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# **PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE CIVILIAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (CTAP)**

**October, 2012**

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Program (CTAP)**

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Lee R. Briggs  
Graeme Atkins  
Andrew Gilmour

## ACRONYMS

ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ATAP	Afghan Technical Assistance Program
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CHF	Community Housing Fund, a USAID-funded NGO
CTAP	Civilian Technical Assistance Program
DFID	(United Kingdom's) Department for International Development
DG	Director-General
EQUIP	Education Quality Improvement Program, a World Bank funded project
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
I-ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
IT	Information Technology (computing and telecommunication systems)
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
MEW	Ministry of Electricity and Water
MIS	Management Information Systems
MoCIT	Ministry of Communication and Information Technology
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoM	Ministry of Mines
MOSS	(United Nations) Minimal Operating Security Standards
MoTCA	Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MoUDA	Ministry of Urban Development Affairs
NAPWA	National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development- Development Assistance Committee
PIU	Project Implementation Unit or Program Implementation Unit
PMU	Project Management Unit or Program Management Unit
SoW	Scope of Work
SWOT	Strengths/Weaknesses/Opportunities/Threats Analysis
TA	Technical Advisor
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

## GLOSSARY

**Capacity Building:** The process of building the capability of individual staff members to be able to undertake their assigned roles/tasks.

**Capacity Development (as used by CTAP):** The process of building the capability of both individual staff members and their organizations to operate and deliver their mandated functions, services, products and other ‘outputs’.

**Counterparts:** The mid-level manager assigned to support, work and partner with the TA

**Institutional Strengthening:** The process of building the capability of an organization to operate and deliver its mandated functions, services, products and other ‘outputs’.

**Mentoring:** An approach to the capacity building of individual staff that emphasizes providing guidance and support to those staff so that they can learn how to better perform their function, thus ensuring their capacity increases. This approach is distinct from the practice of inserting technical advisors to directly perform functions that would ordinarily be performed by staff.

**Supervisor:** Senior manager from Afghan ministry or institution who requests/negotiates placement (Supervises the TA)

**Sustainability (Functional):** The likelihood that project **results** will continue over time, even after a project’s intervention activities have ended.

**Sustainability (Project):** The ability of the **organization** left behind by a project to continue to perform at an appropriate level over a long period of time, even after the financial, managerial, and technical assistance comes to an end.

**Sustainable Human and Institutional Capacity Development:** A USAID model of structured and integrated processes designed to identify root causes of performance gaps in host country partner institutions, address those gaps through a wide array of performance solutions in the context of all human performance factors, and enable cyclical processes of continuous performance improvement through the establishment of performance monitoring systems.

**Technical Advisor:** An external specialist in some aspect of organizational performance or organizational management, which may include specialization a technical area within an organization's institutional mandate, who is recruited and fielded inside a Ministry to provide advice and support and, in the CTAP model, GoIRA staff mentoring.

**NOTE:** For the purposes of this report, the evaluation team uses the term “Ministry/Ministries” to refer to GIRoA organizations of any type, whether formally constituted as a Ministry, Agency, Independent Directorate, or other form.

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## **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

To improve service delivery to its people, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) has adopted a two-part approach to developing the capacity of all ministries. The first part is to implement Public Administration Reform; the second is to provide specific capacity development services, such as provision of critical staff or coaching, through multilateral and bilateral programs.

While GIROA has made progress in providing services in many sectors, these programs are generally implemented by international and national contractors through the fielding of expatriate Technical Advisors, and tend not to use core government staff and systems. These programs are often delivered at a relatively higher cost and raise serious questions about financial and institutional sustainability. As the GIROA and donors move together to strengthen existing programs and develop new ones, it is essential to find ways to deliver programs at a lower cost, to increase focus on building national staff capacity, and to promote activities ensuring financial and institutional sustainability. One key approach for achieving these is to increase the extent to which national programs are delivered through core government staff, systems, and structures, and to use this approach as a vehicle for developing both the human and institutional capacity of government through the assistance of Technical Advisors focused on sustained capacity development rather than program execution.

The Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP) is a national capacity development program designed to strengthen staff capacity in key ministries and ultimately improve services provided to the public. It is currently supported by the U.S. government, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), German's Foreign Services Office and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). CTAP places Afghan expatriate and/or international Technical Advisors (TAs) into ministries to support capacity development initiatives formulated by the ministries themselves.

The CTAP process is unique compared with traditional donor-funded capacity building models that use Project Implementation Units/Program Management Units. CTAP that builds capacity within ministries by placing international TAs inside ministries to work closely with GIROA supervisors to build capacity among staff to generate reforms in policies, procedures, or organizational structures. Built on a ministry demand-driven approach, CTAP's prime difference from other capacity development programs is that Technical Advisors work directly *for* the ministries; they are directed and managed by, and report to, host ministries. CTAP aims to develop capacity *within* government, not just provide external assistance via human resources.

### **Evaluation Purpose**

With the current funding of CTAP expiring on December 31, 2012, USAID commissioned this evaluation to inform decisions regarding future funding and program development. The team evaluated the performance of the CTAP program during the period October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2012, and assessed the program's progress in building the capacity of GIROA's client institutions by examining activities in transparency, effectiveness, sustainability, and gender. The report that follows may also be used to inform the donor community and GIROA engaged in current and future capacity development activities.

### **Evaluation Methodology**

The evaluation approach included a multi-level mixed methods non-experimental research design utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methods. Simple snapshot and before-and-after analytical frameworks were employed. Data collection methods initially included: 1) qualitative analysis of reporting documents and internal CTAP records and reports, as well as a desk review of external documents from various sources (Appendix B); 2) small group interviews and key informant interviews were conducted with CTAP Secretariat staff, CTAP Technical Advisors, and CTAP Supervisors and Counterparts; 3) unstructured site observation occurred at the offices of the CTAP Secretariat; 4) and a mini-survey with all CTAP Technical advisors. The evaluation team visited the following eleven ministries, and spoke with 41 of the 63 currently serving TAs (65%). The mini-survey recorded results from 33 out of the 63 TAs (52% response).

<b>GIROA Institutions supported by CTAP included in evaluation:</b>
1. Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL)
2. Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MoCIT)
3. Ministry of Education (MoEd)
4. Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW)
5. Ministry of Finance (MoF)
6. Ministry of Mines (MoM)
7. Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)
8. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)
9. Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation (MoTCA)
10. Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MoUDA)
11. Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG);

## **Findings and Conclusions**

### ***Transparency***

CTAP advertises jobs in a few, free-to-use websites that attract a modest following of international development experts. This results in a limited pool of interested and qualified candidates to select from. On average, between five and ten candidates applied for each post.

The effectiveness of recruitment panels varies greatly according to the import that ministries place on the process. Usually, a Supervisor and two Counterparts compose the panel, with an observer from the CTAP Secretariat to ensure integrity and effectiveness of the process. There is evidence that CTAP Secretariat staff have been, in a few situations, exposed to intense political pressure around candidate selection. While this process is laid-out and documentation by CTAP is reasonably structured, objective, and transparent, the results still vary by ministry, and not all recruitment undertaken through CTAP is considered ideal. Although the present recruitment process is reasonably strong, CTAP is nonetheless somewhat vulnerable to charges of conducting or condoning unfair practices in final candidate selection. If the Secretariat adopts additional best practices, a uniformly effective, fair and transparent recruitment process is achievable.

Once a candidate is selected, CTAP demonstrates efficiency in the processing of offers, contracts, flights, and orientation. According to the mini-survey, 72 percent of TAs report that they were deployed within four months of hiring. The evaluation team found such delays normal - and unavoidable. CTAP is within the norms of recruitment to Afghanistan when compared to similar programs (such as the Afghan Technical Assistance Program which one evaluator worked with), as well as UNDP or other agencies who provide Technical Advisor placements.

CTAP recruitment processes meet generally accepted national standards for objectivity, transparency, and accountability under often difficult, challenging conditions. These practices are on par with the recruitment practices of other international agencies. The evaluation team could not find any glaring flaws in the structure or operation of the overall process to contradict this conclusion. The evaluation team does believe that CTAP is attracting insufficient quantities of higher quality candidates through a recruitment approach that is too limited. While the CTAP Secretariat has strong systems in place to find recruit well-qualified staff, a few changes to its process and practices could raise the caliber and number of people who apply, along with the transparency and objectivity of the selection system.

Of the 111 TAs recruited, twenty-two (20%) have resigned before their contracts concluded. No data was available to assess exactly why those TAs left the program, but morale issues associated with the lack of various logistical and security-related support may be significant. CTAP security precautions are minimal. Newly recruited TAs are given a one-time cultural briefing that includes the topic of security, but this is not delivered by a security professional.

TAs are provided a list of vetted guest houses, phone numbers of cleared local taxi companies, and a monthly security allowance. Beyond that, there is no further orientation or support.

CTAP also differs significantly from other similar programs in its cost-sensitive approach to maintain modest salaries and benefits. Generally, CTAP TAs earn less than staff who work for other programs. There are no resources devoted to the provision of basic equipment and other programming resources to TAs. While host ministries pledge to provide all necessary support, this is generally limited to the provision of office furniture and internet access. Ministries typically do not have funding dedicated to provide material support to TAs.

A great strength of CTAP staff is that half of the complement of TAs are Afghan-expatriates able to converse in Dari and Pashtun. For other TAs, their ability to be understood depends entirely on the English capacity of Counterparts and Supervisors. Generally, Counterparts are briefed, engaged, and are supportive of the TA. It is evident that the more a ministry invests itself into the CTAP model, the better selected and motivated the Counterpart is likely to be. By carefully and appropriately designating a Counterpart and Supervisor, the ministries provide an enabling environment in which the TA can thrive to best develop and support their Counterpart.

### ***Effectiveness***

The assessment of CTAP's effectiveness was examined through an analysis of whether or not the project performed as intended in the original program design and workplan. Although these performance measures do not capture the whole picture, they are an initial set of measures which help to produce a multi-dimensional picture of program performance. Up to September 2012, CTAP had expended US\$12.357m. Since 2009 approximately US\$44m was planned for CTAP, but not all funds were obligated and disbursed. In regard to TAs recruited and placed, CTAP has fielded 111, but twenty-one of these have been removed due to non-performance or a lack of suitability to ministry expectations.

Where reports of successful TA activity and outputs occurred, ministries had correctly identified both the needs and the skill sets that a TA needed to specifically address. In these higher performing ministries, senior managers involved in the identification of needs and establishing of Terms of Reference (TORs) for TAs correctly understood the CTAP approach and engaged their TA appropriately. Many of the TAs had the appropriate skill sets required to build the capacity of Counterparts to assess and address weaknesses in the offices in which they worked. Performance monitoring frameworks and processes developed by CTAP, primarily a work plan with specified targets, are objective and were effectively used to gauge and track progress. Individual interviews conducted with the supervisors of TAs, and with Director Generals (DGs) or other senior managers responsible for the offices where TAs have been placed, as well as through group interviews conducted with TAs and Counterparts, demonstrate that the majority of the TAs have produced important capacity development

results, although these have been at the micro-level. These are too low-level and disjointed to causally link to significant changes in ministry-level function.

### ***Sustainability***

Judgments about the likelihood of sustainable outputs or results are assumptions of a future state that is at best an educated guess. The ultimate success of CTAP will be many years in the making, due to the size of the task to contribute to government-wide capacity development.

There is strong commitment by both the CTAP Secretariat and individual TAs to ensure that the capacity built in Counterparts is sustainable. This is long-term capacity development, as envisaged in the CTAP mandate. The calibre of TA recruited has generally been of a kind that has included a strong motivation to go beyond expectations, and to make contributions of a kind which are highly desirable but often not realized in other capacity development programs.

The Secretariat recognised that one risk to sustainability is turnover within client ministry staff. Wherever possible, the Secretariat insists that each TA be 'paired' with more than one Counterpart. In many cases, the number of Counterparts per TA is greater than four, and in some cases, the TA is working with an entire department rather than individual Counterparts, thereby insulating against loss of individual staff that would result in a loss of overall capacity.

Overall, many of the ministries demonstrated strong ownership and commitment to the CTAP approach. All of the ministries visited exhibited an interest in CTAP, and several demonstrated during interviews (with Supervisors, Counterparts and TAs) that all parties clearly understood the philosophy behind CTAP, and the unique opportunity CTAP presents to the ministry. The conscientious performance of TAs with a focus on developing capacity is a key determinant in achieving sustainability. The Secretariat reports systematically monitoring TA activities, including cross-checking performance between TAs, Counterparts, and Supervisors, confirming shared understanding of work and achievements, and whether or not targets for the TA are realistic.

The CTAP model is robust, but needs some operational adjustment. CTAP and TAs demonstrate enthusiasm and have achieved momentum. The Secretariat senior staff and Technical Advisors demonstrate a strong work ethic and dynamism and this bodes well for any future manifestation of CTAP. In the experience of the evaluation team members, CTAP represents one of the most successful and progressive capacity development programs they have come across. This is despite the fact that only US\$12.5million (28.4%) of the total donor commitment has been utilized.

In aspects which CTAP can control, sustainability is very likely. The capacity gains provided by TAs appear largely sustainable, especially within the Counterparts with whom they have

worked directly. However, if these Counterparts move on to other positions and/or ministries that capacity will be lost to that ministry. There is a clear need to improve the working arrangements within some ministries, but overall achievements are notable and likely sustainable. The biggest risks to the long-term sustainability of CTAP accomplishments lie in areas under GIROA control, such as staffing, TA pay and conditions of service, and government commitment and resource provision.

### ***Lessons Learned***

1. CTAP's GIROA ministry demand-driven approach is key to its success.
2. CTAP mentoring of ministry Counterparts is critical.
3. Ownership of TAs by ministries is essential.
4. Knowledge and existing capacity of Counterparts and Supervisors is required.
5. TAs require human and institutional capacity development skills, not just technical competence.
6. Objective organizational analysis and facilitating participatory reform is required.

### **Recommendations**

CTAP is a valuable and effective capacity development program. It affords Afghan ministries the opportunity to articulate their own institutional needs, and find the right person to build staff capacity towards meeting these. CTAP has developed robust recruitment systems, procedures and policies to date. Results are adequate, though uneven, and program improvements are needed to raise consistency, transparency, and promote further success.

The evaluation team feels strongly that there is a unique opportunity for CTAP to take on a more ambitious approach to achieve more impressive, measureable, and sustainable gains. Should CTAP embrace a wider program vision, and undertake a more holistic and synergistic approach, the team believes that it can achieve greater impact. The CTAP Secretariat, if it can take the initiative to creatively reflect on its original purpose, and successfully expand its staff to focus current enthusiasm on growth and transformation, could evolve into a more successful whole-of-government initiative that can sustain more efficient and effective long-term capacity development than other similar TA programs.

Specific programmatic changes should also be considered in the following key areas:

#### ***1. Recruit and Place Senior-Level Staff into CTAP's Secretariat***

The CTAP Secretariat suffers from a lack of experienced senior-level management. A senior, expatriate (non-Afghan) manager should be recruited to serve as a Deputy Director. This would revitalize the human resources system by ensuring effectiveness and equality while shielding local staff from inappropriate external pressures. A Senior Capacity Development Manager should be engaged to guide best practices and create an expanded strategic vision.

## ***2. Expand and Diversify Secretariat Staff to Service Demand***

There is an insufficient number of CTAP staff to properly monitor and support TAs. The current system, while robust in terms of structures and systems, is currently conceptually limited in application. An internal labor study is recommended to determine the proper Secretariat staff complement.

## ***3. Reform Capacity Development Approach & Process of Engagement with Ministries***

CTAP should allocate more resources towards communicating its mission and initial approach engaging ministries. This would ensure clarity of the CTAP purpose, work requirements, as well as to assess both staff and institutional capacity in ministries to identify needs for development, and select appropriate Counterparts.

## ***4. Reform Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Engagement with Ministries***

The present M&E system, while robust, is primarily a system designed to support reporting. More effort should be made to identify and analyze weaknesses in TA engagement, examining process rather than solely performance, as well as identifying the causes of performance problems in developing appropriate solutions.

## ***5. Reform and Expand Recruitment***

CTAP should allocate resources towards advertising in higher-traffic, premium development websites, such as DevEx, DevNet, and DevHire. These sites require subscriptions and nominal fees to post advertisements, but the added benefit of a much larger pool of potential candidates more than justifies the original nominal expense. For specialized technical TA recruitment, industry-specific websites should be utilized.

## ***6. Improve Budget, Logistical, on-Boarding, and Security Support***

The present cost-minimizing approach of CTAP is notable, but constrains program effectiveness, and may serve as a deterrent to recruitment and retention. CTAP should commission a study to assess TA salary and benefits to help CTAP better meet standards commensurate with the valuable role that CTAP plays. A follow-up survey with TAs, including those who did not complete contracts, including a review of logistical and other support, should be conducted to address morale or retention issues identified. Overall, during the first few weeks of a TAs' placement, CTAP should devote more time and energy to ensure that the TA is properly briefed and oriented with the program, administration, logistics, and security arrangements.

## **Meta-Recommendations**

### ***Expand Mission and Vision***

CTAP's intent to deploy multi-skilled, multi-year teams, working in more creative and synergistic ways within and across ministries, would necessarily need to evolve to a fully-fledged capacity development resource which proactively manages its key resource – TAs – but also focuses more systematically on the actual locus of capacity developed: Counterparts and Supervisors. A thorough and complete re-examination of its approach, including modes of operation is recommended. This includes a more systematic process of program engagement with ministry staff; more systematic management of TA operation within ministries; and more active communication informing ministries of the benefits of its clear approach.

### ***Conduct Detailed Design Assessment for Next Phase***

In order for CTAP to improve, the donor community should commission a careful and thorough design assessment that identifies the general capacity needs of the GIRoA, and lays out more detailed programmatic focal areas and operational structures necessary for CTAP to fulfill its mission. CTAP has built a solid foundation upon which GIRoA and donors now have the opportunity to inform the key mechanism for capacity development of Afghanistan's civil service, its ministries, and ultimately enable the Afghan Government to more effectively lead and meet the needs of its people, while contributing to its overall development and future stability.



## II. INTRODUCTION

### 1. PROJECT INFORMATION

Program Title:	Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP)
Award Number:	306-09-CTAP-0001
Award Dates:	October 2009 – December 2012
Planned Funding:	USAID: US\$ 30,000,000 <sup>1</sup>
	DFID: US\$ 9,189,887
	AusAID: US\$ 2,120,800
	German Government: US\$ 2,100,000
	<u>Afghan Government: US\$ 500,000</u>
	TOTAL ESTIMATED COST US\$ 43,910,697
Implementing Partner:	Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance

### 2. BACKGROUND

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is using a two-part approach to capacity development. The first part is to implement Public Administration Reform in the ministries and agencies of the government. Public Administration Reform has not been as successful as hoped partly because it is under-resourced, and because in most cases it is not as high a priority as short-term programs. The second part of the approach is to provide specific capacity development services, such as provision of critical staff or coaching, through multilateral and bilateral programs. Few if any of the capacity development programs are of a large scale, and to achieve better results from capacity development in Afghanistan, the government has recognized that it is necessary to allocate more resources to the issue and give it a higher priority.

While the Government has made progress in providing services to the people of Afghanistan in many critical sectors, primarily through flagship programs such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP), the Basic Package of Health Services, and Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP), to name a few, these programs are generally implemented by international and national contractors through the fielding of expatriate Technical Advisors, and tend not to use core government programmatic and financial systems- nor do they focus on supporting

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<sup>1</sup> In the original grant agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Cash Transfer Assistance to support the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan, USAID agreed to provide to the Grantee an amount not to exceed \$30,000,000 subject to availability of funds. USAID obligated \$1,000,000 within this cash transfer agreement signed by the Minister of Finance and the USAID Mission Director on September 30, 2009.

national staff (*Tashkeel*, or professional civil service) to improve performance of their duties. These programs are delivered at a relatively high cost and raise serious questions about financial and institutional sustainability. Because such programs tend not to utilize the permanent staff of ministries, nor function through existing government systems and structures, these operational units of the Government, although temporarily supported by donors to improve their function, tend not to adequately develop capacity as a result. As the Government and the international community move together to strengthen existing national programs as well as coordinated new national programs in sectors and areas that have not yet been covered, it is essential to find more effective ways to deliver programs at a lower cost, to increase focus on building national staff capacity, and to promote financial and institutional sustainability. One approach for achieving this is to increase the extent to which national programs are delivered through the core staff, systems and structures of the government, and to use this approach as a vehicle for developing the human and institutional capacity of Government through the dedicated assistance of Technical Advisors focused on capacity development, rather than program execution using the approach CTAP explicitly seeks to deliver.

The Government of Afghanistan has launched an initiative called the “Cabinet Clusters” system. Under this initiative, various ministries have been organized into several clusters which will identify major gaps in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) implementation, and identify priorities for addressing these gaps. The method for addressing these priorities will often be through the scaling-up of existing programs or the development of new programs. The clusters will also identify opportunities to improve budget execution in government ministries and agencies. This reform will improve inter-governmental coordination and introduce greater focus on a more realistic and manageable number of priorities. However, there are currently major capacity constraints in much of the Government which affect the ability of ministries to execute any programmatic responses identified. If public agencies are to be asked to scale up existing programs, as well as develop new programs and increase budget execution they will need significant capacity development assistance. This capacity development assistance will be even more important if agencies are to use their permanent staff, systems and structures to a greater extent. There is therefore a need to increase and clarify focus on capacity development, and to strategically provide more resources for it. The Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP) articulates its mission as one designed to strengthen capacity development in Afghanistan by increasing resources and tightening focus on capacity development programs and activities, and by complementing existing capacity development initiatives and programs.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Description of CTAP project above is paraphrased from the CTAP Program Document; and referenced from the CTAP website: <http://www.ctapafghanistan.org/>

### 3. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP) is a national capacity development program designed to strengthen the capacity of staff and key ministries within the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, whereby assisting public agencies to deliver services to the public while supporting the Cabinet Clusters system and the ANDS. CTAP does this by placing Afghan expatriate and/or international technical advisors (TAs) into government ministries in order to support capacity development initiatives formulated by the ministries themselves.

CTAP, as a government-driven process, rather than donor-driven, is unique in the context of Afghanistan.<sup>3</sup> While sharing general capacity developing principles, it differentiates itself, in varying degrees, from comparable expatriate capacity development in the following ways:

- *CTAP takes a demand-driven, government-led approach.* The client ministries of CTAP follow a process by which they identify their own capacity development objectives based on analysis of their strategic priorities, and then request assistance from CTAP in order to address these priorities. They then form their own capacity development projects of which CTAP recruited TAs are a key part. The CTAP advisors report to, and are accountable to, the management and leadership of ministries into which they are placed.
- *CTAP advisors support their government clients in these activities rather than discharging staff functions themselves.* The advisors provided by CTAP work in government departments to implement capacity development activities, such as business process re-engineering, organizational restructuring, policy development, establishment of new functions, and skills transfer. The overall capacity development efforts that they support are subject to Monitoring & Evaluation by CTAP to track progress against established baselines.
- *CTAP advisors are placed directly in Government offices.* The advisors provided by CTAP work where the core, day-to-day business of government takes place, and as integrated team members of the offices where they work. Their primary focus is strengthening the permanent staff, systems, and structures of the government. They do not work as staff substitutes, but rather work with and through ‘counterparts’ at the Director-General level and below. They also live in the local community, a unique aspect of the CTAP approach that serves to further erode the perception of their being seen as outsiders.
- *CTAP has mobilized a large pool of resources to increase the likelihood that it will produce results.* The design of CTAP recognizes that capacity development is difficult and takes time and resources. CTAP provides both capacity development specialists (such as organizational

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<sup>3</sup> This ‘unique approach’ is discussed in greater detail under Project Theory of Change, below.

development specialists and training specialists) and subject matter experts (such as educationalists and agriculturalists, depending on the client). The advisors placed by CTAP are able to work in the client ministries for at least two years, a period of time long enough to support significant changes in capacity among counterparts and their offices.<sup>4</sup>

#### 4. PROJECT THEORY OF CHANGE

Capacity Development (sometimes alternatively referred to as capacity building or capacity-strengthening) is a term frequently used by development agencies, and activities described as such constitute a substantial investment on the part of donors, as either a stand-alone project focused exclusively on capacity development, or as capacity development activities as major sub-components of other types of projects across a variety of sectors. Given the fact that capacity development is an approach to development that is very wide-ranging it is perhaps unsurprising that there is no agreed upon, commonly used definition. When reviewing the literature, many actors have their own particular definitions and/or emphasize specific sub-elements of capacity development as a broader field.<sup>5</sup> UNDP defines capacity development as “the process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time.”<sup>6</sup>

According to the USAID-funded Capable Partners Program, capacity development is “strengthening the ability of an organization to manage itself and achieve its mission effectively.”<sup>7</sup> USAID partner PACT, who has produced a number of USAID-endorsed practice notes and handbooks for the design and execution of capacity development, defines it as the “process of developing and strengthening the skills, abilities, processes, and resources that organizations...need to survive, adapt, and thrive in the fast-changing world.”<sup>8</sup>

Provision of ‘technical assistance’ is another tool that is often used as component of the capacity building process. With an emphasis on people, not financial resources or institutional systems and processes, it aims to maximize the quality of service delivery or effectiveness of project implementation, and seeks to improve impact of the target institution or agency through the provision of essential human resources. In ideal practice, technical experts share their expertise and experience through formal or informal instruction, skills

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of the broader uses and diversity of meanings associated with the term ‘Capacity Development’, see “Capacity Development: Definitions, Issues and Implications for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation.” Universalia Occasional Paper No. 35, September 1999. By Charles Lusthaus, Marie-Hélène Adrien, Mark Perstinger.

<sup>6</sup> UNDP Capacity Building Note, 2008

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.dgpconnect.net/documents/592341/749044/USAID+Terms+and+Definitions>

<sup>8</sup> Quote taken from “Introduction to Organizational Capacity Development, Pact Organizational Development Toolkit” First Edition, January 2010 (page xi)

training, transmission of working knowledge and data, and provision of internal ‘consulting services’. However, by default, many projects which provide TA simply locate capable personnel in an institution and these personnel then carry out specific institutional tasks; i.e., they ‘augment’ capacity by filling gaps within institutional structures, rather than carefully and systematically working to develop capacity that will remain behind when they vacate their position.

In Afghanistan, most technical assistance is delivered through the mechanism of a Program Management Unit (PMU), and during the last decade, the PMU approach is the model that has been primarily used in support of Afghan governance.<sup>9</sup> This is not surprising given the urgent requirements for immediate improvement needed in institutional function and service delivery. It is assumed by the evaluation team that the effectiveness of this TA approach for improving governance has varied somewhat; it is not clear from available data exactly what improvements have occurred in recent years (or have *not* occurred), and what proportion of any of these changes might be attributable to PMU-style interventions. But through experience, the evaluation team can confidently assert that PMU effectiveness *as a mechanism for capacity development* remains very limited.

The PMU approach is in stark contrast to the CTAP approach. Through a PMU, international organizations lodge and directly manage technical advisors, reducing the support burden on the target agency while at the same time providing much needed staff capacity to perform the essential functions of that agency. For security and/or convenience, many TAs spread their workday between client ministries and their home PMU office; but almost none fully integrate themselves into the day-to-day function and organizational structures of their host agency. As a result of this level of integration, it is often difficult for TAs to be fully accepted into the day-to-day fabric of a ministry. This not only limits their effectiveness, but makes sustainable capacity development in their host institution difficult, if not impossible.

CTAP, on the other hand, inserts and deeply integrates its TAs into ministries. The CTAP model is structured so that TAs work for, are supervised and managed by, and report to their host ministries. This clarity of purpose and functional-process approach is mostly absent in the PMU model, where advisors fairly uniformly report to their PMU, working at- but not in- the host ministry. CTAP TAs work closely alongside ministry Counterparts, sharing day-to-day challenges, and of necessity developing an intimate, personal understanding of the operational context; this integration allows for internal assessment of weaknesses and needs as well as responsive activities designed to address these.

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<sup>9</sup> For a very interesting (if somewhat depressing and slightly out of date) discussion of this issue, see “Review of Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in Afghanistan, Discussion Paper for the Afghanistan Development Forum.” By Serge Michailof, World Bank, April 26, 2007. This paper identifies a number of key recommendations that it appears CTAP has, intentionally or unintentionally, integrated.

It is also evident that Counterparts and Supervisors tend to accept CTAP advisors more readily, and that cultural and institutional barriers observed decline that normally inhibit PMU effectiveness. This collaborative and integrated operational approach better enables the TA to communicate their knowledge to best, immediate effect, and to work closely with Counterparts and Supervisors to transmit technical expertise to local personnel who will remain behind- *with developed capacity*- after the TA leaves. A number of senior civil servants the evaluation team contacted during the course of the evaluation were critical of PMU approaches, noting that through a PMU TAs are less likely to invest themselves in the institutional mission and work closely with the civil service personnel involved in Afghan governance. TAs attached to PMUs are generally less responsive to the specific needs and concerns of counterpart managers. At least a half dozen Counterparts and Supervisors were clear in their specific, explicit endorsement of the CTAP approach.

CTAP aims to develop capacity of GIRoA line ministries through this ‘deep integration’ model not just to temporarily increase capacity through filling gaps and augmentation of ministry human resources. This capacity development is necessary due to an acute lack of governmental effectiveness that heavily constrains the successful delivery of public services and results in an inability to perform many of the essential functions of government. This weakened governance contributes to a general lack of confidence in government, a popular de-legitimization of the government, and contributes to political and social instability in Afghanistan that is seen to be one of the main drivers of conflict and an essential precondition for the appeal of the agenda of radical elements. If Afghanistan is to become a stable state, where radical and destabilizing political agendas cannot flourish, governance must be improved and become at least minimally effective.

CTAP addresses this problem through a programmatic approach that aims to develop long-term and sustainable capacity within ministries through targeted technical assistance. This is achieved by placing international technical advisors (TAs) inside ministries who then work closely, through GIRoA staff (*Tashkeel* Counterparts) working in these ministries, to build capacity among ministry staff as well as to generate reforms in policies, procedures, or organizational structures that aim to improve ministerial function. Coupled with a demand-driven approach, wherein ministries assess their own needs and identify priority areas for development and support, CTAP TAs work directly for the ministries themselves; rather than being seconded, CTAP TAs are not attached to and ultimately directed by a separate organization- they are directed and managed by, and report to, their host ministries. This is in contrast to the standard approach of posting foreign advisors (as is common in a PMU) where an advisor performs a management function directly rather than supporting ministry staff to improve performance of their function, and is ultimately reporting to the foreign donor organization that placed the advisor. CTAP aims, therefore, to ultimately develop capacity *within* the government, not just to provide externalized assistance to perform government functions. CTAP is intended to increase the sustained effective ability of the GIRoA to provide government services to the people of Afghanistan, to implement programs, and to execute its budget through mentoring and skills-transfer, rather than through human resource augmentation.

The results chain CTAP follows (also noted visually in the Findings section) begins with the ministry assessing their needs, and then submitting a request to CTAP for a TA. CTAP assists the ministry to develop a proposal for the package (which may include several TAs) and then works closely with the ministry to develop responsive Terms of Reference for the positions envisioned. CTAP then posts the advertisements and assists the ministry to produce a short list for each position; CTAP then supervises the interview process, ideally ensuring objective and transparent recruitment- but it is the ministry that makes the final decision, selecting the best candidate. Once identified, CTAP recruits the technical advisor, posts them in the ministry, and then provides the human resource administration and performance monitoring of the TA to ensure objectives are achieved. Once posted, in collaboration with a ministry Supervisor and ministry Counterparts who provide direction, the TAs review and possibly revise their ToR, and establish a work-plan with specific targets to be achieved during their tour- targets related to developing Counterpart capacity as well as revising policies, procedures, or organizational structures. It is this work-plan which provides the monitoring framework CTAP uses to track progress. Periodic monitoring visits are conducted by CTAP, and at the end of the TA's tour a final report is produced documenting the TA's experience.

When responding to the questions in the evaluation SOW related to effectiveness, it is this results chain that will be examined using a theory-based approach to determine if CTAP is effective.

### **III. EVALUATION PURPOSE**

This Performance Evaluation of CTAP aims to examine the effectiveness of the program in achieving its goal, objectives, outcomes, and expected results. The evaluation will assess the performance of the program in building the capacity of GIROA's client institutions. The evaluation also intends to examine the transparency of the recruitment processes of technical advisors. In addition, the evaluation will appraise the sustainability of the program in terms of delivering and maintaining technical assistance offered to the technical advisors' local counterparts. Areas of improvement in the operation of the CTAP secretariat will also be reviewed.

The findings of the evaluation combined with its recommendations will guide the process of re-design of CTAP. Prior to a possible two- or three-year extension of the program, USAID intends to review its approach to support capacity development of GIROA's ministries and institutions under CTAP. The design of a new approach will conclude in late 2012 to which the evaluation findings will significantly contribute. Subject to availability of funds for this purpose, and if such is justified based upon the assessment contained in this evaluation, the next phase of CTAP will be redesigned. The approach will also include a proposed shift from a non-project assistance mechanism to a traditional project.

USAID has not carried out any prior evaluation or technical assessment of CTAP. The UK Department for International Development (DFID), that co-funds CTAP through USAID, assessed CTAP in January 2012.

The purpose statement above is extracted from the original evaluation Scope of Work which is attached as an Appendix A to this document.

#### **IV. EVALUATION RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The questions as laid out in the original evaluation SOW were slightly re-organized by the evaluation team to ensure clarity and focus and to facilitate the research process. The original SOW had three general categories of research concern (transparency, effectiveness, and sustainability), with questions under each. The evaluation team added two additional categories, gender and lessons learned, and simply reorganized the questions already contained in the SOW. No additional questions have been added, and none have been removed.

##### **a. Transparency**

1. Given the standard human resource practices and CTAP human resources policies, how fair have been the recruitment processes of the international technical advisors?
2. Given the standard human resource practices and the CTAP human resources policies, how transparent have been the recruitment processes of the international technical advisors?
3. What are the indications, if any, that suggest otherwise?
4. What appear to be the flaws, if any, in the operation of the program such as areas where the CTAP secretariat's performance/capacity could be improved? Other areas include but are not limited to:
  - a. the length of time that it takes to recruit and deploy a technical advisor;
  - b. logistical support provided to the advisors (work space, internet access, etc.); and,
  - c. Availability of qualified local counterparts to mentor.
5. Have the recruited technical advisors been the best candidates from the pool of applicants?
6. Have they been well-qualified for their assignments?



**b. Effectiveness**

1. To what extent have the technical advisors developed the capacity of their host institutions?
2. Capacity developed refers here to the current situation of CTAP client agencies versus CTAP's baseline of the capacity of its individual client agencies.
3. What policies, procedures, and functional areas have been developed and created since the deployment of the advisors?
4. In what instances have the results been lower than requested by the client agency?

**c. Sustainability**

1. How successful have the technical advisors been in regard to mentoring i.e. building the capacity of their local counterparts to perform the job upon completion of the advisors' assignments?
2. What progress has been made due to this process of skill transfer?
3. Is the program moving forward to achieving sustainability of overall activities after the program ends?
4. When the contracts of the technical advisors end, will the advisors' local counterparts be able to perform the targeted functions?
5. Are the capacity gains developed through the CTAP advisors likely to be sustained beyond the life of the program?

**d. Gender**

1. Given the standard human resource practices and the CTAP human resources policies, how gender-responsive have been the recruitment processes of the international technical advisors?
2. How many women have been recruited as technical advisors?
3. What role have advisors played in exercising gender equality?

**e. Lessons Learned**

1. What lessons learned and best practices can be applied to improve the implementation of the program in the next phase?

## V. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The three expatriates that performed this evaluation arrived in-country on Monday, 31 September 2012 and departed Kabul on Thursday, 26 October 2012. The evaluation approach used for this evaluation is a multi-level mixed methods non-experimental research design utilizing both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Both simple snapshot and before-and-after analytical frameworks were employed.

Research questions as stated in the Scope of Work ranged from descriptive, to normative, to general cause-and-effect (the data available and time and resource constraints precluded a statistically rigorous experimental impact evaluation design), and the questions related to 'effectiveness' fall into this general cause-and-effect category.

The data collection methods included qualitative analysis of various reporting documents and internal CTAP records and reporting formats, as well as review of external documents from various sources; small group interviews and key informant interviews were conducted with CTAP Secretariat staff, CTAP Technical Advisors, and CTAP Ministry Supervisors and Counterparts; unstructured site observation at the offices of the CTAP Secretariat and direct observation of CTAP activities were performed (although a planned observation of a CTAP general meeting did not occur due to scheduling constraints); and a mini-survey was conducted with available CTAP Technical advisors. All of these research instruments are included as Appendix D to this document.

The before and after analysis relied upon recall as the primary technique for inferring changes from original conditions, with triangulation across multiple data sets used to verify change and attribute causation. This recall information was obtained through interviews and through the use of the mini-survey; further before and after analysis was performed through review of CTAP reporting documents. Additionally, a non-experimental theory-based analysis was conducted to determine if key cause-and-effect linkages in the Theory of Change could be validated through observed evidence.

Although CTAP conducts something they refer to as a 'baseline' at the beginning of each TAs placement, this baseline does not mean the same thing that an evaluator means when they use the term, i.e., an initial measure of some key performance or impact indicator to establish initial conditions for future comparison against a midline or end line measure of the same indicator, in order to definitively establish progress against that indicator. The baselines CTAP establishes are more correctly seen to be an assessment of ministry needs which the TA conducts, and then uses to inform the production of a work plan which aims to address those needs. For this reason, there is no corresponding end line record produced which can be compared against a baseline. The work plans that TAs produce constitute the framework for monitoring TA performance (and ultimate success), and each TA also produces an end-of-tour performance report, both of which could theoretically be analyzed to assess an end state of success. However, due to time and resource constraints, this systematic analysis of CTAP records and documents was not possible during this evaluation.

Research began with a qualitative analysis of various background documents provided to the evaluation team prior to arrival in country. These included the Program design document, a program review conducted by DFID, assorted periodic reports (quarterly and annual progress reports), and miscellaneous other documents. Additionally, the team collected numerous internal reporting documents, monitoring and reporting templates, and miscellaneous other internal CTAP records and documents after arrival in Afghanistan, and these were also reviewed and analyzed. In order to establish normative reference points and generally accepted objective standards for comparison, various external documents and reference sources (both peer-reviewed and gray literature) were also examined. All of these documents are listed in Appendix B at the end of this report, and have been provided to USAID in electronic format.

Key Informant Interviews and Group Interviews were conducted following standardized structured questionnaires, although the initial group interview with the CTAP Secretariat staff was unstructured. For the structured interviews conducted with Technical Advisors and ministry Supervisors and Counterparts, flexibility and adaptability in the implementation of the interviews was allowed to identify and pursue emergent themes in the discussion, and to expand the discussion with follow-on questions when areas of particular relevance and interest emerged in discussion. Themes that emerged in interviews were triangulated across all sources, across methods, and across researchers to ensure their validity, and to increase the reliability of the information provided and the strength of the analysis. Narrative transcripts from many but not all interviews were analyzed for content, with key themes identified and compared back against the organizing research questions.

As required in USAID's Evaluation Policy (January 2011), detailed interview transcripts have been archived with the SUPPORT-II project Contract Officer's Representative. Hard copies of all researcher notes have also been provided. The complete list of interview subjects is included as Appendix C to this document. Altogether, interviews were conducted with 11 ministries from a priority list provided by USAID. By order visited, these were the Ministry of Mines (MoM); Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL); Ministry of Public Health (MoPH); Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation (MoTCA), Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA); Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD); Ministry of Education (MoE); Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG); Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MoCIT); Ministry of Electricity and Water (MEW); and Ministry of Finance (MoF).

Team members conducted site observation at the CTAP Secretariat offices to assess systems for record-keeping and general office system organization. Although no specific written record of this site observation was produced, and the site observation was unstructured, some observations made are included in this report. Unstructured observation was planned to occur during a CTAP general meeting, but due to the late scheduling of this activity, this could not be conducted.

A mini-survey was developed using the well-known survey vehicle *Survey Monkey*. The survey was distributed to CTAP Technical Advisors via email. Mini-surveys are a well-established tool for rapidly collecting general trends data when the margin-of-error and confidence levels associated with a more statistically rigorous approach is seen to be too costly given time and resource constraints, or when this level of precision and accuracy is seen to be unnecessary- as was the case in this evaluation. Simple yes/no answers and general estimates were requested, and several perception questions were quantified using Likert scales. The survey was sent to all currently serving TAs; 33 of 63 responded (52.4% response rate). The questionnaire for this survey is included in Appendix D. The quantitative report generated by the *Survey Monkey* data is included as Appendix E.

## 1. LIMITATIONS

As one of the primary methods used for this evaluation was qualitative interviews, these are subject to a number of threats to validity, including recall bias and various other participant or researcher effects. These threats were mitigated primarily through data triangulation across sources and methods, but also through peer review, debriefing, and member checking. It is worth noting that all of our findings and recommendations were independently articulated and/or verified, often without any prompting by at least one but more often several sources contacted during this evaluation. These sources included TAs, Counterparts, or Supervisors; members of the CTAP Secretariat senior management group; and senior ministry managers.

The evaluators had limited time available to design and implement the survey. The survey was conducted with the entire population of Technical Advisors available in order to mitigate the threat of selection bias. The survey was electronically sent to all serving TAs but only 33 out of 63 responded. In general, surveys such as this often have low response rates, and there is no way to determine if there is any response bias among respondents (e.g. if those with high morale and a general self-perception of success were more likely to respond, or those who felt disgruntled by CTAP's management function). There may also be a low response rate simply due to TAs being busy, and choosing not to allocate the time. Again, it must be emphasized that the mini-survey is useful only for identifying very general patterns and trends.

The specific ministries visited were selected based upon a 'priority list' provided by USAID. The rationale for these priorities was not discussed, and there is a possibility that the reason behind selecting these may also be producing biased findings; for instance, if priority ministries receive a large amount of donor attention and assistance, they may be better suited to making good use of TAs, or if they are prioritized due to poor performance, they may have a unique interest in what TAs can provide. Due to further time and resource constraints, there was no way to identify such a possible weakness or to adequately address it.

## **VI. EVALUATION FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

### **1. TRANSPARENCY**

#### **a. Evaluation Questions**

1. Given the standard human resource practices and CTAP human resources policies, how fair have been the recruitment processes of the international technical advisors?
2. Given the standard human resource practices and the CTAP human resources policies, how transparent have been the recruitment processes of the international technical advisors?
3. What are the indications, if any, that suggest otherwise?
4. What appear to be the flaws, if any, in the operation of the program such as areas where the CTAP secretariat's performance/capacity could be improved? Other areas include but are not limited to:
  - a. The length of time that it takes to recruit and deploy a technical advisor;
  - b. Logistical support provided to the advisors (work space, internet access, etc.); and,
  - c. Availability of qualified local counterparts to mentor.
5. Have the recruited technical advisors been the best candidates from the pool of applicants?
6. Have they been well-qualified for their assignments?

#### **b. Findings and Conclusions**

Perhaps no other agency in Afghanistan is tasked to recruit such a varied group of professionals as CTAP provides, if only in terms of divergent areas of technical expertise. At present, there are 63 Technical Advisors placed in the ministries. In the two year life of the program, CTAP has fielded 111 TAs overall. Like other agencies operating in Afghanistan, CTAP finds recruitment challenging. Nevertheless, from a standing start, without benefit of institutional memory or practice, CTAP has been successful in crafting a system that translates ministry needs to people on the ground.

To better understand the recruitment process, the evaluation team conducted interviews with twelve ministries and agencies, speaking to Supervisors, Counterparts and 41 of 63 TAs (19 TAs from ministries the team did not visit were not interviewed, and three from visited ministries were unavailable on leave). The mini-survey recorded results from 33 out of 63 serving TAs (52.4% response rate). The evaluation team also conducted a document review of recruitment folders for five candidates; three of these were examined in depth. All of recruitment process steps were reviewed, including: the ministry's Request for Assistance

(RFA); the TOR; the job description; the recruitment advertisement; Long List/Short List; interview panel composition; interview notes/candidate selection memo; the job offer; the contract and, in some cases, any contract extension.

To begin the recruitment process, a ministry prepares a formal Request for Assistance (RFA). This document outlines the purpose of the placement, the expected results, and logistical support the ministry will provide. If accepted and budgeted by CTAP, the ministry next drafts the ToR, which CTAP converts into a job description and advertises on the web. Once resumes are received, CTAP prepares a long list of candidates, which the ministry culls into a short list. A recruitment panel is formed, composed of two or three members from the ministry with a CTAP observer, and this panel conducts interviews held on *Skype* or by phone. Key to this process is the CTAP Secretariat-drafted job description. Most job descriptions are acceptably clear and specific, though our team deemed a few either as vague or overly-ambitious. “The ToR they made for my position, to produce an MIS (Management Information System) from scratch, would require five people,” said one TA, “no one person could do this.” This is not surprising; ministries and CTAP are unlikely to have universal in-house understanding of all possible specialties sufficient to draft clear and concisely appropriate job descriptions, especially outside of their technical area of expertise (the point of TA placement is often, after all, to introduce new specialties and technical skills into a ministry).

While CTAP production of accurate job descriptions could probably be refined, of greater challenge to the Secretariat is the limited pool of applicants that apply for open positions. CTAP advertises jobs in just a few, free-to-use websites that attract a modest following of international development specialized experts (UN Jobs, ReliefWeb, and the CTAP webpage). This correspondingly results in a small pool of interested and qualified candidates. On average, between five and ten candidates apply for each post. To put this figure in perspective, an evaluation team member who ran a similar program in Kabul usually received ten times the applications that CTAP receives through use of premium advertisements in development and industry specialist websites and HR databases. This recruitment pool is too narrow if the process is to identify and select ideal, highly qualified candidates for any given position. At best, a small recruitment pool robs the panel of a competitive selection of quality candidates. At worst, it renders it easier for a biased recruitment panel to select a relatively under-qualified though favored candidate. Furthermore, it is likely that the best candidates, most of whom may follow certain wide-reaching international development HR websites, or specialized industry-specific websites, do not apply simply because they are unaware of CTAP opportunities.

Interviews, the next step of the recruitment process, present the best opportunity to find, or lose, the right candidate. The evaluation team found that the effectiveness of recruitment panels varies greatly likely according to the import that ministries place on the process. Usually, a Supervisor and two Counterparts compose the panel, with an observer from the CTAP Secretariat to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of the process- although there is evidence that CTAP Secretariat staff have been, in a few situations, exposed to intense

political pressure around candidate selection. It should be noted again that a vague or poorly written job description renders it difficult to find the best qualified person- and makes it easier for a potentially biased interview panel to choose a favored, though poorly-qualified, candidate. In thriving ministries, such as the Ministry of Public Health, this panel may also include technical specialists and sometimes CTAP TAs currently serving in that ministry. Pre-arranged questions are asked, and each applicant is scored on their answers separately by each interviewer. Once all applicants are interviewed, the panel selects the successful candidate and documents their selection decision.

This entire recruitment process is laid-out and documented by CTAP, and is reasonably structured, objective, and transparent, however the results vary ministry to ministry, and not all candidates that go through CTAP are ideal. For instance, in one recruitment panel, there was no variation between members in their scoring of candidates' answers. There are three possible reasons for this: 1.) The panel spontaneously scored each candidate exactly the same; 2.) Panel members assessed the answers to questions collectively, agreed what these scores would be, and then scored candidates; or, 3.) Panel members colluded to score one candidate over another. At the Ministry of Urban Development Affairs, an Afghan-expatriate TA was recruited even though he lacked an international degree or any significant foreign experience, putting in question his ability to impart cutting-edge practice and develop state-of-the-art capacity in Counterparts.

Several other reports emerged of TAs that were 'not the right person for the job' based on poor performance or a failure to skillfully integrate into the host ministry. On the other hand, the Ministry of Public Health's intense and principled engagement in the process to find the best people shows excellent results. As one example, MoPH successfully recruited an Afghan-British physician, a highly experienced lecturer and practitioner from Oxford University, who seems ideally suited to his role of developing hospital systems. The qualifications of most TAs fell somewhere between these extremes, of course, and it should be noted that most Counterparts and Supervisors expressed satisfaction at the qualifications of their TAs, with far more of them considered to be effective and appreciated by their ministry colleagues than those considered to have been unsuccessful.<sup>10</sup>

While the present recruitment panel process is reasonably strong, certain weak points render CTAP vulnerable to charges of conducting or condoning unfair practices in candidate selection. By vulnerable, the evaluation team means that it may produce an appearance of impropriety and, in certain situations there may be inordinate political interference from senior government officials seeking to hire a preferred candidate, as the system as it is currently structured is too weak to successfully deflect this pressure. Although there were a

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<sup>10</sup> Multiple examples of successful TAs are discussed in greater detail under the next section on CTAP effectiveness, below.

number of reports of unfair hiring and biased recruitment, these were vague rumors unsubstantiated with any hard evidence. Three TAs passed on these rumors but none could provide any substantive evidence and it was clear, when asking for specific, tangible details, that these were mere rumors and vague, unsupported allegations. The evaluation team believes they are not credible- although they are certainly alarming and they do have traction. There is some isolated evidence that a very small number of recruitments were not ideally impartial and objective (as discussed in the paragraph above and below), and there was acknowledgement by CTAP Secretariat staff and senior managers from the MoF that inappropriate pressure has been applied in a few, isolated situations. This problem, while serious, is not frequent enough to represent an overall pattern, and if the Secretariat adopts some best practices (such as those demonstrated by MoPH and as discussed above), a more effective, uniformly fair and transparent recruitment process is assured.

Once a candidate is selected, CTAP demonstrates a level of efficiency in the processing of job offers, contracts, flights, and orientation. According to the mini-survey, 72 percent of TAs report that they were deployed within four months of hire date. Thirty percent were fielded within two months. It took five to nine months for 27 percent of TAs to be fielded. Data collected during interviews corroborated this data collected in the mini-survey. From interview to Kabul arrival typically took between three and four months, although a few took a bit longer. In cases where it took longer, the recruitment panel may have had to re-advertise the post as they could not identify a qualified candidate or there may have been logistical issues related to obtaining a visa, etc. Also, candidates may require time to end their present commitment before taking on the CTAP post. The evaluation team finds such delays to be normal- and unavoidable. CTAP is within the norms of recruitment to Afghanistan, when compared to similar programs (such as the Afghan Technical Assistance Program which one of the evaluators worked on), as well as UNDP and other agencies which place Technical Advisors.

Where CTAP differs from other similar programs, such as the Canadian government's former Afghanistan Technical Assistance Program (ATAP), is its emphasis on a cost-sensitive approach to maintain modest salaries and benefits. Generally, CTAP TAs earn less than those in other programs (and the divide has widened even further for those who are now paying income tax). Since September 2011 and based on the recent MOF ruling, most TAs have been assessed a twenty percent income tax on their salary and benefits package. The recent tax ruling has caused considerable resentment among TAs; most TAs raised the issue during interviews, saying either it was not in their contract, or taxes were collected inconsistently or unfairly. Discussions with dozens of Technical Advisors suggest that taxation is being implemented arbitrarily, without sufficient discussion on the rationale and modality, and possibly unevenly, with some being taxed and some not based on the recent MOF ruling. Furthermore, there are some inconsistencies that raise questions about the legitimacy of this taxation overall. (See Fig. 1, below)



One TA interviewed goes further, asserting the belief that taxation is not yet an official policy and alleging a plan by Secretariat staff to skim or defraud TAs. We found no evidence of this and consider it unlikely because the Ministry of Finance, the Secretariat's parent agency, made the decision. Additionally, the MoF directly pays salaries and retains deductions at source - CTAP is not in the payment chain. It might be of interest to understand where the money goes and how the funds received are being administered by the MoF, but this issue is not the evaluation team's concern here.

**TA Pay Slip**

Item	Daily Rate	Qty	Amount
Days work	6,667	25	6,667
Days off W/E	-	5	-
Housing Allowances	1,500	25	1,500
Security Allowance	1,000	25	1,000
Transportation Allowance	300	25	300
Unpaid Time off	-	-	-
Health Care Allowances-Memo	-	25	-
Meal Allowances	130	25	130
Other taxables	-	-	-
Communication Allowances	50	25	50
Invoice Total:			9,647
TAX STATUS Exempt			Tax Withholdings: (1,929)
Health Care Deduction-Memo	Self	-	-
Other Reimbursements-Not Taxable	-	-	-
Net Payment:			7,718

**Indicates TA is tax exempt**                      **Deducts tax**

Figure 1: Detail from TA pay slip showing tax exempt status and withholding amount

The CTAP Secretariat generally views TA taxation as a challenge to recruitment and correctly believes it may reduce CTAP ability to attract quality candidates in a competitive marketplace. Indeed the evaluation team knows of no other instances of state-imposed taxation among other expatriate advisor programs, in Afghanistan or elsewhere. The original salary package provided to CTAP TAs was able to compete with the market rate for international advisors in Afghanistan, but this is no longer the case now that some TAs are being taxed under the current MOF ruling. Certainly morale among TAs has been affected, with many reporting they are thinking of leaving the program because of this issue. While the evaluation team suggests that USAID should review the issue of taxation, there is further concern that if continued without some form of offsetting compensation it will degrade the ability of CTAP to attract and retain top quality candidates.

The evaluation team notes that not all ministries have requested CTAP TAs; it would be informative to determine why some ministries have chosen to opt out. A downstream analysis of recruited Afghan-expatriate TAs does not show bias towards a particular group and the pool of acting TAs is reasonably diverse.

Of perhaps greater concern is the effect of external pressure and politically powerful actors seeking to influence recruitment. Secretariat members and the MoF Acting Director of CTAP Fardeen Sediqi (DG for Policy) all state that the program must occasionally counter intense pressure from some ministries to hire preferred, though often unqualified, candidates. Secretariat staff reported aggressive harassment and intimidation on some occasions, although this level of pressure occurs only in isolated situations and is not part of a general pattern. Reports of such interference are credible, and this is in fact a normal, even predictable situation. Unfortunately, due to the obvious risks and sensitivities, as well as time and budget constraints, the evaluation team did not attempt to determine just exactly how

extensive the problem is. The evaluation team believes that in this operational environment, project systems need to be particularly robust and politically strong to be able to withstand such external pressures. There is a clear need for senior-level oversight and political protection in order to insulate junior staff responsible for administering the recruitment process from this pressure, and to effectively re-direct this possible interference.

CTAP recruitment processes meet generally accepted standards for objectivity, transparency, and accountability under very difficult and challenging conditions. Based on the team's experience in Afghanistan, these practices are on par with the recruitment practices of other international agencies such as Afghan Technical Assistance Program (ATAP), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) the World Bank and Community Housing Fund (CHF). The evaluation team cannot find any glaring and obvious flaws in the structure or operation of the process that would contradict this conclusion. However, the evaluation team also believes that CTAP is attracting insufficient quantities of quality candidates through a recruitment approach that is too limited. While it is likely that a few unqualified candidates have slipped into a post, CTAP has put a determined effort to keep recruitment as fair and transparent as possible, and the evidence strongly suggests that CTAP makes a determined effort to keep the recruitment process fair. CTAP must yield to inappropriate pressure on occasion, based on the inadequate qualifications evident among a small number of the fielded Afghan-espatrian TAs. While inappropriate interference does compromise the process at times, it is not out of control. The CTAP Secretariat should be recognized for the strength of its systems so far, and its attempt to find and place well-qualified people, although with relatively small changes to the process and practice the program could raise the caliber and quantity of people that apply, along with the transparency and impartiality of the selection system.

The Program Management Unit (PMU) model of capacity building has been widely used in Afghanistan. Through it, technical advisors are recruited to mentor or support agencies, though they are usually under the control of their parent agency. They also frequently assume direct responsibility for line functions in a ministry: this is capacity *replacement* instead of capacity *development*. In contrast, CTAP TAs are directly integrated within host ministries; they are expected to work side-by-side with Afghan Counterparts, concentrating on the mission and agenda defined by the ministry through the Request For Assistance (RAF)/Terms of Reference (TORs) process, emphasizing a process of mentoring that results in skills transfer and staff development. As explained in more detail later in this report, CTAP's deep-integration model of capacity building can produce much stronger capacity development results than the PMU model. As TAs are deeply integrated within the client ministry and live on the local economy, their costs are much less than comparable PMU type programs that provide greater and substantially more expensive logistical and life support. Yet, there are indications that CTAP, in its approach to be as cost-effective as possible, may in fact need to upgrade their TA support, particularly when it comes to security.

The United Nations' approach to security, the Minimal Operating Security Standards (MOSS), is useful for reference on best security practice. MOSS serves to assess local threat,

and provides sufficient, if just-enough, resources and response to identified threat. Recognized as an effective modality to minimize and mitigate risk, aspects of the MOSS approach have been adopted or integrated into the security systems of many international agencies. A key aspect of MOSS is recognition of management responsibility for ensuring minimum effective security support is provided for personnel; a 'duty to protect'. Part of this process is the requirement for comprehensive, specialized technical review of potential threats. From this threat assessment, an extensive MOSS plan is developed which covers Communications, Security Information, Medical Support, Equipment, Transport, Facility or Office Security, Staff Training and standards for Residential Security. UN staff in Kabul are fully briefed on the security situation and instructed on how to react to and report security incidents; they are kept constantly updated on security situations by phone, text, email and other means; they live and work in fortified buildings; and they always move using UN vehicles.

In contrast, CTAP precautions are starkly minimal. Newly recruited TAs are given a cultural briefing that touches upon security, though this is not delivered by a security professional. TAs are provided a list of MOSS-compliant guest houses, the phone numbers of cleared local taxi companies, and a \$1000 monthly security allowance. While there formerly was security information and alerts delivered by CTAP, this system ceased once the staff member performing this function left the Secretariat. Beyond that, there is no other support. The CTAP Secretariat did not believe it is their responsibility to provide security for TAs. Their position is that it is up to the individual TAs to protect themselves. It also contends that the low-profile approach of TAs- using taxis instead of armored vehicles, integrating closely with Afghan colleagues- dramatically reduces the threat compared to expatriates using high-profile security. While the evaluation team suspects that some ministries may informally assist TAs with security, this is inconsistent and inadequate. "There is no way we can be expected to provide security for all the advisors," said one supervisor.

Most TAs reported that they feel unprotected, and because they do not receive real-time security alerts, they felt ill-informed. One TA said, "Not long ago I asked my taxi driver to take me to work. He told me there were protests on the route I normally take – I had no idea." Some TAs keep better informed than others through connections with friends in other agencies, while a few fortunate TAs are kept formally or informally advised by ministry counterparts. Most, however, remain ignorant of developing incidents (such as the 17 September protest in Kabul over a provocative anti-Islamic film). The evaluation team is especially concerned over the lack of effective security support for TAs. CTAP does not sufficiently recognize that expatriates are subject to acute threat in Afghanistan. Should a TA suffer injury or death, and CTAP is seen to be negligent in provision of basic services, the program's capacity to recruit and retain TAs will be significantly degraded. Further, the program– and possibly by extension donor agencies– may be liable for damages.

There are even less resources devoted to the provision of basic equipment and other programming resources to TAs. While host ministries, through the Request For Assistance, pledge to provide all necessary support to the TAs they host, this is generally limited to the

provision of a desk, chair, whiteboard and access to internet. Many TAs are not provided printer toner, paper, pens and notebooks, and other basic office supplies, and many end up equipping themselves at their own expense. Further, TAs are expected to buy their own computer and cell phone and to self-finance any workshop they wish to host. As far as the evaluation team can determine, ministries do not have funding dedicated to provide material support to TAs. Additionally, the procurement process in most ministries is so complex and inefficient that requiring TAs to access resources on their own is clearly not a cost-effective use of their time. Usually, any support provided wholly depends on the sympathetic engagement and foraging ability of the Counterpart and Supervisor.

<i>On a scale of 1 to 10, how well do you feel supported?</i>									
least				SUPPORT					best
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
3.2%	0.0%	9.7%	9.7%	19.4%	9.7%	25.8%	16.1%	0.0%	6.5%

**Figure 2: Findings from the Mini-survey**

While ministries, through the RFA agreement with CTAP, pledge to provide adequate resources, TA responses to the mini-survey suggest TAs are widely divided on the level of support they receive. Most TAs interviewed said a lack of administrative support and inadequate resources seriously degrades their effectiveness, and significantly limits the activities they can implement. “We can’t even ask for money for tea if we want to host a workshop,” said one TA at the MoPH. Another, from the Ministry of Mines, said that advisors from other programs that have a small operational budget are more seriously received by counterparts. “You’re judged on what you bring [the ministry], and we bring nothing.” The potential of a relatively expensive TA to build capacity is dramatically reduced by a lack of supportive resources. Workshops are not held for lack of tea money; training opportunities lost from lack of printer paper. This systemic lack of support is needlessly frustrating TAs. Providing basic equipment (e.g. computers) and inexpensive resources for TAs could improve their effectiveness and morale extensively relative to cost.

More important than the material resources a TA may bring to the ministry is their ability to communicate their experience, expertise, and ideas. A great strength of CTAP is that half the complement of TAs is Afghan-expatriates able to converse in Dari and in Pashtun with Counterparts. For other TAs, however, their ability to be understood depends entirely on the English language capacity of Counterparts and Supervisors. Fortunately, most ministries make an effort to pair an English speaking counterpart with a TA, enabling the TA to function. It’s a different situation for document translation, however, where non-Dari speaking TAs are mostly cut off from internal ministry documents that could be useful in

<i>On a scale from 1 through 10, how would you rate the engagement of your counterpart?</i>									
not engaged			COUNTERPART ENGAGEMENT				well engaged		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0.0%	3.2%	3.2%	6.5%	22.6%	19.4%	22.6%	3.2%	9.7%	9.7%

**Figure 3: Findings from the Mini-survey**

their work.

Generally, Counterparts have been acceptably briefed and engaged and are supportive of the TA. It is evident that the more a ministry invests into the CTAP approach and process, the better selected and motivated the Counterpart is likely to be. For instance, supervisors from the Ministries of Mines and the Ministry of Public Health placed great emphasis on the role and importance of the TA, and also clearly understood the ideal requirements for a Counterpart if successful capacity development is to be achieved. By carefully and appropriately designating a Counterpart, the ministries provided an environment in which the TA could thrive and best develop and support the Counterpart. By contrast, Supervisors at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock seem less engaged and clear in their understanding of the value of the TA, and Counterparts in turn demonstrated difficulty in conceptualizing and thus appreciating that CTAP TAs were in place to build capacity, not to fill line positions. With a less than enthusiastic reception from the ministry, TAs felt that their role and work was not sufficiently appreciated; one admitted he essentially went off his work plan to pursue areas of self-defined interest, not what was in the ToR.<sup>11</sup> In order to maximize the capacity development result that a CTAP TA can produce, it is essential that clear understanding of and supervision of the CTAP approach is required along with a certain degree of enthusiasm.

The evaluation team found that CTAP has established a reasonably robust, fair and transparent recruitment and placement system, though on occasion, the wrong person has been engaged. As the program primarily serves as a recruitment vehicle, CTAP should devote attention to tightening up recruitment practices, including internal recruitment, to minimize weak points, enhance effectiveness and raise the perception of equity and transparency. More importantly, CTAP could dramatically raise the caliber and choice of candidates by greatly widening its recruitment advertising reach.

The cost-sensitive approach currently taken by CTAP is likely degrading the potential impact of advisors. While ministries may pledge to provide support to TAs in their RFA, this is not consistently being delivered. Consequently, CTAP should take up the load to provide greater logistical, security and programming support to TAs as a reasonable expense to enhance their effectiveness. The evaluation team feels this would additionally result in improvements in advisor recruitment by making the overall incentive package more attractive and competitive. Finally, the imposition of taxes has eroded the salary and benefits packages below market rate for comparable programs. The take-home pay of TAs could be compensated in order to render CTAP placements more competitive than currently are.

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<sup>11</sup> The Terms of Reference and work plan are agreed between the host ministry and CTAP Secretariat. While there is flexibility in “going beyond” these agreements, CTAP Secretariat needs to be informed of these adjustments.

## **2. EFFECTIVENESS**

### **a. Evaluation Questions**

1. To what extent have the technical advisors developed the capacity of their host institutions? Capacity developed refers here to the current situation of CTAP client agencies versus CTAP's baseline of the capacity of its individual client agencies.
2. What policies, procedures, and functional areas have been developed and created since the deployment of the advisors?
3. In what instances have the results been lower than requested by the client agency?

### **b. Findings and Conclusions**


At the most basic level, the assessment of effectiveness can be examined through an analysis of whether or not the project performed as intended; did it meet basic targets for outputs and expenditures. Although outputs and burn-rates do not capture the whole picture, being the simplest measures of project performance rather than tracking actual results and changes in the development context, they are an initial set of measures which help to produce a multi-dimensional picture of program performance. If judged by this measure alone, CTAP is lacking.

Up to September 2012, CTAP has expended \$12.357 (from CTAP internal finance documents) or thus far has expended 28% of the planned funds. The Cash Transfer Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and USAID, signed September 30, 2009 obligated \$1,000,000. Contained in the same Agreement was an agreed total estimated USAID contribution amount of \$30,000,000 conditioned on the availability of funds. Thirty million dollars, however, was never sub-obligated. In regards to TAs recruited and placed, CTAP has fielded 111, but twenty-one of these have been removed- two were fired and nineteen were pressured to resign due to non-performance or a lack of suitability to ministry requirements and expectations (or about 19%). There were also a small number of reports received during interviews which described ineffective TAs who lacked the necessary skills to effectively build capacity, or who were unable to perform successfully in their positions for a variety of reasons that amount to interpersonal or intercultural skillfulness issues. Although these facts and figures are not flattering, in order to properly assess CTAP's effectiveness overall, they are not the only facts that bear consideration (and there are a number of contextual factors that probably significantly affect these situations described above).

As mentioned in the previous section under research methods, a non-experimental theory-based analysis was conducted to determine if key cause-and-effect linkages in the theory of change could be validated through observed evidence - one way of judging effectiveness.

A theory of change, also sometimes referred to as a development hypothesis, is a progression of results linked together through the logic of cause and effect. From the USAID ADS (200.8; p. 63): “A development hypothesis describes the theory of change, logic, and causal relationship between the building blocks needed to achieve a long-term result. The development hypothesis...explains why and how the proposed investments from USAID...lead to achieving the Development Objectives and ultimately the CDCS goal. It...explains the relationships between each layer of results...often through if-then statements that reference the evidence that supports the causal linkages.” By examining the evidence which supports the presence of each of these linkages in the chain of cause-and-effect, it is possible to make reliable inferences about whether or not the project has achieved a general level of success, although it is not possible using this technique to provide a quantitative measure of the extent of this success. When used in combination with other methods, this technique is useful to validate and further strengthen inferences arrived at through other methodological approaches.

Presented below is a visual representation of the CTAP Theory of Change (Figure 4), showing the progression of if-then results statements which together add up to produce the intended change and, in the case of CTAP, which lead to the development of capacity in each ministry.



**Figure 4: CTAP Theory of Change Diagram**

One of the key considerations when devising a Theory of Change is the requirement for certain assumptions to hold true if the final result is to be achieved. For example, in order for TAs to produce capacity development results, it is necessary that ministries correctly identify capacity weaknesses. Next, CTAP must recruit a TA with the required skill sets to address these weaknesses (in the CTAP model, many of these skills are not purely technical, such as

engineering skills, but relate instead to analytical, organizational, interpersonal, and capacity development skills). Once a TA is identified and recruited, ministries must then manage TAs appropriately to allow them to focus on these capacity weaknesses. Finally, ministries must appoint an appropriate counterpart who is willing and able to engage constructively with the TA. If any of these assumptions do not hold true, if there is any breakdown along this cause-and-effect chain of interlinked results, then the final result of developed capacity cannot be achieved.

Following the results chain represented graphically above, the team found evidence that ministries (where reports of successful TA activity and outputs occurred) had frequently correctly identified needs, and also correctly identified the skill sets that a TA needed to address these. It is clear that in these high-performing ministries, senior managers involved in the identification of needs and establishing ToRs for TAs correctly understood the CTAP approach and engaged their TA appropriately. It is also evident that many of the TAs had the appropriate skill sets required to build the capacity of Counterparts and the offices in which they worked and worked in concert with appropriate Counterparts to accomplish this. It is further evident that the monitoring frameworks and processes developed by CTAP, primarily a work plan with specified targets, were objective and were effectively used to gauge and track progress. From this analysis, it is clear that at each step in the theory of change there was strong evidence collected, through document reviews of CTAP internal documents, through interviews conducted with TAs, Counterparts, and Supervisors, and through responses provided by TAs to the mini-survey, that CTAP has successfully produced results at each of these stages.

Another model for codifying a theory of change, one more commonly used by USAID is a Results Framework. Results frameworks typically are hierarchical in nature with lower level results that are ‘necessary and sufficient’ feeding into higher level results (again, so long as all necessary assumptions hold true). Using this hierarchical model, ministries would identify needs and CTAP would recruit effective TAs who would then, through their activities, produce capacity development results among Counterparts and in their host ministry offices. This capacity development would then improve ministerial function, which would result in improved governance, which would ultimately result in improved public perceptions of the GIRA and increased political stability.

It is important to recognize two critical caveats when it comes to demonstrating effectiveness at the topmost levels in a results framework such as this one. First, the improvements in ministerial function, and governance, and then public perceptions and political stabilization are remote in terms of time-lag. Before these changes would become evident, several years and perhaps even a decade or two must pass- a project that has been in operation for less than two years is extremely unlikely to have made a measurable contribution to results at these levels.


Second, results at higher levels are more and more dependent upon external contextual conditions as one ascends the levels. The ability of project activities to directly influence



these results is thus tenuous and very weak, so that even if changes had occurred in these areas, linking them directly to CTAP and controlling for all other intervening variables is next to impossible. So, in order to analyze effectiveness, it is necessary to focus on lower levels and, based upon logical inference of cause and effect, infer contribution at these higher levels although this contribution cannot be directly verified through tangible, attributable evidence.

So, when focusing back down at the lowest levels of the results framework, it is clear, from individual interviews conducted with the supervisors of TAs, and with DGs or other senior managers responsible for the offices where TAs have been placed, as well as through group interviews conducted with TAs and Counterparts, that the majority of the TAs have produced important capacity development results among their Counterparts and/or in their offices. This finding is further strengthened through the results of the mini-survey (see Figure 5, below) with TAs reporting they have produced many specific outputs that support the overall capacity development result.

The open-ended responses to this question on the survey are also of interest here. TAs reported they had “developed the capacity/level of training specific to their Counterpart functional responsibilities,” and “job related technical skill and analytical capacity (Management Skills) has been improved;” “Organizational efficiency...improved;” “profitability increased 21% [over the] previous year due to improvement of control and reporting” and “improvement of day to day reporting and communication system.”




**Figure 5: TA Contributions to Improved Organizational Capacities.**

There is consistent evidence that when ministry managers understood the CTAP approach and validated it, through the appropriate management and direction of TAs to focus their efforts on mentoring, and review and improvement of business processes and revision of organizational structures and policies, multiple specific examples of these accomplishments were reported. It is also clear that where such understanding and focus was lacking among ministry managers, results reported were few or none. This strong linkage between managerial understanding and thus application of the CTAP model and evidence of

effectiveness can be more clearly visualized in the graphic below, which spatially locates ministries along two axes, one that tracks understanding and one that tracks results.

From the interviews conducted with TAs, Counterparts, Supervisors, and DGs, the examples of success are far too many to mention here (a list of these reported successes, all extracted from interview transcripts, is included in this report as Annex F). For this reason, a few particularly compelling examples of success are described below. Before describing these successes, however, it is important to describe the nature



**Figure 6: Graphic representation of the correlation between understanding and application of the CTAP approach and evidence of positive capacity development results** (This is an informal representation of this relationship for visualization purposes only; it is not based upon a rigorous quantitative scoring of either understanding or capacity development.)

of an anecdote and provide a basic definition, and discuss the limitations of extrapolating generalizable inferences from these. An anecdote is an isolated report of an event, usually one that is interesting or personal in nature, which cannot be independently verified and cannot *by itself* be viewed as representative of a more general principle or trend. When using qualitative interview techniques, which by their nature produce personal reports and subjective narratives, there is a danger that researchers may be misled by anecdotes (as defined above) if due care is not taken to ensure qualitative rigor. One of the primary techniques for ensuring rigor is triangulation across sources or methods in order to ensure that reports can be verified.

Additionally, multiple reports from a variety of interview subjects do not constitute ‘isolated’ anecdotes, but instead represent a broader pattern which it is safe to assume is reliable and thus reasonably accurate. Although each of the successes detailed below by itself is not representative of a trend, taken together- along with the multitude of similar reports provided from across levels, functional roles, and diverse interview subjects – a clear pattern of CTAP success emerges. It is worthwhile reiterating here that CTAP’s ‘edge’ is that it is providing TAs which ministries see as ‘theirs’, to work closely with assigned (and in many cases, unassigned) Counterparts and Supervisors, to develop the capacity in those Counterparts, so that Counterparts are able to undertake their roles more effectively into the future. Furthermore, these capacitated Counterparts can now assist and support, in the areas into which they are assigned, to develop or improve systems, procedures, processes and other aspects of what are best described as ‘administrative’ activities. While the TAs are not assigned to undertake ‘line’ roles, they act as catalysts for the change process, as trainers,

mentors, counselors, coaches, etc. to assist their ministry colleagues to become more effective civil servants, and the ministries themselves to be better-functioning organizations.

At the **Ministry of Mines (MoM)**, the CTAP TA possesses extensive experience working on hydrocarbons projects in another country within the region. He possesses broad-based experience in all relevant areas, with particular experience in producing leases and contracts with international companies for hydrocarbon extraction leases and sales. As Afghanistan has extensive, previously undeveloped natural gas and oil reserves, but no ministry personnel familiar with oil and natural gas extraction (including mining techniques and technology and the complex and varied economic issues associated with extraction, leasing, and sales), the Ministry of Mines has a fundamental lack of capacity to successfully manage this natural resource and engage with the various international corporations that seek access to it. Working closely with those responsible for hydrocarbons extraction and management at the ministry, using the capacity development approach CTAP emphasizes (primarily through mentoring), he helped concerned staff identify the issues that needed consideration, structure the tenders and review offers appropriately, and finalize the contracts.

The supervisor of this TA said, “The TA has good applicable field experience and technical skills as well as policy understanding. The CTAP TA is accessible and helpful.” The Counterparts called him “really an asset” and noted “without him, we would really be in trouble.” One also stated “We do not rely upon him to do the work of the ministry” and then described the process of mentoring (exactly as the team would envision it should correctly occur). As described, the TA first gives general guidance on what to do; from this, ministry staff produces an output; TA then provides comments and suggestions for improvement, working closely with counterparts throughout the process, to help them learn how to do it themselves. When asked if they felt they would be able to perform the function in future without TA assistance, the counterparts reportedly felt confident that they could.

**The Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD)** is mandated with ensuring that humanitarian assistance and social protection are provided to the war-affected and displaced population of Afghanistan and the economically and socially marginalized population in rural areas, as well as responding to natural disasters. In order to perform these functions, it is necessary that MRRD successfully engage with donor agencies and produce thorough, evidence-based, and highly detailed assessment reports, as well as high-quality proposals for donor assistance. The Director of the Social Protection Department reported a number of successes associated with two CTAP Technical Advisors embedded in his department. He reported they had provided assistance in developing the national social protection strategy through a consultative process, and provided invaluable assistance to the department in developing staff capacity which allowed successful engagement with UN agencies and led to successful participation from his staff in developing the Consolidated Humanitarian Action Plan for Afghanistan, a nation-wide foundational document which will organize and coordinate humanitarian assistance across numerous UN and NGO agencies through 2014. Additionally, these TAs performed a Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis with staff, and using the output of this reviewed and revised the

ToRs for each unit using “change management” tools as well as working closely with staff to develop standard operating procedures.

The TAs assisted the department to establish a Management Information System (although this is still under development and is not yet fully operational). They provide routine consultation and assistance to managers to identify and solve problems and have developed and delivered staff training on disaster management as well as how to conduct SWOT analyses themselves; they are currently seeking to mobilize further resources to provide additional staff development training. They have established a “change management working group” and have established a network of staff to participate on this group, and the process usually begins with issues being identified/raised by staff; TAs then provide guidance and advice to refine the thinking of MRRD staff, rather than TAs simply doing it all themselves. He felt that the capacity of MRRD staff to understand the process and requirements, and produce high-quality proposals to donors, had been greatly improved through the engagement of the TAs. He concluded the interview by saying he felt the CTAP approach was far better than other TAs and should be extended: “Two years is not enough to build capacity, as this is a long-term process.”

At the **Ministry of Education (MoE)**, CTAP Counterparts noted that TAs work to establish connections with donors and build staff capacity to understand this process. They have provided assistance in writing proposals, but more importantly have developed reporting templates for ministry staff. CTAP TAs also conducted an analysis that led to major staff restructuring. Based upon objective analysis, the TAs proposed a revised staffing structure based upon needs, explained and defended it to HR and got it approved. Prior to this assessment and restructuring, there had been only two staff and one manager working at the Infrastructure Services Department (ISD) responsible for management and monitoring of 1,500 ongoing projects; the office now has over 200 personnel to perform these functions and this new structure has reportedly resolved many previous issues.

Additionally, it was reported that the core function of the ministry (providing general education service delivery) has been improved through the production of various templates for improving educational quality and services. They noted TAs had designed and implemented a standard tool for “learning assessment” and then had lobbied for and obtained funds to implement this. They have also produced numerous teacher supervision tools and assessment instruments the ministry can use to identify weaknesses and track progress. They also facilitated the production of a policy for pre-school education and established systems for ongoing policy development, and the interviewees felt this policy development capacity had been successfully transferred to ministry staff. The supervisor of the TAs stated that “CTAP is the backbone of the ministry – as a result of this program we can now more successfully run all the projects and activities of the ministry... After thirty years of war, and given the many problems in the education sector, we need the support CTAP provides before we can stand on our own feet.” He noted that one of the great successes from the CTAP TA was developing systems and understanding how to collect data, and the TA produced a

survey design that has made it easier to identify needs especially as relates to construction and rehabilitation of school buildings.

The TA has also established quality assurance and quality control procedures and developed – with ministry staff – standard architectural design templates for school buildings, science laboratories, gymnasiums, dormitories, etc. They have also worked with staff to produce a two-year maintenance plan, and assisted the ministry to develop new units, with staffing for these, that specialize and perform specific functions. He then described in detail the next steps necessary to further improve capacity – also developed in consultation with TAs - listing: preparation of operations manuals; creating quality assurance and quality control checklists; developing MIS and IT systems; developing M&E systems and procedures; and strategic policy development and planning. He recognized the need for specialists to complete these tasks effectively, but felt that with the clarity he now had getting the right people to support these detailed institutional development processes would be possible.

All of the above successes are significant, but it is important to note that not every CTAP TA has been as successful. Many examples were given of TAs that had not performed as expected or where they were seen to be less than effective. Through discussion, the team identified a number of issues that affected this outcome. Many of these TAs were simply not the right candidate (although it should be noted this is difficult if not impossible to guard against and it is difficult to imagine how CTAP could eliminate this in future recruitments; frankly, this issue is a fact in any organization and often becomes evident only after the recruitment process is completed and candidates have taken up their duties). These poor performers, in some cases, did not possess the personal or cultural skills necessary to interact successfully with Afghan colleagues; or did not understand the constraints imposed by the organizational cultures and bureaucratic processes of Afghan institutions; or did not correctly understand the capacity development focus of CTAP; or they lacked the ancillary skill sets (in addition to their areas of technical expertise) that would make them successful in their capacity development roles. Additionally, a number of TAs, along with Supervisors and Counterparts, identified limited capacity and limited English language skills among Counterparts and Supervisors as barriers to successful utilization of the TAs to produce capacity building results.

It is clear that this digest of results reported above lacks a synergistic and unified quality, and also does not add up to a significant, macro-level result. CTAP has not noticeably improved ministerial performance and/or national governance (at least not yet); nor has it improved public perception and political stability in any way that can be objectively measured and verified. This is inarguably true- but frankly is unrealistic if this is what is expected. It must be recognized, however, that CTAP's demand driven approach is primarily the reason for this lack of cohesion and lack of operational focus at the macro-level. Ministries request TAs based upon narrow, very limited identification of needs within specific offices within the ministry- their focus on needs and the CTAP intervention to address these is at the micro-level. It is therefore necessary to analyze CTAP's results from within that contextual lens.

Given what the ministries seek to obtain from TAs, consistent reports were received that TAs have delivered these expected results, both development of individual *Tashkeel* staff and institutional development within offices. A larger theoretical question that may be worth considering is how CTAP can develop capacity of the GIROA writ large, although clearly, as currently conceived and implemented, it does not, and does not attempt to. This may be a conceptual weakness of the project approach, and likely far grander and broader capacity development could occur if the project broadened its vision substantially- a point discussed further in this report.

### **3. SUSTAINABILITY**

#### **a. Evaluation Questions**

1. How successful have the technical advisors been in regard to mentoring i.e. building the capacity of their local counterparts to perform the job upon completion of the advisors' assignments?
2. What progress has been made due to this process of skill transfer?
3. Is the program moving forward to achieving sustainability of overall activities after the program ends?
4. When the contracts of the technical advisors end, will the advisors' local counterparts be able to perform the targeted functions?
5. Are the capacity gains developed through the CTAP advisors likely to be sustained beyond the life of the program?

#### **b. Findings and Conclusions**

The Oxford Dictionary defines 'sustainable' as *able to be maintained at a certain rate or level*. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), in an October 2010 study<sup>12</sup>, indicates that the basic idea of project sustainability is that a project should produce a continuous flow of outputs, services, and outcomes for a long time over its program lifetime. The ADB's definition of sustainability for evaluating public sector projects also refers to human, institutional, financial, and natural resources necessary to sustainability and that any risks that need to be or can be managed are addressed. Other definitions refer almost exclusively to the continuation of benefits after development assistance has ended. Because sustainability necessarily includes project effects after implementation, some definitions refer to the *likelihood* that project results will continue over time even after activities have ended.

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<sup>12</sup> "Special Evaluation Study on Post-Completion Sustainability of Asian Development Bank-Assisted Projects", Independent Evaluation Department, Asian Development Bank Reference Number: SES:OTH 2010-46. October 2010.

Project results should be sustainable in this sense even where there are risks to outputs and outcomes; the notion of building resilience to risk is part of the reason for focusing on capacity development activities in project design in the first place, and is the rationale for attempting to identify mitigating measures.

These three inter-related aspects of sustainability- continuation of benefits, likelihood that project results will be maintained, and resilience to risk- are contained in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development- Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) definition of project sustainability.<sup>13</sup> It is important to recognize that project sustainability as used here refers to the sustainability of project effects rather than any particular project organization, which organizations often disappear at the end of project implementation. Donor expectations generally assume that recipient governments will ensure continuity of the project effects of development assistance, if not the projects' implementing unit. However, this aspect of sustainability depends primarily upon a continuing demand for what the project delivers.

Sustainability has a time dimension that suggests continuation beyond the end of the project. Sustainability exists in some future state that is at best an educated guess. The evaluator must make judgments about the likelihood of sustainable outputs; these judgments are assumptions based upon the experience of the evaluator, taking into account all relevant factors and information available at the time of making this judgment.

In order for sustainability to occur, the following conditions must be present:

- **Need / Demand:** There must be continuing need or demand from various stakeholders for the services, outputs, outcomes, and impacts associated with the project.
- **Resources:** The activities, if they are to continue into the future, must be adequately resourced.
- **Structures and Systems:** The operational units responsible for ensuring continued provision of services need to have adequate structures and systems in place.
- **Mandate and Commitment:** The organizations responsible for ensuring the continued provision of services need to have adequate legal and other authorities in place to empower continuation of the activities that produce the desired results.
- **Personnel:** The host organization requires adequate staffing with competent, committed and conscientious people who are dedicated to providing the results

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<sup>13</sup> "Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management." OECD-DAC, 2010

- **Institutional Elements:** Institutional strengthening, whereby the focus is on building the capability of the institution or organization rather than individual staff members, is also quite important to ensuring sustainability

This is in line with the OECD definition of capacity as being “... the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully. The definition is deliberately simple. It avoids any judgement on the objectives that people choose to pursue, or what should count as success in the management of their collective efforts.”<sup>14</sup>

USAID defines Human and Institutional Capacity Development (HICD) as:

*“A USAID model of structured and integrated processes designed to identify root causes of performance gaps in host country partner institutions, address those gaps through a wide array of performance solutions in the context of all human performance factors, and enable cyclical processes of continuous performance improvement through the establishment of performance monitoring systems.”<sup>15</sup>*

This definition strikes the team as unhelpful as it is a description of a process (i.e. the ‘How’) of capacity development, as opposed to a definition of the ‘What’ – that is to say, this definition describes what one is to do to develop capacity, and necessarily implies a ‘whole of environment’ or, at least, ‘whole of organization’ approach. Many capacity development interventions do not have the resources (including time) to undertake such an all-embracing approach, however desirable in principle such an approach may be.

GIRoA has recognized the need to increase the focus on capacity development, and to provide more resources for this in order to support the overall program of capacity development within the government as a whole and to complement specific capacity development programs that ministries are undertaking. The government recognizes that capacity development is required if ministries are to effectively execute programs and provide services to the people of Afghanistan in a way that will improve and continue over time. This is the rationale for the Civilian Technical Assistance Program, as outlined in the CTAP Program Document, published by the MoF in November 2010: a program designed to focus on building the capacity of government institutions through building capacity in permanent staff, as well as through organizational restructuring, and the reform of policies and business processes.

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<sup>14</sup> The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice, OECD, 2006, p. 12

<sup>15</sup> Human and Institutional Capacity Development Handbook: A USAID Model for Sustainable Performance Improvement, October 2010, p.7



While the original vision outlined in MoF's document is clear, what also is clear is that the ultimate success of CTAP will be many years in the making. This is due to the size of the task ahead to contribute to ministry-wide capacity development. The evaluation team is recommending (see Recommendations section, below) that the scale and scope of CTAP be enhanced to speed up the contribution that CTAP can make to ministry-wide development. Also, it should not be assumed that CTAP alone is sufficient to ensure that ministry-wide capacity is developed – in many, if not most, cases, ministries will require additional mechanisms to contribute to their development. This is to say that it is not an “either-or” approach that is required, but rather a “both” approach (or, more accurately, a multi-pronged approach), both on a ministry-by-ministry basis, depending upon the scale of the task to be undertaken in each ministry, as well as civil-service wide and whole-of-government.

In discussions with CTAP Secretariat staff, it is evident that there is a strong commitment, by both the Secretariat and individual TAs, to ensuring that the capacity built in Counterparts is sustainable. This is capacity development, as envisaged in the CTAP mandate. What has occurred, in addition to this, however, is that the calibre of TA recruited has generally been of a kind that has included a strong motivation to go ‘beyond the expected’ and to make contributions of a kind which the Evaluation Team considers to be highly desirable but is often not realised in typical capacity development programs. Many TAs interviewed spoke with a passion about the opportunities before them to effect improvements in their Counterparts, and through them, in their ministries. In the experience of the Evaluation Team, such zeal and commitment is not often seen in development aid programs. The Secretariat recognises that one of the risks to sustainability is the turnover of host ministry staff. Consequently, wherever possible, the Secretariat insists that each TA be ‘paired’ with more than one Counterpart. In many cases, the number of Counterparts per TA is greater than four, and in some cases, the TA is working with an entire department.

In regards to the necessary conditions for sustainability to occur, the evaluation team has identified the following as pre-conditions or ‘success factors’:

- **Need/Demand:** In the case of many of the ministries visited, the need for the results delivered is relatively self-evident, even if many of the direct customers or consumers of those results are not the general citizenry of Afghanistan - such as is the case, for example, with MoTCA. Typically, TAs' contributions are one of many that contribute to the successful achievement of a ministry's objectives.
- **Resources:** Provision of future resources for the continuation of the capacity development activities obviously will be a policy decision of GIRoA. To the extent that the government seeks to maintain basic core services, resources are likely to be available even if these continue to be indirect donor funds.
- **Structures/Systems:** One of the points continuously raised by Supervisors, Counterparts, and TAs was the reorganization of parts of their ministries, or even the

whole ministry (although these change processes will likely produce results only slowly, over time). Many TAs indicated that they had worked on procedural manuals, policy documents, internal systems, etc., mostly with active Counterpart engagement but sometimes primarily with a Supervisor. Less frequently, they performed this task alone primarily due to the relatively low capacity and motivation of some ministry staff. These results, together with the continued use of contracted Afghan National Consultants to assist with organizational change, indicate that many ministries recognise the need to adjust both structures and systems to the new and/or emerging set of circumstances.

- **Mandate and Commitment:** Putting in place adequate legal and other authorities to empower the continuation of activities that produce the desired results is clearly a matter for GIRoA at a macro level, while the commitment of *Tashkeel* and National Advisors to their respective roles in the continuation of CTAP activities is a ‘micro-level’ matter. The evaluation team met with many senior level staff including Deputy Ministers, Directors-General and Directors, and was impressed with the clear commitment demonstrated, which was further confirmed by Counterparts and TAs. Numerous reports of actions taken to ensure that the presence of TAs resulted in maximal benefit to the office reinforce this assessment. In several cases, senior staff was clearly acting as “CTAP Champions” within their ministries in order to get the greatest benefit and impact.
- **Personnel:** In discussions with Supervisors, Counterparts and TAs, in every single case the matter of civil servants funded through the *Tashkeel* emerged. There is a widely held view that *Tashkeel* staff is generally unmotivated, poorly educated and uninterested in working with TAs. Of course, there are exceptions, but the overwhelming view expressed was that, in general, *Tashkeel* staff is more often part of the problem than the solution. For these reasons, the Counterpart for a TA is often a contracted National Advisor rather than *Tashkeel* staff. This matter is a very real and significant threat to the sustainability of CTAP development of government systems in Afghanistan, whether supported by donor mechanisms or GIRoA resources.
- **Institutional Elements:** CTAP has primarily adopted the ‘traditional’ definition of Capacity Development (where the focus is on building the capability of individual staff members) but has also synergized this with institutional strengthening (where the focus is on building the capability of the institution or organization), and rolled it into the overall heading of CTAP Technical Assistance. This is in line with donors’ expectations of CTAP’s mandate. In many cases, a TA has more than one counterpart, in some cases having a whole (small) department of perhaps 12 people. As well as building the ability of these direct and indirect Counterparts, these TAs also work on integration of the multiple individuals’ development to enable a holistic approach to the activities of their organizational unit. By doing this, there is an enhanced probability that not only will individual staff be better able to perform, but

also the whole unit will perform better, if everyone has developed together and they are now integrated. If there have been improvements in structures and systems as well, there is a much better chance of sustainability.

Many of the ministries visited demonstrated strong ownership of and commitment to the CTAP approach. While all ministries visited exhibited an interest in CTAP (the team did not visit those ministries which did not currently have any CTAP Advisors), several demonstrated, during interviews with Supervisors, Counterparts and TAs, that all parties clearly understood both the philosophy behind CTAP and the unique capacity development opportunity presented to the ministry through posting of TAs. Of particular note were the Ministry of Mines, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, Ministry of Communication Information Technology, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, and the Ministry of Education. In these ministries, it is abundantly clear that all parties want to get as much leverage out of having the TAs' expertise available as is possible.

As an example, at MRRD, in the Monitoring and Quality Assurance Department, the Counterpart to one TA stated, "I have improved the ability to do my job in areas where I previously could not." He also reported that he is 'cascading' the knowledge gained down the chain to ensure increased ability- and sustainability- in the 60 people in his department. The TA in Mining Policy at the Ministry of Mines, with two formal Counterparts, is progressively building knowledge in a team of 35 staff- plus five students at Kabul University and five students at Kabul Polytechnic as that is where future mining professionals will come from.

One Counterpart at the MoF stated that, "CTAP TAs are actively engaged with their Counterparts, assisting them in enhancing their capacity. To what extent the TAs' expertise is used in the ministries ultimately rests on the capacity of the civil servants to understand how to make the maximum use of their TA. Prior to the arrival of my assigned TA, I conducted an analysis and needs assessment of my department to determine my strengths, weaknesses, and areas to invest capacity-building efforts. Upon arrival of my designated TA, a clear analysis of my department for capacity building needs was completed and presented to him, and this tremendously helped him in fully understanding the specific areas that needed his skills within the Directorate. It has been nearly two months since I received the TA and within this period of time he has been able to develop a good work plan and in addition to that has demonstrated a high level of discipline; he is punctual and hardworking."

There was very positive feedback that ministries had gained significant benefits from such activities. At the Ministry of Public Health, the TA conducted a needs assessment on site and then prepared an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the establishment of a post-graduate course in imaging within the medical faculty at University; developed a Diagnostic Policy for Health (the first time in Afghanistan); and instituted a Certification program for imported medical equipment. TAs assigned to the Monitoring and Quality Assurance Department at MRRD and working to improve measurement indicators have produced a

training workshop; a strategic plan; a gap analysis framework; an outcome-based approach; a quality assurance system; and have developed and distributed M&E guidelines to staff.

At MUDA, TAs supported the development of NPPs for the urban sector. TAs also developed the MIS/GIS system further, which is especially significant in that the rest of the Afghan government relies on MUDA's products/services in this regard.

One Counterpart at the Ministry of Mines observed, "We have been able to effectively utilize the TAs' knowledge and skills because our ultimate purpose is not to rely on or require their assistance in the future. We asked the TA to set up training on contract negotiation for us, and the training we received was useful; in this training we came across terms that were completely new for us. As a result of the training received, we now have the necessary skill to develop a lucrative contract." Another said, "One of the preferences for international TAs over our Afghan TAs is that our TAs have an isolated mind-frame and are not very open to apply new techniques and changes to their work, while international TAs come with broader ideas and experience and deliver work with higher quality and correspond to the new global standards."

At the Ministry of Education, the Supervisor reported, "One of the three TAs has been working with me for six months now; the second TA has considerable knowledge of basic and secondary education, and all three of them are familiar with the culture of the ministry as well as how it operates. They have played a key role in incorporating new education related ideas from other countries and this has been well received in Afghanistan."

A senior level Counterpart at MRRD stated that, "The process [of development of systems, procedures, etc.] is as important as the result." This is a key observation- through the process of developing systems undertaken by TAs Counterparts' abilities are enhanced, as well as resulting in an immediate institutional development output. A Supervisor at the Ministry of Education reported, "As rehabilitation and construction designs change in the market every year, we need to have TAs for an extended period of time to help us keep up to date. We have put in place Design, Manual Preparation, Quality Control, Management Information Systems, Monitoring & Evaluation, Maintenance, and Policy and Planning units within the ministry, and are looking forward to receive at least one TA for each of these units to enhance the capacity of its personnel. Preferably the TAs should be able to make field trips and visit the projects for quality control, and I intend to designate five Counterparts with each of these TAs so their knowledge is transferred well and sustains within the ministry." At Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MoCIT), TAs are not only providing technical assistance for a particular Counterpart but an entire Directorate is benefiting from their knowledge and skills.

It must be acknowledged, however, that due to lack of the necessary skills for receiving capacity building in civil servants of some ministries, TAs have not always been successful in their skills transfer objectives. From the Ministry of Electricity and Water (MoEW), the Director General noted, "CTAP has been an efficient capacity building program for the

ministry while, like any other program, it has its challenges as well. The level of capacity in middle and lower management personnel of this ministry still remains low.” One TA at the Ministry of Mines observed, “Having only one Counterpart is risky.” The evaluation team concurs and recognizes that building the capacity of several or many Counterparts is very important for ensuring sustainability. One TA at Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) observed that, “Frequent changes of mandates and leadership within organisations leads to difficulties in consolidating capacity development.”

To summarize, the Secretariat has put in place a system that is designed to identify, recruit and place TAs. There is also a robust system of monitoring in place to maintain oversight of the TAs and ensure that they achieve the objectives laid out in their ToRs and work plans. The Secretariat has also demonstrated flexibility in allowing modification to ToRs to meet new situations, for example when the original circumstances which led to the development of a ToR were found to have altered. This can be due to changed ministry functions, organization and/or processes, and/or refinement of need as identified by the ministry.

In addition, the innovative combination of engaged Supervisors, Counterparts and TAs has produced outputs and outcomes that represent sustainable capacity building on a scale and of a kind which is quite unusual and rarely found. Contrary to usual practice, many TAs have gone beyond the typically narrow boundaries of capacity development to take a strategic view of, and pursue a holistic approach to, what is both necessary and possible, to build real capacity that the evaluation team considers very likely to be long-lived.

Generally, based on the evidence collected during interviews with key ministry Supervisors and Counterparts, TAs have been successful in building the capacity of Counterparts. This has primarily depended upon the skillful supervision and expertise of the TA combined with the skill level and motivation of the Counterpart. Many of the Supervisors interviewed informed the evaluation team that CTAP TAs are used as catalysts to spark review of existing systems, procedures and structures, and to lead the process of change. Based on numerous examples provided during interviews the evaluation team is extremely confident that this is indeed the case. Often, Counterparts were able to contribute actively to leading such change processes, but sometimes, due to their lower levels of knowledge and experience, they had to focus more on learning and developing basic understanding of how to manage the process rather than leading. Nonetheless, many Counterparts are likely to be able to continue to perform the targeted functions once the TAs have completed their assignments.

Given that there is a considerable development task to be undertaken, however, the evaluation team expects that many more TAs will need to be appointed to fill in the ‘gaps’ between what previous/existing TAs have developed and those vast areas of organizational deficit which have not yet benefitted from CTAP input. Due to GIRoA’s organizational restructuring and other changes that might occur, it is possible that some Counterparts may move to other roles, or even other ministries; the stability of maintaining Counterparts in existing positions is an important element of sustainability at the micro level.

The program is achieving sustainability in many ministries in the areas in which it is working, in the opinion of the evaluation team. TAs have in many cases been building the capacity of whole departments rather than focusing solely on individual Counterparts, thereby partly insulating against the loss of one or more individual staff resulting in a loss of overall capacity and reducing the momentum for change. The capacity gains provided by the TAs appear to be largely sustainable, especially within the Counterparts with whom they have worked directly. However, if these Counterparts move into other roles, or leave the ministry, that capacity will be lost to that ministry. A more macro level view should recognize that when developed Counterparts move to other ministries, the capacity built still remains within GIRoA so that there is no net loss to the overall government system. Even if those Counterparts leave the civil service, so long as they remain in Afghanistan there will still be overall benefits to the economy as a whole because of the CTAP intervention.

In the evaluation team's overall view, the CTAP approach is robust but it needs some operational adjustment (as discussed further in the Recommendations section below). In regards to the achievements of CTAP during the period of review, the evaluation team highlights the enthusiasm and momentum created by the Secretariat team and many of the TAs. The Secretariat senior staff and their Technical Advisors generally demonstrate a strong work ethic, and such dynamism exhibited during the many interactions with Secretariat staff bodes well for any future manifestation of CTAP. In the experience of the evaluation team members, all of whom have combined capacity development experience over 30 years, CTAP represents one of the more successful and progressive capacity development programs they have come across.

In regards to both aspects of sustainability mentioned in the discussion above, the evaluation team can confidently report that, based on the evidence it has collected, and in regard to the aspects which CTAP can control, sustainability is likely. While there is still a clear need to improve the working arrangements within some ministries, overall program achievements to date are notable and likely sustainable. This is particularly noteworthy given the many challenges faced in Afghanistan which can make institutional change an especially difficult task. The greatest risks to the long-term sustainability of CTAP accomplishments lie in areas under GIRoA control, such as *Tashkeel* staffing, TA pay and conditions of service, and Afghan government commitment and resources.

## **4. GENDER**

### **a. Evaluation Questions**

1. Given the standard human resource practices and the CTAP human resources policies, how gender-responsive have been the recruitment processes of the international technical advisors?
2. How many women have been recruited as technical advisors?
3. What role have advisors played in exercising gender equality?

## **b. Findings and Conclusions**

Of the 111 technical advisors recruited through CTAP, 18 (16%) have been female. This figure includes female TAs no longer with the program, either because they resigned, were removed, or have concluded their tours. Although this demographic split is below international norms and is far less than a full equality of access distribution would produce, given the prevailing norms in Afghanistan, it is not insignificant. Furthermore, there may be selection factors that are beyond CTAP's control which considerably narrow the pool of female candidates before any recruitment or selection occurs. For example, any qualified female candidates may be far less likely to apply for CTAP positions because of an assumed hostile environment in the country towards women, as well as a lower comfort level with safety and security-related risks.

Of currently serving TAs, 7 out of 63 are female (11%); of those who are no longer serving, 11 out of 48 (23%) are female. This last figure might represent an area of concern for follow-up through further interviews or a gender analysis, but the team currently has no data to confirm this one way or another.

CTAP currently has an Equal Employment Opportunity policy and anti-harassment policy and procedures in place for reporting harassment-related concerns and incidents. These are in alignment with standard human resource policies and practices, and there is no evidence to suggest there is a failure to adhere to these. The CTAP webpage clearly states that CTAP is an EEO employer, and each position is open to women (where qualifications are listed, there is a field for gender, and each position says 'any', which it is assumed means there is no sex preference). It appears that the recruitment process is objective and not gender-biased, rather emphasizing qualifications, experience, and interview performance. Women who apply can compete transparently, and are not treated with a lower standard than male applicants as far as the team can ascertain. In terms of internal human resource processes and procedures, CTAP appears to be in alignment with international standards when it comes to gender equity.

In terms of gender-related program objectives, however, gender objectives for TAs may be incongruous with the CTAP operational approach as this relies upon demand-driven priorities identified by ministries, with TORs for these positions being developed by the ministries themselves. In the absence of interest within a ministry for any specific gender advisor, or identifying specific gender-related tasks they would like a TA to perform, it is difficult to see how CTAP can pursue any specified gender activities.

In discussions with TAs, their understanding of their role in gender varies depending primarily upon personal interest and commitment. One male TA reported that his gender-related activities were simply showing professional respect to female staff, while a female TA took a more gender mainstreaming approach by insisting that female staff be integrated into ministry systems and decision-making processes. The results of the mini-survey also confirm

this assessment: 24 out of 31 (77%) respondents reported they had had no duties associated with gender issues. Of the remaining 23% who had performed gender related functions, all of these appear to be ad-hoc and a result of TAs identifying opportunities as they emerge. One respondent stated, “Though [gender] is not specifically mentioned in my TOR, I still consider it is my responsibility... to mainstream gender...” Quite a few other examples of ad-hoc engagement were also provided, including providing information on gender policies, development of an organizational strategy which describes gender as a cross-cutting issue, seeking to ensure gender-balanced recruitment, developing operational indicators for the ministry that were gender-sensitive, inclusion of gender considerations into National Priority Program (NPP) documents, ensuring stronger participation of women in planning, decision-making and service delivery, as well as focusing on targeting female beneficiaries. One respondent also said, “I make it a point upon thoughtful observation to speak out and or support women whenever I can. I try to mentor all female staff possible regarding personal, career, or academic issues.” Another stated, “I tried to encourage female professionals of [the ministry] to get better engaged and make more contributions in planning, policy making and project preparation.”

In the first year of implementation, CTAP had taken no specific steps towards identified gender objectives except for the very general and high-level strategic objectives outlined in the Program Document (discussed further in the next paragraph). In the second year of implementation a female advisor joined the CTAP Secretariat as a Capacity Development Advisor, and she has taken the initiative to pursue some very general gender-related activities. For example, she has initiated the practice of CTAP sex-disaggregating M&E data on counterparts (with mixed success), and has also initiated the practice of orienting TAs to the inherent gender inequities in Afghanistan, as well as the ANDS and National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan (NAPWA) gender objectives, through briefings and providing pre-fielding materials. Upon arrival and during the course of their assignments, this TA, posted in the Secretariat, also discusses with other TAs in ministries approaches to increase gender equity such as gender-sensitive activity design and production of informational or other gender-related materials. This TA also collects and disseminates gender-related success stories which focus on the capacity development activities of TAs who through working with female Counterparts have assisted others to excel in performance.

Under section 3.4- Gender, the CTAP Program Document states:

*“CTAP aims to assist the government in:*

*Making significant progress towards the gender-specific targets in the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals;*

*Achieving the 13 gender-specific benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact/I-ANDS, including the five-year priorities of National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA);*

*Realizing the gender commitments that are mainstreamed in each of the ANDS sectors;*



*Developing basic institutional capacities of ministries and government agencies on gender mainstreaming;*

*This will be achieved primarily by supporting capacity development programs in ministries and agencies with significant responsibilities for achieving these gender targets. Furthermore, to ensure proper focus on gender CTAP will ensure that gender is mainstreamed into its M&E system, as required by ANDS.”(p.13)*

According to a report produced by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan (NAPWA) goals – such as those contained in the CTAP Program Document – suffer from a lack of political commitment and establish objectives and benchmarks which are “vague, highly ambitious, and as such largely unachievable.” Relative to gender mainstreaming, the report goes on to say that, “expectations of the I-ANDS and NAPWA regarding the implementation of gender mainstreaming are highly ambitious, if not unrealistic.”<sup>16</sup>

Although the CTAP Program Document states gender objectives in a general and high-level sense, there are no measurable specified targets or indicators, thus making measurement of progress and accountability impossible. Furthermore, the project document provides no specific guidance as to mechanisms, approaches, or the extent to which CTAP should effectively assist the government with gender-related objectives, nor does it establish specific objectives or operational approaches for how TAs might do so.

From the team’s perspective, an additional question is worthy of consideration in this evaluation report. Specifically, *did the gender objectives stated in the project document follow USAID policy for harmonization with ANDS and USAID’s Gender policy?* As stated in the USAID Gender Equity and Female Empowerment Policy 2012, USAID must “*Hold implementing partners responsible for integrating gender into programming, developing indicators that measure specific gender equality goals for each activity, and consistently reporting to USAID on results related to gender equality and female empowerment.*”(p. 15) Although CTAP, through the initiative of various TAs, has met this standard to a degree, implementing a modern recruitment system and internal human resources policies and practices of women’s equality, and collecting basic sex-disaggregated data, as well as contributing to gender mainstreaming in ministries in an ad-hoc fashion, USAID has not held CTAP accountable in adequately integrating gender into its programmatic approach, nor in setting specific targets and reporting against these.

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<sup>16</sup> A. Wordsworth, “Moving to the Mainstream,” p. 9, 2008. AREU.

## 5. LESSONS LEARNED

### a. Evaluation Question

1. What lessons learned and best practices can be applied to improve the implementation of the program in the next phase?

### b. Findings and Conclusions

#### **CTAPs demand driven approach is a key to success**

The ministry demand-driven approach taken by CTAP is essential, and is in conformity to the best practices identified consistently in the noted literature associated with capacity development. It is only when ministries identify their own capacity development needs, and the skill-sets necessary to address these, that they will make sufficient use of TAs, as well as appreciate and fully implement the capacity development outputs TA produce. Maintaining this element of CTAP philosophy and approach should be maintained.

#### **CTAP mentoring of ministry Counterparts method is critical**

The innovative mentor-based operational approach CTAP takes is surprisingly unique, and much of the effectiveness the evaluation team has noted is directly due to this approach. Working closely with and through Counterparts is considered the best way to ensure that capacity is developed in ministry staff and to assure that these skills and capacities remain behind after the TA leaves. Developing related support tools and processes to make TA engagement with Counterparts even more effective will further enhance CTAP success.

#### **Ownership of TAs by ministries is essential**

Embedding CTAP TAs in a ministry is a key part of CTAP's overall success. The ownership Supervisors and Counterparts feel over the assistance provided by CTAP Advisors ensures that whatever capacity development outputs are produced by the TA, these are valued and thus far more likely to be taken up and sincerely implemented. Additionally, the fact that CTAP TAs live on the local economy and are not supported through the logistical and security-related structures more common to TAs fielded by other organizations means they do not experience their work as being separate and apart from the operations of the ministry, enhancing the buy-in and commitment to the CTAP approach from the TA.

#### **Knowledge and existing capacity of Counterparts and Supervisors is required**

Correct and sophisticated understanding of the CTAP approach is essential. The selection of the Counterpart is critical, and where the Counterparts have the required skills and capacities – including English language skills and a certain basic level of technical as well as organizational/management understanding – the TA can leverage and accelerate the development of organizational and staff capacity. Additionally, among senior managers and Supervisors, insight into organizational needs and weaknesses coupled with comprehension of the value of the CTAP approach ensures productive engagement and effective focusing of the TA to produce powerful results. Ensuring that Supervisors and Counterparts are properly oriented to the uniqueness of the CTAP approach, ensuring the ministry selects an

appropriate candidate to serve as a Counterpart, and devoting resources to enhancing the effectiveness of Counterparts will ensure engagement with TAs that is more consistently successful.

### **TAs require Capacity Development skills, not just technical competence**

In addition to technical skills, in order to be effective, a TA requires skills in the specific areas of expertise related to capacity development. These include skills in mentoring, organizational analysis, group process and facilitation, and training. Soft skills such as interpersonal communication, cultural awareness, and intercultural communication are also necessary to achieve success. Providing additional support to TAs to enhance their capacity development skills and abilities along these lines will improve their overall effectiveness.

### **Objective organizational analysis and facilitating participatory reform is required**

Focusing on objective, evidence-based organizational analysis is essential. Analyzing institutional structures and staffing, operational procedures and business processes, data collection and monitoring systems, policies and organizational planning processes are critical. By assisting ministry staff to review and troubleshoot these issues using participatory approaches, and assisting ministries in the reform process, sustainable capacity development will continue long beyond the tour of the TA.

## **VII. EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS**

CTAP is a useful and effective capacity building mechanism, capacity development being vital to assist in addressing the emerging needs of Afghanistan's government. It is surprising in that it takes a very innovative approach: using a 'deep-integration' model that is structured primarily around mentoring in stark contrast to the traditional Program Management Unit approach. It also affords Afghan ministries the rare, but important, opportunity to identify and articulate their own needs to find just the right candidate to build their capacity. Starting from scratch without any instructional history or conceptual reference, CTAP has taken two years to define itself and has developed strong systems, procedures and policies for administering embedded TAs. Results are positive (though uneven) and change is required to raise consistency and promote even greater programmatic success and sustainable impact. It should be noted here that such changes as recommended below should be considered enhancements to a solid foundation already built.

### **1. RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **a. Recruit And Place Senior-Level Staff into CTAP's Secretariat**

While active, enthusiastic, and committed to the program, the CTAP Secretariat has a lack of experienced senior-level management. A senior, expatriate (non-Afghan) manager should be recruited to serve as a CTAP Deputy Director (DD). This DD would revitalize the Human Resources system by ensuring effectiveness and equality, while shielding local staff from any

possible unfair external pressures. A strong candidate should also have excellent operational management skills in order to properly direct the activities of an expanded CTAP Secretariat staff as outlined in recommendation #2 below.

Furthermore, a Senior Capacity Development Manager should be engaged to inculcate the Secretariat and Technical Advisors with best practices, as well as develop an expanded vision of capacity development to conceptualize the assorted simultaneous moving parts necessary to expand CTAP's approach further. The Senior Capacity Development Manager should ideally have 10+ years' of progressive, senior-level experience in capacity development in complex environments.

#### **b. Expand and Diversify Secretariat Staff to Service Demand**

There is an insufficient number of CTAP staff to properly monitor and support Technical Advisors. To clarify, it is important to recognize that the current system, while strong in terms of structures and systems, remains mechanistic and conceptually limited in its current application. An internal labor study should be conducted to determine the proper CTAP Secretariat staff complement in each department given the ideal coverage needed to ensure proper staff coverage in all operational areas. For example, a larger HR staff could better process a larger pool of recruitment that would resolve some of the recruitment problems identified in this report. Likewise, a larger complement of M&E field staff could spend more time engaged with ministry Counterparts, Supervisors, and TAs to identify weaknesses in the process of TA engagement rather than focus solely on processing outputs-based performance reporting. Ideally, a "case management" model should be developed, ensuring consistent and protracted engagement between Secretariat staff in each functional area and a designated complement of assigned TAs. The Secretariat should strongly and pro-actively encourage all ethnic groups to apply for these expanded staff positions- and recruit along these lines.

#### **c. Reform Capacity Development Approach & Process of Engagement with Ministries**

CTAP should place considerably more resources into communicating its mission and approach with ministries in the initial stages of engagement with interested ministries. This would ensure clarity of the unique requirements for CTAP, as well as develop initial capacity in ministries to identify appropriate needs and select appropriate Counterparts. CTAP should take greater efforts to ensure that the Request for Assistance, Terms of Reference and annual Work Plan are realistic and achievable in every situation, and that ministries are correctly engaging TAs using the specific mentor-based human and institutional capacity development approach of CTAP. More ministries than are currently participating would benefit from CTAP. The Secretariat should take a more assertive and proactive role in marketing CTAP by engaging in outreach and communicating the value to GIRoA in order to gain new client ministries and broaden results. This "front-loaded" approach, as well as more targeted intensive engagement with ministry personnel throughout the course of TA placement, of course requires additional staff resources.

#### **d. Reform M&E Engagement with Ministries**

The present M&E system, while robust and by all accounts performing as intended, is primarily a system designed to support reporting only. It provides donors with information about project performance, and focuses primarily upon tracking output indicators. Thus, it is insufficiently analytical. More determined effort should be made to identify and analyze weaknesses in TA engagement, examining process in addition to performance, and in identifying the causes of performance problems and developing appropriate solutions. Additionally, a larger frame of analysis should be developed to knit together the multiplicity of efforts of various TAs in order to form a collective and coherent picture of their overall impact. Monitoring activities should seek to collect and analyze the input of Counterparts and Supervisors, outputs of ministries that may be causally linked to CTAP, and not simply track the outputs generated by TAs. To successfully implement this more robust and sustained engagement, additional M&E staff resources will be required.

#### **e. Reform and Expand Recruitment**

We recommend that CTAP advertise in high-traffic, premium development websites, such as DevEx, DevNet, and DevHire. Although these sites require subscriptions and nominal fees to post every position advertisement, the added benefit of a much larger pool of potential candidates more than justifies the nominal expense. CTAP should join such sites as an institutional member in order to access resume databases. The program should also advertise in industry specific websites, according to each job's technical or functional specialization, which again requires nominal fees but is well worth the cost. The increased traffic both in terms of posting advertisements and processing applications will require additional HR staff resources.

#### **f. Improve Budget, Logistical, on-Boarding, and Security Support**

The present cost-effective, cost-cutting approach of CTAP is admirable; however, in the current situation, it may unreasonably constrain program effectiveness and actually serve as a deterrent to optimal recruitment and retention. CTAP should commission an outside agency to conduct a study to assess (and possibly raise) Secretariat and TA salary and benefits to meet standards more commensurate with the valuable role that both parts of CTAP play in building critical capacity in government agencies. To clarify, it is NOT recommended that CTAP adopt the same approach (and associated costs) as the various projects which field advisors from within a "bubble" of needlessly expensive logistical and security support. Done carefully, there is no reason why CTAP cannot remain far more cost-effective and efficient than other similar programs that field technical advisors. However, addressing the pay inequities and perceived injustice associated with taxation, providing a nominal budget to ensure TAs are properly equipped inside ministries and nominally resourced so they can maximize performance, and addressing conspicuous security gaps, would all ultimately

increase success, improve the quality of applicants, and ensure retention. The substantial benefits would greatly outweigh the nominal costs.

During the first few critical weeks of a TAs placement, CTAP should devote considerably more time and energy to ensure that the TA is properly briefed and comfortable with the program, administration, logistics, and security arrangements. The advisors should be properly housed and acquainted with the everyday practicalities of life in Kabul. They should understand the security threats and have a general idea of how to respond in a crisis. They should clearly understand the CTAP approach, and how they should engage with ministry Counterparts and Supervisors - and how they should not. CTAP may consider adopting a 'sponsor' approach where an established TA welcomes and guides the newly recruited TA through 2-3 important formative weeks and can orient them to the realities and challenges of working inside a ministry in a conflict setting.

Should the above recommendations be implemented, the evaluation team is confident that CTAP will be best equipped to deliver on its project mandate effectively and still very cost-effectively. Adopting each of these recommendations would transform the program from a successful to a VERY successful initiative. But each of these recommendations is aimed primarily at operational improvements - they are focused at the solid base of the current design of CTAP. They will certainly improve operational effectiveness, but they do not alone produce the radical, exponential improvement in effectiveness it is believed CTAP is capable of.

## **2. A BIGGER PICTURE**

The evaluation team strongly feels that there is currently an opportunity for CTAP to take its work to a much grander level to achieve far more impressive and sustainable results. At present, the CTAP Secretariat effectively identifies itself as a recruitment, human resources administration, and performance monitoring service. They understand themselves as a mechanism for placing and evaluating the work of disjointed and detached TAs separately fielded to fill isolated positions (even where more than one TA is fielded in a given ministry). This is not surprising as a close read of the Program Document establishes this vision, and donor engagement and oversight to this point has reinforced this limited vision of what the CTAP Secretariat is and how it should function.

To provide context, before moving on to further recommendations, a general discussion of the breadth and depth of capacity development is useful here. Sometimes also referred to as capacity building, capacity development is an approach that focuses on creating both the individual skills and, perhaps most importantly, the institutional strengths required to assume responsibility for producing desired development outcomes and achieving sustainable development results. Capacity development can occur at the individual level, within NGOs or small community-based organizations, within government institutions or other large organizations, or among expansive networks and consortiums. Capacity development refers

to the expansive set of activities and development approaches that ultimately serve to strengthen the knowledge, skills and functional capabilities of people, communities, or organizations operating in developing country contexts so they can ultimately increase their development effectiveness. Organizational capacity development as a specific subset of these activities is often used by governmental organizations (as well as NGOs or private sector actors) to assess organizational strengths and weaknesses, guide internal development of staff, improve management systems or formulate appropriate policy, to guide and structure the production of strategic plans or visions, increase collaboration, or synergize action among diverse actors.

Those unfamiliar with the challenges and complexities associated with capacity development assume it is merely a form of training. Sometimes, it is also simplistically seen as an organizational reform process, where outdated or ineffective organizational policies, procedures, and business processes are examined, assessed, and reformed. The most effective approach to capacity development, however, combines multiple methods that are appropriate between multiple institutional levels and/or across multiple functional units or individual actors. These approaches may include, in addition to carefully developed skills and knowledge-building training (and often mentoring) programs and institutional reform initiatives, the following:

1. Conducting large-scale organizational assessments to identify needs and weaknesses to prescribe organizational structures, systems, or business processes that can mitigate these weaknesses.
2. Facilitated organizational development group processes for problem analysis or problem solving and/or participatory decision-making.
3. Supporting the development of sector networks and advocacy alliances.
4. Leadership or staff development through exchange programs or peer-to-peer learning activities.
5. Conducting evaluation and research to identify weaknesses as well as best practices and lessons learned.
6. Providing necessary equipment or infrastructure such as computer systems or site rehabilitation.
7. Providing small grants or other resources to cover staff development costs.
8. Producing tool-kits, documenting best practices, or publishing how-to guides or field guides.
9. Improving access to any variety of knowledge management resources, such as libraries of resource materials or websites/databases.
10. Providing incentives for implementing reform initiatives or demonstrating operational excellence.

The list above is by no means exhaustive, and none of these approaches or methods should be considered mutually exclusive. Ideally, depending on a systematic and thorough assessment of needs and gaps, a synergistic combination of some or all of these would be implemented to ensure achievement of high-quality and sustainable capacity development results. When determining which method or combination of methods is most appropriate, it is important to consider the levels at which the initiative is directed - individual, operational unit, institution wide, or societal - and examine the key linkages that exist within and between each level, as certain approaches are more resonant at certain levels, while also potentially requiring supporting or reinforcing approaches be delivered at other levels to ensure success.

The most effective approaches will work at each of these levels and/or within interconnected units synergistically to reinforce and leverage interactive effects that together add up to a larger result rather than the sum of the separate parts. It is critically important to consider how the wider context, such as the external policy environment, budgetary systems, or cultural factors in governance might influence the capacity building intervention being proposed, as these could significantly impact which approach is likely to work best - these constraints should be addressed in the activity design and operational approach of the intervention itself.

In order to achieve the very best outcomes, it is important to consider a number of key considerations and best practices, and then integrate these into the design and execution of any capacity development initiative. These include:

1. Use systemic, evidence-based, holistic approaches to the greatest degree possible given time and resource constraints.
2. Apply a variety of reinforcing methods, all of which have been adapted to culture and context, paying special attention to issues associated with gender, indigenous power dynamics, and local conceptions of legitimate authority and appropriate decision -making processes.
3. Ensure local ownership of the process through an intentional and comprehensive approach to consultation and stakeholder engagement; build trust with and give substantial control over the process to the subjects of the intervention.
4. Acknowledge and build upon existing capacities, and where possible, mobilize and leverage pre-existing local actors, institutions, and resources.
5. Ensure locally appropriate and sustainable provision of resources (or at least ensure that there is some sort of detailed planning, perhaps taking an incremental approach, to gradually wean a program from dependence upon foreign donors).
6. Recognize that capacity development is a dynamic and emergent process which may require adaptive responses to ensure effectiveness; these adaptive course corrections ideally should be informed by a systematic 'action-learning' process for assessing and learning from the intervention as it unfolds.



Should CTAP embrace a wider vision, as well as undertake a more creative, holistic, and synergistic approach that incorporates the above considerations, the evaluation team believes that it will find there is previously undreamed of opportunity for greater impact through strategic interventions and TA placements. For instance, instead of focusing on the recruitment of individual advisors, the Secretariat could encourage ministries to develop multi-year strategic capacity development plans featuring the deployment of multi-skilled teams; it could work to create advocacy and peer support networks among Counterparts; it could create knowledge networks or establish repositories of resources for best practices and lessons learned; it could pilot a whole-of-ministry approach as a demonstration project. The opportunities are endless.

The CTAP Secretariat, if it can take the initiative to carefully reflect on its mandate and purpose, if it can successfully expand its staff and focus its enthusiasm on growth and transformation, it could then evolve from a glorified body-shop providing ‘one-shot’ targeted inputs, to a true whole-of-government capacity development initiative that delivers strategic, long-term, sustained capacity development - possibly more effectively and more efficiently than other similarly mandated programs operating in Afghanistan. The range of skills within the CTAP Secretariat would correspondingly need to grow to facilitate and support this new approach - but the essential kernel is already there.

### 3. META-RECOMMENDATIONS

#### a. Expand Mission and Vision

A CTAP intent on deploying multi-skilled, multi-year teams, working in more creative and synergistic ways within and across ministries, would necessarily have to evolve from the self-conception of a recruitment/administration/monitoring agency, to a fully-fledged capacity development resource, which **manages** in a proactive manner its key resource, its TAs, but also focuses far more systematically on the actual locus of capacity being developed: Counterparts and Supervisors. A thorough and complete re-examination of its approach and modes of operation is required; a far more proactive and systematic process of program promotion, outreach and engagement with ministry staff, systematically managing TA operation within ministries; and active communication, informing government agencies of the benefits of its approach to capacity development.

While an expanded administrative staff is absolutely essential, additional specialized staff is also required. Technical expertise in organizational analysis and assessment; group facilitation and collective decision-making; training and adult learning methods; and other specialized expertise related to capacity development as expansively discussed above. In order to expand to fill CTAP’s potential a substantially larger organization will be required.

#### **b. Conduct a Detailed Design Assessment for Next Phase**

In order that CTAP may rise to the challenge that such an expanded vision represents, the Donors should commission a careful and thorough design assessment, identifying the general capacity needs of the GIRoA, and laying out the detailed programmatic focal areas and operational structures necessary to fulfill this exponential mission.

A successful capacity development design initiative such as discussed above likely has two very specific attributes which require careful attention:

1. Engage stakeholders and secure their buy-in to the need as well as the process or approach that will be used, and ensure they acknowledge and validate the identified needs as well as the prescriptive response. Without this clear mandate, there cannot be success to whatever improved design is produced.
2. Conduct a systematic capacity needs assessment, looking at not just individual capacities or organizational processes, but also larger systems and the interrelationships between actors within these, as well as the latent networks which can be made manifest in order to synergistically support a holistic approach.

## APPENDIX A. EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK



### **Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP) Performance Evaluation Scope of Work (SoW)**

#### **I. BACKGROUND**

1. Program: Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP)<sup>17</sup>
2. Award Number: 306-09-CTAP-0001
3. Award Dates: October 2009 – December 2012
4. Planned Funding: USAID: US\$30,000,000<sup>18</sup>  
DFID: US\$ 9,189,887  
AusAID: US\$ 2,120,800
5. Implementing Partner: Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance
6. Agreement Officer's Representative: Mohammad Farid (Farid), Senior Program Development Specialist, Office of Program and Project Development, USAID Afghanistan, [mfarid@usaid.gov](mailto:mfarid@usaid.gov) (resigned from USAID at the end of August 2012)

The Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP) is a multi-donor effort designed to strengthen the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) capacity, help agencies provide services to the public, and support a “Cabinet Clusters” system by which various ministries have been organized into groups to identify gaps in implementing the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS).

The program gives GIROA direct control over the recruitment, hiring, and insertion of expatriate and international technical advisors into its ministries to support capacity development programs formulated by the ministries and to facilitate the transfer of skills and knowledge to civil servants. Through technical assistance, CTAP aims to improve core operations necessary for a functioning government such as finance, procurement, budgeting, human resource management, policy development, and coordination among government institutions at the national and local levels. In addition, CTAP offers technical assistance in

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<sup>17</sup> <http://www.ctapafghanistan.org/>

<sup>18</sup> Note this clarification was not included in the original SOW: USAID obligated \$1,000,000 in the September 30, 2009 Cash Transfer Agreement and planned to provide up to \$30,000,000 based on the availability of funds.

other functional areas which include, but not limited to health, education, infrastructure, alternative livelihood, and public administration reform.

To receive technical assistance under CTAP, ministries must provide written proposals targeting specific government functions and departments. In addition, the proposals must link to the ANDS and the National Priority Program (NPPs), laying out specific organizational development targets and defining key systems or features to be achieved, as well as an exit strategy for the technical advisors. In the short term, the program allows ministries to fulfill fundamental bureaucratic responsibilities; over the longer term, it works to build core competencies by establishing a mentoring relationship between technical advisors and their government counterparts. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) manages the program and reports to donors through a quarterly forum called the advisory board meeting chaired by Deputy Finance Minister for policy affairs.

According to its program document<sup>19</sup>, CTAP has four objectives:

1. To strengthen capacity development in Afghanistan by increasing resources and focus on capacity development programs and activities, and by complementing existing capacity development initiatives and programs;
2. To help build institutional capacity for facilitation and implementation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) through line ministries and government agencies, especially by supporting priorities identified through the Cluster system;
3. To enable public organizations to improve budget execution, both through better operations and better programming; and
4. To create a single mechanism for providing expatriate, regional, and international technical assistance that is lower cost, well-coordinated, more responsive to government priorities, and has better outcomes.

Four specific outcomes are envisioned:

1. Greater government ability to provide services to the people of Afghanistan and improved sustainability in the delivery of services.
2. Improved and more efficient government institutions.

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<sup>19</sup> A copy of CTAP program document is provided in Annex I

3. More government resources to deliver services to the people of Afghanistan, and better use of the budget itself as an instrument of governance.

4. More cost-effective, impactful, demand-driven, and coordinated use of technical resources to enhance capacity of government institutions, delivered through a single mechanism.

USAID signed a \$30 million grant agreement<sup>20</sup> with the MoF on September 30, 2009.<sup>21</sup> The agreement expired on September 30, 2011. The first amendment extended the grant agreement through December 31, 2011 and the second amendment expired March 31, 2012. The third amendment extends the agreement through December 31, 2012. USAID provided the initial funding of \$1 million in February 2010, followed by a subsequent tranche of \$4.5 million in April 2010 for a total of \$5.5 million to date. In addition, USAID has disbursed to MoF \$6.2 million of DFID's contribution as well. The fourth tranche will be DFID's and AusAID's contributions to CTAP through USAID for a total of \$5.1 million, which will fund CTAP through December 31, 2012.

The USAID grant agreement – prior to amendments after DFID's and AusAID's contributions to CTAP – documents the following expected results:

1. Establishment of a national capacity building program to help ministries prepare requests for donor-funded technical advisors and to establish a transparent and competitive process for solicitation, selection and evaluation of technical advisors; and

2. Hiring and deployment of at least 55 technical advisors at central and sub-national levels in specific functional and technical areas in accordance with the needs of recipient ministries/agencies, about 22 of whom are to be funded through the USAID agreement.

In the first several months of implementation, the CTAP secretariat was established under Deputy Minister of Finance for policy affairs and a national manager for the project was recruited. In addition, the secretariat team produced policy documents for smooth functioning of the program on human resource, finance, monitoring, and security/safety practices.

By mid 2010, the secretariat had received many technical assistance requests from many GIRoA institutions. CTAP deployed the first team of international technical advisors to three GIRoA institutions in July 2010. As of today, CTAP has recruited and deployed 60 advisors to 15 GIRoA institutions at the national and sub-national levels. These advisors are to develop the capacity of their host institutions in their respective functional areas and mentor

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<sup>20</sup> Copies of CTAP grant agreement and its amendments are provided in Annex II.

<sup>21</sup> Note this clarification was not included in the original SOW: The Cash Transfer Agreement of September 30, 2009 planned to contribute up to \$30,000,000 for CTAP based on the availability of funds; \$1,000,000 was obligated to CTAP September 30, 2009.

their local counterparts, who are to assume the duties and responsibilities of the technical advisors and ensure sustainability of the results.

CTAP has been the first capacity development program GIRoA has implemented.

## **II. PURPOSE**

This performance evaluation aims to review and evaluate the effectiveness of the program in achieving its goal, objectives, outcomes and expected results. The evaluation will assess the performance of the program in building the capacity of GIRoA's client institutions<sup>22</sup>. The evaluation also intends to examine the transparency of the recruitment processes of technical advisors. In addition, the evaluation will appraise the sustainability of the program in terms delivering and maintaining technical assistance offered to the technical advisors' local counterparts. Areas of improvement in the operation of CTAP secretariat will also be reviewed.

The findings of the evaluation combined with its recommendations will guide the process of re-design of CTAP. Prior to a two- or three-year extension of the program, USAID intends to review its approach to support capacity development of GIRoA's ministries and institutions under CTAP. The design of a new approach will conclude in late 2012 to which the evaluation findings will significantly contribute. Subject to availability of funds for this purpose, the next phase of CTAP will start January 1, 2013. The approach will also include a proposed shift from a non-project assistance mechanism to a traditional project. Also, subject to compliance with applicable laws, regulations and policies, including the special legal requirements that apply to direct government-to-government assistance in Afghanistan, USAID will continue to use GIRoA as the implementation partner.

USAID has not carried out any evaluation or technical assessment of CTAP yet. However, it has audited the program once in 2011 and is auditing it July 2012. The UK Department for International Development (DFID), that co-funds CTAP through USAID, assessed CTAP in January 2012.<sup>23</sup>

## **III. QUESTIONS**

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<sup>22</sup> A GIRoA client institution refers to a government entity that has applied for the technical assistance from CTAP and currently benefits from the expertise of technical advisors.

<sup>23</sup> A copy of the DFID's Report on CTAP Cost-Benefit Appraisal is provided in Annex III.

USAID intends to evaluate the performance of the project to ensure the project is on track. That said, the evaluation is to answer the following questions – in priority order – on transparency, effectiveness, and sustainability of CTAP:

1. Transparency – Given the standard human resource practices and the CTAP human resources policies, how fair, transparent, and gender-responsive have been the recruitment processes of the international technical advisors? What are the indications, if any, that suggest otherwise? What appear to be the flaws, if any, in the operation of the program such as areas of where the CTAP secretariat's performance/capacity could be improved? Other areas include but not limited to: length of time that it takes to recruit and deploy a technical advisor, logistical support provided to the advisors (work space, internet access, etc.), number of women recruited to be advisors, and availability of qualified local counterparts to mentor. Have the recruited technical advisors been the best candidates from the pool of applicants? Have they been well-qualified for their assignments?

2. Effectiveness – To what extent has the technical advisors developed the capacity of their host institutions? Capacity developed refers here to the current situation of CTAP client agencies versus CTAP's baseline of the capacity of its individual client agencies. Also, what policies, procedures, and functional areas have been developed and created since the deployment of the advisors? In what instances have the results been lower than requested by the client agency?

3. Sustainability – How successful have the technical advisors been in regard to mentoring i.e. building the capacity of their local counterparts to perform the job upon completion of the advisors' assignments? What progress has been made due to this process of skill transfer? Is the program moving forward to achieving sustainability of overall activities after the program ends? When the contracts of the technical advisors end, will the advisors' local counterparts be able to perform the targeted functions? What role have advisors played in exercising gender equality? Are the capacity gains developed through the CTAP advisors likely to be sustained beyond the life of the program? What lessons learned and best practices can be applied to improve the implementation of the program in the next phase?

#### **IV. METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation team will review pertinent CTAP documents including, but not limited to, program document, grant agreement and its amendments, progress reports, human resource records of CTAP secretariat, and potentially GIROA's ministerial assessment reports. In addition, the team will meet with the concerned USAID staff members; interview the concerned members of CTAP secretariat, the MoF's relevant officials, randomly-selected technical advisors, their supervisors, and local counterparts receiving the technical assistance to collect data needed for the evaluation. Additionally, the evaluation team can interview those who have oversight roles over the project in USAID, DFID, and AusAID. The

evaluation team shall review documentation/evidence showing the improvement of core operations of GIROA institutions as a result of the technical assistance provided.

The evaluation team can use a mix of data collection and analysis methods to generate descriptive answers. USAID prefers quantitative methods and random sampling. Evaluators will have access to all periodic progress reports including the last few ones that includes log-frames.

Regardless of data collection and analysis methods, USAID requires qualitative and quantitative data disaggregated by gender. Evaluators will produce quantitative and qualitative baseline data for the next evaluation of the program, which will be based on achievements made to date.

## **V. TEAM COMPOSITION**

The evaluation team will consist of a team leader, two international technical experts, and two local translators. The team leader/senior evaluation specialist should have a graduate degree in political science, public administration or any applicable social science. The team leader should have at least 5 years senior level experience working in governance, capacity development programs in conflict or post-conflict countries and possess extensive experience in conducting quantitative, and qualitative evaluations/assessments, and strong familiarity with the public sector. Excellent oral and written communication skills in English are required. The team leader should also have experience in leading evaluation teams and preparing high quality documents. The leader will take specific responsibility for assessing and analyzing the evaluation process.

The leader will also suggest ways to improve the team performance, finalize the evaluation design, arrange periodic meetings, consolidate individual input from team members, and coordinate the process of assembling the final findings and recommendations into a high quality document. It will be the responsibility of the team leader to write the final report and will also lead the preparation and presentation of the key evaluation findings and recommendations to the USAID Afghanistan team and other major partners.

The two capacity development/technical advisors, preferably one female – at least, should have a graduate degree in public administration, political science or any other related social science. These advisors should have at least 3 years' experience with public sector capacity development and implementation in conflict or post-conflict situations and possess knowledge in program assessment and evaluation methodologies in governance, and institutional capacity building. The technical advisors should have extensive experience in conducting quantitative and qualitative evaluations/assessments around public sector, and should have demonstrated knowledge of state-of-the-art strategies for evidenced-based capacity development programming.



The two local translators will help the evaluators in their communication with the supervisors and local counterparts of technical advisors, as appropriate. These translators need to be, at least high school graduates with proficiency in oral English.

USAID requires all team members to provide a written disclosure of any possible conflict of interests.

## VI. MANAGEMENT

Checchi will identify and hire the evaluation team, provide key documents, assist in facilitating the work plan, and arrange meetings with key stakeholders identified prior to the initiation of field work. The evaluation team will organize other meetings as identified during the course in consultation of Checchi SUPPORT and USAID Afghanistan.

Checchi SUPPORT is also responsible for arranging accommodation, security, office space, computers, internet access, printing, communication, and transportation to the project sites.

A six-day work-week is authorized when the team works in the country. Below is an estimated Level of Effort (LOE) for the evaluation:

Task/Deliverable	Estimated Duration/LOE (Days)			
	Team Leader	Technical Advisor I	Technical Advisor II	Translators
Review background documents/literature review and draft work plan (outside of country)	3	3	3	0
Travel to the country	2	2	2	0
Team Planning Meeting and meeting with USAID Afghanistan and finalizing work plan	2	2	2	0
Information and data collection including interviews with the concerned members of CTAP secretariat, MoF's relevant officials, randomly-selected technical advisors, their supervisors, and local counterparts as well as those who have oversight roles over the project in USAID, DFID, and AusAID.	14	14	14	28 (2x14)
Discussion, analysis, and draft evaluation report in country	5	5	5	0

Final briefing to USAID, DFID, AusAID and GIRoA	1	1	1	0
Travel from the country	2	2	2	0
USAID and other stakeholders comment on the draft (out of country)	0	0	0	0
Team revises draft report and submits final to USAID (out of country)	4	4	4	0
<b>Total Estimated LOE</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>28</b>

The evaluation will cover the period from October 1, 2009 through May 31, 2012. With a team of three international evaluators and capacity development experts and two CCNs, the process should conclude in five weeks. USAID Afghanistan and other stakeholders are required to provide comments and feedbacks within 10 working days after the submission of the draft report.

## VII. DELIVERABLES

(The following deliverables are being used for previous evaluations and seem to work well).

**In-briefing:** The Evaluation Team, within 48 hours arrival to Afghanistan, shall meet the USAID/Afghanistan Office of Program and Project Development (OPPD) Team for introductions; presentation of the Team's understanding of the assignments, initial assumptions, evaluation questions, and locations to be visited etc.; discussion of initial work plan; and/or adjust SOW if necessary.

**Evaluation Work Plan:** The Evaluation Team shall provide an initial work plan prior to the arrival of international consultants in country, and the revised work plan 3 days after the in-briefing. The work plan will include the overall design strategy for the evaluation; (b) the methodology and data collection plan; (c) a list of the team members indicating and primary contact (an e-mail and phone contact for the team leader should be provided); (d) the team's schedule for the evaluation; and e) samples of any data collection tools. The revised work plan shall include the lists of potential interviewees and sites to visit.

**Mid-term Briefing and Interim Meetings:** Hold a mid-term briefing with USAID on the status of the assessment including potential challenges and emerging opportunities.

**Final Briefing:** Hold a final briefing with USAID, DFID, AusAID, and GIRoA to discuss the report's findings, conclusions, and draft recommendations.

**Draft Evaluation Report:** Shall be consistent with the guidance provided below. Length of the report: not to exceed 40 pages in English, excluding annexes in Times New Roman 12

point, single space, consistent with USAID branding policy. The report will address each of the issues identified in the SOW and any other factors the team considers to have a bearing on the objectives of the evaluation. Any such factors can be included in the report only after consultation with USAID. The draft evaluation report per the below format will be submitted before the consultants depart Kabul for comments to USAID and shall be finalized in four days after the comments are received. USAID, DFID, AusAID, and GIRONA will provide comments on the draft report within 10 working days after the submission of the draft report.

**Final Evaluation Report** incorporates final comments from USAID, DFID, AusAID and GIRONA. Final evaluation report should be prepared in accordance to the given structure below:

## REPORT STRUCTURE

Title page

Table of Contents

List of any acronyms, tables, or charts (if any)

Acknowledgements or preface (optional)

Executive summary (not to exceed 3-5 pages)

Introductory chapter (not to exceed 3 pages)

A description of the activities evaluated, including goals and objectives.

Brief statement of why the project was evaluated, including a list of the main evaluation questions.

Brief statement on the methods used in the evaluation such as desk/document review, interviews, site visits, surveys, etc.

Findings – Describe the findings, focusing on each of the questions the evaluation was intended to answer. Organize the findings to answer the evaluation questions.

Conclusions – This section will include value statements that interpret the facts and evidence and describe what those facts and evidence mean.

Recommendations – This section will include actionable statements of what remains to be done, consistent with the evaluation's purpose, and based on the evaluation's findings and conclusions. This section will provide judgments on what changes need to be made for future USAID financial and cooperative development programming. This section should also recommend ways to improve the performance of future USAID programming and project implementation; ways to solve problems this project has faced; identify adjustments/corrections that need to be made; and recommend actions and/or decisions to be taken by management.

Annex

Statement of Work

List of document consulted

List of individuals with titles and agencies contacted  
Methodology description  
Copies of all survey instruments, questionnaires, and data  
Statement of Differences (if applicable)

## REPORTING GUIDELINES

The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well- organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not and why.

Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the scope of work.

The evaluation report should include the scope of work as an annex. All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology, or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the technical officer.

Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report.

Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females.

Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).

Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.

Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex.

Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.

Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical, and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

## **APPENDIX B. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

### **CTAP Documents**

1. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme Quarterly Report, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, January-March 2011 (.doc).
2. Client Request for Assistance Form, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, July 2010 (.pdf).
3. CTAP Annual Progress Report, Ministry of Finance, GIRoA, 2011 (.pdf).
4. CTAP Financial Operations Manual, Ministry of finance, GIRoA, 2009-2011 (.pdf).
5. CTAP First Quarter Progress Report, Ministry of Finance, GIRoA, Jan-Mar 2012 (.pdf).
6. CTAP List of USAID- Funded Capacity Development Activities, Ministry of Finance, GIRoA, Sep 2009- Dec 2009 (.xls).
7. CTAP Second Quarter Progress Report, Ministry of Finance, GIRoA, Apr-Jun 2012 (.pdf).
8. Draft Workplan: Gender Analysis of Afghan Agricultural Research and Extension Development Project, USAID/Afghanistan, 24 June 2012 (.doc).
9. Excerpt from Strategic Objective Grant Agreement (SOAG) Annex 2-Taxation Provision (.pdf).
10. First Amendment to USAID Grant Agreement 306-09-CTAP-0001, Ministry of Finance, GIRoA, USAID/Afghanistan, 7 August 2011 (.pdf).
11. Gender Equity Strategy 2007/08-2012/13: Gender Cross-Cutting Sector Strategy, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Approved by Sector Responsible Authorities (.pdf).
12. Grant Agreement Between The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United State of America for Cash Transfer Assistance to Support the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan, Ministry of Finance, GIRoA, USAID/Afghanistan, 30 Sept 2009 (.pdf).
13. H.E. Minister Zakhailwal's Instructions to CTAP Management on TA's Tax Issue (email), 11 December 2011 (.pdf).
14. Letter regarding Article 72 of tax law, Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 18 March 2010 (.pdf).
15. Letter regarding USAID Cash Transfer Grant Agreement, USAID/Afghanistan, 27 September 2011 (.pdf).
16. Ministry of Finance Meeting with USAID Head of Mission Draft Minutes, 27 August 2011 (.pdf).
17. Process for Request and Approval of CTAP Support, The Civilian Technical Assistance Programme Secretariat (.doc).
18. Second Amendment to USAID Grant Agreement 306-09-CTAP-0001, USAID, 21 December 2011 (.pdf).
19. Taxes for Afghan-American CTAP Local Hire Consultants (email), 17 December 2011.
20. Third Amendment to USAID Grant Agreement 306-09-CTAP-0001, Ministry of Finance, GIRoA, USAID/Afghanistan, 4 Jun 2012 (.pdf).
21. USAID Portfolio Review, Ministry of Finance, GIRoA, Aug 2012 (.doc).

### **CTAP Documents (second tranche)**

22. 1<sup>st</sup> CTAP Advisory Board Meeting 2012 Minutes, Ministry of Finance, 13 May 2012 (.doc).
23. Analysis of Financial Statements of Different State Owned Enterprises of MOM and various Balance Sheets (.doc).

24. Annex I. CTAP Log Frame, DFID, 2011 (.doc).
25. Capacity Building for Result (.doc).
26. Capacity Development Department (CDD) Orientation, Mariam Wardak and Abdul Rahman (.doc).
27. CDD Plan (.doc).
28. Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP) Results Inventory Sheet (A), Ministry of Finance (.doc).
29. Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP) Technical Advisor's Annual Work Plan (AWP), Hoveyda Abbas, Ministry of Finance, 23 June 2012 (.xls).
30. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) CTAP Advisory Board Meeting April 2011 Meeting Minutes, Ministry of Finance, 19 April 2011 (.doc).
31. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Minutes 2<sup>nd</sup> Advisory Board Meeting, Ministry of Finance Deputy Minister for Policy Building, 9 December 2010 (.doc).
32. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Monthly Reporting Format, Ministry of Finance (.doc).
33. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Presentation, Ministry of Finance, 25 November 2010 (.ppt).
34. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Quarterly Report, Abdul Ghaffar Jabbarkhail, Chand Bibi, 23 September 2012, (.doc).
35. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) TA Monthly Report, Ministry of Finance, 17 April 2012 (.doc).
36. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) TA Monthly Report, Chand Bibi, Ministry of Finance, 22 May 2011 (.doc).
37. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Quarterly Report Template (Revised), Ministry of Finance, 17 April 2012 (.doc).
38. CTAP Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, Ministry of Finance, GIRoA, 24 July 2011 (.doc).
39. CTAP Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, Ministry of Finance, GIRoA, 1 November 2011 (.doc).
40. CTAP Capacity Development Visits (.doc).
41. CTAP Results Based Quarterly Report (.xls).
42. CTAP Results Based Quarterly Reporting Format (.xls).
43. CTAP Success Story in MAIL, Antoine Huss, 10 October 2012 (.doc).
44. CTAP TA Monthly Report Template, Ministry of Finance (.doc).
45. CTAP TAs Contact List (.xls).
46. CTAP Technical Advisor's Annual Work Plan (AWP) Template (.xls).
47. CTAP Technical Advisor's Annual Work Plan (AWP) Template (Revised) (.xls).
48. CTAP Work Plan Forma (.xls).
49. CTAP Work Plan, Chand Bibi-Decentralization Advisor, Ministry of Education, 18 July 2012 (.xls).
50. CTAP-Evaluation Meeting Notes, Ahmad Elyas Saboor, 10 August 2012 (.doc).
51. Description Note of the Half-Yearly Progress of Dr Satish Chandra, Adviser, BPR (CTAP) for the Ministry of Mines, Government of Afghanistan (June-November 2011), Ministry of Finance, 7 January 2012 (.doc).
52. Diagnostic Analysis of Baseline Survey Questionnaire and Key Observations of the Baseline Study, Ministry of Mines (.doc).
53. Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Profile (.doc).
54. Engagement of USAID with CTAP (email), Hoveyda Abbas, 18 October 2012 (.doc).
55. Female Program Review Feedback (.doc).

56. Finance & Admin Report to Review Team 2 (.xls).
57. Finance & Administration Department Civilian Technical Assistance Program, M. Akbar Momand, Ministry of Finance (.doc).
58. Fourth CTAP Advisory Board Meeting 2011 Minutes, Ministry of Finance, 31 January 2012 (.doc).
59. Gender Disaggregation List of TAs (.xls).
60. Initial Capacity Development Assessment through Request for Assistance (RFA) (.doc).
61. Logical Framework Final Draft, April-June 2012 (.pdf).
62. Logical Framework, MoE, 11 August 2012 (.doc).
63. M&E Framework: Capacity Building Programme for the Ministry of Education, Directorate of Education, Grants Management Unit, Final Draft, August 2011 (.doc).
64. Memorandum of Understanding Between The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and The Government of the Republic of India on Technical Cooperation/Inter-Governmental Grant in the Field of Reform of Existing Fertiliser Plant and Development of Fertiliser Policy for The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2011 (.doc).
65. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled of The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and other organization Template (.doc).
66. Ministry of Finance Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Monthly Reporting Format, Chand Bibi, 22 May 2011 (.doc).
67. Reform & Restructuring Through BPR of SOE (MOM), Dr. Satish Chandra, Ministry of Mines (.ppt).
68. Scope of Work Capacity Development Department (CDD) (.doc).
69. Second (2<sup>nd</sup>)CTAP Advisory Board Meeting 2012, Ministry of Finance, 2 October 2012 (.doc).
70. Speech, *In the Name of God*, from Shafallah's Fifth International Forum on Crisis, Conflict and Disability: Ensuring Equality (.doc).
71. Status Note on Business Process Reengineering of State Owned Enterprises with MoM, November 2011 (.doc).
72. Success Story on Gender, Ghafar Bawar, M.D., Ministry of Finance (.doc).
73. The Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Client Request for Assistance Form, Ministry of Finance (.doc).
74. The Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Funding Proposal to DFID, Ministry of Finance, 14 March 2011 (.doc).
75. The Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) RAF Guidance Notes, Ministry of Finance (.doc).
76. The Civilian Technical Assistance Programme Monitory and Evaluation Operating Manual (draft), Ministry of Finance, 13 May 2010 (.doc).
77. The CTAP Approach to Capacity Development, CTAP Advisor Notes: No. 1, CTAP Secretariat (.doc).
78. Annex A: Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Summary Progress Report, July 2010-June 2012, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 8 August 2012 (.pdf).
79. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Internal Program Review Workshop Report, Monitoring and Evaluation Department, CTAP Secretariat, Ministry of Finance, 15 April 2012 (.pdf).
80. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Second Quarter Progress Report April-June 2012, Ministry of Finance (.pdf).

81. Overview of Achievements and Proposed Programs for further Progress, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs & Disabled, May 2010 (.doc).
82. The Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) Capacity Development Strategy (2013-2015), CTAP Secretariat, DM Policy Office, Ministry of Finance, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 8 August 2012 (.pdf).

## **Publications**

83. ACAP Gender Assessment, Checchi Support, USAID/ Afghanistan, Jan 24 2012 (.pdf).
84. Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014-Volume 2, World Bank, May 2012 (.pdf).
85. Appraisal of Civilian Technical Assistance Programme, Department for International Development, January 2012 (.pdf).
86. Civilian Technical Assistance Programme Monitoring and Evaluation Approach, August 2010 (.pdf).
87. Client Program Summary of the Civilian Technical Assistance Programme, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, August 2010 (.pdf).
88. Final Evaluation Report of the Evaluation of USAID's Capacity Building Efforts for USAID/Afghanistan, Checchi and Company Consulting Inc., 12 June – August 4, 2011 (.pdf).
89. Final Evaluation Report: Evaluation of USAID's Capacity Building Efforts for USAID Afghanistan, Checchi Support, USAID/ Afghanistan, 12 Jun- 4 Aug 2011 (.pdf).
90. Initial Budget for Civilian Technical Assistance Programme, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (.pdf).
91. Task Order #14: Road Operation and Maintenance Capacity and Building Program, Checchi and Company Consulting Inc., 12 June 2012 (.pdf).
92. The Civilian Technical Assistance Programme Program Document, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, November 2010.
93. Trade Capacity Building Evaluation Methodologies and Indicators, Nathan Associations Inc., March 2007 (.pdf).
94. Universalial Occasional Paper No. 35 Capacity Development: Definitions, Issues and Implications for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Charles Lusthaus, Marie- Helene Adrien, Mark Pertsinger, September 199 (pdf.).
95. USAID Terms and Definitions, Development Grants Program (.pdf).

## **Taxation Documents**

96. Afghanistan Income Tax Law, Afghanistan Revenue Department, 2009 (.pdf).
97. Registration and Tax Exemptions in Afghanistan, USAID/Afghanistan, 9 February 2010 (.pdf).
98. Taxation Provision from the Strategic Objective Grant Agreements between USAID and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 19 September 2005 (.pdf).
99. Technical Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and Afghanistan, 7 February 1951 (.pdf).



## APPENDIX C. PERSONS CONTACTED

Organization	Category	First Name	Last Name	Title	Oct
USAID	D	Sayed	Aga	Core Support	
USAID	D	Jeane	Davis	OPPD M&E Specialist	
USAID	D	Cynthia	Huger	Dir, On-Budget Assistance, OPPD	
USAID	D	Zaks	Lubin	Mission Evaluation Officer	
USAID	D	Claudia	Pastor	OPPD M&E Specialist	
USAID	D	Khalid	Rahman	On-Budget, OPPD	
USAID	D	Timothy	Sikes	Dep Dir., Strategic Planning & Coordination, OPPD	
USAID	D	Volodya	Yatsenko	Direct Assistance Advisor	
DfID	D	Bianca	Jinga	DfID Office, London	
DfID	D	Nicci	Lee	DfID Office, London	
DfID	D	Zoë	Ware	Policy and Program Manager, Kabul	
AusAID	D	Paul	Lehmann	Minister Counselor (Development)	
German Embassy	D	Kristin	Augsburg	Counselor, Development	
CTAP Secretariat	Staff	Mohd. Akbar	Momand	Head of Administration and Finance	
CTAP Secretariat	Staff & CP	Abdul Rahman	Tokhi	Capacity Development Manager	
CTAP Secretariat	TA	Sayed Yousuf Ali Shah	Bukhari	Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor	
CTAP Secretariat	TA	Habibullah	Shinwari	HR Advisor	
CTAP Secretariat	TA	Mariam	Wardak	Capacity Development Advisor	
Ministry of Mines	S	Moh.	Anwar	Deputy Minister of Admin and Finance	
Ministry of Mines	S	Abdul Jalil A.	Jumriany	DG, Policy & Promotion	9
Ministry of Mines	S	Wali Mohammad	Faizi	HR Director	9
Ministry of Mines	CP	Jehangir	Gabar	Policy Advisor, Directorate of Investment Promotion	9
Ministry of Mines	CP	Muska	Karimi	National Policy Advisor	9
Ministry of Mines	TA	Sikder	Rahat	HRM Advisor	9
Ministry of Mines	TA	Eng. Khondkar Abdus	Saleque	Mining Policy Advisor	9
	S	<b>None Available</b>			
MAIL	CP	Sayed	Aminullah	Forest Protection and Management	
MAIL	CP	Ahmad Zia	Mirzada	Forest Protection and Management	
MAIL	CP	Sayed	Jamaludin	Strategic Planning Directorate	
MAIL	CP	Qasim	Yar	Strategic Planning Directorate	
MAIL	TA	Joy	Dasgupta	Capacity Development and Policy Advisor	9
MAIL	TA	Niels Dahlgaard	Hove	Provincial Capacity Development Advisor	9
MAIL	TA	Antoine	Huss	Institutional Capacity Development & Reporting Advisor	9
MAIL	TA	Margot	Sangster	Program Management and Coordination	9

				Advisor	
	S	XXXXXX			
	CP	XXXXXX			
MoTCA	TA	Fara	Abbas	Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor	10
MoTCA	TA	Mohammed	Ehsanul Habib	Public Financial Management Specialist	10
MoTCA	TA	Kenneth	Geyi	Procurement Specialist	10
MoTCA	TA	Aminullah	Said	Program Development Specialist / Civil Engineer	10
	S	XXXXXX			
MoPH	CP	Ghulam Sarwar	Homayee	HRD Consultant	10
MoPH	CP	Dr Shahwalli	Mashid	Hospital Reform Project Technical Consultant	10
MoPH	CP	Dr Ashaq Khan	Saodaty	Vascular Surgery Specialist	10
MoPH	TA	Hakim	Adeeb	Bio-Medical Engineering Advisor	10
MoPH	TA	Mohd. Mahboob	Alam	Provincial Human Resources Advisor	10
MoPH	TA	Ghafar Khan	Bawar	Plastic Surgery Advisor	10
MoPH	TA	Jason	Etheredge	Clinical Specialization & Residence Program Advisor	10
MoPH	TA	Anwar Saeed	Kailvi	Provincial Human Resources Advisor	10
MoPH	TA	Ahmad Shakib	Ludin	HR Information Systems Advisor	10
MoPH	TA	Yousuf Ali	Rahimi	Treatment Protocol Advisor	10
MoPH	TA	Santanu	Sanyal	Hospital Management Advisor	10
	S	XXXXXX			
MRRD	CP	Zalmai	Hurmat	M & E Director	13
MRRD	CP	Eng. Kazim	Toraby		13
MRRD	CP	Eng. Moh. Naim	Barekzai	Social Protection Department	
MRRD	CP	Amin	Kohistani	Reporting Unit	
MRRD	TA	Isaac	Msukwa	Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor	13
MRRD	TA	Arvind Kumar	Sinha	Emergency and Social Protection Advisor	13
MoUDA	S	Mohammad Marouf	Azizi	ICT Director	13
MoUDA	S	Eng. Rahim	Ziarmal	Planning & Policy Director	13
	CP	XXXXXX			
	CP	XXXXXX			
	CP	XXXXXX			
MoUDA	TA	Khalil	Chamseddine	MIS Advisor	13
MoUDA	TA	Fernando	Da Cruz	Urban Policy Advisor	13
MoUDA	TA	Frank	Kabudula	Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor	13
MoUDA	TA	Abdul Wassay	Rahim	Policy and Program Advisor	13
MoE	S	Prof. Mohammad Naeem	Baheen	General Director of General Education	14
MoE	S	Eng. Abdul Momin	Raad	Director of ISD	14

MoE	CP	Samir	Amin	Head of GMU	14
MoE	CP	Eng, Reshad	Aziz	ISD	14
MoE	CP	M. Yasin	Hotak	Head of Planning, ISD	14
MoE	CP	Atiqullah	Kamahad	Database Officer, ISD	14
MoE	CP	Eng. Hamidullah	Rahimee	ISD Equipment Focal Point	14
MoE	CP	Eng. Sayed Omar	Sultani	Acting Manager, M&E, ISD	14
MoE	CP	Bahir Ali	Wyaar	General Education Program Coordinator	14
MoE	TA	Chand	Bibi	National Level Decentralization Policy & Strategy Advisor	14
MoE	TA	Samo	Hafeezullah	Capacity Development Advisor for Basic Education	14
MoE	TA	Abdul Ghaffar	Jabarkhail	Grant Management Unit Advisor	14
	S & CP	None Available			
I D L G	TA	Jawid	Maqsoudi	Public Administration Reform Advisor	14
I D L G	TA	Gulalai	Momand	Capacity Building Specialist	14
MoCIT	S	Muhammad Aimal	Marjan	ICT Director General	15
	CP	XXXXXX			
MoCIT	TA	Mohammad	Alauddin	System Development Procurement Advisor	15
MoCIT	TA	Rahul	Arya	Human Resources Advisor	15
MoCIT	TA	Bahawodin	Baha	Capacity Building Advisor	15
MoEW	S	Waliullah	Jabarkhil	Director of Procurement	15
MoEW	S	Eng. Zia Gul	Sajulki	DG, Planning and Donor Relations and Cooperation	15
MoEW	CP	Farid Ahmad	Abdulsahimzai	Procurement Officer	15
MoEW	CP	Wais	Arya	Project Manager	15
MoEW	CP	Aminullah	Lashkaryi	PMU Director, Water Sector	15
MoEW	CP	Akhtar Mohammad	Rajabi		15
MoEW	CP	Eng.	Shabnam	Engineer	15
MoEW	CP	Hizbullah	Stanikzai	Project Management Advisor	15
MoEW	TA	Subhash Chandra	Gupta	Transmission and Distribution Advisor	15
MoEW	TA	Saeed Aoalya	Hashimi	Procurement MIS Advisor	15
MoEW	TA	Saif Rahman	Qargha	Planning Specialist for Projects	15
MoF	S	Fardin	Sedqi	Director General Executive for Policy	16
MoF	S & CP	Mujeeb	Rahman Shirzad	Director of Project implementation Unit	16
MoF	TA	Bismark	Sukanda	Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor	16
CAO	TA	Hoveyda	Abbas	Audit Planning and Reporting Advisor	22
CAO	TA	Rajvir	Singh	Audit Planning and Reporting Advisor	22
ANDMA	Not Selected	Mir Lais	Mustafa	Research Advisor	
ANSA	Not Selected	Yar Mohd	Taraky	Policy and Program Advisor	

KM	Not Selected	Naim	Abdul Wahid	Road and Bridge Design Advisor	
KM	Not Selected	Faisal	Sharifi	Civil Engineering Advisor	
MoCI	Not Selected	Gerlad	Nyamatcherenga	Outreach and Communication Advisor	
MoCI	Not Selected	Uttam	Parkash	Fair Competition Advisor	
MoCI	Not Selected	Farid Ahmad	Wardak	Consumer Protection Advisor	
MoCN	Not Selected	Abbie	Aryan	Law Enforcement Advisor	
MoCN	Not Selected	Azatullah	Asmat	Provincial Planning Advisor	
MoCN	Not Selected	Abdul Aziz	Babakarkhail	Policy Development Advisor	
MoCN	Not Selected	Tajuddin	Millatmal	Drug Demand Reduction Advisor	
MoCN	Not Selected	Malik	Najibullah	Alternative Livelihood Advisor	
MoE	On Leave	Omar Khan	Azizi	Sr. Infrastructure Planning And Mgmt Specialist	
MoE	On Leave	Ahmed	Yasser	Capacity Development Adv for Inclusive Education	
MoFA	Not Selected	Khwaga	Kakar	Program Development Advisor	
MoFA	Not Selected	Roya	Rahmani	Program Management Advisor	
MoLSA	Not Selected	Pradeep B. C	Kumar	Disability Coordination and Program Development Advisor	
MoLSA	Not Selected	Waheed	Saifi	External Relation Advisor	
MoLSAMD	Not Selected	Karen	Coats	Program/Project Design and Implementation Advisor	
MoRR	Not Selected	M. Rafiq	Swash	Information Management Advisor	
MRRD	On Leave	Mustafa	Rasuli	Information Management Advisor	
NEPA	Not Selected	Deepak Kumar	Upadhayay	Financial Management Advisor	

<b>TAs</b>		
41	Interviewed	65.08%
19	Not Selected	30.16%
3	On Leave	4.76%
63	Total	100.00%

<b>Interviewed TAs</b>	<b>Not Selected TAs</b>	<b>On Leave TAs</b>	<b>Total TAs</b>
41	19	3	63
65.08%	30.16%	4.76%	100.00%

## **APPENDIX D. QUESTIONNAIRES**

### **1. CTAP Research Questions- Counterpart**

COUNTERPART – The mid-level manager assigned to support, work and partner with the TA

- Describe how the TA is suited to the ToR, the job, and the environment. Does the TA experience, education, people skills and attitude suit them to the job? Do you feel the advisor was the right person for the job?
- How do you support or facilitate the TA logistically?
- For example, desk space, office equipment, IT, transport, accommodation, security?
- Do you have the time and interest to support the TA?
- How effective has the TA been at improving institutional capacity?
- Do you feel you will be able to maintain new practices once the TA leaves? Why or why not?
- To what extent, as practical, has the TA promoted gender mainstreaming?
- What will be the long-term benefits of CTAP to your organization?
- What best practices have you come across that should be continued across the program?
- What areas of CTAP need improvement? Recommendations?

### 3. CTAP Research Questions- Client/Supervisor

CLIENT/SUPERVISOR – Senior manager from agency or ministry which requests/negotiates placement (DG or DM), etc., pr Supervises the TA

- Describe your involvement in recruitment. How is the TA ultimately selected?
- How engaged are you with managing and directing the TA? Are your views represented?
- How do counterparts get assigned, what's the criteria?
- Describe how the TA is suited to the ToR, the job, and the environment.
- Does the TA experience, education, people skills and attitude suit them to the job?
- How well has the TA been able to build the capacity of counterparts to do their jobs better?
- How have the skills and capacity of agency counterparts improved since the TA was placed?
- How effective has the TA been at improving institutional capacity? How? Specify with examples.
- What policies, procedures, systems etc., have been improved or created since the TA was placed?
- Has the TA met ToR expectations. Why or why not?
- To what extent does the program promote sustainability after the TA leaves? How?
- When the TA leaves, how well will counterparts be able to undertake their roles as expected by their agencies?
- What best practices have you come across that should be continued across the program?
- What areas of CTAP need improvement? Recommendations?

### **3. CTAP Questionnaire-Technical Advisors**

- How were you recruited? Describe the process:
- Prompts: Timeline – Contacts – Responsiveness – Organized – Gender – Transparent
- What problems, if any, did you encounter in the recruitment process?
  
- How were you supported logistically: adequate desk/office space? IT/phone/network? Transport/logistics? Accommodation? Security? Did this affect the quality of your work?
- Did you incorporate gender mainstreaming emphasis in your work? If a woman – how have you been treated?
  
- To what extent was your local counterpart engaged and supportive? How well-qualified were they to serve the role of a counterpart?
  
- Do you feel you were adequately prepared for your placement?
  
- To what extent did the ToR/placement match your skills and experience? To what extent did the ToR reflect your actual duties?
  
- What effect did you have in improving institutional capacity?
  
- Describe the policies, systems, procedures improved since your placement. To what extent did you facilitate these improvements?
  
- If you weren't able to achieve your goals as stated in the ToR, what factors inhibited progress? Why?
  
- How effectively were you able to mentor your counterpart/s? Why?
  
- How has the skills and capacity of agency counterparts improved since you arrived? Why or why not?
  
- To what extent do you believe your counterpart agency will be able to continue to operate once you leave? When you leave, how well will counterparts be able to undertake their roles as expected by their agencies?
  
- To what extent have you been able to promote gender mainstreaming? Why or why not? Has this been part of your job description as you understand it?
  
- What do you feel will be the long term benefits of your placement?
  
- What best practices have you come across that should be continued across the program?
  
- What areas of CTAP need improvement? Recommendations?

#### 4. Mini Survey for Technical Advisors

1. How did you learn about this position? Please select all that apply. - ReliefWeb, CTAP Secretariat web page, referral from CTAP Secretariat Staff, referral from CTAP International Technical Advisor, Referral from CTAP Local Ministry Counterpart, referral from other International Staff (for example, USAID, DFID, AusAID or UN agencies (please describe), Other (please describe)
2. How long did it take to recruit and deploy you?  
1-2 months, 3-4 months, 5-6 months, 7-9 months, 10-12 months
3. Have you received the following logistical support? Please select all that apply.
  - ☐ work space: desk and chair
  - ☐ internet, computer
  - ☐ office equipment/stationary
  - ☐ electrical power
  - ☐ security
  - ☐ communications/telephones
  - ☐ transportation
  - ☐ accommodation
  - ☐ general administrative support
4. On a scale of 1 to 10, how well do you feel you were prepared to operate in this environment?  
1 being not well prepared, 10 being very well prepared
5. What percentage of your time is spent facilitating or mentoring.  
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. On a scale of 1 to 10, how well do you feel supported?  
1 being not supported, 10 being very well supported
7. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the qualifications of your Counterpart?  
1 being not well qualified, 10 being very well qualified
8. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the engagement of your Counterpart?  
1 being minimal engagement, 10 being very well engaged
9. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the improvement in the ability of your host agency to undertake its function as a result of your placement?



1 being no improvement, 10 being substantial improvement

10. Have you been able to help create, facilitate, or improve:

- plans
- policies
- systems
- procedures
- functional areas
- operational units
- other (please describe)

11. Are you male or female?

12. Have there been any gender issues that have affected your placement or effectiveness? If yes, please describe.

13. If you answered: Yes there have been gender issues that have affected your placement or effectiveness, how were these issues addressed or resolved? Please describe.

14. Have you had any duties or responsibilities associated with gender integration or gender mainstreaming? If yes, please describe.

15. On a scale of 1 to 10, how effective has been the mentoring of your counterpart?

1 being not effective, 10 being very effective

16. On a scale of 1 to 10, how successfully have skills been transferred to your counterpart?

1 being not successful, 10 being very successful

17. On a scale of 1 to 10, how likely do you think your counterpart will be able to take over from you when you leave? 1 being not successful, 10 being very successful

18. What percentage of your time is spent performing agency tasks or functions?


10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

19. Do you have any specific recommendations for improvement of the performance of the CTAP Secretariat? Please describe.


## APPENDIX E. MINI-SURVEY REPORT (FROM SURVEY MONKEY)

1. How did you learn about this position? Please select all that apply.		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
ReliefWeb	18.2%	6
CTAP Afghanistan web page	51.5%	17
Referral from CTAP Secretariat Staff	0.0%	0
Referral from CTAP International Technical Advisor	9.1%	3
Referral from CTAP Local Ministry Counterpart	6.1%	2
Referral from International Staff (for example, USAID, DFID, AusAid, or UN agencies, please describe)	18.2%	6
Other (please specify)	9.1%	3
<b>answered question</b>		<b>33</b>
<b>skipped question</b>		<b>0</b>

Number	Response Date	Other (please specify)	Categories
1	Oct 13, 2012 7:04 AM	My friend and colleague.	
2	Oct 11, 2012 3:02 PM	www.preventionweb.net	
3	Oct 10, 2012 6:54 AM	http://unjobs.org/	




2. How long did it take to recruit and deploy you?		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
1-2 months	30.3%	10
3-4 months	42.4%	14
5-6 months	18.2%	6
7-9 months	9.1%	3
10-12 months	0.0%	0
<i>answered question</i>		<b>33</b>
<i>skipped question</i>		<b>0</b>




3. Have you received the following logistical support? Please select all that apply.		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Work space: desk and chair	90.9%	30
Internet, computer	54.5%	18
Office equipment/stationery	57.6%	19
Electrical power	78.8%	26
Security	45.5%	15
Communications, telephones	36.4%	12
Transportation	51.5%	17
Accommodation	48.5%	16
General Administrative Support	66.7%	22
<b>answered question</b>		<b>33</b>
<b>skipped question</b>		<b>0</b>




4. On a scale of 1 to 10, how well do you feel you were prepared to operate in this environment?												
Answer Options	1 Not well prepared	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Very well prepared	Rating Average	Response Count
	0	1	1	0	2	7	2	9	5	6	7.52	33
<i>answered question</i>												<b>33</b>
<i>skipped question</i>												<b>0</b>




5. What percent of your time is spent facilitating or mentoring?		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
10%	0.0%	0
20%	3.0%	1
30%	9.1%	3
40%	15.2%	5
50%	3.0%	1
60%	21.2%	7
70%	9.1%	3
80%	18.2%	6
90%	9.1%	3
100%	12.1%	4
<i>answered question</i>		<b>33</b>
<i>skipped question</i>		<b>0</b>



6. On a scale of 1 to 10, how well do you feel supported?												
Answer Options	1 Not supported	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Very well supported	Rating Average	Response Count
	1	0	3	3	6	3	8	5	0	2	6.00	31
answered question												31
skipped question												2




7. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the qualifications of your Counterpart?												
Answer Options	1 Not well qualified	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Very well qualified	Rating Average	Response Count
	2	1	2	7	7	4	1	4	3	0	5.26	31
<i>answered question</i>												<b>31</b>
<i>skipped question</i>												<b>2</b>






8. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the engagement of your Counterpart?												
Answer Options	1 Not engaged	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Very well engaged	Rating Average	Response Count
	0	1	1	2	7	6	7	1	3	3	6.39	31
<i>answered question</i>												<b>31</b>
<i>skipped question</i>												<b>2</b>




9. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the improvement in the ability of your host agency to undertake its function as a result of your placement?												
Answer Options	1 No improvement	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Substantial improvement	Rating Average	Response Count
	0	0	1	2	5	4	10	6	1	2	6.68	31
<i>answered question</i>												<b>31</b>
<i>skipped question</i>												<b>2</b>




10. Have you been able to help, facilitate, or improve conditions in any of the following areas? Please select all that apply.		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Plans	87.1%	27
Policies	71.0%	22
Systems	80.6%	25
Procedures	90.3%	28
Functional areas	83.9%	26
Operational units	67.7%	21
Other (please specify)	12.9%	4
<b>answered question</b>		<b>31</b>
<b>skipped question</b>		<b>2</b>

Number	Response Date	Other (please specify)	Categories
1	Oct 13, 2012 9:49 AM	Staff capacity/level of training specific to their ToR	
2	Oct 13, 2012 6:01 AM	Communication and Control of the ministry to the stakeholders has been improved a lot. Job related Technical skill and analytical capacity (Management Skills) has been improved considerable level. Organizational efficiency and excellence improved than previous years. Profitability increased 21% than previous year due to improvement of control and reporting.	
3	Oct 11, 2012 3:04 PM	Improvement of day to day reporting and communication system	
4	Oct 10, 2012 6:57 AM	Assisted Project Management Offices in Tender Preparation , Tendering , Evaluating Tenders and concluding contract .	




11. Are you male or female?		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Female	16.1%	5
Male	83.9%	26
<i>answered question</i>		<b>31</b>
<i>skipped question</i>		<b>2</b>



12. If female, have there been any gender issues that have affected your placement or effectiveness? If yes, please describe.		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	9.7%	3
No	90.3%	28
If Yes, please describe		3
<i>answered question</i>		<b>31</b>
<i>skipped question</i>		<b>2</b>

Number	Response Date	If Yes, please describe	Categories
1	Oct 11, 2012 11:05 AM	Systemic sexism and sexual harassment at times. Sometimes I am made invisible in meetings or discussions. In terms of sexual harassment I have not felt threatened rather it has been suggested that I might like to become romantically or sexually involved with Afghan staff -- counterpart and other program staff. I view all of this to be cultural in nature although obviously some personalities more involved than others.	
2	Oct 10, 2012 8:36 PM	Female Staff hardly can avail the Capacity Development Opportunities	
3	Oct 10, 2012 9:52 AM	male	




If you answered Yes, there have been gender issues that have affected your placement or effectiveness to Question 16, how were these issues addressed and/or resolved? Please describe.		
Answer Options	Response Count	
	3	
<i>answered question</i>	3	
<i>skipped question</i>	30	

Number	Response Date	Response Text	Categories
1	Oct 11, 2012 3:07 PM	NA	
2	Oct 11, 2012 11:05 AM	These issues were resolved informally by me. I simply said not interested and or not an option. People with histories of trauma continually test boundaries and there are a large number of misconceptions due to Bollywood movies, cross-cultural differences, etc. Dressing appropriately is very helpful and minimizing physical contact between the sexes is also important.	
3	Oct 10, 2012 9:52 AM	none	

13. Have you had any duties or responsibilities associated with gender integration or gender mainstreaming? If yes, please describe.		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	22.6%	7
No	77.4%	24
If Yes, please describe		8
<i>answered question</i>		<b>31</b>
<i>skipped question</i>		<b>2</b>


Number	Response Date	If Yes, please describe	Categories
1	Oct 15, 2012 6:44 AM	I provide information on Gender policies, Empowerment tools, guides and activities	
2	Oct 14, 2012 2:04 PM	Though it is not specifically mentioned in my TOR, I still consider, as a Disability Advisor to the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, it is my responsibility to mainstream gender in all issues related to people with disabilities	
3	Oct 11, 2012 3:07 PM	Development of Organizational strategy, which describe the cross cutting issues. Gender is one of them in the organizational strategy.	
4	Oct 11, 2012 11:05 AM	But I make it a point to upon thoughtful observation to speak out and or support women whenever I can. I try to mentor all female staff possible regarding personal, career and or academic issues.	
5	Oct 10, 2012 8:36 PM	Balance Recruitment distribution	
6	Oct 10, 2012 1:36 PM	We were developing operational indicators for the Ministry. my role was to make ensure that that the indicators were engendered where appropriate.	
7	Oct 10, 2012 7:15 AM	Inclusion of gender considerations in NPP documents, ensuring stronger participation of women in planning, decision-making and service delivery, as well as beneficiaries.	
8	Oct 10, 2012 7:01 AM	I tried to encourage female professionals of MoM to get better engaged and make more contributions in planning , policy making and project preparation in MoM	

Have you had any duties or responsibilities associated with gender integration or gender mainstreaming? If yes, please describe.







14. On a scale of 1 to 10, how effective has been the mentoring of your Counterpart?												
Answer Options	1 Not effective	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Very effective	Rating Average	Response Count
	0	0	1	0	0	10	12	4	2	2	7.00	31
answered question												31
skipped question												2




15. On a scale of 1 to 10, how successfully have skills been transferred to your Counterpart?												
Answer Options	1 successfully	Not	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 successfully	Very
	0	0	0	1	2	6	11	6	4	1		
Rating Average												7.13
Response Count												31
answered question												31
skipped question												2



16. On a scale of 1 to 10, how likely do you think your Counterpart will be able to take over from you when you leave?												
Answer Options	1 Not likely	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Very likely	Rating Average	Response Count
	0	0	0	1	3	3	11	8	3	2	7.26	31
<i>answered question</i>												<b>31</b>
<i>skipped question</i>												<b>2</b>



17. What percentage of your time is spent performing agency tasks or functions?		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
10%	19.4%	6
20%	16.1%	5
30%	3.2%	1
40%	16.1%	5
50%	16.1%	5
60%	6.5%	2
70%	12.9%	4
80%	3.2%	1
90%	3.2%	1
100%	3.2%	1
<i>answered question</i>		<b>31</b>
<i>skipped question</i>		<b>2</b>



18. Do you have any specific recommendations for improvement of the performance of the CTAP Secretariat? Please describe.	
Answer Options	Response Count
	31
<i>answered question</i>	<b>31</b>
<i>skipped question</i>	<b>2</b>

Number	Response Date	Response Text	Categories
1	Oct 19, 2012 3:06 PM	I am fully satisfied about all staff of CTAP performance.	
2	Oct 17, 2012 6:45 AM	CTAP framework is well designed and monitored. In this framework the ownership is with Afghan people and it is good thing in a capacity building program.	
3	Oct 17, 2012 6:32 AM	No specific comments, as I find the CTAP framework appropriately designed and working.	
4	Oct 16, 2012 4:50 AM	CTAP Secretariat needs to put in place good management practices so that it can professionally manage such a big program CTAP having more than 70 Technical Advisors.	
5	Oct 15, 2012 6:45 AM	Continue the Secretariat without a Director. When Director is involved, the program becomes more political than technical	
6	Oct 15, 2012 6:36 AM	Secretariat staff need training in their relevant area of work. Internal and external communication needs to be developed.	
7	Oct 14, 2012 2:09 PM	It will be helpful if the CTAP secretariat reiterate the role of the Technical Advisors to the ministry and also enable us to get the essential support and cooperation from the ministry at all times.	
8	Oct 13, 2012 1:38 PM	No specific comments	
9	Oct 13, 2012 9:54 AM	M&E is frequently more focused on document completion than verifying or understanding the document content. Secretariat performs well in explaining the CTAP mandate/goals to the ministry, but performs poorly in actively troubleshooting or problem solving with advisors and ministry staff. Repeating the mandate over and over again without actively analyzing the specifics of each ministry or placement and taking steps to address what needs to be done in that context (whether management needs, logistical needs, etc.) is ineffective.	
10	Oct 13, 2012 9:26 AM	1. Communication and Response to issues raised by the Advisors in their respective ministries has to improve 2. CTAP needs to file all physical reports from Advisors 3. Possibly, CTAP Secretariat should have had at least two International Advisors so that they ably handle diverse demands from an international perspective	
11	Oct 13, 2012 7:22 AM	No recommendations. They are fine. Great thoughts, big achievements and permanent changes come only through a cordial and natural action. We see a great improvement in the attitude of secretariat to approach the TAs. Their mode of support has also been changed a good deal from fault finding mode to acknowledgement mode. Probably this attitude may give some strength to the Secretariat to achieve the objectives of the mission.	
12	Oct 13, 2012 7:10 AM	The secretariat could strengthen itself and be a support factor for the TAs. At this point, I feel, the secretariat is a little detached from the advisers, owing largely to the lack of human resources. Additionally, the secretariat could do better by being more diverse and representative in its employment of staff.	

		Lastly, the CD team was supposed to have thematic teams, which since I have started work with CTAP (9 months ago) has been non-existent. The TAs could surely benefit from learning their colleagues experiences in the same functional and thematic areas.
13	Oct 13, 2012 5:54 AM	we need more professional section heads who are technically strong, who are more experienced to guide the TAs who are coming with more than 15 years of experience.
14	Oct 13, 2012 3:56 AM	CTAP should be managed professionally.
15	Oct 11, 2012 6:54 PM	it is imperative that CTAP support the Consultants with providing long term English and computer courses for the counterparts and push the ministries and agencies for the implementation of policies, procedures and guide lines that have been developed by the advisors
16	Oct 11, 2012 3:08 PM	Providing regular update and orientation for enhancement of effectiveness of the Adviser
17	Oct 11, 2012 11:16 AM	1.Increase on-site monitoring support and action. 2.Increase commitment to gender issues both within the secretariat (e.g. hire more women) and in the ministry assignments (e.g. hire more female advisors and require the ministries to provide more female counterparts. 3. Make working 5 days per week the expectation not 6 days per week. This is a challenging work environment and CTAP should encourage advisors to take care of their mental and physical health. I have observed problematic behaviors in some CTAP Advisors for example regarding alcohol. 4. Increase the ethnic diversity in the CTAP Secretariat to represent the country ethnicity demographics. 5. Publicize and adhere to set office hours in the Secretariat. 6. Treat advisors as professionals. A few CTAP staff let their own personality issues and ethnic biases negatively impact interactions with advisors.
18	Oct 11, 2012 11:09 AM	I understand the environment has profound effect on the mentoring and capacity building and if that is improved by provision of some facilities like internet, and wide place for training, I understand that can further enhance our capacity building and mentoring activities. Counter parts are often busy in their routine works and that impede our mentoring strategies. Schedules must be strictly followed. The capacity of our counter parts are very limited we need to train them in addition to our area of expertise, English language too.
19	Oct 11, 2012 4:25 AM	The staff at CTAP secretariat change regularly which affect some functions of the CTAP secretariat. Otherwise, most of the senior colleagues are excellent. Their policy to charge the tax is inconsistent and the amount of tax that the charge is not according to the law of Afghanistan. They should apply the tax law properly.
20	Oct 11, 2012 2:22 AM	No
21	Oct 10, 2012 8:38 PM	Leadership, Capacity Building and Process Mapping
22	Oct 10, 2012 5:46 PM	need more international for effective performance
23	Oct 10, 2012 2:46 PM	Work permit and visa processing may be done faster.
24	Oct 10, 2012 1:42 PM	CTAP should consider the possibility of hiring professional translators for international technical advisors. Communication has been the major barrier to transfer of skills.
25	Oct 10, 2012 9:54 AM	none
26	Oct 10, 2012 8:57 AM	None at the moment.
27	Oct 10, 2012 7:21	No any such specific recommendation as CTAP is providing very good support and also visiting office on regular basis to resolve the issue, if any between the TA and Ministry.

	<b>AM</b>	
<b>28</b>	<b>Oct 10, 2012 7:16 AM</b>	Strong engagement of host ministries at package level
<b>29</b>	<b>Oct 10, 2012 7:07 AM</b>	CTAP must further assist TAs in obtaining logistics [may be PCs and Cell phones, stations ]. Other advisers working in MoM get these from the employer . CTAP must expedite processing visas . There should more interactions of CTAP secretariat with Ministries in integrating CTAP TAs. There should be regular CTAP TAs co-ordination meetings and thematic group meetings. In some meetings representatives of Development partners like USAID, GIZ and USAID etc. Regular monthly Newsletter should carry success stories . CTAP should alert TAs of security situation regularly.
<b>30</b>	<b>Oct 10, 2012 7:06 AM</b>	Operational support in terms of finance and the support to discuss the issues with the Agency i.e. dari language, day to day needs of office equipment, making involvement on daily work improvement ,etc
<b>31</b>	<b>Oct 10, 2012 7:06 AM</b>	Increase the face-to-face meetings with Ministry Officials and follow up with the obligations and commitments of the client ministries.

## APPENDIX F. SUMMARIZED LIST OF REPORTED RESULTS FROM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS AND MINI-SURVEY

- Noted well-coordinated relationship with counterpart (CTAP-MoPH 10 September 2012)
- [TAs] are working alongside with the counterparts and helping them in their daily tasks. (CTAP-MoEW Ministry of Energy and Water, 15 September 2012)
- Considered a very good program, by means of using the skills of TA's in the right way... (CTAP – MoCIT Ministry of Communication Information and Technology 15 September 2012)
- Moreover, [TAs] have been punctual, pro-active, professional and always available to assist. [TA] has provided numerous power-point presentation/ trainings on diverse technical topics to the local staff and he provides direct technical assistance to the DG and DM too. (Interviews with Ministry of Mines Directors and Advisors, 9 October 2012)
- CTAP's personnel within the Ministry of Mines are very responsive, helpful and cooperative. They take their job seriously and have a tremendous amount of enthusiasm and motivation while it's different with the Adam Smith International and World Bank staff as they have privacy and confidentiality issues in sharing and/or exchanging information with the Ministry's personnel. (Interviews with Ministry of Mines Directors and Advisors, 9 October 2012)
- Since the Ministry is mainly focused on oil and gas projects at this stage of its operation, [TA]'s existence is absolutely critical and it would be very challenging without him for us. (Interviews with Ministry of Mines Directors and Advisors, 9 October 2012)
- We have been able to effectively utilize the TAs' knowledge and skills because our ultimate purpose is not to rely or require their assistance in the future. We asked [TA] to set up training on contract negotiation for us; the training we received was useful, and in the training, we came across terms that were completely new for us. As result of the training received, we now have the necessary skills to develop a lucrative contract. (Interviews with Ministry of Mines Directors and Advisors, 9 October 2012)
- "CTAP TAs are like the backbones of the ministry's capacity building efforts." (Interviews with MoE Directors, undated)
- TAs have played a key role in incorporating new education related ideas from other countries and this has been well received in Afghanistan. (Interviews with MoE Directors, undated)
- With the technical cooperation of the TAs, we managed to restructure the staffing of ISD which as result we now have over 200 personnel. In addition to that, we developed a strategy plan for maintenance and rehabilitation of MoE schools and MIS unit to locate our areas of operation. (Interviews with MoE Directors, undated)
- [TA] has taken on responsibilities far beyond his TOR and the ministry's personnel is learning from him. Dr. Bahawodin has requested skills transfers with more counterparts. (Interviews with Director, MoCIT, 16 October 2012)
- One of my TAs has considerable knowledge of basic and secondary education and all three of my TAs are familiar with the culture of the ministry as well as how it operates. (Interviews with Directors, MoE, undated)
- [TAs] have played a key role in incorporating new education related ideas from other countries and this has been well received in Afghanistan. (Interviews with Directors, MoE, undated)
- Department believes [TA] is the right person for the job and has witnessed him providing not only gas and oil related technical trainings but the Legal Department also receives assistance from him. (Interviews with Advisors from Ministry of Mines, 9 October 2012)
- TAs Moreover have been punctual, pro-active, professional and always available to assist. (Interviews with Directors and Advisors, MoM, 9 October 2012)
- CTAP's personnel within the Ministry of Mines are very responsive, helpful and cooperative. They take their job seriously and have a tremendous amount of enthusiasm and motivation. (Interviews with Directors and Advisors, MoM, 9 October 2012)



- CTAP approach is participatory, which is very effective. (CTAP MoUD Ministry of Urban Development, 13 September 2012).
- Reportedly, in different occasions CTAP has been appreciated by the Afghan cabinet members for the constant services providing to its client ministries even in critical conditions. This is because, in times when the security situation in Kabul gets challenged, some organizations such as UNDP and World Bank would pull their advisors away from the Ministries while this is not the case with CTAP. (CTAP Secretariat 10-07-2012- Elias)
- CTAP has received multiple appreciation letters from different ministries for their outstanding services provided and changes they have brought to their areas of responsibility (CTAP Secretariat 10-07-2012- Elias)
- Improved capacity of the Ministry's personnel is one of the major long lasting benefits from TAs. Moreover, CTAP's effective working mechanism has resulted in the best possible technical assistance delivery through cost effective and competent TAs. Local ownership of the TAs, their integration and confidence has made them different from other donor agencies' advisors. (Interviews with Ministry of Mines Directors and Advisors, 9 October 2012)
- Of the good things about the CTAP program, their TAs are actively engaged with their counterparts assisting them in enhancing their capacity. To what extent the TAs expertise are used in the ministries ultimately rests on the capacity of the civil servants on how make the maximum use of their respective TAs. (Interviews with Ministry of Finance Supervisors, 16 October 2012)
- CTAP has been an efficient capacity building program for the Ministry. (Interviews with MoEW Directors, 15 October 2012)
- The Ministry of Communications, Information & Technology has been achieving its capacity building objectives through capable TAs and their Afghan counterparts. This is because the recruitment process for technical advisors has been transparent, merit based and precise. (Interviews with ICT Director General, 16 October 2012)
- We have received technical trainings on project management and staff recruitment processes. (Counterparts, MoEW, 15 October 2012)
- We are now in the process of receiving a Dam specialist to provide the Ministry with technical assistance in this field, with the TA's assistance. (Counterparts, MoEW, 15 October 2012)
- On different occasions CTAP has been commended by Afghan cabinet members for the consistent services to client Ministries even in critical conditions – when security issues become heightened in Kabul, CTAP is available while others like UNDP and the World Bank have their advisors pulled away. (Interviews with CTAP Capacity Development Advisors, 7 October 2012)
- CTAP has provided its client Ministries with TOR and RFA templates. (Interviews with CTAP Capacity Development Advisors, 7 October 2012)
- When TAs arrive in country they receive a 120 page booklet on transferring skills to local counterparts and a three-day orientation on safety, security and Afghan culture. (Interviews with CTAP Capacity Development Advisors, 7 October 2012)
- CTAP has received multiple appreciation letters from different Ministries for outstanding services provided and changes they have brought to their areas of responsibility. (Interviews with CTAP Capacity Development Advisors, 7 October 2012)
- In MoCIT, the TAs are not only providing technical assistance for a particular counterpart but an entire directorate is benefiting from their knowledge and skills. (Supervisor, MoCIT, 16 October 2012)
- With the technical assistance of the TAs, we managed to restructure ISD staffing and as a result we now have over 200 personnel. In addition, we developed a strategy plan for maintenance and rehabilitation of MoE schools and MIS unit to locate our areas of operation. (Supervisor, MoE, undated)
- One of the major long lasting benefits of the TAs is improved capacity of the Ministry's personnel. Moreover, CTAP's effective working mechanism has resulted the best possible technical assistance through cost effective and competent TAs. Local ownership of the TAs,

along with their integration and confidence has made them different from other donor agency advisors. (Interviews with Directors and Advisors, MoM, 9 October 2012)

- Prior to the arrival of my assigned TA, I conducted an analysis and need assessment of my department to determine my strengths, weaknesses, and areas to invest in capacity building efforts. These needs were presented to the TA upon his arrival and this tremendously helped him understand the areas for him to focus on. In the two months since I received the TA, he has already been able to develop a good working plan and has demonstrated a high level of discipline, punctuality, hard work, and good behavior. (Interviews with Directors, MoF, 16 October 2012)

### From the Mini-Survey

- Staff capacity/level of training specific to their ToR
- Communication and Control of the ministry to the stakeholders has been improved a lot. Job related Technical skill and analytical capacity (Management Skills) has been improved considerable level. Organizational efficiency and excellence improved than previous years. Profitability increased 21% than previous year due to improvement of control and reporting.
- Improvement of day to day reporting and communication system
- Assisted Project Management Offices in Tender Preparation, Tendering, Evaluating Tenders and concluding contract .
- I provide information on Gender policies, Empowerment tools, guides and activities
- Though it is not specifically mentioned in my TOR, I still consider, as a Disability Advisor to the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, it is my responsibility to mainstream gender in all issues related to people with disabilities
- Development of Organizational strategy, which describe the cross cutting issues. Gender is one of them in the organizational strategy.
- I try to mentor all female staff possible regarding personal, career and or academic issues.
- Balance Recruitment distribution
- We were developing operational indicators for the Ministry. My role was to make ensure that that the indicators were engendered where appropriate.
- Inclusion of gender considerations in NPP documents, ensuring stronger participation of women in planning, decision-making and service delivery, as well as beneficiaries.
- I tried to encourage female professionals of MoM to get better engaged and make more contributions in planning , policy making and project preparation in MoM



## **APPENDIX G. REFERENCES AND SOURCES OF NORMS AND STANDARDS**

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Staff Rules: Staff Regulations of the United Nations and Provisional Staff Rules, United Nations, 21 October 2009 (.pdf).

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UNDP Recruitment and Selection Framework, UNDP, 1 July 2009 (.pdf).

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Vacancies and Selection Procedure, CINFO, 2010 (.pdf).

## **ANNEX-H: COMMENTS FROM CTAP SECRETARIAT**

### **Notes on CTAP performance evaluation report comment**

Comment-1 (corrections highlighted)

Statement: Germans and Afghan Government are not mentioned

Description: The report mentioned names of all respected donors possess their valuable contribution except Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The comment requests to put the name of Afghan Government in list of donors with its minor contribution of USD 500,000.

Comment-2 (page 1)

Statement: But with CTAP capacity development approach and process

Description: The report mentioned that CTAP contributes to support the capacity development initiatives formulated by the client agencies themselves. This is highly important to differentiate between the quoted statement and CTAP practice. This is facts that CTAP is purely government owned and demand driven program, supports the government agencies based on their intensive needs and desires but strongly committed to its approach and methodology in accordance with its process and requirements. CTAP supports the client agencies mainly in institutional system development and human skills development with its unique approach including standardization of procedures, process simplification and improvement, functions development, restructuring and re organization and human skills development.

Comment-3 (page 3)

Statement: This need to be revised. Three panel members are there from client ministry, one from CTAP secretariat and one external observer from outside.

Description: The interview panel set by CTAP consists of three parts. First part possesses senior bureaucratic officials from client agency having direct relation with targeted directorate or/and possessing technical expertise in desired discipline. Second part contains an external international technical expert to assess the core technical expertise/ level of applied candidate and assist the final interview results. While the third part covers one or two panel members from CTAP HR team to facilitate the interview process and oversight the comments and decision of interview body.

Comment-4 (page 3)

Not agreed

Description: CTAP team has provided a comprehensive response in donors' coordination meeting.

Comment-5 (page 3)

Please do recommend that practices to strengthen the process

Description: As mentioned in evaluation report that the existing HR system at secretariat level needs improvement to reach the recognized and acceptable standards. But the essential

steps are not proposed in recommendations that CTAP HR team review the existing system and incorporate the recommended options and practices.

Comment-6 (pages 7-8)

M&E process allows us to assess the situation, develop the system, implement the system and coach the national staff on applied system to continue. This process has taken around two years and now CTAP needs to divert its attention towards best management practices, attitudes and behaviors with change management process. This is fact that CTAP needs to pay its attention but after setting a reasonable system and improving staff capacity.

The second conflict in the area of capacity measurement was that CDD had taken this responsibility on their shoulders due to unknown reasons. Though it was discussed by our former M&E manager but CDD international advisor emphasized on this point to measure the capacity development through their own selected and developed approaches.

Description: CTAP is one of the capacity development initiatives to enhance the overall institutional and human capacity of government agencies on national and sub national level. The main capacity development theme of program covers Standardization of procedures, process simplification and improvement, functions development, restructuring and reorganization, business process and reengineering and human skills development. M&E department truly initiated its core function in January 2011 with the proper identification of its scope of work divided into four main areas. The process was started from the scratch and a secretariat level detailed review was conducted to understand the program philosophy and commence the system from a crucial/essential point to turn on the department's engine.

The placed team initiated M&E and Reporting system in accordance with donors' mandates and requirements. Program review process was developed with its comprehensive scope of work and tools. All targeted directorates were provided M&E frameworks and intervention logics to place program commitments and their desired deliverables in capacity development mainstream. To strengthen the progress tracking and assessing the ground realities a strong coordination system was placed to triangulate the shared information with targeted departments' supervisors and counterparts. To ensure the stakeholders coordination and placement of a knowledge management system, M&E team developed program documentation system and launched an information sharing process on periodic basis.

The first priority of M&E team was to track the program progress on output and then on outcomes level. The monthly and quarterly reporting system supported the process on individual TA and client directorate level respectively. This is fact that CTAP M&E team mainly focused on program progress in accordance with its commitment and desired outcomes. But this is worth to mention that M&E department also conducted and assisted the placed advisors in initial situational analysis. Frameworks/tools development and baseline assessments on client directorate level. The placed system is also able to conduct the mid-term and end term review on client directorate and overall program level. Additionally,

stakeholders coordination and reporting mechanisms are in place and fully functional with various pace of acceleration in different times.

The mentioned process took longer time in development, consultation, finalization and execution due to verity of reasons. For instance the nature and execution pattern of program was the first challenge faced by the M&E team in the placement of the above mentioned system. Secondly consultation with stakeholders on proposed M&E process and reporting system was delayed around 6 months and had hold the execution and placement of system.

M&E department had planned to initiate the monitoring process of capacity measurement on semiannual basis. This intention was detained my senior program management and the responsibility was handed over to the Capacity Development department. So the capacity measurement activity was taken out from the M&E department's scope of work. This has caused a serous deficiency in the comprehensive role of M&E department on overall program level. Addition to this, the overall acceptability on client agency level have been one of the major challenges. The program monitoring and reporting system was considered an undue interference of CTAP/MoF in the domestic business of the agency. To maintain and keep the situation normal M&E team has tried to penetrate responsibly respond patiently and technically to the queries of targeted directorates or client agencies.

All the above mentioned reasons delayed the overall M&E system development and its execution process. And the team could not accomplish the desirable milestones in given time frame of two years.

Finally, M&E department has planned (already shared with USAID) to initiate program level assessment to measure the overall effectiveness of CTAP approach, adaptation of best management practices and change/development in perceptions, behaviors and attitudes of national level bureaucracy at client directorates' level. The process shall be designed up to the end of March 2013 and placement shall be possible up to June 2013. The commitment contains number of assumptions and contingencies.

#### Comment-7 (page 9)

This is fact that this process needs serious improvement but needs more time to convince the client ministries in understanding and improving the existing coordination level. Some of the agencies blame CTAP to interfere in their authorities So CTAP is penetrating slowly and gradually to apply its desired system and coordination mechanism on client agencies' level.

Description: The expansion of program Mission and Vision have been an argument in CTAP evaluation report. This recommendation is highly and respectfully accepted by program technical team. But this intention needs a detailed internal and external assessment to revisit the program intervention logic, existing pattern and prescribed resources. The ongoing program pattern has caused number of challenges on client agencies' level. The slow adaptation of new and unique process is very common and natural on government level. So the pre execution assessment shall support the new/proposed framework in terms of capacity development with institutional and human skills development. One humble request in this



process is to focus the program intervention in a specific direction of capacity building. The results and expectations should not be expended beyond the programs' scope of work/authority. This will contribute in the clarification of program intervention framework and execution format. The program shall be provided a clear definition with set objectives, expected outcomes and set outputs.

Comment-8 (page 25)

This has never been the case. In some instances, the panel members from the ministries are not experts in subject matter and do not have full technical understanding of the position; so, they might have had a collective decision of scoring the candidate at the end of the selection interview.

Description: CTAP team has provided a comprehensive response in donors' coordination meeting.

Comment-9 (page 29)

TAs have been provided with security alerts on a regular basis; it only stopped after the responsible person left CTAP but was soon re-started on the deployment of the new Security Officer.

Description: CTAP team has provided a comprehensive response in donors' coordination meeting.

Comment-10 (page 40)

CTAP has provided Advisors based on the demand and requirements of ministry. So the segment of contribution on macro level. This is too early to expect the agency level contribution and performance from CTAP technical assistance.

Description: The raised concern is already responded in highlighted paragraph. This is very clear that CTAP has adopted extremely focused and technical approach in providing technical assistance to the client agencies. All 24 client agencies are provided international consultants on top and middle bureaucracy levels. To strengthen the technical backbone of the government agencies, twelve thematic disciplines are covered through 69 international experts on more than 40 client directorates' levels. The standard results chain shall be applied on all three levels having outputs outcomes and impact in the program monitoring and evaluation system but with specific time frame respectively. The macro level contribution in first two years from a program with above approach may not be that much realistic. We do expect macro level results after four to five years of program execution and suppose to provide appropriate time and resources for desirable institutional level outcomes.

Comment-11 (page 54)

CTAP has already advertised a senior capacity development expert position. In addition, CTAP is in the process of recruiting local Afghan experts to form a robust capacity development team.

Description: CTAP team has provided a comprehensive response in donors' coordination meeting.

Comment-12 (page 55)

CTAP considers this and other recommendations seriously and would take necessary steps in this regard very soon

Description: CTAP team has provided a comprehensive response in donors' coordination meeting.