

Assistant Trade Minister – the Hon Tim Ayres MP
EVENT BRIEF

Event	MEDIA BRIEF BO'AO CHINA VISIT
Time	28 March – 1 April 2023
Adviser	s47F(1) and s47F(1)

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1. BO'AO FRAMING MESSAGES

- Pleased to be attending the Bo'ao Forum for Asia – an important step toward the stabilisation and development of Australia's relationship with China.
- My participation in the Forum is the first for an Australian Government Minister since 2016 and is an important step in the stabilisation of our relationship with China.
- The Bo'ao Forum provides an important platform for high level dialogue between governments, business, academics and other non-government organisations to discuss regional economic and trade issues.
- It is also an opportunity to build on Australia and China's recent discussions around trade and investment.
- China is our largest trading partner, with two-way trade worth \$285b in 2021-22.
- Resumption of normal trade in all products remains an important pillar of stabilisation and is in both Australia's and China's interests.
- It would be unrealistic to anticipate that trade impediments are resolved immediately but we will continue to advocate for the resumption of normal trade
- Representing the Minister for Climate Change and Energy Chris Bowen, I will also participate in a panel session exploring the future of clean energy, highlighting the Government's strong action on climate change.
- I look forward to engaging with senior business and government figures from the region as we work towards maximising the opportunities in the fastest growing region in human history.

2. CHINA – BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

- The Australian Government believes it is in the interests of both Australia and China to continue on the path of stabilising and developing the relationship.
- We have taken some steps, but it will take time.
- Our approach is calm and consistent.
- We aim for a relationship of mutual respect and mutual benefit.
- Australia and China have shared interests, but also big differences to manage. We can grow our bilateral relationship and uphold our national interests if both countries navigate our differences wisely.
- We will cooperate where we can, disagree where we must and engage in our national interest.
- China is our largest trading partner. We want to see trade impediments affecting Australian exports removed so that mutually beneficial trade in these products can resume.
- We continue to speak out as necessary on the issues that matter to Australians and bilateral issues of concern, including the detention of Australian citizens and human rights.
- We will also continue to speak in support of international security and the global rules and norms that underpin our prosperity and security.
- We remain open to working with China, including to address shared global challenges like climate change.
- Regular dialogues and engagement through our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership are essential for us to avoid miscommunication and take forward the relationship.
- Australia will continue to work with all our partners to build a region that is peaceful, prosperous and respectful of sovereignty.

If raised: What are the next steps in the bilateral relationship?

- The Sixth Australia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue Joint Outcomes Statement in December 2022 gave both sides an agreed set of activities to progress including: bilateral relations; trade and economic issues; consular affairs; climate change; defence; and regional and international issues
 - regular dialogue and engagement through our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership are essential to avoid miscommunication and develop the relationship

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- No.
- We can grow our bilateral relationship and uphold our national interests if both countries navigate our differences wisely.
- Regular dialogue and engagement are essential to this. This is why we have been transparent with China and all countries on our approach to AUKUS.

If raised: “Red Alert” suggestions that conflict over Taiwan could see China attack Australia

- The Government undertakes its own planning and assessments.
- Conflict in the Indo-Pacific would be catastrophic, for our people and our prosperity.
- It is up to all countries to consider how national power, influence, networks and capabilities can be employed to avert such conflict.

If raised: Will the Prime Minister travel to China in 2023

- The Prime Minister made clear at the G20 that he would be open to an invitation to visit China at the appropriate time.
- Decisions on high-level travel will be made at an appropriate time.

3. CHINA – TRADE

- China is our largest trading partner and will remain a key economic partner for us and the region
 - our two-way goods trade with China was worth \$273 billion in 2021-22, up 2 per cent from 2020-21
 - complementarities between our two economies remain strong.
- The resumption of normal trade in all products would be a welcome step towards stabilisation, and is in Australia's and China's interests
 - there have been some positive steps, but it will take time
 - our approach is calm and consistent.
- In the meantime, we will continue to advocate for all trade impediments affecting a wide range of Australian exports to be removed
 - while continuing our dialogue with business on the wisdom of diversifying market risks.
- Welcome agreement (6 February) by Trade Ministers to enhance dialogue as a pathway towards the resumption of trade in all products; that dialogue is taking place
 - the Trade Minister has accepted an invitation to travel to China at an appropriate time to continue dialogue (no date has been set).
- This is in keeping with increasing engagement in a positive direction across the breadth of the relationship.
- We welcome the initiative business had shown to reconnect with the Chinese market following the lifting of COVID travel restrictions.

If raised: Has China eased restrictions on Australian exports?

- We are aware of reports that China will allow all companies to purchase Australian coal
 - and that copper ores and concentrates and cotton has been shipped to China recently.
- Also aware of reports Chinese importers might resume purchasing other Australian products (live lobster, timber logs, beef and hay) affected by trade impediments
 - those would be welcome steps, but we have no confirmation that shipments of live lobster or other affected products have resumed

- in relation to timber logs, technical discussions between officials are ongoing.

If raised: Australia's current two-way agricultural trade with China?

- Our total two-way Agriculture goods trade with China is valued at \$15.4 billion, up 21 per cent year-on-year (YOY)
- The value of our agriculture **exports** goods trade is \$13.5 billion, up 21 per cent YOY
- The value of our agriculture **imports** goods trade is \$1.8 billion, up 19 per cent YOY
- Australia's top 3 exports to China in Agricultural goods are wool, wheat and beef.
 - Australia's wool exports are valued at \$2.6 billion, up 24 per cent YOY
 - Wool makes up 19 per cent of Australian Agriculture exports to China
 - China makes up 79 per cent of Australia's total wool export market
 - Australia's wheat exports are valued at \$2.3 billion, up 296 per cent YOY
 - Wheat makes up 17 cent of Australian Agriculture exports to China
 - China makes up 20 per cent of Australia's total wheat export market
 - Australia's beef exports are valued at \$1.9 billion, up 26 per cent YOY
 - Beef makes up 14 per cent of Australian Agriculture exports to China
 - China makes up 19 per cent of Australia's total beef export market

If raised: When do you expect a full resolution of trade impediments?

- Although we have seen positive steps in the relationship, it would be unrealistic to anticipate that trade impediments are resolved immediately.
- We will continue to advocate for normal trade in a wide range of Australian exports to resume, including through our action on the duties imposed by China on wine and barley in the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system.
- Ultimately decisions to allow normal trade to resume are for China to make.

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- We will continue to advocate for all trade impediments affecting Australian exports to be removed, while standing firm in our national interests.
- As the Government has said clearly, we will cooperate with China where we can, disagree where we must and engage in our national interest.
- Notwithstanding the steps we continue to take towards a stable relationship, prudent businesses will continue to diversify their markets.

4. INVESTMENT

- Australia welcomes foreign investment that aligns with our national interest, including from China.
- Our investment screening framework is risk-based and applies to all countries. Many countries have a similar screening regime.
- Australia and China have a long, historical investment relationship. Chinese investment has helped Australia realise projects in varied sectors including agriculture, mineral resources, and renewable energy.
- China remains a significant source of investment, ranking as Australia's sixth-largest source of foreign direct investment worth \$46.3 billion in 2021 (an increase of 1.6 per cent year-on-year; 4.4 per cent of total investment)
- Foreign direct investment flows from China were \$1.9 billion (or up 20 per cent year-on-year) in 2021, although this is still lower than pre-COVID numbers
 - flows from 2017-2020 averaged \$2.8 billion per year.
- Globally, Chinese outbound investment fell from a peak in 2017 to 2020 due to domestic policies including capital controls, and COVID
 - investment by Chinese state-owned enterprises has shifted towards Europe and countries affiliated with the Belt and Road Initiative.
- Chinese investors continue to make up a significant amount of FIRB approvals
 - in financial year 2021-22, China was the largest source of approved investment by quantity [2620 proposals] and fourth largest by value [\$7.2 billion].
- China was the eighth largest destination for Australian investment, comprising \$74.8 billion (2.2 per cent) of total investment stock in 2021.

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- Australia's foreign investment framework is open to all investment proposals in all sectors and from all countries.
- The Government reviews most foreign investment proposals for mining tenements or critical minerals businesses, to ensure the investment is not contrary to Australia's interests.
- The Government has publicly recognised the strategic importance of the critical minerals sector and placed a priority on developing more diverse, robust and sustainable global critical minerals supply chains.
- The Government's priorities for the critical minerals sector are to grow the sector and expand downstream processing in Australia, contribute to diverse and sustainable supply chains, and help meet future global demand.
 - Foreign investment plays a crucial role in meeting these objectives.
- As global demand for critical minerals grows, Australia expects to see these projects attracting greater attention from a wider range of investors.
- To ensure Australia harnesses the full benefits of this opportunity, the Government will also review and track trends to ensure foreign investment aligns with our national interest.

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5. CHINA – HUMAN RIGHTS

- The Government is committed to ensuring human rights are protected, respected and promoted globally.
 - A world in which universal human rights are enshrined in international law is in our shared interests.
- Australia has grave concerns about severe human rights violations in Xinjiang; the human rights situation in Tibet, and the erosion of rights and freedoms in Hong Kong.

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- We will continue to raise these publicly, in multilateral forums, and directly with China, including at the highest levels.

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- Sanctions are a tool the Government will use judiciously, where we determine the action will have the most impact.
- The Government responds to each human rights situation of international concern on the basis of what we assess will be most effective in bringing about change.
- While sanctions remain one of the tools available to us, we do not speculate about potential listings under any of Australia's sanctions regimes.

If raised: What is the Australian Government doing to address forced labour?

- The Government is committed to stepping up international efforts and strengthening our domestic framework to help ensure that supply chains we use do not promote, condone, or financially support forced labour.
- This includes a number of measures to address modern slavery both at home and abroad:
 - strengthening Australia's Modern Slavery Act, which is currently undergoing a statutory review
 - expanding the role of Australia's Ambassador to Counter Modern Slavery, People Smuggling and Human Trafficking

- establishing an Anti-slavery Commissioner to work with business, civil society, NGOs and state and territory governments to improve the transparency of supply chains.

If raised: Reports link [Company X] to forced labour practices in Xinjiang, what is the Government's position?

- The Australian Government is deeply concerned about credible reports of severe human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslim minorities in Xinjiang
 - including reports of forced labour.
- We raise our concerns regularly, including directly with China.
- The Australian Government is working to address the problem of forced labour, including through efforts to strengthen our Modern Slavery Act, establish an Anti-Slavery Commissioner, and engage with business about the risks related to supply chains, including in Xinjiang
 - we urge any Australian company sourcing products from, or engaging with, companies that have links to the region, to undertake due diligence and monitor their supply chains.

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If raised: Re-education camps being used against queer people in China

- The Australian Government regularly raises human rights issues with China at official and ministerial level.

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If raised: Hong Kong

- The Australian Government remains deeply concerned by the continuing erosion of Hong Kong's rights, freedoms and autonomy
 - including due to the National Security Law, which is being applied broadly to suppress pro-democracy figures, opposition groups, the media, trade unions and civil society.
- Our Post is closely monitoring several cases related to rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, including the trial of the group known as the 'NSL47', which began on 6 February.
- We continue to engage with the Hong Kong government in support of Australia's interests in Hong Kong which have benefited from Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, rights and freedoms and the rule of law as guaranteed by the Basic Law.

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6. CHINA – CONSULAR AND LEGAL ISSUES

Consular Cases: Ms CHENG Lei s47C(1)

Dr YANG Jun s47C(1)

- Australia continues to take a close interest in Australians detained in China, including Ms Cheng Lei and Dr Yang Jun
 - we continue to advocate for their rights, interests, and welfare and raise our concerns with Chinese authorities at every opportunity.
- We expect basic standards of justice, procedural fairness and humane treatment to be afforded to them, in accordance with international norms.
- Due to privacy obligations I am unable to provide further comment.

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- s47C(1) The Australian Government has consistently raised our concerns about Australians detained in China, including at the highest levels
 - the Prime Minister raised consular matters in his meeting with President Xi [November 2022]; the Foreign Minister and Trade Minister have both raised consular concerns in every meeting with their Chinese counterparts
 - we will continue to raise our concerns at every opportunity and to advocate for the rights, interests and welfare of these Australians.

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Consular Consultations

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- These would be the first consular consultations to be held since 2018 and we welcome their resumption.
- The consultations would provide a valuable opportunity to progress our consular priorities with China, including to discuss issues around detained Australians, and Australian consular officials' access to them.

7. TAIWAN

- As Prime Minister Albanese has said, there has been no change to Australia's longstanding bipartisan one China policy.
- Australia supports peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
- We do not want to see any unilateral change to the status quo.
- We value our unofficial relationship with Taiwan, focused on economic and people-to-people ties.

If raised: Prospects for military escalation in Taiwan Strait

- The Australian Government has, and will continue to, urge restraint and de-escalation.
- We share the region's concerns about the risks of miscalculation.
- We will continue to work with partners to promote peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
- It is in all our interests to have a region at peace and not in conflict.

If raised: Australia's position on media reports US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy will meet President Tsai in the United States

- Not going to comment on US actions or policy.
- As the Prime Minister has said [3 August 2022], the level of US engagement with Taiwan is a matter for them.

8. AUKUS

- Our Foreign Minister has consistently stated, that we want to stabilise the relationship with China and we want to re-engage more deeply with our region. Challenges
- It is in both countries' interests to continue to stabilise and develop the bilateral relationship
 - we will cooperate where we can, disagree where we must and engage in our national interest.
- We want to be transparent with China and all countries on our approach to acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.
- AUKUS partners are committed to ensuring the Indo-Pacific remains a region where all countries – big or small - are able to act in their sovereign interests to shape their own future free from coercion.
- We do not question the right of regional countries to invest in and develop defence capabilities
 - but this must be done transparently and with strategic reassurance.

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If raised: Non-proliferation aspects of AUKUS

- AUKUS partners are committed to progressing Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines in a way that sets:
 - the highest non-proliferation standard; and
 - the strongest precedent that would make it harder for any non-nuclear-weapon state to use naval nuclear propulsion as a cover for diverting nuclear material to a covert nuclear weapons program.
- AUKUS partners will continue to meet our respective non-proliferation obligations and commitments, including under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), our agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty)
 - naval nuclear propulsion is not prohibited under the NPT regime and was envisaged since its inception.

- A number of fundamental elements underpin the non-proliferation approach we are developing for the program:
 - as a non-nuclear weapon state, Australia does not have- and will not - seek to acquire nuclear weapons
 - Australia's nuclear-powered submarine program will occur within the framework of Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA
 - Australia will declare all nuclear material and activity to the IAEA as required under its CSA and AP
 - Australia intends to negotiate an arrangement with the IAEA under Article 14 of Australia's CSA
 - AUKUS partners will continue working with the IAEA to develop a suite of safeguards and verification measures that will enable the IAEA to meet its technical objectives throughout the life of the submarines' life cycle.
 - Australia will not enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel as part of this program.
 - Australia will not produce nuclear fuel for its SSNs.
 - The United Kingdom and United States intend to provide Australia with nuclear material in complete, welded nuclear power units that will not require refueling during their lifetime
 - removing nuclear material from these units is highly complex – requiring specialised equipment, facilities and workforce – and doing so would render the power unit, and the submarines, inoperable.
 - The nuclear fuel Australia receives cannot be used in nuclear weapons without further chemical processing, requiring facilities that Australia does not have and will not seek.

If raised: Australia's proposed use of Article 14

- Minister Wong wrote to IAEA Director General Grossi on 10 March to advise of Australia's intention to commence negotiation with the IAEA of an Article 14 arrangement under our CSA.
- Once finalised, this arrangement would be transmitted to the IAEA Board of Governors for appropriate action.

- DG Grossi has confirmed that Article 14 of Australia's CSA allows for naval nuclear propulsion, including in his statement on the AUKUS optimal pathway [14 March].
- Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and Article 14 is the specific provision that was included in the IAEA's model CSA to facilitate it.
- Article 14 will not remove nuclear material from IAEA oversight.
- Australia's negotiation of an Article 14 arrangement with the IAEA will set a strong precedent
 - and will include a package of robust verification measures to be applied to the submarine program, to ensure the IAEA can continue to meet its technical objectives throughout the submarine's lifecycle.

If raised: Engagement with the IAEA

- We strongly support the IAEA's impartiality, independence and mandate to engage with member states on safeguards and verification matters, free from outside political interference.
- We will continue to work openly and transparently with the IAEA to develop a robust safeguards and verification approach to underpin Australia's nuclear-powered submarine program.
- We welcome Director General Grossi's statement on AUKUS [14 March 2023] acknowledging the ongoing commitment of AUKUS partners to:
 - maintain the integrity and strength of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
 - fulfill their respective non-proliferation obligations; and
 - continue to work with the IAEA to enable it to fulfill its verification and safeguards mandate in an impartial, objective and technical manner.
- Director General Grossi confirmed at an event at the Center for International and Strategic Studies on 14 March that he was satisfied AUKUS partners were listening to the IAEA and that we understand the seriousness and responsibility of what we are doing.
- Director General Grossi said that he could "see the political commitment" and thought the process for negotiating our Article 14 arrangement for presentation to the Board was a "model of transparency".

If raised: Regional reactions to the AUKUS announcement

- International responses to the optimal pathway announcement continue to acknowledge the commitment made by AUKUS partners to transparent and

continued engagement, and the critical importance of strengthening peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region

- transparency and openness have been central to our engagement with the region throughout the 18-month consultation period and we will continue to keep our partners well informed.
- We wanted to be very clear about our intention and how we would approach this.

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If raised: Pacific reactions

- Reactions in the Pacific have been broadly positive, and have recognised the importance of Australia's commitments to the Treaty of Rarotonga.
- We will continue to uphold our obligations under the Treaty of Rarotonga, and ensure our actions are consistent with the maintenance of the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
 - US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin confirmed in a statement [14 March], that the US submarines involved in forward rotational presence would be conventionally-armed [emphasis added].
- Our continued objective is to strengthen our Pacific family, and be a generous, respectful, and reliable partner of that family
 - we engage regularly and transparently with our Pacific family and listen to regional views about safety, security and strategic issues.

If raised: Southeast Asia reactions

- Southeast Asian partners have underscored the importance of continued transparency and relayed appreciation for Australia's reaffirmation of the importance of ASEAN centrality and non-proliferation.
- We will continue our close engagement with our Southeast Asian partners on AUKUS as we seek to shape this period of change together.
 - AUKUS will help make Australia a more capable security partner, contributing to strategic equilibrium and helping to address collective security challenges
 - Australia cannot accept a situation where larger countries determine the fate of smaller countries.

- ASEAN and ASEAN-led regional architecture will remain central to Australia's engagement in Southeast Asia and an inclusive, secure, resilient, and prosperous region.
- We fully recognise the importance of the Bangkok Treaty to the region and support the maintenance of a nuclear weapon free zone in Southeast Asia

9. CLIMATE CHANGE

- Australia has a new ambitious 2030 target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 43 per cent below 2005 levels, putting us on track to achieve our net zero emissions by 2050 target.
- On 16 June 2022, the Australian Government lodged the new 2030 target and reaffirmed the 2050 target as an *updated* Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement.
- The Australian Government is implementing a substantial and rigorous suite of new policies across the economy to drive the transition to net zero.
 - together with like-minded countries, we worked to prevent backsliding on mitigation ambition and to shift the world's focus to practical implementation and increased investment in climate solutions
 - we played a positive role in negotiations by working with Pacific countries and others to find common ground where possible on climate finance, mitigation and loss and damage
- We are committed to supporting enhanced climate action in our region through increased climate finance and new partnerships in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
- Pleased to have announced during COP27 Australia's bid to co-host with the Pacific the 31st UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP31) in 2026.
- We want to help put Pacific voices at the centre of international climate discussions and look forward to working closely and cooperatively with the Pacific to first secure, and then plan, a collective vision for COP31.

If raised: Isn't 43 per cent inconsistent with the Paris Agreement temperature goals (keeping global warming well below 2°C, and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C)?

- The Government's commitment to net zero emissions by 2050 is consistent with a 1.5 degree pathway.
- Our ambitious target to reduce emissions to 43 per cent below 2005 by 2030 charts a credible path to net zero.
 - Australia's 2030 target is a significant step up in ambition – it is a 15 per centage point increase on the upper end of the previous target of 26-28 per cent below 2005 levels.
 - And we are backing this target with real action, and real investment, strengthened by the commitments of our industries, states and territories.

- We hope that together, Australian efforts will yield even greater emission reductions in the coming decade.
- These targets reflect the Australian Government's resolve to urgently step up the pace of action, and work alongside global partners and particularly with our Pacific family, to tackle the climate crisis, achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, and keep 1.5 degrees within reach.

If raised: Why have you removed the low emissions technology economic stretch goals from the NDC?

- The updated NDC is focused on reflecting Australia's broader and increased ambition.
- Australian clean energy export industries will be important to reducing global emissions and creating economic opportunities
 - particularly for regions with less abundant renewable energy.
 - hydrogen will play a key role in reducing emissions in hard-to-abate sectors, such as steel and the maritime sector.
 - Supply chains for products like solar cells, electrolyzers and batteries will be crucial in powering the clean energy economies of our region.
- The Australian Government has *introduced new* policies that will support the transition to renewable energy, including:
 - a commitment of up to \$3 billion from the National Reconstruction Fund to support renewables manufacturing and low emissions technologies, and
 - a doubling of the Commonwealth's investment zero emissions vehicle charging and refuelling infrastructure, to \$500 million.
- This is in addition to existing emissions reduction and low emissions technology accelerator policies and programs, including the work of:
 - Australian Renewable Energy Agency
 - The Clean Energy Finance Corporation
 - The Clean Energy Regulator
 - a range of investments to support development and deployment of low emissions and clean energy technologies, through DISR, NAIF, CSIRO and DCCEEW

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If raised: Will your Government use 'carryover' from overachievement on Kyoto targets to meet its 2030 target?

- No.
- Australia's updated Nationally Determined Contribution states that Australia will not carry over any overachievement on its 2020 target or its Kyoto Protocol targets to meet its Paris Agreement targets.

If raised: Does Australia support Vanuatu's International Court of Justice initiative?

- We acknowledge and appreciate Vanuatu's leadership in seeking to pursue an UNGA resolution requesting an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on climate change
 - We look forward to working closely with Vanuatu in the development of their proposal.

If raised: China in the global solar energy market:

- We recognise that China has played an important role in bringing down the costs of PV solar manufacturing globally.
- At the same time, this has created significant concentration of global PV supplies
 - about 85% of the world's solar panels are made in one country, and this is on track to rise to 95% over the decade (International Energy Agency, 2022)
- COVID-19 showed us that we are all vulnerable to disruptions, and it is common sense to not be over reliant on any one market, regardless of which market it is.

If raised: Australia's clean energy manufacturing ambitions:

- The Government is committed to ensuring Australia becomes a country that makes things again.
- That is why we are establishing the \$15 billion [National Reconstruction Fund](#) (NRF) to support, diversify and transform Australia's industry and economy to help create secure, well-paid jobs, and drive sustainable economic growth.
- The National Reconstruction Fund is a nation-building, transformational investment to help deliver a better future.

- It will provide finance in priority areas to leverage Australia's natural and competitive strengths.
 - The priority areas are renewables and low-emissions technologies, medical science, transport, value-add in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors, value-add in resources, defence capability and enabling capabilities.
 - The Government has identified up to \$3 billion for renewables and low-emissions technologies.
- The NRF will pursue commercial opportunities from renewables and low-emission technologies, including from production of batteries and solar panels.
- The NRF will operate commercially. It will be governed by a Board who will make independent investment decisions guided by an investment mandate.

10. CPTPP (s33(a)(iii))**ACCESSION REQUESTS)**

- CPTPP members are focussed on the ongoing accession negotiations with the UK.
 - a strong accession precedent is in all our interests.
- Australia will work with the CPTPP membership to consider this application on a consensus basis, in accordance with the accession guidelines
 - as with all accession applications
- It is vital that we maintain the high standards of the CPTPP with an acceding economy.
- An economy that seeks to accede to the CPTPP must demonstrate that it can meet, implement and adhere to the rules and standards of the Agreement and have a demonstrated track record of complying with trade commitments.

If raised: Has Australia spoken with other CPTPP members about China's application?

- As with all CPTPP matters, Australia will consult with the CPTPP membership.

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- As Australia will continue to work with the CPTPP membership to consider this application on a consensus basis, in accordance with the accession guidelines
- At the recent CPTPP Commission [Ministerial, 8 October 2022] meeting, members agreed to continue efforts to address subsequent accession applications, in accordance with the Accession Process
 - including whether aspirant economies could meet the CPTPP's high standards
 - taking into account their experience on trade commitments.

If raised: Does Australia support Taiwan's application to the CPTPP?

- Australia will work with the CPTPP membership to consider Taiwan's application on a consensus basis, in accordance with the accession guidelines.
- An economy which seeks to accede to the CPTPP must demonstrate that it can meet, implement and adhere to the rules and standards of the Agreement
 - and have a demonstrated track record of complying with trade commitments.

- The focus of the CPTPP members remains the ongoing accession negotiations with the United Kingdom.
 - All accession decisions are by consensus.

If raised: Has Australia had any ministerial level contact with China/Taiwan on the CPTPP?

- Australia engages periodically with China/Taiwan at official and ministerial level to discuss various issues, including CPTPP

11. SOUTH CHINA SEA

- The South China Sea is a vital waterway for the entire international community
- Australia is deeply concerned when countries pursue claims or engage in activities that are inconsistent with international law
 - where they undertake activities that are provocative and destabilising, or where they don't respect the rights and freedoms of others
- or when they advance their claims by intimidation or coercion.
- Adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides the comprehensive legal framework for all activities in the oceans and seas, is vitally important for the region
 - maritime claims – whether in the South China Sea or elsewhere – must be consistent with UNCLOS law

If raised: Qantas: Reports of VHF interference by Chinese military

- Aware of the notice issued by Qantas to pilots regarding unwarranted very high frequency (VHF) interference in the Western Pacific and South China Sea.
- We note the interference is reported to have emanated from stations purporting to represent the Chinese military.
- There is no indication this activity has been specifically directed at Australian aircraft – other airlines have reportedly experienced similar incidents.
- All states must respect the right to freedom of overflight under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as international rules on civil aviation safety.
- We will continue to work with Qantas to understand further detail of these incidents.

If raised: Chinese Coast Guard lasing a Philippine Coast Guard vessel in February 2023

- Australia shares concerns about unsafe and intimidatory actions directed against the Philippines.
- We continue to call for peace, stability and respect for international law in the South China Sea, a vital international waterway.

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- Australia is committed to continuing its longstanding presence in the region, including in the South China Sea.
- We are open to cooperating with all of our partners to exercise our freedom of navigation and overflight, s33(a)(iii)
- We are exploring how this this would look.

If raised: China's intercepts of Australian aircraft and vessels

- Australian vessels and aircraft will continue to exercise our rights and freedoms under international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, as we have done for decades.
 - rule of law in the South China Sea and other international waterways, particularly adherence to UNCLOS, is fundamental to our national interest
 - we will continue to act to support a region which is peaceful, stable and where the rights of sovereign states are protected under international law.
- Australia ensures our operations are safe and professional and we expect others, including China, to do the same.

If raised: ASEAN-China Code of Conduct negotiations

- Australia isn't a party to ASEAN negotiations with China on a Code of Conduct, which are confidential between ASEAN states and China
 - but we have clear interests in ensuring an open maritime environment and upholding international law.
- We consider that any Code of Conduct should:
 - strengthen commitments to cease actions that would complicate or escalate disputes
 - not prejudice the interests of third parties or the rights of all states under international law, particularly UNCLOS.

12. QUAD

- The Quad seeks to support the agency of Indo-Pacific countries – large or small – to be part of this shaping and decide their future
 - we all desire a region where no country dominates, and no country is dominated.
 - a region that is peaceful and predictable, that is governed by accepted rules and norms, where we all can cooperate, trade and thrive.
- This is the heart of the Quad – our four countries working together alongside partners and regional groupings to shape the region we want to live in
 - we are working together to create choices – not forcing choices
 - and ensuring transparency in what we do.
- Quad partners are deeply invested in making a positive and enduring contribution to the Indo-Pacific region
 - pooling the resources and leveraging the collective strengths and capabilities of Australia, India, Japan and the United States enables us to be more effective in responding to the region's needs.
- Our engagement in the Quad complements our deep engagement in the Indo-Pacific
 - we see the Quad as working alongside regional institutions, foremost ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum, to strengthen our shared interests and build capacity to pursue them

2023 Quad Leaders' Summit

- The Prime Minister looks forward to hosting the 2023 Quad Leaders' Summit in May
 - the Summit will be an important opportunity to advance the Quad's positive and practical agenda
 - and reaffirm our steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region that is stable, prosperous and respectful of sovereignty.
- The Government will make announcements about hosting arrangements, including specific timing, at the appropriate time.
- We want to deepen Quad cooperation in existing policy areas to help meet the region's needs and highlight our positive and practical agenda.
 - focused on climate and clean energy; health security; infrastructure and connectivity; and critical and emerging technologies.

If raised: How is the Quad boosting trade and economic integration in the Indo-Pacific?

- While the Quad has no economic or trade pillar, we seek to promote an open, stable and prosperous region where countries have choices
 - building the foundations for resilient economies
 - including through our efforts to deliver quality infrastructure, bolster supply chain security, support the region's energy transition interests, and protect critical infrastructure.

s33(a)(iii)

- The Quad is a key pillar in Australia's foreign policy, and complements our other bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation, including the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan and the US, and the Australia-France-India Trilateral.
- Our respective networks of alliances and partnerships is a force multiplier
 - providing a vast reach to give more choices to the region in a spirit of partnership.

s33(a)(iii)

- No. The Quad is a diplomatic partnership, not a military alliance, and it is not seeking to militarise

s33(a)(iii)

- The Quad has a positive and practical agenda focussed on supporting the region address its key challenges
 - we are transparent in our agenda and actions.

13. RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE

- Australia condemns Russia's illegal and immoral, full-scale invasion of Ukraine; it is a gross violation of international law.
- There is clear evidence that Russia has committed war crimes.
- Russia's invasion has negatively impacted the global economy, exacerbating already high food and energy costs.
- We will continue to work with partners to impose costs on Russia.
- Australia strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We call on Russia to immediately withdraw its forces.
- Australia has contributed significant defence, economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine.
- Australia's objective, along with our partners, is to empower Ukraine to resolve this conflict on its own terms.

If raised: Actions to impose costs on Russia

- Russia must pay a price for its actions against national sovereignty, the rule of law and the UN Charter.
- Australia has imposed a comprehensive suite of measures against Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine.
- This includes more than 1000 targeted financial sanctions, and trade sanctions banning the:
 - import of Russian oil, refined petroleum products, coal and gas
 - import of Russian gold
 - export of alumina and bauxite to Russia
 - export of certain luxury goods to Russia, including wine and cosmetics.
- Australia is denying Russia access to most-favoured-nation tariff treatment and is imposing an additional tariff of 35 per cent on goods that are the produce or manufacture of Russia or Belarus.
- Australia has implemented the G7+ price caps on Russian oil and refined petroleum products.

If raised: Actions to Support Ukraine

- Total Australian assistance to Ukraine is approximately \$680 million including
 - \$65 million in urgent humanitarian assistance, and
 - more than \$500 million in defence assistance.
- Australia has expanded its current package of military support to the Government of Ukraine, gifting additional Uncrewed Aerial Systems worth \$33 million.

If raised: Missile attacks on civilian infrastructure

- Australia condemns Russia's missile attacks on health facilities and civilian infrastructure.
- Millions of Ukrainians are without power, heating, clean water or adequate health care.
- Australia has provided AUD 65 million in emergency humanitarian funding to help meet the urgent needs of the Ukrainian people
 - through our partners, Australia is providing emergency shelter, blankets and gas cookers.
- We stand with Ukraine to mourn the tragic loss of life.

If raised: President Xi's visit to Russia; China's position on Russia's invasion of Ukraine

- The Australian Government and the world will be following President Xi's visit to Russia closely.
- Australia looks to China – as a permanent UNSC member and 'no limits' partner of Russia – to use its substantial influence with Moscow to bring an end to the terrible suffering in Ukraine
 - we continue to urge China to show that leadership.
- Aware China released its "position paper on a political solution to the Ukraine crisis".

s33(a)(iii)

If raised: Ukrainian Government's requests to Australia for further assistance

- The Australian Government remains in contact with Ukrainian counterparts
 - we acknowledge the significant challenges associated with rebuilding Ukraine
 - all formal requests from Ukraine for support will be considered.

If raised: Is Australia the largest non-NATO contributor?

- Australia is proud to be a significant contributor, providing defence, economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine.
- The statement about Australia being “the largest non-NATO contributor” to Ukraine was used in the early phase of the invasion and was based on public reporting (by the Kiel Institute) of military support to Ukraine at the time.
- It is increasingly difficult to verify, measure, monitor and compare nations' contributions.

If raised: Expelling Russian diplomats from Australia

- The Australian Government has implemented a range of measures to ensure Russia pays a heavy price for its invasion of Ukraine.
- The Government is clear that the number of accredited Russian diplomats in Australia should reflect our national interest.
- All options remain under consideration.
- I am unable to comment further.

If raised: Termination of the lease of the site for the new Russian chancery

- I am unable to comment on this matter as the site is currently the subject of legal proceedings.

If raised: Does Australia support the proposal to establish a Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression Against Russia?

- Australia is giving this proposal further consideration.
 - and has joined a Core Group of partners to consider options for holding Russia's political and military leadership to account [25 January 2023]

- To date, our approach has been to support accountability for Russia's actions through established processes, including through the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice.

If raised: Proposed ban on Russia and Belarus competing in international sporting events

- On 21 February 2023, Australia joined more than 30 countries, including the US, UK and Japan, to express support for a ban on Russia and Belarus competing in international sporting events.

If pressed: Australia's absence from list of countries originally supporting this statement opposing Russia and Belarus for participation in international sporting events

- Australia was not listed in the initial published document as a signatory, but does support it.
- Given the time difference, we anticipate the public statement will be updated to reflect that support in the near future.

If raised: International Criminal Court (ICC) announces arrest warrants

- Welcome the International Criminal Court (ICC) issuing an arrest warrant [on 17 March 2023] for President Putin
 - the Court has found there are reasonable grounds to believe Putin is individually criminally responsible for war crimes.
- The Court's decision is an important step towards justice for Ukraine and its people
 - Russia must be held to account for its unlawful actions in Ukraine.
- Australia strongly supports the ICC's investigation into the situation in Ukraine
 - we joined with 42 other states in referring the situation in Ukraine to the Court and have committed personnel and financial support to the investigation.

If raised: What crimes do the arrest warrants relate to?

- It is alleged that Putin and his Commissioner for Children's Rights [Maria Lvova-Belova] are responsible for the war crimes of unlawfully deporting and transferring children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia.
- The specific contents of the arrest warrants remain secret, to protect victims and witnesses and to safeguard the investigation.

If raised: Are there any real prospects of Putin ever being arrested and brought before the Court?

- The ICC has a critical role to play in ensuring accountability for Russian crimes in Ukraine.
- The ICC can issue arrest warrants, including for political and military leaders for war crimes committed under their authority or command in Ukraine.
- ICC arrest warrants are enforceable in the territory of any of the 123 State Parties to the Rome Statute of the Court.

If raised: Doesn't President Putin have immunity from prosecution as a Head of State

- The ICC is empowered to investigate and try individuals for serious international crimes, including political and military leaders on the basis of their command responsibility.
- The Court's Statute states that "official capacity as a Head of State or Government...shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility."
- Any claim of immunity would need to be considered by the Court in the independent exercise of its functions.

If raised: Have crimes against humanity been committed in Ukraine?

- There The Independent, International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine concluded that the Russian armed forces' attacks on Ukraine's energy-related infrastructure and the use of torture by Russian authorities may amount to crimes against humanity
 - and it recommended further investigations.
- A determination on the question of whether crimes against humanity have been committed is a matter for the ICC.
- Australia joined with 42 other states in referring the situation in Ukraine to the International Criminal Court (ICC)
- The ICC's investigation is ongoing.

If raised: G7's price cap on Russian oil and petroleum products

- Australia joined the G7 in implementing a price cap on Russian crude oil in early December 2022.

- We have also joined the G7 in implementing two additional price caps on Russian refined petroleum products
 - a price cap of USD 100 per barrel will apply for high value products such as gasoline, diesel and kerosene
 - a price cap of USD 45 per barrel will apply for lower value products such as fuel oil.
- Supporting the price caps demonstrates Australia's resolve to limit the global economic impact of Russia's invasion while maximising the pressure on Russia to end the war
 - the price caps are designed to stop Russia profiting from higher oil and refined petroleum product prices and curtail its ability to fund its invasion.
- Australia has in place a complete ban on Australians importing, purchasing and transporting Russian oil, gas, refined petroleum and coal, anywhere in the world [as of 25 April 2022].
 - The price caps only apply where the Russian oil or refined petroleum products are imported by a third country because importing these products into Australia remains prohibited.

If raised: Involvement of other countries in Russia's war on Ukraine

- In a time of dangerous rhetoric and destabilising behaviour from Russia, it is imperative that countries exert their influence on Russia to end the war.
- Australia is closely monitoring the involvement of other countries in the war
 - those who provide material support to Russia will face consequences.
- This was underlined by the [20 March 2023, 10 December 2022 and 1 February 2023] announcements of sanctions on Iranian persons and entities involved in the transfer of drones to Russia
 - drones have been used by Russia to target Ukrainian civilians and critical infrastructure.

If raised: Reopening of the Australian Embassy in Kyiv

- The situation in Ukraine remains extremely complex and challenging.
- In light of rigorous safety and security assessments, the Embassy continues to operate remotely from Warsaw.
- DFAT is keeping this decision under review.

- The Embassy is managing Australia's interests effectively from Warsaw, including the provision of consular services.
- The Australian Government is providing significant support for Ukraine, including vital military and humanitarian assistance, and imposing sanctions on those who have supported Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine
 - this includes gifting additional Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) valued at approximately AUD33 million (as announced on 24 February).

If raised: Why have more than 60 other countries, including many like-minded partners reopened their embassies in Kyiv but we have chosen not to?

- The situation in Ukraine remains complex and challenging.
- Every country must work through its own safety and security considerations to work through.
- It is not appropriate to comment on the risk assessment procedures and processes of other countries.

If raised: What has the Australian Government been doing to assist Australian families in Ukraine for surrogacy purposes?

- The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has been providing consular assistance to a small number of families with surrogacy arrangements in Ukraine.
- We advise Australians not to enter into new surrogacy arrangements. Our ability to provide consular assistance in Ukraine is severely limited
 - it will not always be possible for the Australian Government to assist and Australians should not expect increased consular support.
- We have been maintaining close contact with families and surrogacy agencies.
- Due to our privacy obligations, we will not provide specific details.

14. AUSTRALIA'S FIRST NATIONS APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

- The appointment of Mr Justin Mohamed as Australia's inaugural Ambassador for First Nations People is an important step towards placing the perspectives of First Nations people at the heart of our diplomacy.
- Mr Mohamed will lead the Office of First Nations Engagement in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- We will work in genuine partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to progress Indigenous rights globally, and help grow First Nations trade and investment.
- Elevating the perspectives of First Nations people – this land's first diplomats – enables deeper engagement with many of our closest partners including the Pacific family
- This new position ensures, for the first time, that Australia will have dedicated Indigenous representation in our international engagement.
- Mr Mohamed is a Gooreng Gooreng man from Bundaberg in Queensland. He brings a strong connection to community. Currently Deputy Secretary of Aboriginal Justice within the Victorian Department of Justice and Community Safety. Mr Mohamed has worked for decades in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health, social justice and reconciliation, in roles spanning First Nations community, government and corporate sectors.
- Mr Mohamed will commence as Ambassador in April.

If raised: What is Australia's First Nations approach to foreign policy?

- Mr Mohamed will engage with First Nations communities and organisations to bring Indigenous perspectives into Australia's foreign policy.
- Drawing on these consultations, the Ambassador will lead the establishment of the Office of First Nations Engagement which will:
 - strengthen connections in the Indo-Pacific to address shared challenges such as health, environmental management and climate change, and gender equality
 - progress First Nations' rights and interests globally
 - support First Nations trade and investment
 - support building DFAT's First Nations diplomatic capability.

If raised: Will the Ambassador be an advocate for the Government's proposed First Nations Voice to Parliament?

- The Ambassador's role will not be to advocate for the Voice within Australia, but rather explain and share insights on the Voice, Treaty, Truth process of the Uluru Statement from the Heart with regional and international partners.

If raised: What progress has been made on a First Nations Foreign Policy?

- Work to elevate the voices of First Nations Australians in foreign policy is already under way. It will include actions in line with the themes set out in the Terms of Reference for the Ambassador.
- Early examples include:
 - endorsement of an Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander representative on the Governance Board of the flagship gender quality program, "Pacific Women Lead" as a direct result of the visit to Fiji by Senator Malarndirri McCarthy in October 2022
 - expanding our dialogue with New Zealand on domestic lessons and best practices on First Nations issues, building on the discussion held by the Foreign Minister and Senator Dodson at UNGA in September 2022 with New Zealand, Canada, Finland, Mexico and the United States
 - engaging with First Nations people and businesses, including through the new 2040 Taskforce, to amplify their voices in trade negotiation strategies
 - consultations with First Nations stakeholders to inform the new Development Policy
 - highlighting First Nations and Pacific connections in high-profile events, such as during the Asia-Pacific Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Brisbane in October 2022
 - continuing to promote First Nations rights and interests in multilateral fora and international statements such as the Human Rights Council, UN General Assembly committees, G20, APEC and ASEAN.

If raised: What is Australia's First Nations approach to trade and investment policy?

- As Ambassador, Mr Mohamed will advise DFAT and portfolio partners on pathways to help grow First Nations trade and investment
 - our overarching goal is to support the growth of First Nations businesses through export and investment opportunities in overseas markets.

- Australia will elevate First Nations voices and interests in international trade institutions and fora by:
 - working with IP Australia to support negotiations at the World Intellectual Property Organization for a multilateral agreement for the protection of traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions and genetic resources
 - working to incorporate an inclusivity element within the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) which will seek to remove barriers to Indigenous peoples' participation in international trade and investment
 - implementing the Indigenous Peoples Economic and Trade Cooperation Arrangement (IPETCA) to expand business networks for Indigenous businesses and entrepreneurs across the region.

If raised: How was the Ambassador chosen?

- A public Expression of Interest process for the Ambassador role was announced in a joint ministerial media release on 21 September by Minister Wong, Minister Burney and Senator Patrick Dodson.
- s47F(1) expressions of interest were assessed by a six-person Advisory Panel, comprised of First Nations representatives and senior government officials.
- The appointment of the Ambassador was approved by the Executive Council, in line with usual practice.

s47C(1)

- Mr Mohamed is a Gooreng Gooreng man with strong connections to First Nations communities, having worked for decades in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health, social justice and reconciliation
 - he has been extensively involved in the First Nations community-controlled sector, as well as government and corporate sectors.
- Mr Mohamed is currently Deputy Secretary of Aboriginal Justice within the Victorian Department of Justice and Community Safety.
- He has held the roles of Chief Executive Officer for Reconciliation Australia and Chairperson of the National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation
 - and has represented Indigenous organisations internationally, including at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.

- Mr Mohamed is currently co-chair of the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Cricket Advisory Committee, within Cricket Australia.

If raised: Will Mr Mohamed be an Ambassador for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to Government?

- No. Mr Mohamed will be an Ambassador representing the Australian Government on First Nations issues internationally.

If raised: How much will the Ambassador be paid?

- The Ambassador will be remunerated in accordance with the conditions outlined in a contractual agreement with DFAT, which will be placed on AusTender in line with usual procurement practices once finalised.

If raised: Does a First Nations approach to foreign policy mean Australia will support independence movements in the Indo-Pacific?

- The First Nations approach to foreign policy is about us – reconciling our past, and presenting a more accurate story to the world about who we are as a nation.
- There has been no change to Australia's position on the territorial integrity of other countries.

If raised: What is the budget allocation?

- The 2022-23 Budget allocated \$2 million over two financial years (2022-23 to 2023-24) to establish an Office of First Nations Engagement within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- This funding enables the Department to support the appointment of the Ambassador and the early engagement required to design and establish an Office of First Nations Engagement.

15. PACIFIC ENGAGEMENT

- As part of the Pacific family, Australia stands shoulder to shoulder with the Pacific Island countries as our region grapples with the challenges of climate change and increasing strategic competition.
 - We are deeply committed to taking meaningful action, at home and in partnership with the Pacific
 - and have heard from the Pacific about their priorities and are responding in line with the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent
 - ensuring Pacific priorities are at the forefront of how we engage
 - and sovereignty and the centrality of Pacific-led regional organisations are respected.
- The Foreign Minister has visited 15 of the 17 other Pacific Island Forum (PIF) members since taking office
- We understand regional unity is central to protecting our shared interests in a peaceful, prosperous and resilient region – we are stronger together.

If raised: Security in the Pacific

- Australia's security engagement builds on longstanding partnerships with Pacific Island countries
 - guided by the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security
 - to promote our shared interests in security, sovereignty and resilience
 - recognising that our Pacific family has proven time and again its commitment and responsiveness in meeting Pacific security needs.
- We are committed to enhancing our security cooperation with our Pacific family, driven by their priorities and needs.
- The security of the Pacific is the shared responsibility of the Pacific family, of which Australia is part
 - the Pacific family is best placed to respond to the needs of the Pacific region.

If raised: AUKUS in the Pacific

- Our region is being reshaped and AUKUS is one response to the challenges posed by our deteriorating strategic environment.

- The first major initiative of the AUKUS partnership is the delivery of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) capability.
- Our objective is to strengthen the Pacific family, and be a generous, respectful, and reliable member of that family.
- We remain steadfast in our commitment to the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty). Australia's compliance with our obligations under this treaty is not affected by Australia's plans to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.
 - Our submarine acquisition plans will ensure Australia's capacity to operate, maintain and regulate this technology, and set the highest standards for nuclear non-proliferation.

If raised: China's intentions in the Pacific

- We respect the right of every Pacific nation to make sovereign decisions about engagement with other countries.
- We encourage all countries engaging in the Pacific to be open and transparent, reinforce Pacific priorities and institutions, build local capacity and avoid unsustainable debt burdens.

s33(a)(iii)

- Pacific Island countries face substantial infrastructure gaps that will slow their economic recovery from the pandemic.
- Australia employs responsible lending practices and the highest standards of quality in infrastructure projects – we encourage others to do the same.

16. SOUTHEAST ASIA ENGAGEMENT

- The Deepening engagement with Southeast Asia is a priority for the Australian Government.
- We share a region and we share a future.
- We want to work together on pressing challenges like climate change and the clean energy transition.
- We want our region to be peaceful and prosperous, where all nations' sovereignty is respected.
- We seek a strategic equilibrium where countries are not forced to choose sides but can make their own sovereign choices.
- Over the coming decades the greatest economic opportunities for Australia will be in Southeast Asia.
- The Government announced Mr Nicholas Moore as Australia's Special Envoy for Southeast Asia and he will lead the Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040.

If raised: ASEAN Centrality

- Australia is committed to ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led regional architecture—we share a region and we share a future.
- The Prime Minister's attendance at the 2nd Annual ASEAN Australia Summit and 17th East Asia Summit in Cambodia [11-13 November 2022] demonstrated the Government's commitment to deepening our engagement with Southeast Asia.
- We will work with ASEAN to shape the kind of region we all want.
- We all want to live in a region that is stable, prosperous and respectful of sovereignty.
- Where disputes are guided by international law and norms, not by power and size.
- A region that is peaceful and predictable.
- Where our countries and peoples can cooperate, trade and thrive.
- Where our relations are based on partnership and respect.
- A regional order with ASEAN at the centre.

If raised: Australia's Special Envoy for Southeast Asia and Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040

- Prime Minister Albanese appointed Mr Nicholas Moore as Special Envoy for Southeast Asia on 12 November 2022.
- Mr Moore was chosen for his strong record of achievement in the business and finance sectors in the Asia-Pacific region, including 10 years as CEO of Macquarie Group.
- As Special Envoy, Mr Moore oversees the development of the Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, which will set a pathway to strengthen economic engagement with the region
 - this includes leading stakeholder consultations in Australia and the region to seek perspectives and advocate for greater two-way trade and investment.
- The strategy is due to be completed in 2023.

If raised: Development Assistance

- The Government will deliver an additional \$470 million in ODA
 - increasing Australia's ODA to Southeast Asia to an estimated \$1.2 billion in 2022-23.
- Australia's development assistance will further our collective interests and tackle shared challenges in Southeast Asia
 - including coordinating action on climate change, responding to infrastructure needs, and building inclusive growth.
- However, we recognise that development assistance is only one lever to advance the interests of the region.
- We will also focus our diplomatic, social and economic efforts on supporting regional development priorities.
- The Government will launch a five-year \$620 million Partnerships for a Healthy Region initiative to improve health outcomes and promote regional prosperity and stability in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
- At Sydney WorldPride the Government has announced a contribution of \$3.5 million to support human rights defenders in the Indo-Pacific.

If raised: Climate and Energy Transition

- The Government is deeply committed to taking real and significant climate action at home and establishing Australia as a climate leader internationally.
- We are ambitious for what Australia can achieve as we confront the challenge of climate change, and ambitious for what we can do in partnership with our friends and neighbours.
- We need to lift our engagement in the region
 - talking with our partners about climate policy
 - and recognising it as the central, existential issue that it is, requiring committed cooperation.
- The Singapore-Australia Green Economy Agreement was signed by Trade and Tourism Minister Don Farrell and Singapore Trade and Investment Minister Gan Kim Yong on 18 October 2022
 - this first-of-its-kind agreement will promote trade and investment across green economy sectors to assist both nations to advance their net zero ambitions.
- Prime Minister Albanese announced at the ASEAN-Australia Summit [12 November 2022] that Australia will co-host with Vietnam and Laos an ASEAN-Australia High Level Dialogue on Climate Change and Energy Transition.
- The Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040 will map current and emerging opportunities to deepen trade and investment with the region, including energy transition in Australia and Southeast Asia.
- As we transition to a net zero world together, Australia will continue to support the region's energy needs.

If raised: is Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) open to accessions by other economies?

- At the Inaugural RCEP Ministerial Meeting in September 2022, Ministers agreed to progress priority implementation and governance issues before establishing accession procedures in 2023.
- RCEP is an ASEAN-led initiative that is based on consensus.

17. MYANMAR

- The military coup in Myanmar has reversed years of democratic, economic and development gains and plunged the country into a deep political and humanitarian crisis
- Australia remains committed to supporting the people of Myanmar through our development and humanitarian assistance.
- In the two years since the coup, the people of Myanmar have demonstrated their courage, their commitment to a democratic country and demanded respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
- and have shown determined resilience in the face of unspeakable atrocities.
- Australia strongly condemns the actions of the Myanmar military regime
- we urge the regime to end violence against civilians, engage in dialogue, release those unjustly detained, and allow open and unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance.

From: s22(1)(a)(ii)
To: s47F(1)
Cc: [Greg Wilcock](#) s22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: s33(a)(iii) [REDACTED]
Date: Thursday, 16 March 2023 2:09:00 PM

[REDACTED]

Hi s47F(1)

Our EAD colleagues have also shared the below s33(a)(iii)
Passing along for your awareness and ATMO use.

Let me know if you have any questions on the below,

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s33(a)(iii)

- It is in both countries' interests to continue to stabilise and develop the bilateral relationship.
 - We want to be transparent with China and all countries on our approach.
- s33(a)(iii)

- We have regular discussions with China on a range of issues.
- I don't intend to go into the specifics of our conversations.

//

Kind regards,

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Media Liaison Officer | Media Liaison Section
Communications Branch | Executive Division
T s22(1)(a)(ii) | **M** s22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s22(1)(a)(ii)
To: s47F(1) s22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: [Greg Wilcock](#); s22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: RE: *ATMO clearance* Media Brief and Media Plan - ATM Travel to Boao Forum [REDACTED]
Date: Monday, 27 March 2023 4:50:00 PM
Attachments: [Media Brief - ATM Boao Forum Visit 2023 - 270323.docx](#)

[REDACTED]

Hi s47F(1)

Thanks for your patience. I've updated the Media Brief to include these lines (Section 6 – China Human Rights), but also copied below for quick views.

As you'll see from the formulation below, advice from desk is that s47C(1) s22(1)(a)(ii) and s22(1)(a)(ii) are across the sensitivities/background and can advise if you have further questions.

//

If raised: Reports link [Company X] to forced labour practices in Xinjiang, what is the Government's position?

- The Australian Government is deeply concerned about credible reports of severe human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslim minorities in Xinjiang
 - including reports of forced labour.
- We raise our concerns regularly, including directly with China.
- The Australian Government is working to address the problem of forced labour, including through efforts to strengthen our Modern Slavery Act, establish an Anti-Slavery Commissioner, and engage with business about the risks related to supply chains, including in Xinjiang
 - we urge any Australian company sourcing products from, or engaging with, companies that have links to the region, to undertake due diligence and monitor their supply chains.

s33(a)(iii)

s33(a)(iii)

//

Kind regards,

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Media Liaison Officer | Media Liaison Section
Communications Branch | Executive Division

Ts22(1)(a)(ii) | **M**s22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s22(1)(a)(ii)
To: s47F(1) s22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: Media
Subject: RE: ATM Visit Bo"ao Forum - Media/Comms Taskings [REDACTED]
Date: Wednesday, 29 March 2023 10:08:00 AM
Attachments: [Media Brief - ATM Boao Forum Visit 2023 - Updated 280323.docx](#)

Good morning s47F(1)

Please find attached updated Media Brief, with additional points on consular cases, Cheng Lei and Dr Yang Jun. Copied below for quick views.

s47C(1)

I also incorporated those Solar lines in Section 9 – Climate Change. Let me know if you need any other points in advance of the engagements with AFR or The Australian.

s47C(1)

- s47C(1) The Australian Government has consistently raised our concerns about Australians detained in China, including at the highest levels
 - the Prime Minister raised consular matters in his meeting with President Xi [November 2022]; the Foreign Minister and Trade Minister have both raised consular concerns in every meeting with their Chinese counterparts
 - we will continue to raise our concerns at every opportunity and to advocate for the rights, interests and welfare of these Australians.

s33(a)(iii)

//

Regards,

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Media Liaison Officer | Media Liaison Section
Communications Branch | Executive Division

Ts22(1)(a)(ii) | **M**s22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s22(1)(a)(ii)
To: s47F(1)
Cc: [Greg Wilcock](#); s22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: **For ATMO consideration** Proposed holding statement: ATM travel to Boao Forum [REDACTED]
Date: Wednesday, 15 March 2023 6:03:07 PM
Attachments: [image001.png](#)

Hi s47F(1)

As requested, please find below a proposed holding statement in relation to the ATM's planned travel to Bo'ao for the Boao Forum for Asia. As requested, we have referenced the fact that the Minister is representing Minister Bowen – you may wish to engage his office on the statement.

The holding statement has been cleared by Post Beijing and Scott Wilson/Acting Assistant Secretary East Asia Economic Branch (m) s22(1)(a)(ii)

Post has advised that the list doesn't appear to have been published yet. They are continuing to liaise with the forum organisers and have requested a "TBC" be placed against the Minister's name.

//

I plan on traveling to Bo'ao for the 2023 Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference.

During the Boao Forum I will represent the Minister for Climate Change and Energy of Australia, the Honourable Chris Bowen MP on a panel discussing the future of clean energy.

I will also seek to meet senior Chinese representatives and Australian business figures attending the event.

My visit to Bo'ao represents another step towards a stable relationship with China.

A stable and constructive relationship serves the interests of both Australia and China, as well as the broader region.

Australia wants to see trade impediments affecting Australian exports removed as soon as possible so normal trade can resume, to the benefit of both our countries.

//

Desk has advised that the TPs regarding China's reaction to AUKUS will follow.

In the meantime, s22(1)(a)(ii) and myself will see you at Parly House at 930am tomorrow.

Regards,

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Director | Media Liaison Section
Communications Branch | Executive Division

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

P s22(1)(a)(ii) | **M** s22(1)(a)(ii)

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[We acknowledge](#) the Traditional Custodians of Country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to land, waters and community. We pay our respects to all First Nations peoples, their cultures and to their Elders, past, present and emerging.

