



Contingency Planning & Crisis Preparedness

SCENARIO: NUCLEAR INCIDENT MER

MISSION

Deliver an operational crisis response that meets government's needs, provides timely advice and assistance to Australians and protects our staff and posted families, information and assets overseas.

CONTEXT

Iranian missile strikes injured about 200 people in southern Israel, including in Arad and Dimona near a nuclear research facility. The IAEA said it had not observed damage or abnormal radiation levels at the site (Guardian, Times of Israel). Separately, Israel said the IDF had been directed to destroy bridges over Lebanon's Litani River and accelerate demolition of Lebanese homes in frontline border villages (JPost, NYT, s 22(1)(a)(ii)).

RESPONSE

- Use of a nuclear weapon or an incident at a nuclear power plant would trigger:
- **initial response** to assist and provide information to Australians in the vicinity of the incident, with a focus on immediate safety concerns of Australians and our staff; and
 - **secondary consular response** to the likely disruption of global travel and supply chain disruption and increasing welfare and information needs of Australians overseas in the affected areas.

PRIORITIES

- Physical and mental welfare of both our staff overseas and Australians overseas
- Accurate reporting to the IDETF and coordination of WoG response and briefings to Ministers
- Timely information for Australians through travel advice
- Services for Australians, including travel document services and consular assistance
- Protection of government buildings and information to support key overseas functions
- Liaison with overseas governments for situational awareness and cooperation

INDICATORS AND TRIGGERS

s 47E(d)

LINES OF EFFORT

- Information for staff and families at post.
- Timely advice to the IDETF and respond to needs of NSC/Ministers
- Lead consular crisis response
- Accurate and timely travel advice and public information
- Business continuity of Australian missions
- Foreign policy response and domestic response

1/05/2026





PLANNING & RESPONSE

RESPONSE ACTIONS – in event of crisis

s 47E(d)

CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Ramifications for global insurance, in particular for aviation industry
- Complications of any two-sided escalation
- Any potential impacts of Australia’s policy response on consular response
- WHS considerations for staff
- Triggers for HOM / PPD to drawdown or suspend post operations

s 47E(d)

- Staffing capacity issues
- Distribution of timely and accurate information for Australians
- risks of disinformation

PREPAREDNESS UNDERWAY – March 2026

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PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS


People	Line areas/posts are responsible for WHS assessments for deployments, with PPD and ARPANSA guidance; Crisis Cadre and A-based overseas have done mandatory crisis management training
Systems and process	ICT systems are reviewed and tested; response processes have been designed and exercised for a response (CAP, SOPs)
Information	Nuclear data will be available through ARPANSA and partners; disinformation will be identified by assessment agencies
Physical environment	Crisis Centres can be activated quickly, allow WofG use and access; ARPANSA will advise on safety of overseas operations
Leadership	Government and agency leaders are committed to the safety and security of Australians abroad, and providing consular services in line with the Consular Services Charter

Please contact s 22(1)(a)(ii) [@dfat.gov.au](mailto:dfat.gov.au) for more information or feedback on this document

1/05/2026



Middle East Region Nuclear and Radiological Facilities





ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

ARPANSA ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Time/date of this report: 23 March 2026 at 16:00 AEDT

Dimona (Israel) s 33(a)(iii)

Soreq (Israel)

Smaller reactor than Dimona (5 MW) with more information publicly available. The model scenario is a scaled down version of the Dimona scenario and has limited offsite impacts by comparison. Damage to the power grid or backup power supply may have impacts on reactor safety.

Bushehr (Iran)

Iran has also reported a projectile struck the premises of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant on 17 March 2026. Reports indicate that there was no damage to the facility or personnel. ARPANSA expects that similar to the situation in Ukraine, damage to critical infrastructure and backup systems may prevent the safe operation of the reactor. The modelled scenario includes a loss of offsite power and no functioning backup supply. Availability of backup power supply would allow the reactor to be safely powered down.

Barakah (UAE)

The modelled scenario also assumes a loss of offsite power and no functioning backup supply. Facility has not been directly targeted.

Natanz/Fordow/Esfahan (Iran)

The largest risks at these facilities would be damage resulting in a release of Iran's stockpile of enriched Uranium. The exact location of this stockpile is not publicly known. The modelled scenario assumes that the entirety of the stockpile is present at each site and is released entirely. It is much more likely that enriched material is stored in hardened facilities which would limit any offsite release.

Tehran (Iran)

Similar research reactor to Soreq and the same scenario is used. Media reports state the facility has not been directly targeted and has not been linked to Iran's enrichment program.

May be shutdown and not in operation.

Other facilities

Facilities not included in ARPANSA's Radiation Assessment Report would require similar protective actions in the event there was an offsite release but we consider these facilities at much lower risk of damage or disruption



Australian Government
**Australian Radiation Protection
 and Nuclear Safety Agency**

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

SITUATION UPDATE

On 28 February 2026, Israel and the United States of America conducted a strike on Iranian targets in Tehran and other regional cities. Iran retaliated against Israel, regional American military assets, and against the Gulf States that host U.S. forward bases. Both sides of the conflict continue to conduct military strikes, and threats have been made that power facilities in the region may be targeted.

Sites related to Iran's nuclear program have reportedly been struck including the Natanz Nuclear Facility on 1 March and 21 March 2026. The IAEA has acknowledged the strikes but confirmed there were no indications of radioactive releases. The Esfahan (Isfahan) Nuclear Technology/Research Centre and Fordow sites were previously struck. Modelling indicates that off-site radiological consequences from an incident at these sites are not significant.

Iran has also reported a projectile struck the premises of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant on 17 March 2026. reports indicate that there was no damage to the facility or personnel. Damage to the facility is unlikely to result in urgent protective actions being required at Australian embassy locations due to the distance from the site. In a worst-case event, embassy staff may be instructed to shelter in place with doors and windows sealed and await further advice.

Strikes occurring in Tehran are not reported to have struck the research reactor in Tehran. Should the research reactor be struck, it poses a low risk due to the small inventory and power output of the academic research reactor.

Israel also has several nuclear facilities, including the Negev (also called Dimona) Nuclear Facility and the Soreq Nuclear Center that both contain research reactors. The Negev reactor is reported to be of higher power output than the Soreq facility. Iran has recently (5 March) threatened to strike the Negev Nuclear Facility should the U.S. seek regime change in Iran and has struck the nearby towns of Arad and Dimona on 21 March 2026.

Media Reporting indicates that the nuclear power plant in Barakah (UAE) has not been targeted by strikes.

Radiological risk to the Australian embassies in the region is very low due to the distance from major nuclear facilities. In the event of an incident at a nuclear site, it is unlikely that any urgent protective actions would be required at the embassy locations. In a worst-case event, staff may be instructed to shelter in place with doors and windows sealed and await further advice. As a precautionary measure, and if feasible, having a short-term stockpile of food and water may be prudent to avoid ingesting potentially contaminated food and water.

Time/date of this report: 23 March 2026 at 16:00 AEDT

KEY MESSAGES

- Since 28 February 2026 Iran and Israel/The United States have been at war and actively launching drones and missiles.
- Iran has reported a projectile striking the premises of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant on 17 March 2026. Reports indicate there was no damage to the facility or personnel.
- Radiological risk to the Australian embassies in the region is very low due to the distance from major nuclear facilities. It is unlikely that any urgent protective actions would be required at the embassy locations.
- In a worst-case event, embassy staff may be instructed to shelter in place with doors and windows sealed and await further advice.

DISCLAIMER

Radiation health advice to shelter in place is not informed by possible security considerations (e.g., military activity). Members of the public in the region should be encouraged to follow local advice.

ARPANSA DUTY OFFICER

s 22(1)(a)(ii) @arpansa.gov.au | s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Protective actions that may be required following an incident at the Nuclear Power Plant

Should there be a large release of radioactive material from the Nuclear Power Plant in the region (Bushehr or Barakah), radioactive contamination may deposit on land used for food production and in water bodies close to the site e.g., the Persian Gulf.

Within several tens of kilometres

EVACUATION

Local directions: Follow local directions for protective actions such as evacuation.



ARPANSA assessment indicates that protective actions may be required out to several tens of kilometres from the site. These protective actions would not be required at Australian embassy locations.

Within around one hundred kilometres



SHELTER IN PLACE and POTASSIUM IODIDE TABLETS

Local Directions: Follow local directions provided with regard to protective actions such as shelter in place and taking potassium iodide tablets.



ARPANSA assessment indicates that these protective actions may be required out to around one hundred kilometres from the site. These protective actions are unlikely to be required at Australian embassy locations.

ACTION

In a worst-case event, staff at embassy locations may be required to undertake some protective actions. The primary protective action would be to shelter in place with doors and windows sealed and await further advice.

As an additional protective action, use of potassium iodide tablets may be directed. These tablets should only be taken if instructed to do so.

Within several hundred kilometres



FOOD and WATER RESTRICTIONS

Monitoring of locally produced food and drinking water may be conducted. This may be required in regions with Australian embassies such as Kuwait and Qatar.



At these distances, the consumption of potentially contaminated food and drinking water does not present an immediate health hazard, although continued consumption may lead to an increased risk of long-term health effects. Monitoring would be conducted as a precautionary measure to prevent this risk.


Water supplied through desalination may not remove all radioactive contaminants and would still require monitoring to ensure radiation levels are safe for consumption. It is likely that desalination plants in the region already have appropriate means to screen for radiation levels in the water supply. If significant radiation contamination could not be removed, restriction of desalinated water may be required.

ACTION


As a precautionary measure, and if feasible, having a short-term stockpile e.g., 7 days of food and water, at the Kuwait City and Doha embassies may be prudent and provide additional reassurance to embassy staff as they are within several hundred kilometres of the reactor site.

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

HYPOTHETICAL RELEASE – Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran



LEGEND – UNSHIELDED DOSE | COMPARATIVE DOSES



Modelled release at 13 00 AEDT 23 March 2026

Model generated at 10 00 AEDT on 23 March 2026

Figure 3

The figure estimates the total dose that may be incurred during the plume passage of the hypothetical release

RELEASE SCENARIO

Postulated scenario of a Station Black Out following loss of power after damage to plant infrastructure and backup power supply. Reactor power assumed to be 3000 MWt

ASSESSMENT

Plume direction Atmospheric modelling at this time shows predominant plume direction to the north and north west of the site

Protective actions may be advised based on a release of this nature

Evacuation, May be required up to 5 km from the site

Sheltering and KI Tablets, May be required up to 70km from the site


Food and water restrictions, May be required up to 100km from the site

COMMENTS


Radiological risk at Australian embassy locations in Kuwait City, Doha, Riyadh, and Bahrain is very low due to the distance from the Bushehr facility. In the event of an incident at this facility, it is unlikely that any protective actions would be required at these embassy locations. In a worst case event, staff may be instructed to shelter in place with doors and windows sealed and await further advice

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

HYPOTHETICAL RELEASE – Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in UAE



LEGEND – UNSHIELDED DOSE | COMPARATIVE DOSES



The figure estimates the total dose that may be incurred during the plume passage of the hypothetical release.

Modelled release at 13:00 AEDT 23 March 2026


Model generated at 10:00 AEDT on 23 March 2026

Figure 4

RELEASE SCENARIO	ASSESSMENT	COMMENTS
<p>Postulated scenario of a Station Black Out following loss of power after damage to plant infrastructure and backup power supply. Reactor power assumed to be 4000 MWt.</p>	<p>Plume direction: Atmospheric modelling at this time shows plume direction initially to the west of the site.</p> <p>Protective actions may be advised based on a release of this nature:</p> <p>Evacuation: May be required up to 5 km from the site.</p> <p>Sheltering and KI Tablets: May be required up to 70 km from the site.</p> <p>Food and water restrictions: May be required up to 100 km from the site.</p>	<p>Radiological risk at Australian Embassy locations in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Doha, Riyadh, and Bahrain is very low due to the distance from the Barakah facility. In the event of an incident at this facility, it is unlikely that any protective actions would be required at these embassy locations. In a worst case event, staff may be instructed to shelter in place with doors and windows sealed and await further advice.</p>

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

HYPOTHETICAL RELEASE – Negev Nuclear Facility in Dimona, Israel




Modelled release at 13 00 AEDT 23 March 2026

Model generated at 10 00 AEDT on 23 March 2026

Figure 5

LEGEND – UNSHIELDED DOSE | COMPARATIVE DOSES



The figure estimates the total dose that may be incurred during the plume passage of the hypothetical release

RELEASE SCENARIO

Postulated scenario of a Station Black Out following loss of power after damage to plant infrastructure and backup power supply. Reactor containment is considered damaged. Reactor power assumed to be 150 MWt.

ASSESSMENT

Plume direction. Atmospheric modelling at this time shows plume direction initially to the south and south-east of the site, and then a change to the west and north-west.

Protective actions may be advised based on a release of this nature.

Evacuation. May be required up to 15 km from the site.

Sheltering and KI Tablets. May be required up to 25 km from the site.


Food and water restrictions. May be required up to 30 km from the site.

COMMENTS


Radiological risk at Australian embassy locations in Tel Aviv is very low due to the distance from the Negev facility. In the event of an incident at this facility, it is unlikely that any protective actions would be required at these embassy locations. In a worst-case event, staff may be instructed to shelter in place with doors and windows sealed and await further advice. Some contamination requiring implementation of food restrictions may reach greater distances including neighbouring countries.

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

HYPOTHETICAL RELEASE – Soreq Nuclear Facility in Israel



LEGEND – UNSHIELDED DOSE | COMPARATIVE DOSES



Modelled release at 13:00 AEDT 23 March 2026

Model generated at 10:00 AEDT on 23 March 2026

Figure 6

The figure estimates the total dose that may be incurred during the plume passage of the hypothetical release

RELEASE SCENARIO

Postulated scenario of a Station Black Out following loss of power after damage to plant infrastructure and backup power supply and safety systems. Reactor containment is considered damaged. Reactor power assumed to be 5 MWt.

ASSESSMENT


Plume direction: Atmospheric modelling at this time shows plume direction predominantly to the north and north west of the site.
Protective actions may be advised based on a release of this nature.
Evacuation: May be required up to 3 km.
Sheltering and KI Tablets: May be required up to 10 km.
Food and water restrictions: May be required up to 20 km.

COMMENTS

Potential radiological exposure from this scenario is low. Radiological risk at Australian embassy locations in Tel Aviv is very low due to the distance from the Soreq facility. In the event of an incident at this facility, it is unlikely that any protective actions would be required at these embassy locations. In a worst case event, staff may be instructed to shelter in place with doors and windows sealed and await further advice. Some contamination requiring implementation of food and water restrictions may reach areas close to the site.

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

HYPOTHETICAL RELEASE – Tehran Research Reactor in Iran




Modelled release at 13 00 AEDT 23 March 2026

Model generated at 10 00 AEDT on 23 March 2026

Figure 7

LEGEND – UNSHIELDED DOSE | COMPARATIVE DOSES



The figure estimates the total dose that may be incurred during the plume passage of the hypothetical release

RELEASE SCENARIO

Postulated scenario of a Station Black Out following loss of power after damage to plant infrastructure and backup power supply and safety systems. Reactor containment is considered damaged. Reactor power assumed to be 5 MWt.

ASSESSMENT

Plume direction. Atmospheric modelling at this time shows plume direction initially to the south of the site.

Protective actions may be advised based on a release of this nature.

Evacuation. May be required up to 2 km from the site.

Sheltering and KI Tablets. May be required up to 5 km from the site.


Food and water restrictions. May be required up to 10 km from the site.

COMMENTS


Potential radiological exposure from this scenario is low. Radiological risk at Australian embassy locations in Tehran is very low due to the distance from the Tehran facility. In the event of an incident at this facility protective actions may be required at this embassy location. In a worst case event, staff may be instructed to shelter in place with doors and windows sealed and await further advice. Some contamination requiring implementation of food and water restrictions may reach areas close to the site.

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

HYPOTHETICAL RELEASE – Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre in Iran



LEGEND – UNSHIELDED DOSE | COMPARATIVE DOSES



The figure estimates the total dose that may be incurred during the plume passage of the hypothetical release

Modelled release at 13:00 AEDT 23 March 2026


Model generated at 10:00 AEDT on 23 March 2026

Figure 8

RELEASE SCENARIO	ASSESSMENT	COMMENTS
<p>Postulated scenario of major damage and dispersal from ground level of the entire Uranium Hexafluoride stockpile estimated in IAEA verification and monitoring reports</p>	<p><u>Plume direction</u>. Atmospheric modelling at this time shows plume direction to the north and north east of the site</p> <p><u>Protective actions</u> may be advised based on a release of this nature</p> <p><u>Evacuation</u>. May be required up to 2 km from the site</p> <p><u>Sheltering</u>. May be required up to 3 km from the site</p> <p><u>Food and water restrictions</u>. May be required up to 2 km from the site</p>	<p>Potential radiological exposure from this scenario is low</p> <p>In a worst case event with very low wind speeds, sheltering may be required out to several kms from the site</p> <p>Some contamination requiring implementation of food and water restrictions may be required at further distance from the site</p>

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

HYPOTHETICAL RELEASE – Fordow Nuclear Facility in Iran




Modelled release at 13:00 AEDT 23 March 2026

Model generated at 10:00 AEDT on 23 March 2026

Figure 9

LEGEND – UNSHIELDED DOSE | COMPARATIVE DOSES



The figure estimates the total dose that may be incurred during the plume passage of the hypothetical release

RELEASE SCENARIO

Postulated scenario of major damage and dispersal from ground level of the entire Uranium Hexafluoride stockpile estimated in IAEA verification and monitoring reports

ASSESSMENT

Plume direction Atmospheric modelling at this time shows plume direction to the east of the site

Protective actions may be advised based on a release of this nature

Evacuation, Not predicted to be required

Sheltering, Not predicted to be required


Food and water restrictions, May be implemented in vicinity of the site

COMMENTS


The simulation shows that no significant off site radiological consequences are predicted in the event of a release at this facility. Some contamination requiring implementation of food and water restrictions may reach areas close to the site

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

HYPOTHETICAL RELEASE – Natanz Nuclear Facility in Iran



LEGEND – UNSHIELDED DOSE | COMPARATIVE DOSES



The figure estimates the total dose that may be incurred during the plume passage of the hypothetical release.

Modelled release at 13:00 AEDT 23 March 2026

Model generated at 10:00 AEDT on 23 March 2026 *Figure 10*

RELEASE SCENARIO	ASSESSMENT	COMMENTS
<p>Postulated scenario of major damage and dispersal from ground level of the entire Uranium Hexafluoride stockpile estimated in IAEA verification and monitoring reports</p>	<p><u>Plume direction</u> Atmospheric modelling at this time shows plume direction to the north east of the site</p> <p><u>Protective actions</u> may be advised based on a release of this nature</p> <p><u>Evacuation</u>. Not predicted to be required off site</p> <p><u>Sheltering</u>. May be required up to 3 km from the site</p> <p><u>Food and water restrictions</u>. May be required up to 2 km from the site</p>	<p>Potential radiological exposure from this scenario is low</p> <p>In a worst case event with very low wind speeds, sheltering may be required out to several kms from the site</p> <p>Some contamination requiring implementation of food and water restrictions may be required at further distance from the site</p>

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE

s 33(b)

Figure 11 s 33(b)

International Radiation Monitoring Information System (IRMIS)

This network is designed to provide near real-time information and can be used to inform urgent protective actions.

A suite of gamma dose rate detectors positioned in many nations to report and visualize large quantities of environmental radiation monitoring data during nuclear or radiological emergencies. The data maps the areas of potential impact that can assist countries to take appropriate protective actions in an emergency.

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE





Figure 2 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Monitoring System (IMS) radionuclide detection network



International Monitoring System (IMS)

The International Monitoring System is a comprehensive global network of detectors that includes seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations. This network is managed by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and is designed to detect clandestine nuclear explosions. The IMS is more sensitive than the IIRMS network and provides different information.


The radionuclide stations in the network can detect very low levels of radiation in the atmosphere. The closest radionuclide station in the region is located in Kuwait City, with other relevant stations in Switzerland, Russia, China, Mongolia, and the British Indian Ocean Territory.

The system is highly effective, having detected all six of North Korea's declared nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017. The network also provided valuable information during the Fukushima nuclear accident, with measurements from stations in Japan helping to identify and quantify the amount of radioactive material that reached certain locations.

If there was a significant release from a nuclear reactor, it would be detected by the IMS network. However, the measurement process takes several days, so these stations **do not provide an early warning system of a nuclear incident or provide real-time measurements to help inform urgent protective actions.**

ARPANSA acknowledges ASNO as the National Authority under Article 3 of the CTBT for the release of IMS data.

ARPANSA Radiation Assessment Report: Incident at Foreign Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and UAE



Locations of nuclear facilities in Iran and Israel and United Arab Emirates

Figure 13



s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Monday, 23 March 2026 6:23 PM
To: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc:
Subject: FW: ARPANSA Radiation Assessment report 23/03/2026 [REDACTED]
Attachments: 20260323_ARPANSA_Radiation Assessment Report.pdf; 20260326_MER_Nuclear_Facilities.pdf


[REDACTED]

Hi, see attached latest assessment by ARPANSA for the MER.

Any questions, please send to s 22(1)(a)(ii) and we will coordinate with ARPANSA responses.

Thanks,
s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Contingency Planning and Preparedness Section
 Crisis Preparedness and Management Branch | Consular and Crisis Management Division
 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
 P s 22(1)(a)(ii) | M s 22(1)(a)(ii) |
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We acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of Country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to land, waters and community. We pay our respects to all First Nations peoples, their cultures and to their Elders, past, present and emerging.

From: s 22(1)(a)(ii) @protected.arpansa.gov.au>
Sent: Monday, 23 March 2026 6:17 PM
To: s 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii) @protected.arpansa.gov.au>; s 22(1)(a)(ii) @protected.arpansa.gov.au>
Subject: ARPANSA Radiation Assessment report 23/03/2026 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Hi s 22(1)(a)(ii)

ARPANSA has updated its radiation assessment report following events over the weekend.

Attached is a map encompassing the broader MER and radiological sites which can be distributed at the Official:sensitive level.

I have also attached our updated radiation assessment report with additional detail on some of the modelling scenarios.

These products are always able to be improved upon so if there's more detail in an area or a clearer explanation of something, let us know and we'll implement it in future assessment reports.

Regards,

s 22(1)(a)(ii) (EPR - Duty Officer)

Classified by s 22(1)(a)(ii) [REDACTED] @protected arpansa gov au on 23/03/2026 6 15 40 PM

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s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Wednesday, 25 March 2026 10:05 PM
To: Alan Copeland; Elizabeth McGregor; Paula Brewer; s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: FW: ARPANSA Radiation Assessment report 23/03/2026 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

s 33(a)(ii)
Hi,

s 33(a)(ii)

From: s 22(1)(a)(ii) @protected.arpansa.gov.au>
Sent: Wednesday, 25 March 2026 4:32 PM
To: s 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>; s 22(1)(a)(ii) @protected.arpansa.gov.au>
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii) :@protected.arpansa.gov.au>
Subject: RE: ARPANSA Radiation Assessment report 23/03/2026

Hi s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The plume modelling for the reactor locations included in the assessment report is performed six times per day at each location for a worst-credible case scenario to provide general coverage of weather conditions for the whole 24-hour period. The plume shown in the Radiation Assessment Report is typically the model output for 12 AEST, and is shown to provide familiarity with what a release from each site might look like for a given set of weather conditions. The distances given in the 'Protective actions' section in the 'Assessment' area of the report reflect a range of modelled outcomes and can be used for planning. In the event of an incident at the modelled sites, the model outputs for the closest times can be used to provide further advice on request from DFAT, while more information is collected and assessed regarding the incident and any potential release.

This automated modelling does take significant time and resources and has been prioritised for the Iran, Israel, and UAE sites. For planning purposes for the other countries mentioned, the best approach would be to apply protective action zones from similar sites. In the event of an incident at the sites, more detailed modelling can be conducted. For planning purposes, the following assessments may be used (note that these

may differ from published planning zones for some sites based on the incident type assessed and different protective action criteria used by the country):

Country	Reactor Name	Reactor Type	Reactor Power (MWth)	Location
Pakistan	Karachi Nuclear Power Complex	Power Reactor	337, 3060, 3060	24.85241, 66.77510
Pakistan	Chashma Nuclear Power Complex	Power Reactor	999, 999, 999, 999, 3180	32.38833, 71.46695
Pakistan	Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology	Research Reactor	10	33.65314, 73.25988
Pakistan	Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology	Research Reactor	0.03	33.65361, 73.25835
Syria	Atomic Energy Commission of Syria	Research Reactor	0.03	33.50510, 36.27750
Armenia	Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant	Power Reactor	1375, 1375	40.18050, 44.14728
Iraq	Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre	Research Reactor	40, 5, 0.5	33.20319, 44.51848
Turkey	Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant	Power Reactor	3200, 3200, 3200, 3200	36.14456, 33.53993
Turkey	ITU Energy Institute	Research Reactor	0.25	41.10838, 29.03075
Turkey	TENMAK Nuclear Energy Research Institute	Research Reactor	5	40.06055, 32.60411

s 33(a)(ii)

Please let us know if you would like any further information and welcome a call to the duty officer phone number to further explain these details and help with planning arrangements where possible.

I'd also like to flag that ARPANSA will not have access to its protected environment (Fortress) this weekend (28-29 March). Please notify the duty officer phone if there are any communications that need attention.


s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Science Officer/EPR Duty Officer
Health Physics Measurements
Radiation Health Services
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency

t: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
m: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
w: arpansa.gov.au



Australian Government
Australian Radiation Protection
and Nuclear Safety Agency



From our scientists to the world's first scientists, we respectfully acknowledge Traditional Owners and First Nations communities and their rich cultures. We recognise, respect and continue to learn from Indigenous sciences, and the deep understanding and observations of land, waters and sky carried and shared by First Nations peoples over thousands of years. Artwork by Natalie L. Simmons

Classified by s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted] @dfat.gov.au on 24/03/2026 4:51:34 PM

From: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted] @dfat.gov.au>
Sent: Tuesday, 24 March 2026 4:52 PM
To: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted] @protected.arpansa.gov.au>
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted] @protected.arpansa.gov.au>
Subject: RE: ARPANSA Radiation Assessment report 23/03/2026 [redacted]




Hi, further to the attached reporting, would it possible to receive modelling for Pakistan, Türkiye, Syria, Armenia and Iraq.

s 33(a)(ii)

Thanks for all your help with this.

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Burherect



s 33(a)(ii)

From: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

[@protected@parisa.gov.au](#)>

Sent: Monday, 23 March 2026 6:17 PM

s 22(1)(a)(ii) - duplicate email - see from bottom of page 25

Classified by s 22(1)(a)(ii) [REDACTED] on 23/03/2026 6 15 40 PM

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s 22(1)(a)(ii) @protected.arpansa.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 9 April 2026 2:01 PM
To: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii) Alan Copeland; s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: Re: ARPANSA Radiation Assessment report 23/03/2026:seeking update on Bushehr NPP [REDACTED]

Hi s 22(1)(a)(ii)

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The short answer to your question is that this report does not change our modelling for Bushehr.

These strikes reinforce our modelling basis as the strikes occurring pose a risk of creating a Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) which is the basis for our modelling scenario. Our basis is more conservative than the risk posed by strikes at the NPP area boundary as our scenario doesn't include Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) restoring the lost power.

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Cheers,
s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>
Sent: Wednesday, 8 April 2026 08:44
To: s 22(1)(a)(ii) @protected.arpansa.gov.au>
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii) @protected.arpansa.gov.au>; s 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>; Alan Copeland <Alan.Copeland@dfat.gov.au>; s 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>; s 22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>
Subject: RE: ARPANSA Radiation Assessment report 23/03/2026:seeking update on Bushehr NPP [REDACTED]

Hi, overnight cable from Vienna copied below. Checking in to see if there are any changes to the modelling for Bushehr NPP given reporting? Copying in your assessment of 23 March.

Thanks,
s 22(1)(a)(ii)

//

OFFICIAL:Sensitive

Cable overview

Title: s 33(a)(iii)

MRN: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Sent: 08/04/2026, s 22(1)(a)(ii)

To: Canberra

Cc: Geneva UN, IAEA Board of Governors (2025-26), London, Tehran, Tel Aviv, UN New York, Washington

From: Vienna UN

Approved by: s 22(1)(a)(ii)


Response: Routine, Information Only

Cable annotations

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

s 33(a)(iii)

HYPOTHETICAL RELEASE – Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran



Modelled release at 13:00 AEST 23 March 2026

Model generated at 10:00 AEDT on 23 March 2026

Figure 3

RELEASE SCENARIO

Portulated scenario of a Station Black Out following loss of power after damage to plant infrastructure and backup power supply. Reactor power assumed to be 3000 MWt.

ASSESSMENT

Plume direction: Atmospheric modelling at this time shows predominant plume direction to the north and north west of the site.

Protective actions may be advised based on a release of this nature:

Evacuation: May be required up to 5 km from the site.

Sheltering and KI Tablets: May be required up to 70km from the site.

Food and water restrictions: May be required up to 100km from the site.

From: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

@protected.arpansa.gov.au>

Sent: Monday, 23 March 2026 6:17 PM

s 22(1)(a)(ii) - duplicate email - see from bottom of page 25

s 22(1)(a)(ii) - duplicate email - see from bottom of page 25

Contingency talking points – US strikes on Iran (revised 19 February 2026)

Key messages

s 33(a)(iii)

- Iran’s nuclear program has long posed a threat to international peace and security.
- Iran has repeatedly failed to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and fulfil its legally binding safeguards obligations.
- Iran is the only state without nuclear weapons that has produced and accumulated vast quantities of highly enriched uranium, without accountability or credible civilian justification.
- Australia, along with the international community, has been clear that Iran can never be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon
 - the Australian Government has supported targeted action by the United States to prevent that from happening.
- It is incumbent on Iran to fully implement its international obligations in relation to its nuclear program
 - and reach a diplomatic solution that provides assurances Iran can never develop a nuclear weapon.
- Important all parties use their influence to urge restraint and dialogue going forward
 - the prospect of broader regional conflict is in no one’s interest.

s 33(a)(iii)

- The Iranian regime has long been a destabilising force through its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, support for armed proxies, and brutal acts of violence and intimidation inside and outside Iran.

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

- These actions / statements risk a broader regional conflict.
- Australia urges all parties to promote de-escalation, dialogue, and diplomacy
 - and refrain from actions and rhetoric that will escalate tensions further.

Consular

- We continue to urge all Australians in Iran to leave as soon as possible
 - be prepared to shelter in place for an extended period - make sure you have supplies of food, water and medication.
- Our ability to provide consular services in Iran is extremely limited
 - the Australian Embassy's operations are suspended.
- We urge Australians in the Middle East region to be alert to developments, including retaliatory action
 - as reflected in travel advice, conflict will affect airport operations and airspace
 - expect flight cancellations and disruption to travel.
- Travellers should prioritise their safety, monitor events and follow local advice.
- Australians in need of urgent consular assistance should contact the Consular Emergency Centre on 1300 555 135 or +61 2 6261 3306 outside Australia.

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

Background

Throughout January 2026, the Iranian government used lethal force, violence, arbitrary arrests, and internet and telecommunications blackouts to crackdown on domestic protests. The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency reports over 7,000 confirmed deaths (with almost 12,000 still under review), over 25,000 injured, and over 53,000 arrests [as of 13 February 2026].

President Trump has repeatedly threatened military strikes against Iran – initially for its violent suppression of the protests; and, more recently, if it failed to reach an agreement with the US on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and support for regional proxies.

In late January 2026, the US deployed military resources (the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and additional tactical combat, cargo, and refuelling aircraft) to the Middle East. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi said Iranian armed forces were ready to respond “immediately and powerfully” to US aggression.

On 6 February 2026, Iran and the US began new talks on Iran’s nuclear program in Muscat, mediated by Oman. Following a second round of talks in Geneva on 17 February 2026, the parties reportedly agreed to “guiding principles” for a potential nuclear deal. Ahead of the talks, the US moved a second aircraft carrier to the Gulf region to increase pressure on Iran to reach an agreement.

