

s22(1)(a)(ii)

[REDACTED]

From: ODIN <odin@dfat.gov.au>

Sent: Friday, 28 February 2025 5:52 PM

To: s22(1)(a)(ii)

@dfat.gov.au>

Subject: Third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW): s33(a)(iii) and s33(b) Representations [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CABLE - s22(1)(a)(ii)

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Friday, February 28,
2025, 05:52 PM (AEDT)

Title: **Third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW): s33(a)(iii) and s33(b) Representations**

To: Berlin, Brussels, Copenhagen, Geneva UN, London, Paris
EMB, Tokyo, UN New York, Vienna UN, Washington, Wellington
Cc: Bandar Seri Begawan, Bern, Cairo, Doha, Majuro, Rabat, Singapore

From: Canberra
(CHCH/DFAT/ISDD/NPB) Sent by: s22(1)(a)(ii)

Topics: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY/Arms Control, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY/Strategic Policy, POLITICAL-ECONOMIC/International
Organisations, POLITICAL-ECONOMIC/International Political

Approved By: FAS ISD, Mathew Fox

References: s22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: **Routine, Information Only**

Summary: Ahead of the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in New York s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

FAS ISD confirmed that Australia would attend 3MSP, but reassured s33(a)(iii) and s33(b) of Australia's strong commitment to the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

On 28 February s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

Australia's attendance at the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) from 3-7 March in New York.

s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

4. Fox responded (s22(1)(a)(ii)) and said that Australia had not signed and was not a party to the TPNW. Our decision to attend as an observer did not change that. s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

Brodrick added that Australia would not deliver a statement at 3MSP and wished to observe the meeting to consider questions regarding the TPNW's interaction with the NPT, and that we would be looking to take the insights from our attendance to the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting later this year.

5. Fox said that Australia considered its work with s33(a)(iii) in multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation issues highly important, especially in the context of the NPT. Australia still believed the NPT to be the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and the best pathway to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was to ensure the NPT was acted upon and progressed. Australia had a deep, vested interest in maintaining the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime, echoed by the Foreign Minister in multiple forums.

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Comment

s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

Sender: s22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL

From: ODIN <odin@dfat.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 21 March 2025 8:46 AM
To: s22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au
Subject: UN: Disarmament: TPNW Third Meeting of States Parties [REDACTED]

CABLE -
s22(1)(a)(ii)
s22(1)(a)(ii)

Friday,
March 21,
2025, 08:45
AM (AEDT)

Title: UN: Disarmament: TPNW Third Meeting of States Parties

To: Canberra, Geneva UN, Vienna UN

Cc: FAF Posts

From: UN New York
(UNNY) Sent by: s22(1)(a)(ii)

Topics: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY/Arms Control, UN & COMMONWEALTH/UN Discussions
Approved Chargé Bryant
By:
References: s22(1)(a)(ii)
Response: **Routine, Information Only**

Summary: The third meeting of states parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) saw TPNW states reiterate concerns around the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and the perceived lack of progress on disarmament. Australia attended as an observer, consistent with our previous approach. We are not a party to the TPNW and were the only state under extended nuclear deterrence to attend this year. While discussions were primarily consistent with the last meeting, s33(a)(iii) South Africa will preside over the TPNW Review Conference in 2026.

From 3-7 March, the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was held in New York. Consistent with our approach to the last two meetings and our position of engaging constructively, Australia attended as an observer represented at DHOM level – initially DHOM Bryant and then s22(1)(a)(ii) Australia is not a state party to the TPNW and has not made a decision to join. We did not deliver a statement or

make interventions at side events but we did engage in bilaterals upon request. We made clear that we supported the goal of the TPNW – a world without nuclear weapons – and our intent was to listen as we continued to consider questions around **complementarity** of the TPNW with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); **verification**; and **universality**. South Africa will be President of the first TPNW Review Conference (RevCon) (30 November - 4 December 2026, New York).

2. The [declaration agreed by TPNW States](#) reiterated their concerns around the **humanitarian consequences** of the use of nuclear weapons, the **perceived lack of progress on disarmament** and the expansion and modernisation of nuclear arsenals among states possessing nuclear weapons. s33(a)(iii)

This year's declaration also included new language on emerging technologies and criticising nuclear sharing (the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of NNWS s33(a)(iii)).

s33(a)(iii)

3. While discussions during the meeting were primarily consistent with 2MSP s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

s22(1)(a)(ii)

s33(a)(iii)

5. s33(a)(iii)
state under END to attend. s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

this year Australia was the only

6. s33(a)(iii) appreciated our presence, with s33(a)(iii) acknowledging allies of nuclear

armed states in attendance. s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)
s33(a)(iii)

s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

s33(a)(iii)

8. The informal facilitators on complementarity (s33(a)(iii)) said complementarity went beyond existing nuclear disarmament regimes and also included environmental instruments. s33(a)(iii) and s 33(b)

10. Co-chairs of the informal working group on article 12 - universalisation (s33(a)(iii)) advised since 2MSP signatories had increased from 93 to 94, and States Parties increased from 69 to 73. s33(a)(iii)

11. Co- chairs of the informal working group on article 4 - verification (s33(a)(iii)) said the process to develop verification procedures would take time; verification of nuclear disarmament was possible; and disarmament verification under the TPNW would likely proceed on a cooperation basis rather than adversarial – differing to New START or the JCPOA. s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

s33(a)(iii)

s33(a)(iii)

12. Co-chairs of the [informal working group on articles 6 and 7 – victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance](#) (s33(a)(iii)

) indicated that a planned trust fund would likely be open for contributions from states not party to the TPNW. They were aiming to establish the trust fund after the RevCon and noted it may proceed in a phased approach. s33(a)(iii)

s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

13. [A second generation Aboriginal victim of nuclear testing and International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons \(ICAN\) advocate](#) said nuclear testing had had a significant impact on Indigenous Australians and there was a lack of compensation. She called for the trust fund to accept contributions from non-States Parties and be open to providing funds to affected communities in these States. She was concerned Australia hadn't signed the TPNW. s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

14. 3MSP also saw an [update to the TPNW Scientific Advisory Group's report](#); a [gender focal point report](#) (s33(a)(iii)); a panel discussion on the legality of nuclear deterrence under international law; and several developing states seeking to link increasing military expenditures to sustainable development, arguing these funds could be better spent achieving the SDGs. s33(a)(iii)

s33(a)(iii)

s33(a)(iii)

Sender: s22(1)(a)(ii)

s22(1)(a)(ii)



Ministerial Submission

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Cleared by: Lloyd Brodrick

Date sent to MO: 16 January 2025

Action Requested By: 31 January 2025

Reason for Urgency: Not Applicable

FOR: Senator the Hon Penny Wong

INFO: The Hon Tim Watts MP

Attendance at the 3rd Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

Key Issues: The Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will take place in New York on 3-7 March 2025. The meeting provides an opportunity to track TPNW implementation and reinforce the Government's constructive engagement with the TPNW and its States Parties. Australia attended the 1st and 2nd meetings of States Parties as an observer, represented by Susan Templeman MP. We would recommend again attending as an observer, represented by a non-executive parliamentarian or by a working-level official from Australia's mission in New York. s33(a)(iii) s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

Civil society will press for Australia to attend and to sign the Treaty.

Recommendation:

That you:

- a) agree that Australia attend 3MSP as an observer;
- b) agree to nominate a non-executive parliamentarian to lead the delegation;
- c) agree a working-level official from the Australian mission in New York attend if a non-executive parliamentarian is not available; and
- d) agree a working-level official from the Australian mission in New York attend if caretaker provisions apply.

Decision:

Agreed / Not Agreed

Agreed / Not Agreed

Agreed / Not Agreed

Agreed / Not Agreed

Domestic/Media Considerations: Domestic media (ABC, The Guardian) may cover Australia's attendance. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons is likely to cover the meeting extensively through its social media.

Action:

s47F(1)

Penny Wong
12/1/25

The Minister is for

Information:

Noted

Tim Watts
/ /

From: Lloyd Brodrick, ISG | ISD | NPB - Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Branch
s22(1)(a)(ii)

Contact: s22(1)(a)(ii)
s22(1)(a)(ii)

Can this proposal be funded from within your existing divisional allocation (departmental/aid)? Yes

If the proposal high risk/high value (over \$100m) concept has been approved by the Development Program Committee? Not Applicable

Consultation: CLO, DND, ILX, Geneva, UNNY, Australian Submarine Agency, Defence, Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet



Background:

The 3rd Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will take place in New York from 3 to 7 March 2025 with Kazakhstan serving as President. In line with previous iterations, 3MSP is expected to focus on treaty implementation issues, including progress on intersessional processes; security considerations; universalisation; verification; complementarity; victim assistance; and environmental remediation. Since 2MSP, membership has grown from 69 to 73 States Parties, including Indonesia in September 2024.

2. Consistent with our attendance as an observer to 1MSP and 2MSP, we propose that Australia again attend as an observer (s22(1)(a)(ii)). Attendance would allow us to continue to closely track TPNW developments and demonstrate the Government's ongoing constructive engagement with the Treaty.

3. We propose that you (Minister Wong) nominate a non-executive parliamentarian to lead the delegation, consistent with past practice. Should a non-executive parliamentarian be unavailable, we propose that a working-level (EL1/EL2) official from Australia's mission to the United Nations in New York attend. Consistent with the Government's current policy position and past practice, Australia would not deliver statements nor make interventions at the meeting. s47C

4. If the Government has entered a caretaker period, we recommend that a working-level official from Australia's mission to the United Nations attend.

5. Fifty-six of the TPNW's then 69 States Parties and 33 observer states attended 2MSP in 2023.

s33(a)(iii)

s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

6. Our attendance at 3MSP should not be a surprise to key partners. s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

7. Our attendance at 3MSP would be complemented by ongoing engagement efforts in priority regional and multilateral disarmament forums, all of which will provide opportunities for articulating and advancing Australian priorities in non-proliferation and disarmament. This includes the high-level segment in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in February, our co-chairing of the ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in March, together with the Philippines and New Zealand, and the 3rd Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting in April.

8. All MSP attendees including observers must contribute to the meeting costs based on a UN scale for assessed contributions. s22(1)(a)(ii)

We expect costs for 3MSP to be similar, s22(1)(a)(ii)

DFAT // Non-proliferation and AUKUS

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

- As Australia is not a State Party, we do not have any legal obligations under the TPNW.

s22(1)(a)(ii)

2024 UNGA TPNW Resolution [*First Committee: 122 Yes – 44 No – 14 abstain*]

- We support the TPNW's ambition of a world without nuclear weapons.
- Our decision to abstain is consistent with our vote in 2022 and 2023.

If pressed:

- an abstention represents a position of neutrality, not supporting or opposing.

s22(1)(a)(ii)

OFFICIAL

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Background document

s22(1)(a)(ii)

BACKGROUND (not for attribution)

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Supported the ambition of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) for a world without nuclear weapons.

- In 2022, the Albanese Government changed Australia's vote on the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW from 'oppose' to 'abstain'.
- The Albanese Government also decided for Australia to observe the first two TPNW Meetings of States Parties in June 2022 and November 2023, with the delegation led each time by Ms Susan Templeman MP.
- The Government has enhanced engagement, at the highest levels, on the TPNW with civil society groups.

s22(1)(a)(ii)

s22(1)(a)(ii)

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Tuesday, 22 April 2025 4:33 PM
To: Foreign Minister
Cc: Anna Oldmeadow; s22(1)(a)(ii) ; s22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: [EXTERNAL] NPT Preparatory Committee
Attachments: 2025_ICAN_NPT_PrepCom_Briefing_Paper_.pdf; NPT-TPNW complementarity.docx

CAUTION: This email originated from outside the organisation. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender.

Dear Minister Wong,

The upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee is beginning soon, from 28 April to 9 May. This meeting is a good opportunity for Australia to demonstrate its commitment to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

I am pleased to attach a new ICAN briefing note regarding the upcoming meeting, as well as a document that outlines how the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) are complementary. We hope it will help allay concerns that there is any conflict between the treaties.

We hope Australia, in any statements made during the NPT Preparatory Committee, will reference its engagement with the TPNW and attendance at all three Meetings of States Parties, as an important contribution to the multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Finally, would you please let us know who will represent Australia at the upcoming NPT Preparatory Committee?

Kind regards,

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Director
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Australia
<https://icanw.org.au/>



2025 NPT Preparatory Committee

April-May 2025

Background

This Preparatory Committee of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) takes place amidst developments that we have not seen since the Cold War: an escalation of nuclear threats and rhetoric – even at the highest political levels – promoting new nuclear proliferation, cooperation, sharing and stationing arrangements. **These developments are not only in direct conflict with existing NPT non-proliferation and disarmament commitments, but also further increase the already all-time high risk of nuclear weapons use.** This meeting is thus of particular importance and States Parties must, in accordance with their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT, address these developments directly, as a matter of priority, ahead of the Review Conference in 2026.

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive, inhumane and indiscriminate weapons ever created. A single nuclear bomb detonated over a large city could kill more than a million people in a matter of seconds. The complex, cascading and catastrophic impacts of a nuclear detonation would not be limited to “ground zero” alone, producing transboundary short and long-term impacts on the environment, socio-economic and sustainable development, food security and the health of current and future generations, including the disproportionate impact that nuclear weapons have on women and girls¹, as well as on infants and children.² **The perpetual reliance on nuclear weapons in some states' security strategies actively diminishes the legitimate right to security of non-nuclear-armed states.**

The escalatory behaviour demonstrated by some states in issuing nuclear weapons threats, or conducting activities designed as “show of force” or capability demonstrations with their nuclear arsenals is increasing risks to all states. This risk is further increased by exercises to use nuclear weapons and tests of nuclear weapon delivery systems, particularly by states engaged in an armed conflict.

¹ *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*, New York, 7 July 2017.

² International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, “The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on Children”, August 2024

States have failed to implement agreed actions from past Review Conferences, including ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, negotiation of further bilateral reductions between United States and Russia, lowering the operational status of warheads, reduction of the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military doctrines, the unequivocal undertaking for nuclear disarmament under Article VI, and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

While nuclear-armed states and their allies are failing to articulate a pathway for nuclear disarmament, half of all UN Member States have strengthened their commitment towards the elimination of nuclear weapons by joining or signing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). On 7 March 2025, the third Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW reaffirmed their commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime through a unanimous declaration and decisions to advance the treaty's implementation. In the adopted declaration, governments proclaimed that “**nuclear weapons are a threat to the security, and ultimately the existence, of all states, irrespective of whether they possess nuclear weapons, subscribe to nuclear deterrence or firmly oppose it**” and thus “**all States therefore have an urgent security interest in their total elimination.**”³

Key points to raise at the NPT Preparatory Committee

In statements to the NPT PrepCom, ICAN encourages states to:

1. Recognise that nuclear weapons programmes and the increasing reliance on nuclear weapons in security strategies are a **significant and legitimate security concern for all states, and undermine the principles and objectives of the NPT**, including by:

- Deploing the fact that more than fifty years after the NPT entered into force, there are still more than 12,000 nuclear weapons in the world, many ready to be used within minutes.⁴
- Unequivocally condemning any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances.
- Expressing alarm at the consideration of new sharing and stationing arrangements that contravene the 2010 Outcome document's Action 5(c) in which nuclear weapons states committed to “further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”.
- Condemning nuclear-armed states' qualitative and quantitative advancements of their nuclear arsenals as violations of Article VI.
- Reiterating the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish

³ Declaration of the third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: “Strengthening our commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons amidst the rising global instability” (7 March 2025) [TPNW/MSP/2025/CRP.4](https://www.un.org/disarmament/tpnw/mtpnw2025/declaration)

⁴ Federation of American Scientists, Status of World Nuclear Forces, March 2025, <https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/>.

the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.⁵

- Condemning the practice of “nuclear sharing” or deploying nuclear weapons on foreign territory, including recent calls by a small number of European states to expand this practice by offering to “host” nuclear weapons on their territory, and calling on all states to end any such arrangements.
- Condemning non-nuclear-armed states’ plans to use highly-enriched uranium for military purposes, including Australia’s proposed acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, as undermining the NPT and weakening the IAEA safeguards system.⁶

2. Highlight the greatly heightened risk of nuclear weapons use due to the recent actions of nuclear-armed states and their allies, including by:

- Expressing alarm at international developments, which include nuclear weapons threats, and calls for increasing and expanding reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines, all of which increases the risk of proliferation and the risk of use.
- Highlighting the fact that the ongoing possession of nuclear weapons and reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines by some countries threatens the security of all countries.
- Reaffirming that nuclear deterrence is posited on the very existence of nuclear risk, thus eliminating nuclear risks is a prime and legitimate concern and national responsibility of all states.⁷
- Expressing concern about the emerging nuclear arms race, and the fact that nuclear-armed states spent \$91.4 billion in 2023.⁸
- Expressing concern that the risk of emerging technologies incorporated into nuclear weapons systems heightens the risks of nuclear weapon use – intentional, inadvertent or accidental – by increasing miscalculation, escalation, and loss of control, and; reaffirming that nuclear-armed States must maintain meaningful human control over nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.⁹

3. Highlight the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, including by:

- Expressing deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons as well as at the ongoing humanitarian and

⁵ United Nations, 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Volume I, *NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II) (2000)*.

⁶ ICAN Australia, “Briefing Note: Nuclear-powered submarines,” October 2021.

⁷ Report of the coordinator for the consultative process on security concerns of States under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 2025, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4077296?v=pdf#files>.

⁸ International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, “Surge: 2023 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending”, June 2024. https://www.icanw.org/surge_2023_global_nuclear_weapons_spending

⁹ United Nations, third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Final Declaration, TPNW/MSP/2025/CRP.4 (2025)

environmental harms caused by nuclear weapons use and testing.¹⁰

- Recognizing that new scientific evidence has shown that these effects are more severe, long-lasting, and complex than previously understood.¹¹
- Welcoming the recent establishment by the UN General Assembly of an independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War.

4. Welcome the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, including by:

- Welcoming the successful third Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in March 2025, the progress in the TPNW's implementation including its universalisation, which underscores the commitment of TPNW states parties to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.
- Calling on all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the TPNW without delay.
- Emphasising that the TPNW complements and strengthens the NPT as an effective measure for nuclear disarmament as called for in Article VI, alongside nuclear-weapon-free zones.¹²
- Welcoming efforts to address the rights and needs of affected communities through victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance as provided for by the TPNW.
- Recognizing the TPNW as the strongest legal norm against nuclear proliferation, including through its explicit prohibitions in Article 1 (a-g) on possessing, transferring, receiving the transfer and stationing of nuclear weapons.

¹⁰ United Nations, 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *Final Document: Volume I, NPT/CONF.2010/50(Vol. I)* (2010).

¹¹ United Nations, third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Working paper submitted by the Scientific Advisory Group, TPNW/MSP/2025/WP.5 (2025)

¹² United Nations, 10th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Joint Statement delivered by Mexico on behalf of TPNW states parties and signatories, 17 August 2022, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/17Aug_MCI_TPNW.pdf

March 2023

How the TPNW Complements, Reinforces, and Builds On the NPT

The **2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)** was carefully crafted to reinforce, complement, and build on the **1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**, which obligates its parties to negotiate further legal measures to achieve nuclear disarmament. Both treaties are an integral and permanent part of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and have the same goal at their core: a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Implementing Article VI of the NPT

- Article VI of the NPT requires all NPT parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on “**effective measures** relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. The TPNW is one such “effective measure”.
- At the first meeting of states parties to the TPNW in June 2022, TPNW parties [said](#) they were “pleased to have advanced the implementation of the NPT’s article VI by bringing into force a comprehensive legal prohibition of nuclear weapons”.
- The preamble to the TPNW describes the NPT as “the **cornerstone** of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime” and reaffirms its “vital role” in promoting international peace and security.
- All [parties](#) to the TPNW are also [parties](#) to the NPT and remain firmly committed to the NPT’s full and effective implementation. No TPNW party has expressed its intention to withdraw from the NPT or to cease complying with its NPT obligations.

- It was never envisaged during negotiation of the NPT that nuclear disarmament could or would be accomplished solely through the single sentence that comprises article VI – hence its stipulation that “effective measures” be pursued.
- While a number of measures have been concluded to implement the non-proliferation and “peaceful uses” pillars of the NPT, little has been achieved with respect to the **disarmament pillar**. Indeed, the TPNW is the first “effective measure” under article VI to enter into force since the conclusion of the NPT in 1968.

“We recognise the [NPT] as the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and deplore threats or actions that risk undermining it. As fully committed states parties to the NPT, we reaffirm the complementarity of the [TPNW] with the NPT. We are pleased to have advanced the implementation of the NPT’s article VI by bringing into force a comprehensive legal prohibition of nuclear weapons, as a necessary and effective measure related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.”

Declaration adopted by TPNW parties in Vienna in 2022

- The negotiation of the NPT, like the TPNW, was motivated by **humanitarian concerns**. Both treaties recognise in their preambles the inherent danger posed to humanity by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert such a war.
- The TPNW strengthens the **non-proliferation regime** by prohibiting its parties from engaging in a wide range of nuclear-weapon-related activities. These prohibitions make it harder for states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.
- The TPNW also strengthens the international **safeguards regime** administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which aims to prevent nuclear materials and technology from being used for weapons. Like the NPT, the TPNW includes specific obligations to bring nuclear safeguards agreements into force.
- The obligations in the TPNW extend well beyond those of the NPT. As the UN secretary-general, António Guterres, has [put it](#), the TPNW enables states “to subscribe to some of the highest available multilateral norms against nuclear weapons”.
- The TPNW builds on the NPT by establishing a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear weapons (which applies to all of its parties), a framework for the verified elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, and a framework to address harm caused by the use and testing of nuclear weapons.

The NPT (1968):

- Prohibits five of the nine nuclear-armed states – China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US – from transferring their nuclear weapons to anyone else or assisting other states to acquire nuclear weapons.
- Prohibits all other parties from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Facilitates the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the “peaceful uses of nuclear energy”, subject to safeguards agreements.
- Requires all parties to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament” (without specifying what those measures must be).

The TPNW (2017):

- Prohibits a wide range of activities relating to nuclear weapons, including their use, threatened use, development, testing, manufacture, and possession, as well as assistance with any of these activities.
- Establishes a legal framework for the verified elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes and the removal of foreign-owned nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of parties.
- Requires all parties to adhere to IAEA safeguards to ensure that nuclear materials and technology are not used for weapons.
- Establishes a legal framework for assisting victims of the use and testing of nuclear weapons, and for the remediation of contaminated environments.

Continued Engagement with the NPT

- Since the TPNW’s entry into force in 2021, TPNW parties have continued to call for the NPT’s full implementation and universalisation, and have contributed actively to its review process, including by submitting working papers.
- At NPT meetings, TPNW parties and signatories have emphasised the full compatibility of the two treaties. In 2022, for example, [they](#) “reaffirm[ed] the complementarity of the TPNW with the NPT” and condemned actions that risk undermining the NPT.
- At the first meeting of states parties to the TPNW in 2022, TPNW parties [appointed](#) Ireland and Thailand as informal facilitators “to further explore and articulate the possible areas of tangible cooperation between the [TPNW] and the [NPT], and other relevant nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments”.

Part of the Disarmament Architecture

- Following the TPNW's entry into force in 2021, the UN secretary-general, António Guterres, [called on](#) all states to “support the [TPNW's] goals and recognise its place in the **global disarmament architecture**”. He also urged states to “reject the poisonous and flawed logic of endless nuclear competition”.
- The popularity of the TPNW reflects the strong desire of the international community and civil society organisations to see meaningful progress towards implementation of article VI of the NPT, which has been lacking for decades.

“[I]t must be said that [the TPNW] is fully compatible with the [NPT] ... I believe there is complementarity, no opposition.”

António Guterres, UN secretary-general

- All NPT parties should welcome initiatives aimed at advancing the full and effective implementation of article VI of the NPT – and recognise the TPNW as a **significant contribution** by a large number of NPT parties towards this end.
- All NPT parties should also welcome the fact that the TPNW reaffirms, in its preamble, “that the full and effective implementation of the [NPT], which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security”.
- Moreover, NPT parties should share the hope that the TPNW will bring **new impetus** to collective efforts to implement the NPT, in particular article VI.
- There is **no contradiction** between the NPT and the TPNW. Any claims that the TPNW undermines or poses a threat to the NPT are entirely unfounded. The two treaties can – and do – exist side by side and complement each other.
- All TPNW parties have [expressed](#) their “commitment to work constructively with all NPT states parties to achieve our shared objectives”. All NPT parties should also commit to working constructively with TPNW parties.

s22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Tuesday, 18 February 2025 9:39 AM
To: Lloyd Brodrick
Cc: Craig Maclachlan; Mathew Fox; DS ISG Office; s22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: RE: TPNW - 3rd Meeting of States Parties - Rebecca Bryant's availability
[REDACTED]

Thanks Lloyd,

I agree that sounds like a sensible approach.

Best,
s22(1)(a)(ii)

Adviser to Senator the Hon Penny Wong
Leader of the Government in the Senate
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Labor Senator for South Australia

s22(1)(a)(ii) [@dfat.gov.au](mailto:s22(1)(a)(ii)@dfat.gov.au) | M s22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Lloyd Brodrick
Sent: Tuesday, 18 February 2025 9:18 AM
To: s22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: Craig Maclachlan ; Mathew Fox ; DS ISG Office ; s22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: TPNW - 3rd Meeting of States Parties - Rebecca Bryant's availability [REDACTED]

Good morning s22(1)(a)(ii)

Following our discussion yesterday, re the Minister's preference for Rebecca Bryant to lead the delegation to 3MSP, s22(1)(a)(ii)

The meeting is from 3-7 March. s22(1)(a)(ii)

We don't yet have the program for 3MSP but it would be similar.

s22(1)(a)(ii)

s22(1)(a)(ii)

s47C

Grateful your views on this proposal. We will include advice on the delegation lead s33(a)(iii)

Regards

Lloyd

Lloyd Brodrick

Assistant Secretary
Nuclear Non-Proliferation & Disarmament Branch | International Security Division
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
P s22(1)(a)(ii) | M s22(1)(a)(ii)

s22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Monday, 10 February 2025 7:56 PM
To: s22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: Notes - ahead of tomorrow [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive]
Attachments: Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament - Summary.docx

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

s22(1)(a)(ii)

The Albanese
Government remains firmly committed to the Labor Party's National Platform position on the TPNW. This means we support the ambition of the TPNW of a world without nuclear weapons, but we also understand concerns with the treaty:

- the treaty's ability to achieve universal support
- the need to ensure effective verification and enforcement, and
- the extent to which it may undermine the NPT.

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Our decision to observe the
treaty's Meetings of States Parties and to change Australia's vote on the annual UN resolution on the TPNW from 'oppose' to 'abstain', demonstrate our serious and considered approach to the treaty.

s22(1)(a)(ii)

TPNW response

s22(1)(a)(ii)

s22(1)(a)(ii)

We share the ambition of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) of a world without nuclear weapons and are committed to engaging constructively to identify realistic pathways towards nuclear disarmament. The Albanese Government's decision to observe the first two Meetings of States Parties to the TPNW (2022 and 2023), its ongoing engagement with civil society, and its decision to change Australia's vote on the annual UNGA resolution on the TPNW from 'oppose' to 'abstain' demonstrate its considered approach to the Treaty.

We note concerns with the TPNW's universality, its interaction with the NPT and the need to ensure an effective verification and enforcement architecture. While Australia continues to monitor work to address these concerns, the Government remains focused on practical and constructive efforts to bolster the non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Senior Adviser

Office of Senator the Hon Penny Wong

Leader of the Government in the Senate

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Labor Senator for South Australia

E s22(1)(a)(ii) [@dfat.gov.au](mailto:dfat.gov.au) M s22(1)(a)(ii)

s22(1)(a)(ii)

From: DLO FM
Sent: Tuesday, 28 January 2025 2:16 PM
To: PDMS-Support
Cc: Lucienne Manton; s22(1)(a)(ii) ; s22(1)(a)(ii) ; s22(1)(a)(ii) ; s22(1)(a)(ii)
; Lloyd Brodrick; s22(1)(a)(ii); s22(1)(a)(ii)
Subject: FW: Kazakhstan - invitation from Deputy PM/Foreign Minister to FM Wong re participation at nuclear disarmament in UNNY, 3-7 March 2025 [EXTERNAL] 30-26/7 Aus [REDACTED]
Attachments: s22(1)(a)(ii).docx; Australia.pdf; 30-26-7 Aus.pdf

[REDACTED]

Hi PLE,

Please register for min reply

Kind regards,

s22(1)(a)(ii)

From: s22(1)(a)(ii)
Sent: Tuesday, 28 January 2025 1:44 PM
To: s22(1)(a)(ii)
Cc: Lucienne Manton ; DLO FM ; s22(1)(a)(ii) ; Lloyd Brodrick
Subject: RE: Kazakhstan - invitation from Deputy PM/Foreign Minister to FM Wong re participation at nuclear disarmament in UNNY, 3-7 March 2025 [EXTERNAL] 30-26/7 Aus [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Hi s22(1)(a)(ii)

Thanks for this. FYI, the FM is currently considering a minsub on 3MSP attendance (attached).

DLO s22(1)(a)(ii) – Assume you'll be entering this corro into PDMS? s47C

Regards
s22(1)(a)(ii)

Acting Director | Nuclear Policy Section (NPS)
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Branch
International Security Division
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
P s22(1)(a)(ii) | s22(1)(a)(ii)
dfat.gov.au | [X](#) | [Facebook](#) | [Instagram](#) | [LinkedIn](#)



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We acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of Country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to land, waters and community. We pay our respects to all First Nations peoples, their cultures and to their Elders, past, present and emerging.

From: s22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>

Sent: Tuesday, 28 January 2025 12:13 PM

To: s22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>; s22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>; s22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>; s22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>

Cc: Lucienne Manton <Lucienne.Manton@dfat.gov.au>; DLO FM s22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au>

Subject: FW: s33(a)(iii) and s33(b) to FM Wong re participation at nuclear disarmament in UNNY, 3-7 March 2025 [EXTERNAL] s33(a)(iii) and s33(b) [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Dear colleagues,

Please see attached s33(a)(iii) and s33(b) to FM Wong to participate as an observer in the Third Meeting (3MSP) of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), in New York on 3-7 March 2025, for your consideration and recommendation to FMO about Australia's representation at this event.

Kind regards,
s22(1)(a)(ii)

Senior Policy Officer | Mainland South and Central Asia Political Section (APS)
Mainland South and Central Asia Branch (ANB) | South and Central Asia Division (SXD)

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
M: s22(1)(a)(ii) **E:** s22(1)(a)(ii) @dfat.gov.au
s22(1)(a)(ii)

s33(a)(iii) and s 33(b)

s33(a)(iii) and s 33(b)

Ministerial Submission

FOR: Senator the Hon Penny Wong
INFO: The Hon Tim Watts MP

s22(1)(a)(ii)
Cleared by: Lloyd Brodrick
Date sent to MO: 16 January 2025
Action Requested By: 31 January 2025
Reason for Urgency: Not Applicable

Attendance at the 3rd Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

<p>Key Issues: The Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will take place in New York on 3-7 March 2025. The meeting provides an opportunity to track TPNW implementation and reinforce the Government's constructive engagement with the TPNW and its States Parties. Australia attended the 1st and 2nd meetings of States Parties as an observer, represented by Susan Templeman MP. We would recommend again attending as an observer, represented by a non-executive parliamentarian or by a working-level official from Australia's mission in New York. s33(a)(iii) s33(a)(iii) and s33(b) Civil society will press for Australia to attend and to sign the Treaty.</p>	
<p>Recommendation: That you:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) agree that Australia attend 3MSP as an observer;b) agree to nominate a non-executive parliamentarian to lead the delegation;c) agree a working-level official from the Australian mission in New York attend if a non-executive parliamentarian is not available; andd) agree a working-level official from the Australian mission in New York attend if caretaker provisions apply.	<p>Decision:</p> <p><u>Agreed / Not Agreed</u></p> <p><u>Agreed / Not Agreed</u></p> <p><u>Agreed / Not Agreed</u></p> <p><u>Agreed / Not Agreed</u></p>
<p>Domestic/Media Considerations: Domestic media (ABC, The Guardian) may cover Australia's attendance. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons is likely to cover the meeting extensively through its social media.</p> <p>Action:</p> <p>Penny Wong / /</p>	
<p>Information:</p> <p>Tim Watts / /</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Noted</p>	
<p>From: Lloyd Brodrick, ISG ISD NPB - Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Branch s22(1)(a)(ii)</p>	<p>Contact: s22(1)(a)(ii)</p>
<p>Can this proposal be funded from within your existing <u>divisional</u> allocation (departmental/aid)? Yes</p> <p>If the proposal high risk/high value (over \$100m) concept has been approved by the Development Program Committee? Not Applicable</p>	
<p>Consultation: CLO, DND, ILX, Geneva, UNNY, Australian Submarine Agency, Defence, Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet</p>	



Background:

The 3rd Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will take place in New York from 3 to 7 March 2025 with Kazakhstan serving as President. In line with previous iterations, 3MSP is expected to focus on treaty implementation issues, including progress on intersessional processes; security considerations; universalisation; verification; complementarity; victim assistance; and environmental remediation. Since 2MSP, membership has grown from 69 to 73 States Parties, including Indonesia in September 2024.

2. Consistent with our attendance as an observer to 1MSP and 2MSP, we propose that Australia again attend as an observer (s22(1)(a)(ii)) Attendance would allow us to continue to closely track TPNW developments and demonstrate the Government's ongoing constructive engagement with the Treaty.

3. We propose that you (Minister Wong) nominate a non-executive parliamentarian to lead the delegation, consistent with past practice. Should a non-executive parliamentarian be unavailable, we propose that a working-level (EL1/EL2) official from Australia's mission to the United Nations in New York attend. Consistent with the Government's current policy position and past practice, Australia would not deliver statements nor make interventions at the meeting. s47C

4. If the Government has entered a caretaker period, we recommend that a working-level official from Australia's mission to the United Nations attend.

5. Fifty-six of the TPNW's then 69 States Parties and 33 observer states attended 2MSP in 2023. s33(a)(iii)

s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

6. Our attendance at 3MSP should not be a surprise to key partners s33(a)(iii) and s33(b)

7. Our attendance at 3MSP would be complemented by ongoing engagement efforts in priority regional and multilateral disarmament forums, all of which will provide opportunities for articulating and advancing Australian priorities in non-proliferation and disarmament. This includes the high-level segment in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in February, our co-chairing of the ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in March, together with the Philippines and New Zealand, and the 3rd Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting in April.

8. All MSP attendees including observers must contribute to the meeting costs based on a UN scale for assessed contributions. s22(1)(a)(ii)

We expect costs for 3MSP to be similar s22(1)(a)(ii)

Nuclear Non-proliferation & Disarmament

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Has DFAT provided advice to the Government on signing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) or attending the next Meeting of States Parties (MSP)?

- DFAT is supporting Australia's engagement and keeping the Government informed on TPNW matters
 - DFAT engages regularly with governments, including our allies and partners, and civil society stakeholders.
- The decision to sign the TPNW or attend the MSP is one for Government.

Prepared By:

Name: **s22(1)(a)(ii)**
Branch: Nuclear Policy Section / ISD
Phone: **s22(1)(a)(ii)**
Consultation: LGD, Australian Submarine Agency, Defence, PM&C.

Cleared By:

Name: Craig MacLachlan
Position: Deputy Secretary
Phone: **s22(1)(a)(ii)**
Group: International Security, Legal and Consular Group

Background

The TPNW came into force on 22 January 2021. As of 31 January 2025, the TPNW had 73 States Parties with the most recent ratifications being Indonesia, the Solomon Islands and Sierra Leone on 24 September 2024. A further 21 states have signed but not ratified. By comparison, the NPT has 190 States Parties, including the P5 Nuclear Weapon States.

Australia observed the First and Second Meetings of States Parties to the TPNW [June 2022 and Nov-Dec 2023, Susan Templeman MP].

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Prepared By:

Name: **s22(1)(a)(ii)**
Branch: Nuclear Policy Section / ISD
Phone: **s22(1)(a)(ii)**
Consultation: LGD, Australian Submarine Agency, Defence, PM&C.

Cleared By:

Name: Craig Maclachlan
Position: Deputy Secretary
Phone **s22(1)(a)(ii)**
Group: International Security, Legal and Consular Group

Supporting information

Freedom of Information (FOI) Requests

s22(1)(a)(ii)

- On 4 September 2023, *The Guardian* sought access from DFAT to a joint letter from the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Minister to the Prime Minister about the TPNW. The document was exempt in full.

s22(1)(a)(ii)

Relevant Media Reporting

s22(1)(a)(ii)

- On 10 October 2024, Indonesia's Ambassador H. E. Dr. Siswo Pramono at an event at Australian Parliament House, said "I hope all countries, including Australia, will follow suit in becoming a Party to the [TPNW]. We need your leadership."
- On 24 September 2024, the Solomon Islands ratified the TPNW, citing in their [press release](#) that "to date, 10 Pacific Island States have signed and ratified, or acceded to the TPNW... while other such as Australia...have not yet acceded to the Treaty but have since expressed support for the TPNW."

Prepared By:

Name: **s22(1)(a)(ii)**

Branch: Nuclear Policy Section / ISD

Phone **s22(1)(a)(ii)**

Consultation: LGD, Australian Submarine Agency, Defence, PM&C.

Cleared By:

Name: Craig Maclachlan

Position: Deputy Secretary

Phone: **s22(1)(a)(ii)**

Group: International Security, Legal and Consular Group