**FINAL REPORT**

***Mid-Term Review***

***of the***

***AusAID-NGO***

***Humanitarian Partnership***

***Agreements (HPA)***

***2011-2014***

Prepared for the HPA Partners

11 June 2013

The views, contents and recommendations of this report are the views of the author based on evidence gathered during the Review and are not necessarily the views of the Australian Government. Recommendations made in this report are for HPA-NGOs and AusAID consideration only.

**Executive Summary**

In June 2011, the AusAID-NGO Humanitarian Partnership Agreements (HPA) 2011-2014 was launched to replace the Periodic Funding Agreements for Disaster Risk Management (PFA) 2006-2009, as the formal mechanism for engagement between AusAID and selected accredited Australian Non-Government Organisations (ANGOs) in rapid-onset humanitarian emergency responses. HPA also provides the mechanism for collaboration on programmed Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Capacity Building initiatives implemented by the HPA Partners.

Six Australian NGOs were selected by AusAID, in a transparent tender process, to become partners with AusAID in the HPA. These HPA NGOs are Oxfam Australia, CARE Australia, Save the Children Australia, Plan International Australia, World Vision Australia and Caritas Australia.

Informed by the findings and recommendations of an independent review of the PFA in late 2009, and subsequent consultations with the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) Humanitarian Reference Group (HRG), the HPA was developed with the view to improve strategic engagement and partnership between AusAID and the HPA NGOs. The strengthened partnership was expected to produce several benefits, including: streamlined funding processes for a faster turn-around of funding approvals and improved targeting and appropriateness of activities, for rapid onset humanitarian emergencies; increased support for communities to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience; and capacity building for HPA NGO staff and their partner agencies. It was also anticipated that AusAID and the HPA NGOs would obtain mutual benefit from improved coordination, robust dialogue on key humanitarian issues, and opportunities for joint learning.

This mid-term review (MTR) of the HPA was undertaken between March and June 2013*.* An evaluation of the Typhoon Bopha response was conducted within the timeframe of the MTR and was to provide the primary field level evidence of the performance of a response for the MTR. Due to security concerns, the visit was cancelled but a document review and phone discussions with NGO and United Nations (UN) representatives provided some insights.

The HPA MTR findings indicate that there have been improvements in the timing of funding turnaround in the context of emergency response through the activation of the HPA. Efficiencies were also found in processes associated with DRR initiatives and DRM Capacity Building initiatives to support longer-term planning and implementation.

Based on a selection of documents available, response activities were found to be relevant and appropriate. Evidence suggests that needs were assessed on the basis of information drawn from UN sources, other donors, NGOs and AusAID Posts. HPA NGOs built on these sources through their own networks in-country in the development of proposals. Evidence available indicates that HPA NGOs continued to assess needs in the target communities during implementation, and the focus and scope of activities were revised where necessary and reported in the Emergency Response Implementation Plan (ERIP) produced within 8 weeks of the response.

In terms of effectiveness, while reporting formats and content made a definitive assessment difficult, evidence available suggested that all targets were either achieved or exceeded, and that for most activities, the quick release of funds ensured that the HPA not only provided crucial support to people in great need, but was noticed and appreciated by partners and other donors. Reports and discussions with stakeholders indicated that early commencement of activities influenced other donors and private sector organisations to contribute. Importantly evidence and discussions with key stakeholders confirmed active coordination of the HPA NGO in-country staff and partners with UN Clusters and other fora, as well as working closely with government.

HPA was designed to focus on rapid-onset humanitarian emergency responses. However, of the five activations of HPA since June 2011, three have been responses to escalations in slow onset or protracted disaster situations. The MTR supports the use of HPA as one of the mechanisms to be considered by the Australian Government as part of a response for sudden and/or unforseen escalations in slow onset and protracted humanitarian emergencies, in circumstances where a rapid response is required to provide life-saving assistance. The MTR furtherrecommends that AusAID decision- making regarding the use of HPA in these circumstances respond to signals that demonstrate that humanitarian needs have reached, or have suddenly escalated to, a point of being acute against international humanitarian standards. The MTR has prepared a set of Guidelines at Annex 4 to support decision-making for the activation of HPA for escalations in slow onset and protracted disaster situations.

The selected DRR initiatives considered by the MTR were found to align with the AusAID DRR policy, “Investing in a Safer Future”. Again reporting formats and content made it difficult to draw definitive conclusions. However, evidence in selected documents, together with in-field observations in Timor Leste and Indonesia, demonstrated effective approaches to supporting government to implement their DRR mandates as well as support for high risk communities to identify and reduce hazards and to organise themselves to prepare for disaster.

Selected DRM Capacity Building initiatives were found to be appropriate. Initiatives included a wide variety of capacity building activities in a range of different areas including: emergency management, cultural awareness, supply and logistics, international standards, WASH training, running response simulations, drafting preparedness plans, establishing Emergency Response Teams for in-country partners, and many others. There were examples of collaboration between HPA NGOs, and in some instances, other humanitarian actors had also benefitted from HPA DRM Capacity Building activities. There were also examples of cross-regional learning.

The HPA NGO Response Committee was established to review and select the most appropriate HPA NGO emergency response proposals for submission to AusAID in a Joint Emergency Response Concept Paper (JERCP). The Response Committee has evolved during the first two years of HPA into a thorough and robust peer based decision-making process. However, HPA NGO representatives reported that transaction costs associated with response activation were out of proportion to the funding allocations provided for emergency responses. CEOs and HPA NGO senior staff reported that Australia provides less humanitarian funding directly to NGOs than any other OECD country. The MTR acknowledges these concerns and has conveyed them to AusAID. However, this issue is not within the mandate of the HPA MTR to consider.

In addition, transaction costs associated with establishing and managing the processes and protocols surrounding the HPA have been high for both AusAID and the HPA NGOs. The MTR recommends that the HPA Partners take prompt action to rationalise and simplify the complexity of governance and management systems. This would include simplifying and improving the quality and relevance of reporting that the MTR has found to be sometimes complex and repetitive, and not always meeting the needs of its audience.

In terms of the development of the partnership, while the partnership between the HPA NGOs has continued to develop over the first two years of HPA, the partnership between AusAID and HPA NGOs is taking longer to develop. The MTR observed that AusAID often adopts a traditional AusAID client role in a service provider relationship. Equally the MTR observed that the HPA NGOs often adopt their traditional role of seeking funds from a donor.

This first phase of HPA has been in many ways a pilot of an innovative partnership approach, between AusAID and selected Australian NGOs, after many decades of, for the most part, a donor/grantee or client/service provider relationship. It is therefore not surprising that as the partnership has evolved, some elements have progressed more quickly than others.

AusAID and the HPA NGOs have made a significant investment in the HPA and this should not be wasted. The MTR believes that the partnership with selected humanitarian NGOs has proven its value in the current HPA phase, and that continuation and further improvement of the partnership would be justified beyond the current phase. For this potential to be achieved, partners need to recognise the different strengths each partner brings to the partnership. Attention needs to be given to resolve issues in the current phase and set the scene for an enhanced partnership after the current phase ends.

**Recommendations for the Current Phase**

The MTR recommends that:

**Partnership**

***Recommendation 1***:HPA Partners take prompt action to commission a thorough Rationalisation Exercise to rationalise and simplify HPA governance systems, processes and management, with a particular focus on simplifying and improving the quality and relevance of reporting, for all Partners’ benefit. The MTR further recommends that the Rationalisation Exercise is closely linked to or integrated with the proposed Organisational Analysis at Recommendation 13.

***Recommendation 2***: A regular meeting between the HPA Director and the Manager Partnership and Programs be reinstated, with a set agenda and a clear objective of establishing appropriate regular communications and reducing transaction costs for all Partners.

***Recommendation* 3**: Clause 4.9 of the Head Agreements Schedule 2 relating to the 75%/25% allocation split be deleted.

***Recommendation 4***: AusAID develop effective handover and training processes for new staff working with HPA in the Humanitarian Branch.

***Recommendation 5:***All Partners work to develop concrete steps to further progress the partnership from a transactional relationship to a true strategic relationship.

***Recommendation 6:*** All Partners review and prioritise commitments associated with shared objectives in Schedule 2 of the Head Agreement, and revise as appropriate, with agreement to be formalised in a letter of agreement between all Partners. ACFID should be consulted in the review process to ensure their relationship with the HPA is reflected accurately and appropriately.

**Emergency Response**

***Recommendation 7*:** ANGOs continue to refine the Response Committee (RC) structure and process.

***Recommendation 8***: Proposed Guidelines for the activation of HPA for escalations in slow-onset and protracted disaster situations be considered by AusAID in decision-making and engagement with the HPA NGO Partners.

***Recommendation 9***: HPA NGOs to include a plan to address the needs of people with disabilities in the Emergency Response Implementation Plan (ERIP) and in DRR and DRM Capacity Building proposals and reports.

**Disaster Risk Reduction**

***Recommendation 10:*** Responsibility for both technical oversight and activity management of HPA DRR activities within AusAID be transferred to the Disaster Prevention and Risk Reduction (DPRR) Section and reporting be enhanced to support this new relationship.

**Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)**

***Recommendation 11****:* ExistingHPA fora include consideration ofM&E systems to ensure they are adequate and meet AusAID requirements

***Recommendation 12:*** HPA NGOs prioritise reporting on targeted and mainstreaming activities in Gender.

**Recommendations – Preparing for Beyond the Current Phase**

***Recommendation 13***: An independent organisational analysis be conducted as part of the evaluation of the existing phase and to inform the design of a successor program to HPA. The MTR further recommends that the Organisational Analysis is closely linked to or integrated with the proposed Rationalisation Exercise at Recommendation 1.

***Recommendation 14*:** A 12 month extension be agreed for all components of HPA.

**Contents**

[Executive Summary 2](#_Toc358817387)

[1. Acknowledgements 9](#_Toc358817388)

[2. Acronyms 10](#_Toc358817389)

[3. Introduction 11](#_Toc358817390)

[4. The Mid-Term Review (MTR) 12](#_Toc358817391)

[4.1 Methodology 13](#_Toc358817392)

[5. Background 14](#_Toc358817393)

[5.1 Australian Humanitarian Policy 14](#_Toc358817394)

[5.2 Total Humanitarian Response Funding 15](#_Toc358817395)

[5.3 HPA as part of the humanitarian program 16](#_Toc358817396)

[5.4 AusAID and NGOs 16](#_Toc358817397)

[5.5 HPA NGOs Capability 17](#_Toc358817398)

[6. General Findings 18](#_Toc358817399)

[7. Partnership Arrangements 18](#_Toc358817400)

[7.1 Timeliness 18](#_Toc358817401)

[7.2 Transaction Costs 20](#_Toc358817402)

[7.3 HPA Interface with ACFID 24](#_Toc358817403)

[7.4 The Status of the Partnership 24](#_Toc358817404)

[8. Emergency Response 26](#_Toc358817405)

[8.1 The HPA Emergency Response Mechanism 26](#_Toc358817406)

[8.2 HPA NGO Response 27](#_Toc358817407)

[8.3 HPA and Escalations in Slow-Onset and Protracted Disaster Situations 31](#_Toc358817408)

[9. Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building 32](#_Toc358817409)

[9.1 Disaster Risk Reduction Activities 33](#_Toc358817410)

[9.2. Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building Activities 36](#_Toc358817411)

[10. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and Reporting 38](#_Toc358817412)

[11. Looking Beyond the Current Phase 40](#_Toc358817413)

[12. Conclusions and Recommendations 41](#_Toc358817414)

[Recommendations for the Current Phase 42](#_Toc358817415)

[Recommendations – Preparing for Beyond the Current Phase 43](#_Toc358817416)

[Annex 1 - Mid-Term Review Terms of Reference 44](#_Toc358817417)

[Annex 2 – HPA Activation Details Chart 54](#_Toc358817418)

[Annex 3 - Head Agreements Schedule 2 Commitments 56](#_Toc358817419)

[Annex 4 – Escalations in Slow-Onset and Protracted Disaster Situations 57](#_Toc358817420)

[Annex 5 – List of Stakeholders Interviewed 59](#_Toc358817421)

# 1. Acknowledgements

The Review Team acknowledges the time and contribution CEOs and staff of the HPA NGOs and the senior staff and representatives of AusAID. The time and support provided by AusAID staff in Timor Leste and Indonesia during the MTR field visit, and the HPA NGO partner staff was also much appreciated.

The time and contribution of the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Social Solidarity and his staff in Timor Leste was particularly appreciated. The guidance and support provided by district and sub-district government staff in both Timor Leste and Indonesia was very helpful and enlightening.

The MTR Team also wishes to express its appreciation to the communities visited in Timor Leste and West Sumatra in Indonesia for their hospitality and openness.

Particular thanks must also go to the staff in the AusAID Humanitarian Branch and the HPA Director and HPA NGO staff for the effort in bringing in-Australia and in-country arrangements together. The work of Sophie Boucaut with providing ongoing administrative support throughout the review process was particularly appreciated.

# 2. Acronyms

ACAPS Assessment Capacity Project

ACC Australian Civilian Corps

ACFID Australian Council for International Development

AIFDR Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction

ANGO Australian Non-Governmental Organisation

ANCP AusAID NGO Cooperation Program

ARC Australian Red Cross

AusAID Australian Agency for International Development

CBHA Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies

CERF Central Emergency Response Fund (United Nations)

CSEF Civil Society Engagement Framework

CSO Civil Society Organisation

DPRR Disaster Prevention and Risk Reduction Section, AusAID

DFID UK Department for International Development

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office

ER Emergency Response

ERIP Emergency Response Implementation Plan

ERF Emergency Response Fund

GOI Government of Indonesia

GoTL Government of Timor Leste

HAP Humanitarian Action Policy

HERO&P Humanitarian Emergency Response Operations and Preparedness Section,

HNA Harmonised Needs Assessment

HoA Horn of Africa

HPA AusAID-NGO Humanitarian Partnership Agreements

HPA NGOs Humanitarian Partnership Agreements Non-Government Organisations

HRG Humanitarian Reference Group (of ACFID)

IDPS Internally Displaced People

INGO International Non-Government Organisation

JERCP Joint Emergency Response Concept Paper

MTR Mid-Term Review

NDMD National Disaster Management Department

NGO Non-Government Organisation

OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA Overseas Development Assistance

OECD/DAC Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Co-operation Directorate

PFA Periodic Funding Agreements for Disaster Risk Management

PVCA Participatory Capacity and Vulnerability Analysis

RRF Rapid Response Fund( of DFID)

UN United Nations

# 3. Introduction

The AusAID-NGO Humanitarian Partnership Agreements (HPA) was established in June 2011 to replace the Periodic Funding Agreements for Disaster Risk Management Program (PFA) 2006-2009 as the formal mechanism for engagement between AusAID and selected accredited Australian NGOs (HPA NGOs) in rapid-onset humanitarian emergency responses. HPA also provides for collaboration between HPA Partners on programmed Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Capacity Building initiatives implemented by HPA NGOs.

Six Australian NGOs were selected by AusAID, in a transparent tender process, to become partners with AusAID in the HPA. These HPA NGOs are Oxfam Australia, CARE Australia, Save the Children Australia, Plan International Australia, World Vision Australia and Caritas Australia.

The HPA partnership seeks to provide quicker, streamlined funding processes in the event of a rapid-onset disaster, improved decision-making and reduced transaction costs. HPA also seeks to achieve reduced community vulnerability and enhanced resilience through DRR activities, as well as strengthened DRM capacities of the HPA NGOs and their in-country partners.

Based on the recommendations of the independent review of the PFA[[1]](#footnote-1) the HPA also seeks improved coordination, regular and wide ranging dialogue and mutual accountability between the seven partners, and to progressively strengthen and institutionalise the AusAID-NGO humanitarian partnership.

The HPA partnership is intended to enhance, within the humanitarian sector, the long-standing relationship between AusAID and the Australian NGOs while bringing benefits to both AusAID and the HPA NGOs. For AusAID, HPA, through faster and better targeted responses, will further enhance Australia’s already good reputation as a flexible and responsive donor in disaster situations, while reducing transaction costs. HPA also provides another avenue for AusAID to engage in the growing international agenda for reducing vulnerability and increasing the resilience of communities most at risk of disaster.

For the HPA NGOs, the HPA offers the opportunity for greater input to decision-making on Australian Government funding during a disaster response through the HPA NGO Response Committee process, as well as guaranteed, long-term and flexible funding for DRR initiatives and for DRM capacity building for HPA NGO staff and their in-country partners.

It is anticipated that all partners, AusAID and the HPA NGOs, will benefit at the strategic and intellectual level from improved coordination, more opportunity for discussion and debate on key humanitarian issues, as well as opportunities for shared learning.

It was agreed between the seven HPA Partners in Schedule 2 of the HPA Head Agreements, that a Mid-Term Review (MTR) would be conducted two years into the HPA program[[2]](#footnote-2) to assess progress towards these outcomes. This document reports on the MTR findings.

# 4. The Mid-Term Review (MTR)

The MTR was asked to assess progress and achievements to date of the HPA and to assess, where possible, its contribution to strengthening Australian emergency responses, reducing community vulnerability and building resilience to disasters.

The MTR is not intended to involve an in-depth, across the board evaluation. Such an evaluation will be conducted at the end of the HPA program. The TOR required the MTR to provide a “snapshot” of HPA progress, issues and constraints to-date.

The emphasis of the MTR is on considering how the Partnership is developing and how it is contributing to improved implementation of responses, DRR and DRM Capacity Building programs. Given the focus on partnership and the early stage of the DRR and DRM Capacity Building initiatives, in terms of OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, the MTR has primarily focused on the key criteria: relevance and appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency.

It should be noted that there were limitations on the scope of the MTR:

* The scope of the MTR does not include comparison of HPA with other delivery/funding mechanisms available to AusAID for rapid-onset emergency responses.
* The scope of the MTR does not include consideration of changing the design parameters for the HPA mechanism.
* The scope of the MTR is constrained in terms of capacity to effectively measure impact (ie the wider effect and longer-term outcome), given the HPA is relatively new.

A further constraint resulted from the cancellation of the visit by the Team for the Evaluation of the Typhoon Bopha Response to the site of the response in Mindanao, in the Philippines, due to security concerns. The evaluation (conducted by a separate team with its own Terms of Reference) was to provide the primary case study for the MTR, providing on-the-ground evidence relating to the performance of an emergency response under the HPA mechanism. While the Bopha Evaluation team drew information from a document review and extensive phone interviews with NGO and United Nations representatives in the Philippines, they were unable to provide the anticipated rich field level data and findings for the MTR.

Therefore, it should be noted that apart from two short field visits by the MTR team to DRR and DRM Capacity Building initiatives in Timor Leste and Indonesia, no additional intensive field research, to verify or test information provided by stakeholders and reporting, was undertaken. MTR findings and recommendations need to be read with this in mind.

The Terms of Reference provided five questions as a lens through which the MTR has assessed progress and constraints.

* Is strengthened collaboration contributing to enhanced efficiencies, including reduced transaction costs, improved practices, processes and accountability?
* Is strengthened collaboration contributing to quicker, more appropriate and coordinated emergency assistance on the ground?
* Is HPA contributing to safer communities on the ground?
* Is HPA contributing to strengthened capability on the ground?
* Are HPA M&E arrangements appropriate, efficient and effective?

Compliance/consistency with AusAID Policies and Humanitarian Guiding Principles have also been considered by the MTR.

## 4.1 Methodology

The review team comprised an independent Team Leader, a representative from AusAID’s Humanitarian Emergency Response Operations and Preparedness (HERO&P) Section, and an HPA NGO representative for part of the Review.

The Working Group, with representatives from CARE, Caritas, Oxfam, Plan, Save the Children and World Vision and the HPA Director supported the process.

The MTR commenced with a workshop with representatives from the seven Partners. From the workshop, the MTR drew up a set of questions/issues which were provided to stakeholders as a basis for extensive discussions with HPA NGO Headquarters in Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra as well as with ACFID. HPA NGO CEOs and senior staff of both AusAID and HPA NGOs provided valuable guidance and information.

A field visit to Timor Leste included a meeting in Dili with the Vice Minister of Social Solidarity and the Director of the National Disaster Management Department (NDMD) and his staff. We also met with senior staff at the AusAID Post in Dili, and had a roundtable discussion with HPA NGO in-country representatives. A visit to a Save the Children DRR activity in Manufahi District provided useful insights into the integration of DRR into an existing health project.

The field visit to Indonesia commenced with meetings in Jakarta with senior staff from the Australia Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR), followed by discussion, with local representatives of World Vision, CARE, Plan and Oxfam. A visit to districts around Padang in West Sumatra provided useful insights into the progress made with introducing a quite advanced system of DRR and preparedness at the district and sub-district level.

An Aide Memoire was produced on return from the field visit and sent to stakeholders on 3 May 2013 and was followed by useful discussions with stakeholders on 7 May 2013, including participation by staff of the AIFDR in Jakarta. The first draft of the final report was sent to stakeholders on 14 May, with a further teleconference on 30 May 2013. Another revision was sent to stakeholders on 3 June 2013 with final comments received and incorporated, and the report submitted to AusAID on 11 June 2013.

# 5. Background

## 5.1 Australian Humanitarian Policy

Australia’s *Humanitarian Action Policy*, January 2005, committed Australia to enhancing its capacity to respond to unexpected crises and to strengthen regional resilience to disaster.  Australia’s current DRR policy, *Investing in a Safer Future*, June 2009, commits the Australian Government to fully integrating disaster risk reduction into its aid programs, strengthening partner country capacity to reduce disaster risks, supporting DRR advocacy, and developing coherent and coordinated DRR policies and programming.  These two humanitarian policies provide the guiding principles for, and underpin the goal, purpose, design, and implementation of the HPA.

 In late 2011 – six months after HPA commenced - a new Australian *Humanitarian Action Policy,* December 2011 (2011 HAP) was introduced.  2011 HAP was a new strategic framework for Australia’s humanitarian action and arose from the Australian Government’s aid policy introduced in July 2011 – *An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a real difference – Delivering real results*.  2011 HAP defines four core policy outcomes for Australia’s humanitarian action:

* Meets the needs of, and is accountable to, affected populations.
* Supports partner governments and local capacities, including with disaster preparedness.
* Protects the safety, dignity and rights of affected populations.
* Is timely and coordinated.

With these policy outcomes in mind, the 2011 HAP committed to deliver a range of humanitarian action results. Those most relevant to HPA are:

* Support our near neighbours.
* Respond effectively to simultaneous disasters.
* Respond in support of partner government and affected community priorities.
* Provide humanitarian action on the basis of needs and respect our partner’s adherence to humanitarian principles.
* Support protection activities that align with international accepted guidelines, and those that address gender-based violence and sexual and reproductive health.
* Australia will continually improve our own humanitarian action procedures.
* Take a holistic approach to longer-term recovery and building resilience.
* Continue to support mandated protection agencies and increase engagement with NGOs on protection.
* Support humanitarian action that builds on the existing skills and capacity of the affected community and involve them in the planning, delivery and evaluation
* Support agencies that improve the accountability and inclusiveness of humanitarian actions.

Australia’s current DRR policy, *Investing in a Safer Future*, June 2009, commits the Australian aid program to four outcomes[[3]](#footnote-3):

* DRR is integrated into the Australia aid program
* The capacity of partner countries to reduce disaster risks is strengthened in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action[[4]](#footnote-4).
* Leadership and advocacy on disaster risk reduction are supported and enhanced.
* Policies and programming for DRR and Climate Change Adaptation are coherent and coordinated.

## 5.2 Total Humanitarian Response Funding

Table 1 includes details of humanitarian response funding during the first two years of the HPA.

**Table 1: AusAID Humanitarian Response Funding[[5]](#footnote-5)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Budget Item** | **FY 2011/12**  **$m** | **FY 2012/13 (to date)**  **$m** |
| Total HPA humanitarian emergency response funding | 12.5 | 6.0 |
| Total NGO humanitarian emergency response funding | 41.0\* | 22.3\* |
| United Nations | 161.88 | 150.90 |
| Red Cross | 22.26 | 35.3 |
| Other | 2.15 | 6.9 |
| Total humanitarian emergency response funding: | 227.3 | 215.4 |
| Total Australian ODA: | 4,825.2 | 5,148.6  (estimated outcome at May 13) |

\*Note: The Total NGO humanitarian emergency response funding figures include HPA.

**Table 2: HPA Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building Funding[[6]](#footnote-6)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Budget Item** | **FY 2011/12**  **$** | **FY 2012/13**  **(to date)**  **$** |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Disaster Risk Reduction | 1,864,992 | 2,067,017 |
| 2 | Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building | 1,010,488 | 1,677,250 |

## 5.3 HPA as part of the humanitarian program

The HPA as a partnership mechanism arose from recommendations of the 2009 Independent Review of the Periodic Funding Agreement for Disaster Risk Management (PFA). The review sought to build on the achievements of the PFA to achieve a more robust and strategic collaborative framework. The Review argued that working through Australian NGOs, as trusted partners with expertise and extensive international on-the-ground networks facilitated rapid response. Australian NGOs could also obtain greater visibility both in Australia and internationally for the Australian Aid Program and could leverage funds from other donors. The Review suggested that the proposed HPA structure also offered an opportunity to pilot integrating emergency response with DRR and DRM Capacity Building[[7]](#footnote-7).

Two options were proposed. Option 1 proposed moving forward from what the PFA review team saw as a client/service provider relationship between AusAID and the ANGOs under the PFA, towards a strengthened partnership model, with a greater emphasis on NGO coordination and responsibility, shared learning, capacity building and DRR. Option 2 proposed multi-year block grants to fund capacity building and DRR, as well as contingency planning, preparedness, and initial emergency response, with AusAID relinquishing some control over funding and decision-making to the ANGOs[[8]](#footnote-8). AusAID considered the relationship between the ANGOs, and the relationship between AusAID and the ANGOs, not sufficiently developed for Option 2 at that stage and proceeded with Option 1 in anticipation that the partnership would evolve during the three years of HPA[[9]](#footnote-9). The choice of Option 1 resulted in many of the improvements sought by the PFA review, but retained the administrative burden of multiple individual contracts.

## 5.4 AusAID and NGOs

The Australian Government’s aid policy statement: ‘An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a real difference -Delivering real results’; committed AusAID to the development of a Civil Society Engagement Framework (CSEF) that sets out how AusAID will work more effectively with civil society organisations in Australia and overseas to increase the impact of aid for the world’s poorest.

The CSEF acknowledges the important role played by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs/NGOs) and outlines the various AusAID programs that provide support through CSOs/NGOs. Apart from support to emergency situations through HPA, AusAID works with CSOs through: the AusAID- NGO Cooperation Program (ANCP) which provided funding of $98.1 million to 43 accredited NGOs during 2011-12; country and sector programs that support both accredited and non-accredited Australian, international and local CSOs/NGOs; and support for Australian Volunteers for International Development which supported 950 new and 600 ongoing volunteers during 2011-2012[[10]](#footnote-10).

The CSEF requires AusAID to develop an agency-wide CSO monitoring and evaluation framework which will track results of AusAID funding through CSOs against objectives[[11]](#footnote-11). As this Framework develops, HPA Partners will need to consider its implications for HPA M&E.

## 5.5 HPA NGOs Capability

Prior to selection as HPA partners, the HPA NGOs were already accredited by AusAID. Accreditation ensures that organisations have appropriate systems and capability to deliver effective aid. HPA NGOs have signed the ACFID Code of Conduct, which among other things, requires Australian NGOs to ensure their work meets high quality standards. HPA NGOs were selected through a transparent tender process which assessed their capability to respond to rapid-onset disasters (including through international and local partners) and assessed their capacity to implement DRR initiatives and DRM Capacity Building initiatives.

Funding emergencies through HPA NGOs facilitates rapid mobilisation of funds through trusted partners with a wide range of expertise and significant international on-the-ground partners and networks. HPA NGOs provide their in-country partners with capacity building, technical support and experience from programs in other countries, and take significant responsibility for proposal writing and liaison with AusAID.

The HPA NGOs have all had long-term engagement in international development and humanitarian work but at the same time their strong domestic constituencies allow them to educate and inform the Australian public about international development and humanitarian issues[[12]](#footnote-12).

# 

# 6. General Findings

During the MTR process, the following themes emerged:

* The HPA response mechanism has evolved into a thorough and robust communication and decision-making system.
* The timeliness of funds approval of the HPA emergency response mechanism has improved compared to PFA.
* The anticipated reduction in transaction costs has not yet been achieved.
* HPA NGOs believe the transaction costs associated with the HPA emergency response mechanism are out of proportion to the levels of response funding provided.
* A strong partnership has developed amongst the humanitarian areas of the 6 NGOs, and appears to now extend beyond the HPA context
* The partnership between AusAID and HPA NGOs has not developed to the same extent.
* HPA NGO activities have on the whole met the objectives of the HPA, and based on evidence available, were found to be relevant and appropriate, effective and efficient.
* HPA NGOs appreciate the guaranteed, longer-term funding for DRR and DRM Capacity Building and appear to have made good use of it.
* Problems with format, focus and content of reporting have made it difficult, in some instances, to draw definitive conclusions on effectiveness and potential impact.

# 7. Partnership Arrangements

## 7.1 Timeliness

***Emergency Response***

All stakeholders agreed that in terms of timeliness, funds approval-turnaround during an activation of the HPA has significantly improved compared to its predecessor, PFA. While the 5 responses have not achieved the perfect 48-72 hour turnaround from the AusAID call to the HPA NGOs for proposals to advice of funding decision,[[13]](#footnote-13)they have all been reasonably close and have improved on the timing of PFA responses (see Table 3 below). The 2009 Review of the PFA reported that the best timing for funds turnaround had been 10 days, and the worst several months[[14]](#footnote-14).

**Table 3: Activation Timing[[15]](#footnote-15)** (a more detailed chart at Annex 2)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Response** | **Disaster** | **Call for Proposals** | **Tele-**  **conference** | **Response committee** | **JERCP**  **Submitted** | **JERCP**  **AusAID**  **Approval** |
| Horn of Africa | Ongoing | 20 July 2011 | 21 July 2011 | 22 July 2011 | 22 July 2011 | 25 July 2011 |
| Pakistan | 14 Sept 2011 | 16 Sept 2011 | 20 Sept 2011 | 20 Sept 2011 | 21 Sept 2011 | 21 Sept 2011 |
| Niger Sahel | Ongoing | 13 April 2012 | 17 April 2012 | 18 April 2012 | 18 April 2012 | 27 April 2012 |
| Typhoon Bopha | 4/5 Dec 2012 | 6 Dec 2012 | 10 Dec 2012 | 10 Dec 2012 | 10 Dec 2012 | 13 Dec 2012 |
| Syria | Ongoing | 29 April 2013 | 29 April 2013 | 2 May 2013 | 2 May 2013 | 6 May 2013 |

HPA NGO partners and AusAID officers at the Islamabad Post reported positive outcomes from the early arrival of HPA funding. Early implementation had drawn positive responses from, and greater influence with local partners, government and UN clusters. HPA NGOs had been able to quickly kick-start larger relief activities and expand existing activities to additional sectors or locations. HPA NGO reporting suggests that the quick release of funds had encouraged other donors to support the Horn of Africa (HoA) response and achieved efficiencies and flexibility in programming[[16]](#footnote-16). The Typhoon Bopha Evaluation early findings indicate that the quick release of HPA funds had influenced private foundations to provide generous funding support[[17]](#footnote-17). HPA NGO representatives also suggested that the quick release of the HPA funds has also leveraged HPA NGOs’ own funding.

***DRR and DRM Capacity Building Tranche Payments***

Equally, the funding of DRR and DRM Capacity Building initiatives has achieved efficiencies. DRR and DRM Capacity Building funding is guaranteed for the three years of HPA, with tranches paid annually subject to reporting demonstrating satisfactory progress, along with a workplan for the following year. Longer-term funding allows for planning and continuous improvement in implementation while funding arrangements have been structured to support smooth implementation, while ensuring accountability through an acquittal process.

***The 75/25% Funds Allocation Mechanism***

The MTR found confusion over the Schedule 2 Clause 4.9 which proposes that funding for HPA NGO proposals outlined in the Joint Emergency Response Concept Paper

(JERCP) is provided in two phases – an initial 75%, followed by 25% to be allocated at AusAID’s discretion. The HPA Framework is clear that the balance of funds is to be available for allocation to HPA NGOs, but the Head Agreement is ambiguous and has created an incorrect interpretation among non-HPA NGOs, ACFID, and some areas of AusAID, that the remaining 25% is available for allocation to non-HPA organisations. The 75%/25% mechanism has not been used to-date. On the basis that it is not useful and unnecessarily complicates the HPA Mechanism, the MTR believes that, subject to a proposed review of the Schedule 2 commitments (described on page 23 of this document), the clause should be deleted from the Head Agreement and any other documents, and the full allocated HPA funds be made available to the HPA NGOs.

AusAID advised that funding would continue to be provided as appropriate to non-HPA NGOs with proven capacity in humanitarian response through individual emergency response grants under HERO&P and other AusAID programs.

**7.2 Transaction Costs**

While all stakeholders reported the significant improvement in timeliness of disaster response funding, they also expressed concern to the MTR that the anticipated reduction in transaction costs has not been achieved in the first two years.

***Response Committee Transaction Costs***

All HPA NGOs reported an increase in transaction costs at the time of disaster response activation, with the transfer of responsibility for proposal selection to the HPA NGO Response Committee (details of Response Committee operation appear on page 24). However based on discussions, the MTR believes that this new responsibility has, on the whole, been accepted by the HPA NGOs, given the benefit they perceive of their greater input to the decision-making for AusAID funding of emergency response.

However, HPA NGO representatives, including CEOs, made strong representations about the effort and cost associated with the Response Committee process during an HPA Activation being out of proportion to the funding allocations provided by AusAID. Estimates provided by the HPA Director indicate costs of close to $30,000 incurred collectively by the HPA NGOs to conduct a Response Committee process.

As the MTR has no way of determining the appropriate balance between the cost of the process and the allocation provided, we believe that the Response Committee processes should be reviewed to explore ways of reducing the reported administrative burden.

Regarding the level of response allocations, CEOs and senior HPA NGO staff also drew comparisons between the funding provided to UN agencies and directly to HPA NGOs. They reported that Australia now provides less humanitarian funding directly to NGOs than any other OECD country. HPA NGOs provided a summary of figures to support this claim. The MTR acknowledges the concerns of the HPA CEOs and HPA NGO staff and has conveyed these to AusAID. However, decisions relating to the allocation of funds within the AusAID Humanitarian Program are outside the mandate of the Terms of Reference of the HPA MTR.

The MTR was advised that there are many areas of AusAID that influence decisions relating to disaster response funding. The MTR therefore makes recommendations on approaches to increase understanding throughout the agency, including at Posts, of the HPA, its purpose and how it is used. The MTR strongly encourages the HPA NGOs to ensure that they and their in-country partners make themselves and their capabilities known to AusAID staff at Post.

***Establishment Transaction Costs***

HPA NGO staff, particularly senior staff, acknowledged the inevitability of higher transaction costs during the first year of the HPA while new systems and protocols were established. This is reflected in Schedule 2 Clause 4.2[[18]](#footnote-18). However, they reported that these costs appear to have continued through the second year. They expressed concern to the MTR about the extent to which the excessive emails, a succession of meetings, steering committees, lessons learnt exercises and working groups associated with the partnership, occupied staff time. The volume of reporting at different levels to support the partnership was seen by some to be excessive. AusAID staff also reported difficulties with the volume of reporting received. A reported (by the HPA NGOs) lack of feedback by AusAID to this reporting would appear to demonstrate the issue. The Partners need to explore ways of reducing the administrative burden of these processes and to improve reporting content and formats.

***Communications between HPA NGOs and AusAID***

AusAID, the HPA NGOs and the HPA Director reported difficulties in resolving issues between the HPA NGOs and AusAID in a timely manner. Communication has reportedly at times been problematic. For example instances were reported of unnecessarily protracted email and phone exchanges that failed to resolve issues satisfactorily, with growing frustration for all concerned.

Examples of issues that caused considerable frustration for AusAID, the HPA NGOs and the HPA Director include:

* Preparation of the Capacity Mapping Database. AusAID reported receiving a document that was too complex for their requirements. HPA NGOs reported repeated efforts over many months, during the database development process, to clarify AusAID requirements in terms of format, specifications and level of detail. It was clear to the MTR that that preparation of the data for this document had required an inordinate effort on the part of the HPA NGOs and HPA Director.
* HPA Workplan. The preparation of an HPA workplan took several months to finalise apparently due to an inefficient process involving interventions by too many people and lack of clarity on what the workplan should reflect. What should have been a reasonably simple document appears to have gone through an unnecessary succession of iterations, occupying people’s time.
* The Mid-Term Review Preparations: Developing the Mid-Term Review was also a protracted process, possibly due to lack of clarity surrounding the purpose and scope of the MTR and the role of different partners in its preparation. It is the MTR’s understanding, that the assignment of one AusAID officer, dedicated to this task and working with the HPA Director, supported the development of a new concept for the MTR and the development of strengthened TOR which facilitated progress.
* JERCP Clearance for Typhoon Bopha Response: At least one HPA NGO response was reportedly disrupted due to a short delay in the clearance of the JERCP for Typhoon Bopha. MTR investigations would suggest that this was due to timing issues of consultation with the Post on the AusAID side. On the otherhand, AusAID reported receiving a JERCP document that had problems with format and content, complicating approval within AusAID. There is a need to standardise and simplify formatting and content of the JERCP and to rationalise the sequencing of AusAID processes.
* Visibility: Both AusAID and the HPA NGOs cited instances to the MTR where partners had not been adequately represented in documents and media releases. HPA partners are bound by commitments in the Head Agreements Schedule 2 Objective 5 to promote public awareness and visibility of the Australian Government and the HPA, its work and achievements. Subject to the outcome of the recommended review of Schedule 2 commitments (mentioned on page 23 of this document), a realistic Joint Visibility Plan should be finalised and implemented by all Partners. All Partners should continue to make every effort to acknowledge the Australian Government and HPA in media and documents about HPA activities.

The MTR believes that a regular meeting between the HPA Director and the Manager Partnership and Programs in AusAID’s Humanitarian Branch would help minimise misunderstandings and promote resolution of outstanding issues. The meeting should have a set agenda with a clear objective of establishing appropriate regular communications and reducing ad hoc email and phone contact and avoiding prolonged and unproductive debate on issues.

***AusAID Staff***

HPA NGOs reported difficulties surrounding the level of experience and the frequent turnover of staff in the Partnerships and Program Unit, in HERO&P Section, with new staff coming on board with little knowledge of HPA. MTR observations suggests that limited staff numbers and high staff turnover in AusAID is a reality that is not going to change, and the expectations of the HPA NGOs need to take this into account. The MTR strongly encourages AusAID to ensure that all new staff receive good training, particularly in activity and contract management, and are sensitised to the partnership concept. There should be comprehensive handover processes, which include visiting and engaging with the HPA Director and the HPA NGOs as early as possible. The MTR also strongly encourages AusAID to provide administrative support positions within the Branch to allow space and time for HERO&P officers to engage more readily in the HPA and other programs.

***The HPA Director Position***

Senior HPA NGO staff reported that the HPA Director has played a crucial role at the strategic and management level in the establishment of partnership protocols and processes. It was made very clear to the MTR that the current occupant of the position was chosen on the basis of her long experience in government at a senior level. This provides her with the authority to have influence at the highest levels in the HPA NGOs and to control and mediate sometimes intense negotiations.

The Director advised that her workload during the establishment phase had been heavy, and she confirmed other comments that this stage had lasted longer than expected. The experience of the first two years would suggest that having only one person in this position without support has been unsustainable with additional transaction costs for HPA NGOs and AusAID during absences. The Rationalisation Process should consider the Director’s role in the context of simplifying processes.

***Rationalisation of Processes and Review of Reporting***

It is the view of the MTR that the concerns and frustrations surrounding these various transaction costs and administrative tangles are interfering with the development of a strengthened partnership between AusAID and the HPA NGOs, and it is essential that HPA Partners get this under control. The MTR recommends that the Partners take prompt action to conduct a thorough-going Rationalisation Process of governance structures and management processes. This would consider the number and focus of meetings, the quantity, structure and relevance of reporting; processes within AusAID, and communication processes between AusAID and the HPA NGOs; and the structure and operation of the HPA Director’s position. The study would also focus on reporting to ensure that reporting is simplified and that format and content are relevant and useful to the audience of the report. The desired outcome of this Rationalisation Exercise would be simplified systems, more relevant reporting and base data for developing an HPA Operation Manual within AusAID, including material to put on the AusAID Intranet to raise agency wide awareness of HPA.

***Recommendation 1***:HPA Partners take prompt action to commission a thorough Rationalisation Exercise to rationalise and simplify HPA governance systems, processes and management, with a particular focus on simplifying and improving the quality and relevance of reporting, for all Partners’ benefit. The MTR further recommends that the Rationalisation Exercise is closely linked to or integrated with the proposed Organisational Analysis at Recommendation 13.

***Recommendation 2***: A regular meeting between the HPA Director and the Manager Partnership and Programs be reinstated, with a set agenda and a clear objective of establishing appropriate regular communications and reducing transaction costs for all Partners.

***Recommendation* 3**: Clause 4.9 of the Head Agreements Schedule 2 relating to the 75%/25% allocation split be deleted.

***Recommendation 4*:** AusAID develop effective handover and training processes for new staff working with HPA in the Humanitarian Branch.

## 7.3 HPA Interface with ACFID

ACFID reported favourably about the evolution of the HPA over its first two years. The MTR was advised that HPA NGOs had continued to work well with non-HPA NGOs in the HRG. However, ACFID requested that care be taken in terms of policy dialogue within the HPA, that topics with implications for the whole sector are more appropriately discussed in the broader HRG forum.

An umbrella memorandum of understanding between AusAID and ACFID, envisaged in the HPA Framework design, has not been put in place. However, Schedule 2 of the HPA Head Agreement contains reference to suggested opportunities for engagement between ACFID and the HRG that are not appropriate in the absence of an AusAID/ACFID MOU and do not belong in an agreement to which ACFID and the HRG are not party. Schedule 2 should be revised to correct this. It was agreed at the 30 May 2013 teleconference that ACFID should be consulted in this process to ensure that their relationship with HPA is reflected accurately and appropriately.

## 7.4 The Status of the Partnership

The MTR found a continuing commitment to the concept of partnership among all seven Partners including their senior staff. However, this was qualified by the burden of perceived excessive transaction costs. Furthermore, the evolution of the relationships within the partnership has not necessarily been smooth or easy.

The six HPA NGOs are each very different organisations with very different mandates. The MTR was advised that the decision-making process in the Response Committee had at times been quite robust and difficult. Therefore, progress made by the HPA NGOs in developing what appears to be a mature, collaborative decision-making process is commendable.

The partnership between AusAID and HPA NGOs is taking longer to develop. The MTR observed that AusAID often adopts a traditional AusAID client role in a client/service provider relationship. Equally it was observed that the HPA NGOs often adopt their traditional role of seeking funds from a donor.

This first phase of HPA has been in many ways a pilot of an innovative partnership approach, between AusAID and Australian NGOs, after many decades of, for the mostpart, a donor/ grantee or client/service provider relationship. It is therefore not surprising that as the partnership has been evolving, some elements have progressed well and other elements of the partnership have been problematic. However, the MTR sees the slow development of the relationship between AusAID and the HPA NGOs as a significant impediment to strengthening the humanitarian partnership in the current phase and realising the full potential of HPA in the future.

The MTR makes practical recommendations to reduce the pressure of transaction costs on both AusAID and the HPA NGOs, which we believe are contributing to these difficulties. The aim of the proposed Rationalisation Exercise is to simplify processes and make reporting more usable, and to develop an HPA Manual within AusAID which can support good handover and training processes and broaden the knowledge of HPA throughout the agency.

However, AusAID and the HPA NGOs need to recognise the different strengths each partner brings to the HPA Partnership and work to further progress the partnership from a transactional relationship to a true strategic relationship. Partners should seek to develop improved coordination, robust dialogue on substantive humanitarian issues outside the financial framework, and participation in joint learning. Partners need to map out what this looks like in practical terms and the Rationalisation Process may assist with this. AusAID and the HPA NGOs also need to recognise the required shift from traditional roles and focus on developing the approaches, mechanisms and resources required to support a strong and productive partnership**.**

Revisiting current commitments associated with the shared objectives in Schedule 2 of the Head Agreements should assist this process. On the basis of the experience of the first two years of HPA, many of the commitments are no longer relevant or require amendment. The MTR therefore recommends the Partners review, prioritise and where appropriate revise the Schedule 2 commitments, with agreement to be formalised in a letter of agreement between all Partners.

***Recommendation 5:***All Partners work to develop concrete steps to further progress the partnership from a transactional relationship to a true strategic relationship.

***Recommendation 6:*** All Partners review and prioritise commitments associated with shared objectives in Schedule 2 of the Head Agreements, and revise as appropriate, with agreement to be formalised in a letter of agreement between all Partners. ACFID should be consulted in the review process to ensure their relationship with the HPA is reflected accurately and appropriately.

# 

# 8. Emergency Response

At the time of the MTR there have been five activations of the HPA emergency response mechanism as outlined in the table below.

**Table 4: Response Details**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Response** | **Activation** | **Budget** | **HPA NGOs funded** | **Allocation** |
| Horn of Africa | 20 July 2011 | $ 5million | CARE  Save the Children World Vision Caritas PLAN Oxfam | 990,000  1,500,000  455,000  455,000  800,000  800,000 |
| Pakistan | 16 Sept 2011 | $2.5million | Save the Children  Oxfam Plan | 1,000,000  770,000  730,000 |
| Niger/Sahel | 13 April 2012 | $5million | Plan  Save the Children  Oxfam  CARE | 1,500,000  1,000,000  1,000,000  1,500,000 |
| Typhoon Bopha | 6 Dec 2012 | $2million | Caritas  Oxfam  Save the Children | 747,095  569,811  683,094 |
| Syria | 29 April 2013 | $4million | Oxfam  Save the Children  CARE  Caritas | 1,000,000  1,010,000  1,350,000  640,000 |

## 8.1 The HPA Emergency Response Mechanism

The HPA response mechanism has been activated five times during the first two years of the HPA (see table 1 and 2) and stakeholder comments and documentary evidence suggest that the mechanism has evolved into an improved and effective response process. Senior HPA NGO staff reported it to be “world class,” comparing well to other such mechanisms[[19]](#footnote-19). It compares well to the PFA assessment process conducted by AusAID that the PFA Review assessed as having many inconsistencies.[[20]](#footnote-20) Response Committee minutes indicate the Emergency Managers of the 6 HPA NGOs conduct a thorough process of analysis, assessment and scoring of proposals. The process following the call from AusAID to the HRG including the HPA NGOs includes the following steps[[21]](#footnote-21):

* HPA NGOs prepare Individual Concept Papers (ICPs) which are similar to the stand-alone emergency response proposals under the PFA.
* The ICPs are considered by the Response Committee through an intensive process of presentation, challenge, justification and scoring.
* The Response Committee debate focuses on various aspects of HPA NGO’s proposals including: accordance with AusAID criteria; capacity of each NGO to respond in the particular context, geographic spread of proposals, potential overlaps, staff capacity in-country, status of in-country partners; technical capacities; cost structures, etc.
* A decision is made relating to the number of ICPs that can be funded within the allocation advised by AusAID and the funding distribution is negotiated.
* The Response Committee members prepare a Joint Emergency Response Concept Paper (JERCP) for submission to AusAID for funding.
* The target is for the process to take 48-72 hours from call from AusAID to the HPA NGOs, Response committee meeting, submission of the JERCP, and AusAID approval of JERCP.

## 8.2 HPA NGO Response

The MTR assessment at the activity level is based on a desk review of the Horn of Africa response for which the MTR had access to all main documents (JERCP, ERIP, final reports, lessons learnt and HPA NGO Evaluation). The MTR therefore acknowledges that the comments in this section may not take adequate account of changes and improvements to reporting made by HPA NGOs during more recent responses. Initial Findings of the Typhoon Bopha Evaluation appear in this section.

**8.2.1 Horn of Africa Response**

Failure of seasonal rains during 2010 and 2011 in the countries of the Horn of Africa (HoA) resulted in a drought of massive proportions. It is estimated that as many as 11.6 million people were affected and 50-100,000 people died during the worst days of the drought. The drought affected Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, South Sudan and parts of Uganda[[22]](#footnote-22). The situation worsened during 2011 which resulted in growing international and donor interest until, on 20 July 2011, the UN declared famine in parts of southern Somalia for the first time in 30 years. At the same time increasing numbers of desperate people were on the move.

AusAID has advised the MTR that the Australian Government provided a total of $A90.5 million in response to the HoA drought during financial year 2011-12. Given a clear escalation of the drought situation with an immediate threat to the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, the situation was defined as an escalation of a protracted disaster situation and HPA was activated with an allocation of $5million. The Australian Government also funded 18 ANGOs (including the HPA NGOs) as part of this response through the Dollar for Dollar mechanism.

This first activation of the HPA was announced by AusAID in a teleconference with the HRG on 20 July 2011. The first HPA Response Committee meeting was held on 22 July to decide on the HPA NGO proposals to be included in the JERCP. Details of the activation can found in Tables 3 and 4. The JERCP estimated a total of 231,784 beneficiaries from the projects of the 6 HPA NGOs across the 3 countries.

The MTR found the HoA response to be ***relevant and appropriate***. The decision by the Australian Government to support a major response was based on information obtained from the UN, including UNOCHA, other donors, NGOs and AusAID Posts in Africa. The consideration of proposals by the HPA NGO partners was based on UNOCHA assessments, in-country partners and public sources. Sectors were relevant to the situation with Nutrition and WASH addressing the serious escalation in the rates of malnutrition and support for the hundreds of thousand IDPs, complimented by livelihoods and food security support to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to the protracted disaster.

In terms of ***effectiveness***, while the MTR found some reports quite difficult to read, evidence suggests that all initiative achieved or exceeded their targets[[23]](#footnote-23). HoA reporting indicates that funding commitment was provided by AusAID within one week. In the HPA lessons learning paper produced in July 2011, country officers are quoted as saying that the quick transfer of funds enabled HPA NGO partners to rapidly activate new and enhanced programs. They also reported that the funding filled intervention gaps in communities that were often underfunded.[[24]](#footnote-24) There were, however, some NGOs that suffered delays due to local government requirements and security concerns, and one HPA NGO that required a no-cost extension.

In terms of ***coordination***, Response Committee minutes indicate that discussions consider how the different proposals fit together in order to avoid gaps and duplications and geographical overlap. There was no reported specific coordination in-country between the HPA NGOs, but it was apparent through existing coordination mechanisms such as UN clusters.

Coverage of ***cross-cutting issues*** was variable in the HoA reports. In some documents there is a focus on gender, but little reporting against it in final reports. The inclusion in the ERIP of a Gender Action Plan is an improvement but it is not clear how this is addressed in M&E processes and final reports. Some HPA NGOs addressed the needs of people with disabilities, but this is less apparent in other HoA documents. Plan’s collaboration with CBM/Nossal Institute to address the needs of people with disabilities was a highlight of the HoA response which benefitted the Plan project as well as those of other HPA NGOs.

Indications of ***compliance with international standards and AusAID policies,*** as required by Schedule 2 of the Head Agreements, was not common in HoA response documents, with notable exceptions. It is noted that reference to international standards is more common in more recent JERCPs and hopefully will be referenced in more depth in more recent final reports. Reference to AusAID policies was not common.

In ***conclusion***, on the basis of Response Committee operations and the analysis of the HoA documentation, the MTR assesses that the format and rigour of the Response Committee represents improved decision-making which provides better targeted initiatives on the ground and increased coordination of planning and lessons learnt between the HPA NGO Partners. This will be considered in more detail by the Office of Development Effectiveness Evaluation of the Horn of Africa Response.

**Case Studies**

The following case studies were based on a desk review of available documentation. No additional intensive field research was undertaken to verify and test information provided.

***CARE’s nutrition project in Ethiopia***

Despite delays and having to change location due to Ethiopian Government requirements, CARE continued on to achieve and exceed its ERIP targets of 11,442 severely and moderately malnourished children in the ERIP, pregnant women and lactating mothers (targets had reduced from the 13,000 in the JERCP due to refined beneficiary information by the time of the ERIP). At the completion of the project, CARE came in just under this new target, at 10,963, but had added health, hygiene and nutrition education for 15,907 mothers and caretakers. Training of health officials and volunteers were slightly reduced due to changing needs. Use of SPHERE standards is mentioned frequently in their reporting, as well as close coordination with government and the local UN Cluster group. CARE also worked closely with International NGOs and a local NGO partners, Gayo Pastoral Development Initiative. CARE reporting indicates a strong focus on gender and people with disabilities.

***World Vision WASH Project in Kenya***

Again despite delays and security concerns which led to a three month no-cost extension, World Vision exceeded the JERCP beneficiary target of 21,666 people, providing access to functioning and safe water facilities to 26,566 people and their animals, as well as short term water access to 6,204 people. Activities included drilling of new boreholes, installing and repairing broken pumps, construction of steel towers and installation of water tanks, establishing supply chain links for household water treatment, training of community health workers on basic household sanitation and hygiene practices, and development of IEC materials. World Vision reported the “greatest success of the project” to be the uptake of community led sanitation processes, and 1000 traditional pit latrines were constructed. World Vision worked with local NGO partners, Wajir South Development Association (WASDR), Kenya Red Cross, and CARE Kenya.

***Oxfam WASH Project in Somalia***

The OXFAM WASH Project also exceeded its JERCP estimate of food and WASH support for 9,533 people in the Bandera and Sakow districts of Gedo and middle Juba in Southern Somalia. The HPA allocation complemented other funding which increased the total beneficiary numbers to 17,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and host communities. By completion of this 6 month response, the project had provided cash and food inputs to 17,736 people who had no access to food and other basic house needs; had stimulated local markets and increased the supply of goods; and stemmed the flow of people crossing the border into refugee camps. Oxfam work in the area also included construction of latrines, distribution of hygiene kits, aqua tabs, mosquito nets and blankets for 2,956 households. Close coordination through the UN cluster is indicated. Oxfam worked with an indigenous partner, the Social-Life and Agriculture Development Organisation (SADO) which they have been supporting since 2004. There was a strong focus on gender. The project was working in a challenging environment in which the Al Shabaab movement was expelling INGOs from the area. The fact that they were able to finish their response before being expelled has been attributed to the speed at which the HPA funds were provided which allowed early implementation[[25]](#footnote-25).

**8.2.2 Typhoon Bopha Response**

In December 2012, Typhoon Bopha struck the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines, killing more than 1,000 people, displacing 800,000 and damaging agriculture, livelihoods and infrastructure. The Australia Government committed $10.3million of emergency relief and early recovery assistance. As this was a rapid-onset disaster, the response included activation of HPA with an allocation of $2million.

The HPA NGOs temporarily suspended the Quarterly Steering Committee Meeting on 6 December 2012, to accommodate the HRG/AusAID teleconference relating to the emergency developing in the Philippines. The Steering Committee resumed and at the end of the meeting, AusAID announced the HPA activation. The JERCP was submitted on 10 December and approved by AusAID on 13 December 2012. Details of the response appear in Tables 3 and 4.

In accordance with the commitment in the HPA Agreements that HPA Partners would jointly evaluate selected responses, a joint evaluation of the HPA Typhoon Bopha response was conducted just prior to the completion in June 2013 of the six-month activities and coincided with the MTR. The Bopha Evaluation was to be the primary case study for the MTR for provision of in-field evidence of an emergency response under the HPA mechanism. Due to security concerns, the team was prevented from conducting site visits in Mindanao, and was constrained to a document review and phone conversations with in-country HPA NGO partner staff and UN representatives. The Evaluation Team Leader, who was located in Manila at the time of the proposed mission, coordinated these phone calls with other team members in Australia. He also met with AusAID staff at the Manila Post.

Due to this unfortunate disruption to the mission, the evaluation was unable provide the rich on site evidence for response performance. However, initial findings are helpful to triangulate with some MTR findings. Of most relevance to the MTR are the following:

* The response appeared to be appropriate which confirms the MTR assessments of other responses.
* There were reports of good coordination with government and communities. This has been a feature of other programs.
* Efforts to identify the most vulnerable were reported, which complies with Schedule 2 commitments.
* M&E systems were working well, which confirms MTR assessments that adequate systems are in place.
* Comments on the difficult balance in an activation between ‘enough’ information and the need to move quickly. This aligns with concerns reported by some AusAID staff.
* HPA response leveraged additional funds and support from other donors and private sector foundations. This confirms claims from HPA NGOs that HPA funds have influenced other humanitarian actors to respond.
* Rapid response gave the HPA NGOs and AusAID a stronger voice to advocate for unmet needs through a presence in the field. This was also found by the MTR.
* HPA NGOs coordinated through UN clusters and other fora, not HPA. This confirms the reporting relating to other responses.
* Found that AusAID Post and even the HPA NGO in-country teams were not familiar with the HPA mechanism. This confirms MTR observations.

## 8.3 HPA and Escalations in Slow-Onset and Protracted Disaster Situations

The MTR was advised that AusAID will respond to crises in accordance with the criteria set out on page 43 of the 2011 Humanitarian Action Policy.  This includes consideration of Australian Government staff and experts, United Nations, Non-Government Organisations, multilateral and other bilateral partners.  The most appropriate option or mix of options will be used for the particular context.

HPA was designed as the formal mechanism for engagement between AusAID and the selected Australian NGOs in rapid-onset humanitarian emergency responses. However, of the five activations of HPA since June 2011, three have been responses to escalations in slow onset and protracted disaster situations.

The MTR does not support the use of HPA for response to slow-onset or protracted disasters, but the MTR does support the use of HPA for sudden and/or unforeseen escalations in slow-onset and protracted disasters, in circumstances where a rapid response is required to provide life-saving assistance.

The MTR recommends that AusAID decision-making regarding the use of HPA in these circumstances take account of signals that humanitarian needs have reached, or have suddenly escalated to, a point of being acute against international humanitarian standards. It is acknowledged that the Australian Government will also take into account reporting from the UN, NGOs and other donors, as well as AusAID Posts.

The MTR also recommends that the timeframe of activation processes for escalations in slow onset and protracted disasters be agreed in the context of each disaster, in order to allow HPA NGOs a period of time appropriate to each particular disaster, to fully understand the situation on the ground. The MTR also recommends flexibility in the choice of sectors, to ensure that, while immediate live-saving support is provided, approaches are also included to support resilience to the ongoing disaster. This could include protection.

The MTR recommends that the Rationalisation process consider the need to build into the JERCP process the flexibility required for responses to unforeseen and acute escalations in protracted and slow-onset disaster situations. Recommended Guidelines are at Annex 4.

***Recommendation 7*:** ANGOs continue to refine the Response Committee (RC) structure and process.

***Recommendation 8***: Proposed Guidelines for the activation of HPA for escalations in slow-onset and protracted disaster situations be considered by AusAID in decision-making and engagement with the HPA NGO Partners.

***Recommendation 9***: HPA NGOs to include a plan to address the needs of people with disabilities in the ERIP and in DRR and DRM Capacity Building proposals and reports.

# 9. Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building

Under HPA, HPA NGOs receive grant funding of $1.5 million over three years for programmed DRR activities and DRM Capacity Building activities, with funding provided in annual tranches, subject to satisfactory progress. The MTR was advised by AusAID that following ratification of HPA Head Agreements, each NGO was required to submit for AusAID approval, a design/ implementation document for DRR and DRM Capacity Building activities, with a detailed work plan for year one and indicative work plans for years two and three. In designing and nominating programmed activities, HPA NGOs were required to comply with specifications contained in Schedule 2 of the HPA Head Agreement. AusAID’s policy “Investing in a Safer Future’ – A Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for the Aid Program’ of June 2009 provides the guiding principles under which HPA DRR initiatives are funded and implemented.

While meeting these requirements, HPA NGOs were free to determine the focus, location and nature of their DRR and DRM Capacity Building activities, as well as the emphasis, balance, and linkages (if any) between DRR and DRM Capacity Building activities. While HPA NGOs were not specifically required to develop HPA DRR and DRM Capacity Building activities in coordination with other HPA NGO partners, Schedule 2 commitments do seek complementarity. The MTR found evidence of DRR and DRM Capacity Building activities that have fostered collaboration between the HPA NGO partners.

The MTR also found links between DRR and DRM Capacity Building in training to support capacity in DRR planning and implementation, such as Oxfam's cross-regional learning opportunities in the broader application of the Participatory Capacity and Vulnerability Analysis (PVCA) toolkit and the Harmonised Needs Assessment (HNA) in Timor Leste which involves all the HPA NGOs and the Red Cross. The HNA aims both to increase the capacity of HPA NGO staff and their partners to coordinate in an emergency and also to increase the capacity of the Timor Leste National Disaster Management Department (NDMD) to coordinate with the international humanitarian NGOs.

Should the MTR recommendation for a 12 month extension of HPA be accepted, the MTR recommends that funding for DRR and DRM Capacity Building also be extended in order to foster increasing collaboration between initiatives. Preparations for an extension of funding should include a peer review process among all Partners, HPA NGOs and AusAID to establish strategy and scope for DRR and DRM capacity building initiatives for the fourth year.

The MTR has also concluded that better alignment of technical and management functions in AusAID, particularly for DRR, would result in gains in effectiveness and efficiency of these programs. HPA DRR and HPA DRM Capacity Building activities have been managed to date by the Programs and Partnerships Unit of the HERO&P Section, with technical advice from the DPRR section as required. The MTR observed that DPRR and the HPA NGOs have established an informal relationship that is strengthening, particularly since the March 2013 Steering Committee meeting where DPPR and HPA NGO representatives had a fruitful discussion on DRR issues and approaches.

The MTR suggests that the transfer of both HPA DRR activity management and technical oversight within AusAID to the DPRR Section would enhance the quality of strategic and technical engagement between AusAID and the HPA NGO Partners on DRR, improve the quality of reporting, streamline management and administrative arrangements, and facilitate future planning.

The MTR believes it is appropriate for HPA DRM Capacity Building to remain with HERO&P given its close link to NGO response capacity. Where DRM Capacity Building activities have DRR aspects, or are linked to HPA DRR activities, DPRR should be consulted on technical issues.

## 9.1 Disaster Risk Reduction Activities

The MTR conducted a rapid desk review of a selection of funded programmed DRR activities, and found that activities, for the mostpart accorded with AusAID’s DRR policy. Reporting was variable in quality, with some being repetitive and some more focused on outputs rather that potential impact. DPRR staff who have been involved in reviewing DRR reporting have confirmed the MTR’s findings. However, it is acknowledged that these are Year 1 reports, and it is anticipated that Year 2 reports will include an increased focus on impact or the signs of potential impact.

The MTR team also visited and was briefed on DRR activities in Timor Leste and in Sumatra in Indonesia. Having the opportunity to visit programs on the ground allowed the team to fill in gaps in information and gave the team more confidence in the effectiveness of HPA NGO DRR programs. During the field visits, the MTR observed the value of HPA NGO Australian-based and in-country staff engagement with local partners and beneficiaries, and their support with technical and management advice.

The HPA design did not require collaboration on DRR activities between HPA NGOs. However, Schedule 2 of the Head Agreements sought complementarity, and the MTR found examples of increasing collaboration. The MTR were advised by field staff in Timor Leste of growing and productive collaboration among the HPA NGO partners in Timor Leste. The Harmonised Needs Assessment (HNA) initiative provides joint HPA NGO funding for a local adviser to support the National Disaster Management Department (NDMD) to coordinate with the HPA NGOs and the Red Cross in the event of a disaster. Joint DRM Capacity Building activities under the HNA are described under the next section of this report. The MTR was also advised that HPA NGO Head Offices had initiated a DRR Sub-Group soon after the commencement of HPA, which was a forerunner to the ACFID DRR Working Group. The ACFID DRR Working Group which includes the HPA NGOs, non-HPA NGOs and the Red Cross has served as a platform for coordinated communication and policy messaging to AusAID, and to international DRR bodies such as UNISDR. The MTR also noted that Save the Children, World Vision, Caritas and Oxfam were working together with the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative in the lead-up to the High Level Meeting in June 2013, with Oxfam as co-chair of the DRR/Preparedness.

HPA NGOs also reported to the MTR that their involvement with HPA, has led to an increase in new programs and the expansion of their existing DRR portfolio. Oxfam has implemented new programs in the Solomon Islands, South Africa and Sri Lanka that expand, or build on methodologies and lessons learned of other activities, and Caritas is planning new programs in West, East and Central Africa. Plan reported that HPA has supported an increase its programs from four countries to 14 and now across x3 regions (Asia, Africa and the Pacific). The MTR also observed in our field visit that HPA allowed Oxfam to expand the Building Resilience Program in Eastern Indonesia to high risk districts around Padang in West Sumatra. Oxfam also reported using HPA to leverage additional funds from DipECHO, Oxfam Confederation and ANCP in multiple locations. The MTR was briefed on CARE’s MAKA’As project in Timor Leste which links and adds value to two much larger CARE livelihoods and climate change adaptation projects.

HPA NGOs reported some instances of HPA DRR funding influencing broader policy and approaches within their agencies. Oxfam suggested that experience from HPA would have an influence in the development of a broader DRR/CCA Policy within the agency and input into policy papers relating to DRR and CCA. Caritas reported that HPA has contributed to DRR becoming a cross-cutting issue in development programming and a key sector over the next five years, and had influenced the Review of Caritas Australia and New Zealand DRR and DRM work in the Pacific. Oxfam also reported that HPA had driven greater bridging and alignment of DRR, preparedness and response work. CARE reported that HPA had influenced agency policy to increasingly focus on how to integrate consideration of disaster and climate-induced risk into long-term development programs with vulnerable groups through value-add components such as the MAKA’As project in Timor Leste described below.

***Recommendation 10****:*  Responsibility for both technical oversight and activity management of HPA DRR activities within AusAID be transferred to the Disaster Prevention and Risk Reduction (DPRR) Section and reporting be enhanced to support this new relationship.

**9.1.1 Case Studies**

**Timor Leste - Vulnerability Assessment – Timor Leste**

The MTR team met with the HPA representatives in Dili and was provided a briefing on a **CARE** DRR Project which is supporting and linking two larger CARE projects, the EC-funded Hadia Agricultura No Nutrisaun (HAN Agriculture and Food Security Program) and the Mudanza Klimatica No Ambiente Seguro (MAKA’As Community Adaptation to Climate Change Program) funded from AusAID’s International Climate Change Adaptation Initiative. The HPA program contributes to these two larger programs through the development of vulnerability assessment system and M&E framework through data brought together in a GIS system. This system is building up a significant database of quantitative and qualitative data on a wide range of factors relating to potential vulnerability, for example: agricultural data, livestock data, sources of energy, crop density, road density etc. On this basis a variety of maps are being produced on altitude, population distribution, distribution of erosion, distribution of forest cover, access to electricity, water sources, health facilities and many more. The data includes consideration of gender, through qualitative research with separate men’s and women’s groups, including the elderly. The MTR was advised that people with disabilities were not yet included.

While early in its development, the system will provide important information for government and communities to implement DRR activities. National CARE staff envisage that the system will also provide information to communities to allow them to more effectively participate in Sub-District annual program planning. The risk in this project is that it is reliant on computer-based technology that is currently beyond the capacity of district and sub-district government to manage and keep up to date. CARE staff indicated that they were negotiating with UNDP to provide continued support for development of the system after HPA.

**Padang, West Sumatra – Building Resilience**

The MTR visited an **Oxfam** Community Based DRR project in the districts of Padang Pariaman and Agam, in West Sumatra. Oxfam has used their HPA allocation to replicate, in these two high risk districts, the successful components of their Australia Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR)-funded DRR program in Eastern Indonesia. Oxfam reported that the strong foundation of DRR skills, knowledge and experience developed in the Building Resilience Program in Eastern Indonesia had supported more rapid progress in the Padang districts. District government officials and community leaders reported strong support from Oxfam’s two local partners, Jemari Sakaato and Persatuan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia (PKBI), for the development of DRR policy and regulations and for the establishment of district disaster committees and village preparedness teams. The project aims to support 23,024 indirect beneficiaries (11,213 men and 11,811 women) and 642 direct beneficiaries in 20 sub-villages.

The MTR was impressed by the commitment of the Head of the District Disaster Committee and his staff who provided a very detailed presentation of government activities in DRR and disaster preparedness. The level of technology being established by the Oxfam project was impressive. Dedicated district government staff, on duty 24 hours a day, can now draw real time meteorological information from the internet as a basis for early warning signals provided to communities via a radio network. At the village level, members of the Village Preparedness Teams, established with the support of the project, provided enthusiastic briefings on their structure and function, which included a board, a management structure, and different sections. The different sections are staffed by volunteers and include: first aid, fire, search and rescue, security and public kitchen. The MTR surmised that the high level of commitment and rapid program in the Padang districts was also influenced by experience of the 2009 earthquake in the province, as well as the constant threat of frequent floods, landslides, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, storm surges and deforestation.

## 9.2. Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building Activities

The MTR conducted a rapid review of a selection of documents and concluded that the DRM Capacity Building activities reviewed were appropriate.

There is a wide variety of capacity building activities in a range of different areas, including emergency management, cultural awareness, supply and logistics, international standards, WASH training, response simulations, drafting preparedness plans, establishing Emergency Response Team for in-country partners, etc. Training has been cross-regional with HPA NGO staff and partners in many regions participating. Innovative approaches and new technologies, including social networking, were evident.

The MTR was advised by field staff of growing and productive collaboration among the HPA NGO partners. In Timor Leste, the MTR was provided with a comprehensive briefing on the Harmonised Needs Assessment (HNA) activity led by CARE, but involving all HPA NGO partners plus the Red Cross and GoTL. Save the Children’s Humanitarian Leadership Course at Deakin University (described further below) has involved other HPA NGO Partners in both lecturing and participant roles. CARE’s WASH in Emergencies training Bangkok, involved other HPA Partners, including AusAID, Australian Red Cross and ACFID. Plan facilitated Disability Inclusiveness training in Ethiopia in which Caritas, CARE and Oxfam participated.

While HPA NGOs are using HPA DRM Capacity Building funding in a wide range of areas, the Year 1 reporting available to the MTR was variable in terms of providing qualitative evidence of progress and likely outcomes and impact of capacity building activities. There are instances of reporting in cases where the activity is implemented by a partner that do not indicate the role and value added of the HPA NGO. Again the MTR only had access to Year 1 reports. We anticipate that Year 2 reports to provide further and more qualitative information.

**9.2.1 Case Studies**

**In Australia – Training future leaders in humanitarian response**

Save the Children briefed the MTR team on the status of the Humanitarian Leadership Program with Deakin University.  This program is a four part learning and development program designed to help address a deficit in the number and quality of humanitarian leaders across the sector, with a particular focus on Asia and the Pacific.

The program commences with a distance education unit which focuses on the humanitarian system and the underpinnings of leadership theory and practice delivered from a humanitarian perspective. This is followed by a 7 day residential that further builds on the leadership behaviours and practicing leadership. This is again followed by a distance education unit which looks at some of the key strategic issues faced by humanitarian leaders. The program culminates in an 8 day residential in Indonesia where students further develop their leadership skills and are assessed during a four day continuous simulation. The distance learning components are supported by seminars delivered by subject matter experts. During the 2012-2013 program, the distance units were gradually transitioned to Deakin University’s online learning platform.

The first program was delivered at Deakin University’s Warrnambool Campus during 2012 with 48 students from 29 countries. The program is a good example of cross-learning between the Partners, with students from other HPA and non-HPA NGOs as well as from AusAID.  Thirty-eight students continued through to the second part of the course. The third part of the program was delivered in Indonesia, and is now delivered as a four unit programme, with unit 2 delivered in Melbourne at Deakin University’s Burwood Campus, and unit 4 delivered in Indonesia.

Save the Children staff advised the MTR that as of December 2012, the course was accredited as a Graduation Certificate of Humanitarian Leadership with Deakin University with a $1.5 million fee waiver.  Save the Children is seeking to share the course with international partner institutions and a further expansion of the program into Africa is currently under consideration. This appears to have been a very successful use of HPA DRM Capacity Building funds, which has benefitted all HPA Partners.

**Timor Leste – HPA Promoting Coordination on the Ground**

At a joint meeting of all HPA NGO representatives in Timor Leste (TL), the MTR was briefed on a Harmonised Needs Assessment (HNA) initiatives being developed by the collective HPA NGOs and Red Cross. Strengthening needs assessment procedures accords with AusAID policy as well as SPHERE and Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles. CARE TL had engaged the Assessment Capacity Project (ACAPs) to visit TL to advise the HPA NGOs on developing the assessment initiatives.

All HPA agencies have contributed funds to recruit an HNA coordinator to be based in National Disaster Management Department (NDMD). This person would be managed directly by Oxfam, and would coordinate the development and implementation of the joint HNA tool together with NDMD staff.

The Vice Minister for Social Solidarity and the Head of NDMD both welcomed the proposal. The Vice Minister advised that International NGOs had been close and welcome partners since Independence but he had insufficient visibility and coordination of their programs The Vice Minister indicated that HNA project addressed his concern that, in the event of a disaster, “he needed to know who was doing what and he currently had no way of doing this”. AusAID is also planning to place two Australian Civilian Corps (ACC) staff in NDMD. The MTR encouraged the HPA and AusAID to coordinate closely on these activities. While the MTR team welcomes the proposed support for the Government, it is concerned to ensure that advisers are building capacity of NDMD staff to take on these responsibilities.

# 10. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and Reporting

The MTR assessed the overall M&E and reporting system established by HPA to be appropriate for the partnership. The system has three levels of reporting for response, DRR and DRM Capacity Building: Level 1 Individual Agency Activity Reports, Level 2 Collective Report eg Evaluations and Lessons Learnt reports, and Level 3 Reports which focus on the status and contribution of the overall partnership and involve all Partners - this MTR report. The MTR considered the reporting formats, steps and processes to be reasonably complicated and repetitive, and we believe that there is considerable scope to simplify the process and reduce the burden to all parties.

The anticipated level of M&E expertise inputs to the MTR team was curtailed for various reasons. Therefore in terms of assessing M&E practices at the activity level, we have attempted to make a judgement, where possible, on whether the M&E systems provide for relevant and understandable information, both qualitative and quantitative, in final reports to enable confidence that the activity is delivering outcomes. The MTR based assessments on selected documents from the HoA Response (for which we had all documents), some early reports from subsequent responses, as well as Year 1 DRR/DRM Capacity Building activity reports and the Level 2 reports. We also had discussions during our field visit on M&E systems. The MTR did not have access to Year 2 reports at this stage.

The MTR found that at the activity level for the HoA response, all HPA NGOs had M&E systems in place and operating, although they varied in sophistication. At one end of the spectrum, we found quite complex multilevel systems of data collection, analysis and reporting, some including the establishment of community level monitoring committees and some using innovative monitoring tools eg KAP surveys, and SMS surveys. At the other end were systems of regular visits and discussions by locally based Project Managers.

All final reporting included output reporting against Indicators. A few reports took this further to simple impact and outcome statements. Only a few of the reports mentioned compliance with international humanitarian standards. Reporting on cross-cutting issues was also variable, with gender reporting at a fairly basic level. Only one agency provided a detailed analysis of their focus on people with disabilities. Qualitative reporting on outcomes and impact was variable.

Document formatting was an issue for the MTR. The format of final reports for HoA was quite difficult to read particularly the covering Excel Sheets. Some HPA NGOs addressed this by adding narrative sections. Several ERIPs for HoA again were Excel Sheets which did not appear to add much information to the JERCP. More recent ERIPs have more useful detail, but the ERIPs role of updating the information in the JERCP with explanations and justification seems to have been lost. The JERCP is prepared appropriately with less than perfect information given the need to move quickly. Following the Typhoon Bopha response, it was agreed between partners that the format for the JERCP, ERIP and final reports should use a Word format. The MTR also believes that it would be useful to include in the ERIP and final report, a simple Changeframe with brief narrative justifications, which shows how targets and activities have changed during the project.

DRR and DRM Capacity Building reporting was equally variable. Again it was clear that agencies have adequate M&E systems in place, and of varying degrees of complexity. Some agencies mentioned innovative assessment tools being used such as KAP surveys and PCVA tools. The MTR found that the Activity level Year 1 interim report format tends to create a lengthy and at times repetitive report. We found that the format asks quite relevant questions, but several agencies focused mostly on outputs without reference to potential outcomes or drawing learning about what works and what doesn’t and why.

In terms of Level 2 Collective reporting, while the HPA NGOs conducted a joint evaluation of the HoA response, the evaluation of the Bopha Typhoon response was the first evaluation involving all partners, including AusAID. It has been agreed that the next evaluation to involve all Partners will consider the seventh response. There have been five responses to-date. For DRR and DRM Capacity Building, the Level 2 report provides a useful summary of collaboration and experience to-date. It would strengthen them to add experience at the impact level in future reports.

The MTR took an interest in cross-cutting issues, particularly gender and disabilities. The issue of disabilities is already addressed in Recommendation 9. Gender reporting was variable on the HoA response and in Year 1 DRR and DRM Capacity Building reports. With the introduction of the Gender Action Plan, the focus on gender within HPA has clearly increased. However, discussions with local female beneficiaries during the MTR field visits, suggested that many of the issues associated with fostering gender equality were still challenging. The MTR therefore recommends that HPA continue to develop its focus on gender, and prioritise reporting of targeted and mainstreaming activities.

The HoA Evaluation and the MTR both concluded that HPA should form an M&E working group to ensure that HPA aligns with AusAID’s M&E requirements. However, the MTR accepts the HPA NGO request that consideration of M&E should be included in the deliberations of existing fora rather than creating yet another structure and meeting.

It will be important, that space and time is given to M&E over the remaining period of the program. Resulting from the Civil Society Engagement Framework, AusAID NGO Section will be developing an agency-wide M&E Framework for Civil Society programs. It will be important that HPA is engaged with this process to ensure that the new framework properly reflects the special needs of the humanitarian sector.

***Recommendation 11****:* ExistingHPA fora include consideration ofM&E systems to ensure they are adequate and meet AusAID requirements

***Recommendation 12:*** HPA NGOs prioritise reporting on targeted and mainstreaming activities in Gender.

# 11. Looking Beyond the Current Phase

The HPA has one year remaining and AusAID and the HPA NGOs need to consider what form the AusAID NGO humanitarian relationship will take after June 2014. AusAID and the HPA NGOs have invested considerable resources, effort and time in establishing the HPA. It is the view of the MTR that, while issues remain to be resolved, there is a good base upon which to build another phase which would see further enhancement of the partnership.

A follow-on phase would also need to be structured to significantly reduce the transaction costs. The advantages and disadvantages of other emergency response models should be considered. The Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA), the DFID Rapid Response Fund, the ECHO Primary Emergency Decision mechanism, and the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) are all examples of response mechanisms that could be studied, as well as rapid response approaches from other sectors eg the private sector. Block grant models (Option 2 for HPA of the Review of the Periodic Funding Agreements for Disaster Risk Management) and consortium arrangements offer interesting features.

The MTR believes it would be prudent for AusAID to conduct an independent organisational analysis, with input from the HPA NGO partners, as part of the final evaluation of HPA and to inform the design of a follow-on program. The organisational review would:

* Assess the structure, functions and constraints of the current HPA.
* Assess what is working well and what is not.
* Assess what should remain and what can be improved.
* Revisit the transaction cost issues following the rationalisation process to ensure this is minimised in a new phase.
* Evaluate other models of rapid response mechanisms in the international humanitarian arena and in other sectors.
* Contribute to the evaluation process recommendations on the optimal structure and function of a subsequent HPA program.

In order to complete the proposed organisational analysis, conduct the required evaluation of the current phase and prepare a design for a subsequent phase, the MTR believes a twelve month extension of all components of the current HPA is required.

***Recommendation 13***: An independent organisational analysis be conducted as part of the evaluation of the existing phase and to inform the design of a successor program to HPA. The MTR further recommends that the Organisational Analysis be closely linked to or integrated with the proposed Rationalisation Exercise in Recommendation 1.

***Recommendation 14*:** A 12 month extension be agreed for all components of HPA.

# 12. Conclusions and Recommendations

The seven HPA Partners (AusAID and the HPA NGOs) have established an effective mechanism which provides life-saving assistance very quickly to people in great need in disaster situations, and supports communities to build resilience and reduce vulnerability. This aligns with the humanitarian action results of the AusAID 2011 Humanitarian Action Policy.

The HPA emergency response mechanism is evolving into a thorough and robust response process which, on the evidence available to the MTR, appears to be providing well targeted and appropriate emergency response initiatives.

On the basis of evidence provided to the MTR, DRR initiatives have resulted in improved planning and preparedness on the part of government and communities, and programs to identify hazards, address risks, reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to disasters. Equally the funding for DRM Capacity Building is being used by the HPA NGOs in practical ways to raise the capacity of their staff and in-country partners as well as other humanitarian actors. In addition DRR and DRM Capacity Building activities have fostered collaboration between the HPA NGO partners.

There are still areas of the HPA which require attention to ensure the partnership evolves to maximise the considerable investment by AusAID and the HPA NGOs over the first two years. The significant transaction costs experienced by AusAID and the HPA NGOs must be addressed quickly and effectively to create space and time for crucial areas of the partnership which include improved communication and coordination, robust dialogue on key humanitarian issues and opportunities for joint learning. Reporting format, steps and processes must improve to give partners confidence in program effectiveness.

AusAID and the HPA NGOs have made a significant investment in the HPA and this should not be wasted. The MTR believes that the partnership with the HPA NGOs has proven its value and that continuation and further improvement of the partnership is justified beyond the current phase. Concerted attention needs to be given to resolve issues in the current phase and to set the scene for an enhanced partnership after the current phase ends.

## Recommendations for the Current Phase

The MTR recommends that:

**Partnership**

***Recommendation 1***:HPA Partners take prompt action to commission a thorough Rationalisation Exercise to rationalise and simplify HPA governance systems, processes and management, with a particular focus on simplifying and improving the quality and relevance of reporting, for all Partners’ benefit. The MTR further recommends that the Rationalisation Exercise is closely linked to or integrated with the proposed Organisational Analysis at Recommendation 13.

***Recommendation 2***: A regular meeting between the HPA Director and the Manager Partnership and Programs be reinstated, with a set agenda and a clear objective of establishing appropriate regular communications and reducing transaction costs for all Partners.

***Recommendation* 3**: Clause 4.9 of the Head Agreements Schedule 2 relating to the 75%/25% allocation split be deleted.

***Recommendation 4***: AusAID develop effective handover and training processes for new staff working with HPA in the Humanitarian Branch.

***Recommendation 5:***All Partners work to develop concrete steps to further progress the partnership from a transactional relationship to a true strategic relationship.

***Recommendation 6:*** All Partners review and prioritise commitments associated with shared objectives in Schedule 2 of the Head Agreements, and revised as appropriate, with agreement to be formalised in a letter of agreement between all Partners. ACFID should be consulted in the review process to ensure their relationship with the HPA is reflected accurately and appropriately.

**Emergency Response**

***Recommendation 7*:** ANGOs continue to refine the Response Committee (RC) structure and process.

***Recommendation 8***: Proposed Guidelines for the activation of HPA for escalations in slow-onset and protracted disaster situations be considered by AusAID in decision-making and engagement with the HPA NGO Partners.

***Recommendation 9***: HPA NGOs to include a plan to address the needs of people with disabilities in the ERIP and in DRR and DRM Capacity Building proposals and reports.

**Disaster Risk Reduction**

***Recommendation 10:*** Responsibility for both technical oversight and activity management of HPA DRR activities within AusAID be transferred to the Disaster Prevention and Risk Reduction (DPRR) Section and reporting be enhanced to support this new relationship.

**Monitoring and Evaluation**

***Recommendation 11****:* ExistingHPA fora include consideration ofM&E systems to ensure they are adequate and meet AusAID requirements

***Recommendation 12:*** HPA NGOs prioritise reporting on targeted and mainstreaming activities in Gender.

## Recommendations – Preparing for Beyond the Current Phase

***Recommendation 13***: An independent organisational analysis be conducted as part of the evaluation of the existing phase and to inform the design of a successor program to HPA. The MTR further recommends that the Organisational Analysis be closely linked to or integrated with the proposed Rationalisation Exercise in Recommendation 1.

***Recommendation 14*:** A 12 month extension be agreed for all components of HPA.

# Annex 1 - Mid-Term Review Terms of Reference

**Terms of Reference  
Mid-Term Review  
of  
AusAID-NGO Humanitarian Partnership Agreements (HPA) 2011-2014  
*March 2013***

##### **INTRODUCTION**

AusAID has entered into partnership arrangements with six Australian NGOs to respond rapidly to disasters and to provide three-year funding for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Capacity Building initiatives. The six NGOs selected as HPA NGO partners are CARE Australia, Caritas Australia, Oxfam Australia, Plan International Australia, Save the Children Australia, and World Vision Australia.

The AusAID-NGO Humanitarian Partnership Agreements (HPA) 2011-2014 (AusAID Initiative INJ593) was established to strengthen the strategic humanitarian partnership between AusAID and the HPA NGO partners to respond effectively to disasters and to reduce vulnerability, enhance community resilience, and strengthen preparedness and response capacity. Since May 2011, the HPA has been activated for: two responses to rapid-onset disasters in Pakistan and the Philippines; two responses to sudden escalations of slow-onset/protracted crises requiring emergency life-saving assistance in the Horn of Africa and Sahel; programmed DRR initiatives; and programmed DRM Capacity Building initiatives.

In accordance with the HPA agreements, the HPA Partners (i.e. AusAID and the HPA NGOs) will implement a Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the HPA to assess progress and achievements to date of the new AusAID-NGO HPA partnership. Where measurable, the MTR will assess HPA’s contribution to strengthening Australian emergency responses and to reducing community vulnerability and building local preparedness and response capacity.

The MTR is intended to provide a ‘snapshot’ of HPA progress, issues and constraints to date. The MTR will not involve an in-depth, across-the-board evaluation – this will take place towards the end of HPA’s initial three-year life.

The proposed MTR methodology includes a rapid desk review of relevant documentation, consultations with stakeholders, and (if indicated) targeted field trips. The MTR will be jointly managed by the AusAID HPA Manager and the HPA Director.

**The** **Terms of Reference Scope will be fine-tuned and detailed review methodology and prioritised work-plan developed by the Review Team in consultation with, and for agreement by, the HPA Partners. OBJECTIVES OF THE REVIEW**

* Review the achievement of a **strengthened, institutionalised and accountable humanitarian partnership** between the HPA partners.
* Review the achievement of the **HPA anticipated outcomes**:
* Quick turn-around of emergency response funding.
* Better decision making and more flexible, targeted, coordinated and accountable emergency responses.
* Reduced community vulnerability and enhanced resilience to disasters.
* Strengthened DRM capacities and systems of HPA NGOs and their in-country NGO partners.

##### **SCOPE OF REVIEW**

3.1 The Scope of the MTR will cover the following aspects of the HPA mechanism:

* Partnership Arrangements
* Emergency Response
* Disaster Risk Reduction
* Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building
* Monitoring and Evaluation
* Compliance/Consistency with AusAID Policies and Humanitarian Guiding Principles

3.2 The MTR will use as a reference the partnership commitments and performance indicators listed against the five HPA Shared Objectives outlined in the HPA Head Agreements at Section 3 Agenda for Collaboration, and detailed at Annex A of Schedule 2.

3.3 The MTR will use as a reference/evaluation point of reference DRAFT AusAID Humanitarian Quality Criteria (currently under development as part of a new AusAID humanitarian performance assessment framework) that are adapted from guidelines in the ALNAP publication *‘Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria’*.

3.4 **It is acknowledged that for some HPA activities, impacts (as defined by OECD-DAC as the wider effect and longer-term outcome of an intervention) - and even outcomes – may be difficult to measure given the HPA is still relatively new. The Scope, methodology, and work-plan will reflect these constraints.**

***Partnership Arrangements***

***Is strengthened collaboration contributing to enhanced efficiencies, including reduced transaction costs, improved practices, processes and accountability?***

3.5 Assess the extent that new strategic engagement, collaborative mechanisms and procedures and pooling of collective HPA Partner resources have resulted in efficiencies and reduced transaction costs in the delivery of AusAID-NGO emergency response, DRR and DRM Capacity Building activities. This may include review of:

1. the timeliness and efficiency of the emergency response funding process, e.g. is it an improvement on the previous Periodic Funding Agreement for Disaster Risk Management (PFA) mechanism.
2. **is the HPA achieving quick turn-around of emergency response funding (the target being 48-72 hours from the call to HPA NGOs for proposals to confirmation of funding decision).** *(HPA Shared Objective 1)*;
3. the tranche funding process for DRR initiatives and DRM Capacity Building initiatives *(HPA Shared Objective 2*);
4. institutional governance arrangements and protocols of the HPA including management arrangements, the role and responsibilities of the HPA Director, the independent Director model versus a secretariat model, and the level of HPA Partner staffing inputs required to manage the HPA.

3.6 Assess the level of compliance of HPA Partners with the Partnership Commitments and key Partnership Performance Indicators detailed at Annex A of Schedule 2 to the HPA Head Agreements.

3.7 Assess the extent that the HPA commitment to continuous improvement has been followed in practice. *(HPA Shared Objective 3)*

3.8 Assess the quality and extent of HPA Partner collaboration in humanitarian policy dialogue and formulation, research, training, and advocacy *(HPA Shared Objective 3).*

3.9 Review the interface between HPA and the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) Humanitarian Reference Group (HRG), and accountability to the humanitarian sector. *(HPA Shared Objective 3)*

3.10 Review HPA joint visibility plan and assess its implementation and effectiveness. *(HPA Shared Objective 5)*

* 1. Review the three-year initial duration of the HPA and consider if there is a case for extension of the initial term.
  2. Review the structure of the program to assess the congruence of the elements of the program.

***Emergency Response***

***Is strengthened collaboration contributing to quicker, more appropriate and coordinated emergency assistance on the ground?***

* 1. Review selected HPA emergency response activities to date to assess timeliness, appropriateness and effectiveness of assistance provided. **The MTR should provide an assessment (based on evidence available) as to whether HPA is contributing, or is likely to contribute to, the outcome of improved decision making and more flexible, targeted, coordinated and accountable responses*.*** *(HPA Shared Objective 1)*

3.13 An evaluation of the HPA response to Typhoon Bopha in the Philippines in late 2012 will be conducted separately from the MTR as a standalone joint HPA evaluation. **For the purposes of the MTR, the Typhoon Bopha evaluation to be conducted in the same timeframe as the MTR will be the primary case study for provision of evidence of an emergency response under the HPA mechanism.** It will be necessary to appropriately align the Terms of Reference, planning, methodology and sequencing of the two exercises to ensure that the Philippines response evaluation informs the final MTR report, while ensuring that the integrity of each evaluation is not compromised.

3.14 In light of the flexible use of the HPA to support NGO emergency life-saving assistance in response to sudden/unforeseen escalations of slow-onset and protracted crises in the Horn of Africa and Sahel, recommend guidelines for future similar rapid scale-up events. *(Refer Limitations to the MTR Scope below.)*

***Disaster Risk Reduction***

***Is HPA contributing to safer communities on the ground?***

* 1. Review selected HPA DRR activities to assess appropriateness of targeting, design and implementation. **The MTR should provide an assessment (based on evidence available) as to whether HPA is contributing, or is likely to contribute to, the outcome of reduced community vulnerability and enhanced resilience to disasters.** *(HPA Shared Objective 2)*
  2. Identify any issues and constraints and make recommendations for improvements*.*

***Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building***

***Is HPA contributing to strengthened capability on the ground?***

* 1. Review selected HPA DRM Capacity Building activities to assess appropriateness of targeting, design and implementation. **The MTR should provide an assessment (based on evidence available) as to whether HPA is contributing, or is likely to contribute to, the outcome of strengthened DRM capacities and systems of HPA NGOs and their in-country partners.** *(HPA Shared Objective 3)*
  2. Identify any issues and constraints and make recommendations for improvements.

***Monitoring and Evaluation***

***Are HPA M&E arrangements appropriate, efficient and effective?***

* 1. Review HPA monitoring and evaluation arrangements (including performance indicators) and their implementation at the individual activity, collective activities, and partnership level, as well as the contribution to AusAID higher-level humanitarian performance indicators in *An Effective Aid Program for Australia: a Comprehensive Aid Policy Framework (CAPF)*, and new draft AusAID humanitarian performance assessment framework *(HPA Shared Objective 4)*
  2. Review HPA reporting requirements and specifications and a representative sample of reporting provided by NGO partners. The MTR should consider reporting formats, user-friendliness and level of detail required; the extent that the reporting focuses on outcomes; measurability; and consistency with AusAID higher-level humanitarian performance indicators in *An Effective Aid Program for Australia: a Comprehensive Aid Policy Framework (CAPF),* and new AusAID humanitarian performance assessment framework. *(HPA Shared Objective 4)*

***Compliance/Consistency with AusAID Policies and Humanitarian Guiding Principles***

* 1. The MTR will review HPA partnership and HPA emergency response, DRR and DRM Capacity Building activities for consistency with humanitarian guiding principles and best practice; as well as:
* compliance with relevant AusAID policies in place when HPA commenced, including:
* *Investing in a Safer Future – A Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for the Australian aid program, June 2009*;
* *Gender equality in Australia’s aid program – why and how*; and
* *Development for All – Towards a disability-inclusive Australian aid program 2009-2014*; and
* consistency with relevant AusAID policies promulgated since the commencement of HPA, including:
* *Australia’s 2011 Humanitarian Action Policy*;
* *An Effective Aid Program for Australia: a Comprehensive Aid Policy Framework (CAPF)*;
* *The Environment Management Guide for Australia’s Aid Program 2012 – AusAID’s Environment Management System*;
* *AusAID Civil Society Engagement Framework, June 2012*;
* *AusAID Transparency Charter*; *and*
* *AusAID Visibility and recognition guidelines for NGOs.*

***Limitations to the MTR Scope***

* 1. The Scope of the MTR does not include comparison of HPA with other delivery/funding mechanisms or channels available to AusAID for rapid-onset emergency responses.
  2. The Scope of the MTR does not include consideration of changing the design parameters of the HPA mechanism.
  3. The Scope of the MTR is constrained in terms of capacity to effectively measure the impact (i.e. the wider effect and longer-term outcome) given the HPA is relatively new.

##### **METHODOLOGY AND WORK-PLAN**

In consultation with the Team Leader, the HPA Partners will develop a detailed review methodology and prioritised work-plan. The Team Leader will write the work-plan.

##### **DOCUMENTATION REVIEW**

Prior to stakeholder consultations and field/site visits, the Team Leader will undertake a rapid review of reports and other documents related to the design, management, and operation of the HPA. The Team Leader will consult the AusAID and NGO Team members as appropriate during this process, including discussion of findings and issues arising. The Team Leader will prepare a brief discussion paper summarising design, operational and management strengths, weaknesses and issues to inform subsequent stakeholder consultations and Review considerations.

Documentation will be collated and provided by the HPA Director and the AusAID HPA Manager. Documentation may include, but is not limited to:

* Final Report of the Independent Review of the Periodic Funding Agreement for Disaster Risk Management (PFA) *(the PFA being HPA’s predecessor);*
* AusAID-NGO Humanitarian Partnership Agreements (HPA) Framework;
* HPA Head Agreement Schedule 2 (generic example);
* Joint Emergency Response Concept Papers (JERCP);
* Emergency Response Implementation Plans (ERIP);
* NGO reports of HPA emergency response activities (HPA Head Agreement clause 4.35 refers);
* Collective lessons learned reports on emergency responses (clause 4.36 refers);
* DRR and DRM Capacity Building design/implementation documents, including work-plans;
* Reports of programmed DRR and DRM Capacity Building activities (clause 4.37 refers);
* Report of HPA Light Touch Annual Review 29 August 2012;
* HPA Work-plan;
* HPA Steering Committee minutes;
* HPA Director position description;
* Country strategies; and
* AusAID policy documents.

##### **STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION**

The MTR will involve consultation with a range of key stakeholders based in Australia and overseas. The indicative list of stakeholders to be consulted is as follows:

* AusAID Desks and Posts that have been involved with the HPA (as nominated by the AusAID HPA Manager);
* AusAID Humanitarian Policy and Partnerships Section (HPPS);
* AusAID Disaster Prevention and Risk Reduction Section (DPRR);
* all HPA partner organisations, including field staff;
* HPA Director, Chair and Vice Chair;
* Former Interim HPA Director and former HPA Chair;
* HPA NGO CEOs;
* AusAID Humanitarian Coordinator and/or Assistant Director General Humanitarian Preparedness and Response Branch; and
* a member of the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) nominated by the HPA Director.

The consultation process will be flexible and involve methodologies including face-to-face interviews, video and teleconferences, and email. The AusAID HPA Manager and the HPA Director will facilitate stakeholder consultation arrangements.

##### **FIELD VISITS**

Subject to determination by the HPA Partners, the MTR Team may be required to undertake targeted field visits to review (in accordance with the approach detailed in section 3. Scope of Review above) selected:

* Programmed DRR activities; and
* Programmed DRM Capacity Building activities.

The AusAID HPA manager and the HPA Director will facilitate field visits.

The MTR will not include a field visit to HPA emergency response activities. For MTR purposes, a separate evaluation of the 2012 HPA response to Typhoon Bopha in the Philippines will provide field evidence of an HPA emergency response.

##### **PERSONNEL, COORDINATION AND SUPERVISION**

The MTR will be undertaken by a three-person Team comprising:

* a Team Leader (an independent consultant to be endorsed by all HPA NGOs and contracted by AusAID);
* a HPA NGO representative (nominated by HPA NGOs); and
* an AusAID HPA program officer.

**The HPA NGOs have indicated they can provide up to 10 days input. This will need to be factored into MTR planning considerations.**

In addition to the core MTR Team, the HPA NGOs will appoint a small Reference Group of NGO partner representatives (not all NGO partners need to be represented on the Reference Group). The Reference Group will assist the MTR Team by providing technical advice and acting as a sounding board.

***Core Team Skills***

* Experience and expertise in the monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian emergency responses and/or humanitarian assistance programs;
* Good understanding of DRR and DRM Capacity Building;
* Good understanding of NGO activities and administration practices;
* Demonstrated understanding of AusAID’s humanitarian and emergencies programs and relevant policies; and
* Understanding of the dynamics and practice of government-NGO partnerships

***Team Responsibilities***

The **Team Leader** will be responsible for the agreed work-plan, the Documentation Review, leading stakeholder consultations, preparation of the Aide Memoire and MTR Report; coordination of Team inputs, and quality assurance on all outputs.

The **HPA NGO representative** will provide the NGO humanitarian, technical and management perspective and act as liaison with the Reference Group if required.

The **AusAID HPA program officer** will provide the AusAID humanitarian policy and management perspective, and facilitate consultations within AusAID.

***Coordination and Supervision***

The AusAID HPA Manager and the HPA Director will be jointly responsible for coordination and supervision of the MTR. The HPA Partners will provide support for logistics arrangements, e.g. in-country interviews and site visits where required, and according to capacity, availability and comparative advantage. The Team Leader will report jointly to the AusAID HPA Manager and the HPA Director.

The Reference Group will have the primary liaison role between the MTR Team and the HPA NGOs. The main steering committee representatives of each HPA NGO will be consulted if agreement is required by all HPA NGOs on a specific issue.

##### **OUTPUTS AND REPORTING**

The MTR will produce the following outputs:

* A brief Aide Memoire on key preliminary findings and recommendations at the conclusion of stakeholder consultations and field visits. The Team will present the Aide Memoire to AusAID and HPA NGO partners by tele/videoconference.
* A Draft MTR Report (no more than 20 pages plus annexes.) to specifications to be agreed by the HPA Partners prior to commencement of the MTR.
* A Final MTR Report addressing HPA Partner feedback and approved by all HPA NGOs, for final approval by AusAID.

##### **WORKPLAN AND TIMEFRAME (final Workplan timing slipped to accommodate the Typhoon Bopha Evaluation)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Activity** | **Outputs** | **Indicative Timeframe** | **Indicative Dates** |
| Planning Workshop   * to draw out and prioritise the key ideas and issues at partnership and component level that the MTR needs to investigate; * to agree on the best approaches to deal with each issue. * Agree on the final workplan. * Agree on the final TOR. | * A list of high priority issues at partnership and component level. * Questions to pursue these issues. * Agreed workplan * Agreed TOR. | 1 day | 15 March 2013 |
| * Desk Review of documentation | * Triangulation with Workshop outcomes * Questionnaire as a basis for consultations. | 4 days | During week of 18-22 March |
| * Questionnaire to HPA partners in preparation for stakeholder consultations. |  |  | 21 March |
| * Stakeholder consultations including, meetings with CEOs of HPA partners in Melbourne | * Summary of key issues raised. | 4 days | 25 -28 March 2013 |
| * Stakeholder consultations including meeting HPA partner CEO in Sydney. | * Summary of key issues raised. | 1 day | 3 April 2013 |
| * Stakeholder consultations, including AusAID (including Posts), HPA Partner and ACFID in Canberra | * Summary of key issues raised. | 2 days | During weeks of 18 March and 3 April, as appropriate |
| * Field visit to DRR and DRM projects in Timor Leste and Indonesia | * Summary of findings for input to the Aide Memoire and Draft Report. | 9 days | 7 – 15 April 2013 |
| * Meet with Bopha team, face to face or by teleconference. | * Bopha input to the MTR Aide Memoire | 1 day | During the week of 22-26 April |
| * Preparation of Aide Memoire, incorporating findings of Bopha Evaluation team. | * Draft Aide Memoire | 2 days | During the period 17-26 April |
| * Consideration of Aide Memoire to HPA Partners | * Feedback | 2 days | 29 April-1 May |
| * Teleconference with HPA partners at which feedback will be provided on the Aide Memoire | * Feedback on the Aide Memoire to TL | 1 day | 1 May |
| * Finalise Aide Memoire and Preparation of Draft Report | * Draft Report | 4 days | 2-8 May |
| * Consideration of Draft Report by HPA partners (through the HPA Director and AusAID HPA Manager) | * Feedback | 14 days | 8-21May |
| * Teleconference with Team/HPA Partners at which feedback from all Partners is provided | * Feedback provided to the TL | 1 day | 22 May |
| * Final Draft Report revised on the basis of feedback. | * Revised Final Draft Report | 2 days | 23-24 May |
| * Revised final report resubmitted to HPA Partners(through the HPA Director and AusAID HPA Management) for final look | * Final clearance comments by email. |  | 24-28 May |
| * Final Report delivered to AusAID for approval | * Final report |  | 30 May |

##### **BUDGET AND COST-SHARING**

AusAID will fund all costs associated with engagement and participation of the consultant Evaluation Team Leader. AusAID will cover travel costs of the HPA NGO Team member. HPA NGOs will offer some in-country logistical support and absorb limited local costs in-country such as lo transport in the context of field visits.

# Annex 2 – HPA Activation Details Chart

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Response** | **Disaster Occurred** | **AusAID**  **Activation** | **HPA/AusAID**  **Teleconference** | **Response committee** | **JERCP**  **Submitted** | **JERCP**  **Agreed** | **Grant**  **Processed** | **ERIP Submitted (deadline)** |
| HoA | Ongoing, escalation late 2010/early 2011 | 20 July 2011  (discussion over 2 days prior when agencies told it may but no conf.) | 21 July 2011 | 22 July 2011 | 22 July 2011 | 25 July 2011 | CARE: 3 Aug 11 | CARE: 16 September 2011 |
| OXFAM: 3 Aug 11 | OXFAM: October 3rd, 2011 |
| CARITAS: August 4th 2011 | CARITAS: 28/9/2011 |
| PLAN: 3rd August 2011 | PLAN: 28th September 2011 |
| SAVE: 3 August 2011 | SAVE: 27 September 2011 |
| WORLD VISION: 1 Aug 11 | WORLD VISION: 29th September 2011 |
| Pakistan | (10 Aug 11 first wave)  14 Sept 2011 – main event (dates taken from UN RRP) | 16 Sept 2011 | 16 Sept 2011 (approx.)  Call came late Friday afternoon.  Subsequent discussion about the timeline, and AusAID agreement to extend the deadline to the Tuesday (after holiday weekend). | 20 Sept 11 | 20 Sept 2011 | 21 Sept 2011 (agencies informed),  26 September 2011 official AusAID confirmation | 23 September 2011 | OXFAM: November 21, 2011 |
| SAVE: 21 November 2011 |
| PLAN: 21st November 2011 |
| Niger Sahel | Ongoing, escalation early 2012 | 13 April 2012 | 17 April 2012 | 18 April 2012 | 18 April 2012 | 27 April 2012 | 9 May 2012 | 26 June 2012 |
| Typhoon Bopha | 4/5 Dec 2012 | 6 Dec 2012 | 10 Dec 2012 | 10 Dec 2012 | 10 Dec 2012 | 13 Dec 2012 | 13 Dec 2012 | 13 Feb 2013 |
| Syria | Ongoing | 29 April 2013 | 29 April 2013 | 2 May 2013 | 2 May 2013 | 6 May 2013 | 9 May 2013 |  |

# Annex 3 - Head Agreements Schedule 2 Commitments

It was agreed at the 30 May 2013 Teleconference that the MTR would recommend that Partners review the Schedule 2 commitments in order to prioritise them and where appropriate, revise or delete them to reflect the experience of the first two years of HPA. This could be formalised in a letter of agreement between all Partners. This is now Recommendation 6. It is important that ACFID is consulted in these negotiations, to ensure their relationship with HPA is reflected accurately and appropriately.

The MTR found that the following commitments had either not been fulfilled or only partly fulfilled.

**Schedule 2 Comment on Commitment**

No.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 1.2 | Reporting of emergency response initiatives does not always include reference to international standards eg Sphere, GHD, etc etc. |
| 1.3 | Reporting needs to better reflect how HPA NGOS are upholding and protecting the rights of the most vulnerable particularly people with disabilities. |
| 1.4 | Reporting on environmental impact needs to be strengthened. |
| 1.5 | Compliance with timing requirement is acceptable, and HPA processes are included in SOPs. |
| 2.1 | Regular dialogue on DRR has not occurred. MTR recommendation of transfer of management of DRR to DPRR Section of AusAID addresses this. |
| 2.4 | Reporting needs to better reflect how HPA NGOS are upholding and protecting the rights of the most vulnerable particularly people with disabilities, and it is not clear to the MTR that HPA NGOs are consulting with ACFID Disability and Development Working Group. |
| 2.5 | It is not clear to the MTR from reporting, that DRR initiatives conform to AusAID environmental guidelines. |
| 3.2 | The proposed training and event calendar has not been developed and implemented. |
| 3.5 | As far as the MTR is aware, details of humanitarian points of contact and interlocutors at Post etc, has not systematically been provided by AusAID. |
| 4.3 | The MTR did not find the level of joint learning, particularly involving AusAID, suggest by this clause. Discussions did not indicate that two ACFID-HRG AusAID seminars were held each year. |
| 4.4 | Investigations suggest that only one Desk Top emergency simulation was held at the beginning of HPA. Annual desktop exercises are required by this clause. |
| 4.6 | AusAID has not been providing a generic verbal debriefing on the process and funding decision. Given that proposal selection is conducted by the HPA NGO Response Committee and no longer by AusAID, this clause does not appear to be necessary. |
| 5.1 | The Joint Visibility Plan has not been finalised and implemented. |
| 5.2 | It is not clear that collective contributions data has been provided to OCHA. |

# Annex 4 – Escalations in Slow-Onset and Protracted Disaster Situations Proposal:

**Background**

HPA was designed as the formal mechanism for engagement between AusAID and the selected Australian NGOs in ***rapid-onset*** humanitarian emergency responses. However, of the 5 activations of HPA since June 2011, 3 have been responses to escalations in slow-onset or protracted disaster situations.

From the documentation relating to decisions to support the three escalations, certain themes are apparent.

* Horn of Africa - a sudden and significant increase in malnutrition with large populations unable to obtain minimum nutritional requirements as defined by international standards, with high levels of malnutrition among children, exceeding 30%, and large numbers of IDPs and refugees in need of assistance.
* Niger/Sahel - weather conditions changing unexpectedly, as in the Niger/Sahel, where the normal cyclical food and nutrition crisis came early and hit harder than expected, with large populations (15.5 million in Niger) without adequate food and 8 million in needs of urgent emergency assistance. Large numbers of IDPs and refugees in need of assistance.
* Syria - large numbers of IDPs and refugees in need of assistance.

Themes include a sudden increase in the scale or severity of the disaster which was recognised by the international community as requiring an intervention.

**Guidelines**

AusAID will respond to crises in accordance with the criteria set out on page 43 of the 2011 Humanitarian Action Policy.  This includes consideration of Australian Government staff and experts, United Nations, non-government organisation, multilateral and other bilateral partners.  The best option or mix of options will be used.

Consideration of the activation of HPA in the event of an escalation in a slow-onset or protracted emergency situation will take place in the context of dialogue between all HPA Partners and be based on international standards and indicators of humanitarian need.

The baseline requirement for a subsequent decision to activate HPA is recognition by the international community that there is an escalation requiring an intervention to provide urgent emergency life-saving assistance and that HPA is assessed as best placed to respond. Examples of sudden escalations requiring emergency life-saving assistance include:

1. Where there is a sudden spike in humanitarian issues in one or more sectors (eg a sudden cholera outbreak in refugee camp).
2. Where the numbers of people displaced reaches or suddenly increases to very significant numbers in the context of the disaster situation.
3. Where the conditions for displaced people suddenly worsen or reach a point of being acute against international humanitarian standards.

The HPA emergency activation process would need to be flexible in responding to escalations of slow-onset and protracted situations:

1. that the timeframe of activation processes for escalations in slow onset or protracted disasters be agreed in the context of each response activation, in order to ensure that HPA NGOs have the opportunity to adequately assess the ongoing situation on the ground, eg local governments responses to-date and their capacity to deal with the escalation, what other donors and INGOs are active; the status of the UN agencies and clusters etc.
2. flexibility surrounding sectors may be required. While the response would include sectors focused on immediate needs to save lives and reduce suffering caused by the escalation, approaches should be included to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to the ongoing protracted disaster. This may include protection.

The MTR recommends that AusAID and the HPA NGOs consider these concepts when considering activating HPA for the escalations in slow-onset and protracted disaster situations.

# Annex 5 – List of Stakeholders Interviewed

**Save the Children Australia**

Scott Gilbert, Director, Programs and Humanitarian Response

Stephen McDonald, Head of Humanitarian Programs

Sarah Ireland, Humanitarian Manager

David Sims, Humanitarian Manager

Sophie Boucaut, Programs Support Coordinator – Special Projects

**World Vision Australia**

Tim Costello, CEO

Anthea Spinks, Head, Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs/HPA Chair

Kaitrin Both, Programme Operations Manager, Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs

Karen Alexander, Programme Operations Coordinator, Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs

**Oxfam Australia**

Alexia Huxley, Director, International Programs, previously acting CEO.

Meg Quartermaine, HSU Manager

Richard Simpson, Humanitarian Coordinator, Africa

Emma Renowden, Disaster Risk Reduction Coordinator

**Plan International Australia**

Ian Wishart, CEO

Dave Husy, Program Director

Rohan Kent, Disaster Risk Manager/HPA Vice Chair

Suresh Pokharel – DRR Program Manager

Berhe Tewoldeberhan – Senior Food Security Advisor

**CARE Australia**

Julia Newton-Howes, CEO

Adam Poulter, Manager, Humanitarian Emergency Response Unit.

Peter Leahy, Principle Executive, International Programmes

Jackie Symonds, Senior Program Officer - Humanitarian Emergency Response Unit

Stephan Knollmayer, Senior Program Officer, Humanitarian Emergency Response Unit

Laura Baines - WASH Program Officer, Humanitarian Emergency Response Unit

**Caritas Australia**

Jack de Groot, CEO

Jamieson Davies, International Programs Manager

Melville Fernandez, Group Leader, Humanitarian Emergencies Group

Richard Forsythe, Program Coordinator, Humanitarian Emergencies Group, Asia

**HPA**

Richard Young – former Chair of HPA

Helen Horn – HPA Director

**Australian Council for International Development (ACFID)**

Joanne Lindner, Head of Policy – Aid and Development Effectiveness

Katherine Sciglitano, Advocacy Adviser – Humanitarian Coordinator

**Act for Peace**

Ben Fraser, International Programs Coordinator

**AusAID Canberra**

Alan March – Assistant Director General, Humanitarian Preparedness and Response

**Humanitarian Emergency Response, Operations & Preparedness Section (HERO&P)**

Thanh Le – Director, HERO&P

Jonathon Ball, Director, HERO&P

Ray Bojczuk, Emergency Operations Manager

Allanah Kjellgren, Manager, Partnerships and Programs

Monica Zajac, Acting Manager, Partnerships and Programs

Jemma Johnson, Humanitarian Emergency Response, Operations & Preparedness Section

**Disaster Prevention and Risk Reduction Section (DPRR)**

Hugh McLeman – Director

Grant Morrison –Manager

Ishara Davey – Program Officer

**Humanitarian Policy and Partnerships**

Claire James – Policy/Program Manager

Chantelle Boland – Senior Program Officer

**East Africa 1 Section**

Penny Dennis – Africa Humanitarian Program Manager

Niamh Dobson – Senior Program Officer

**NGO Policy and Programs Section**

Katherine West – Senior Project Manager

Rachel Rawlings – Program Manager, ANCP

**AusAID Posts (by phone)**

**Islamabad Post**

Andrew MacKee – First Secretary, AusAID

Mahvash Zafar – Program Officer

**Port Moresby Post**

Isolde Macatol – Second Secretary, Disaster Management

Eileen Turare – Senior Program Officer

**Visit to Timor Leste**

**Meeting with AusAID Post**

Mr Vincent Ashcroft – Minister Counsellor

Ms Neryl Lewis – Counsellor

Mr Pedro Aquino – Humanitarian Focal Point

**Meeting with Vice Minister, Ministry of Social Solidarity**

Jacinto Rigoberto, Vice Minister of Social Solidarity

Francisco do Rosario, Director of National Directorate for Disaster Management (NDMD)

Amandio Freitas, Director of Social Assistance and Cohesion

Lourenco Cosme Xavier, Chief of Disaster Operation Centre (DOC), NDMD, MSS

Frank Elvin, Adviser to the Minister of Social Solidarity

**CARE Timor-Leste Country Office**

Geraldine Zwack - Country Director

Bharath Mohan - Assistant Country Director – Programs

Mirko Arias Gamez - Program Manager, Climate Change and Food Security

Guilia Secondini – Consultant for Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping

**World Vision Timor-Leste Country Office**

Samaresh Nayak - Country Director

Abilo Marques - HEA Point person

**PLAN Timor-Leste Country Office**

Terence McCaughan - Country Director

**Caritas Timor-Leste Country Office**

Tom Nicholas - Country Director

**Oxfam Timor-Leste Country Office**

Rufino Da Costa simoes - RiC/WASH Coordinator

**Save the Children Timor-Leste Country Office**

Joydip Ghosh – Health Program Manager

Georgia Noy – Country Director

**Field Trip to Manufahi**

Livia Dacosta - Senior Health Officer – Manufahi

Justino Dasilva - Child Rights, Protection and Governance Program Manager

Fatima (Lala) Soares – Child Rights, Protection and Governance Senior Coordinator

Januario Rodrigues – DRR and Emergencies Officer

Rosalino Martins – Senior Health Officer – Ainaro

Fransisco Dacosta - operations assistant - Manufahi

Armenio  Carvalho - operations assistant – Ainaro

Jack French – DRR and Emergencies Officer (Australian volunteer)

**Carbulau (community first visited):**

Alberto Dacosta - Chief of village

Mr Paulino  Cardoso - School teacher

Alberto Sarmento - CHC manager, Same

Mrs. Albertina Da Costa

Mr. Fransisco - Cultural leader (part of Suco council)

Marciana Dacosta - Child Club representative:

Nafofila (Ainaro based): drama team

**Sesurai (evacuation drill with children)**

Joao Bosco - Chief of village

Mr. Joao Noronha - School principal/ teacher

Mrs. Etelvina Da Costa - PSF (health worker volunteer)

Mr. Arantes Isaac Sarmento - District Administrator Manufahi

**Indonesia**

**AusAID Indonesia Country Post**

Mr Trevor Dhu - Director, Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction

Ben O’Sullivan - Manager, Disaster Response Unit (DRU)

Mr Jeong Park - Disaster Management Adviser, Disaster Response Unit (DRU)

Ms Fenni Rum - Program Officer, Disaster Response Unit (DRU)

**World Vision Indonesia Country Office**Billy Sumuan - Humanitarian & Emergency Affairs Director

Ita Balanda - HEA Program Development Coordinator at WV Indonesia

**Plan Indonesia Country Office**

Mr Wahyu Kuncoro - Interim DRM Program Manager

Mr. Nono Sumarsono - Head of Program Department

Mrs. Vanda Lengkong - Interim DRM Specialist for South East Asia Region

**CARE Indonesia Country Office**

Hadi Sutjipto - Support Unit Manager

**Oxfam Indonesia Country Office**

Nanang Subana Dirja - RiC Lead

Ms. Zubaedah - OAU Representative

**Field Visit with Oxfam Indonesia**

**Meeting with District Disaster Committee (BPBD):**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| No | Name | M/F | Organization |
| 1 | Petrasa Wacana | M | Oxfam Indonesia (Project Officer) |
| 2 | Ade Reno Sudiarno | M | Oxfam Indonesia (DRR Coordinator) |
| 3 | Meilyasina Tarigan | F | Oxfam Indonesia (MEL Officer) |
| 4 | Armen Rangkuti | M | BPBD Padang Pariaman District (Staff Preparedness Devision) |
| 5 | Budi Fitra | M | PKBI Sumatera Barat (Staff Partner) |
| 6 | Hasnul Amri | M | PKBI Sumatera Barat (Staff Partner) |
| 7 | Firdaus Jamal | M | PKBI Sumatera Barat (Director Partner) |
| 8 | Nusirwan | M | BPBD Padang Pariaman District (Head of Preparedness Division) |
| 9 | Asriadi | M | BPBD Padang Pariaman District (Staff Preparedness Division) |
| 10 | Syafriment | M | BPBD Padang Pariaman District (Secretary of BPBD) |
| 11 | Zainir Koto | M | BPBD Padang Pariaman District (Head Of BPBD) |

**Meeting Sunur Community:**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| No | Name | M/F | Organization |
| 1 | Petrasa Wacana | M | Oxfam Indonesia (Project Officer) |
| 2 | Ade Reno Sudiarno | M | Oxfam Indonesia (DRR Coordinator) |
| 3 | Meilayasina Tarigan | F | Oxfam Indonesia (MEL Officer) |
| 4 | Armen Rangkuti | M | BPBD Padang Pariaman District (Staff Preparedness Devision) |
| 5 | M. Ridho | M | PKBI Sumatera Barat (Staff of Partner) |
| 6 | Firdaus Jamal | M | PKBI Sumatera Barat (Director of Partner) |
| 7 | Budi Fitra | M | PKBI Sumatera Barat (Staff of Partner) |
| 8 | Hasnul Amri | M | PKBI Sumatera Barat (Staff of Partner) |
| 9 | Anuardi | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 10 | Suhmini | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 11 | Mahyulis | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 12 | Sudirman | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 13 | Didi Dasman | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 14 | Sudirman | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 15 | Asni Efendi | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 16 | Zakilman | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 17 | Perianto | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 18 | Zainal | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 19 | Risfaldi | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 20 | Saparudim | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 21 | Rita Zulhana | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 22 | Yuli Warnita | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 23 | Solfamimarni | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 24 | Dahlia | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 25 | Yulimar | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 26 | Dina Septiani | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 27 | Leni Marlina | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 28 | Khairul Anwar | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 29 | Mardiana | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 30 | Meldiana | F | PKBI Sumatra Barat, Project Manager |

**Meeting with Canduang**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| No | Name | M/F | Organization |
| 1 | Petrasa Wacana | M | Oxfam Indonesia (Project Officer) |
| 2 | Ade Reno Sudiarno | M | Oxfam Indonesia (DRR Cordinator) |
| 3 | Meilayasina Tarigan | F | Oxfam Indonesia (MEL Officer) |
| 4 | Imran Sarimudanas | M | Jemari Sakato (Project Manager of partner ) |
| 5 | Metrizal | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 6 | Rinaldi | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 7 | Ismail Marzuki | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 8 | Surya Dinata | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 9 | Syafriadi | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 10 | Adikus Endang | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 11 | Rizky Elia | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 12 | Liska Martina | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 13 | Meldiana | F | PKBI Sumatra Barat (Project Manager of partner) |
| 14 | Gita Sherliani | F | Jemari Sakato (Finance Officer of partner) |
| 15 | Yumnul Fauza | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 16 | Mega Lestari | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 17 | Elfa Miyantri | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 18 | Wasnelia | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 19 | Ahmad Edy | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 20 | Mulyandri | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 21 | Afrizal | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 22 | Abdul Rahman | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 23 | Eriyanto | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 24 | Ariyan Saputra | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 25 | Mazardi | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 26 | Atrius | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 27 | Asizal | M | Village Preparedness Team |
| 28 | Syafrimet Aziz | M | Jemari Sakato (Director of partner) |
| 29 | Fetmi R | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 30 | Mayulis | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 31 | Yuliandra Liza | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 32 | Ona Yulfita | F | Village Preparedness Team |
| 33 | Nismar | F | Village Preparedness Team |

1. Independent Review of the Periodic Funding Agreements December 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Final Head Agreement, Schedule 2, Clause 4.39 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Investing in a Safer Future: A Disaster Risk Reduction policy for the Australian Aid Program June 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Provided by the Humanitarian Branch of AusAID. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Provided by the Humanitarian Branch of AusAID [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The Independent Review of the Periodic Funding Agreements for Disaster Reduction page [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The Independent Review of the Periodic Funding Agreements for Disaster Reduction page [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. AusAID-NGO Humanitarian Partnership Agreements (HPA) Framework page 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. AusAID Civil Society Engagement Framework June 2012 page 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. AusAID Civil Society Engagement Framework June 2012 page 9 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. ANCP Mid-Term Review 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. HPA Head Agreements Schedule para 1.5 (a) [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Independent Review of the Periodic Funding Agreements December 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Details provided by HPA Director. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. HoA Response Joint Lessons Learnt page 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Typhoon Bopha Evaluation Initial Findings page 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. HPA Head Agreements Schedule 2 Clause 4.2 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Discussions with NGO Head Offices [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Independent Review of the Periodic Funding Mechanism for Disaster Risk Management (PFA) 2009

    page 17 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Description provided by the HPA Director 20 March 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. HPA evaluation of the Horn of Africa Response 2012 page 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. HPA HoA Evaluation Report page ii and final reports. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. HPA HoA lessons learnt July 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. HPA NGO Evaluation of HoA Response page 18 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)