

## Evaluation Report


# Assistance to Burmese Conflict-Affected and Displaced Persons

**Client: Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade**

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This is an independent evaluation and the opinions given here are the views of the consultants and do not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Government.

## Executive summary

1. Thailand has been generously hosting refugees from Myanmar for 30 years even though Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. There are approximately 120,000 people now residing in the nine border camps along the Thai-Myanmar border.
2. The last evaluation of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) support for the border camps was two years ago in 2012. That evaluation led to the reshaping of the programme with minor changes in partners and an emphasis on preparedness for return. The objective of this evaluation was to review the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of DFAT's Assistance to Burmese Conflict-Affected and Displaced Persons (ABCDP) program to inform DFAT management's decision for a one-year program extension (until June 2016).
3. DFAT support to the border camps includes providing approximately eight million Australian dollars over 2 years (2013 – 2015) for five partners. This funding was the subject of this evaluation. The Evaluation did not review other supports including: Australian volunteers; Community Based Organisation (CBO) funding through Australian Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); DFAT's core funding to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and resettling nearly 9,000 individuals from the camps in Australia.
4. The current context is one of great uncertainty. Following the assumption of power by the National Council for Peace and Order in Thailand, the authorities conducted head counts in seven of the nine refugee camps. They also began to strictly enforce camp regulations and especially the rules forbidding refugees from going outside the camp.
5. Refugees and partners were concerned that, after hosting them for more than thirty years, the Thai Government were preparing to push back the refugees. However, the government at several different levels have repeatedly reiterated that any repatriation will be in line with international norms and standards. Worries about what the Thai Government will do have added to concerns about the fragile peace-process in Myanmar and further contributed to the stressful environment for the refugees.
6. The team visited three of the border camps, including the largest one at Mae La. We interviewed over 260 people, mainly in group interviews in Bangkok, Mae Sot, Mae Hong Song, and the Camps. It was only possible to meet so many people thanks to the efficient organisation of the mission by the Bangkok Embassy and the five partners.
7. Refugees fleeing oppression in Myanmar began to arrive in the 1980s. They were originally scattered among 60 or so small sites along the border. Cross-border attacks on the camps in the mid-nineties led the Thai Government to consolidate the sites into what eventually became the nine border camps of today. The two most northerly camps had a majority Karenni population, and the other seven have majority Karen populations.
8. The refugees themselves manage the camps professionally and efficiently. The advantage of this arrangement is that it reduces the costs of running the camps. It also ensures that project work in the camp is appropriate to the perceived needs of the refugees.
9. The camp management and other refugee structures are closely linked with the respective ethnic refugee committees. These in turn are connected to the respective ethnic political organisations. The result is that, as in Myanmar, decisions are largely directed by the view of the dominant ethnic group. Unlike Myanmar, the dominant group does not use force to maintain its position. However this failure to fully include minorities is a poor preparation for the multi-ethnic context to which the refugees may eventually return.

10. Small scale returns have been underway for the last three years, but there is a lack of transparency over the issue in the camps. During discussions with camp committee structures in the camps individual returns were referred to as look and see visits, even though there is good evidence that small numbers of refugees have returned permanently. There was unanimous agreement among interviewees that conditions in Myanmar are not yet favourable to large-scale returns.
11. The camps are remarkable in that over half of the original refugee case load have been resettled in third countries (with 8,802 to Australia). Resettlement started in 2005. The Thai Government closed refugee registration 2006, concerned that resettlement was attracting refugees. Only registered refugees are eligible for resettlement. 92,361 refugees have been resettled in third countries. Just under half of the 120,000 refugees now in the camps are registered. However, although they are eligible for resettlement, they appear not to want to do so.
12. Migrant labour has been suggested as a potential durable solution. Migrant flows from Myanmar far exceed refugee flows. It is estimated that 2.3 million migrants in Thailand are from Myanmar. The migrants include some people who left Myanmar for protection reasons.
13. In the recent One Stop Service Centre migrant registration drive by the Thai Government only 0.55 million Myanmar migrants registered. Most Myanmar migrants are unregistered and therefore have no legal right to work there. However, Migration is only a durable solution when voluntary repatriation is possible. Otherwise refugee migrants who are not under their own country's protection, are even more vulnerable to exploitation than other migrants in Thailand.
14. The evaluation found that DFAT's assistance and approach to the protracted refugee crisis was appropriate to the context and need of the refugees. DFAT's partners have applied their long experience of working with the refugees to adapt their programmes to meet the changing context.
15. The evaluation found the programme makes some contribution to preparedness, but this could be stronger. The evaluation found that the refugee structures in the camps were reluctant to discuss the possibility of return. This is in spite of engagement by the Karen and Karenni Refugee Committees in return discussions in various fora. Partners have been reluctant to vigorously promote preparedness, as they might be seen as promoting return when conditions are not right for it.
16. However, partners have undertaken some initiatives, such as convergence (with the Myanmar system) in education and health that will remove barriers to individual decisions to return. The future is not certain. The peace process may collapse as did the 2004 process. In the past there has been little preparedness for any life outside the camps. This is now changing with the efforts to have Vocational Training courses accredited by the Thai and Myanmar authorities.
17. Linkages to interventions inside Myanmar are still weak but are growing. For example, Australian support for its partner The Border Consortium in Myanmar. All of DFAT's partners are working on both sides of the border. The integration between the programmes varies by agency. There is scope for further strengthening cross-border links by having complementary programming on both sides of the border.
18. The evaluation found that the programme is largely on track at the project level, where targets are more specific. It is more difficult to make a ground assessment at the programme level as targets for the contribution projects are for activities and outputs rather than outcomes. This is complicated by the number of different actors in the camps, and by DFAT's partners having multiple sources of funding.
19. The evaluation found that social inclusion is a challenge in the camps, especially where it collides with cultural norms. The evaluation is happy to note that a separate evaluation of social inclusion is now being conducted. Some of the minorities in the camp seem to be invisible to the majority and a number of vulnerabilities are only partially understood.

20. The evaluation considered that changing the current mode of service delivery would not be an efficient decision. This does not preclude the need for continued monitoring of interventions and assessment of the context to confirm that needs continue to be met and that minorities and vulnerable individuals are tracked and included.
21. The evaluation found operations in the camps were efficient and reflected years of learning by the agencies. The assumption of responsibility by the refugees for managing and delivering services makes the operation cheaper than it would otherwise be increasing efficiency. The temporary nature of the camps has limited efficiency to some extent.
22. Any large scale returns will increase needs on the Myanmar side of the border. Needs will increase faster in Myanmar than they decrease in Thailand as return is considerably more expensive than care and maintenance, the most vulnerable are less likely to return, and the loss of key staff will raise the cost of servicing the residual caseload.
23. The evaluation concluded that the needs in the border camps are likely to continue for some time. The evaluation found that this is a well-managed efficient programme that is largely appropriate and effective. It is addressing real needs in an environment where other donors are shifting their funding to inside Myanmar.
24. The evaluation makes a number of specific recommendations that can be found at the end of the report.

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# Acknowledgements

## 1.1 Thanks

25. As a part of the standard protocol for each interview, we normally ask interviewees whom else we should talk to. We didn't in this evaluation as the programme was already so full of the key informants that we would have chosen ourselves.
26. This evaluation has been the best organised of the fifty or so evaluations the team leader has conducted in the last 17 years. This is down to meticulous planning by the DFAT Humanitarian Coordinator for the Border, and to the support from the DFAT partners in the field.
27. These intensive programmes have allowed us to form what we hope is an accurate view of the operation in the border camps.
28. Thanks to DFAT and partners for all your work in support of the evaluation. Special thanks also to the head of the Burma section in DFAT Canberra who accompanied the team throughout the mission. Her input made Australian policy and concerns clear to the team.
29. However, this report reflects the views of the core evaluation team and not necessarily those of the participating DFAT staff.

## 1.2 A note on language and currency

30. The name of the country to the west of Thailand is variously given as Myanmar or Burma. Officially those in the border camps are not refugees but displaced persons and the camps are but temporary shelters.
31. The team has decided to follow the example set by UNHCR and refer to the Country of Origin of the displaced as Myanmar, to the displaced persons as refugees, and to the temporary shelters as refugee camps.
32. Reference to dollars in this report are to Australian dollars unless otherwise specified.

## Acronyms and abbreviations

Term	Meaning
<b>ABCDP</b>	Assistance to Burmese Conflict-Affected and Displaced Persons
<b>ADRA</b>	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
<b>BDY</b>	Ban Don Yang (Refugee Camp)
<b>BMNS</b>	Ban Mai Nai Soi (Refugee Camp)
<b>BMS</b>	Ban Mae Surin (Refugee Camp)
<b>CBO</b>	Community Based Organisation
<b>CCSDPT</b>	Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand
<b>CV</b>	Curriculum Vitae
<b>DFAT</b>	Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GBV</b>	Gender Based Violence
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>ML</b>	Mae La (Refugee Camp)
<b>MLO</b>	Mae La Oon (Refugee Camp)
<b>MRML</b>	Mae Ra Ma Luang (Refugee Camp)
<b>NCPO</b>	National Council for Peace and Order
<b>NGO</b>	Non Governmental Organisation
<b>NP</b>	Nu Po (Refugee Camp)
<b>PREPS</b>	Preparing for Reintegration through Education and Participative Solutions
<b>PU-AMI</b>	Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale
<b>SC</b>	Save the Children
<b>SGBV</b>	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
<b>TBC</b>	The Border Consortium
<b>TH</b>	Tham Hin (Refugee Camp)
<b>ToR</b>	Terms of reference
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
<b>UM</b>	Umpiem Mai (Refugee Camp)
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>US</b>	United States



## 2 The Evaluation

### 2.1 Objective of the evaluation

33. The last evaluation of Australian assistance to the border camps was two years ago in 2012. That evaluation led to the reshaping of the programme with the introduction of a humanitarian coordinator in Thailand, the direct funding of partners, and changes in some partners (after a revised selection procedure). There have been large changes in both Myanmar and Thailand since then. This evaluation was commissioned in line with DFAT's general evaluation policy partly because of these changes.
34. The objective of the evaluation was to review the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of DFAT's "Assistance to Burmese Conflict-Affected and Displaced Persons (ABCDP)" programme to inform DFAT management's decision for a one-year programme extension (until June 2016).

### 2.2 Evaluation questions

35. The Evaluation Terms of Reference are exemplary. The ToR provided all the information needed in a short readable document. The terms of reference asked the team to look at five questions, two on appropriateness, two on effectiveness and one on efficiency. The five questions are presented below.

#### 2.2.1 Appropriateness

36. *How well humanitarian activities are tailored to local needs.*
37. Are the objectives and approach of DFAT's assistance appropriate to the protracted humanitarian context and needs of refugees on the Thai-Burma border?
38. Does the program contribute to preparedness for voluntary repatriation of refugees, including by creating linkages to Australian support for the peace process in Burma?

#### 2.2.2 Effectiveness

39. *How well has an activity achieved its purpose, or can be expected to do so on the basis of existing outputs.*
40. Is the ABCDP program effectively addressing issues of gender, disability and social inclusion of different groups?
41. Is the ABCDP program on-track to meet program and project level goals and objectives?



#### 2.2.3 Efficiency

42. *Measure of outputs, qualitative and quantitative, achieved as a result of inputs.*
43. Is the program making efficient use of resources to achieve outputs, including through coordination and collaboration with other donors and humanitarian agencies?

### 2.3 The work of the evaluation team.

44. The team visited three of the border camps, one with a mostly Karenni population (Ban Mae Nai Soi) and two with a mostly Karen population including the largest camp at Mae La. We also met with over 260 people, mainly in group interviews in Bangkok, Mae Sot, Mae Hong Song, and the Camps.



Refugee Camps visited   
Other interview locations 

Base map source: UNHCR

## 2.4 Constraints on the evaluation

45. The total time for the evaluation fieldwork was only two weeks. This limits the potential depth of the evaluation in terms of how much the evaluators could probe particular issues. The evaluation approached the time limits by trying to have the broadest programme possible, and by interviewing those whom we considered to be particularly useful key informants. The team also split on a number of occasions in order to be able to visit as many activities as possible and meet more key informants.
46. A bigger constraint in some ways was that the camps are controlled by organisations linked to the respective political organisations. The Karen camps are effectively controlled by the Karen Refugee Committee and the Karenni camps by the Karenni Refugee Committee. They are linked to the Karen National Union and to the Karenni National Progressive Party. This is not an uncommon phenomena where refugees flee from government responses to a liberation or secessionist struggle<sup>1</sup>.
47. While the 2012 evaluation report has presented the refugee control of their own camps as exemplary, it has some negative consequences as well as positive ones. One of the negative consequences was that in interviews with the camp structures the evaluation got virtually identical answers on the question of return. This is unusual. Normally, even where there is a strong consensus, one still gets differences in the ordering of priorities between different interviewees and groups. This suggested to the evaluation team that the people we were talking to were reiterating a common position. This common position matched the position of the respective ethnic political groups.
48. This does not mean that the evaluation team thinks that conditions are ripe for return. We don't. However in any population there is always a range of views, depending on the individual circumstances. We do know that some refugees have returned. It is impossible to offer any estimate on the numbers as no-one is counting the returns. While camp leaders referred to such refugees as going on "look and see visits", it was clear from other sources that some of the returning refugees had returned to Myanmar intending to stay there.
49. One NGO reported that one of their workers from the camp was now working for them in Myanmar. Three percent of the teachers who has left employment in the Karenni camps are recorded as having returned to Myanmar. There have been enough returns for Save the Children to plan a survey of returned children to find out what barriers they have faced in returning to school in Myanmar. Further, when the post-coup government in Thailand instigated head counts in the camps, several thousand people on the rolls were absent from the camp. Those who were absent are probably in Myanmar or working as migrant labour in Thailand. It is perfectly possible for refugees to maintain their food distribution status in the camps by returning every November for the annual headcount by TBC, the DFAT partner that distributes food and maintains the registration for distribution within the camp.
50. The evaluation team has tried to counteract this constraint by looking at what people are doing rather than just what they are saying. We have also had good input from UNHCR and NGOs working on the Myanmar side of the border, as well as from DFAT and other donors in Myanmar.
51. The final constraint was that the team did not visit the Myanmar side of the border. This means that the team has to rely on second-hand evidence on the conditions there. Again we have tried to counteract this by asking specific questions about conditions on the other side.

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<sup>1</sup> For example Tigrayan refugees in Ethiopia in 1984, or Namibian Refugees in Angola in the 80s.

### 2.4.1 DFAT support to the Border Camps

52. This evaluation only looked at one component of DFAT support to the border camps. The DFAT support to the border camps includes:
- Funding for the five partners working in the camps approx. AU\$8m over 2 years (2013 – 2015) – the subject of this evaluation.
  - The provision of Australian volunteers to support the programme (not reviewed).
  - CBO funding through Australian NGOs (not reviewed).
  - Core funding to UNHCR (not reviewed).
  - Resettlement of nearly 9,000 individuals from the camps in Australia since 2005. (not reviewed).

## 2.5 The goals and objectives of the programme of support to five partners.

53. The overall goal of the programme is that:
54. *Burmese refugees are healthy, educated and skilled, lead camp management and are informed, engaged and prepared for potential voluntary repatriation with safety and dignity when conditions are conducive and people are ready.*
55. The programme logical framework has three objectives.
1. *Refugee men and women play a lead role in camp management and are informed and actively engaged in preparedness for potential return and decisions regarding their future.*
  2. *Refugees maintain good health status and health workers are trained in curriculum recognised in Burma.*
  3. *Girls and boys are educated and refugees have vocational skills and increased self-reliance in preparation for potential voluntary return to Burma.*

## 2.6 Logical frameworks

56. Each project has its own logical framework. There is also an overarching log-frame developed by the Embassy in Bangkok together with the five partners based on the individual project log-frames. DFAT required an overall theory of change and monitoring framework for the overall programme of assistance to the camps. The individual components of the programme were not decided in advance but were based on the bids for funding. This meant it was only possible to draw up the overall log-frame and monitoring framework after the components had been selected.
57. As the partners are funded by a range of donors DFAT used the monitoring indicators from their log-frames to prepare the overall monitoring indicators. In the case of PU-AMI, where DFAT funding represents only a small part (7%) of the whole, DFAT agreed to accept reporting against PU-AMI log-frame. These were then compiled by DFAT to populate the DFAT monitoring framework. This is fully in accordance with the principles of good humanitarian donorship<sup>2</sup>.
58. In a number of cases, such as for IRC's work on convergence, DFAT added indicators that were not presented in the original project log-frame. The indicators for this activity were developed in

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<sup>2</sup> Good Humanitarian Donorship. (2003). *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*. Stockholm: Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark, the United States, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland.

discussion between the partners. Similarly DFAT also worked with Save the Children to develop indicators to measure educational convergence and to include quantifiable targets for the other indicators.

**Table 1: Analysis of number of indicators in DFAT and organisations log frames.**

Partner	No of Indicators	
	Organisation's log frame	DFAT's log frame
<b>ADRA</b>	14	8
<b>IRC</b>	28	14
<b>PU/AMI</b>	20	3
<b>Save the Children</b>	18	10
<b>TBC</b>	122	10

*2.6.1 DFAT Log-frame objective one. Refugee men and women play a lead role in camp management and are informed and actively engaged in preparedness for potential return and decisions regarding their future.*

59. Only one partner, The Border Consortium (TBC), is specifically engaged with this objective. TBC is a coalition of agencies focused on working with the border camps since the first major influx in 1984. It's registered as a charity in the UK. IRC, which is separately funded by DFAT, is also a member of TBC.
60. The information services project is a sub-project held by the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT). The CCSDPT is the government approved coordination body for all NGOs working with the camps. Only members of CCSDPT may legally work in the camps. TBC is a member of CCSDPT, and provides its secretariat.
61. TBC now has a small DFAT-funded operation on the Myanmar side of the border, but this operation was not reviewed as it is separate from the support for the camps.

**Table 2: Activities under Objective 1**

Partner	Funding	Sector	Location	Activities or Outcomes
The Border Consortium	\$4.4m (2013-15)	Food, shelter, non-food items  Camp governance, peace-building  Information services	All 9 camps: MLO, MRO, ML, UM, TH, NP, BDY, BMNS, BMS (see Table 5 below for a key to the camp names.)	Provision of basic food supplies targeted to the most vulnerable households, non-food items, shelter and livelihoods  Accountable and inclusive systems of refugee camp management are established  Refugees have access to and contribute to timely, credible and relevant information regarding durable solutions; establishment of information centres in the nine camps

Partner	Funding	Sector	Location	Activities or Outcomes
				Refugees effectively engage in preparedness for return discussion and peace-building activities

### 2.6.2 Objective 2: Refugees maintain good health status and health workers are trained in curriculum recognised in Burma.

62. IRC and PU-AMI are the partners for health services (including mental health) in six camps. The picture is somewhat complicated as other partners are also engaged in health services in these camps and the DFAT partners work in different camps with funding from other donors. IRC also provides water and sanitation services in three camps with DFAT support.

**Table 3: Activities under Objective 2**

Partner	Funding	Sector	Location	Activities or Outcomes
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	\$1.2m (2013-15)	Health Mental health support Water and sanitation	3 camps: TH, BMNS, BMS	Primary health services available to 21,000 refugees through patient care, maternal and child health care, health education, mental health care  Access to quality water and sanitation services  Support for platform for health-care convergence, including progress to train health workers in a curriculum that will be recognised if refugees return to Burma
Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale (PU-AMI)	\$0.4m (2013-15)	Health Mental Health support	3 camps: ML, UM, NP	Primary health services available to 68,000 refugees including patient care, maternal and child health care and health education  Mental health care and psychosocial services

### 2.6.3 Objective 3: Girls and boys are educated and refugees have vocational skills and increased self-reliance in preparation for potential voluntary return to Burma

63. Education is a key issue for the refugees. The importance of education is shown by the presence of large numbers of unaccompanied young people at schools in the camp. They have apparently been sent by their families to study at the camp schools. Some stay with relatives but most stay in boarding houses in the camp. In Mae Lae, the largest camp, there were over 1,500 children in 31 such boarding houses in August 2014. Save the Children report there are nearly five thousand separated or unaccompanied children in all nine camps.

64. Vocational training is increasingly recognised as an important activity that could assist refugees to build a livelihood in the camps or when they return to Myanmar. Previously, young refugees told the evaluation team, vocational training wasn't attractive as it was seen as far inferior to academic training.

**Table 4: Activities under Objective Three.**

Partner	Funding	Sector	Location	Activities or Outcomes
Save the Children (SC led consortium with Right to Play and ADRA.)	\$1.1m (2013-15)	Education	7 camps: MLO, MRO, ML, UM, TH, NP, BDY	Provide quality basic education for more than 30,000 children Train more than 500 teachers Focus on issues related to convergence with the education system in Burma, including working towards recognition of teacher training and student prior learning
ADRA Thailand	\$0.8m (2013-15)	Vocational Education	3 camps: ML, UM, NP	Provide vocational training to 2,200 refugees so they can earn an income if they return home Engage with Thai and Burma vocational education departments to work towards future accreditation of qualifications

## 3 Current context

### 3.1 The broader context

65. The current context is one of great uncertainty. Following the assumption of power by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) in Thailand, the authorities conducted head counts in seven of the nine refugee camps and began to strictly enforce camp regulations and especially the rules forbidding refugees from going outside the camp. Interviewees told the evaluation that headcounts were implemented differently across the camps and were sometimes carried out in a way that caused distress to the refugees.
66. Refugees and partners were concerned that the Thai authorities were preparing to push back the refugees. However, the Thai government at several different levels has repeatedly reiterated that any repatriation will be conducted in line with international norms and standards.
67. The constant jockeying for position by the many different Karen political and military organisations inside Myanmar adds a further layer of confusion. The political organisations are centralised and secretive. This is illustrated by the questions received by the information centres which ask about the positions of the political organisations to which the camp management is affiliated. The evaluation team were told of one instance where the camp management were delighted because a briefing by their related political organisation for camp leaders made that organisation's position clear.

### 3.2 The camp context

68. Refugees fleeing oppression in Myanmar began to arrive in the 1980s. They were original scattered among 60 or so small sites along the border. Because each site could draw on the surrounding countryside, the refugees needed relatively little external assistance.
69. Cross border raids on the camps in January 1995 led the Thai government to begin to consolidate the camps. Mae La grew from 6,979 in April 1995 to over 44,000 today as other sites were closed and the population moved to Mae La. These numbers understate the extent of the consolidation as 90,000 refugees have been settled in third countries.

**Table 5: Abbreviations for camp names**

Abbreviation	Camp name	Order from North	Population	Majority Ethnicity
<b>BDY</b>	Ban Don Yang	8	3,273	<b>Karen</b> (94.8%)
<b>BMNS</b>	Ban Mai Nai Soi	1	11,803	<b>Karenni</b> (95.4%)
<b>BMS</b>	Ban Mae Surin	2	2,908	<b>Karenni</b> (91.9%)
<b>ML</b>	Mae La	5	44,771	<b>Karen</b> (84.3%)
<b>MLO</b>	Mae La Oon	3	11,878	<b>Karen</b> (99.2%)
<b>MRML</b>	Mae Ra Ma Luang	4	13,355	<b>Karen</b> (99.4%)
<b>NP</b>	Nu Po	7	12,478	<b>Karen</b> (81.7%)
<b>TH</b>	Tham Hin.	9	6,744	<b>Karen</b> (98.7%)
<b>UM</b>	Umpiem Mai	6	12,964	<b>Karen</b> (82.5%)

Source: Population data from TBC Monthly Population Report for August 2014. The percentages show what proportion of the population is from the majority ethnicity.



70. The two southernmost camps, Ban Don Yang and Tham Hin are different from the other camps in that the military has always played a stronger role in their management and the rules have always been enforced most strictly there. Thus, no head counts have taken place in those camps since the new government took over in May 2014, although they have been repeatedly held in the other camps.
71. Protracted displacement and uncertainty about developments in Myanmar coupled with the recent clamp down by the Thai authorities have contributed to a highly stressful environment for the refugees. Many interviewees reported that mental health issues, depression, alcohol and drug abuse, domestic violence, and attempted suicides, have increased as a result of this stress.
72. The camps are efficiently managed by camp committees that are closely linked with the respective ethnic political organisations. The organisation is complex and multi-layered, with thematic committees for different areas. Members of the community are paid nominal amounts, known as stipends, for undertaking different roles in the camp. All the NGOs working in the camps rely on these refugee workers to implement their programmes.
73. Community management and control of the camps brings many advantages. The first advantage is that it leads to reduced costs for the agencies, through the provision of services by the refugees whose stipends represent only a part of the value of their work.
74. The second advantage is that community control guarantees local ownership and helps to ensure the programmes in the camp are appropriate to the needs of the camp population. This means that resources are not wasted on inappropriate or irrelevant programming.
75. However, the camp management reflects the situation inside Myanmar, where the dominant Burman ethnic group directs the state. The camp committees and section leaders are elected by the camp residents. The predominance of one ethnic group in the camp population means that the elected camp structures are controlled by the majority group.
76. Minorities sometimes seem invisible<sup>3</sup>. The evaluation team saw an illustration of this in one camp when asking how many schools were in the camp. The answer included only the schools using the Karen Refugee Committee Education Entity (KRCEE) curriculum, and did not include three Muslim schools that were not administered by the KRCEE, These schools used a Myanmar Government or mixed curriculum<sup>4</sup>. The invisibility of minorities extends to groups like the disabled, for whom there is no accurate count in the camps.
77. Another resonance with Myanmar is the limited understanding of how the international community operates. One example in the camps of this limited understanding is that the refugee leadership saw reducing funding from some donors as a concerted signal by the international community that the refugees should return. It is instead the result of individual donors assigning their fixed budgets to other priorities in the region, including displacement inside Myanmar. However, the perception that they are being sent a signal increased the pressure on the refugee leadership.
78. The comparison between Myanmar and the camps should not be taken too far. In the camp minorities are not suppressed by force as sometimes happens in Myanmar. In part the strong ethnic

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<sup>3</sup> This was why TBC launched the consultancy on inclusion and equity.

<sup>4</sup> The DFAT/EU funded education programme does provide support to Muslim schools in the camp. DFAT's partners have recently identified two further schools in Umpiem camp which are not supported by KRCEE and which the partners are now seeking to assist.

identity expressed in the camp is a counterbalance to the suppression of their identity within Myanmar.

79. Education is a case in point. The schools in the seven Karen majority camps almost exclusively use the Karen Refugee Committee Education Entity's curriculum in which all the subjects are taught in Karen. The camps attract students from Myanmar because they are, for some areas, the nearest schools teaching in Karen at intermediate and higher level.
80. However, education in Karen is a problem for those for whom Karen isn't the maternal language. For many of the Muslim refugees in particular, the language of the home is Burmese. Muslims form one eighth of the population in Mae La, and over one fifth of the population in Umpiem Mai.
81. A further issue around language is that children returning to Myanmar are returning in many cases to schools with the national curriculum which is taught in Burmese. Even if current efforts at educational reform within Myanmar succeed and early classes were taught in mother-tongue languages, it is unlikely that intermediate and high school curricula would be in other than Burmese. This makes return more difficult as children from the camp schools cannot pass tests in Burmese to gain entry to higher level classes.
82. Another issue with community control is that we are all prisoners of our cultures. Culture dictates 'normal' or 'proper' behaviour. Community control can mean that behaviour and practices that are in conformance with cultural norms are not challenged. This may be part of the issue behind the slow progress with issues such as Gender Based Violence (GBV). IRC's project proposal notes that among the reasons given by women refugees for the high incidence of GBV in the camps are *traditional norms and cultural attitudes*. Initially the refugee leadership stated that GBV was not a problem, but they now openly acknowledge it. This should not be understood as saying that GBV is part of the refugees' culture. It isn't, but addressing GBV conflicts with the cultural norm of each family managing their own affairs.
83. Another example may be the persistence of stunting despite low levels of acute malnutrition for many years, or some hygiene practices (such as low levels of hand-washing). Stunting is low height for age. What is surprising in the camps is that stunting is prevalent despite the lack of acute malnutrition. The recent DFID mid-term review notes that stunting is also an issue within the same population inside Myanmar. The recent IRC/TBC nutrition study notes that *cultural norms and beliefs also hinder the provision of quality complementary feeding*.<sup>5</sup> It is difficult for community leaders to challenge practices that were the norm in their own childhood.

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<sup>5</sup> TBC has begun an intensive programme to address this issue.

## 4 Durable Solution

### 4.1 Voluntary Return

84. There is a lack of transparency over the issue of voluntary return. Knowledgeable persons told the evaluation team that there has been a trickle of returns over the last three years. However, meetings with camp leadership were challenging in that there was a denial that anyone was returning to Myanmar. Those who returned were said to be going on extended look and see visits.
85. However, as previously noted, there is solid evidence the refugees are returning to Myanmar, and not just for extended visits. UNHCR reports that an estimated 790 refugees have returned to the areas it has access to in the South East of Myanmar<sup>6</sup>. UNHCR found returnees in 18 of the 40 villages it assessed in Kayin state, the source of the bulk of the refugees in the Thai camps.
86. Four per cent of the teachers who left their Karenni camps from June 2013 to March 2014 returned to Myanmar. In the same period six percent of the teachers in the Karen camps left the camps other than for resettlement. It can be assumed that some of these returned to Myanmar while others may have become migrant workers in Thailand. It is clear that small scale individual voluntary returns are already taking place.
87. When the Thai authorities conducted surprise headcounts, there were several thousand people missing from the largest camp at Mae La. It is not known to what extent the missing numbers at the headcounts reflected return, local integration, or migrant work.
88. If the parties, or some of the parties, in Myanmar reach a political settlement, conditions should be ripe for large-scale returns. However, there are suggestions that the reforms which are the cornerstone of the peace process may have stalled<sup>7</sup>. Interviewees told the evaluation team that the pace of reform has slowed in Myanmar. They gave education as a case in point where the latest version of the education bill no longer has a reference to mother-tongue education.
89. The consensus of all the stakeholders the evaluation team talked to, including donors, is that conditions inside Myanmar are not yet favourable for large scale returns. However, interviewees stated that large scale IDP returns in the South East of Myanmar would probably precipitate large-scale refugee returns, regardless of whether the camp leadership was in favour of such returns or not. This potential triggering of large scale return by IDP returns would duplicate what has happened in other refugee contexts.

### 4.2 Resettlement


90. Resettlement started in 2005. The Thai government feared that the resettlement programme was drawing people from Myanmar into Thailand and ended registration of refugees in 2006. According to UNHCR, there were 74,720 registered refugees in the camps in August 2014. However, the TBC figure for the same month for registered refugees was over 15,000 less at 59,321. The difference appears to be that TBC remove persons from their register when they die or no longer claim food,

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<sup>6</sup> UNHCR (2014) *South-east Myanmar: Return Monitoring Update: September 2014*.

<sup>7</sup> Hiebert, M., & Nguyen, P. (2014). Myanmar's Peace Process Carries High Stakes Ahead of 2015 Elections. *Southeast Asia from Scott Circle*, V(17), 1-4. Last viewed on 7 December 2014. URL: [http://csis.org/files/publication/140821\\_SoutheastAsia\\_Vol\\_5\\_Issue\\_17.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/140821_SoutheastAsia_Vol_5_Issue_17.pdf)

but UNHCR only does so when they are formally notified of a change as during resettlement<sup>8</sup>. The TBC figures show that slightly more than half the refugees now left are unregistered, and therefore ineligible for resettlement. Figure 1 offers an overview of the pattern of resettlement by country of destination.



**Figure 1: Country of destination for refugees resettled from the camps.**

91. Up to August 2014 there had been 92,321 departures to third countries. The peak of departures was in 2007 to 2009 when there were approximately 15,000 departures a year. Australia has been the second largest recipient of resettled refugees from the camps<sup>9</sup> ( Figure 1). Well over half of the eligible refugee population has been resettled.
92. The United States ended the group resettlement scheme in January 2014, but will continue with individual resettlement. Under the group scheme, whole families were resettled. People who applied before the deadline will be processed. The reason given for the ending of the group scheme is that after nearly ten years, all of those eligible and interested in resettlement have taken that option. UNHCR give the number of applications for resettlement as 2,640 for 2014.
93. Surveys of the camp population show strong interest in resettlement. But this interest is strongest among the ineligible population, those who arrived after registration was closed.
94. Resettlement has had a large impact on the camp with many qualified persons opting to resettle. This has been an ongoing issue since resettlement started. Resettlement was the largest single reason for teachers leaving work in the Karenni camps in June 2013 to March 2014, and accounted for one fifth of the teachers leaving work in the Karen camps.
95. Resettlement has been one of the factors in the high level of churn in the camps. This year 47% of the teachers in TDY camp were new teachers, and nearly one third of the teachers in Mae La, the largest camp, were new teachers.

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<sup>8</sup> UNHCR also seeks to have children born to registered refugees, and special protection cases from the unregistered population (such as victims of sexual and gender-based violence) registered as refugees.

<sup>9</sup> The numbers here do not include persons resettled by Australia directly from Myanmar.

### 4.3 Local Integration

96. Local integration is not considered an option at present. It is illegal for anyone from the camps to be outside the camp or to work in Thailand. If caught outside the camps they are arrested and may be deported if they are unregistered.
97. The only form of “local integration” that interviewees suggested as possible for the refugees in the future was labour migration. Although it is illegal for refugee to work outside the camp, several interviewees referred to Thai employers preferring the refugees to other migrants for a range of reasons, including higher levels of education, knowledge of the Thai system, and Thai language skills.

### 4.4 Durable Solutions? Labour Migration

98. Migrant flows from Myanmar far exceed refugee flows. It is estimated that 2.3 million migrants in Thailand are from Myanmar. They play an important role in some sectors of the Thai economy, such as agriculture and fishing<sup>10</sup>.
99. The migrants include some people who left Myanmar for protection reasons. A study by the International Organisation for Migration found that seven per cent of Myanmar migrants in Thailand cited security or safety issues as prompting their migration.
100. The Thai Government has launched an effort to register migrants with new One Stop Service Centres where migrants can regularise their immigration status and join the compulsory health insurance system.
101. In the recent One Stop Service Centre drive to register migrant works in Thailand, 0.55 million Myanmar migrants have registered. A small number are registered under an older separate scheme. Most Myanmar migrants have not registered and have no legal right to be in Thailand.
102. Migration has been the subject of debate as a forth potential durable solution. Some argue that including it in the set of durable solutions of return, third country resettlement, and local integration, *will allow UNHCR to better respond to the contemporary realities of global mobility, shrinking asylum space in the North and regional state fragility in the South*<sup>11</sup>.
103. However migration often has its own protection concerns as migrants are vulnerable to exploitation. Critically for the refugees, migration does not grant citizenship or even rights to permanent residence. Therefore labour migration is only a durable solution when voluntary repatriation is possible. Otherwise the refugees’ lack of protection from their home country makes them even more vulnerable than other migrants.

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<sup>10</sup> Mae La is also known as ‘Beh Klaw’ in Karen. This means ‘cotton field’ a reference to the agricultural activities for which Karen leaders first negotiated permission for refugees to cross into the area in 1984.

<sup>11</sup> Kathy Long, (2009) Extending protection? Labour migration and durable solutions for refugees (New issues in Refugee Research: Research Paper 176), UNHCR, Geneva

## 5 Appropriateness

104. *Are the objectives and approach of DFAT's assistance appropriate to the protracted humanitarian context and needs of refugees on the Thai-Burma border?*
105. The evaluation found that the objective and approaches were largely appropriate. DFAT's overall approach has been to work through tried and trusted partners on the border. The programmes at the evaluation team saw in the camp were largely appropriate to the needs of the refugees as they are in the camps.
106. Since the beginning of the programme (2013) there have been significant changes in both Thailand and Myanmar. Implementing partners have made efforts to keep the assistance in the camps appropriate. Notable examples include increased attention to mental health, efforts to adapt vocational training programmes, and increased rations in the wake of reduced movement.
107. The May change of government in Thailand hasn't had any impact on DFAT's goals and objectives, which remain appropriate. However there will be a need for constant monitoring and reassessment if there are further changes in the context, either in Thailand or in Myanmar. DFAT's experienced partners are well placed to adapt their programmes as necessary.

### 5.1 Preparedness

108. *Does the program contribute to preparedness for voluntary repatriation of refugees, including by creating linkages to Australian support for the peace process in Burma?*
109. The programme has contributed to a limited extent to preparedness for voluntary return. Promoting preparedness is difficult as the refugee structures appear to be reluctant to discuss concrete aspects of return. Part of the reason for this may be the high level of anxiety about potential forced repatriation and the false perception that donors are sending signals about return. Partners are concerned that they might be seen as promoting return if they put too much emphasis on preparedness.
110. However, there are some examples of partners taking measures that will remove barriers to individual decisions to return. These include convergence in both education and health, researching conditions in the south east and applying the findings for the type of training packages provided, and providing trainees and staff with documentation that will be recognized in Myanmar as well.
111. Interviewees highlighted several points which could improve preparedness generally. These include focussing further on attitudes and expectations and preparing refugees for the context they would return to. This would be a multi-ethnic context where they would no-longer be the dominant group. In the same vein, trust issues have been highlighted by many interviewees and should be taken into consideration.
112. Vocational training has tried to introduce a life skills training which has so far however failed to trigger people's interest despite its obvious importance. As more information becomes available about people's areas of origin and/or potential areas of return, refugees' capacities should be tailored more towards the portable skills that are likely to be in demand in the areas of return. These might include such skill as barefoot doctors or agricultural machinery repair among others.
113. The biggest barrier to preparedness is the population of the refugee camps themselves, who seem reluctant to discuss the possibility of return. This is clearly influenced by the position taken by the leadership, but also by their own experience, and by previous failed peace initiatives. There is little

that the partners can do about this reluctance apart from continuing their present effort to remove barriers to individual decisions<sup>12</sup> while continuing to engage with refugees on the issue.

114. Access to unbiased information is an important base for individual decisions to return. The project has made an effort to establish such a mechanism through the Information Centres. However, the effectiveness of this activity has proven challenging as will be shown below.
115. One aspect of preparedness or return that was missing was mine risk education<sup>13</sup>. There were 101 recorded land-mine casualties in Myanmar in 2013<sup>14</sup>. Handicap International is doing some mine risk education, but the evaluation did not see the types of poster and information displays (e.g. with wooden dummy mines that are common in such contexts).

## 5.2 Preparedness for other solutions

116. The outcome of the peace process in Myanmar is uncertain. Discussions and negotiations are still underway, but there is no guarantee that these efforts will succeed. What then will happen to the refugees? Voluntary return is but one of three durable solutions. The team therefore briefly looked at how the programme may be preparing refugees for other durable solutions (local integration and labour migration).
117. As already mentioned- labour migration seems to be regarded by some interviewees as a potential option for the future. Currently it is illegal for the refugees to work outside the camp.
118. Training within the camps is largely focused on life within the camps. There has been little preparedness for any life outside the camps. Qualification have been accredited under the Thai system for several years. The efforts of DFAT's partners to have the qualifications recognised in Myanmar have now succeeded with agreements by the relevant ministries there to endorse the certificates. The first such endorsed certificates have already been received back from Myanmar.
119. Similarly there are efforts in the health sectors to train health workers in a qualification that would be recognised in both Thailand and Myanmar. These are positive approaches as they remove barriers to the choices that individuals can make about their own futures.

## 5.3 Links to interventions in Myanmar

120. Linkages to interventions inside Myanmar are still weak but are growing. For example, DFAT is now supporting TBC's work in Myanmar. This helps to ensure that TBC has a good understanding of the situation in Myanmar. All of DFAT's partners are working on both sides of the border. The integration between the programmes varies by agency (but the evaluation has not reviewed this).
121. One problem with linkages is that the refugees on the border were only one small part of the larger and more complex picture inside Myanmar. The refugees are hugely outnumbered by Internally

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<sup>12</sup> One excellent example is an initiative by IRC (not part of its DFAT-funded programme) where staff were being provided with CV in English and Burmese, with all certificates attached. This makes the workers much more employable in their post-camp lives.

<sup>13</sup> DFAT is not funding this sector. This is mentioned in terms of general preparedness.

<sup>14</sup> The actual number may be higher due to unreported cases. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (2014) *Myanmar/Burma: Casualties and Victim Assistance*. Updated 29 October 2014 at [http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region\\_profiles/theme/3699](http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3699)

Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Myanmar. UNHCR estimates<sup>15</sup> there are nearly quarter of a million IDPs in the south-east of Myanmar, the region of origin for the refugees in the Thai camps. There are acute protection concerns within Myanmar with other groups and UNHCR gives the total of 1.56 million persons of concern to UNHCR within Myanmar.

122. Links in specific sectors to Myanmar have been weak despite the inter-dependence between strategic choices made in the field of education and health in the camps in Thailand and the discussions in Yangon. The participation of Save the Children in both the PREPS consortium in the camps and as the lead agency of the Myanmar Education Consortium is a positive step towards strengthened linkages.

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<sup>15</sup> *Myanmar Factsheet: September 2014*. At <http://www.unhcr.org/50001cf99.html>



# 6 Effectiveness

*Is the ABCDP program on-track to meet program and project level goals and objectives?*

- 123. The ABCDP programme is largely on track to meet the project level goals. Performance overall has been good (see the analysis in the annexes). Achievement are better for technical issues than for softer targets. For example, while water provision was on target, there were problem around lowering the rate of stunting or changing some of the refugees’ sanitation practices.
- 124. The information centers have not yet become an effective source of independent information. This is for a number of reasons, including the extent to which the camp structures welcome an independent information mechanism. While DFAT had initially planned financing nine information centres (one in each camp) they are now only four and DFAT and the partner have jointly decided to halt the roll-out until the first few begin to operate effectively.
- 125. The effectiveness of the vocational training is limited by the lack of access to financial and material resources to carry out their activities once the training completed. While some loans are available (from a variety of actors), trainees (current or past) appear to lack awareness about these possibilities. The team talked separately to eight trainees, only one of which was aware of a financing opportunity. The closed nature of the camps constrains many potential livelihoods. There are only jobs for so many barbers or bakers in the camp. As a result, many of the trainees interviewed thought of vocational training as an end in itself rather than a path towards a better livelihood.

## 6.1.1 Attribution and the intervention level

- 126. Many of the project indicators are at the activity or output level, and these are not necessarily well linked to the programme goals. The programme objectives are not specific or measurable, making it impossible to assess the extent to which they have been met. DFAT’s support is only part of the support that the different partners have for their work in the refugee camps (Table 6).

**Table 6: DFAT funding as a proportion of partner's total funding for the border camps.**


Organisation	DFAT % of funding	Other donors
<b>ADRA</b>	100% in three camps	Other camps: EU/UNHCR
<b>IRC</b>	41%	US BPRM main donor
<b>PU/AMI</b>	7%	US BPRM, EU/ECHO, Gates Foundation
<b>Save the Children</b>	27%	EU
<b>TBC</b>	7%	30 donors

- 127. Given this donor landscape, DFAT’s assistance is only contributing to the overall outcomes. Only one project, the Information Centres has 100% DFAT funding<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> This project is also intended to had UNHCR support with translation etc.

128. The effectiveness of DFAT's assistance is also influenced by the reduction of funding for some partners. This has made DFAT's funding more effective in some cases through DFAT's support for essential services in the camps when other donors have shifted funding to inside Myanmar.
129. The picture is even more complex than Table 6 suggests as in many cases several different agencies are working on the same issues in the same camp. For example, there are several different training providers in Mae La. Health services are provided by a range of agencies across the camps and so on.



**Figure 2: Reducing influence as one moves up the results chain**

130. Figure 2 illustrates another issue with attributing results to DFAT's support. The influence of any particular project or programme decreases as one moves up the results chain<sup>17</sup>. Both this and the multiplicity of donors and actors make it difficult to link the DFAT project level targets (which are often activity or output based) to the overall programme objectives (which are outcome or impact based).

### 6.1.2 Staff churn and effectiveness

131. The resettlement programme has led to the loss of trained staff from the camp. This has been one cause of staff churn. The other is the size of the stipends. The camp staff are volunteers, but they have been paid a stipend in recent years. Stipends are small. The basic stipend is only 800 Thai Baht, approximately \$28 a month. Staff churn has challenged effectiveness because of the constant loss of expertise and the cost of training large numbers of new teachers or health workers every year.
132. While resettlement is unlikely to have such a large impact in future, large scale return would also challenge effectiveness, as trained staff would leave while the remaining population in the camps would contain a growing percentage of vulnerable individuals.

<sup>17</sup> Diagram after Smutylo, T. (2001). Crouching impact, hidden attribution: overcoming threats to learning in development programs. Paper presented at the Block Island Workshop on Across Portfolio Learning, 22-24 May 2001. Last viewed on 9 November 2009. URL: [http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/10905186681Crouching\\_Impact,\\_Hidden\\_Attribution.pdf](http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/10905186681Crouching_Impact,_Hidden_Attribution.pdf)

### 6.1.3 Temporary and closed nature of the camps

133. The Thai Government has kept to the policy that the camps are meant to be temporary. The extent to which this policy is enforced has varied between camps. Some camps have only natural roofing, where others have been allowed to use corrugated galvanised steel roofing. The temporary nature of the camps has forced sub-optimal choices for construction etc. that bear higher maintenance costs. One example is that the requirement to use timber posts (which as subject to insect attack) for communal structures rather than concrete or steel.
134. The enforcement of the regulations on the closed nature of the camps had increased the costs of partners to some extent. For example, it's no longer possible to take a motor-cycle taxi from one part of Umpiem Mai to the other, but instead one has to use a project vehicle. It's more difficult to get permits for refugees to travel outside the camp for training. Those trying to build a livelihood inside the camps now find it harder to get the raw materials that they need.

## 6.2 Inclusion

*Is the ABCDP program effectively addressing issues of gender, disability and social inclusion of different groups?*

135. The issue of social inclusion will be looked at by a separate TBC evaluation which is about to be carried out. This evaluation will be able to go further into details on this question. While the centralised management of the camps make it challenging to get open answers on these questions, it is evident that social inclusion is a challenge in the camps, especially where it collides with cultural norms.
136. Partners agree that vulnerabilities are not tracked well enough in the camps. TBC's headcounts cover some aspects of vulnerability, but do not record others such as physical or mental disability, education level or illiteracy.
137. Key informants highlighted the needs to gain a better understanding of certain groups whose vulnerability is not well understood. Disabled people are one group which is largely invisible. Some estimate that there are at least 18,000 people with physical impairment in the camps. TBC and Handicap International attempted to work further with this caseload but failed to attract funding. Save the Children is planning to systematically collect information about disability in schools.
138. The needs of Muslim camp residents are also not well understood and certain activities effectively exclude this group as they involve the handling of "haram" food-stuff for instance. Mental health workers have furthermore noted high levels of stress and anxiety within this group. During the visit two Muslim groups presented the team with petitions highlighting their protection concerns regarding a potential return to Myanmar. This further underscored the elevated anxiety within this group.
139. The clear needs of the Muslims in the camps highlights the issue of the extent to which minority needs have been considered by the camp leadership. The needs of other minority groups would also benefit from closer analysis.
140. Women's participation remains limited though some have made it to leading positions in certain camp committees. The extent of issues such as gender based violence are still not fully understood and many warn about a rise in trends as stress and uncertainty vis-à-vis long-term solutions further develops. Balancing domestic responsibilities and finding livelihood opportunities is a challenge for women and is likely to increase further as families split and husbands either return to Myanmar to see the situation or seek opportunities elsewhere.


141. Youth were often mentioned as a group in need of further attention and tailored support. Their inclusion in governance and decision making structures is limited. Their self- identity is challenged by a life in the camps and their skills are limited. DFAT's partner recognise that this is a challenges and some are seeking funding to develop projects focused on youth.
142. Language is a key factor in exclusion. The choice of one language for education or service provision limits access to those services. The camp system follows a policy of mother-tongue based education which is in line with the best practice in this area. Providing education in minority languages is challenging given the large variety of languages and the limited resources to respond to those. However, DFAT's partners plan to work with KRCEE to improve language grouping and provide mother-tongue teachers wherever possible.

## 7 Efficiency

143. *Is the program making efficient use of resources to achieve outputs, including through coordination and collaboration with other donors and humanitarian agencies?*
144. The operations seen in the camps were efficient and reflected years of learning by the agencies. The evaluation team were impressed by the professionalism and competence shown by the staff of the partners in their day to day activities.
145. The assumption of responsibility by the refugees for managing and delivering services makes it much cheaper for the partners than it might otherwise be. This had had a significant impact on the overall cost of supporting the border camps. At the same time, the closed nature of the camps makes them more expensive to support than open camps would be.
146. DFAT is seen as striving towards good humanitarian donorship. DFAT has made efforts to combine with other donors and to limit the administrative burden on partners. However partners observed that not all donors were as committed to a collaborative approach as DFAT was.

# 8 Implications of return

147. Any large scale returns will increase needs on the Myanmar side of the border. Needs will increase faster in Myanmar than they decrease in Thailand for three reasons:
- Return is considerably more expensive than maintenance in Thailand.
  - The residual population in the camps is likely to have an increasing percentage of vulnerables (Figure 3).
  - The loss of key staff will increase the cost of service provision in the camps.



**Figure 3: Implications of large scale return for the residual caseload.**

148. The message here is that return cannot be addresses simply by shifting resources from one side of the border to the other. The increasing vulnerability of the residual caseload, as the less vulnerable leave and the more vulnerable remain will lead to a higher per-capita cost for services in the camps.

## 9 Recommendations

### 9.1 Extension

149. We conclude that the needs in the border camps are likely to continue for some time. Australian assistance is making a difference especially in an environment where other donors are shifting their funding.
150. 2015 is likely to be a critical year. Elections and the hoped-for progress on nation-wide ceasefire are likely to be important milestones. It is important to note that a large scale IDP returns in the South East of Myanmar is likely to precipitate large-scale refugee returns, regardless of the position taken by the camp leadership.
151. *We recommend that DFAT should extend assistance in a flexible manner to the border camps for at least a further year and ideally until June 2017, with the option to reprogram part of the funding in the event of large scale returns.*

### 9.2 Focus on Outputs

152. Current targets for projects focus largely on activities and outputs (e.g. number of persons trained) without considering what the outcomes are (e.g. successful business start-up).
153. *We recommend that DFAT partners begin to monitor the outcomes of their assistance so that they can determine which types of assistance are likely to have the greatest positive impact.*

### 9.3 Mobile skills

154. Although many refugees have received training, this training has often been focused on the camp settings.
155. *We recommend that DFAT partners should increase the labour mobility of trainees and students.*
156. This could be done by: certification (in multiple languages) of skills and experience; the accreditation of skills in Thailand and Myanmar<sup>18</sup>; education and health convergence; cross-training of staff for similar roles in a non-camp setting; and the provision of tool-kits etc. to trainees.

### 9.4 Protection

157. Despite the age of the camps, there has been surprisingly little progress on some aspects of protection.
158. *We recommend that DFAT's partners continue to mainstream protection and promote inclusion.*
159. In particular there are still issues around the empowerment of women, GBV, child protection, and the specific needs of different age and disability groups. If the present peace process should fail, there will be a need to have much stronger protection focus in the work on the camps, to ensure that minorities are not marginalised and the needs of vulnerable people are met.

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<sup>18</sup> Currently the qualifications from the DFAT supported courses are recognised in Myanmar (through endorsements on the backs of certificates), but are not formally accredited as such.

160. More work is also needed on mine risk education. There was little evidence of the types of displays (of dummy mines, danger signs etc.) that one sees in similar contexts elsewhere. While children may be most at risk from unexploded ordnance, young adult and adolescent males are most at risk of mine strikes, and a wide range of media are needed to get the message across to this group.

## 9.5 No major changes

161. While the large role of ethnic organisations in the camps has had advantages it has also had disadvantages in such areas as inclusion, unbiased information, and in the persistence of traditional practices.
162. However, it would take many years and a large budget to restructure this control now, and this would not be a worthwhile investment.
163. *We recommend that no major changes should be made in the use of ethnic based organisations for programme implementation within the camps in the current context.*
164. This recommendation would no longer hold should the present peace process fail.

## 9.6 Monitoring and Evaluation

165. One of the weaknesses of this evaluation is that it examines only a part of the programme of assistance. In particular it does not examine all of the DFAT funding (such as volunteers etc.) or look at what is happening in the south-east of Myanmar.
166. *We recommend that any future DFAT evaluation of the support to the camps take a broader two country approach to look at both support in potential areas of return in Myanmar as well as in the border camps.*



## Appendix A      Persons met

167. The team met with two hundred and sixty six people women and men during the evaluation. This was only possible thanks the meticulous planning by the Embassy in Bangkok and DFAT's partners

<b>Title</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>
<b>Camp Committee and other leadership structures</b>	8	20
<b>Community based organisations</b>	18	6
<b>DFAT staff</b>	4	3
<b>Royal Thai Government</b>	3	4
<b>Other Donors</b>	7	1
<b>Staff of DFAT partners</b>	18	12
<b>Refugees</b>	53	21
<b>Refugee staff of partners</b>	13	19
<b>Teachers</b>	22	21
<b>UNHCR and IOM</b>	5	8
<b>Total</b>	151	115

## Appendix B Reporting against Log Frames

### B.1 Reporting against partners own log frames

168. The following are the partners own log-frames with their reporting against them (where they've used those log frames for reporting for either the first or second six monthly report). The first six monthly period was truncated due to the delay in the signing of the funding agreements. This was due first to the Caretaker period<sup>19</sup> prior to the September 2013 Australian federal election, and then pending the approval of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. The first 'six-month' period only ran from 11 November to 31 December as a result.

#### B.1.1 ADRA

169. ADRA made no report for the first period, as this overlapped with the end of their previous funding. For that period, they reported against their previous funding agreement. The apparent low achievement against targets reflects that fact that training targets are for the full period. Unlike other indicators, they are mostly cumulative rather than service level targets.

Outputs and outcomes	Indicators	Second period
Project Goal: <b>Refugees in the three Tak camps along the Thai - Myanmar border are prepared for potential repatriation with improved livelihoods and self-reliance skills</b>		
Outcome 1: <b>Camp residents have increased vocational skills</b>	# of camp residents who have demonstrated an increase of 60% in their technical skills competencies after taking a VT course  (Target: 1800, at least 50% of those being women, 2% PwD)	553 trainees (83%) demonstrated an increase of 60% in their technical skills competencies; 69% women; 17 persons (24% of 72) with disability.
Output 1.1 <b>Quality vocational training is provided, relevant to return to Myanmar</b>	# of camp residents who have completed a VT course  (Target: 1800, at least 50% of those being women, 2% PwD)	661 camp residents completed a VT course; 69% women; 17 (24% of 72) persons with disability
Output 1.2 <b>Youth have access to introductory VT courses</b>	# of high school students who have completed a short VT course  (Target: 300)	

<sup>19</sup> Australian constitutional practice is that once Parliament is dissolved pending an election, the Government avoids making major contracts or undertakings unless this is unavoidable. Parliament was dissolved on 5 August 2013.

<p><b>Output 1.3</b>  <b>Trainees who complete a vocational course will receive official certification from the Thai vocational education system</b></p>	<p>% of course graduates who receive Thai VT certificate  (Target: 80%)</p>	<p>Above target: 91% of course graduates received Thai VT certificate (601 of 661 trainees) 66% female</p>
<p><b>Output 1.4</b>  <b>Vocational trainers and KRC VT staff receive ongoing capacity building training</b></p>	<p># of trainers who receive annual ToT training  (Target: 60)  # of management capacity building trainings  (Target: 2 per year)</p>	<p>54 trainers received ToT training and of those 39% (21 of 54) were women  1 capacity building</p>
<p>Outcome 2:  <b>Trainees have complementary skills to maximize their potential to access and maintain livelihoods upon return to Myanmar</b></p>	<p>% change in pre-test, post-test life skills evaluation  (Target: 60%)</p>	<p>41 %</p>
<p>Output 2.1  <b>Vocational trainees receive additional life skills training focusing on workplace and communication skills</b></p>	<p># of VT trainees who complete a life skills module  (Target: 1,440)</p>	<p>216 trainees completed</p>
<p>Output 2.2  <b>Vocational trainees are provided with basic business and small enterprise management training</b></p>	<p># of VT trainees who complete Small Enterprise Development (SED) module  (Target: 1,440)</p>	<p>404 trainees completed SED training of which 74% were represented by women</p>
<p>Output 2.3  <b>VT trainees are given training to learn Burmese language relevant to their course</b></p>	<p>% of courses who have bilingual instruction in Burmese and Karen  (Target: 90%)  # of courses with textbooks and handouts in Burmese (in addition to Karen)  (Target: 10)</p>	<p>Above target: 93% of the courses (25 of 30 courses, 10 courses in each camp) have bilingual trainers.  100% of the courses (10 of 10 courses across 3 camps) are provided with textbooks and handouts in Burmese and Karen.</p>

<p>Outcome 3</p> <p><b>Support and facilitate dialogue between relevant key vocation education stakeholders, including relevant RTG and GoM departments, to work towards recognition of VT course certification, or RPL, and VT Trainer qualifications.</b></p>	<p>Strategic plan for stakeholder engagement developed by the end second quarter and implemented by the end of the project</p>	<p>Framework of Cooperation signed on May 22, 2014</p>
<p>Output 3.1</p> <p><b>Initiate policy dialogue among vocation education stakeholders and relevant RTG and GoM departments to develop processes for transferrable certification or RPL</b></p>	<p># of meetings with relevant vocational education stakeholders per year (Target: 2)</p>	
<p>Output 3.2</p> <p><b>Engage in the GoM led CESR to promote the re-development of VT in Myanmar in the medium to long term.</b></p>	<p># of CESR meetings/ workshops attended per year (Target: 2)</p>	

### B.1.2 IRC

170. IRC submitted report for both the first and second six month periods, but due to an oversight only the second six monthly report was provided to the evaluation.

Indicators/targets Year 1	Mae Hong Son (2 camps)	Tham Hin
Goal: To maintain and improve the health and mental health status of refugees in three camps on the Thailand-Myanmar border to ensure a healthy population prepared for any possible future return to Myanmar		
< 1/ 1,000 population/ month crude mortality rate		
<1.5/ 1,000 population/ month under 5 mortality rate		
< 60 deaths/ 1,000 live births infant mortality rate		
< 600/ 1,000/ year LRTI cases		
< 170/ 1,000/ year watery diarrhoea cases		

<b>Mortality and morbidity rates are maintained at or below the current levels during Year 1 and Year 2</b>		
<b>85% of patients express satisfaction with clinic services</b>	Above target: 92% of respondents	Above target: 93% of respondents
<b>At least 80% of children under five showing symptoms are treated for diarrhoea and acute respiratory infection according to treatment protocols.</b>	Above target: 95.5% of cases	Above target: 100% of cases
Objective 1: Refugees have access to quality primary and mental health care services in Sites 1 and 2 and primary health care in Tham Hin camps		
<b>At least 90% of target children under 1 year are fully vaccinated</b>	53.6% of target children under 1 year have been fully vaccinated	61.89% of target children under 1 year have been fully vaccinated
<b>30% recovery rate for children admitted to SFP program during the project period</b>	Above target: 52.65% recovery rate	29.41% recovery rate
<b>&lt; 5% false positive and false negative results for malaria microscopy during the project</b>		
<b>80% of targeted physically disabled people receive two home visits per month during the grant period</b>	Above target: 89%	Above target: 100%
<b>At least 85% of new mothers attend 3 post natal clinics within 6 weeks of birth</b>	Above target: 92%	Above target: 88.18%
<b>More than 95% of all deliveries are attended by skilled birth attendants in all three camps</b>	Above target: 100%	Above target: 100%
<b><u>Sites 1 and 2 only:</u> 90% of mental health patients receive at least one visit per month from KnHD psychosocial workers during Year 1</b>	Above target: 98.21%	
Objective 2: Ensure quality water and sanitation services are accessible to all residents in Sites 1 and 2 and Tham Hin camps		
<b>30 litres of water per person per day available for household consumption/use during the project</b>	Above target: 124l/day	Above target: 44.95l/day
<b>80% of tests of tap stands indicate 0 faecal coliforms per 100ml in three camps during the project</b>	Above target: 100%	Above target: 100%
<b>100% of waste collected is disposed of appropriately during the project</b>		
<b>90% of reportedly-full family latrines are</b>	Above target: 100%	Above target: 98%

replaced, emptied or appropriately maintained by families, with technical advice and materials support from the EH team		
Community members in all sections of Mae Hong Son camps participate in monthly big camp cleaning day throughout the project period		
In Tham Hin, 40% increase in the number of families that request Effective Microorganism (EM) from baseline		Since then 208 families requested EM compared to the baseline of 220 families
Population with access to clean water is maintained at over 95% in all three camps throughout the project period		
Objective3: Community-led services improve knowledge and practice of healthy behaviours by the population in Sites 1 and 2 and Tham Hin camps		
In Tham Hin, larvae is present in no more than 5% households		
60% of mothers of children <5 know how to prepare ORS by the end of the project	Above target: 84.56%	Above target: 73%
50% of residents know two or more ways of preventing HIV infection	Below target: 42.23%	Above target: 74%
60% of mothers of under-5 children reported washing their hands with soap at least at 3 defined critical times	Above target: 64.71%	Above target: 63%
240 middle school students in all three camps trained on adolescent health issues including HIV, sexually transmitted infection (STI) prevention and health knowledge by CHW School Health team	Below target: 173 middle and high school students.	No training.
Average of 20% increase in score between pre-test and post test after the adolescent health training to middle school students	• ???	???

### B.1.3 Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale

171. PU-AMI reported against their own more detailed log frame. This was by agreement with DFAT, who abstracted the monitoring data from the DFAT log-frame from the PU-AMI report. This simplified reporting for PU-AMI own only get 7% of their funding from DFAT.

<b>Objective #1: Curative healthcare services are provided in the three camps through partnership between all health stakeholders</b>		
<b>Indicators</b>	<b>1<sup>st</sup> report</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> report</b>
<b>Crude Mortality Rate in each of the 3 camps is ≤ 1.5 deaths/1,000/month</b>	0.3	0.3
<b>Under 5 Mortality Rate in each of the 3 camps is ≤ 3.0 deaths/1,000/month</b>	0.0	0.2
<b>Average number of OPD consultations /medic/day is ≤ 50</b>	37	30
<b>OPD utilization rate is between 1.0 and 4.0 consultations / refugee / year</b>	1.79 (males) and 2.23 (females)	1.59 (males) and 2.03 (females)
<b>Average emergency referral rate from IPDs to Thai hospitals is ≤ 8.0%</b>	5%	5%
<b>Objective #2: An effective system for disease prevention &amp; control is implemented in the three camps in coordination with all health partners and through community participation, with a particular emphasis on preventive healthcare in Mae La</b>		
<b>Global Acute Malnutrition Rate for children under 5 years old in Mae La is ≤ 5%<sup>20</sup></b>	No data (TBC survey every 2 years)	1.6 for 2013
<b>Diarrhea morbidity rate for each of the 3 camps is ≤ 300 cases/1,000/year</b>	88	118
<b>Full immunization coverage rate in Mae La for children under one year old is ≥ 90%</b>	96% for DTP-HepB3, 96% for Polio3 due to nation-wide measles vaccination shortage	127%
<b>Growth monitoring utilization rate for CU1 in Mae La is greater or equal to 80%</b>	85%	83%
<b>100% of reported outbreaks investigated in less than 48h</b>		
<b>Objective #3: HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care are provided to the community and PLWHA with a focus on risk reduction for MARGs.</b>		

<sup>20</sup> NB: Assuming TBC will continue to measure this in the future. As this data is gathered from TBC, gender disaggregated data may not be available.

<b>ART defaulter rate is <math>\leq</math> 5%</b>	0%	0%
<b>At least 80% of CBO members attending 3 refresher training sessions of 2 days on HIV/AIDS prevention &amp; control will score a minimum of 70% on the post-test.</b>	No training	89%
<b>110 PLWHA will attend at least to 75% of the self help group/social gathering meetings</b>	100 PLWHA attended at least 75% of groups/gatherings	62%
<b>Objective #4: Mental health services are provided in the three camps</b>		
<b>At least 80% of new patients receive at least one follow-up counselling session</b>	59%	73%
<b>800 new patients will receive at least one counselling session by PSWs</b>	100	301
<b>Each quarter, one four-week long group activities course will be organized to promote positive coping strategies</b>	2 courses were conducted in each of the 3 camps	1 course was conducted in each of the 3 camps
<b>One mental health awareness training session on SGBV per semester will be held with PU AMI health workers to raise awareness, reduce stigma, promote social inclusion, and increase referrals.</b>	n/a	activity delayed
<b>Objective #5: Health workforce is reinforced and increased through capacity building and supervision.</b>		
<b>80% of PU-AMI health workforce* will score at least 60% at their 6-month theoretical evaluation.</b>	n/a	100%
<b>One refresher training per month per health workforce* category will be organized</b>	24 refresher trainings	71 refresher trainings were conducted in the 3 camps
<b>PU-AMI will support 2 stakeholder trainings.</b>	1 training	

#### B.1.4 Save the Children

172. Save the Children have reported on both periods, but the team only had access to reporting for one period at the time of analysis. Save the Children' proposal provided detailed timelines for the implementation and provided more detailed numerical indicators than those listed in the outputs. Save the Children reported against the DFAT log-frame.



<b>Outcome 1: School age children in the nine camps are supported to access basic education</b>
<b>Output</b>
<b>Output 1.1: Schools in the targeted basic education schools in the seven Karen camps are adequately equipped with teaching-learning materials (in accordance with established camp standards)</b>
<b>Output 1.2: 100% of priority school repairs are carried out</b>
<b>Output 1.3: Teachers, principals, and KRCEE/OCEE staff are supported</b>
<b>Output 1.4: Undertake an assessment of barriers to education, including gender and disability issues, identify needs and develop strategies to address them</b>
<b>Output 1.5: For separated students in schools in all nine camps, map areas of origin and last known family locations</b>
<b>Output 1.6: Out of school children and youth gain access to education services</b>
<b>Outcome 2: Improved quality of basic education provided in schools in the camps</b>
<b>Output 2.1: Basic education teachers and education personnel are trained to provide quality education services</b>
<b>Output 2.2: KRCEE/OCEE staff are provided with relevant training, capacity building and technical support</b>
<b>Output 2.3: Teachers are trained on holistic student assessment</b>
<b>Output 2.4: Teachers and school administrators are trained in child protection and child rights in schools</b>
<b>Output 2.5: System for increasing teacher retention is developed and implemented</b>
<b>Output 2.6: Action plan developed on addressing language issues in the education system in the context of transition and inclusion</b>
<b>Output 2.7: Systems for monitoring, coaching, and supervising of teachers and school personnel are implemented</b>
<b>Output 2.8: Schools in 7 Karen camps have PTAs or similar school governance structures</b>
<b>Outcome 3: Progress towards education convergence in Thailand and Myanmar is achieved</b>
<b>Output 3.1: Refugee-led strategies and action plans are developed and locally endorsed, and are aligned with sustainable education solutions</b>
<b>Output 3.2: Ensure that key education issues related to refugees and convergence are included in the Comprehensive Education Sector Review (CESR) process and other relevant forums</b>
<b>Output 3.3: Steps are made towards certification of pre- and in-service teacher training and of the learning attainment of K-12 students</b>
<b>Output 3.4: Promote education convergence through cooperation and policy dialogue in both Thailand and Myanmar</b>

## B.1.5 The Border Consortium

173. There was no reporting against this log frame as it contains a large number of indicators for a wide range of donors. It is included for completeness. TBC plans to make a completed log-frame with results indicators publically available.

OBJECTIVES	Performance indicator (outcome level)
<p><b>1. Readiness:</b> Displaced persons and local communities are supported to advocate and prepare for voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return to and reintegration in SE Myanmar when conditions are conducive.</p>	
	<p>1.01: UNHCR/government voluntary return frameworks incorporate views of displaced people.</p> <p>1.02: Number of civil society organizations supported by TBC to participate in return planning processes in Thailand (Target 25 CSOs).</p> <p>1.03: Proportion of displaced persons, including women and vulnerable groups, reporting satisfaction with quality and comprehensiveness of return-related information received.</p> <p>1.04: Number of TBC supported initiatives in which civil society organisations engage in policy dialogue in Burma/Myanmar about protection issues (Target 5 initiatives).</p>
<p><b>2. Economic &amp; Social Development</b> Prioritising women and marginalised groups, support displaced and conflict-affected communities, to re-establish sustainable livelihoods through skills enhancement, social capital development and the creation of economic opportunities</p>	
	<p>2.0.1: Number of townships in South East Burma/Myanmar where TBC facilitated community rehabilitation projects are implemented (Target 20 Townships).</p> <p>2.0.2: Number of stipend work jobs created (temporary, part-time, and full-time), including for women and vulnerable population groups.</p> <p>2.0.3: Number of refugees establishing and maintaining viable entrepreneurial activities.</p> <p>2.0.4: Number of refugees adopting improved gardening, animal husbandry and shelter techniques.</p>
<p><b>3. Humanitarian Support:</b> Humanitarian assistance is targeted to the most vulnerable and supports household capacities and strategies that contribute to food security and shelter.</p>	
	<p>3.0.1: Crude mortality rate (CMR) remains under 7/1,000 per year in Thai refugee camps</p> <p>3.0.2: Under-5 mortality rate (U5MR) remains under 8/1,000 per year in Thai</p>

OBJECTIVES	Performance indicator (outcome level)
	<p>refugee camps.</p> <p>3.0.3: Rate of children (m/f) under five years old with wasting malnutrition remains under 5% in Thai refugee camps.</p> <p>3.0.4: Prevalence of stunting malnutrition reduced in children age 6 months to 24 months in selected intervention sites annually by at least 5% from current levels in selected sites in Thai refugee camps.</p> <p>3.0.5: CMT approach implemented in 9 camps and households categorized according to vulnerability.</p> <p>3.0.6: Eucalyptus, bamboo and thatch provide sufficient covered space for all refugees (3.5–4.5 m<sup>2</sup>/person) in Thai refugee camps.</p> <p>3.0.7: % of beneficiary households with inadequate food consumption scores in IDP camps in South East Burma/Myanmar (Target &lt;33%).</p> <p>3.0.8: Number of civilians in South East Burma/Myanmar suffering from shocks to livelihoods or chronic poverty assisted with cash transfers (Target 34,000 civilians).</p>
	<p><b>4. Participation &amp; Governance:</b> Accountable and inclusive programme, governance and reconciliation processes are strengthened through increasing community leadership capacities, promoting civil society engagement and ensuring community participation.</p>
	<p>4.0.1: Community-based camp management model functioning in all camps.</p> <p>4.0.2: Electoral procedures in place and adhered to in all camps enabling transparent and fair elections.</p> <p>4.0.3: Percentage of elected community representatives that are women.</p>
	<p><b>5. Organisational Development:</b> TBC's organisational resources and structure in Thailand and Myanmar respond to the shifting and expanding programme directions</p>

## B.2 Reporting against the DFAT log frame

### B.2.1 ADRA

174. As ADRA did not report against the DFAT log frame but against their own one, the following has been prepared by the evaluation team.

Program 3, Outcome 8: Men and women are trained in targeted vocational and self-reliance skills and training qualifications are recognised by Thai and Burmese Governments				
<b>Output 8.1 VET courses that align to Burma livelihoods opportunities are provided to refugees in three camps</b>	# and % of refugees who have completed a VET course	1800 (50% female)		553 trainees; 69% women.
	% of VET trainees with bilingual instruction (Karen/ Burmese)	90%		Above target: 93%
	# of VET trainees that complete supplementary life-skills course	1440 (50% female)		216
<b>Output 8.2 VET trainees have life skills to maximise their potential to access and maintain livelihoods for the future</b>	% change in pre- and post-test life skills evaluation	60%		41 %
<b>Output 8.3 VET qualifications are certified by the Thai education system and a strategic plan for recognition in Burma is agreed and implemented</b>	% of course graduates that receive a Thai VET certificate	80% (50% female)		Above target: 91% ; 66% female
	Strategic plan on stakeholder engagement completed	1		Framework of Cooperation signed
	# of policy dialogue meetings with GoM on VET certificate recognition	2		nil

### B.2.2 IRC

IRC reported against both their own and DFAT's log frame for the second six-month reporting period.

<b>Objective 2: Refugees in three camps achieve and maintain good general health and mental health status</b>		
Programme 2, Outcome 5: Primary health	MHS	TH
<b>Indicator 1: 70% of mothers of children under six months give exclusive breast feeding up to six months of age</b>	54.4%	No data - KPC survey is scheduled for July 2014

<b>Indicator 2: 90% of children aged below 23 months who receive vitamin A and mebendazole supplementation</b>	Above target: 92.2%	Above target: 93.75%
<b>Indicator 3: 85% of deliveries are attended by a skilled birth attendant in three camps</b>	See Objective 1, Indicator 6 above Above target: 100%	See Objective 1, Indicator 6 above Above target: 100%
<b>Indicator 4: 120 and 80% of new mental health patients who receive at least two counselling sessions in the three camps</b>	97.72%	No counselling
<b>Indicator 5: 90% of children under 1 year are fully vaccinated in three camps</b>	See Objective 1, Indicator 1 above. 53.6% of target children under 1 year have been fully vaccinated	See Objective 1, Indicator 1 above. 61.89% of target children under 1 year have been fully vaccinated
Programme 2, Outcome 6: Refugees in three camps have community led improvements in knowledge and practices of health behaviour		
<b>Indicator 1: 60% of residents know two or more ways of preventing HIV infection</b>	See Objective 3, Indicator 3 above. Below target: 42.23%	See Objective 3, Indicator 3 above. Above target: 74%
<b>Indicator 2: 70% of mothers of under-5 children reported washing their hands with soap at least at 3 defined critical times</b>	See Objective 3, Indicator 4 above 64.71%	See Objective 3, Indicator 4 above 63%
Programme 2, Outcome 7: Environmental health in three camps is managed and maintained		
<b>Indicator 1: Population with access to clean water is maintained at over 95% in all three camps throughout the project period</b>	See Objective 2, Indicator 7 above. Above target: 100%	See Objective 2, Indicator 7 above. Above target: 100%
<b>Indicator 2: 30 litres of water per person per day available for household consumption/use in all three camps</b>	See Objective 2, Indicator 1 above. Above target: 124l/p/day	See Objective 2, Indicator 1 above. Above target: 44.95l/p/day
<b>Indicator 3: 50/100/year Malaria incidence in Tham Hin and Ban Mae Surin</b>	The incidence of malaria cases in Ban Mae Surin camp was 34.8/1,000/year	The incidence rate of malaria during this period was 19.92/1,000 population/year
<b>Indicator 4: 30/100/year Malaria incidence in Ban Mai Nai Soi</b>	The incidence of malaria cases in Ban	

	Mai Nai Soi camp was 13.2/1,000/year	
<b>Objective 3: Refugees in seven camps are educated and trained, and qualifications are recognised in Thailand and/or Burma</b>		
Programme 2, Outcome 9: Qualifications of community healthcare workers are recognised in Burma or Thailand		
<b>Indicator 1: 8 curriculum modules developed for the Thammasat University certified healthcare training and used in certified training of border health workforce</b>	all modules developed (training to start in 07/2014)	
<b>Indicator 2: 2 meetings with/ visits by Union-level Burma government officials resulting in agreed action points that contribute to the recognition of certified healthcare training programmes</b>	1 meeting was conducted	
<b>Indicator 3: 4 meetings/workshops on convergence issues involving border-based CBOs and Burmese government that result in agreed action points relating to training of CBO staff by the Burmese government, service delivery collaboration and/or commodity support.</b>	3 meetings on convergence issue were conducted	

### B.2.3 Première Urgence / Aide Médicale Internationale

175. PU-AMI reported only against their own log frame. The achievements listed here have been drawn by the evaluation team from the PU-AMI log frame.

<b>Program 2, Outcome 5: Quality primary health-care and mental health care services in six camps are accessible to men, women, boys and girls</b>			<b>Report 1</b>	<b>Report 2</b>
<b>Output 5.1</b> <b>Refugees in six camps have access to quality health care services, including maternal and child health care</b>	Under-5 mortality rate	≤3.0 or ≤1.5 /1,000/month	0.0	<b>0.2</b>
	% of children under 1 year who are fully vaccinated in 4 camps	90%	96% for DTP--- HepB3, 96% for Polio3 due to nation--- wide measles vaccination shortage	<b>127%</b>
<b>Output 5.2</b> <b>Refugees in six</b>	# and % of new mental health patients that	800/ 90%	100 patients, 59% with	301 patients,

<b>camps have access to quality mental health care services</b>	receive at least two counselling sessions		follow-up session	73% with follow-up session
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#### B.2.4 Save the Children

176. Save the Children reported against both periods. It should be noted that DFAT's log frame included quantifiable indicators and targets whereas the Save the Children one does not.

<b>Program 3, Outcome 9: Girls and boys in seven camps access quality education</b>			<b>2<sup>nd</sup> period</b>
<b>Output 9.1 Basic education provided to school age children in camp schools meets guiding principles for quality learning environments</b>	Pass rates of basic education facility on quality of learning environment (QLE) standards	80%	69%
	% and # of teachers trained	80%, 584	68%
	# of children enrolled	30,000 (estimate)	
	% of enrolment rates of eligible students	80%	80%
<b>Output 9.2 Assessment is undertaken and a strategy developed to address barriers to access of basic education</b>	# of assessments on barriers to access assessment report	1	
	Strategy on mitigating barriers to education in camps	1	
Program 3, Outcome 10: Refugees are engaged in strategy to ensure their education is valued and recognized if they return to Burma			
<b>Output 10.1 Basic education and teacher qualifications are progressively recognised by Thai and/or Burma education departments</b>	# of convergence meetings in Burma and/or Thailand with multiple stakeholder representation	6 meetings >4 agencies	2 meetings
	Teacher qualifications recognition strategy developed & implemented	1 strategy	research started
<b>Output 10.2 A collaborative process for education convergence between</b>	Refugee-led strategy for sustainable education solutions is endorsed by ethnic education stakeholders	4 endorsements	5 endorsements

<b>Thailand and Burma, including a joint convergence plan, is developed and implemented</b>	Refugee education convergence agenda promoted among Burmese Government education stakeholders	4 meetings	1 meeting
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### B.2.5 The Border Consortium

177. TBC only reported against the DFAT log frame for the second period, but their narrative reporting for both periods is set against their own log frame.

Result s	Indicator	Achievements (2nd Period)
<b>Objective 1: Refugees have confidence in the peace process, influence preparedness and planning for return and make informed choices about the future</b>		
Program 1, Outcome 1: Accountable, transparent and inclusive systems of governance are established		
<b>Camp management is participatory and community led</b>	Electoral procedures in place and adhered to in all camps enabling transparent and fair elections.	
<b>Women and minority groups are represented and elected into positions of leadership in camp management structures</b>	Percentage of elected community representatives that are women.	33% are women
Program 1, Outcome 2: Refugees effectively engage in peace-building activities		
<b>Civil society is actively and effectively engaged in advocacy and inclusive reconciliation processes</b>	Number of forums facilitated by TBC for non-state actors or civil society representatives to exchange and verify information with each other and/or international community.	10 forums were attended by civil society organisations with support from TBC
Program 1, Outcome 3: Refugees have access and contribute to timely, credible and relevant information regarding durable solutions		
<b>Preparedness for return and reintegration planning are inclusive and shaped by refugee communities</b>	Number of government/ UN/ CCSDPT consultations with displaced people target: 13/year	Above target: 33 forums were organised by TBC and 17 by CCSDPT



<b>Information Centres are established in nine camps</b>	Number of information Centres established	The first two centres were inaugurated in Tham Hin and Ban Mai Nai Soi; <i>rolling out to the other camps will follow</i>
OBJECTIVE 2: Refugees in six camps achieve and maintain good general health and mental health status		
Program 1, Outcome 4: Refugee households have economic and food security		
<b>Most vulnerable refugees are effectively targeted and receive food assistance</b>	3.1.1: All eligible refugees receive basic monthly food rations (as per TBC policy on kcals/person/day for different population categories).	As of June 2014, food rations were provided to 118,917 refugees on TBC's verified caseload; CMP implemented in 9 camps.
<b>Refugees have adequate shelter</b>	3.0.6: Eucalyptus, bamboo and thatch provide sufficient covered space for all refugees (3.5–4.5 m <sup>2</sup> /person) in Thai refugee camps.	3.5–4.5 m <sup>2</sup> /person
<b>Refugees establish and lead commercial and agriculture enterprise creation in camps</b>	2.0.3: Number of refugees (men and women) establishing and maintaining viable entrepreneurial activities.	1.092 new refugees (65% female) in the reporting period
	2.0.4: Number of refugees (men and women) adopting improved gardening, animal husbandry and shelter techniques.	1.392 new refugees (547 women, or 39%)
	2.0.2: Number of stipend work jobs created (temporary, part-time, and full-time), including for women and vulnerable population groups.	2.966 stipend workers employed as of June 2014 (30.2% women, or 39.6% excluding the predominantly male security staff)