

2nd ARF Workshop on Nuclear Risk Reduction
Theme: Reducing Nuclear Risk in Pursuit of a World Without
Nuclear Weapons
22-23 March 2023, Brisbane, Australia

PROVISIONAL AGENDA

Day One: Wednesday, 22 March 2023

09:30-10:05 **Opening Session**
Co-Chairs' Opening
Remarks Ambassador Ian
Biggs
Ambassador for Arms Control and Counter-
Proliferation Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade
Australia

s 47F(1)

Department of

Foreign Affairs
The Philippines

Keynote Addresses

The Philippines: Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and International
Economic Relations, Carlos D. Sorreta *[video]*

Australia: Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Tim
Watts MP *[video]*

Ian Biggs – Opening remarks

As it is a custom in Australia, I begin today by acknowledging the Turrbal people, Traditional Custodians of the land on which we meet today and pay my respects to their Elders past and present. I extend that respect to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples here today. I would also to take this opportunity to highlight that Australia has appointed Ambassador for First Nations People, his excellency Justin Mohamed on 7 March 2023. One of the key roles of the

Ambassador is to undertake consultation with First Nations communities and leaders to listen and engage directly on how to embed First Nations perspectives into Australia's foreign policy and progress First Nations' rights and interests globally.

Colleagues, it is a pleasure to be co-chairing this second ARF workshop with our close friends and neighbours from the Philippines.

Our first workshop in November 2020 was held virtually due to global COVID travel restrictions. While the workshop was extremely productive, when discussing issues that impact on the security of our region, I think we all benefit by meeting in-person to the extent possible. I appreciate many of you have travelled far and I would like to warmly welcome you all to Brisbane and thank you for joining us.

Australia is a strong supporter of ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led architecture in underpinning regional stability and prosperity. The ARF is an important component of this architecture, providing a forum to discuss our views on how we manage contemporary challenges, to reduce the risk of conflict and ensure the preservation of peace. The ARF, with its focus on confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy, provides an excellent venue to consider steps that can be taken to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use.

The first workshop was extremely instructive and opened our eyes to the diversity of views and perspectives among the ARF membership around the topic of

nuclear risk reduction. My strong sense is that the understanding of nuclear risk reduction has evolved and matured since that workshop.

It is broadly accepted, for example, that taking immediate steps to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use is not a substitute for disarmament. At the same time, there is growing acknowledgement that there are many points of intersection between the steps taken to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use and steps taken toward disarmament. So, there is practical value in pursuing such measures.

It is also acknowledged that while moving ahead with disarmament, we cannot discount the risks that exist from potential of use. Taking steps to address those risks needs to go hand in hand with parallel efforts to achieve disarmament.

As you will hear in the video address by Australia's Assistant Foreign Minister to be screened shortly, Australia remains fully committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. I hope this workshop can assist in taking us closer toward that goal and to reducing the immediate risks posed by nuclear weapons.

In the course of the program, we welcome the perspectives of all ARF members. You will also have the opportunity to hear from and interact with a number of expert guest speakers. I would like to thank these speakers in advance for their contributions.

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

As we have a busy agenda, I will leave my comments there and hand over to my
Co-Chair s 47F(1) of the
Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs.

[Opening remarks by Philippines co-chair]

Thank you for those remarks. Again, it is wonderful to have the opportunity to
partner with the Philippines on this series of workshops.

Before moving to the next item in our agenda, we would quickly like to go over
a few housekeeping matters.

Can I hand over to s 22(1)(a)(ii) in our Secretariat team to run through those points
please.

[Housekeeping items covered by s 22(1)(a)(ii)]

Thank you. If anyone has any questions on those matters, please raise your country plate? The Australian or Philippines delegations should be able to assist with any later questions you may have.

In terms of the co-chairing arrangements, the co-chairs have agreed between us that I will navigate the sessions up to lunch today, with the sessions after lunch to be chaired by my Philippines co-chair. Tomorrow, the Philippines co-chair will steer us through to the coffee break after which I will take over through to the close of the meeting.

Let us now proceed to the keynote addresses. Both of these will be delivered via video message so I invite you to turn to the nearest screen. The first video message is from the Philippines Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and International Economic Relations, Carlos D. Sorreta. The second keynote address will be from the Australian Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Tim Watts MP.

[video messages conclude]

10:05-10:35

Session 1 - Presentation: Understanding Nuclear Risks

s 47F(1)

s 47F(1)

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

(UNODA) Q&A

That concludes the opening session. Unless there are any comments or questions, we move now to session 1 in the agenda – Understanding Nuclear Risks. Clearly, there will be many perspective on what nuclear risks are, and we welcome discussion on these perspectives during the workshop. To help stimulate that discussion, we are delighted to have s 47F(1)

s 47F(1) to offer some thoughts. s 47F(1), thank you for making your self available for this important workshop and I invite you to take the floor.

[Remarks from s 47F(1)]

s 47F(1) –s 22(1)(a)(ii)

We have a little time remaining for questions. Please raise your country name plate if you would like to ask a question.

[Q&A]

Thank you. If there are no further questions, I would like to thank s 47F(1) again for s 47F(1) useful remarks which really have helped set the scene for this workshop and I hope have stimulated some thinking on nuclear risks.

10:35–11:00 **Coffee break**

There is a further opportunity to stimulate your minds with coffee – as we take a short coffee and tea break. We will resume the workshop at 11am with session 2 and the exchange of views. We will follow the speakers list which has been made available – and if you do wish to speak but have not yet been inscribed on the list, please let one of our team know and you will be added. Thank you.

11:00-12:20 **Session 2 - Exchange of Views**

- Delegates to deliver interventions on nuclear risks and risk reduction

I hope you are all refreshed. We will now commence session 2 – the exchange of views. We have a number of speakers on the list. Thank you to all for your interest in delivering remarks. Our aim will be to get through as many speakers as possible before the lunch break.

- The first speaker on the list is [*Country name*]. You have the floor.

-Thank you for those remarks – the next speaker is [*Country name*]. You have the floor.

12:20–13:30 **Lunch**

That concludes the list of speakers. If there are no further requests for the floor, we will conclude session 2 now and take lunch. Lunch will be a buffet style and

is served just outside the conference room. We will resume at 1:30pm for session

3. The Philippines will chair the sessions through to the close today.

[You next chair session 6 after the coffee break on day 2]

13:30-14:45 **Session 3 - Panel Discussion: Nuclear Risk Reduction and Current Prospects for Disarmament**

Panellists (20 minutes each):

1. Dr. Manpreet Sethi
Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi
Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN)
2. Dr. Benjamin Zala
Research Fellow in International Relations
Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs
The Australian National University
3. s 47F(1)

UNODA

14:45-15:15 **Coffee break**

15:15-16:45 **Session 4 - s 33(a)(iii)**
s 33(a)(iii)

16:45-17:00 Co-chairs Wrap-up and Day 2 preview

18:00-20:00 **Welcome Dinner**

Day One close

Day Two: Thursday, 23 March 2023

09:15-09:30

Opening

- Co-chairs summary of Day 1 and introduction to Day 2

09:30-10:30

Session 5 - Panel Discussion: ASEAN Regional Perspective on Nuclear Risk Reduction

1. s 47F(1)

, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network

10:30-11:00

Coffee break

11:00-1200

Session 6 - s 33(a)(iii)

- s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

12:00-12:30

Closing remarks

- Co-chair closing remarks, summary & next steps

We have wrapped up our discussions – at least in the time available to us – the co-chairs will now move to close the meeting.

From my perspective, this workshop has shown the level in which the debate on nuclear risk reduction and effective measures has evolved since our first ARF workshop in November 2020.

To some extent, this reflects the way in which the international security landscape has also evolved in the two and half years between the two workshops.

I would like to thank all of you for your contributions over these two days. I would, in particular, like to thank the Philippines for all its assistance with the arrangements and for most ably co-chairing the workshop. There were many highlights – including the exchange of views, panel discussions and ^{s 33(a)(iii)}

The co-chairs will aim to issue a co-chairs summary report as soon as possible ^{s 33(a)(iii)}

Before closing the meeting – I would like to open the floor for any closing comments from delegates.

[delegate remarks]

I see no others wishing to take the floor.

Given this, I thank you all for travelling to Brisbane for this workshop and declare the meeting closed. I wish you a safe journey home.

Lunch will be served in the same venue as yesterday and our team remains at your disposal for any further matters you wish to raise, including on the documents to be produced by this workshop.

12:30–13:30 **Lunch**

*** Note: further time following lunch could be allocated should any delegates wish to continue to discuss s 33(a)(iii)**

Day Two and Workshop close

s 47E(d)

Title: Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: ASEAN Regional Forum 2nd Workshop on Nuclear Risk Reduction - readout

MRN: s 47E(d) 14/04/2023 01:06:58 PM ZE10

To: ARF Posts

Cc: RR : Geneva UN, UN New York, Vienna UN

From: Canberra
(CHCH/DFAT/ACD/ACB)

From File:

EDRMS

Files:

References: s 47E(d)

The cable has the following attachment/s -

Sethi - NRR Brisbane 2023.pdf

s 47F(1)

s 47F(1), s 33(a)(iii)

Australia national statement As Delivered.pdf

AFM Watts recorded remarks.pdf

Response: Routine, Information Only

Summary

The second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Nuclear Risk Reduction Workshop, which we co-chaired with the Philippines, was well received and progressed work s 33(a)(iii)

On 22–23 March, we co-chaired with the Philippines the second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Nuclear Risk Reduction Workshop in Brisbane, building on the inaugural event held virtually in 2020 (s 47E(d) reports). Ambassador for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (Biggs) co-chaired with s 47F(1)

. Recorded addresses from AFM

Watts (transcript attached) and Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and International Economic Relations Sorreta opened the Workshop.

s 33(a)(iii)

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s 47E(d)

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

National statements

4. With the exception of s 33(a)(iii) all delegations delivered national statements.
s 33(a)(iii)

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s 47E(d)

s 33(a)(iii)

7. Our intervention (attached) reaffirmed Australia's commitment to doing more on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, s 33(a)(iii). We called out Russia over its invasion of Ukraine, nuclear threats and called on it to return to New START. We highlighted, s 33(a)(iii) and the DPRK's missile and nuclear activities in violation of UNSC resolutions. s 33(a)(iii)

Civil society

8. In a subsequent session, panellists (s 47F(1), UNODA; Dr Manpreet Sethi, The Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi; and Dr Benjamin Zala, ANU) painted a pessimistic picture of the current state of play in nuclear affairs. s 47F(1)

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

s 47E(d)

s 33(a)(iii)

Comment

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

13. We extend our thanks to Posts for their assistance in advocating for appropriate host country participation and support with logistic arrangements for select participants.

text ends

Sent by: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Prepared s 22(1)(a)(ii)

by:

Approved Sarah Roberts, AS ACB

by:

Topics: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY/Arms Control, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY/Strategic Policy, POLITICAL-ECONOMIC/International Organisations

▼ New Distribution

Nuclear Risk Reduction & Current Prospects for Disarmament



Manpreet Sethi, Ph.D
Distinguished Fellow
Centre for Air Power Studies

22 Mar 2023

Current State of Nuclear Affairs

- ❑ **From nuc quiescence to nuc cacophony**
- ❑ **Severely stressed pol relations**
 - **Multiple nuc actors**
 - **Diff perceptions of how to establish deterrence**
- ❑ **Technology races underway**
 - **Offence-defence spirals**
 - **Intersection with nuc deterrence unclear**
- ❑ **Growing salience of NWs in national security**

Current Crop of Risks

- ❑ **Nuclear Proliferation**
- ❑ **Nuclear Use**
- ❑ **Nuclear Terrorism**
- ❑ **Civilian nuclear infrastructure**

1. Risk of Nuc Proliferation

Vertical Proliferation

- **Modernisation of existing nuc arsenals**
 - **Rapid expansion of numbers & capabilities**
 - **Breakdown of arms control architecture**
 - **Reactive build-up and security dilemmas**

Horizontal Proliferation

- **North Korea – unlikely to denuclearise**
 - **Domino effect in North-east Asia?**
- **Iran – heightened possibility of moving to NWs**
 - **Domino effect in West Asia?**
- **Whither NPT? – Rumblings of discontent**

2a. Risk of Nuc Use

- **Deliberate or intentional use – *low***
 - **Mutual vulnerability deters**
- **Accidental – *relatively low***
 - **NWS expected to have good negative controls on C2**

2b. Risk of Nuc Use

□ Inadvertent – *high*

- Miscommunication or lack of commn
- Misperception of intention/source of risk
- Risk creation for enhancing det
 - Dual use delivery systems / Nuc entanglement
 - Conv attacks on nuc assets
- Growing ‘confidence’ in nuc escalation mgt & control
 - TNWs & limited nuc war
 - BMD

3. Risk of Nuclear Terrorism

- ❑ **Terrorist organisations well networked**
 - **Theft, purchase or insider collusion**
- ❑ **Growing use of RMs**
- ❑ **IAEA Database on trafficking of NM & RM**
- ❑ **Reduced high level pol attention to nuc security**
- ❑ **Growing risk of cyber attacks on NPPs**
- ❑ **Complicit behaviour of states sponsoring terrorism**

4. Risk to Civilian Nuclear Infrastr

- ❑ **Not just from non-state actors**
- ❑ **Risks from states in war zones**
- ❑ **Russia & Ukraine both have shown tendency to 'use' risk to NPPs**
 - **Storing ammo & troops**
 - **Attacks on the plant**
- ❑ **Nuc disaster would impact future of nuc energy**

Addressing Nuc Risks

- **Nuclear Risk Reduction**
 - **Umbrella concept**
- **Nuclear CBMs**
 - **More general**
 - **For improving atmospherics or generating mutual understanding/confidence**
- **Nuclear Arms Control**
 - **More precise**
 - **Specific to weapon or weapon systems**
 - **For rationalizing arsenal build-up or generating arms race stability**

Prospects for Acceptance of NRRMs

- ❑ **Dim – pre-requisites missing**
- ❑ **No shared interest in reducing nuc dangers**
- ❑ **No mutual desire for strategic stability**
 - ❑ **By addressing misperceptions**
- ❑ **No acceptance of SS as a worthwhile objective by national leaderships**
- ❑ **No readiness to invest in risky negotiations & at risk of domestic opposition**

How to make NRR desirable & feasible?

- **Create shared understanding of nuc risks**
 - **Cuban Missile crisis & Superpowers**
- **Nuc Risk Reduction Summits (like NSS)**
- **Equity of benefits – no loser**
- **Flexibility of approach – reciprocal concessions**
- **Domestic acceptability of end results**
- **Patience and perseverance**
- **Reassurance + Restraint + Trust + Verification
+ Communication = NRRMs**

NRR Ideas – More likely

Pol will is key component

- ❑ Dialogues to understand each other's threat perceptions, doctrines & force postures**
- ❑ Unilateral/Coordinated statements on reduced role of NWs – “sole purpose”**
- ❑ Legally binding NSAs to all NNWS**
- ❑ Studies/movies on effects of nuclear deterrence breakdown**
- ❑ Permanent communication channels on nuclear issues**

More Likely contd....

- **Permanent communication channels on nuclear issues**
 - **Hotlines and NRRCs**
- **Transparency of nuc survivability measures**
 - **Eases use or lose pressures**
 - **Removes temptation for pre-emption**
 - **Silos, SSBNs, robustness of C2**

NRR Ideas – More difficult

- **Reining in capabilities impacting SS**
 - **BMD – multilateral ABM of sorts?**
 - **Control on MIRVs? Or their numbers??**
- **Agreements on**
 - **Keeping arsenals de-mated & at low alert levels**
 - **Eschewing dual use missiles**
 - **Eschewing TNWs – artificial distinction of CF/CV**
 - **Acceptance of NFU**

© manpreet sethi

Current Nuc Disarmament Prospects

- **Dim, despite TPNW**
- **Trend towards hard power, not giving up wpns**
- **What cld change the prospects?**
 - **Disastrous nuc event**
 - **Understanding of nuc risks**
 - **Popular public groundswell**
 - **Emergence of political leadership**
- **Need for NRR in the interim**

-
- **Delegitimization difficult without devaluation**
 - **Example of CWC**
 - **Reduce salience of NW**

 - **Restraint on role, circumstances of use, readiness**

ARF Nuclear Risk Reduction Workshop

22-23 March 2023

Australia

Chairs

Australia welcomes the opportunity to again come together with ARF members, including our co-chairs the Philippines, to build on the outcomes of first workshop in 2020 and to progress constructive outcomes on nuclear risk reduction. ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the ARF, help reduce the risk of conflict and create a region that is stable, prosperous and respectful of sovereignty.

As you have heard in the earlier video message from the Assistant Foreign Minister, Australia believes that nuclear risk reduction measures, or efforts to decrease and control the possibility of nuclear weapons use, whether this be intentional, unauthorised or accidental – are critical to supporting a safer region for all ARF members.

We recognise there are different appreciations about nuclear risk reduction concepts, and its place relative to hopes for disarmament.

We retain the view that it remains fully consistent with disarmament objectives, which Australia and the Philippines, as co-chairs, have reflected in the theme of this workshop ‘Nuclear risk reduction: In pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons’.

Chairs

The importance of nuclear risk reduction has been recognised, both in policy positions and in practice:

The statement issued by the Leaders of the Five Nuclear States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races in January 2022 is one such example.

Putting aside the actions of one state, this Leaders' statement considered 'the avoidance of war between nuclear-weapon states and the reduction of strategic risks as their "foremost responsibilities" and affirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought'.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan continue to implement their Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities – with the exchange of lists again occurring on 1 January this year.

That was the 32nd consecutive exchange between the two countries.

And while consensus was not reached at the August 2022 NPT review Conference, there was broad satisfaction with the draft text on nuclear risk reduction among NPT States Parties.

Chairs

There is an imperative for reducing the risk of nuclear use, particularly in the most challenging strategic context in recent memory.

s 33(a)(iii)

Meanwhile, another State does so blatantly through irresponsible and dangerous testing of delivery platforms, and preparedness for another nuclear test.

One year on, Australia continues to condemn Russia's illegal and immoral full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This aggression is contrary to ASEAN fundamental principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the renunciation of the threat or use of force, as set out in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, to which Russia is a party. We strongly support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised border and call on Russia to end its war.

As we focus on nuclear risks in this workshop, we further call on Russia to cease its unacceptable, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric. Russia's ongoing occupation of the Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant also presents an unprecedented threat to nuclear safety and security.

The most effective way to ensure nuclear safety and security at Ukrainian nuclear facilities would be Russia's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Ukraine.

We consider Russia's noncompliance with the New START Treaty, and its claimed suspension of the treaty, to be unfortunate and irresponsible steps. Nuclear stability is especially important in time of crisis, and we urge Russia to return to full compliance with the treaty.

s 33(a)(iii)

Chairs

Beyond this series of ARF workshops, there have been numerous lines of effort on nuclear risk reduction across a number of forums.

This includes the NPT, the Conference on Disarmament – where we understand discussions on this topic are occurring this week - within the US initiated 'Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament' or 'CEND' initiative, and by groups of States such as P5, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and the Stockholm Initiative.

Track 2 is also very active in this space.

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

We welcome the views of the membership during discussions later in the agenda.

Remarks to ARF Nuclear Risk Reduction Workshop

Speech, check against delivery

22 March 2023

Delegates,

Welcome to Australia for the second ASEAN Regional Forum Nuclear Risk Reduction Workshop, which we are privileged to co-host with the Republic of the Philippines.

Reducing the risks associated with nuclear weapons is as important today as it has ever been.

The Australian Government remains fully committed to efforts to reduce these risks.

Our region knows too well the devastating consequences both of nuclear weapons and of conflict.

The Indo-Pacific is witnessing the largest military build-up anywhere in the world, with limited transparency and reassurance by some states.

In our region and beyond, states refuse to comply with their non-proliferation obligations or make reckless threats to use nuclear weapons.

A realistic and tangible approach to nuclear risk reduction is an important step forward.

As Foreign Minister Wong has said, *"we can all agree we want to live in a region that is peaceful and predictable..."*

...Where disputes are guided by international law and norms, not by power and size...

and where our relations are based on partnerships and respect".

These are the fundamental principles we have all undertaken to uphold as parties to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

ASEAN's enduring strength is in enabling the space for dialogue and for the peaceful discussion of differences.

As the Foreign Minister has also affirmed, Australia is committed to ASEAN centrality and advancing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

Australia has and will continue to work with ASEAN to support the peace and stability of our region.

Australia shares ASEAN's wish for parties in the region to consider how they can best contribute to upholding regional peace and stability, including by reducing the risk of escalation and miscalculation.

Australia works with ASEAN, and members of the ASEAN Regional Forum more broadly, in a spirit of partnership to create the kind of region we aspire to.

To address shared challenges and risks, such as those posed by nuclear weapons.

ARF members may hold different views about the way to manage these risks.

But these differences make institutions such as the ARF important.

Because the purpose of the ARF is to reduce the risk of conflict.

And cooperation with regional partners through workshops such as this can build confidence and trust and make a tangible contribution to addressing global challenges.

All countries that seek to work with the region have a responsibility to engage constructively with, and through, ASEAN.

The Australian Government has committed to do more on non-proliferation and disarmament.

We have promoted the use of nuclear safeguards and we have worked tirelessly with partners to prevent the spread of other weapons of mass destruction.

We are a leading example for the international community on protecting nuclear material.

Australia was the first country to bring into force the Additional Protocol to our Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Australia's extensive work throughout the region demonstrates our enduring commitment to this goal.

We continue to work with Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and others to build practical safeguard capabilities through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network.

We will continue to advance the objectives of the NPT through the twelve nation Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, established by Australia and Japan.

In partnership with other members of the Pacific family, we remain steadfastly committed to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

And Australia has committed to transparency in our ambition to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

We understand that acquiring this critical capability comes with a responsibility to engage with our friends and partners in the region.

We have been consulting with the IAEA to ensure we set the highest non-proliferation standard.

This Australian Government deals with the world as it is.

We are committed to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

Most of all, we remain committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

It is my hope that the participants in this workshop share that goal.

I also expect that many of you share Australia's firmly held view that risk reduction measures are no substitute for tangible progress on disarmament.

But I hope you will also agree that there remain clear and present risks which cannot be ignored.

Through this workshop and other complementary efforts, we have an opportunity to make the world we live in today a safer place.

Safer – so that we can take the steps needed for disarmament.

And so we can pursue our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Let us work together toward a productive dialogue that contributes to the uptake of practical risk reduction measures in our region and beyond.

I wish you well and look forward to hearing of your progress.

