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| **June, 2013** |

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| INDEPENDENT PROGRESS REVIEW OF THE AUSTRALIA AFRICA PARTNERSHIPS FACILITY |

**Final Report**

### Aid Activity Summary

| **Aid Activity Name** | **Australia Africa Partnerships Facility (AAPF)** |
| --- | --- |
| AidWorks initiative No. | INJ018 |
| Commencement date: | 1st December, 2009 |
| Completion date: | 30th June, 2014 |
| Total Australian $ | A$125,000,000 |
| Delivery organisation(s) | Cardno Emerging Markets (Australia) Pty Ltd |
| Country/Region | Africa |
| Primary Sector | Mining, agriculture/food security and public policy |

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The team also wishes to extend grateful thanks to AusAID and DFAT staff in the Pretoria, Accra and Nairobi Posts and to the MC staff in Pretoria and Accra. We are also grateful to a range of PG agency personnel who gave generously of their time to share their achievements and valuable insights with the team.

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**Executive Summary**

**Background**

1. The Australia-Africa Partnerships Facility (AAPF) was established by AusAID to help expand the aid program across Africa by facilitating the development of relationships between the Australian Government and African governments. As a flexible and responsive initiative, it was also anticipated that the AAPF could assist in limiting fragmentation of AusAID’s sector-focused aid program in Africa. The AAPF commits $A125 million over 5 years (2009-2014).

The AAPF objectives are:

* To build effective partnerships that contributes to sustainable achievement of targeted development priorities in African countries.
* To build and promote effective working relationships with African countries.

The AAPF’s primary tools for implementing activities are: training and study tours; professional development assignments; applied research; short-term advisory support; and grant support for capacity development projects. AAPF was designed to support activities of up to two years duration with a maximum allocation of AUD 1m per activity. Activities which are beyond the standard duration and allocation are considered on a case by case basis.

2. The purpose of the Independent Progress Review (based upon the review plan agreed with AusAID was to: (i) review the operational management of the facility as a whole; (ii) provide an independent assessment of the quality of a sample of activities; and (iii) consider the shape and size of the facility required to support Australia’s changing focus in Africa. The period of review was 2009 to 2012 and the IPR focused on the analysis of effectiveness, efficiency and relevance to the on-going Africa program.

3. The Independent Progress Review (IPR) commenced in October, 2012 and involved interviews with Australia based personnel, including DFAT personnel, as well as Africa based senior management. The review team considered a range of documentary sources and conducted field visits to South Africa, Ghana, Mozambique and Kenya. During these visits the IPR team met with AusAID and Managing Contractor (MC) staff, as well as partner government (PG) personnel involved in fifteen activities funded under AAPF. This was not a representative sample and no statistical inferences can be drawn. Rather, it was a purposive sample which reasonably reflected the 2009-2012 portfolio as a whole based on geographic, sectoral and investment dimensions.

4, Given both the limits of time (a three week field trip) and availability of key informants, the review team was conscious that the depth of analysis of individual activities was necessarily constrained.

**Achievements of the facility**

5. The scope and speed of roll-out of AAPF activities is impressive. From 2009 to 2012 fifty-four African countries benefited from AAPF assistance; there were a total of 113 activities, of which 51 were for bilateral projects and 62 multi-country projects. Of the latter, fourteen were for unspecified countries.[[1]](#footnote-2). Over $72m was disbursed during this period. [See Appendix D for a full profile of AAPF activities funded during the review period].

6. Interviews with stakeholders during preparation of the IPR revealed nine separate interpretations of the AAPF objectives. On the basis of evidence available to the IPR team, the facility appears to have met expectations in facilitating a quick and positive response to PG requests, opening doors to engagement with a larger number of African countries and increasing knowledge about AusAID.

7. On the basis of analysis of a purpose sample of fifteen activities, the facility was responsible for the following positive outcomes:

* some key, high value interventions (e.g. Legal Support Institutional Strengthening, Mozambique and support for Fiscal Decentralization in Kenya)
* highly regarded study tours / short term training
* opening doors to a broad range of development relationships
* some good matches between what the PG wanted and what Australia had to offer
* success in brokering relationships between African countries.

8. The review of the sample of fifteen activities also revealed:

* one example of an institutional partnership that appeared to lack substance
* one example of lack of flexibility and responsiveness
* two examples of perceived lack of follow-up and Australian ‘presence’
* no evidence of development or relationship outcomes in two instances
* less than adequate training pedagogy.

9. From any efficiency perspective, for an investment of $125m Australia has broadened its diplomatic relations to include every African state, including the recently established state of South Sudan. The facility assisted AusAID to establish a distinct identity in a crowded donor community and achieved modest development outcomes.

10. Although the Facility was designed as a ‘contractor-managed’ modality, the majority of AAPF activities funded in 2009-10 and 2010-11 were direct managed by AusAID. The primary rationale for the appointment of a contractor to manage the facility was to reduce the mounting workload on the limited AusAID establishment in Africa. Ultimately, the way in which the MC is being used appears to be undermining the anticipated efficiencies. The most notable factors include: (i) an ad hoc, limited delegation of activities to the MC; (ii) ambiguity in the way in which the MC is tasked; and (iii) inefficiency and delays in approvals.

11. AusAID management, coordination and oversight of the facility has been negatively affected by a difficult structural and organisational environment characterised by partial devolution from Canberra and delegated functions between Pretoria and other Posts. As a pan African mechanism, the AAPF has had five AusAID teams engaged, in one form of another, in implementing the mechanism. As a consequence, no single person appears to be clear on actual expenditure at a given point in time; no-one appears to have a clear line of sight for the facility as a whole.

**Looking forward**

12. Whilst the Africa program strategy provides the predominant geographic and sectoral boundaries for AAPF activities, the results of this review suggest that the facility should focus on the provision of ‘niche assistance’ in ways which use the mechanism to best advantage, namely:

* for rapid response within the context of pre-existing, valued relationships
* providing key, high value interventions in reform areas
* conducting study tours / short term training (subject to achievement of a quality pedagogical standard);
* focusing on multi-country tours which offer the potential for brokering relationships and networks between African countries
* focusing on ‘good matches’ between Australian and African institutions/organisations;
* focusing on ‘talent spotting’ to identify participants in study tours / training programs who may be suitable candidates to undertake training ‘pathways’.

**INDEPENDENT PROGRESS REVIEW OF THE**

**AUSTRALIA-AFRICA PARTNERSHIPS FACILITY**

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AAA | Australia Awards in Africa |
| AAPF | Australia-Africa Partnerships Facility |
| ACIAR | Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research |
| AFRITAC | African Regional Technical Assistance Centres |
| AFS | Agriculture and Food Security |
| APSC | Australian Public Service Commission |
| APSG | Africa Program Support Group |
| ARR | Activity Request Report (previously, Quarterly Request Report, QRR) |
| AusAID | Australian Agency for International Development |
| AWR | Ancillary Work Request |
| DFAT | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade |
| FMC | Facility Management Committee |
| GPMA | Grant Payment and Management Agreement |
| HOMs | Heads of Mission |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IM4DC | International Mining for Development Centre |
| MC | Managing Contractor |
| M4D | Mining for Development |
| M&E | Monitoring and evaluation |
| MG | Mining Governance |
| PAF | Performance Assessment Framework |
| PP | Public Policy |
| QAE | Quality at Entry |
| QAI | Quality at Implementation |
| SRG | Senior Reference Group |
| TA | Technical assistance |

**INDEPENDENT PROGRESS REVIEW OF THE**

**AUSTRALIA-AFRICA PARTNERSHIPS FACILITY**

**FINAL REPORT**

**June 2013**

1. **Background**
   1. **AAPF objectives**

On 3rd September, 2009 the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Stephen Smith announced at the Africa Down Under Conference in Perth that “*Australia is creating a new technical facility – the Australia-Africa Partnership Facility*.” The Minister went on to describe the facility as “*an important means for African Governments to access Australian technical expertise in the minerals resources sector, as well as in trade policy, public sector reform, and private sector development*.”

The initiation of the facility occurred within the context of a rapid scaling up of the aid program to Africa. The design process proceeded quite rapidly. The design essentially focused on the articulation of a framework of processes and systems through which development activities would be delivered. Responsibility was assigned to the Senior Reference Group to propose changes to continual improve the Facility’s efficiency and effectiveness over time. A ‘real-time’ independent appraisal process was used as part of the design, whereby the independent appraiser was given access to drafts of the design document in order to feed in comments during the design process.

By November 2009 a final design document was produced by AusAID which emphasised the critical importance of relationships to effective delivery of targeted assistance to African governments. To this end, the goal and objectives of the facility were formulated as follows:

**Goal:** Partnerships developed between Australia and African countries that contribute to achieving African countries’ development priorities

**Objective 1: Development Benefit:** Build effective partnerships that contribute to sustainable achievement of targeted development priorities in African countries

**Objective 2: Relationship Benefit:** Build and promote effective working relationships with African countries

The design noted that the Facility would provide targeted capacity building assistance across a range of areas but with an underlying focus on the following three major sectoral themes:

* Governance for mining and natural resources;
* Public policy (especially trade policy and negotiation, economic governance and public sector reform)
* Agriculture

On 23rd November, 2009, the AusAID Delegate signed an FMA Reg 9 Approval for the facility authorising a spending proposal of up to $90m over four years (2009/10 to 2012/13). The approval noted that “*Australia will provide modest capacity building assistance for mining, agricultural and public policy requests in the form of deployments of people, exchanges of people between African and Australian organisations, training, workshops, seminars and grant funding*.” The FMA9 approval noted, however, that Australia would provide assistance to requests outside the areas sited above if either the African country or the Australian government identified a priority need.

The FMA9 approval also provided approval for the procurement of an MC for a four year contract with an option to extend for up to two years. Whilst the procurement process got underway, AusAID established an interim ‘Partnership Initiative ‘on 1st December 2009 and commenced funding AAPF activities in July 2010.

On 24th November, 2011 approval was given for an additional spend of $35m to facilitate implementation of activities outside of the arrangement with the MC as necessary; additional support to AusAID Posts, through the MC, to manage implementation of the facility and a one year extension to 2013/14.

**1.2 Management arrangements**

The majority of AAPF activities funded in 2009-10 and 2010-11 were directly scoped by AusAID and involved direct engagement of partners to deliver AAPF support through a grant agreement or contract arrangement. Activities managed in this way are referred to as ‘direct managed’ activities. Over 80 activities worth more than $30m were funded by the AAPF during 2009-2011 and direct managed by AusAID.

The management of this level of activity could not be sustained by the relatively small AusAID staff establishment responsible for the Africa program; “AusAID was drowning in the proposals coming to them”.[[2]](#footnote-3)In January 2011, a Managing Contractor (MC) was appointed “to receive and process requests for assistance in accordance with the Senior Reference Group’s directions”.[[3]](#footnote-4) The initial focus of the MC was on clearing a backlog of requests for AAPF support. In 2011 – 2012 the priority shifted towards designing and implementing activities. In FY2011/12 fifty-nine activities worth approximately $31.9m were funded by the AAPF; 45% of these (by funding) were managed by the MC.

The original contract with the MC was for three years with the option of a two year extension. The contract was amended in March 2012 to extend the contract term by one year until June 2014, and to enable the AAPF to begin to develop longer-term, more coherent mining for development and agriculture technical assistance programs.

1. **Review purpose**

## This IPR has three purposes. First, the IPR will review the operational management of the AAPF. Second, the IPR provides an independent assessment of the quality of a sample of AAPF activities. Third, insofar as AusAID’s overall Africa strategy is being shifted to reflect a greater sub-regional and priority country focus, the IPR will feed into considerations regarding the optimum shape and scope of the facility to support the change in focus.

This review is intended to inform management decisions regarding:

* The current AAPF contract (to 30 June 2014):
  1. the review recommendations will inform the AusAID AAPF management team and MC on measures to improve delivery mechanisms, management & coordination, quality and M&E systems for the remaining period of the contract.
  2. The review will inform the AusAID AAPF management team decision regarding the scope and shape of funding through AAPF until the end of the current phase (June 2014).
  3. The review will inform AusAID AAPF management team decisions regarding better alignment of AAPF activities with other AusAID programs.
* The AAPF contract extension: the review will inform the AusAID AAPF management team and Minister Counselor/ADG decision regarding the decision to exercise the option to extend the contract, and if so, the scope and shape of funding.

The review will inform Minister Counsellor/ADG decisions regarding the scope and shape of any future support for human resource development in Africa, including alignment with other human resource development programs and the shift in the overall Africa strategy towards priority countries and a sub-regional focus.

1. **Approach and methodology**

**3.1 Review objectives**

The IPR focused on three core criteria and key evaluation questions as follows:

**Effectiveness:**

Is the Facility delivering expected development and relationship outcomes in terms of:

1. The impact it is making on achieving development outcomes, particularly in the areas of agriculture/food security, mining governance and public policy?
2. Building relationships and partnerships with African countries through providing flexible and responsive support?
3. The funding of quality activities (i.e. those with clear objectives, focused on priority sectors)
4. An appropriate use of the mechanism?

**Efficiency:**

Are we using inputs of aid program funds, staff and other resources in the most efficient manner to achieve the desired results? Specifically, are we achieving efficiencies in terms of:

1. The management of the Facility (including management of activities by the MC and direct management of activities by AusAID)?
2. The management of individual initiatives (including consideration of transaction costs)?
3. The most efficient use of funds to achieve the desired results?

**Relevance:**

Are the AAPF focus and objectives still relevant to Australia’s broader goals in Africa in terms of:

1. delivering targeted activities that produce development results and new or stronger partnerships?
2. the breadth of sector and geographic coverage?
3. the focus on partnerships and relationship building as core objectives?
4. the scale and focus of funding?
5. the benefits and risks of AAPF aligning with and complementing other capacity building activities as part of a new human resources development program?

**3.2 Review design**

The IPR involved the following phases:

* ***Phase 1: Desk Review*** to examine key program documents. The review team conducted individual analysis of relevant documents. The Review Team focused the desk review upon a preliminary consideration of the key review questions with a view to articulating issues to be discussed with key AusAID stakeholders, as well as stakeholders in the field. The desk review also formed the basis for factual data presented in the IPR report.
* ***Phase 2: Discussion with key AusAID stakeholders*** on the direction of the review and preparation of a final Review Plan, incorporating issues identified by senior management. The final Review Plan was circulated to all relevant AusAID staff prior to the field visits. The Key Evaluation Questions and Data Methods are attached as Appendix B.
* ***Phase 3: Field visits*** involving:
* In-depth analysis of the MC data base: one member of the review team spent several days in the office of the MC interrogating the data base to assess the quality of processes and the outcomes of AAPF activities
* In-depth analysis of data provided by AusAID managers who have direct managed AAPF activities in order to assess the quality of processes and the outcomes of AAPF activities.
* Key informant interviews (KII)**:** Interviews with purposively selected, informed individuals provided the backbone of the fieldwork since these interviews enabled probing and triangulation of stakeholder issues and perspectives concerning the AAPF. The field mission schedule and list of persons met is attached as Appendix C.
* Focus group discussions (FGD): FGDs with beneficiaries enabled the review team to rapidly develop a sense of the diversity of views about the program. This method was especially useful for identifying key sources of diversity of results (e.g. variability of impact by country, sector, recipient organisation and type of support provided).
* Observation: general observations during the fieldwork confirmed or challenges preliminary conclusions arising from the other methods; for example the interactions/relationships between classes of stakeholder, the degree of professionalism of implementation, the quality and appropriateness of deliverables, and the general attitude/engagement of various stakeholders.
  + - * ***Phase 4: Analysis, Feedback and Reporting***

Review team members compiled their own notes of interviews and discussions and used these as the basis for completing quality assessments of individual activities included in the purposive sample. Regular team discussions throughout the fieldwork phase were undertaken to assimilate the emerging trends against the key review questions.

Content analysis methods were employed to identify common and exceptional themes against the key issues in the ToR and the review questions. The review team formed conclusions in relation to the review questions that synthesised the views of the various stakeholders but ultimately involved the professional judgements of the team members. The review team adopted a ‘consensus approach’ to conclusions, documenting diverse opinions where they occurred.

Reporting of review findings involved three key steps:

* **Exit Briefings:** at the completion of the fieldwork phase in each country, the review team presented preliminary findings to key review stakeholders for the purposes of validation and refinement.
* **Draft report:** following the fieldwork phase, the review team applied content analysis methods to synthesise findings from the field. A draft report was prepared and submitted to AusAID for review, comment and Peer Review.
* **Final report:** a Final IPR Report was produced two weeks after Peer Review.

**3.3 Limitations**

**Confused management and oversight of the Review:** Section 4.2.3 below discusses the management challenges which have beset the AAPF – as a pan-African mechanism – being implemented within the context of partial devolution from Canberra and delegated functions between Pretoria and other Posts. The limitations of this management approach were manifest during the preparation of the Review Plan; the resulting delays, complexities and costs are unusual in preparation for a review.

**Difficulty in obtaining definitive data sets:** An AAPF Portfolio Analysis (Appendix D) was prepared as part of the process of developing the Review Plan and used as the basis for identifying a purposive sample for review. The IPR team also referred back to the Portfolio Analysis on numerous occasions during the review. For a range of reasons, the IPR team has had great difficulty in compiling a final/definitive data set.

**Depth of assessment of individual activities:** The review team assessed fifteen activities based upon documentation reviews and interviews. The results of these assessments are detailed in Appendix F. Given both the limits of time (a three week field trip) and availability of key informants, the review team was conscious that the depth of analysis of individual activities was necessarily constrained. The focus of the ToR on assessment of effectiveness as context for a discussion of the relevance of the current AAPF model appears to have been appropriate.

1. **Findings**

**4.1 Effectiveness**

The AAPF objectives, outlined in 1.1 above, were not supported by any definitions in the design document as to what was meant by relationships, partnerships or development benefit. Nor were the operations of the facility underpinned by a theory of change which defined the developmental purpose of the relationships and partnerships. As a result, the ToR for this review tasked the IPR team to focus on assessment of Facility effectiveness as *context* for consideration of the relevance of the current AAPF model. The review was required to assess what has worked and what has not in order to inform how Facility effectiveness could be improved in future.

**4.1.1 Expected ‘end-of-Facility’ outcomes**

The AAPF Quality at Entry Report[[4]](#footnote-5) (QAE) referred to “the dual nature of the Facility in development and foreign policy areas”. The reference to relationships / partnerships in the objectives was consciously ‘opaque’ because it needed to embrace the meaning of these terms both in the diplomatic sense, as well as in the developmental sense.

Interviews with stakeholders during the IPR revealed a range of interpretations of the meaning of the AAPF objectives, including:

1. Responding quickly and positively to requests from African governments; “We wanted PGs to see Australia as a country that is willing to listen and respond in a reliable way.”[[5]](#footnote-6)
2. “Opening doors”;the facility provided Ministers and Special Envoys with something tangible to take with them during their visits to countries where Australia had not had a previous engagement;
3. Building ‘people-to-people’ links.
4. ‘Exploring the possible’; gathering intelligence about what AusAID could do, where, with whom, with what strategic emphasis, with what operational approach[[6]](#footnote-7). The facility was “an incubator of new ideas”.
5. Acting as a catalyst for longer term, larger initiatives.
6. Increasing links between sectors.
7. Increasing the knowledge of African governments about Australia and encouraging a positive attitude towards Australia.
8. Identifying countries that were serious about engaging with Australia and serious about nominating good candidates for study tour/training opportunities.
9. Taking the pressure off the sector programs to respond to PG requests.

Discussions with DFAT and AusAID stakeholders also revealed that when the facility was set up there was a strong imperative to “get things going fast”. Within this context, it was clear from the outset that the AAPF would involve a large number of relatively small activities spread across many countries.

**4.1.2 Achievements of the facility**

The scope and speed of roll-out of AAPF activities is impressive. From 2009 to 2012 fifty-four African countries benefited from AAPF assistance; there were a total of 113 activities, of which 51 were for bilateral projects and 62 multi-country projects. Of the latter, fourteen were for unspecified countries.[[7]](#footnote-8). Over $72m was disbursed during this period. [See Appendix D for a full profile of AAPF activities funded during the review period]

In general, the facility, as an aid modality, has not been consciously employed as part of an integrated suite of modalities within the aid ‘architecture’[[8]](#footnote-9). However, examples were provided in respect of the Mining for Development strategy and from the Nairobi Post where this was occurring.

Despite these limitations it is possible, based upon consultations with over 60 stakeholders and a review of a purposive sample of 15 AAPF funded activities, to provide some insights into the achievements of the AAPF.

Of the nine separate expectations for the AAPF outlined on the previous page, the IPR investigations indicate the following. The IPR found evidence that the facility **met[[9]](#footnote-10) expectations** in terms of:

* *Facilitating a quick and positive response to PG requests:* A range of superlatives were employed by HOMs, PGs and AusAID Africa-based personnel related to the ‘value-add’ of the facility in this regard. The AAPF was “massively advantageous”; “hugely significant” and “allowed Australia to meet one of the key requirements for a good partnership – listening and responding”. The following was a typical statement from an African Government representative interviewed during the IPR: “It is very valuable because of the speed with which it happens. Small contract; timely, more useful, more productive for the professionals involved.”[[10]](#footnote-11)Speed of deployment was identified as the competitive edge that Australia had over other donors in Africa.
* *Opening doors:* the AAPF facilitated the initiation of a bilateral relationship between Australia and a range of African countries where none had previously existed. In 23 countries where Australia had little or no prior relationship, the AAPF ‘paved the way’[[11]](#footnote-12). (See Appendix E for a detailed ‘Analysis of AAPF relationships using a relationships matrix tool”).
* *Increasing knowledge about Australia:* the increase in knowledge appears to relate less to Australia the country and more about Australia, the donor; typical comments include:
* “we lifted our profile above where it should be given the size of the development budget”[[12]](#footnote-13)
* “Australia is seen within Africa as a donor that gets things done – small, flexible, pragmatic, responsive”; “the facility reinforced and bolstered this perception”[[13]](#footnote-14)
* “Australia is seen as a donor with a more modern approach to development in Africa, focused on knowledge, systems, scale and transformation.”[[14]](#footnote-15)
* *Taking the pressure off the sector program:* Few specific examples were encountered by the IPR team; by definition, it is difficult to detect the *absence* of something. Nevertheless, a range of AusAID staff interviewed felt that the AAPF had, in fact, allowed them to respond to a range of ad hoc requests for support without interfering with their mainstream programming efforts.
* *Identifying countries serious about engagement with Australia.* Key DFAT/AusAID stakeholders who completed the ‘Relationship Matrix Tool’ observed that the relationships between Australia and ten African countries are moving into deeper partnerships as a direct result of AAPF funding. (Refer Appendix E) In all of these countries, bilateral relationships were also in place, but it would appear that the responsive and flexible funding provided by the AAPF expedited the deepening of those relationships.

The IPR found evidence that the facility **partially[[15]](#footnote-16) met expectations** in terms of:

* *Exploring the possible / ‘incubating’ new ideas:* The AAPF allowed Australia to play a facilitative role in supporting the process of development of the African Minerals Development Centre out of the Addis Ababa office. This was an example of this type of role. Whilst this may be a good approach entering a new development environment, corporate learning requires an agreed mechanism for learning if the potential benefits of this approach are to be realised.
* *Building people to people links:* The IPR team encountered evident affection on the part of participants in study tours towards the coordinators or hosts of these events. Furthermore, participants in the Livestock Study Tour from Ghana have maintained contact with the number of the farmers whose farms they visited in Australia.

The IPR **did not find evidence that the facility met expectations** in terms of:

* *Acting as a catalyst for longer term, larger initiatives*
* *Increasing links between sectors*

A review of the full profile of activities supported by the facility during the period under review (2009-2012) suggests that, with the exception of work related to mining for development, activities have been discrete rather than being located within a broader program or strategy. Even where activities appeared to have had synergies with the broader program, there was not a conscious strategy of stimulating second or third generation AAPF activities, nor of ‘graduating’ AAPF activities to other parts of the ‘aid architecture’. These issues have begun to be addressed.

In summary, the AAPF would appear to have been highly successful in meeting the diplomatic intent of its objectives. Further, it would appear that the best possible development outcomes were achieved within the context of a rapidly deployed aid modality, disbursing a rapidly expanding budget. However, with the exception of work in mining for development, many of the achievements of the AAPF have yet to be capitalised upon.

**4.1.3 Achievements of individual activities – what worked, what did not and why?**

Approximately three quarters of the sample of activities reviewed by the IPR appear to have been implemented effectively.[See Appendix F for individual assessments of a sample of AAPF activities]Of the sample of 15 activities reviewed, three lacked clear objectives when they started; two of these were assessed as having low levels of effectiveness. The remaining twelve activities had clear objectives; nine of these were considered to have been highly effective. Within this sample, the facility was responsible for the following positive outcomes**:**

* ***some key, high value interventions***: Funding activities focusing on technical assistance and training in times of reform has been highly effective.[[16]](#footnote-17) “Being there early; taking the risk.” The Legal Support Institutional Strengthening activity in Mozambique and the support for Fiscal Decentralization in Kenya both represent the right intervention at the right time. They were implemented quickly, at a critical time. As such, they were able to provide ‘real time’ advice. These activities have influenced legislation, systems and regulations in key development areas and, in both cases, Australia has had a unique contribution to make.[[17]](#footnote-18)
* ***highly regarded study tours / short term training:*** The IPR team had the opportunity to speak to with 24 participants in seven different AAPF-funded study tours and short term training events from three countries[[18]](#footnote-19). Many of the study tours had also hosted participants from other countries throughout the region. The study tours and short term training events were run by a variety of different regional and Australian service providers. In general, these training opportunities were highly regarded and considered to have been of value for the individual participants. In some cases the activity acted as a catalyst for institutional or policy change, usually where participants were drawn from higher levels of the executive and management and were well placed to bring about change.
* ***opening doors to a broad range of development relationships:*** The quick and responsive nature of the funding has been highly valued by recipients and, as indicated above, has differentiated Australian funding from that of other donors.

Interviews with representatives of organisations which had received AAPF funds suggest that many want the relationship to develop further. However, in most cases, the facility is not the appropriate modality to deepen development relationships in the absence of a coherent ‘aid architecture’. Whilst embryonic relationships have been developed as a result of the AAPF funded activities, something approaching a partnership could only be detected in two cases.

* ***some good matches between what the PG wanted and what Australia had to offer***: A number of AAPF activities reviewed demonstrated meaningful synergies between Australian and PG experience and challenges. For example, the Ghana Public Service Commission felt a surprising degree of commonality of experience with the Australia Public Service Commission and valued the training they received. Similarly, Ghanaian participants in livestock study tours to Australia felt that the experience was highly relevant to their needs. “We would like to continue to learn from Australia, and for Australia to learn from us. We have much in common”.

Similarly, study tours funded by the AAPF facilitated a systematic institutional engagement between the Africa Flying Doctor Service and the Royal Flying Doctor Service of Australia, the only comparable organisation anywhere in the world.

* ***success in brokering relationships between African countries:*** In one third of the activities reviewed by the IPR team (5/15), stakeholders interviewed expressed their appreciation of the contacts and networks that they had been able to form as a result of an AAPF activity. This was an outcome highlighted by participants from Mozambique in the Uranium Mining & Hazardous Waste Study Tour and the study tour organised as part of Legal Support Institutional Strengthening for the Ministry of Mineral Resources. Participants in the Regional Diplomacy Training in West Africa, the DFAT Trade Policy short course and the Mining Governance Study Tour expressed similar appreciation of the relationships formed and the networks established with counterparts in other African countries as a result of the AAPF funded activity.

Review of the purposive sample of fifteen AAPF activities also revealed some less than positive results:

* ***one example of an institutional partnership that appeared to lack substance:*** Despite the recommendation from a recent scoping mission to commence a ‘twinning’ relationship between the PSCs in Australia and Ghana, comments from interviewees suggest a predominantly one way relationship to date. Whilst it was clear to the IPR team that the small international section of the APSC has a strong commitment to the GPSC, the same level of commitment was not evident from the APSC as a whole. Without the latter, a twinning arrangement will not work.
* ***one example of lack of flexibility and responsiveness:*** A recently commenced activity involving support for Ghana Farmer Based Organisations, via the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, appears to have had a difficult inception (see assessment contained in Appendix F). If adequate future engagement does not occur, this might result in damage to Australia’s reputation.
* ***two examples of perceived lack of follow-up and Australian ‘presence’:*** In 2011/12 the AAPF funded study tours, training and adviser support for the Ministry of Planning and Development and the Tete provincial government, in Mozambique, to establish and strengthen collaborative planning systems in resource-rich areas. AusAID advised the review team that a number of attempts were made to follow up on this work; despite this, the clear perception of the Director General of the Ministry of Planning and Development is that Australia’s ‘presence’ is limited (compared to other donors) and that, as a result, the level of follow up is less.

Similarly, whilst the diplomacy training was clearly welcomed, discussions with participants revealed that they were unable to identify the ‘point of difference’ for the Australian training compared to training from other countries. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ghana commented that they would like to see future training include substantive briefings on Australia (cultures, politics, history, economy) and the region, and specifically Australia’s engagement with Africa, which its diplomats could otherwise not access. It was felt in both Kenya and Ghana that this had been a missed opportunity in the training design.

Further, while it appears that decisions have been made for the diplomacy training to be offered through the Australia Awards Program through the same Australian provider, it is important that these decisions are communicated to the in-country service providers as soon as possible. In the case of Ghana, the providers are waiting to schedule the next courses already planned. (See Appendix F for detailed discussion of the abovementioned activities)

* ***no evidence of development or relationship outcomes in two instances:*** the IPR did not find evidence of any tangible outcomes from the $A2.5m invested in the ACIAR partnership for agricultural research, nor for the $US8m invested in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) African Regional Technical Assistance Centres.

In the former case, both DFAT and AusAID personnel expressed their concern that the pilot research activities do not appear to have responded to PG demand, do not appear to have succeeded in developing bilateral relationships and have not facilitated Australian branding. Despite repeated efforts on the part of the IPR team, we were not able to gain access to key informants from ACIAR. Given the concerns raised, and the inability of the IPR team to obtain evidence of achievement, this initiative may warrant a more detailed evaluation in future.

In the case of the contribution to the IMF, AusAID made a comparatively minor (unearmarked) contribution to fund start up and operational costs for an IMF capacity building consultancy. Notwithstanding the fact that the initiative is behind in terms of the agreed implementation schedule, the nature of the contribution obscures AusAID’s support to partner governments. Indeed, an interview with the regional head of the IMF confirmed that no specific outcomes were expected from AusAID’s investment. Whilst it is possible that that AusAID might gain access to partner government officials through support to AFRITAC, no specific examples were able to be discerned.

A key rationale for supporting the initiative was to “buy a seat at the table” on the Steering Committee. However, an AusAID representative has attended two meetings and the IPR team did not find evidence that Australia has exercised a tangible influence on AFRITAC.

* ***less than adequate training pedagogy:*** Interviews with 24 study tour / short course training participants revealed that ‘traditional’ pedagogies were most commonly employed involving participants sitting in classrooms receiving lectures. Participants expressed a strong preference for the course components which were ‘hands on’ and practical (e.g. role plays, simulations) and valued opportunities to discuss their own issues and constraints with the experts, rather than just listening to lectures. Where external experts were brought in, participants expressed the desire for them to stay on for a period beyond any formal lecture in order to facilitate discussions and problem-solving. Field visits and field-based learning/lectures were also highly valued. More detailed assessments of individual study tours/training may be found in Appendix F: Assessment of a purposive sample of AAPF activities.

In order to improve the quality of the training pedagogy AusAID needs to identify the standard required when RFTs for training providers are issued. An example text for inclusion in RFTs for training providers is attached as Appendix G.

**4.1.4 Quality Assurance Processes**

The QAE Report for the AAPF accepted the realism of the M&E principals enshrined in the design document:

*“The overriding principals presented are:*

* *Partner country ownership of performance;*
* *Focus on activity level performance, not program-wide performance;*
* *Acceptance that this is an inherently risky program, with resources spread thinly in countries where Australia has a limited track record and little or no physical presence.”*

After the MC was appointed, the primary responsibility for quality processes was vested in them. The MC developed (and AusAID approved) a ‘five-step process’ to assure the quality of facility activities.[[19]](#footnote-20) However, the MC had no authority to implement such processes in respect of AusAID ‘direct managed’ activities. The ‘five-step process’ has generally been by-passed by AusAID, with ARRs being used to instigate ‘priority activities’ (e.g., activities requested by HoMs).

The umbrella FMA9 for the AAPF, in a sense, provided a blanket approval for the funding of activities that fell within the designated areas of support. However, this type of approval does not constitute a quality assurance process. Comparatively recently an ‘Activity Design Summary’ form has been introduced to be used by AusAID staff when seeking to fund an activity under the AAPF. However, this form was not applied during the period under review.

Until the introduction of the above Activity Design Summary there was no systematic Quality at Entry process for AusAID managed activities.

In February 2012 a Quality at Implementation report noted that the data produced by the MC in their quarterly reports primarily covered activities which had been managed by them (since July 2011) and did not systematically cover AusAID activities, largely due to lack of available information. As a result, AusAID officers preparing the QAI were unable to report on the achievements of the facility in meeting the over-arching ‘relationship’ and ‘partnership’ objectives.

It has been noted elsewhere that the QAI format is unsuited to reporting on clusters of activities and large programs involving a range of heterogeneous components.[[20]](#footnote-21) By extension, it is not a format that is suited to reporting on a facility which has been responsible for the implementation of more than 113 discrete activities.

It is open to those who prepare the QAI report to indicate the limitations of the format in reporting on a given activity. This was not done in respect of the AAPF QAI Report. Rather, a team made up of AusAID and MC personnel attempted to introduce quality assurance processes which would make it possible, in future, to aggregate the achievements of individual activities in order to demonstrate performance against the over-arching objectives.

The team produced a Performance Assessment Framework [PAF] (with facility level outcome indicators), processes for approving activities eligible for funding through AAPF (whether MC or AusAID ‘direct managed’ and templates for each stage of activity quality assurance.[[21]](#footnote-22) Both the MC and AusAID staff at Posts were requested to implement these processes.

In the view of the IPR team, the PAF is significantly flawed. It does not articulate a theory of change; it does not define performance in terms of a chain in influence; it reads more as a de facto regional program PAF, rather than an AAPF PAF and the indicator phrasing / structure does not follow convention. A detailed appraisal of the PAF is attached as Appendix H. The quality control processes also appear to be unduly complex and undermine the greatest asset of the facility – speed of response. AusAID personnel at Posts have been reluctant to apply these processes. Perversely, the MCs insistence on applying AusAID’s quality control processes has led some Posts to prefer not to task them

It is highly unlikely that the AAPF will ever be able to demonstrate outcomes by aggregating the outputs from individual activities.

As noted in an AusAID analytical paper on the subject: “a) it is not possible to design an M&E system that can measure progress toward open ended objectives b) the M&E findings will usually suggest that the facility has not been particularly effective or that expectations of higher order objectives were not met; c) the M&E system ignores the significant achievements related to the real underlying objectives.”[[22]](#footnote-23)

Section 4.3 of this report, ‘Relevance – looking forward’ suggests a process for narrowing the future focus of the facility on the provision of ‘niche assistance’ which maximises the strengths of the mechanism and applies them within the context of the Africa Program Strategy and the overall ‘aid architecture’. The recommendations for improvement of the PAF, contained in Appendix G, need to be considered within the context of the suggested future focus.

**SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: EFFECTIVENESS**

* The AAPF fulfilled diplomatic objectives; the facility provided a quick response to PG requests, paved the way for bilateral relationships across the continent and established Australia’s identity as a flexible, pragmatic, responsive donor.
* The facility funded some key, high value interventions.
* The study tours and short term training are highly regarded.
* There have been some good matches between what the PG wanted and what Australia had to offer.
* The facility has successfully brokered relationships between African countries.
* No evidence of development or relationship outcomes from two ‘big ticket’ activities.
* Less than adequate training pedagogy employed in some cases.
* Quality assurance processes have not been applied consistently by AusAID. The current PAF and quality assurance documentation appears overly complex and ignore the significant achievements of the facility.

**4.2 Efficiency**

The TOR tasked the IPR team to consider the efficiency of the current AAPF model in order to inform recommendations regarding ways to improve management arrangements in future.

**4.2.1 Efficient use of funds to achieve desired results**

A distinguishing feature of the AAPF is that it was subject to a single FMA9 approval, for a $A90m budget, followed by an amendment to increase that budget by $A35m. From an operational perspective this ‘umbrella approval’ made it possible to fund activities quickly in response to PG requests and allowed Posts to program with the Facility in mind.

AusAID’s discussion paper on experiences with the facility modality[[23]](#footnote-24), it was noted that a facility can offer extremely good value for money where Australia has limited resources to apply in a large development arena. This would certainly appear to have been the case in Africa over the period under review.

Australia invested $125m in the AAPF to engage with governments across the African continent. This contributed to Australia’s diplomatic, strategic and economic interests and to the nation’s aid and development commitments. It is beyond the scope of this review to carry out a rigorous analysis of the precise level of contribution of the facility to the achievement of these higher order goals. Nevertheless, certain observations may be made.

* ***Australia has broadened its diplomatic relationships with African countries***

The funds invested in the AAPF appear to have contributed to the broadening of diplomatic relationships which will serve Australia’s long term strategic and economic interests. Australia now has diplomatic relations with every African state, including the recently established state of South Sudan.[[24]](#footnote-25) Again, whilst the AAPF was only part of a process leading to this outcome, the HOMs interviewed were quite explicit about the ‘value add’ of the facility.

* ***The facility assisted AusAID to establish a distinct identity in a crowded donor community*** Australia has two key advantages on the continent. First, Australia is widely regarded as ‘neutral’, that is, lacking in colonial associations with African countries. Second, Australia is perceived as having a more ‘modern’ approach to development, focused more on knowledge transfer and less on ‘bricks and mortar’. The AAPF is a mechanism which has allowed Australia to demonstrate both of these advantages; it has made it possible to be responsive to PG requests and it has largely focused on rapid ‘knowledge transfer’.
* ***The facility has achieved modest development outcomes*** The IPR team detected significant development outcomes for two of the fifteen activities reviewed and modest development outcomes for another seven activities. While a 60% achievement rate overall might appear low, it is not when seen in light of the short term nature of the activities funded under AAPF. Furthermore, the development of bilateral relationships may result in more substantive development outcomes in future. The challenge now is for AusAID to act strategically to capitalise upon the relationships which have been developed. A process for doing this is discussed in 4.3.5 below.

**4.2.2 Management by the MC**

Although the Facility was designed as a ‘contractor-managed’ modality, the majority of AAPF activities funded in 2009-10 and 2010-11 (under the interim ‘Partnership Initiative) were directly scoped by AusAID and involved direct engagement of partners to deliver AAPF support through a grant agreement or contract arrangement.

The primary rationale for the appointment of a contractor to manage the facility was to reduce the mounting workload on the limited AusAID establishment in Africa. A Minute dated 19 November 2009 acknowledged the growing pressure on AusAID staff to action ministerial commitments.

The appointment of an MC was also intended to reduce processing time for requests and proposals and to create some distance between AusAID and the requesting governments; “*there are lots of benefits of having an MC, including being at arm’s-length from the government*”.

When the MC commenced work in January 2011, their contract tasked them to carry out the full range of services, including management and administration, monitoring and evaluation, quality control and assessment, procurement and grant management, people management, logistics, security and performance management. Throughout the MC’s contract the language conveys the impression that the MC is responsible for all of the activities undertaken by the AAPF.

In reality, this *was* not - and is not - the case. The interim ‘Partnership Initiative’ managed by AusAID left a substantial legacy of ‘direct managed’ activities; it might also be suggested that, in certain areas, this period of management also left a culture predisposed towards direct management. Furthermore, the FMA9 approval signed in November to increase the AAPF budget specifically provided for implementation of activities outside of the arrangement with the MC.

Ultimately, the way in which the MC is being used appears to be undermining the anticipated efficiencies. The most notable factors include: (i) an ad hoc, limited delegation of activities to the MC; (ii) ambiguity in the way in which the MC is tasked; and (iii) inefficiency and delays in approvals. These factors are discussed in detail, below.

* + - 1. ***Ad hoc, limited delegation of activities to the MC:***

Although the amended FMA9 provided for implementation of activities outside of the arrangement with the MC, the scope of this would appear to call into question the original rationale for adopting an outsourced management model.

In FY 2011-12 the MC managed 45% of activities (by funding). The IPR team has not been able to definitively establish how many activities have been MC managed for the current financial year both because of the lack of definitive / final data sets on AAPF activities and because of the ambiguity of management arrangements (see (ii) below). However, the MC attests that the nature and level of tasking has dropped substantially

There appear to be a range of reasons for the lower than anticipated utilization of the MC:

1. Some PGs refuse to sign an agreement with a third party (i.e. the MC)
2. The AAPF budget has now been decentralized to the Posts. In the better staffed Posts there is a sense that they have sufficient in-house capacity to carry out the work themselves. Furthermore, proposals may be endorsed by the local head of Post and go directly to the relevant Delegate for approval, bypassing the role of the MC.
3. There is a strategic commitment within the Africa program to increasingly work through multilaterals; funds cannot be channelled through the MC to a multilateral.
4. In some cases AusAID prefers to maintain a direct engagement with the partner government agency.
5. AusAID staff interviewed also indicated that in some cases direct management was simply easier than outsourcing, because of the quality assurance processes that the MC was obliged to implement. (Refer discussion under sub-section 4.1.4 above).

There does not appear to have been a clear protocol guiding the decision for an activity to be direct managed by AusAID or managed by the MC. As a result, the management decisions appear to have been ad hoc.

Of the sample of 15 activities assessed as part of the IPR, eight were direct managed, five involved tasking of the MC for full management functions and two activities involving tasking the MC to carry out logistics functions only. Of the eight AusAID direct managed activities, one pre-dated the appointment of the MC, three are managed from Canberra, two are managed by the Post in Nairobi and two are managed by the Post in Pretoria.

* + - 1. ***Ambiguity in the way in which the MC is used:***

It is evident that the original concept of an outsourced facility was for the MC to take responsibility for activity management, payment processing and M&E/quality assurance. AusAID’s responsibility was for approval and oversight through two mechanisms, Ancillary Work Requests and Activity Request Reports[[25]](#footnote-26). However, over time, AusAID has amended the engagement arrangements such that at least five different modes of engagement have been identified in the portfolio, as reflected in the table below

**Table 3: AAPF modes of engagement of MC**.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Mode of engagement** | **Management responsibility** | **Payment responsibility** | **M&E and other oversight functions** |
| 1 | MC | MC | MC |
| 2 | AusAID | MC | MC |
| 3 | AusAID | MC | AusAID |
| 4 | AusAID | AusAID | MC |
| 5 | AusAID | AusAID | AusAID |

As noted above, in some cases AusAID has taken full responsibility for all aspects of activities—especially when this has involved multilateral partners (e.g. the IMF) or sensitive contact with government counterparts. In other cases, AusAID has tasked the MC with responsibility for financial disbursements and/or M&E and quality assurance aspects. However, this has created an unacceptable degree of exposure for the MC[[26]](#footnote-27): “*We had the situation where AusAID was transferring accountability for the performance of projects to us when we had little influence over the quality”*.[[27]](#footnote-28)

Whilst AusAID, as the client, clearly has the right to use the MC as they see fit, discussions with a range of stakeholders, both within AusAID and the MC, suggest that this situation has created uncertainty and ambiguity. Such ambiguity is inimical to effectiveness and efficiency.

In order to address this ambiguity the MC designed a ‘Grant Payment and Management Agreement’ which attempts to clarify the roles of the parties in relation to individual activities. Unfortunately, this has had the effect of further bureaucratising the process of engagement. One AusAID staff member reflected that:

*“The rationale for engaging contractors is to free up AusAID staff to do more analytical work and reduce the administrative burden; but the reality is the opposite. Instead there is more work associated with tasking; reading reports; requesting additional information; and the administration of contractors”.*

* + - 1. ***Inefficiency and delays in approvals***

The processes related to financial approval are of particular and growing concern to the MC. Funds for implementation are paid in advance, not as reimbursables. This model is similar to that of the Grant payments: a proposal and budget must be submitted, appraised and approved before funds are released for implementation. This process, combined with the affects of the devolved model and the ambiguous lines of authority within AusAID has led to significant delays in approval processes. This has, apparently, been most keenly felt in the current financial year; insofar as this is outside the period under review, the details of MC concerns have not been included in this report. This is an area, however, that AusAID management may wish to investigate further.

* + 1. **AusAID management, coordination and oversight**
* ***Confused and confusing management arrangements:*** As a pan African mechanism, the management of the AAPF reflects the management arrangements across the Africa program.

The Africa program works within a difficult structural and organisational environment characterised by partial devolution from Canberra and delegated functions between Pretoria and other Posts. As a pan African mechanism, the AAPF has five AusAID teams engaged, in one form of another, in implementing the mechanism.

Senior Management conducted a workshop in August 2012 to clarify roles and responsibilities across the Africa Program. In addition, a process review of the AAPF was commissioned by AusAID and carried out in the same month. A report was produced in October 2012 recommending a range of ways to improve the facility processes. Unfortunately, the recommendations left many of the ambiguities around roles and responsibilities unresolved.[[28]](#footnote-29)Further, AusAID’s delayed management response to the report has meant that no action has been taken on the recommendations and the MC has been left in virtual limbo. Nevertheless, agreement has been reached between AusAID and the MC that a more detailed process-mapping exercise is necessary to further clarify responsibilities and streamline processes.

Within the context of this management ambiguity, the AAPF appears to be subject to a process of collective decision making which is time consuming, inefficient, distracts personnel from their core responsibilities, involves substantial stress for individuals and facilitates interpersonal conflict.

As a consequence, no single person appears to be clear on actual expenditure at a given point in time. No-one appears to have a clear line of sight for the facility as a whole on what has been approved, why and whose responsibility it is to manage each activity.

* ***Some exposure on acquittals for AusAID direct managed activities.*** As mentioned in sub-section 4.1.1 above, the early stages of facility implementation were characterised by rapid expansion. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that a high proportion of acquittals for the AusAID direct managed activities from this period are outstanding. It is less clear why acquittals should be outstanding from more recent direct managed activities; of the fifteen activities reviewed by the IPR team, five direct managed activities appear to have acquittals outstanding.

While physical files may exist in the Posts with evidence of acquittals, this evidence is not on Aid Works and does not appear to be readily accessible. The Agency is therefore exposed and the task of following up on these acquittals needs to be addressed.

**SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: EFFICIENCY**

* The AAPF achieved the desired results for the funds invested in terms of encouraging a positive attitude towards Australia, thereby facilitating a broadening of diplomatic relations and establishing Australia’s identity.
* The Facility achieved modest development outcomes.
* The efficiency of MC management has been compromised by ad hoc, limited delegation of activities by AusAID, ambiguity in the way in which the MC is used and inefficiency and delays in approvals.
* AusAID coordination, management and oversight has been confused. It is extremely difficult to obtain reliable figures on current expenditure and approvals for the Facility as a whole.
* AusAID appears to be exposed on acquittals for ‘direct managed’ activities.

**4.3 Relevance – looking forward**

As required by the Tore for this review, the foregoing discussion of effectiveness and efficiency forms the context for a discussion of the on-going relevance and potential focus of a flexible facility in the changing operational and strategic environment in Africa.

**4.3.1 Changes in the operating environment**

The AAPF was set up within a context in which there were strong diplomatic drivers for Australia to rapidly scale up its engagement with Africa. Those responsible for the AAPF design were not – and could not be - fully aware of the ways in which the delivery mechanism would be used and the expected development or relationship outcomes. As a result, the objectives of the facility were couched in terms which were sufficiently open ended to permit of a wide range of interpretations, as discussed in sub-section 4.1.1 above.

However, the operating environment has changed. Australia now has diplomatic relations with every African country and has a memorandum of understanding with the African Union Commission. Around 200 Australian resource companies are engaged in about 600 projects across 40 African countries. Australia’s trade with the region has grown at approximately 6% per year over the past decade. Australian development assistance for the region has tripled since 2007-08 and is predicted to continue to increase. Australia Awards for Africa will offer at least 2,750 scholarships between 2011 and 2013.[[29]](#footnote-30)

AusAID is currently finalising the Africa program strategy based upon an analysis of priority development problems, Australia’s national interest and capacity to respond. The focus of Africa-wide or multi-country delivery mechanisms may be narrowed to support the program’s sub-regional objectives.

**4.3.2 Stakeholder perceptions of the future role for the facility**

Within the changed operating environment there is scope both for the objectives of the facility to become less open-ended and for the role to be clarified within the broader ‘aid architecture’.

The IPR team encountered differences of opinion amongst stakeholders regarding the preferred future role for the AAPF. A view frequently expressed by DFAT personnel was that the AAPF is a ‘whole-of-government’ mechanism which should not be constrained to particular sub-regions or sectors but should be available for use in countries where Australia does not have a strong bilateral relationship. The emerging Africa program strategy envisages a narrowing of the focus of the pan-African delivery mechanisms, including the AAPF, to support the strategic objectives being pursued in the priority sub-regions and countries. However, AusAID staff based in the priority (and non priority) sub-regions expressed different views on the ways in which the facility may be used to best advantage.

In the East and Horn of Africa specific references have been made to “retaining the capacity to respond”, as well as putting together a suite of activities which use the facility mechanism to best advantage. The current thinking is that the best way to use the mechanism is to identify policy issues that are critical to the programming area objectives and to fund technical assistance and study tours / training programs which address these policy issues.

Similarly, in Southern Africa the emphasis appears to be upon using the facility to fund TA and study tours for mining related assistance. Whilst there is a strategic focus on supporting development in the growth corridors, the IPR team did not detect any perception that the facility was an appropriate mechanism to support this focus.

By contrast, in West Africa, there appears to be a desire to use the facility to maintain relationships which have been built since 2008. Presumably this would be by funding second and third generation activities. However, it is not clear whether this intent is compatible with AusAID’s overall strategic intent.

Further, insofar as the AAPF is one of only a few sources of funding for the West African sub-region, Post staff in Accra also expressed the desire to continue to use the facility to support the larger, longer term activities such as multi-country water management. As indicated in (iii) above, this is not an appropriate use of the mechanism.

Despite the differences of opinion amongst stakeholders regarding the future role of the facility, the IPR team found virtually *universal agreement on two point*s:

First, the key ‘value add’ of the facility is its capacity to respond quickly to PG requests. This characteristic of the facility mechanism contributes to branding, innovation and PG attitudes to Australia as a potential development partner.

Second, it is critical for the facility to remain responsive in style. Without the facility operating in this way the aid program to Africa will be largely budget driven. The capacity to be responsive will be dramatically reduced.

From this perspective, the notion that the AAPF should continue to deliver targeted activities that produce vague development or relationship / partnership benefits appears inappropriate. Rather, in the changed operating environment there needs to be a conscious focus on the provision of timely, ‘niche assistance’ within the context of a coherent Africa program strategy and aid ‘architecture’.

* + 1. **Defining the future focus: ‘niche assistance’ within a context**

Whilst the Africa program strategy provides the predominant geographic and sectoral boundaries for AAPF activities, the results of this review suggest that the facility should focus on the provision of ‘niche assistance’ in ways which use the mechanism to best advantage, namely:

* for rapid response within the context of pre-existing, valued relationships
* providing key, high value interventions in reform areas
* conducting study tours / short term training (subject to achievement of a quality pedagogical standard);
* focusing on multi-country tours which offer the potential for brokering relationships and networks between African countries
* focusing on ‘good matches’ between Australian and African institutions/organisations;
* focusing on ‘talent spotting’ to identify participants in study tours / training programs who may be suitable candidates to undertake training ‘pathways’.

In its future phases the facility should not be used for:

* channelling funds to multilaterals (unless there is clear branding; Australian TA; direct reporting on the achievements of the Australian contribution)
* funding ***‘***big ticket’ or long term items; it is not appropriate to continue to use the facility as a replacement for direct budget allocations to Posts
* facilitating connections between Australian and African institutions where there is no genuine, mutual interest or demand.

**4.3.4 Placing the facility within the ‘aid architecture’**

In the 2011-2012 AAPF Annual Report the MC highlighted the potential to link facility funded activities into larger existing activities supported by AusAID and/or other donors. Except in the East and Horn of Africa sub-region, however, little attention appears to have been given to envisaging operational links between the facility and the rest of the program. Whilst the emerging Africa Program Strategy emphasises the importance of the AAPF supporting the sub-regional priorities, it does not discuss choices of aid modality in priority countries and sub-regions.

It is important for future strategies to envisage the relationship between AAPF funded activities and the rest of the program. So, for example, it may be suggested that the majority of responses to PG requests for immediate TA in a given sub-region should occur within a program context. The facility could then be used to fill gaps that cannot be met within a fully programmed context. This would allow for any benefits from the facility’s provision of ‘real time’ support to be embraced by the broader program in the medium to long term. Similarly, one of the intended outcomes of study tours could be to identify individuals suitable for follow-on training via AAA short courses.

Key, high value interventions in reform areas also provide an opportunity for follow-on activities whether in the form of long term capacity development, policy analysis and research and/or policy dialogue. Whilst it is not possible to know where such an activity will go when it starts, it *is* possible to envisage possibilities and provide for them.

The Country Engagement Strategies and sub-regional Delivery Strategies could also provide a foundation from which to determine the focus of the HRD framework. The discussion of the HRD framework to date appears to have focused primarily on the supply side. Australia is providing a range of HRD inputs, across a range of programs; attention is being given to identifying ways to rationalise these inputs in order to improve efficiencies

Whilst this is valid, it is not necessarily the best way to approach the issue. The issue might better be approached by asking:

* “”Which organisations, groups of organisations and individuals do we wish to develop/enhance our relationships with in priority countries and sub-regions?
* What are their needs?
* How do we ensure that they receive the appropriate type and quality of support?
* How do we consolidate both the relationship, and the value of the support provided, by ensuring successive engagements, possibly through a variety of HRD mechanisms?

This approach would serve to directly link various aid modalities together around practical, operational goal, to provide human resource and organisational capacity development to specific organisations/individuals in priority countries/sub-regions. The role of the AAPF within this context would be to use its demonstrated strengths; it can remain open to emerging requirements and opportunities and respond, as required, in ways that other aid modalities cannot.

* + 1. **Capitalising on achievements to date**

As discussed under sub-section 4.1 above, the facility has achieved a great deal in a short period of time. However, with the exception of work in mining for development, many of the achievements of the AAPF have yet to be capitalised upon. Nor has there been corporate attention to the identification of lessons learned to improve performance. In order to capitalise upon what has been achieved so far and in order to maximise the capacity of the facility mechanism to function effectively in future, the IPR team suggests that there is a need for AusAID to:

1. Take stock of the current state of development of relationships resulting from AAPF activities.
2. Decide which relationships will be taken forward.
3. Determine the appropriate aid modality to take these relationships forward.

Each of these steps is discussed below, with input from the IPR team based upon the findings of the review. The adoption of a systematic approach to analysis of the achievements of the facility will not only allow AusAID to ‘make sense’ of the past and plan for the future. This approach will also address DFAT’s concerns regarding future uses of the facility and appropriate ‘messaging’ to PGs.

1. ***Conduct a relationship audit***

A joint workshop needs to be conducted involving AusAID staff from Posts and MC personnel to assess the potential for the development of substantive relationships with PG organisations which have received AAPF funds. In some cases the activities funded will simply have been about establishing goodwill; others may have involved dialogue to ‘open doors’; others may have involved work to achieve mutually valued objectives; and others may have been part of a process of development of joint programs or activities growing out of common skills and interests. An example matrix for categorisation of relationships is included in Appendix E.

***(ii) Determine the future for the relationships initiated via AAPF activities***

AusAID then needs to determine whether there is a sound argument for exploring the identified relationships further within the context of the new Africa Program Strategy. In some cases the relationship may remain transactional (Tier 3); in others the relationship will be transactional but with potential to embark on ‘pathways of change’ (Tier 2); finally relationships developed via the facility may have the potential to deepen into development partnerships within the context of the Africa Program strategy (Tier 1).

***(iii) Decide upon the appropriate aid modality to handle on-going relationships***

The findings outlined in 4.1 above confirm that the facility is rarely the appropriate modality to deepen development relationships. In such cases, it may be more appropriate to consider transitioning viable activities incubated with AAPF funding to more strategic/systematic ‘sectoral engagements’ (e.g. Legal Support Institutional Strengthening in Mozambique). In other cases, it may be appropriate to continue to use the facility as the appropriate mechanism for engagement where specifically requested (e.g. support to the Commission on Revenue Allocation in Kenya). In such circumstances, second and third generation AAPF activities may be scoped and designed. However, it should be recognised that working to bring about follow-on activities can be time intensive. The number of activities highlighted for follow-up will have implications for the workload of the MC.

Finally, where Australia is unable to engage further as a result of strategic or resource constraints, this needs to be clearly conveyed to the PG organisation which received AAPF funding in order to avoid reputational risk.

**4.3.6 Improving the efficiency of the management arrangements**

As indicated in 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 above the current management arrangements, both in terms of the way in which the MC is used and in terms of AusAID’s management, coordination and oversight, are less than adequate. The IPR team is of the view that the current problems are best addressed by ensuring that the facility is used in ways which maximise the effectiveness of the mechanism and that the management arrangements facilitate, rather than interfere with, those uses.

The types of ‘niche assistance’ outlined in (iii) above inherently suggest the type of management arrangements which should prevail. For example:

* Responding to PG requests appears to be a use of the facility that is best ‘direct managed’ by AusAID. MC staff interviewed noted that:
* Key, high value interventions in reform areas is also something which is more likely to be driven by AusAID’s Africa Program strategy and to emerge from dialogue between AusAID Posts and PGs. Furthermore, the visibility of AusAID staff in these areas is extremely important.
* Study tours / short course training and the brokering of relationships within Africa are currently being carried out very effectively by the MC and are highly regarded. These are also HR intensive activities which AusAID staffs are not well placed to carry out.
* ‘Talent spotting’ to identify candidates to undertake training ‘pathways’ is also a function that would appear to be best performed by the MC.

However, if the two streams of activities (AusAID ‘direct managed’ and MC managed) are to continue, there need to be only *two* management models. The work either needs to be entirely managed by the MC or entirely managed by AusAID; anything else sets up significant audit challenges. Table 4 below outlines the suggested management arrangements; it will be noted that the MC could still be used to scope and design activities but the scoping and design reports would be submitted to AusAID for their further action (i.e. management, payment, monitoring and reporting). Similarly, the MC could be tasked to provide specific, logistical services in respect of an activity managed by AusAID.

**Table 4: Suggested future division of management responsibilities**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Niche Assistance** | **Scoping and design** | **Management responsibility** | **Payment responsibility** | **M&E and other oversight functions** |
| Responding to PG requests (e.g. short term TA; short term professional development) | MC | AusAID | AusAID | AusAID |
| Key, high value interventions in reform areas (e.g. short term TA) | MC | AusAID | AusAID | AusAID |
| Study tours/short course training / brokering relationships within Africa in priority sectors | MC | MC | MC | MC |
| Brokering relationships between Australian/African institutions in priority sectors | MC | MC | MC | MC |
| ‘Talent spotting’ | N/A | MC | MC | MC |

Furthermore, improved internal management arrangements within AusAID (notably, between Canberra and Posts and between Post) are critical to the efficient management of the facility going forward. Therefore:

* AusAID currently has 40% of an A-based officer and 100% of an O-based officer working on the AAPF. The O-based position is fully taken up with the administrative requirements of the AAPF. As a result, at the time of the IPR field visit, key tasks such as preparation of a management response to the Facility Process Review Report[[30]](#footnote-31)were still outstanding. Further, there are key functions which need to be performed by an A-based officer, including:
* preparation / updating of strategy documents relevant to the on-going operations of the facility, for approval by management; the MC should no longer be producing strategic framework documents which are the province of the Agency
* rationalising the differing approaches to the use of the facility across the continent
* liaising with Posts to ensure (a) a consistent approach to tasking of the MC and that (b) acquittals, monitoring and reporting on ‘direct managed’ activities is kept up to date
* streamlining tasking and financial approvals for the MC
* liaising with / tasking the MC on the integration of data on MC managed activities and AusAID ‘direct managed’ activities in order to ensure that the delegates receive regular reports on the ‘whole-of-Facility’ spending and activities.

The MC has prepared a range of strategic documents beyond those required by their contract as an attempt to achieve consistency in the AusAID approach to use of the facility across sub-regions. This is not their role; the role should revert to AusAID and, specifically to an A-based officer. The current 40% commitment of time does not appear to be sufficient to perform the above functions.

* Despite the recommendations of the October 2012 Facility Process Review report, the review team noted that there are a range of areas where functions still overlap. The management response needs to be finalised as soon as possible and clear directions provided to staff to avoid, as far as possible, parallel performance of functions.
* The MC’s contract needs to be revisited to delink the contractor from responsibility for the facility as a whole. The contract should reflect the actual work which will be carried out (e.g. the conduct of management and administration / monitoring / performance management services, etc. *only* in respect of the MC managed stream of activities; preparation of ‘whole-of-facility’ reports on spending and activities *only as specifically tasked* by the AusAID Facility Manager and with input from AusAID on the status of ‘direct managed’ activities.

Further, whilst the MC may be tasked to build up and develop data bases on alumni networks, in the long term AusAID will need to identify an institutional home for the data (e.g. sub-regionally based institutions) and a mechanism for providing on-going secretariat support to the network which is not linked to a particular MC on a time-bound contract.

**4.3.7 Communicating the future focus to key stakeholders**

As discussed earlier, AusAID coordination and oversight has suffered from confused and confusing lines of communication. Once the process for clarifying the future focus of the facility is carried out (as suggested above) it is critical for the Minister Counsellor to provide a clear directive to Posts to consolidate the uses of the facility in accordance with the decisions made. It will also be important to provide briefing notes for HOMs on the future uses of the facility and the way in which relationships developed as a result of AAPF activities will be dealt with in future. This will allay concerns about ‘messaging’ to PGs.

**SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: RELEVANCE**

* The operating context has changed substantially since the facility was established.
* There is scope for the objectives of the facility and the role in the aid architecture to be clarified.
* There is universal agreement that the key ‘value add’ of the facility is its capacity to respond quickly and that this should be maintained.
* In future the facility should focus on the provision of ‘niche assistance’ which maximises the strengths of the mechanism within the context of the Africa Program Strategy and the aid ‘architecture’.
* Country Engagement Strategies need to envisage the relationship between AAPF funded activities and the rest of the program.
* There is a need to assess the potential for the development of substantive relationships with PG organisations which have received AAPF funding, to determine which relationships will be taken forward and via which aid modality.
* A range of changes need to be made to improve management efficiency.
* Communicating the future focus of the facility to key stakeholders will be critical.

1. **Conclusion and recommendations**

The facility, and the overall programming environment in Africa, has evolved a great deal in the last three years. It would be wrong to assume that ‘business as usual’ is an appropriate future for the AAPF. The facility has made a major contribution to the achievement of Australia’s foreign policy and trade objectives to engage more broadly in Africa. In the process, the facility has made a modest contribution to development and amply demonstrated it’s ‘value add’ as a responsive mechanism.

The AAPF has the potential to make a significant contribution to Australia’s role as a small/medium donor in Africa.

In order to achieve this it is recommended THAT:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Number** | **Recommendation** |
| 1. | The AAPF objectives are reformulated to reflect the role of the facility in providing ‘niche assistance’ within the context of the Africa Program Strategy and ‘aid architecture’. |
| 2. | Relevant AusAID country and sub-regional strategies are required to discuss choices of aid modality, including the role for the AAPF and links with the rest of the program. |
| 3. | A Joint Workshop is conducted involving AusAID staff from Posts and MC personnel to:   1. Carry out an audit of relationships formed with PG organisations as a result of AAPF funding. 2. Determine the future of these relationships within the context of the emerging Africa Program Strategy. 3. Decide upon the appropriate aid modality to handle on-going relationships with priority PG organisations. |
| 4. | AusAID appoint a full time, continent based, A-based AAPF Manager who has complete oversight of the workings of the facility. |
| 5. | The management response to the October 2012 Facility Process Review is finalised as soon as possible and clear directions provided to staff to avoid, as far as possible, parallel performance of functions. |
| 6. | The MC’s contract is revisited to delink the contractor from responsibility for the facility as a whole and focus the contract on only those services for which the MC is directly responsible and genuinely accountable. |

## Appendix A:

**MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE**

**AUSTRALIA-AFRICA PARTNERSHIPS FACILITY**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

## BACKGROUND

## *1.1 Overview of the AAPF*

1. The Australia-Africa Partnerships Facility (AAPF) commits $125 million over 5 years (2009-2014) to help build the human resources capacity of African countries, particularly in areas and ways where Australia has recognised strengths and expertise. Its responsive, flexible approach allows the exchange of skills and knowledge within a broad range of African countries.
2. The AAPF was established by AusAID to assist the Australian Government as it expanded its aid program across Africa. The aid program needed a tool through which to establish relationships between the Australian Government and African governments, demonstrate goodwill through small, low-cost and low-risk activities and prevent these multiple commitments from fragmenting AusAID’s broader and sector-focused aid program in Africa.
3. The AAPF’s primary tools for implementing activities are: training and study tours; professional development assignments; applied research; short-term advisory support; and grant support for implementing capacity development projects. AAPF was designed to support activities of up to two years duration with a maximum allocation of AUD 1 million per activity. Activities which are beyond the standard duration and allocation are considered on a case by case basis.
4. AAPF has increasingly focused on three areas that African governments consistently identify as a priority, and where Australia has particular expertise to offer: mining, agriculture, and public policy (e.g. trade policy and public sector reform). Requests outside these areas can be considered where they relate to identified African development priorities, where Australia has particular experience and expertise to offer, and where Australian assistance would have an impact.
5. Requests for AAPF support are prioritised in accordance with the objectives to:

* build and promote effective working relationships with African countries; and
* build effective partnerships that contribute to sustainable achievement of targeted development priorities in African countries.

Due to the nature of the AAPF, which aims to provide flexible and responsive support, usually in the form of small-scale, short-term technical assistance, it is recognised that sustainability and development impact are difficult to achieve. While activities retain a development focus, sustainability is a secondary objective. It is preferred that African Governments show links between their requests for assistance under the AAPF and their own broader national development plans. However, this is not a prerequisite for funding.Requests reach the AAPF in the form of formal proposals submitted according to the AAPF guidelines, but also as a result of ministerial dialogues or discussions held at international fora, such as the African Union Summit.

1. To date the program has sought to respond to requests for support through regional and bilateral activities, delivered both through the Managing Contractor (Cardno, appointed in January 2011) and through AusAID’sdirect engagement withother delivery partners.
2. AusAID has directly scoped and engaged a number of partners to deliver AAPF support through a grant agreement or contract arrangement. The majority of AAPF activities funded in 2009-10 and 2010-11 were implemented in this manner. AusAID continues to use this approach in instances where AusAID must manage the relationship with multilateral, WofG partners and regional organisations.
3. Under the AAPF contract, Cardno scopes, designs and implemenst AAPF activities in consultation with relevant AusAID Posts. The original contract with Cardno was for three years with the option of a two year extension. The contract was amended in March 2012 to:

* Extendthe contract term by one year,until June 2014, and retains the option of a further one year extension. The extension allows time for the long term strategy for the Africa program to be finalised such that any future AAPF design and tender process can reflect Africa program directions.
* Provide additional resources for continued expansion of mining for development activities and support to West African countries; improving the coherence of support being provided under the AAPF by developing: a longer-term mining for development program; a suite of agriculture technical assistance activities that complement activities under the Australia Africa Food Security Initiative; and a more strategic approach to peace-building activities being supported.

1. The AAPF is governed by:
   * An AusAID Facility Management Committee (FMC) chaired by AusAID Counsellor Pretoria and includes Director Pan Africa Program, AAPF Manager Pretoria, and AAPF Policy Manager Canberra.The FMCmeets to review and prioritise requests. This follows consultation between AusAID officials and DFAT officials - including HOMs - at Posts with African-accreditation.
   * A Senior Reference Group (SRG), comprising senior officials from AusAID and DFAT, meets at least annually to set high-level strategic priorities, determine funding allocations to Posts with African-accreditation, and review performance against AAPF’s high-level objectives.
2. In 2009-10 AAPF delivered $11.2 million worth of support to Africa. AAPF spending in 2010-11 was close to $20 million and in 2011-12 is $36 million. AAPF expenditure by sector is as follows:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Financial year** | **Agriculture** | **Mining** | **Public Policy\*** | **Peace Building** | **Program Support** | **Unspecified** | **TOTAL** |
| 2010-11 | $2,569,748 | $1,719,515 | $12,511,748 | $1,627,294 | $908,948 | $626,917 | $19,964,170 |
|  | 13% | 9% | 63% | 8% | 5% |  |  |
| 2011-12 | $6,531,149 | $12,983,811 | $12,457,000 |  | $4,426,582 | -$106,033 | $36,292,509 |
|  | 20% | 41% | 39% |  | 12% |  |  |

*Note:*

*\* Includes support for public sector reform, economic governance, trade & diplomacy, election training and counter-piracy (peace building is incorporated into public policy in 2011-12 figure)*

## *1.2 Key issues*

1. While there is a coordinated management structure for AAPF, the Facility is faced with the risk of fragmentation due to:
   * Being committed to delivering flexible aid through varied mechanisms, including political commitments by the Minister.
   * Being viewed by the AusAID Africa Program as a mechanism to shield other sectoral programs from fragmenting support.
   * Being given contradictory messages about the purpose of the AAPF and the mix of sectors it is intended to support due to the need to remain responsive to requests outside of the sectoral focus.
   * Following a successful bid for a seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) the AAPF may be expected to be the mechanism to respond to requests related to Australian being a non-permanent member of the UNSC. This includes support for peace-building in targeted countries.
2. AAPF quality and performance is assessed through an M&E framework for AAPF and the Quality Assurance Process, which links activity level outputs with mid-level outcomes which, in turn, link to the AAPF’s higher-level objectives. The Quality Assurance Process was jointly developed by AusAID and Cardno and was put in place in February 2012 to guide activity design and implementation for results.
3. There has been discussion about the need for a human resource development program as a complementary suite of activities that include both scholarship and partnership type of support instead of having separate mechanisms such as AAA and AAPF.
4. Australia’s Comprehensive Aid Policy Framework (CAPF) to 2015-16 requires a move towards fewer and larger investments and an increased focus on delivering results.A draft strategy paper (“Future Directions for Australian aid in Sub-Saharan Africa”) was developed in May 2012 which provided initial guidance on the Africa Program’s response to the CAPF, including a shift towards organising theprogram sub-regionally with a focus on priority countries. The paper will inform an Africa regional situational analysis and new Regional Strategy due to be completed in early 2013. The review will provide important lessons and evidence of what works and what doesn’t to inform a decision on the AAPF’s role in delivering the new aid strategy.

## *1.3 Key management decisions*

1. This review is intended to inform management decisions regarding:

* The current AAPF (to 30 June 2014):
  1. the review recommendations will inform the AusAID AAPF management team and Cardno on measures to improve delivery mechanisms, management & coordination, quality and M&E systems for the remaining period of the AAPF.
  2. The review willinform the AusAID AAPF management team decision regarding thescope and shape of funding through AAPF until the end of the current phase (June 2014).
  3. The review will inform AusAID AAPF management team decisions regarding better alignment of AAPF activities with other AusAID programs.
* The AAPF contract extension: the review will inform the AusAID AAPF management team and Minister Counsellor/ADG decision regarding the decision to exercise the option to extend the contract, and if so, the scope and shape of funding.
* The review will inform Minister Counsellor/ADG decision regarding the scope and shape of any future support for human resource development in Africa, including alignment with other human resource development programs and the shift in the overall Africa strategy towards priority countries and a sub-regional focus.

## OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE REVIEW

1. Specificobjectives and questions for this review will be the product of consultation based on an initial discussion paper produced by the review team (described in the method section below). However, the broad scope of the review will include an assessment of:
2. **Effectiveness:** While the Facility is targeted at initiating and building partnerships with African governments and institutions and at delivering development results, it is not governed by focused objectives or a clear theory of change.In light of these challenges and recent changes aimed at improving assessment of program performance, the focus of this review is on assessment of Facility effectiveness as *context*for an evaluation of the relevance and efficiency of the current AAPF model. In other words, the review as a whole will assess what has worked and what hasn’t worked and why to informhow Facility effectiveness could be improved through a better targeted design and more efficient management arrangements.In this process, the review team will have the opportunity to define the standards and criteria used to measure results and assess the effectiveness of the AAPF.The review team would also be expected to evaluate how the M&E framework is being applied in practice to guide activity design and implementation for resultsand what challenges might be affecting consistency of application across the whole Facility portfolio.

**Key review question:** Is the Facility delivering expected development and partnership outcomes in terms of:

* 1. the impact it is making on achieving development outcomes, particularly in the areas of agriculture and food security, mining governance and public policy?
  2. building relationship and partnerships with African countries through providing flexible and responsive support in sectors where Australia has expertise?

1. **Efficiency:** AusAID moved to the management of some AAPF activities and operational processes through a managing contractor after an initial period of direct management. This review assesses the performance of the managing contractor and AusAID in delivering the program efficiently and economically and will make recommendations to improve the management of the Facility. The review will also draw on the results of a recent and separate review of the Facility’s operational systems in framing findings and recommendations.

**Key review question**: Are we using inputs of aid program funds, staff and other resources in the most efficient manner to achieve the desired results? Specifically, are we obtaining value for money in terms of the:

* 1. Management of the Facility as a whole (including financial and HR management)?
  2. AusAID coordination, governance and oversight arrangements?
  3. Management of individual initiatives (including assessment of transaction costs)?
  4. Funding of quality initiatives (i.e. those with clear objectives, focused on priority sectors and representing an appropriate use of the modality)?

1. **Relevance:**The AAPF design was aimed at creating or strengthening relationships with African governments and institutions by funding small, short-term activities focused in particular sectors. As AusAID’s program shifts focus from rapid expansion to longer-term engagement and strategic consolidation, the Facility’s role may change. This review will assess the relevance of a flexible Facility in this changing operational and strategic environment and make recommendations about the need to target and refine the focus of the AAPF and how this could be achieved.This includes an assessment ofthe benefits of a flexible facility and how this could align with and complement other programs to deliver a comprehensive human resource development strategy in Africa.

**Key review question**: Arethe AAPF focus and objectivesstill relevant to Australia’s broader goals in Africa in terms of:

* 1. delivering targeted activities that produce development results and new or stronger partnerships?
  2. the breadth of sector and geographic coverage?
  3. the focus on partnerships and relationship building as core objectives?
  4. the scale and focus of funding?
  5. the benefits and risks of AAPF aligning with and complementingother capacity building activities as part of a new human resources development program?

## REVIEW PROCESS

1. The review will be conducted by a team of independent reviewers over a period of up to 8 weeks and will encompass:
2. A briefing of the key issues and priorities for the review team by AusAID.
3. Document review and appraisal (see list at **Attachment 1**);
4. Provision of a Review Plan which includes a fully elaborated methodology (see the proposed check list for the review plan at **Attachment 2**).
5. Consultations with key AusAID stakeholders, including Head of Africa Branch in Canberra, AusAID Minister Counsellor and Counsellor in Pretoria, Directors of Africa sections in Canberra, Head of AusAID Posts.
6. Provision of an initial Discussion Paper based on the above consultation with key AusAID stakeholders. The Discussion Paper will summarise early feedback from these stakeholders on the direction of the review as well as identifying preliminary findings and issues for further investigation.
7. Revise Review Plan based on consultation outcomes; including defining duration, scope and purpose of the field visit.
8. Field visit to selected African countries to undertake more detailed discussion on AAPF activities.During field visit, the review team will consult with a number of stakeholders agreed with AusAID. The list of stakeholders will be finalised as part of the final Review Plan and may include:

In Africa (Pretoria, Maputo, Nairobi and Accra):

* + (Selected) African partner agencies
  + AusAID Posts (including AAA, food security and mining teams)
  + HOMs
  + AAPF Managing Contractor
  + AAA Managing Contractor

In Canberra:

* + AusAID - Africa Branch Head and Directors
  + AusAID – Africa sectoral programs (mining, food security and scholarship)
  + AusAID - Mining for Development Section
  + DFAT - Africa Branch Head

By phone:

* + Multilateral organisations (UNODC, World Bank, International IDEA, IMF, etc)
  + Academic institutions (University of Sydney, University of Queensland, University of New England, etc)
  + Non-governmental organisation (MAG, Kyeema, etc)
  + Private sector (UNIQUEST, GRM, etc)

1. Exit Briefing: The Exit Briefing will be submitted at the end of the Field Mission, and prior to leaving Africa, covering major findings, preliminary recommendations an summary of the review process. The briefing will be presented for discussion and comments to appropriate AusAID staff, key stakeholders and the Managing Contractor.
2. Draft Review Report: The draft Review report will present the team’s findings in accordance with AusAID’s quality standards. The report will use outcomes of consultation with stakeholders on the initial findings detailed in the Exit Briefing.
3. Peer review of draft report: The draft report will be considered at a peer review organised by AusAID.
4. Finalise the report based on the findings of the peer review.The final report may be further modified by AusAID before it is uploaded on to AusAID’s website to be available to the general public.
5. AusAID will form a Reference Group chaired by Director of Pan Africa Program Section in Canberra and comprisingthe head of AusAID Posts (or designated person by head of Post) to consider and approve key review documents. The role of the Reference Group is to consolidate AusAID’s view and provide clarity and guidance to the review team.

## REVIEW TEAM

1. The review team during the field mission will consist of a team leader (who will be an experienced evaluator), a capacity development and partnerships specialist, an M&E Specialist as well as one AusAID staff member with experience of the AAPF. Should an individual with combined partnerships and capacity development experience not be found, the team may complement the team’s skills with an additional member with the required specialisation. Collectively, the review team is required to have skills and experience in following areas:

* Experience in managing development programs andfacilities, including: strategic management and contract administration
* Experience in design of monitoring and evaluation systems, especially in relation tocapacity building and partnership facilities
* Knowledge and understanding of the development context in Africa
* Ability to balance best practice methods and internationalexperience with current and emerging conditions in Africa.
* Experience in post-conflict and/or fragilestates
* Experience with a range of development partners including multilateraldevelopment agencies

1. Proposed roles/ responsibilities of the review team:

#### Team Leader

The Team Leader should be an experienced evaluator, with experience in evaluating capacity development programs or partnerships desirable. The team leader will be responsible for:

* Overall management and direction of the team.
* Preparation of the review plan including study instruments.
* Providing advice to AusAID to assist with finalisation of the field visits and consultation with key stakeholders.
* Lead in consultations with key stakeholders during field visits.
* Formulation of recommendations in respect of each of the reviewquestions.
* Oversight of report preparation, including the Exit briefing, Draft Report and Final Report.
* Lead in presentation of the Exit Briefing.
* Ensuring AusAID quality standards are met in relation to all review outputs.
* Submission of documentation and reports to AusAID within the agreed time frame.

#### Capacity Development/Partnerships Specialist

The Capacity Development/Partnership Specialist should have capacity development experience, along with experience in the management or assessment of partnerships.Under the direction of the team leader, the Capacity Development/PartnershipSpecialistwill be responsible for:

* Detailed desk review of documentation relevant to the AAPF and selected activities of study to inform the field visits.
* Participating in consultations with key stakeholders
* Providing advice on recommendations in respect of each of the reviewquestions.
* Contributing to report preparation, including the Discussion Paper, Exit Briefing, Draft Report and Final Report.

Where an individual without combined knowledge of capacity development and partnerships is not available, an additional individual with complementary skills will be recruited.

#### Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist

The Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist should have strong M&E experience along with experience undertaking AusAID reviews. Under the direction of the team leader, the M&E Specialist will be responsible for:

* Contributing to a detailed desk review of documentation relevant to the AAPF and selected activities of study to inform the field visits.
* Assessment of monitoring data held by the program.
* Providing support in consultations with key stakeholders
* Providing advice on recommendations in respect of each of the review questions.
* Contributing to report preparation, including the Discussion Paper, Exit briefing, Draft Report and Final Report.

#### AusAID staff member

Under the direction of the team leader AusAID staff member involved in the desk review and review mission will be responsible for:

* Providing the Review Team with the benefit of institutional and historical background on the implementation of the AAPF during the review period.
* Organisation of field missions to selected countries, including accommodation bookings and in-country transport arrangements
* Organisation of interviews and other engagement with review informants as stipulated in the review plan
* Participating in the field mission as an observer and attending and facilitating meetings as directed by the review team leader – this may involve not attending meetings where the team leader feels AusAID participation will adversely affect the independence of informants’ responses
* Responding to ad hoc requests for additional or follow-up meetings from the team leader while on the field mission
* Responding to team leader requests for further documentary evidence or verbal briefings, including engaging with the managing contractor where required
* Coordinating management response, drafting Implementation Plan in response to review recommendations.

Where the team leader feels the presence of the AusAID staff member compromises the integrity or independence of the review, or where it influences responses from stakeholders, the team leader will reserve the right to ask the AusAID staff member to recuse themselves.

## REPORTING AND OUTPUTS

1. The reviewteam will produce the following outputs in the format agreed with AusAID:

* a draft Review Plan by7 November 2012
* a Discussion Paper by30 November 2012
* a final Review Plan by 30 November 2012
* a draft report by 1 March 2013 (see the proposed check list for the review report at **Attachment 3**).
* a final report by29 March 2013

1. The proposed inputs, outputs and timing are at **Attachment 4.**

## Attachment 1 – Documents for Review

**AAPF program quality**

1. AAPF Design Document, 2009 (AusAID)
2. Quality at Implementation report 2011(AusAID)
3. AAPF Quality Assurance Processes, February 2012 (AusAID and Cardno)
4. AAPF Quality Assurance Implementation Report, August 2012 (AusAID)
5. AAPF Performance Assessment Framework and M&E tools (AusAID & Cardno)
6. Cardno’s 2012 brochure which is a quick reference guide for internal use to highlight the full range of recent (and upcoming) AAPF activities. While not all activity completion reports are available (and are of varying quality), they can be provided upon request.
7. Gender Policy Review Report (Cardno)
8. Review of Mining Study Tours Report (Cardno)

**AAPF program management**

1. AAPF contract and Amendment 1
2. Senior Reference Group meeting minutes
3. Facility Management Committee minutes
4. Cardno Annual Report 2012
5. Cardno Quarterly Report No.6 and No.7
6. Facility operational systems review (a review of AusAID internal operating systems by Paul O’Neil, August 2012)
7. AusAID AAPF Procedures Manual July 2012 (a hand-over manual from Canberra to Pretoria)
8. Cardno Operations Manual
9. AAPF expenditure by country and sector from 2009 to 2012 (AusAID)
10. AAPF bilateral and regional activities from 2009 to 2012 (AusAID)

**Africa Program Context**

1. Africa Annual Program Performance Report 2011 (AusAID)
2. Africa Program Food Security Delivery Strategy\*
3. Africa Program Mining Governance Delivery Strategy\*
4. Africa Program Regional Situational Analysis\*

\* *These documents are being developed by AusAID Africa Branch. The review team will be briefed on future program direction and the progress of these documents by relevant staff during field work*.

## Attachment 2 – Review Plan Checklist

### The review design is based on a collaborative approach.

### The primary intended users of the review are clearly identified and their review needs are described.

### Limitations or constraints on the review are described (e.g. time frame; resources; available data; political sensitivities).

### The purpose and/or objectives of the review are stated.

### A summary is provided to orient the reader to the overall review design.

### More detailed review questions are posed. These are based on the terms of reference, but provide AusAID with greater clarity in how the terms of reference a) have been interpreted; and b) will be met.

### It is clear which questions are considered to be of higher priority and are expected to provide the most important information.

### The design is flexible enough to allow unexpected issues to emerge.

### The methods to collect data are described for each question (or related questions).

### The proposed data collection methods are appropriate for the questions posed.

### The approach to data processing is described and is consistent with the time and resources available.

### Approaches to enhance the utilization of findings are outlined (if this has been requested in the terms of reference).

### Ethical considerations have been addressed where relevant (e.g. privacy and confidentiality).

### The review plan provides guidance on scheduling. The final schedule reflects adequate time to answer the posed review questions.

### The allocation of review tasks to team members is clearly described (i.e. data collection, processing and reporting).

## Attachment 3 – Review Report Checklist

### Introduction

### A background to the evaluation summarizes: the total value of the initiative; the number of years of the initiative; the stage of initiative delivery; key outcomes of the program; and the key issues identified in the terms of reference

### A brief summary of the methodology employed is provided

### Key limitations of the methodology are described and any relevant guidance provided to enable appropriate interpretation of the findings

### The executive summary provides all the necessary information to enable primary users to make good quality decisions.

### Findings and Analysis

### The evaluation report clearly addresses all questions in the Terms of Reference

### There is a full description of each of the issues identified so that the reader feels they have been given the full picture

### The relative importance of the issues communicated is clear to the reader

### There is a good balance between operational and strategic issues

### The text clearly establishes that the evidence supports the arguments posed

### Alternative points of view are considered where appropriate

### Complex issues are fully explored and not oversimplified

### The role of the context in program performance is explored

### The text uses appropriate methods/language to convince the reader of the findings and conclusions

### There is an adequate exploration of the factors that have influenced the issues identified and conclusions drawn

### The implications of key findings are fully explored

### Conclusions and Recommendations

### The overall position of the author is clear and their professional judgments are unambiguous.

### The conclusions and recommendations logically flow from the presentation of findings and any associated analyses.

### Individuals have been allocated responsibility for responding to recommendations.

### Where there are significant cost implications of recommendations, these have been estimated (financial, human and materials costs).

### The recommendations are feasible

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Proposed inputs, outputs and timing** | | | | | | | |
| **Duties** | **Required inputs** | **Timing** | **Product** | **Responsibility** | **Proposed Inputs** | | |
| **Team Leader** | **Capacity Building/ Partnership** | **M&E Specialist** |
| **Conduct desk review of documentation** | Total of 3 days for team leader and 2 days each for CB/P and M&E Specialist for document review | 31 Oct - 2 Nov |  | AusAID staff member to provide documents for review, finalise list of key AusAID stakeholders to be consulted | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| **Produce review plan** | Total of 3 days to prepare plan in consultation with AusAID AAPF staff in Canberra and Pretoria | 5 - 7 Nov | Review Plan | Team Leader in consultation with relevant AusAID staff | 3 |  |  |
| **Consultation with key AusAID stakeholders (joint teleconference followed up by phone call to individual staff if required)** | Total of 2 days for team leader and 1 day each for CB/P and M&E Specialist for consultation with key AusAID stakeholders | 8 - 13 Nov |  |  | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| **Produce a discussion paper** | Total of 2 days each for team leader, CB/P and M&E Specialist to prepare a discussion paper | 14 - 30 Nov | Draft discussion paper/ review plan / schedule of field visit and consultation | Team Leader, CB/P Specialist and M&E Specialist to draft discussion paper | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| **Discussion paper & review plan approved by AusAID** | Total of 1 day for team leader to finalise discussion paper/ review plan/ schedule of field visit | 30Nov – 14 Dec | Final discussion paper/ review plan / schedule of field visit | Team Leader to incorporate AusAID's comments and produce final discussion paper, review plan and schedule of field visit | 1 |  |  |
| **Field visit to consult with key stakeholders (including AusAID Posts, HOMs, selected implementing organisations, African partner agencies and the managing contractor)** | Total of 20 days each (including travel time) for team leader, capacity development/partnerships and M&E specialists for consultation with key stakeholders and implementing agencies. Decision on country focus and scope of fieldwork to be determined after consultation on discussion paper. Tentative schedule of field visit:  • Pretoria  • Maputo • Nairobi • Accra • Canberra | 21 Jan to 8 Feb | Exit Briefing / Presentation of Exit Briefing to relevant stakeholders (including Cardno and AusAID AAPF team) | Post staff to arrange interviews with key stakeholders & implementing agencies, accommodation and in-Africa travel |  |  |  |
| Team Leader, CB/P Specialist and M&E Specialist to draft Exit Briefing and present findings to stakeholders | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| **Draft and present draft Review Report** | Up to 10 days for preparation of draft report by team leader, 5 days each for contribution to draft report by CB/P specialist and M&E specialist | 11 Feb to 1 Mar | Draft Report | Team Leader to process information and produce draft report | 10 | 5 | 5 |
| **Draft report peer review** | 1 day for team leader to present findings to relevant stakeholders at AusAID peer review in Canberra (including travel) | 4 to 14 Mar | Consolidated comments | AusAID staff member to arrange report peer review and consolidate comments. Team Leader to present findings at peer review. | 1 |  |  |
| **Presentation of Final review report** | Up to 5 days for team leader to respond to comments and finalise report | 15 to 29 Mar | Final Report | Team Leader to incorporate Peer Review observations and submit Final Report | 5 |  |  |
| **AusAID Management response and dissemination of findings.** | N/A | 1 to 12 Apr | • Management response to review recommendations • Final Implementation Plan Approval Minute to ADG • ADG approval for professionally edited review report and implementation plan published online | AusAID staff member |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | **47** | **30** | **30** |

## Appendix B:

**KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND DATA METHODS**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Key evaluation question** | **Second level questions** |  | **What do we want to know?** | **Data methods** |
| **Is the Facility delivering expected development and partnership outcomes?** | What development outcomes was Australia aiming to achieve during the review period in the agriculture/food security, mining governance and public policy sectors?  What contribution has the Facility made to the achievement of these development outcomes?  To what extent has the Facility been used effectively, in conjunction with other aid modalities, to achieve these development outcomes? | i.  ii  iii  iv  v  vi  vii  ix  x | What development outcomes were expected in respect of funded activities? (for MC managed activities; for AusAID direct managed activities)  What development outcomes have been achieved by the funded activities? What has worked, what has not, and why?  Have there been any catalytic impacts, or roll-on effects of the facility on other AusAID aid activities?  Why was the Facility chosen as the appropriate aid modality to use in specific circumstances? What evidence is there that confirms the correctness of this choice?  To what extent have quality processes been observed in funding activities (i.e. clear objectives, focused on priority sectors; articulation of expected results; basic monitoring, reporting and acquittal processes established)  How are inputs from different aid modalities coordinated? Is the coordination adequate? What is enabling or constraining coordination efforts?  What is the view on the relative contribution of the Facility, vis-a-vis other aid modalities, to development outcomes?  To what extent has the Facility protected AusAID’s sector-focused aid program from fragmentation?  **For external interviewees:** Is the AAPF aligning with the development agenda of African governments? ...with donor coordination and harmonisation mechanism? Is Australia a responsive and flexible donor?  What development outcomes have been achieved by the funded activities? What has worked, what has not, and why? | Interviews with MC and AusAID staff who have ‘direct managed’ AAPF activities  Analysis of MC data and relevant AusAID files, plus interviews with MC and AusAID staff.  Document review. Interviews with recipient organisations/individuals, relevant PG commissioning bodies, implementing partners/sub-contractors.  Senior AusAID management; PG commissioning staff.  Senior AusAID management  Senior AusAID management  Interviews with PG commissioning staff, external donors, NGOs, recipients. |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Key evaluation question** | **Second level questions** |  | **What do we want to know?** | **Data methods** |
|  | What relationship outcomes was Australia aiming to achieve during the review period?  To what extent has the Facility contributed to the achievement of these relationship outcomes? | i  ii  iii  v  vi | What relationship outcomes were expected as a result of activities funded by the facility? (for MC managed activities; for AusAID direct managed activities)  What relationship outcomes have been achieved by the use of the Facility? What has worked, what has not, and why?  Would these relationships have been formed without the Facility?  What should be the future role of the facility in the relationship/partnership building process?  **For external interviewees:** How would you characterise the relationship between your government/organisation and the Australian government / linked Australian organisation? What has contributed to your view? How would you describe Australia’s role in Africa? What has contributed to this view? How has the implementation of the (named) activity contributed to the development of your relationship with Australia? | Interviews with HOMs, AusAID program managers, direct managers and MC.  Interviews with PG commissioning staff, recipient organisation staff, individual recipients. |
| **Are we using inputs of aid program funds, staff and other resources in the most efficient manner to achieve the desired results?** | How efficient is the management of the Facility (including management of activities by the MC and direct management of activities by AusAID)?  How efficient is the management of individual initiatives?  What level of risk has been associated with various categories of Facility funded initiatives? Have the risk management approaches been adequate? | i  ii  iii  iv  v | Why was the decision made to use the MC (or not) in managing the (named) activity?  Are the monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management processes adequate? (For MC managed activities; for AusAID direct managed activities)  Have the monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management processes been implemented to the required standard? If not, why not?  To what extent has the funding of initiatives beyond the standard duration and allocation (2 yrs; AUD1m) been adequately justified?  Have initiatives of >$3m value met quality standards for entry and implementation? | Interviews with MC and AusAID staff who have ‘direct managed’ AAPF activities  Review of the monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management processes and products employed by the MC and by AusAID staff on direct managed activities.  Review of quarterly /annual reports for initiatives valued more than $3m.  Review of project files; interviews with MC and AusAID managers. |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Key evaluation question** | **Second level questions** |  | **What do we want to know?** | **Data methods** |
|  |  | vi  vii | How is it possible to balance the need for the facility to be flexible and responsive with the need to achieve results and meet quality standards?  What challenges has the MC, and AusAID Managers, faced and how are these being addressed? | Interviews with MC and AusAID staff who have ‘direct managed’ AAPF activities |
| **Are the AAPF focus and objectives still relevant to Australia’s broader goals in Africa?** | To what extent is the Facility the modality of choice to achieve development and relationship outcomes going forward?  What should be the geographic and sectoral focus of Facility going forward?  What should be the scale and focus of funding?  What are the benefits and risks of aligning the Facility with capacity building activities in Africa? | i  ii  iii  iv  v  vi  vii  viii | What are the future expectations of the facility? Are there particular ways in which the facility has been used which should be incorporated into any new HR design effort?  Are there examples where it may be possible to have a second or third generation group of activities that build on what has been achieved with the facility?  When is the Facility the modality of choice in promoting development and relationship outcomes?  What enabling factors need to be present for the Facility to achieve the desired development and relationship outcomes?  To what extent should the geographic and sectoral spread of the Facility change going forward? Why?  What scale of funding is required to support the proposed geographic and sectoral focus of the Facility?  To what extent will the achievements of the Facility to date (in achieving development outcomes and relationship outcomes) remain relevant within the context of AusAID’s shifting strategic focus in Africa?  **For external interviewees:**  Australia offers aid in a range of ways. How important is the facility compared to other forms of aid?  In what circumstances do you think that the facility should be used? | Interviews with AusAID management and staff, HOMs.  Interviews with AusAID management and staff.  Review of MC and AusAID files.  Interviews with AusAID management and staff  Interviews with PG commissioning staff |

## Appendix C:

## 

**SCHEDULE AND LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED**

1. **Pre-departure**

**1.1 AusAID:**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Name** | **Title** |
| 07.12.2012 | Lisa Rauter | Assistant Director General |
|  | Raine Dixon | Director, Southern Africa |
|  | Naomi Dumbrell | Director, East Africa 1 |
|  | Stacey Walker | A/g Director | Pan Africa Programs Section |
|  | Anh-Thu Nguyen | A/g Manager  Africa Strategy, Performance and Partnerships Section |
|  | Andrea Cole | Quality & Performance Mgr |
|  | Sarah Willis | [previously First Secretary, West Africa] |
|  | Peter Duncan-Jones | First Secretary, Addis Ababa |
| 07.12.2012 | Daniel Boettcher | Program Mgr, Africa M4D |
| Tristan Armstrong | Program Mgr, Agric. & Food Security, [ACIAR Flexible Mechanism] |
| Sue Moore | Program Mgr, Peacebuilding, Sth Sudan and Somalia [UNODC Counter Piracy] |
| Matt Kellam | Program Mgr, Water and Sanitation, Southern Africa |
| Alice Crowley | Program Mgr, Water and Sanitation, Indian Ocean States |
| Katherine Vousaz | Program Officer, Pan Africa Programs |
| Katherine Mitchell | Manager, Mining for Development |

**1.2 Interviews with external stakeholders:**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Activity to Review** | **Name** | **Title** | **Organisation** |
| 7.12.2012 | Overall role of AAPF program | Dave Sharma | Assistant Secretary,  Africa Branch | DFAT |
|  |  | Will Blomfield | Director A/g, East, West and Regional Africa Section |
|  |  | Jan Hutton | Director, Southern and Central Africa Section |

1. **Field mission: 21st January – 9th February**

**2.1 Pretoria**

**AusAID/MC Briefing:**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Name** | **Title** | **Organisation** |
| 21.01.2013 | Jamie Isbister | Minister Counsellor – Australia Awards | AusAID |
| ##.11.2012  And 21.01.2013 | Andrew Edge | Counsellor, Southern Africa |
| 27.11.2012 and 21.01.2013 | Percy Stanley | Counsellor – Development Cooperation |
| 21.01.2013 | Gaye Moore | First Secretary, Partnerships and M4D |
| Frank Thompson | First Secretary, Australia Awards (previous First Sec. AAPF) |
| Anita Menete | AAPF |
| 08.02.2013 | Toni Redden | First Secretary, Contracts and Compliance |
|  |  |  |  |
| 22.01.2013 | Michael Baxter & team | Facility Director | MC |
| 23.01.2013 | Mr.VitaliyKramarenko (& advisers) | AFRITAC Representative | IMF |
|  | Percy Stanley | Counsellor | AusAID |
|  | Paul Greener | Food Security Adviser | MC |
|  | Michael Baxter | Facility Director | MC |
|  | Matthew Smith | M&E Manager | MC |
| 24.01.2013 | Anita Menete | Program Officer | AusAID |
|  | Andrew Edge | Counsellor | AusAID |
|  | Gaye Moore | AAPF Manager | AusAID |
|  | Frank Thompson | AAPF Manager (former) | AusAID |
|  | Will Wright | Communications Manager | MC |
|  | Andy Dijkerman | Strategic Planning Adviser | MC |
| 25.01.13 | Michael Baxter | Facility Director | MC |
|  | Gerome Rich | Deputy Facility Director | MC |
|  | Andy Dijkerman | Strategic Planning Adviser | MC |

**Interviews with external stakeholders:**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Activity to Review** | **Name** | **Title** | **Organisation** |
| 11.12.2012 | Role of AAPF in accredited countries | Anne Harrap | Ex High Commissioner, Pretoria | DFAT |
| 07.12.2012 | H.E. Graeme Wilson | High Commissioner, Pretoria |

**2.2 Ghana: 23rd – 26th January**

**AusAID/MC Briefing:**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Name** | **Title** | **Organisation** |
| 23:01:2013 |  |  |  |
| Michael Hunt | A/g First Secretary (Development Cooperation, West Africa) | AusAID |
| Stephanie Kimber | STM | AusAID |
| Isabel von Oertzen | AAPF Activity Manager | MC |
| 26.01.2013 | Monica Van Wensveen | FS Secondee, CSIRO Partnership | AusAID |

**Interviews with external stakeholders:**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Activity to Review** | **Name** | **Title** | **Organisation** |
| 23:01:2013 | Overall AAPF | H.E. Ms Joanna Adamson | High Commissioner | DFAT |
| 23:01:2013 | APSC program to Ghana | Bridget Katsriku | Manager - Chairman | Ghana Public Services Commission |
|  |  | Building Better Workforce Study Tour participants:   * Ernest Mallet * Ms Elsie AkuOkoh * B.K. Gyasi * Mrs Helena OseiGyamfi * Mr Salifu Abdul-Rahim * Joseph KwesiSarpong | Deputy Director  Senior HR Manager  Director  PMA  Assistant Director  Assistant Director | Ministry of Agriculture  Health Service  Ministry of Agriculture  Office of the Head of the Civil Service  Public Services Commission  Ministry ofFood and Agriculture |
| 24:01:2013 | Agriculture Training – Livestock (Multicountry Study Tour) | Dr Barfour Asare Mensah  Dr Abdul Razak Okine  Mr Charles Okyere-Darko  Rev. Raymond Tachie | Director Animal Production  Head of Pasture Management  Livestock Management  Schedule Officer Staff Training & Development | Ministry of Agriculture – Livestock Division  Ministry of Food &Agric: HR Development & Management Directorate |
| 24.01.2013 | Ghana Farmer Based Organisation Support | Dr Kwame Amezah | Director | Directorate of Agricultural Extension Services, MoFA |
| 25:01:2013 | Trade & Diplomacy Training | Naila Salihu | Program and Research Officer, Development Diplomacy for Peace &Security | Kofi Annan Training Centre |
| Mercy Debrah-Karikari  Harold | Director of Administration  Director of Training | Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration |

**2.3 Mozambique: 29th January – 1st February**

**AusAID/MC Briefing:**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Name** | **Title** | **Organisation** |
| 29.01.2013 | Michael Baxter | Facility Director | Managing Contractor |

**Interviews with external stakeholders:**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Activity to Review** | **Name** | **Title** | **Organisation** |
| 29:01:2013 | Technical Assistance for Newcastle Disease Control Program | Rosa F. Da Costa  Rosa | Regional Project Manager  Program Manager | Kyeema Foundation |
| 30:01:2013 | Overall support to MIREM from the AAPF | H.E. Esperanca Bias | Minister | Ministry of Mineral Resources  (MIREM) |
| Mario Marques | Minister's Adviser |
| Snr. Ramoa | Head of Planning and Development |
| 31:01:2013 | Uranium Mining and Handling Study Tour | Suzette Taimo | Head of Environment | MIREM |
| Legal support institutional strengthening | Carolino Tiago Luchucha, Vanda Nbaea, Sandra Huxtable, ChadrequeGuambe, Nelson Zumbene | Lawyers | MIREM |
| Public Private Partnerships (PPP) for Collaborative Regional Planning in Resource Rich Areas of Mozambique/ ARR1&2 | Danila Nala | Director-General | GAZEDA, Special Economic Zones Office |
| 01:2:2013 | Mozambique Mining Governance Assessment/ ARR25 | Benjamin Jose de S. Chilenge | National Director | Directorate of Planning and Development, Ministry of Mineral Resources |
| DFAT Trade Policy Course | Sylvia Soares Ribeiro  Ana Machova | Assistant of Minister | Ministry of Industry and Trade |

**2.4 Kenya: 3rd – 7th February**

**AusAID/MC Briefing:**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Name** | **Title** | **Organisation** |
| 30:01:2013  (teleconference) | Geoff Tooth | Australian Ambassador to Kenya | DFAT |
| Michael Collins | First Assistant Secretary, East and Horn of Africa | AusAID |
| 18.12.2013 and  04:02:2013 | Sue Graves | Counsellor: East and Horn of Africa |
| 04:02:2013 | Lisa Staruszkiewicz | First Secretary, East and Horn of Africa |
| Hilda Ouma | Program Manager, AAPF |
| 05.02.2013 | TomOnyango | Program Manager, South Sudan and Mining |
| 07.02.2013 | Asif Khan | Snr. Program Mgr, AAA |

**Interviews with external stakeholders:**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Activity to Review** | **Name** | **Title** | **Organisation** |
| 04:02:2013 | Fiscal Decentraliza-tion Project | Chris Finch | Snr. Social Development Specialist | World Bank |
| 04:02:2013 | Counter Piracy Programme | Alan Cole | Regional Coordinator | UNODC |
| 05.02.201 |  | George Ooko | Secretary/CEO | Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) |
| 05.02.2013 |  | Kathy Whimp | Technical Advisor | CRA |
| 06.02.2013 |  | Wolfgang Fengler | Lead Economist | World Bank |
| 05:02:2013 | AMREF | Sean Cullighan | Chief Operations Officer | AMREF |
| 05.02.13 | Diplomatic Training | Emma Malinda  Sophie Amboye  Daniel Mokoya  Agabio Mutumbei Mutego | Counsellor  Second Secretary  Third Secretary Welfare/AIDS Control/Gender/Public Sector Integrity  Second Sec Public Affairs & Communication | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| 06.02.13 | Mining Governance Study Tour | Jennifer Halwenge (telint)  Moses Masibo | Chief Inspector of Explosives  Acting Commissioner, Mines & Geology | Ministry of Environment & mineral Resources |

## Appendix D:

## 

**PROFILE OF AAPF ACTIVITIES**

## Document Purpose

This document provides a descriptive analysis of the portfolio of projects funded by the Australia Africa Partnerships Facility (AAPF)—an initiative of the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). The analysis was undertaken as part of a mid-term review (MTR) of the facility[[31]](#footnote-32).

## Background

The AAPF has funded projects through three mechanisms: i) ‘bilateral grants’to individual countries; ii) ‘multi-country’grants that have benefited a range of countries in each instance; iii) ‘transnational projects’ that have not benefited specified countries, but rather have supported transnational work (e.g. grants to the African Union, or studies of transnational issues).

## Portfolio Overview

The AAPF has funded projects in four financial years: 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13. This review covers the first three years.During the period under review assistance was facilitated by a total of **113**activities including **14** multi-country projects in which the beneficiary countries were not specified (e.g. grants to the African Union and UN Economic Commission to Africa, or transnational studies). Of the 113activities, a total of **51**were for bilateral projects implemented in discrete countries.In addition, around **12**agreements concerneda range of program support activities such as probity services, advisory services, M&E etc.

## Geographic Dimensions

AAPF has benefited a total of **54**countries throughout Africa. All 54 countries participated in multi-country projects; **20** also benefitted from bilateral projects.

The six countries benefitting most frequently from any form of AAPF assistance are depicted below.




Figure 1: Countries benefitting most frequently from any form of AAPF assistance

The countries benefiting most frequently from multi-country projects and bilateral projects are shown in the two graphs below, respectively. Note that South Africa benefited disproportionately more than other bilateral project recipients.





Figure 2: Countries benefiting most frequently from multi-country and bilateral assistance

Countries that benefited from participation in three or less multi-country projects included:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Country | No. projects |
| Libya | 1 |
| African Union (institutional support) | 2 |
| Algeria | 2 |
| Angola | 2 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 2 |
| Mauritania | 2 |
| Sao Tome & Principe | 2 |
| Sudan | 2 |
| Eritrea | 3 |
| Somalia | 3 |
| Guinea Bissau | 3 |
| Morocco | 3 |

Figure 3: Countries that participated in three or less multi-country projects

Ten countries benefited from only one bilateral grant, including: Eritrea, Somalia, Gambia, Lesotho, Seychelles, Mali, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania.

## Financial Dimensions

To date AAPF as committed a total of **AUD$72,250,358.**Funds committed in each financial year are shown below.

Figure 4: AAPF investment by financial year

A total of **$18,497,316** was invested through bilateral agreements that ranged between **$4,998.00**[[32]](#footnote-33) and **$1,164,026.70**[[33]](#footnote-34)**,** with an average of **$345,448**per project. Examples of ‘average’ sized bilateral investments include:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Project | Sector | AUD |
| Mozambique | Support for Mozambique to undertake Mining Governance Assessment | Mining | $ 400,000.00 |
| Sierra Leone | DFAT Peacebuilding and Conflict Adviser for Sierra Leone | Peace-building | $ 390,286.94 |
| South Africa | Large City Support Program | Public Sector Capacity Building | $ 331,376.63 |

Figure 5: Examples of average sized bilateral projects

Most (**27**) bilateral investments were in the range **$150,000 – $500,000**, with only one project valued at less than **$5,000**.




Figure 6: Number of bilateral projects within funding ranges

A total of **$$48,019,698**[[34]](#footnote-35) has been committed through multi-country projects (i.e. more than two-and-a-half times the investment in bilateral projects), as shown below:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2009/10 | 2010/11 | 2011/12 |
| Total | $7,089,069 | $13,052,045 | $24,558,352 |
| Average | $417,004 | $621,526 | $613,959 |
| Minimum | $46,783 | $19,479 | $55,116 |
| Maximum | $3,000,000 | $5,053,134 | $4,362,322 |

Figure 7: Multi-country project expenditure

The majority of multi-country projects (**23**) were in the **$100,000 - $500,000** range.




Figure 8: Number of multi-country projects within funding ranges

## Sector Dimensions

During the period under review AAPF invested in a total of **17** sectors[[35]](#footnote-36). More than half of all AAPF projects were in mining (**24%**), agriculture (**19%**) and trade/diplomacy (**9%**) with the remaining 14 sectors distributed as shown below:




Figure 9: Distribution of the 17 AAPF sectors

Bilateral projects invested in **15** of the 17 AAPF sectors, with the most projects (**9**) in mining, followed by agriculture (**8**) and public sector capacity building (**7**). The largest investments were in mining (**25%**), agriculture (**16%**) and economic governance (**15%**).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sector | No. Projects | Average Investment | Total Investment |
| Agriculture | 8 | $ 365,814.80 | $ 2,926,518.41 |
| Counter-piracy | 1 | $ 172,421.00 | $ 172,421.00 |
| Economic Governance | 3 | $ 875,767.08 | $ 2,627,301.23 |
| Education | 1 | $ 500,000.00 | $ 500,000.00 |
| Election Support | 1 | $ 15,320.00 | $ 15,320.00 |
| Environment and Climate change | 1 | $ 500,000.00 | $ 500,000.00 |
| Health (incl. biomedical research) | 3 | $ 33,243.33 | $ 99,730.00 |
| Humanitarian | 3 | $ 666,666.67 | $ 2,000,000.00 |
| Mining | 9 | $ 497,434.22 | $ 4,476,908.00 |
| Peace-building | 4 | $ 376,932.49 | $ 1,507,729.97 |
| Public Policy | 5 | $ 325,296.60 | $ 1,626,483.00 |
| Public Sector Capacity Building | 7 | $ 170,982.24 | $ 1,196,875.71 |
| Public Sector Reform | 4 | $ 33,481.81 | $ 133,927.22 |
| Sport/ Culture | 1 | $ 180,862.02 | $ 180,862.02 |
| Trade & Diplomacy | 1 | $ 4,998.00 | $ 4,998.00 |




Figure 10: Bilateral investments by sector

Multi-country projects invested in **14** sectors, with the most projects (**17**) in the mining sector, followed by agriculture (**13**) and trade and diplomacy (**9**). In terms of funding, two-thirds of all multi-country projects were in economic governance (**27%**), agriculture (**20%**) and mining (**20%**). Of note, the highest average investments per project were in economic governance, election support and public sector reform.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sector | No. Projects | Average | Total |
| Agriculture | 13 | $ 748,705.35 | $ 9,733,169.53 |
| Basic Education | 2 | $ 104,997.00 | $ 209,994.00 |
| Counter-piracy | 4 | $ 409,695.00 | $ 1,638,780.00 |
| Economic Governance | 2 | $ 4,276,566.83 | $ 12,829,702.48 |
| Election Support | 1 | $ 3,646,496.35 | $ 3,646,496.35 |
| Humanitarian | 1 | $ 103,839.00 | $ 103,839.00 |
| Mining | 17 | $ 554,280.09 | $ 9,422,761.47 |
| Peace-building | 1 | $ 119,564.19 | $ 119,564.19 |
| Public Policy | 3 | $ 883,333.33 | $ 2,650,000.00 |
| Public Sector Capacity Building | 1 | $ 185,000.00 | $ 185,000.00 |
| Public Sector Reform | 1 | $ 1,193,785.00 | $ 1,193,785.00 |
| Research | 1 | $ 100,000.00 | $ 100,000.00 |
| Sport/Culture | 1 | $ 55,116.00 | $ 55,116.00 |
| Trade & Diplomacy | 9 | $ 719,465.36 | $ 6,475,188.22 |




Figure 11: Multi-country investments by sector

## Project Dimensions

Content analysis of the AAPF portfolio revealed a typology of ‘project types’ represented as follows[[36]](#footnote-37):

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Project Type | No. |
| Advisers | 37 |
| Training | 28 |
| Study tour | 24 |
| Study/research | 13 |
| Conference | 5 |
| Demining | 3 |
| Scholarships | 2 |

Figure 12: AAPF project types

Within the multi-country ‘sub-portfolio’, the most frequent project type was training (**22**), followed by advisers (**13**), and study tours (**12**).

## Management Dimensions

The APPF portfolio has been predominantly (**76%**) managed by AusAID, with Pretoria carrying the bulk of the management responsibility (**42**), followed by Canberra (**37),** Nairobi (**4**), Addis Ababa (**3**), and Accra (**1**). The managing contractor (Cardno) has been responsible for **28** projects—of which almost two-thirds (**18**) have been multi-country projects[[37]](#footnote-38).




Figure 13: Management responsibility

## Appendix A: Bilateral Investments

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **2009/10** | **2010/11** | **2011-12** | **2012-13** | **TOTAL** |
| Botswana | $ 12,000.00 |  |  |  | $ 12,000.00 |
| Botswana | $ 4,998.00 |  |  |  | $ 4,998.00 |
| Botswana | $ 400,000.00 | $ 350,000.00 |  | $ 350,000.00 | $ 1,100,000.00 |
| Botswana | $ 250,000.00 | $ 120,000.00 |  |  | $ 370,000.00 |
| Botswana |  | $ 260,000.00 | $ 240,000.00 |  | $ 500,000.00 |
| Ethiopia | $ 240,000.00 |  |  |  | $ 240,000.00 |
| Ethiopia |  |  | $ 150,000.00 |  | $ 150,000.00 |
| Eritrea | $ 13,578.50 | $ 22,600.00 |  |  | $ 36,178.50 |
| Gambia | $ 57,051.00 |  |  |  | $ 57,051.00 |
| Ghana |  |  | $ 723,728.00 |  | $ 723,728.00 |
| Ghana |  |  | $ 449,612.00 |  | $ 449,612.00 |
| Kenya | $ 172,421.00 |  |  |  | $ 172,421.00 |
| Kenya | $ 62,530.00 |  |  |  | $ 62,530.00 |
| Kenya |  | $ 1,164,026.70 |  |  | $ 1,164,026.70 |
| Kenya |  |  | $ 850,000.00 |  | $ 850,000.00 |
| Kenya |  |  | $ 221,128.00 |  | $ 221,128.00 |
| Kenya |  | $ 100,000.00 |  |  | $ 100,000.00 |
| Lesotho |  | $ 34,611.91 |  |  | $ 34,611.91 |
| Liberia |  |  | $ 650,000.00 |  | $ 650,000.00 |
| Liberia |  |  | $ 706,418.00 |  | $ 706,418.00 |
| Malawi |  | $ 199,166.28 |  |  | $ 199,166.28 |
| Mali |  |  | $ 20,944.00 |  | $ 20,944.00 |
| Mozambique |  | $ 205,000.00 | $ 295,000.00 |  | $ 500,000.00 |
| Mozambique |  | $ 500,000.00 |  |  | $ 500,000.00 |
| Mozambique |  |  | $ 866,305.00 |  | $ 866,305.00 |
| Mozambique |  |  | $ 400,000.00 |  | $ 400,000.00 |
| Seychelles | $ 211,161.96 | $ 262,303.91 | $ 139,808.66 |  | $ 613,274.53 |
| Sierra Leone |  | $ 390,286.94 |  |  | $ 390,286.94 |
| Somalia |  | $ 500,000.00 |  |  | $ 500,000.00 |
| South Africa | $ 11,919.99 |  |  |  | $ 11,919.99 |
| South Africa | $ 48,606.23 |  |  |  | $ 48,606.23 |
| South Africa |  | $ 16,350.00 |  |  | $ 16,350.00 |
| South Africa | $ 500,000.00 |  |  |  | $ 500,000.00 |
| South Africa | $ 27,200.00 |  |  |  | $ 27,200.00 |
| South Africa | $ 500,000.00 |  |  |  | $ 500,000.00 |
| South Africa | $ 87,184.50 |  |  |  | $ 87,184.50 |
| South Africa |  | $ 180,862.02 |  |  | $ 180,862.02 |
| South Africa |  | $ 297,908.94 |  |  | $ 297,908.94 |
| South Africa |  | $ 331,376.63 |  |  | $ 331,376.63 |
| South Africa |  |  | $ 165,613.00 |  | $ 165,613.00 |
| South Sudan |  | $ 17,443.03 |  |  | $ 17,443.03 |
| South Sudan |  | $ 1,000,000.00 |  |  | $ 1,000,000.00 |
| South Sudan | $ 500,000.00 |  |  |  | $ 500,000.00 |
| South Sudan |  |  | $ 523,460.00 |  | $ 523,460.00 |
| Tanzania |  | $ 10,000.00 |  |  | $ 10,000.00 |
| Uganda | $ 1,000,000.00 |  |  |  | $ 1,000,000.00 |
| Uganda |  |  | $ 543,335.00 |  | $ 543,335.00 |
| Uganda |  |  | $ 510,169.00 |  | $ 510,169.00 |
| Zambia | $ 15,320.00 |  |  |  | $ 15,320.00 |
| Zimbabwe |  | $ 11,390.72 |  |  | $ 11,390.72 |
| Zimbabwe |  |  | $ 46,407.00 |  | $ 46,407.00 |
| Zimbabwe |  | $ 29,848.64 |  |  | $ 29,848.64 |
| **TOTAL** |  |  |  |  | **$ 17,969,074.56** |

## Appendix E:

## 

**RELATIONSHIPS AND PARTNERSHIPS IN THE AAPF**

## Relationships versus partnerships

In the AAPF design document the term ‘partnerships’ is used very loosely. Many senior PG representatives interviewed as part of the IPR Review had a clear view of what the term meant to them. To summarise, these representatives described a partnership as incorporating the following characteristics:

* *working together for mutual benefit*
* *to achieve a shared objective*
* *learning from each other*
* *sharing risks and benefits to achieve a common goal*
* *having great mutual respect, trust and equity*

Taken together, these characteristics align closely with the definition of partnership employed by The Partnering Initiative (TPI), an influential program of the International Business Leaders Forumwhich grew from work initially undertaken in the mining sector in West Africa in the 1980’s and 90’s.

From AusAID’s perspective, the AAPF has predominantly enabled the initiation and exploration of *relationships* with a range of countries with whom AusAID had previously had limited exposure or knowledge: a ‘foot in the door’. Interventions have been short-term, specific and highly responsive to partner government requests – not necessarily linked to Australia’s strategic interests. In most cases, there has been no specific intent (on AusAID’s part) for the short-term activities of AAPF to develop into something more substantial or long term. Applying the TPI schema for stages of the partnering cycle[[38]](#footnote-39) (which is also used internally within AusAID in its new partnering training), it would appear that AAPF has involved the ‘Initiating and Scoping’ stages of partnering.



An analysis of AAPF relationships using a relationship matrix tool, attached as Annex 1, suggests that theAAPF has been very successful in establishing relationships.

From the interviews the IPR team conducted, it is also clear that a considerable degree of goodwill has resulted from the very flexible and highly responsive use of the AAPF. Furthermore, some of the activities funded by AAPF have generated ideas and plans within the PGs for ways in which a ‘partnership’ could develop over time.

It is now incumbent upon AusAID to conduct a relationship audit to determine the way in which the relationships formed maybe managed in future and tocommunicatethe outcomes to PGs in way which will maintain goodwill. Relationships may be categorized in a range of ways; the following is an example of a Partnering Continuum.



## Defining partnerships

Partnership can mean many things to many different people and is influenced by the sector, the legal definition in different countries and by experience or exposure to different types of partnerships. Furthermore, partnerships and partnering have become an increasingly important response to dealing with complex development issues. Where one player/sector cannot solve problems by themselves, they may be able to mount a more appropriate and ultimately effective response by joining together with other sectors or key players.

For this reason, it is important that AusAID arrives at a common definition and understanding of what ‘partnerships’ mean within the Africa Program context.

Typically, in development, a partnership can be defined as an arrangement **where two or more parties work together to address a common development problem** (ie a shared objective), and where both risks and benefits are shared. Each partner may also have additional individual objectives, which they seek to achieve via partnership, but these are transparent and openly disclosed.[[39]](#footnote-40)

In practice, what we think of as ‘genuine partnerships’ tend to consist of two or more organisations (often but not always from different sectors) whose relationships and linkages/projects last for a longer period of time than one-off short term activities; which engage the organizations at various levels and in various ways; and where there is a deep mutual trust and respect. Mutual benefit is essential in order to build trust and equity and to avoid a ‘master-servant’ dynamic, which regrettably, has often been a feature of international development.

Key champions from within each organization are often critical, especially at start up, but truly successful partnerships are usually deeply embedded in each institution’s strategic interests and ways of working. This can enable partnerships to become sustainable, surviving departures of key champions. Without institutionalisation, partnerships can become highly vulnerable to a wide range of changes.

**Annex 1: Analysis of AAPF Relationships using a relationships matrix tool**

The IPR team developed and administered a ‘relationships matrix’ which was completed by a total of five DFAT and AusAID individuals in Posts who were both involved in the day to day management of AAPF activities and had an overview of the development relationships maintained between Australia and African countries. In the case of West Africa, the Managing Contractor representative, who has played a key role in developing and maintaining those relationships, was also asked to complete the matrix.

Respondents were asked to determine (on a 6-point scale) where they felt the relationship with each country was prior to AAPF support and where it was now *as a direct result of AAPF funding*. Where existing bilateral or other programs existed between Australia and the said country, respondents were asked to specifically consider the impact of the AAPF on the relationship.

The descriptors for each of the points on the relationship gradient were developed based on field interviews with AusAID staff and partner governments, and where possible, their language was used, supplemented by definitions of partnership also used internally by AusAID, as follows:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Relationship Level** | **Descriptor** |
| 0 | No relationship to speak of |
| 1 | ‘Opening the Door’ |
| 2 | ‘Going through the door and shaking hands’ |
| 3 | ‘Picking up the phone’: Open & informal conversations possible with key individuals |
| 4 | Developing into a deeper partnership (eg. joint problem solving; frank and open discussions) |
| 5 | A genuine partnership (institutionalised and characterized by mutual benefit, equity and respect) |

It is important to note that respondents are influenced by their own exposure and perception of the relationship, as well as in some cases, by the length of time they have been involved, but in no cases was this less than one year, and in most cases it was considerably longer. Most respondents had been involved in some way since the start of the AAPF. Most respondents were senior and would be expected to have a strategic view of partner relationships. In some cases, the comment on the country partnership is in reality a comment on the partnership with the specific Ministry with whom AusAID predominantly engages in that country, for example in Mozambique, this relates to the Ministry of Mineral Resources.

**Analysis**

Of the 54 African countries in receipt of AAPF funding, DFAT and AusAID respondents felt that eleven (plus the African Union) were considered to be moving beyond relationships into deeper partnerships (average score of 4 or above), with only one (South Africa) rated as a ‘genuine partnership’. In the case of South Africa, a significant relationship/partnership already existed prior to AAPF. Those countries felt to be developing into ‘deeper partnerships’ (4 or above) were:

Ghana (4.5)

Liberia(4.0)

Ethiopia (4.5)

Zambia (4.3)

Zimbabwe (4.5)

Kenya (4.0)

South Sudan (4.3)

Seychelles (4.7)

Botswana (4.5)

Mozambique (4.8)

Africa Union (4.3)

In the case of Ghana, Liberia, South Sudan, Seychelles, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the African Union, the AAPF was felt to have substantially progressed the relationship (movement of 2 or above compared to prior to the start of AAPF).

In all of these countries, bilateral relationships were also in place, which provided for a good starting place, and it could be argued that the responsive and flexible funding provided by AAPF expedited the development of those relationships.

In countries like Malawi, the Gambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Lesotho and Namibia, partnerships were relationships were considered to be good (rating around 3), but little change in the relationship was felt to be attributable to AAPF support.

Furthermore, as a result of AAPF, there had been a progression of 2 points or more in the following countries (some starting from a ‘no relationship’ basis):

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Present Relationship** |
| Burkino Faso | 3 |
| Mali | 2.5 |
| Sierra Leone | 2 |
| Niger | 3 |
| Rwanda | 2 |
| Comoros | 2 |
| Madagascar | 3.5 |
| Mauritius | 2.5 |

In a number of countries, where Australia had little or no prior relationship the AAPF ‘paved the way’ but no significant progress has been made in the development of a relationship with Australia as a result of the limited AAPF input. This included Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Sunda, Tunisia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bisseau, Sao Tome, DRC, Somalia, CAR, Chad, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria and Angola.

Overall, good progress has clearly been made in developing partnerships in some key country partners, and this was supported by field interviews with partner governments in the case of Kenya, Mozambique and Ghana.

## Appendix F: ASSESSMENT OF A PURPOSIVE SAMPLE OF AAPF ACTIVITIES

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Management** | **Relevance to relationship objectives1.**  **(H,M,L)** | **Relevance to development objectives2.**  **(H,M,L)** | **Appropriate use of the modality3.**  **(H,M,L)** | **Had clear objectives**  **(Yes/No)** | **Implemented effectively4.**  **(H,M,L)** | **Represented optimal use of resources**  **(H,M,L,)** | **Monitoring and reporting adequate**  **(Yes/No)** | **Delivered relationship benefit**5.  **(H,M,L,)** | **Has delivered development benefit**  **(H,M,L,)** | **Potential for on-going benefit**  **(H,M,L)** |
| **GHANA** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| APSC Public Sector Reform | AA | H/M | H | H | Yes | H | H | Yes | L | M | H |
| Farmer Based Organisations | MC | H/M | H | M | Yes | L | L | N/A6. | L | L | L |
| Agricultural training (livestock) | AA | M/H | H | H | Yes | M | H | Yes | H) | M | H |
| **MOZAMBIQUE** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Legal Support Institutional Strengthening | MC | H/H | H | H | Yes | H | H | Yes | H | M | H |
| Uranium and Haz. Waste Tour | MC | M/H | H | H | Yes | H | H | Yes | M | M | M |
| PPP for Collaborative Regional Planning | MC | H/H | H | H | Yes | L | M | Yes | L | L | L |
| **KENYA** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Supporting fiscal decentralization | AA | H/H | H | H | Yes | H | H | Yes | H | M | H |
| AMREF | AA | H/M | M | H | Yes | H | H | Informal reporting | H | M | H |
| **MULTICOUNTRY** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Regional diplomacy training | AA/ MC | M/L | L | L | No | M | M | No | M | L | L |
| DFAT Trade Policy Course | AA/ MC | H/L | L | M | Yes | H | H | Yes | H | L | M |
| UNODC | AA | H/M | M | M | Yes | H | L | No | L | M | M |
| ACIAR research | AA | H | M | L | No | L | M | Yes | L | L | ? |
| TA for Newcastle Disease | AA | L/H | H | M | Yes | H | H | Yes | M | H | H |
| AFRITAC South | AA | L | L | L | No | L | L | No | L | L | M |
| Mining Governance Study | MC | H/H | H | H | Yes | H | H | Yes | H | H | H |

Notes:

Two ratings have been awarded against this criteria. The first rating indicates the degree to which the activity satisfied the diplomatic relationship objective (i.e. being seen to be responding to PG request and being visible in the country). The second rating refers to relevance in terms of development relationships. The degree to which AusAID was able to further a development relationship via the Facility Varied from Post to Post and activity to activity.

Development objectives have changed over time. Pre November 2011 the defining factor was the Looking West Strategy; post November 2011, whilst this Strategy prevailed, there was a defined emphasis in the FMA9 and the MC’s contract to an increasing focus on mining, agriculture/food security and public policy. The ratings have been awarded according to the relevance at the time that the activity commenced.

* + 1. The FMA9 definition of the "appropriate use of the Facility", which is echoed in the MC contract, is:

“Australia will provide modest capacity building assistance for mining, agricultural and PP requests in the form of deployments of people, exchanges of people between African and Australian organisations, training, workshops, seminars and grant funding. Australia will also provide assistance to requests outside these areas if an African country identifies a high priority need that Australia can meet or if the Australian Government identifies such a need." Clearly the second sentence allows anything to be funded through the Facility. For the purposes of this exercise the first sentence has been used as the primary intent of the facility and the rating has been made against this definition.

* + 1. The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:
* the expected development outcomes were clearly defined
* achievements met expectations
* there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’
* inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated

Relationship benefit can be between Australian government and African counterparts and/or between Australian and African Educational Institutions, businesses and NGOs.

This activity has only just commenced.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Activity Name | **Public Sector Reform Initiatives** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **14146** | | |
| Start date | **24th February 2011** | End date | **December 2012** |
| Value | **$1,193,785** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | AusAID | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) | | |
| Country/Region | Multi-country | | |
| Primary Sector | Public policy | | |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 4 | * The facility was a useful mechanism to ‘get something started’ in the Ghana PSC. It may not be the most appropriate mechanism to ‘keep something going’. * The activity responds to PG demand. It is not that a focus on governance in Ghana is a priority strategic focus for AusAID in future. * Participants felt there was a great deal of commonality of experience to be shared between APSC and GPSC, and that understanding how APSC had addressed shared issues (eg absenteeism, workforce management, performance management) was relevant and highly valuable. * Despite the scoping mission recommendation to commence a ‘twinning’ relationship between the PSCs in Australia and Ghana, it is not clear that the APSC either really understands, or is committed to, a long term partnership with the Ghanaian PSC, with all that entails,. Comments from interviewees suggest a predominantly one way relationship “we are the beggars; they are willing to support us” and were not clear as what APSC’s objectives were in partnering with them. Attempts to find a volunteerto provide high level TA have not been successful, though APSC requested a strong preference for a secondee from within APSC in place of a volunteer. Not clear that there is institutional commitment from APSC (ie not just their international division) to genuine twinning (i.e. secondments, mentoring, sharing between like positions in the Australian and GPSC), of which GPSC were highly desirous. |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 4 | * It would appear that the expected development outcomes were not clear at the outset. This is not surprising given that it was an exploratory exercise. * Interviews with PSC indicate strong satisfaction with both the inputs provided (study tours, training) and with the ‘Australian style’ of training. The participatory, action-research approach was highly regarded. However, the study tour and training attempted to cover too much ground in too short a period of time - consideration could be given to breaking the training into modules. The Chair noted that although study tours are valuable in certain circumstances, greater value for money can be achieved by bringing trainers to Ghana. |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
|  |  |  | * The participation of staff from a range of departments was cited as highly valuable in terms of developing networks for the HR practitioners. While some informal networking had subsequently occurred, it was hoped that APSC would help foster an effective alumni network, perhaps hosting an online platform for exchange (such as Linked In) or supporting actual meetings of the alumni group. It was suggested that this could include alumni from other countries in Africa where APSC had run similar courses. * The interviewees wished to see a deeper and longer term engagement develop between the APSC and their PS. They also have some clarity about the type of partnership they would like to develop with the APSC (see quote below). They are also clear that the embryonic relationship which they currently have with the APSC is a long way from being a partnership. * Interviews with training and study tour participants indicate that the activity has brought about changes in their professional practice. Evidence cited includeschanges to the format and content of the State of the PS Report; the intention to establish a network of (trained) HR practitioners across the agencies; rolling out a new HR manual in the MoA as a test run before rolling out across the agencies. * Some less senior participants noted their limited ability to affect systems change in isolation when their department heads had not had the same exposure to the training or study tour. They also noted they were just a few players in a very large system. More senior directors noted they had the ability to make change happen as a result of their training. * It was noted that the AusAID had not been respectful of Ghana government hierarchies, for example, approaching participants and other ministries directly about the study tour, when this should be channelled through the GPSC as the coordinating body. It was hoped this would be understood and addressed. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | 3 | * This activity was initiated and managed directly by AA staff because it involved engaging another Australian Government department. * Some of the logistics associated with the study tour were very poor. In one case (this is apparently not isolated) the participant was not aware he was attending the course until 3 days before departure; he received his visa just 4 hours before his plane took off, and was not briefed before he left. He met fellow participants for the first time en route, in Dubai, by chance.   The Draft Completion Report is adequate although the description of the purpose and objectives of the exercise is confused in various places.  The follow-on scoping mission report is adequate but, as indicated above, it does not reflect a true understanding of the nature of a twinning arrangement, nor is there any indication of high level institutional commitment from the APSC (beyond the ‘international’ group) |

**Quotes:**

*“We want an arrangement with the public service in Ghana and Australia where we identify the institutions performing similar functions (Federal or State government) and build a relationship which establishes a good communication system (so that we don’t have to travel there all the time) linked on technical, professional issues” [Authors’s note: this interviewee was extremely interested, and clearly well versed, in the way in which the Australian Federal model works. The Ghanaian PSC is struggling with issues of decentralization and is keen to learn. It is surprising that this issue did not receive much attention in the Scoping Report].*

*“In our day-to-day activities I would love the opportunity to learn from Australia how someone in my position works every day.”*

*“The Public Service Act in Ghana requires us to prepare a report for the President, but having seen the State of the Public Service Report which APSC produces we felt that we should improve what we are doing – we want to replicate the Australian system here.’*

*“APSC’s involvement in the training is very key. It is more important than having Training of Trainers. The external perspective and examples made the performance management training very fresh and exciting”.*

*“In some instances, study tours are very very good. ‘Seeing and doing’ will stay with you forever. Another way is working alongside people for 2 weeks or one month – this is very helpful. But if you go on a study tour and you are just sitting in a classroom being talked at, this is not as effective; it would be better in this case to bring four people to Ghana for training – they can train a lot more people here.”*

*“Australia and Ghana both have good public services, but Australia has made good strides which we can learn from …. It is useful for us to understand how Austraia got to it’s current situation”.*

*“The world is these days a small global village. We need to move everyone along together and share ideas so that as we learn from you we can move abreast and reduce the gaps between countries.”*

*“An ideal partnership with Australia shouldn’t just be a one-off. There needs to be ongoing support, and we need to institutionalise it.”*

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| Activity Name | **Ghana Farmer Based Organisations** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **ARR11** | | |
| Start date | **May 2012** | End date | **April 2014** |
| Value | **4723,728** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | Cardno Emerging Markets | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | Ministry of Food and Agriculture | | |
| Country/Region | Ghana | | |
| Primary Sector | Agriculture | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 3 | This activity has barely commenced. The activity does not align with the proposed directions of Australia’s program in Africa. The PG appears highly dissatisfied with the process for setting up this activity, particularly the failure to finalise an agreement; the use of an MC rather than working directly with the Ministry; the failure to involve the Ministry in selection of a logistics provider, etc.  The Director of Extension perceives the current exercise to be a pilot and a precursor to further engagement. Currently there is some intention to link Agriculture Extension with the research work being supported under the auspices of the CSIRO Agriculture/Food Security program. However, it is unlikely that this will involve substantial support for agricultural extension. If adequate future engagement does not occur, there is potential for damage to Australia’s reputation. |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | N/A | This activity has only just started. Although part time TA support (local consultant) is in place, a project implementation agreement has not been signed and no funds have been available to the Ministry to commence work (see comments below).Australia has not yet carried out a fiduciary assessment of the Ministry and is not prepared to use MoFA systems. This is despite the fact that MoFA has had more than 20 years engagement with CIDA and GIZ and these donors use the PG systems.  The activity is being managed by the MC. The procurement of the logistics service provider has been carried out by the MC without any involvement from the Ministry. Given the Ministry’s long term implementation of the FBO program (more than 20 years), they are not only deeply offended by the treatment from Australia, the process has also caused significant problems for them. |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
|  |  |  | The review team was advised that the Ministry selects service providers on a participatory basis, involving representatives of the FBO apex bodies. The FBO apex bodies are then involved, in their own area, in the selection of the local providers. In the current circumstances, the Ministry is placed in the uncomfortable position of needing to call for EOIs from local providers which have experience working with FBOs and getting them to go to the logistics provider selected by the MC.  In commenting upon the way this matter has been handled, the Director of Agricultural Extension Services commented:“I have not seen this behaviour before”.  Nevertheless, the Director acquired his PhD in Australia and he has been very gracious in the way in which he has interpreted this situation. He believes that, insofar as AusAID has not worked with the Ministry in Ghana before, they are being cautious and treating the current activity as a pilot.  The Chief Director is not so sanguine. The Chief Director has noted that, as yet, he has had no contact whatsoever from AusAID personnel and is not prepared to meet again with the MC representative. “Let Australia take their money and go.”  Finally, a two week study tour to Australia is in the process of being organised. The Review Team was advised that minimal information has, as yet, been provided to the Ministry about the purpose and focus of the study tour. The Ministry has been asked to release 25 people from central and regional levels. The Director of Extension was reluctant to release so many people at one time and requested that the batch be broken into two. The MC advised that this was not possible due to the costs involved. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | N/A | MOFA has had engagement with CIDA and GIZ for more than 20 years. The Ministry is used to a process involving joint agreement on a design and work plans, a designated project budget, disbursement decisions approved by a Steering Committee including the donor, management by the Ministry but direct donor involvement in key processes (e.g. committees select service providers).  Currently there is no MOU between GoA and GoG. AA advised the MC to draw up an Implementation Contract to be countersigned by the Ministry and the MC. The MC is tasked with selecting service providers and paying them directly. The Ministry was asked to set up an account to receive the only direct payment available to them ($50K support for the FBO Secretariat). The Ministry consequently set up this account but no money has been paid in. AA has now advised the MC not to proceed with the Implementation Contract and that the matter will be dealt with via an Exchange of Letters between governments. This exchange of letters has not yet occurred.  Despite the TA being in place and an office made available by the Ministry, there are no operating funds. The MC advises that funds are available if the Ministry follows correct process in requesting funds targeted to specific purposes (e.g. quoting trips, mileage, etc) However, given the Ministry’s previous experience of a more flexible way of operating they appear to be reluctant to follow this process. |

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| Activity Name | **Agriculture Training (Livestock) – Multicountry Study Tour** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **57613** | | |
| Start date | **12th June, 2011** | End date | **24th July, 2011** |
| Value | **$537,781** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | AusAID | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) |  | | |
| Country/Region | Accra / West Africa | | |
| Primary Sector | Agriculture | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 5 | * The scoping and study tour was an appropriate way to initiate exchange of knowledge between Ghana and Australia in an area of common interest/experience – increasing meat production in Ghana, which only produces 30% of its meat requirements is a key priority, with Australia/Ghana’s focus on food security and the learning is of great relevance to Ghana. * This first contact was a door-opener to ongoing and highly relevant development assistance with Ghana. A number of follow-on activities (seed production trials, feed lot management, pasture management) have been identified by the Animal Production Unit following the study tour, which directly build on the learnings of the tour, but internal (Ghana) budget is not available. The tour coordinators asked about follow on activities but there has been no follow up, and the participants were unaware that they could investigate further opportunities. * Ghana requested the study to visit the very north of WA and also Darwin, given that the tropical climate in these areas is very similar to Ghana’s, whereas SE WA is very temperate, so not as comparable. This was not reflected in the study tour. |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 4 | * The Director of the Animal management Unit was involved in scoping the design of the study tour with an earlier, two week visit to WA which greatly assisted in the design. * Participants felt the design of the course very accurately addressed their needs of learning about seed production, pasture management, agricultural workforce, pelletised food production, food mixes etc. The practical work in particular was highly appreciated, and the participants would like to see more of this – the 3 weeks of lectures followed by field work was not ideal – the practical work should have been interspersed with the theory to maximise effective learning. * Participants greatly valued having other regional country counterparts on the course, though noted the difficulties for the francophone participants with limited English and no interpreters. * There have been a number of exciting ideas resulting from the study tours, including a proposal to expand seed production/pasture management in Ghana (their current facility does not produce sufficient seed for the whole country); pelletisation of local feed crops, livestock identification system and investigation into feedlot management and artificial insemination (AI). Interviewees expressly wished for a future course in respect of the latter. The Department does not have funding for these initiatives and was not aware of any follow-up opportunities, though it would value further exchanges. * In terms of ‘partnerships’ the respondent assessed the current relationship with Australia at ‘the very beginning’ – a 0 or 1, but would very much hope it will develop into a longer term partnership. |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features[[40]](#footnote-41)** | **Rating[[41]](#footnote-42)**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | 4 | * This activity was direct-managed by AusAID and in general logistics were felt to be adequate, although securing visas via Pretoria and Nairobi was felt to be challenging. * The Completion Report of the activity is sufficient and records feedback for changing the way future activities are being run. It does not record the strongly expressed wish from Ghana that exposure to Australia’s north and comparable tropical climate be included (this was expressed during the course as well). The * The collaborative approach to the study course content was appreciated by the participants, though clearly the theoretical components would need to be broken up in future courses to maximise learning opportunities. * No follow-up activities were discussed or acted upon despite significant interest and clear areas of mutual interest. The opportunity for alumni to apply for AAA scholarships was raised but not followed up. |

**Quotable quotes:**

“Seeing is believing” (in relation to field aspects of study tour).

“ We would like to continue to learn from Australia, and for Australia to learn from us. We have much in common”

“The shared experience between Australian farmers and free communication with other countries on the study tours was fantastic”.

**Scholarship Comments:**

The Department of Animal Management expressed a desire for access to the Scholarships and were seemingly unaware of this possibility. They were interested in short course with a practical focus and noted that Ghana university course in agriculture were highly theoretical.

**Other:**

The Department really valued the practical aspect of the program and noted that agricultural teaching in Ghana was very theoretically based. They raised the idea of an Australian agriculture training institute working with the Ghana equivalent to help evolve more practical, hands-on courses.

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| Activity Name | **Legal Support Institutional Strengthening (MIREM)** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **ARR12** | | |
| Start date | **MARCH 2012** | End date | **June 2013** |
| Value | **$866,305** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | Cardno Emerging Markets | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) |  | | |
| Country/Region | Mozambique | | |
| Primary Sector | Mining | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 6 | * Support to the Government of Mozambique on specialised law relating to mining resources is both timely and an appropriate use of AAPF. There are some 38 Australian mining companies alone operating in Mozambique in the current mining ‘boom’, and the GoM is rapidly trying to update its legislation and capacity to reflect this reality. * The focus of training in 2011-12 was mining taxation and contracts. The study tour and short courses have focussed not just on lawyers in the Ministry of Mineral Resources (MIREM) but on lawyers across a wide range of relevant government departments (e.g. Finance, Environment). * Given Australia’s own interest in mining, and its regulatory experience, this is a highly appropriate, timely and valued (by the recipient government) use of AAPF funding. It is in both Mozambique’s and Australia’s interests to ensure a transparent and effective regulatory environment for mining in Mozambique. The decision to assume a whole-of-government approach to the capacity building is wise and appreciated by the Government. |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 5 | * The need for the legal strengthening support was identified by MIREM and seminars were based on topics defined by MIREM, so all were considered of value. * Participants identified the need for legislative change as a result of participating in the course, but felt they were not able to directly influence this outcome. * Participants have been able to apply the knowledge they have acquired in contract negotiations with mining companies, and have appreciated the more strategic perspective the training has brought. * Participants report feeling better able to advise their Minister on specialist mining matters, which they previously could not, however, they identified a need for 1 or 2 of their number to acquire specialist qualifications in mining law, as this doesn’t not exist in Mozambique. * The training pedagogy included role plays and simulations (for example in negotiation), and the interaction with lawyers from other government departments was of considerable benefit. The ability to see and learn ‘in the field’ was also considered very important – for example in neighbouring countries where small scale and artisanal mining also represent a challenge to governments – this could not have been offered if the study tour only visited Australia. |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
|  |  |  | * Some participants were very new to their roles, and gained enormously. Those who had more experience still reported the training as adding value and expanding knowledge. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | 5 | * The MC’s expertise and networks within the mining industry (both in Australia and Africa) have contributed to this being a well designed and run program of capacity building. |

**Quotes:**

*“I don’t think there is any lawyer at MIREM who has special training on minerals law, so we can’t advise the Minister appropriately as we don’t have the knowledge”.*

*“One of the most important things we learned was the future consequences of relatively small clauses in (mining) contracts; the impact of a small thing in 20 years time. I could remember this when I subsequently negotiated a contract, but before I wouldn’t have”.*

*“We now understand that contracts need to be changed for the benefit of Mozambique’.*

*“Previously, we just used the model contract approved by Cabinet, which we gave to the mining companies. They would make changes to the clauses to suit their needs and previously we would expect just to approve the changes without thinking through the consequences.”*

*“Now we are visiting mining companies to see if they are complying with the contract. We didn’t do that before.”*

*“It would be very beneficial to continue this exchange with Australia. We would like to continue it. The signing of the contract is just the beginning. The implementation is to come. Every day I am sure there will be many new issues about which we require new knowledge.”*

*“It would be good to have (access to) a legal advisor or panel who is very experienced in mining issues and comes from a mining country background, like Australia, Brazil or South Africa. It would be good if they spoke Portuguese”.*

*“We ought to change our mining law on the basis of what we have learned from these courses”.*

**Scholarship Comments:**

The external AAPF Coordinator for the Legal Strengthening Study tour indicated to participants that there would be the opportunity to apply for schlolarship in the ‘second phase’ of the funding.

The participants identified the need for 2 or 3 of their number to acquire formal qualifications in mining resources law, in order to be adequately equipped to advise their Minister. This could be a good follow-on in terms of some scholarships. It was felt that out of the 10-11 strong legal team, that 2 could be spared for Masters training. However, a plea was made to consider the language difficulties of Portuguese-speakers from Mozambique and the barrier this created for applications to the Scholarships program.

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| Activity Name | **Uranium Mining & Hazardous Waste Study Tour/Short Course - Australia – Interview with MIREM Environment Department participant** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **ARR28** | | |
| Start date | **10 August 2012** | End date | **18 August 2012** |
| Value | **$412,415** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | Cardno Emerging Markets | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) | | |
| Country/Region | Mozambique (part of multi-country study tour and short course involving Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia) | | |
| Primary Sector | Mining | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 5 | * The IPR team was only able to interview one participant in this study tour and short course. * The study tour was highly relevant and timely for MIREM’s Environment Unit. They have only 3 people who are trying to cope with the rapid escalation of mining in Mozambique, including trying to develop a new Environment law. * The study tour visited Australia, Mozambique, Mali and Zambia. Namibia was supposed to be included but the visit was called off due to elections in country. The visit to Zambia was particularly helpful, given experience in small scale and artisanal mining, which is a big environmental issue for Mozambique. |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 4 | * The interviewee indicated that the study tour/course will have an impact on changing environmental policy and law specific to the environmental impacts of mines. * AAPF brokered networks between African partner countries with shared mining experiences. * The practical, field based approach of the study tour was most valued, as was seeing the robust relationship which the private sector has with partner governments in other countries. * Management of the fear and expectations of communities around hazardous and toxic waste, and of the resettlement of large communities due to mining activities was a major focus. These are all new areas of concern, and the government now has more ideas of how to pursue, and particularly around the development of specialist environmental law. * The pedagogy used in the mining short course (community aspects of mining – 21 days) could have been more interactive; the expert came, gave lectures, then left. There was no real time to explore and discuss issues of concern to the participants. * The selection of candidates may need to be looked at more closely. It is important to include technical people engaged in the field (eg those on the ground doing the actual environmental assessments), many of whom are located outside of Maputo, in Tete for example. It was suggested that it would be worthwhile running a short course locally (eg 3 weeks in Maputo then go out to the field and discuss how change could be achieved and develop concrete plans). |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features[[42]](#footnote-43)** | **Rating[[43]](#footnote-44)**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
|  |  |  | * Greatly valued opportunity to participate on study tour with counterparts from other African countries – great learning benefits. * The interviewee rated the current relationship with Australia 6/10, noting that the intervention has been very positive, but Australia has not really been ‘felt’ (visible) yet probably due to the language barrier. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | 5 | * The study tour built on an existing initiative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) * Other donors have previously provided inputs to MIREM, including DANIDA and IAEA. However, it was felt that while Australia’s engagement had been short, a great deal had happened in that time (eg study tours, training courses). * Request to consider building capacity of local institute with aim to running short courses in Mozambique in the medium term. |

**Quotes:**

*“We saw many things (on the study tour) that we are going to bring into our new environmental law. The tour was very useful in opening new horizons. We were not expecting to have this boom in the mining sector, so we really need the help”*

*“The corporate social responsibility approaches of the different countries who are here: Brazil, Japan, China, Australia, are all different. We want to be able to harmonise approaches and say what is the right policy for Mozambique, so developing our policies around this is very important.”*

*“We would like to see technicians trained in Mozambique so that we develop in a sustainable way, people who can contribute to the economy just as in Australia”.*

**Other**: A request was made for strengthening Mozambique’s educational institutions to expand in-country training (and quality of training) around mining rehabilitation, mining engineering, radioactive mining, environmental impact.etc so that more Mozambicans can benefit. Request not just on content, but also on pedagogical methods. Current training for mining engineers for example is out of country, in Zambia or elsewhere. There is currently a technical college (mining) in Tete which could be strengthened.

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| Activity Name | **PPP for Collaborative Regional Planning** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **57567** | | |
| Start date | **May 2011** | End date | **December 2012** |
| Value | **$500,000** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | Cardno Emerging Markets | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | Ministry of Planning and Development, Tete provincial ghovernment | | |
| Country/Region | Mozambique | | |
| Primary Sector | Mining | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating (1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use (yes) * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas (yes) * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant (yes) * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant (doubtful) | 4 | This activity seems to have been initiated through pre-existing contacts which the MC Project Director had with Gazeda. Discussions started in 2010; the Ministry felt that it was important to have a planning instrument for the development of Tete. The Ministry wanted to learn about the *process* for developing and signing minerals and mining contracts. The Ministry sent 3 or 4 people on the study tour.  They do not get much Australian aid, compared to other donors.[[44]](#footnote-45) A lot of donors are contributing to strategic planning.  The DG notes: “For myself, I do not feel too much presence of Australia and I feel that the process of cooperation with Australia is different from any other country. Australia has more steps and controls; it takes more time. It is not easy to contact Australia. If Australia wants a partnership it needs to be:   * more present * have more than just financing of trips and scholarships but also bringing experience from Australia with the people who are capable and who have been doing these things for many years in Australia. For this we need long term advisors and consultants. |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 3 | They learned the importance of ownership of the process of planning by all key stakeholders. They are now attempting to join regional planning for Tete with regional planning for the northern part of the country.They also learned how Australia plans. They want to learn how to make sure that a thirty year plan will remain.  “The follow up is very important. Without follow-up there is a risk that whatever was learned on the study tour is forgotten.”  The relationship benefit is embryonic. The development benefit has been minimal and the MPD clearly regard themselves as having stronger partnerships with other donors. |

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| Activity Name | **Supporting Fiscal Decentralization in Africa** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **ARR19** | | |
| Start date | **27th April, 2012** | End date | **31st October, 2012** |
| Value | **$221,128** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | AusAID / Cardno Emerging Markets | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | World Bank; Commission on Revenue Allocation | | |
| Country/Region | Kenya | | |
| Primary Sector | Public Policy | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating (1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | **5** | The driver for the involvement of Australia in this initiative came from a World Bank staffer who had direct experience of AusAID’s work in supporting decentralization in Indonesia. The World Bank was aware that changes to the constitution in Kenya were coming and wanted to provide TA to support the early stages of implementation of decentralization.However, at the time, the Bank had no capacity to do so.  The World Bank staff was quite convinced that Australia’s capacity to respond quickly was critical. “The WB would not have been able to do much without Australia’s support. In a perverse way it also encouraged us to put our own staff resources into devolution.”  The Facility was the appropriate modality to provide support because it “allowed Australia to be there early, to take the risk.” “This is exactly when gap filling support is appropriate, when systems are being built. You can influence the development of the systems”.  “From a strategic perspective, helping a country with something that is hugely important, you could not have picked a better one than this.”  The activity was definitely seen as ‘Australian’ by the PG. “The Australian Ambassador met with us; the person in charge from the AusAID side has a relationship with us.” |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | **5** | The Secretary/CEO of the Kenyan Commission on Revenue Allocation considers the study tour and technical assistance to have been extremely valuable. The Australian advisor has excellent experience in this area; the professional input was greatly valued “at a time when we were working on the first steps of the decentralization process.” A World Bank staffer noted that “It is the capacity to respond quickly and on point that has distinguished this activity. There is no-one else in the space”. The input has specifically influenced the formulation of a range of policies (e.g. County Government Act, the Public Financial Management Act and the Transition Bills). Comments have been made on all these instruments and significant changes have occurred as a result of these contributions. A contribution was also made to the development of regulations/standards for County level organisations and inter-governmental coordination arrangements.Without the Australian support it would not have been possible to provide “real time advice”. This is a critical value add of the facility.Now that the devolution process is underway a number of large donors are going to provide assistance (e.g. USAID, DFID, EU). However, these programs of support are still in the design stage and it may be 2 years before start up. |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating (1-6)** | **Explanation** |
|  |  |  | In the mean time, the Secretary/CEO sees an on-going role for the AAPF providing small scale, rapid responses to emerging problems, particularly in the areas of capacity building of County personnel and revenue enhancement at the County level. In other words, there is great potential for AAPF support for second and third generation activities.  The activity has also demonstrated an effective way for Australia to engage with a multilateral but still maintain national branding. The combination of an Australian expert, a study tour to Australia and visits from respected Australian professionals has enabled strong branding to occur. Furthermore, the fact that Australia provided support at a critical time ensured that branding on all relevant World Bank literature. The Fiscal Decentralization Knowledge Program business cards, reports, etc. all bear the AusAID logo. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | **5** | The speed and efficiency of the response from the AAPF was greatly valued. “Compared to other kinds of support this was valuable; this was really fast track; small but fast track. Other support takes too long.”  The MC monitoring and reporting requirements were considered arduous for a 4 month assignment. The TA was required to provide a training plan, M&E plan, inception report, monthly reports and completion report.  A World Bank staffer also noted: “You have to be realistic about what you are going to see. You cannot capture concrete results in the time frame you are working with. However, there are many intermediate outcomes, including people having knowledge of what has worked in other countries as a result of the TA provided by Australia, the study tours, etc.” |

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| Activity Name | **AMREF Africa Flying Doctor Service – Study tours +** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **53453** | | |
| Start date | **12th January 2010** | End date | **30th June 2010** |
| Value | **$62,530** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | AusAID | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | Royal Flying Doctor Service of Australia (South Eastern Section) | | |
| Country/Region | East Africa | | |
| Primary Sector | Health | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features[[45]](#footnote-46)** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 5 | * AMREF provides emergency evacuation services throughout Africa (everywhere north of Johannesburg) and medical outreach specialist services to over 140 hospitals throughout east Africa. The study tours funded via the AAPF followed initial funding from AusAID in 2006 for technical support and capacity building between RFDS and AMREF. The responsive and flexible nature of the AAPF funding was entirely appropriate for this small initiative, and allowed flexibility in the use of funds (with approval sought and given) when circumstances changed so that underspent funds were utilised to implement change in AMREF’s operations which had been determined as a result of the study tour. * The inputs align with AusAID’s focus on health (particularly maternal and child health) in the East Africa region. * The nature of the support (primarily study tours to RFDS Australia, and short course training at Sydney University for their medical team) fits very well with both the capacity buildling and development of partnerships (NGOs) aspect of AAPF. |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 6 | * RFDS is the only comparable organisation to AMREF anywhere in the world, dealing with many similar issues. A pre-existing loose ‘relationship’ existed between the two CEOs but the AAPF funding has allowed much deeper and more systemic institutional engagement. This would not have been possible without the funding provided by AAPF. There appears to be a very genuine, mutually beneficial partnership (in the true sense of the word) between both agencies, where they are both learning and chaning practise as a result of their ongoing exchange. * There have been very real and progressive changes in AMREF operations as a result of the engagement under AAPF. Following the first study tour, AMREF observed the public education component of RFDS work and have subsequently developed a visitors information centre, tours and schools program; many technical changes ot the way aircraft are fitted out, flight communications and satellite systems are utilised are a direct consequence of the exchange. The second study tour |
| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features[[46]](#footnote-47)** | **Rating[[47]](#footnote-48)**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
|  |  |  | * Focussed on learning more about RFDS administration, marketing and fundraising – AMREP now have busy social media presence, have produced a short film about their work and developed their fundraising capabilities. Some of their medical staff have had training in Sydney which has changed their approach to treatment of patients in some circumstances. The proposed third phase will be specifically focussed on learning from RFDS experience around establishing, managing and maintaining remote bases, as AMREF plans to look at having bases outside of Nairobi. They also are hoping to have RFDS staff come and work with them in Africa for 3-6 month periods to assist their own staff and provide technical expertise in the expansion. There is a clear and progressive element to the activities funded under AAPF. * AMREF were not aware of opportunities for Awards or other funding windows, though they have had 3 AYAD volunteers, which are greatly appreciated. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | 5 | * The inputs were extremely well designed and received by AMREF who have subsequently implemented considerable change and innovation as a direct result of the funded activities. * For a very small investment of AAPF funds, therefore, there has been a considerable development outcome. * A third proposal is currently under consideration for small scale support of another study tour/exchange of staff. It was not clear to the IPR team whether or not this had been directed to the AAPF. However, the new application process is potentially disproportionately complex to the size of grant. AMREF reports that the new system requires their Australian host organisation to complete the application, rather than them – which they felt place a blatantly unfair burden on their counterpart RFDS. They also felt the new online system was over-complicated and time-consuming (they referred to 3-4 links off every page which then had to be completed and they didn’t know here they had completed them all or not). In fact, they had proposed to ‘pull’ the application (which is for only around $50,000) but RFDS volunteered to assign a grant writer to complete it for them. This was submittedin December but they have not heard anything as yet. The system previously, in AMREF’s experience, was much faster and simpler to access. * AMREF are very aware of and extremely good about the branding and acknowledgement of Australian Aid program funds. They have Australian Aid logos all over their headquarters, on plaques, in their annual report (which also has pages dedicated to their partnership with RFDS and also details the AYAD volunteers. There is also a photo with the Deputy High commissioner. |

**Quotes:**

“RFDS (our partner) is the only organisation in the world which operates the way we do – it’s the perfect partner for us. The difference they have made to us is incalculable”

**Scholarship Comments:**

AMREF were unaware of current scholarship opportunities though they noted that 10 years ago, one of their nurses had gone to Australia to study for a PhD scholarship.

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| Activity Name |  | **Regional Diplomacy Training (West Africa – Ghana, Sierra Leone, Burkino Faso)** | | | |
| Aidworks ID |  | **Ph 1: 57706 Ph 2: ARR5** | | | |
| Start date | **Phase 1** | **15th April 2011** | | End date | **31st December 2011** |
| Value | **$428,355** | | | |
| Start date | **Phase 2** | **1st January 2012** | End date | | **30th June 2013** |
| Value | **$4,362,322** | | | |
| Managing agency |  | Cardno Emerging Markets (Logistics) | | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) |  | Ghana: Kofi Annan Peace Training Institute/Uniquest  Kenya: Kenya Foreign Service Institute/Uniquest | | | |
| Country/Region |  | Multi-country | | | |
| Primary Sector |  | Public Policy | | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 3 | * The regional diplomacy training is valued by the Ghana MoFA who intake 38 Diplomatic Officers each year and appreciate any diplomacy training they are able to access. Important to note that Australia is a minor provider of diplomacy training in Africa, and sits in amongst a range of other donors providing similar training opportunities, including China, India, Pakistan, Mexico, France, Germany (GIZ) (KAIPTC also report USA). This was also the case for the Kenyan interviewees, who had themselves participated in training in the Netherlands, Geneva, Beijing, Pakistan, China, Korea, Japan. * MOFAGhana was unable to identify the ‘point of difference’ for the Australian training, but noted that they would like to see future ones include substantive briefings on Australia (cultures, politics, history, economy etc) and its region, and specifically Australia’s engagement with Africa, which its diplomats could otherwise not access. It was felt by both countries that this had been a missed opportunity in the training design. * This training initiative has been a good ‘door opener’ in terms of building relationships with new counterpart governments. There is no case to support this activity for the achievement of development objectives. It is not meeting an expressed development need, though the general training it provides is appreciated by MOFAs and the individual participants. If a decision is made to discontinue the training (as appears to be the case) it is important that this is communicated to the service providers as soon as possible, who, in the case of Ghana, are waiting to schedule the next courses already planned. |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 3 | * While the diplomacy training was clearly welcomed by the participants and MOFA and appreciated as an excellent opportunity, there did not seem to be a significant ‘brand Australia’ aspect to the Regional Diplomacy, though the Vice Consul (Accra) participated on one of the panel sessions and presented certificates. In Nairobi, there was also a presentation on the course. Going forward, if the intent under AAPF is to develop relationships with Australia, it would be preferable to enhance this through increased participation from the post (though being cognisant of time constraints).There needs to be a much stronger linking to Australia throughout (both in content and process) if any relationship objectives are to be achieved. * Participants in Kenya greatly appreciated having regional organisations (African Union) and other country participants as part of the course. The value of the networking opportunities the course subsequently provided was highlighted by all participants, and in Kenya, more time was requested in the design of future programs, to facilitate participants ‘getting to know’ one another. * Feedback on the course suggested many participants were unhappy with the pedagogy of the course which was largely lecture-discussion based, when participants had hoped for more interactive, simulation-based/role play/exercises components to the program. It may be worthwhile for the MC or AUSAID to be somewhat prescriptive when calling for service providers in the future to ensure that they adopt a more interactive, experiential approach. Furthermore, some 25 separate topics were covered in 3 weeks, for example, one hour was devoted to ‘human rights’ – more benefit could perhaps be derived from a more narrow focus to the course to allow participants to explore issues in more depth, rather than a ‘Diplomacy 101’ approach. Less experienced participants appeared to benefit more from the course as it was designed, and in some instances participants reported it had had a big impact on their way of thinking. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) |  | * KAIPTC are clearly an extremely professional and well utilised facility with considerable resources, experience and a good reputation in the region. The provider felt they were under-utilised and would have liked to be involved in both logistics and the application process as they feel they have a lot of experience to offer in this area. The bulk of the training was delivered by KAIPTC and University of Ghana people with one or two sessions delivered by UniQuest people. It was modified from the earlier program delivered in Pretoria. * The service provider felt that AAPF imposed systems rather than see what already existed and working within that. It was noted that a wide range of donors were satisfied with KAIPTC’s systems but AAPF was not (refer quote below). * There are some issues of scheduling of planned batches. Two have been completed, two are yet to be completed, but the Kofi Anna Centre has yet to be told when the next one is. In July 2012 they were asked to run one in September 2012, but their facilities are in demand and they require 4-6 months notice minimum in order to schedule them into their program. * The use of the MC to coordinate logistics was sensible. Ideally, AusAID may have had more input to the actual program content and delivery if at all possible. |

**Quotes:**

“*Initially I asked ‘ why is Australia training diplomats in Africa?’ But I came to learn that Australia wanted to increase its presence in Africa’. (Ghana)*

*“After the second course, AAPF were much better. We would have had a LOT to say if it was just after the first course. (AAPF) just wanted to come and dictate whatever they wanted, but we had been contracted to run the program. (It felt like) the role of the Institute was not well understood even though it had been agreed in the contract. Luckily, we spoke to Uniquest informally who could deal with AAPF”. (Kofi Annan Institute, Ghana)*

*“When you are building a relationship, and you have a warm heart for someone, you feel you want to learn more.” (Kenya)*

*“With Australia, because it is just starting (in Africa), it is not very visible. There is not much funding. BUT when Australia does (fund activities), it does so with more impact than the other donors. I will never forget this course for 50 years”. (Kenya)*

*“We haven’t received any trade and economic delegations from Australia. We have plenty from the Chinese and Malaysians. The future for Kenya is foreign direct investment and we need to bring delegations here to learn about investing in Kenya”.*

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| Activity Name | **DFAT Trade Policy short course (Canberra)** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **2009-10 :50523, 55068, 55069 2010-11 : 56660** | | |
| Start date | **1 September 2010** | End date | **10th May, 2011** |
|  | **July, 2011** |  | **October, 2011** |
| Value | **2009-10: $26,000; 2011-12: $198,000** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | AusAID | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade | | |
| Country/Region | Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Senegal and Zimbabwe (Interviewees: Mozambique) | | |
| Primary Sector | Trade & Policy | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 4 | * Two participants were interviewed by the IPR team. They indicated that the course provided in-Australia exposure to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and was focused on assisting participants to be able to formulate trade policy and to develop their negotiation skills. * It’s relevance is linked to achieving diplomacy objectives under AAPF – building relationships with DFAT in particular (though AusAID also presented in the course, and this was very well received by participants), networking with key government professionals and being seen as a ‘good partner’. |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 4 | * Both participants interviewed had participated in other international training before, but found the Australian program to be very different: having the mix of participants from regional countries in Africa and the Indian Ocean was considered beneficial in building exposure and networking. * The pedagogical focus on practical examples and simulations was considered very attractive, and encouraged widespread contributions amongst participants. The facilitators also encouraged participants to focus on their own real-world problems, so that the course would have immediate,practical benefit. * Since attending the course, participants have been in regular informal professional contact with other participants from the Seychelles, South Africa, Mauritius and Madagascar * In terms of building profile and relationships for Australia, holding the course in Australia helped achieve this intent. Participants report the course pedagogy equipped them with a different perspective on negotiations and excellent networking. * It is not possible to draw any conclusions about development effectiveness from a two week, once-off course. The IPR team did not detect any roll-on effects.. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed: | 4 | * The logistics appear to have been adequately managed, although some participants only received notification of their attendance and their visa at very short notice (in some cases, this responsibility lies with partner governments who did not nominate participants until quite late). * The costs of bringing so many participants to Canberra are far greater than the cost of running a similar course in Africa. However, running the course in Australia achieved a very high profile and exposure to Australia for participants, built relationships and an understanding of Australian policy. |

**Quotes:***“Australia has very practical experience to share. The way we resolved issues, by solving case studies, was excellent. We learned how to reach a compromise with other participants from different countries, which is critical in a globalised world“Discussions were really different for us. It was very practical. It wasn’t at all monotonous as there were many presenters and everyone was free to talk and to contribute their own experience”.*

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| Activity Name | **Australian contribution to UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to support counter-piracy efforts** | | | | | |
|  | **Aidworks ID** | **Start Date** | **End Date** | | **Value** | |
|  | **52911** | **13 Oct 2009** | **13 Oct 2010** | | **$500,000** | |
|  | **59313** | **10 June 2011** | **10 June 2012** | | **$749,780** | |
|  | **14378/18** | **9 June 2011** | **20 June 2012** | | **$195,000** | |
|  | **ARR16** | **March 2012** | **September 2012** | | **$194,000** | |
| Start date | **July 2011** | | | End date | | **December 2012** |
| Value |  | | | Expenditure to date | |  |
| Managing agency | AusAID | | | | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | UNODC | | | | | |
| Country/Region | Multi-country | | | | | |
| Primary Sector | Counter piracy | | | | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 4 | | * This activity was funded in response to an initiative in 2009 by the then Australian Ambassador to Vienna, expressing Australia’s strong interest in contributing to the UN counter piracy work. Australia provided core funding, through the AAPF, as well as funds to deploy Australian Federal Police secondees to work, under the auspices of UNODC.to * The Australian core contribution assisted with the provision of interpreters for the cautioning of suspects; upgrading of facilities (e.g. court rooms or facilities for holding prisoners on remand), provision of legal books, covering of core administration costs and support (in the Seychelles) for a local NGO to provide a welfare package to prisoners. UNODC is also constructing new prisons in Somalia to receive returning prisoners and training prison staff. * The AFP secondees strengthened the capacity of personnel in the police forces, the courts and prisons in selected countries to reduce piracy in the region. The secondees were also tasked to ensure that those pirates who were caught were dealt with in accordance with international law. * It is not clear why the facility modality was used to fund this secondment. Indeed, the UNODC representative interviewed believed that the funding had been provided by DFAT. * The activity supports Australia’s commitments to upholding international law, (including the Law of the Sea), Peacebuilding, Counter-Terrorism[[48]](#footnote-49) and Combating Piracy.[[49]](#footnote-50)There is no obvious link to AusAID’s sectoral focus in Africa. |
| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | | 5 | * The first tranche of funding (2009/10) came at a time when the counter-piracy work had no funding at all. The response was rapid, unearmarked and “kept the program alive”. The second tranche involved some earmarking and this has increased for the third tranche. * The initiative did not have clearly defined outcomes for the first two tranches of funding, although this has been addressed in the current round of funding. * UNODC report a dramatic (20%) decline in the numbers of pirates arrested last year compared to previously. * The activity has contributed to the broad AAPF relationship objective as a result of the effectiveness of the AFP secondees (both of whom are extremely well regarded by their UN and partner government counterparts); “people remember the Australian policemen”. The activity drew on skills and experience developed within the Australian Federal Police dealing with illegal sailors in Australian waters and peacekeeping missions. .The activity has also built solid relationships between DFAT’s Counter-Terrorism and Piracy department in Canberra and UNODC. * There appear to have been development outcomes in the area of capacity building of law and justice personnel in the targeted countries in respect for human rights, as well increased understanding of international law/anti-piracy/anti-terrorism approaches and protocols. There is also evidence of a logical progression of the capacity building work, with a proposed third phase of funding seeking to engage participants in further training, study and certification (with an Australian counterpart institution)to try and help sustain behavioural change. * There have not only been benefits to individuals charged with and/or convicted of piracy, but also to the wider prison communities in the prisons/countries concerned. UNODC’s complementary prevention and alternate livelihoods work in Somalia also appears to have achieved modest development outcomes. * Australian branding has not been formally present. However, the impact of the aforementioned AFP secondees has been significant. Some magistrates have also been sent from the Seychelles to the Commonwealth Magistrates School in Melbourne. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs. | | 3 | * Whilst the funds appear to have been used effectively, the monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management processes and products have not been adequate. Reporting tends to have been part of global reports and UNODC has been unresponsive to requests from Canberra to provide more detailed acquittals and reporting related to AAPF expenditure. |

**Quotes:**

*“########*  (the first AFP secondee) ‘saved us’ *– he was absolutely critical to keeping the program going and supporting police in Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius to stay afloat. The fact that he was an experienced, active officer who had served in Timor and Afghanistan, and not a retired or worn out officer, was key. He won enormous respect for his ‘can-do’ approach.”*

*”Big development spin-offs have evolved from the program, starting from the bottom up. We are improving prison systems, laws, the court process, skills and governance in th ecountries in which we work. We have to do this under international law for the pirates, but when we improve the standards in a prison where they are held for example, or train the prison guards in human rights, it means the entire prison population benefits. While there is a lot of donor support for judges and prosecutors to improve their skills, there is virtually no external support for police and prisons, only this program”.*

*“Australia’s funding was very flexible and responsive. With other donors, the delays and restrictions on funding make it very hard to work with. Australia … came in at a time when we were not well funded – it kept the program going. We could not have achieved what we did without their support, and (the program) is now the fastest growing area within UNODC.”*

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| Activity Name | **AusAID / ACIAR Partnership for Agricultural Research** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **14376** | | |
| Start date |  | End date |  |
| Value | **$2.5m** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) |  | | |
| Country/Region | Multi-country | | |
| Primary Sector | Agriculture | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 2 | The lack of clarity of the AAPF objectives created an environment in which a stakeholder such as ACIAR could drive its own agenda in Africa; hence, the activity has been largely supply driven.  The relevance of a research activity led by Australian researchers to the relationship and development outcomes of the AAPF is tenuous. |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 2 | The activity has involved 16-17 individual activities which are not coherent. They appear to be small pilot studies conducted by Australian researchers. As indicated above, these have not responded to demand.  The activity has not succeeded in developing bilateral relationships, although some of the pilot work has led to large programs in Tunisia and Egypt.  The work in southern Africa was intended to define “*incentives for sustainable farming*”, but a report on the activity listed a range of truisms as ‘outcomes’ before concluding “*further work is required in the development of 'smart' incentives*”.  From DFAT’s perspective ACIAR is *“a very poor communicator which provided little or no assistance in facilitating branding or recognition of Australia’s contributions to the agriculture sector.”*  From AusAID’s perspective there is no need for any more of these ‘one-off’ small exploratory adventures. All research needs to be aligned with the Africa Program strategy and involve filling gaps which are not being filled by the current program. |
| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features[[50]](#footnote-51)** | **Rating[[51]](#footnote-52)**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | 1 | The relative management responsibilities of AusAID and ACIAR were not made clear in the agreement between the two parties. Whilst the activity has been nominally managed in Canberra, AusAID has not been in control of this activity. ACIAR has not met basic reporting requirements.  There is a clear need for the agreement between ACIAR and AusAID to be amended to clarify roles and responsibilities. It would appear to be appropriate for ACIAR to have full carriage of the management of the activity with clear lines of fiduciary and reporting accountability to AusAID.  However, the use of this aid modality to fund the AusAID ACIAR Research Partnership does not appear appropriate and should not continue.  A total of $2.5 million was invested in this activity, and yet neither the development nor relationship outcomes are clear/unambiguous. On this basis it is difficult to argue that the investment has been efficient or represents value-for-money. |

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| Activity Name | **Supporting food security and capacity building in African Union member states through sustainable control of Newcastle disease in village chickens** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **(ARR 24)** | | |
| Start date | **25 May 2012** | End date | **30 Jun 2013** |
| Value | **AUD999,401** | Expenditure to date | **AUD599,155 (at Jun 2012)** |
| Managing agency | Cardno | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | KYEEMA Foundation Ltd | | |
| Country/Region | Africa Union member states | | |
| Primary Sector | Agriculture (livestock) | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 5 | * The sectoral focus of the activity is aligned with a priority theme of AAPF, and with AusAID’s emerging Africa program strategy. * The engagement is multi-country. Previous phases have engaged directly with partner countries (Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia), and the current phase is positioning for scale-up through African Union member states. * The initiative has the potential to establish and strengthen partner government relationships through addressing a known and pervasive problem facing smallholder producers, predominantly vulnerable households in rural areas. * The activity has a strong Australian identity. It evolved from original Australian research (University of Queensland and ACIAR) to develop thermo-tolerant Newcastle Disease vaccines. Being thermo-tolerant, and not requiring syringes, the vaccines can easily be stored, distributed and used without expensive cold-chain equipment. The I-2 master seed was made available to interested developing country governments without cost. KYEEMA Foundation is a Brisbane-based NGO which formed as a ‘spin off’ from AusAID’s three-year Southern Africa Newcastle Disease Control Project (SANDCP) which ended in 2005. KYEEMA has attracted ongoing support from a range of donors. The project has attracted notable profile, including visits by former Parliamentary Secretary Bob McMullan. KYEEMA is currently pursuing NGO accreditation with AusAID and has been independently reviewed. * Notwithstanding the development relevance of the initiative, it is unclear why the current phase has been funded by AAPF since it is not a discrete ‘responsive’ activity and, as an activity implemented by an Australian NGO, it is not consistent with other facility activities which mainly involve PGs. * AusAID (and the contractor) has expressed concerns about continuing support for the initiative without a clear exit strategy. This may be a function of the short-timeframes and limited scope of the previous funding arrangements, though the advancement of the program has also been delayed by government trials required in order to register the vaccine in Mozambique. This has now been achieved. Arguably, a more comprehensive, long term, strategy (supported through AusAID’s sector program)would be more appropriate. |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating (1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 5 | * The KYEEMA project appears to represent very good development practise, in terms of its outcomes and capacity building approach. * There are clear causal linkages between the intervention and outstanding development outcomes, including: i) improved nutrition and food security (through increased egg production and chicken survivability); ii) increased household income; ii) disproportionate benefits to women, who are typically responsible for bird husbandry in rural Africa. * The project has demonstrated a viable mechanism of delivery which includes a ‘cascade training’ structure; a user-pays system (community vaccinators, many of whom are women); the engagement of national laboratories and extension services. * Income from the vaccines goes back TO the Institute to fund ongoing production. This covers the costs of raw materials, but not the ongoing running costs, which are funded by the Government. * The previous phases of the project have demonstrated progress in obtaining PG engagement/support for the initiative including official registration of the vaccine in Mozambique. * Importantly, the nature of the engagements has evolved from conventional TA through to pan-African rollout through bilateral and multilateral engagements. In interviews with KYEEMA Foundation in Mozambique, they are currently preparing the next stage funding proposal based on regionalisation of the initiative to 11 partner governments (with the development of a base in Addis Adaba to support the expansion) and to replace the current needle vaccination with an I2 droplet vaccination, which should substantially increase usage and reduce wastage. There is a clear focus on local training and capacity building in order to support sustainability of the initiative, as well as improving utilisation rates.The plan is for Mozambique to become a sub-regional office for Southern Africa. * Given the strong Australian ‘branding’ associated with this initiative, there is room for AusAID to be more, not less, engaged but also to be more communicative about how they wish to see their funding evolving and what outcomes they are expecting in what time frame in return.   The current phase is essentially a transition to a larger and more comprehensive strategy to institutionalise the vaccine through rollout in Africa Union member states. Whilst other donors are interested (notably Save the Children, FAO, African Development Bank, Govt of Mozambique) it would be unfortunate if Australia relinquished its connection at the very point when it stands to achieve pan-continental recognition for its contribution in this critical area. |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating (1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | 4 | * The project is evidently a ‘legacy project’ for the facility, having attracted AusAID support since the completion of the SANDCP in 2005. It is questionable if AAPF is the most appropriate mechanism to oversee the project—which should arguably be supported within the wider sectoral strategy. * KYEEMA has met reporting and acquittal obligations. The project budget is significantly underspent, with year-on-year carry forwards, which may raise questions about planning/management. * Funding is for one year and is less than AUD1m, but is otherwise the most recent phase of protracted support by AusAID, and presupposes ongoing support for scale-up activities. The piecemeal support raises concerns about inefficiency for both AusAID and KYEEMA. If incorporated into the sectoral program, multi-year funding should be considered and would benefit from AusAID inputs into the design. KYEEMA is a very small, largely volunteer-lead organisation, which means that its project management overheads are potentially small, but it may benefit from internal capacity building around project management and planning. * The project is supported by internationally recognised, Australian, technical specialists who developed the original vaccine thereby enabling its roll out in developing countries. There is high visibility of Australia’s involvement in this initiative across the region which generates considerable good will. KYEEMA are very proactive about actively promoting Australia’s involvement. |

**Quotable quotes (from partners):**

*“The partnership with Kyeema (Brisbane) is very open and respectful. We have known each other for a long time and we are really learning from each other”*

*“Australia are the pioneers (in Newcastle Disease vaccination). They have the technical expertise and other donors are just providing the funding support”*

*“We are trying not to depend as much on Kyeema Brisbane. (As a result of the AusAID support) we can now do the training and quality control, and Brisbane does the vaccine production training. We are trying to build capacity across the continent, with PAFVAC (Pan African Vaccine), which covers 18 countries. 14 of these have already expressed interest for the roll out.”*

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| Activity Name | **AFRITAC South** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **(ARR 55557, 55860, 55834, 59066, 59067, 59068, 59071, 59432)** | | |
| Start date | **?** | End date | **?** |
| Value | **USD8 million** | Expenditure to date | **USD8 million** |
| Managing agency | AusAID | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | International Monetary Fund | | |
| Country/Region | Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe | | |
| Primary Sector | Economic Governance | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 2 | * In June 2010, then Foreign Minister Smith agreed to an Australian contribution of US$8 million to the AFRITACs(African Regional Technical Assistance Centres). This followed a November 2009 request for support from the then Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). * AFRITACs are a collaborative venture between the IMF, the recipient countries, and bilateral and multilateral donors. They originated from the IMF's response to a call from Africa leaders to the international community to increase technical assistance (TA) to Africa and focus it more sharply on capacity building. In this sense, the activity is aligned with partner government priorities—although the nature of the investment obscures AusAID’s support to partners through the IMF agreement. * The strategic goal of AFRITACs is to strengthen the institutional capacity of African countries to design and implement their Millennium Development Goals and poverty-reducing strategies, supported by sound macroeconomic and financial policies, as well as to strengthen the coordination of capacity-building TA. The broad intent of the activity is aligned with explicit and implicit aims of the Facility—noting that the extent to which these aims are achieved is complicated by several factors, including: i) the demand-led nature of the ‘TA services’ provided by AFRITAC to partner governments—meaning that government officials must be aware of the services available, and be able to access them in a timely fashion; ii) the capacity of advisers engaged by AFRITAC, and the efficiency of associated administrative processes to support them in working with governments. * Of the USD8 million committed, USD2 was to establish a new AFRITAC South.AusAID’s support was not ear-marked for any particular purpose, but rather was consolidated with other donor contributions to support start-up and operational costs. * AusAID’s main rationale for supporting AFRITAC South was to be eligible to participate on the Steering Committee, which comprises representatives from beneficiary countries and contributors (i.e. buying a “seat at the table”). I understand that a Counsellor (Pretoria) has attended perhaps two such meetings. * The broad geographic focus of the activity is consistent with the general aims of the Facility, although it is unclear why the Facility was used for this investment, rather than a central multilateral engagement mechanism. |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating (1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 1 | * An interview with the regional head of the IMF confirmed that no specific outcomes were expected from AusAID’s investment—beyond the broad workplan which was agreed by all key stakeholders (N.B. the workplan was reported to be 20% behind schedule in March 2012). * No specific performance arrangements were put in place to assess AusAID’s contribution. The IMF has almost completed a general Results-based Management Framework that is broadly consistent with the USD40 million five-year envelope. * No risk management mechanisms have been established to support AusAID’s investment. The whole Australian commitment has been paid in advance. * It is plausible that AusAID has gained access to partner government officials through support to AFRITAC, although no specific examples of this were available. Further, the nature of the activity facilitates relationships between AusAID staff and AFRITAC staff/advisers, with only opportunistic engagement with partner government officials. This was evidenced by the claim that one of the tangible benefits of the AFRITAC support was that IMF staff/advisers had identified possible partner government candidates for AAA scholarships. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | 1 | * AusAID’s funding represents a relatively minor contribution to the (scaled down) $40 million five-year envelope for AFRITAC South. AusAID is recognised as an AFRITAC South donor—appropriately highlighted on a second page of the website along with Brazil and the Indian Ocean Commission. * An agreed workplan is reportedly behind implementation schedule—owing mostly to delays associated with engaging advisers. * AusAID’s direct management of the activity is appropriate given that it would be inappropriate for a contractor to represent the Commonwealth on the steering committee with IMF and partner country officials. As it stands, the engagement with AFRITAC South is a direct function of the networking skills of the AusAID Counsellor (Pretoria). * The scale of the funding in the context of the Facility does not appear to have been well justified. * No quality assurance processes (at entry or implementation) have been completed with respect to this activity. |

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| Activity Name | **Mining Governance Study Tour (and Mining and Communities Study Tour)to Australia** | | |
| Aidworks ID | **ARR1 & 2** | | |
| Start date | **Study Tour 1: August 2011** | End date | **September 2011** |
|  | **Study Tour 2: September 2011** |  | **October 2011** |
| Value | **Study Tour 1: $718,837**  **Study Tour 2: $665,162** | Expenditure to date |  |
| Managing agency | Cardno Emerging Markets | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) |  | | |
| Country/Region | Multicountry (interviewees from Kenya and Mozambique) | | |
| Primary Sector | Mining | | |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating (1-6)** | **Explanation** |
| Relevance | The activity is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia shares with its development partners within the given context. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the Facility was/is the right modality to use * the activity aligns with Australian and PG development agendas * the geographic and sectoral focus is relevant * the scale and focus (i.e. within the sector) is relevant | 6 | * The timing of the study tours was important for Kenyan participants as they have been conducting a review of mining law, and were able to build in some of their learnings, particularly around health and safety and benefits to local communities (a retroactive law allocating 35% of profits to local communities).The timing is also good for Mozambique who are faced with a rapid influx in mining companies seeking to exploit the country’s resources. * Both Mozambique and Kenya are grappling with mining legislation, health and safety and environment considerations, and corporate social responsibility issues – all dealt with differently by differing mining companies. They are seeking to define their own national approaches, and the study tours were highly relevant in assisting them to achieve this. * The content of the study tours was highly relevant – both Ministries were consulted in the development of the tours, which was appreciated. * Of all the donors supporting work in the Ministry (in Mozambique) it was felt that Australia’s support alone was committed to capacity building, which GoM felt to be critical. |
| Effectiveness | The initiative is meeting or will meet its objectives, and is managing risk well. The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the expected development outcomes were clearly defined * achievements met expectations * there have been some catalytic or ‘roll-on effects’ * inputs from different modalities have been adequately coordinated | 5 | * The study tour appears to have had a considerable impact for all the participants interviewed, influencing legislative and policy changes in both Kenya and Mozambique. * It is unclear whether all of the participants attending the study tour were in a position of influence/decision making, and it was felt that this ought to be a consideration going forward, ie decision makers to participate first, followed by managers and also technical people from the field (eg geologists or occ safety and health professionals). It was noted that senior personnel are often the blockage to change if they have not been exposed to the ideas. * The multi-country aspect of the study tour was highly valued by participants – it allowed them to benchmark and compare how their counterparts in neighbouring countries were performing, and also to learn from their experiences. |

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| **Evaluation Criteria** | **Features** | **Rating**  **(1-6)** | **Explanation** |
|  |  |  | * In terms of developing relationships with Australia, some participants felt they would like to have more direct contact with AusAID (“*we should be seeing you*”), and had valued the networking opportunities at the Mozambique alumni meeting held in Nov 2012. * Ministries are realistic that some of the trainees who participate in short courses and study tours are ‘leached’ out into the private mining sector, but feel this is still building the country’s overall capacity. This loss needs to be balanced by ‘saturating the market with increased capacity’, according to the Minister MIREM. * The short-course components need to be much more interactive and ensure that the expert lecturers are available longer to engage in discussion with participants. * A plea was made to consider building the capacity of an appropriate (existing) technological training institute in each country –to include a focus on pedagogical approaches – in order to expand the numbers of participants able to benefit from the program. Mozambique requested teaching institute capacity building in mine rehabilitation, mine engineering and radioactive mining, reflecting current concerns. |
| Efficiency | The resources allocated by Australia and its partners are appropriate to the objectives and context, and are achieving the intended outputs.   The following dimensions should be addressed:   * the decision to use the MC or to direct manage was/is defensible * monitoring, reporting, acquittal and risk management is adequate. * Funding of initiatives beyond 2 yrs; AUD1m was adequately justified. * Activities of >$3m have met quality standards for entry and implementation (i.e. QAE and QAI reports available and of a reasonable standard) | 4 | * An AusAID comment from Post was that it was not possible to develop relationships with government when the activity was managed by the MC. A greater role and input for AA had to be prioritised in future mining governance short courses and study tours. However, it is unlikely that AusAID would have the resources required to support the design and conduct of a study tour of this scale. * In the case of Mozambique, there is no confusion on the part of the government about the distinction between the MC and AusAID, as the Ministry maintains a good relationship with Pretoria, but appreciates the logistical support of the MC. * There is a wide range of donors supporting the mineral resources ministries in both countries, but it was clear that their inputs do not overlap and there is good donor coordination in place. Australia’s funding of AAPF is recognised as being responsive to partner government needs and is quick. * On a logistics note: where multi-language groups are participating, it is critical that interpreters have access to presentations in advance, so that they have a time to work through and prepare the content. |

**Quotes:**

*“We have many other partners. The difference with Australia is that we are more fortunate, because AAPF is very responsive. The response from AAPF has been very good.”*

*“Good development partnerships should be based on mutual respect. Mozambique is as strong as Australia, each has its own strengths and expertise and this needs to be recognised. Partners retain their own independence, but there should be mutual benefits where possible, not just one way.”*

*“Australia-Mozambique have a long and shared relationship through mining. We are both mining countries. Australia has long mining experience and we wanted to access that”.*

*“If we want to expand (the relationship), we should continue to develop longer term programs, not just short-term projects: ideally a 5 year plan as it would be clearer and more strategic. We would like to consider gas and oil, capacity building of management and monitoring, and technical areas of mineral exportation, mining safety and looking at the entire value chain.” (Mozambique)*

*‘(Participants report that) their way of thinking and looking at things have changed. Acquiring direct experience by seeing things is very important.”*

*“As a result of the developing relationship with Australia in mining, we have gone out of our way to assist Australian companies who are working in Kenya, or wish to work here. When a friend helps you, you are indebted to support them if you can.”*

*“The visits to the mines and listening to the various people we met helped us see a lot of improvements we could make in our own countries. It made us really think about what mining can do for our country.”*

*“In Australia we saw what mining companies can do for local communities (and) we have brought this into our mining law (in Kenya)”.*

*“We were not expecting to have this mining boom – we still need help to manage it”.*

**Scholarship Comments:**

The Kenyan Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources have trained 6 officials at masters level in geology and mining through the Australian Awards.

*“Continued Australian support for masters, short courses and post graduate awards is critical for Kenya as this type of specialist training is not available here but is key to strengthening our country.”*

**Other:**

A request for Australia to consider building the capacity of appropriate technical (mineral resource/geology) training institutes in both Kenya and Mozambique was put forward to the team on a number of occasions. It was felt this would enable access to many more students, and would improve training content, approach and overall quality in particular. At present, those wishing to study mining engineering in Mozambique had to leave the country and study in Zambia.

## Appendix G:

**EXAMPLE TEXT FOR RFT FOR**

**STUDY TOUR / TRAINING PROVIDERS**

The Contractor will provide expertise for study tour / training programme design, development of training materials and training methodology in respect of *(selected study tour / training area).*The Contractor will also support, manage and coordinate the entire study tour / training program.

In funding study tours / short course training activities through the AAPF, AusAID is committed to support for practical and relevant training programs. Where formal classroom work is considered desirable, this should be as interactive as possible, and include appropriately designed and chosen activities such as role plays, simulations, in-basket exercises, real problem solving and action planning.

The Contractor’s response to this RFT will:

1. **Demonstrate relevance**: The Contractor will explain the way in which they will consult with the PG institutions nominating candidates for study tours / training programs in order to ensure that the training content addresses the priorities of the institution and is relevant to the needs of individual candidates.

1. **Identify effective learning methods:** The Contractor will use its experience as a training provider to advise on the training delivery methods which will be used for each part of the proposed study tour / training program. The methods used will be practical, field based, experiential, varied and motivating. In addressing this section of the RFT, the Contractor will:

* Outline the learning content
* Identify the proposed learning method and discuss the measured effectiveness of this method.
* Nominate staff with experience in the conduct of these training methods.
* Wherever possible, develop new, bespoke training methods designed to capture the audience and convey the key messages.

1. **Use a ‘learning by doing’ approach to the conduct of study tours / training programs:** The Contractor will describe the processes by which participant feedback will be sought and analysed during the conduct of the event in order to improve the structure and content of the course during implementation.
2. **Measure effectiveness:** The Contractor will describe the way in which they will measure and report upon the effectiveness of the training program. The measurement methods will be reliable and simple. Reporting will be expected to report upon improvements to the monitoring methods, as well as to the substance, methods and trainers employed in the training event.
3. **Qualification and experience requirement:**

* Experience in the field of ................ (no. of years, profile, achievements) minimum 5 years.
* Experience in awareness raising and capacity building (no. of years, profile, achievements) minimum 5 years.
* Track record of producing quality training materials, modules and tools. Minimum 5 years.
* Experience and qualifications of key staff proposed
* Experience in monitoring and evaluating learning development (including capacity assessments, exit surveys, data compilation) .
* Experience in a range of methods of delivering capacity building (e.g. training, workshops, learning-by-doing)

**Appendix H:**

**APPRAISAL OF THE AAPF PERFORMANCE**

**ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK**

## Purpose

This note is an appraisal of the performance assessment framework (PAF) for the Australia Africa Partnerships Facility (AAPF). The appraisal was undertaken as part of the mid-term review of the AAPF in January 2013.

## Background

* No performance arrangements were defined as part of the AAPF design.
* Mobilisation of the facility occurred in a high-pressure environment in which the focus was on rapidly appraising a backlog of concept submissions.
* The facility has had to contend with multiple demands from an array of stakeholders, which in turn has complicated performance expectations.
* A PAF was retrospectively developed through a process jointly managed by AusAID and the managing contractor (MC).

## PAF Structure

The PAF defines AAPF performance in terms of three top-level ‘**categories**’:

* Development
* Relationships
* Partnerships

The ‘development category’is underpinned by three **sectoral themes**:

* Mining governance
* Agriculture and food security
* Public policy

The other two categories (‘relationships’ and ‘partnerships’) are not elaborated by sectoral themes.

The PAF’s three top-level categories are defined in terms of eleven ‘**whole of government outcomes**’—some of which are brought over from other strategies:

* The **mining governance outcomes** are drawn from the five strategic areas for AusAID support identified in the ‘M4D in Africa’ strategy.
* **Agriculture and food security outcomes** are drawn from the nascent ‘Africa Food Security Delivery Strategy’
* **Public policy outcomes**are drawn from headline results specified in ‘An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a real difference—Delivering real results’.
* Outcomes listed under Relationships and Partnerships were prescribed in the facility design.

Seventeen ‘**AAPF-specific outcomes**’ are aligned under the whole of government outcomes. These are in turn defined in terms of twenty-eight **indicators**.

This performance hierarchy is depicted below in an alternative (vertical) format to illustrate the complexity of the structure.

## Critique

#### **Structure:**

* The structure of the PAF appears to be influenced by recent thematic or country program PAFs developed within AusAID, rather than adopting an initiative-level focus.
* An initiative-level PAF would normally articulate:
  + The **deliverables** that are reasonably within the control of an implementing team;
  + The end-of-program **outcomes** that the initiative will influence. That is, the anticipated behaviour/performance changes in the lives of key partners over the life of the initiative;
  + The significant and lasting **impact** to which the initiative is expected to make a contribution in the lives of ultimate beneficiaries.
* The AAPF departs from convention in that no AAPF deliverables are articulated, leaving it unclear what the facility team can reasonably be held accountable for.
* There seems to be an assumption that AAPF will ‘contribute’ to the ‘whole of government’ outcomes (presumably in concert with other Commonwealth investments), but will not be held responsible for achieving these outcomes *per se*. The practical effect of this is that the PAF is ‘high level’ in the sense that it defines a ‘strategic context’ for AAPF, but offers little operational direction in relation to how the performance of the facility will be assessed. Further, this assumes that the AAPF is expected to play a supporting/enabling role for other AusAID/Commonwealth investments.
* Arguably,there is an element of circularity in having the framework titled “AAPF PAF”, while AAPF-specific outcomes and indicators are relegated to the lowest levels in the hierarchy.

#### **Logic:**

* The PAF does not articulate a ‘theory of change’ for AAPF. There is no clear pathway that links the significant and lasting changes anticipated in people’s lives with what the facility will deliver.
* The three high-level ‘categories’ are unhelpful as a ‘purpose’ for AAPF. Defining the purpose in terms of ‘development, relationships and partnerships’is tantamount to saying that the facility (which is a development partnership initiative) is an end in itself.
* Conceptually, it is difficult to distinguish between ‘relationship outcomes’ and ‘partnership outcomes’. It is not transparent if there is an expected causality between these outcomes (i.e. relationships outcomes 🡪 partnership outcomes 🡪 development outcomes); or if they are all considered to be on the same logical level.
* There is weak/absent/circular logic between the AAPF-specific outcomes, and the whole-of-government outcomes. For example:
  + An **AAPF-specific outcome:** “*building select stakeholder capacity in financial resources management in mining industries*” is expected to contribute to a **WoG outcome:** “*developing countries have strengthened transparency of financial resources from mining and extractives revenue”.* The human actors that are the subject of these outcomes are unhelpfully broad, and are likely to actually be the same individuals. This is tantamount to asserting that ‘strengthening financial management’ will lead to ‘strengthened financial management.’
* Many of the **AAPF-specific outcomes** are phrased as deliverables *of* the facility rather than behaviour/performance changes influenced *by* the facility; e.g. *“integrating gender and disability inclusiveness into all activities”* is normally part of ‘good practice’ by an implementing team, and as such would normally be reflected at the output/deliverable level*.* Gender and disability inclusive *outcomes* should be phrased in terms of the influence on key partners that such implementation practicesare expected to achieve.
* Some outcomes are unhelpfully amorphous—phrased in ways that are not easily measured for M&E purposes; e.g. *“promoting a mutual appetite amongst Australia and African partners to commit resources to partnership activities”.* What is a “mutual appetite”? Who are the “Australian and African partners” of concern? What “resources” are envisaged? What are “partnership activities” likely to entail? Are these activities an end in themselves or are they expected to be a means to a substantive result?

#### **Performance Measurement:**

* The actors in whom outcomes are expected to manifest are defined broadly (e.g. “*select stakeholders*…”) which means that the performance judgements will be necessarily broad and subjective.
* In some cases, the actors that underpin the subject/focus of outcomes are abstracted/invisible; e.g. “*Enhancing skills”.* This means that performance measurement will be ambiguous/ill-defined.
* No performance indicators are defined for the whole of government outcomes. This means that the AAPF indicators are alienated—lacking a strategic context/purpose. As noted above, there is no ‘theory of change’ that elaborates a plausible pathway through which desirable changes can be realised.
* A range of specific issues are identifiable in the **AAPF indicators** which are likely to erode the interpretive value of the PAF:
  + Some indicators are phrased as an objective/end-state rather than as a neutral/independent measure of a phenomenon; e.g. “*Increased women’s participation in the mining sector*” (c.f. ‘number of women engaged in the mining sector’).
  + Some indicators require key parameters to be defined before they can be used; e.g. *“Increased capacity within government in fields relevant to improved governance”.* Whose capacity within which government? What is considered relevant/irrelevant? How is ‘governance’ understood, and what will be considered evidence of an improvement’?
  + Some indicators attempt to measure multiple issues/phenomena, and hence are unworkable; e.g. “*number of countries (or instances) where AusAID inputs have resulted in (or been associated with) either development of transparency policy or improvement in transparency of policy development, revenue management, legislation and institutional practice related to mining*”.
* It is not transparent who will be responsible for capturing, analysing, reporting and disseminating the performance information defined in the PAF. Presumably the MC is best-placed to lead these processes in relation to AAPF-specific performance, but the main focus of the PAF is on a contributing to strategic outcomes that are the domain of AusAID or WoG partners.
* The PAF does not deal with common challenges typically associated with performance measurement of ‘facilities’; e.g.:
  + What is the relationship between performance measurement of individual activities and the overall performance of the facility?
  + Will there be a census of the whole portfolio or a sample? If a sample of activity performance will be taken as indicative of the overall facility’s performance, what is the rationale for the sample frame? If a census of the portfolio will be taken, what is the conceptual basis for generic/standardised performance measures applied to such a diverse array of activities across countries, sectors, scales, budgets etc.

## Broad Recommendations

* Articulate a theory of change for AAPF—defining its role in contributing to AusAID’s development strategy in Africa.
* Define performance in terms of a chain of influence between key classes of humans:
  + The **deliverables** that are reasonably within the control of the facility team;
  + The end-of-program **outcomes** that the facility will influence. That is, the anticipated behaviour/performance changes in the lives of key partners over the life of the initiative;
  + The significant and lasting **impact** to which the facility is expected to make a contribution in the lives of ultimate beneficiaries.
* Rationalise the overall structure of the PAF by making it more focused on AAPF; less a defacto regional program PAF.
* Streamline indicator phrasing/structure convention.
* Define a small number of meaningful indicators at both the impact (ultimate beneficiary) and outcome (key partner) levels

1. In addition, there were around 12 agreements that concerned program support activities such as probity services, advisers and M&E. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Personal communication: Senior AusAID staff member involved in implementation of the interim ‘Partnership Initiative.” [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Minute: FMA Reg 10 Authorisation and FMA Reg 9 Approval for Australia-Africa Partnerships Facility 16th November 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. 31st October, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Personal communication: Senior AusAID personnel [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Note: In areas where AusAID already had a clear direction (e.g. in sub-Saharan Africa) there was no need to use the facility in this way. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. In addition, there were around 12 agreements that concerned program support activities such as probity services, advisers and M&E. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Aid architecture refers to the instruments and strategic or political frameworks governing development assistance to a particular country. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. The AAPF was assessed as having met expectations where, for example: (i) quantitative evidence was available to suggest achievement (i.e. an increase in the number of countries with which Australia engaged as a result of AAPF activities; coupled with (ii) qualitative evidence based upon multi-context interviews where respondents expressed the same/similar opinions about the key role of the AAPF in this expansion of engagement with African countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. CEO, CRA, Kenya: There are clear areas for second generation activities: “The Country system will start now. We are going to have a lot of input and work – advice, visists, mentoring, etc, That is the area where we want our abilities to be strong to supervise, advise, mentor financial management/revenue management at the County level” Second, Revenue enhancement: working with the new National and County Governments to enhance identification, exploration, exploitation, tax, revenue sharing. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. The IPR team developed and administered a ‘relationships matrix’, which was completed by key DFAT and AusAID staff at Post who were both involved in the day to day management of AAPF activities, and those with an overview of the development relationships maintained between Australia and African countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Personal communication: DFAT representative [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Personal communication: AusAID representative [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Personal communication: World Bank representative [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. The AAPF was assessed as only having partially met expectations where only limited evidence was identified by the Review Team. Within this context it is important to take into account the Limitations of this review as discussed in sub-section 3.3 above. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. These findings echo the findings presented in ‘Discussion Paper: Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of Facilities” Susan Dawson, Monitoring and Evaluation Help Desk (Asia Regional, China and Indonesia) 20th November, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Australia has extensive experience in mining legislation, contractual arrangements, taxation etc. to share with Mozambique. The Commonwealth Grants Commission is an institution which most closely replicates the remit of the Commission on Revenue Allocation in Kenya. Furthermore, AusAID’s experience in supporting decentralization initiatives in Asia offered useful insights. A World Bank staffer interviewed in respect of the Fiscal Decentralization activity commented: “The WB would not have been able to do much without Australia’s support. In a perverse way it also encouraged us to put our own staff resources into devolution.” [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Ghana Kenya and Mozambique [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Enquiry received on a proposal form;appraisal conducted;scoping/design carried out and Activity Design Summary (ADS) prepared;Quality of Design (QoD) carried out; ARR prepared. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Refer 2012 Spot Check of QAI Reports, Kaye Bysouth October 2012 published by the Office of Development Effectiveness, AusAID *for Internal Use Only* [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. ‘Quality Assurance in the AAPF Activity Approval Process’ AusAID Internal document Feb. 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. OpCit ‘Discussion Paper: Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of Facilities” Susan Dawson, Monitoring and Evaluation Help Desk (Asia Regional, China and Indonesia) 20th November, 2009 p 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. OpCit ‘Discussion Paper: Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of Facilities” Susan Dawson, Monitoring and Evaluation Help Desk (Asia Regional, China and Indonesia) 20th November, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Refer speed of the Hon. Stephen Smith, 25th May, 2010: Africa Day and ‘Australia and Africa: Partners into the Future’ G. Worrall 17.12.2012http://www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Documents/africa-partners.doc [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. i) Ancillary Work Request (AWR): permission to commit reimbursable funds; ii) Activity Request Report (ARR): delegate approval to spend from a pre-payment account. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. The MC was initially marked down by AusAID in contractor performance appraisals for M&E, sustainability and finance. After some debate a 5/6 was awarded, with AusAID recognising that many of the issues of concern were beyond the sphere of control of the MC. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Personal communication: MC staff [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. Notably a chart of AAPF AusAID responsibilities includes a number of areas where the function/role for Pretoria, other Posts and Canberra is defined using exactly the same language. Refer Annex 1 of AAPF: Australia – Africa Partnership Facility Process Review Report 26th October 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. ‘Australia and Africa: Partners into the Future’ Author: G. Worrall 17.12.2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. AAPF: Australia – Africa Partnership Facility Process Review Report 26 October 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. This analysis was undertaken using an AusAID-supplied dataset. All care has been taken to rely on the best available figures, but readers should be advised that give the size and nature of the facility, definitive figures on some issues were difficult to verify. Consequently there may be marginal errors in some of the figures reported here. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. A trade and diplomacy course in Botswana (2009/10). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. Support for the Implementation of Fiscal Decentralisation, in partnership with the World Bank in Kenya during 2010-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Spread across 55 countries, this investment translates to an average of more than $873,085.42 per country. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. N.B. analysis of sector dimensions was based on AusAID records, but is acknowledged to be confusing owing to the fact that activities funded in 2009-10 and 2010-11 were classified using a diverse array of ‘sectors’, but from 2011 onwards, activities were classified against only three ‘primary’ sectors: mining, agriculture and public policy (i.e. anything not mining or agriculture). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. N.B. analysis involved the evaluation team categorising projects based on limited information, and hence there may be errors of interpretation. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Cardno-managed bilateral projects have been in: Ghana (2), Liberia (1), Mali (1), Mozambique (2), South Africa (1), South Sudan (1), and Uganda (2). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. <http://thepartneringinitiative.org/w/who-we-are/philosophy-and-approach/the-partnering-cycle-and-partnering-principles/> [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. This definition has been developed by IBLF’s The Partnering Initiative, based on extensive experience of over 30 years partnership brokering in developing country context: most particularly in the context of West African oil exploration in the 80’s and 90’s, where British Partners for Development (BPD) were engaged in extensive brokering of partnerships between corporates, the government and local communities. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Taken from AusAID registered Guideline #105 current to Jan. 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. Performance against quality criteria is rated using a six point scale: 6- Very high quality; needs ongoing management and monitoring only; 5- Good quality; needs minor work to improve in some areas; 4- Adequate quality; needs some work to improve; 3- Less than adequate quality; needs work to improve in core areas; 2- Poor quality; needs major work to improve; 1- Very poor quality; needs major overhaul [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. Taken from AusAID registered Guideline #105 current to Jan. 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. Performance against quality criteria is rated using a six point scale: 6- Very high quality; needs ongoing management and monitoring only; 5- Good quality; needs minor work to improve in some areas; 4- Adequate quality; needs some work to improve; 3- Less than adequate quality; needs work to improve in core areas; 2- Poor quality; needs major work to improve; 1- Very poor quality; needs major overhaul [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. In the northern part of the country they have 30 Japanese consultants supplied by JICA. Japanese are working in the Nakala corridor preparing a strategic development plan. JICA and Brazil are also funding a large project along the corridor in agriculture to provide food for people engaged in the development along the corridor. WB is financing sub-development initiatives for the transport corridors,. They are collecting GIS data to see how it will work. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. Taken from AusAID registered Guideline #105 current to Jan. 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. Taken from AusAID registered Guideline #105 current to Jan. 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Performance against quality criteria is rated using a six point scale: 6- Very high quality; needs ongoing management and monitoring only; 5- Good quality; needs minor work to improve in some areas; 4- Adequate quality; needs some work to improve; 3- Less than adequate quality; needs work to improve in core areas; 2- Poor quality; needs major work to improve; 1- Very poor quality; needs major overhaul [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. From the publication: Australia: Candidate for the UN Security Council 2013-14 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012: p 6, 21) [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. From the publication: ‘Australia and Africa: Partners into the Future’ (AusAID, Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, p9) [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Taken from AusAID registered Guideline #105 current to Jan. 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Performance against quality criteria is rated using a six point scale: 6- Very high quality; needs ongoing management and monitoring only; 5- Good quality; needs minor work to improve in some areas; 4- Adequate quality; needs some work to improve; 3- Less than adequate quality; needs work to improve in core areas; 2- Poor quality; needs major work to improve; 1- Very poor quality; needs major overhaul [↑](#footnote-ref-52)