—approved by the Council of Ministers in November 2010, passed by National Parliament in January 2011 and promulgated by the President in February 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. RWSSP reporting to AusAID, March 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Baseline study of Water Supply and Sanitation in Aileu and Lautem Districts, Timor-Leste, PLAN Timor-Leste 2009. ‘Fully functioning’ is defined providing safe water through-out the year to 80 per cent of the community. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. AusAID estimates based on European Commission, Technical Assistance to Design the Masterplan for Rural Roads, Final Report, 18 November 2010. The survey found that 69 per cent of 730 km of rural roads accessible by vehicle were in bad or very bad condition. It is therefore estimated that around 90 per cent of the total 3025 km of rural roads are in bad or very bad condition. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. AusAID calculations based on the *Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2011*, Book 1, Budget Overview. ‘Economic infrastructure’—includes energy, transport, agricultural and industrial infrastructure. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Asian Development Bank reporting to AusAID. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. International Labour Organization reports to AusAID on the TIM-Works project and Youth Employment Program. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. AusAID calculation based on *Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste State Budget 2011*, Book 1 Budget Overview, tables 3.3 and 3.4, p. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Statement by the International Monetary Fund Staff Representative on the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, January 19, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. ACIAR, SoL II, final report, 31 March 2011, table 12, p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. ACIAR estimate reported to AusAID and ACIAR, SoL II, final report, 31 March 2011, p. 31. SoL reporting years are from September to August, incorporating the wet season from November to May. Because the second phase of SoL finished in January 2011, the 2001–10 distribution figure does not cover a full wet season. The figures for each wet season include some double counting of households across different crops. The estimate of 25 000 farming households for September 2008 to January 2011 incorporates an approximate adjustment for double counting (across crops and across years) to the total for three wet seasons of around 43 000 households. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. ACIAR, SoL II, final report, 31 March 2011, p. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. UNCDF Special Projects Implementation Review Exercise. Mid Term Review (MTR): INFUSE Timor-Leste, March 2011, p. 45 and INFUSE reporting to AusAID. In December 2010 microfinance providers had 55 851 active clients. The INFUSE MTR includes a December 2008 baseline of 34 733 savers but no separate figure for total clients. In calculating growth since December 2008 it is assumed (based on the March 2010 figures) that the total number of clients (including lenders) in December 2008 was almost equal to the number of savers. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. INFUSE MTR, pp. 26–27. At December 2009 the two institutions had financial self-sufficiency ratios of 105 per cent and returns on assets of 3 per cent or greater. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. PEFA Assessment, IMF, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey 2009–10, p. 245. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. Ratings are defined as: High quality: at least three 5s or 6s (no 3s or below). Acceptable/moderate quality: 4s and above; 1 rating of 3 allowed; no rating of 2 or 1. Needs improvement: two or more criteria rated at 3; any rating of 2 or 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. See ‘Results focus’ below. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. See ‘Capacity development approaches’ below. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)