



Submission to the
Australian Multilateral Assessment

October 2011

1 Introduction

- 1.1 Oxfam Australia welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Australian Multilateral Assessment. Australia has demonstrated a long-standing commitment to multilateralism, and the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness recommendations and the Government response reinforce this commitment. Oxfam recognises the delivery of aid through multilateral development organisations as a vital component of the Australian aid program.
- 1.2 Oxfam has long called for a more systematic and rigorous approach to monitoring Australian aid delivery through multilateral institutions, and for more debate on the role of multilateral organisations within the Australian aid program. The AMA, and the opportunity to provide public submissions, is therefore welcome.
- 1.3 The AMA is a timely and appropriate exercise in the context of a growing aid program, in particular given the Independent Review's recommendations for increased funding for multilateral organisations, including the possible doubling or trebling of contributions to those identified as good performers. The Review's recommendation for increased contributions to some humanitarian assistance organisations is also appropriate.
- 1.4 We recognise that the AMA has a specific purpose: to develop a multilateral rating system. It represents just one step in a range of ongoing measures that are required to ensure the overall and long term effectiveness of Australia's multilateral development cooperation. Oxfam has a long history of engagement with the Australian Government on many of these measures. We therefore regard this submission as a continuation of this engagement, rather than as a one-off input.
- 1.5 We highlight the following as key considerations that underpin Australia's effective multilateral development cooperation:
 - 1.5.1 The guiding principle for Australia's support for multilateral organisations should be their demonstrated commitment to, and effectiveness in bringing about poverty reduction and sustainable development. Priority should also be given to institutions that demonstrate accountability and transparency, that ensure developing country ownership, that respect and implement human rights, and that address gender equality.
 - 1.5.2 Australia should use its influence within multilateral organisations to ensure their governance becomes more democratic, and that developing countries – and their citizens – have greater voice and influence in relation to organisational policy and programs.
 - 1.5.3 Australia should continue to measure effectiveness against its own development objectives as well as against joint donor and international performance measures. The use of the AMA to develop a system for updating annual assessments of Australia's multilateral partners will be a useful addition to this approach. In addition, Australia should also institute independent monitoring and reporting on Australian contributions, including breakdown of earmarked funds.

- 1.5.4 Multilateral accountability should include mechanisms for target communities and partners to provide feedback on multilateral organisations' performance and impact. Australia should also measure and report on multilateral institutions' performance in implementing the safeguard policies and accountability requirements that apply to multilateral development banks.
- 1.5.5 Australia should prioritise support for multilateral organisations that are transparent regarding their policies, programs and activities, and, in particular, that make this information available and accessible to target countries and communities.
- 1.5.6 The Government should also improve its own transparency regarding its support for multilateral organisations. Until recently, little systematic data has been publicly available on the effectiveness and even break-down of Australian aid to different multilateral institutions. AusAID should provide more regular and comprehensive information to the Australian public on how Australia is assessing multilateral effectiveness.
- 1.5.7 Australia should use its ongoing support to the UN Humanitarian System to leverage necessary improvements in UN performance, leadership and transparency. The AMA and the proposed annual updates provide an important opportunity not only to monitor the effectiveness of UN agency performance in humanitarian response, but also to apply appropriate pressure to challenge poor UN performance, demand increased accountability and improve funding arrangements to ensure predictable, timely and cost efficient disbursement.
- 1.5.8 Oxfam agrees that results and value for money are central considerations for effectiveness and should be key criteria for the AMA. An emphasis on tangible results, however, must not lead to a focus on easier to achieve objectives at the expense of potentially more significant outcomes that may be more difficult to measure. "Results" from multilateral aid should be understood in terms of assistance that creates significant positive change in peoples' lives. Similarly, assessment of value for money should take into account what this means for people living in poor countries.

The AMA and an ongoing ratings system

- 1.6 Oxfam commends the Government for its plans to build on the AMA to develop an ongoing annual ratings system. In so doing, the following issues should be taken into account:
 - 1.6.1 It will be important to develop ranking criteria in a way that are properly representative of achievements or lack thereof. The use of criteria that result in oversimplified or generalised rankings will run the risk of seriously deceptive assessments.
 - 1.6.2 For the findings of an annual ratings system to be truly representative, they must improve and strengthen systematic feedback channels for the target groups and communities that receive and are impacted on by multilateral assistance. The Government's tight timeframe for the AMA has constrained the ability for on-ground civil society and community input. It is essential that future annual updates give adequate time, space and channels for target groups to provide input and feedback. This will enhance the credibility of the process, but will require forward planning and resource inputs, which should be adequately budgeted.

- 1.6.3 Australia should consider the human rights performance and focus of multilateral institutions as part of an ongoing ratings system. Respect, protection and advancement of human rights are inherent in a number of the criteria used in the current AMA methodology. Australia's commitment to human rights has been a hallmark of our multilateral engagement since the inception of the United Nations. Oxfam believes an ongoing ratings system should continue to assess multilaterals' contribution to human rights advancement through their mandates, as well as through their operations and impacts, even where human rights are not explicitly mandated

Core and earmarked funding

- 1.7 The AMA and annual updates will play a central role in informing budgetary allocations to multilateral organisations, and should be drawn on in particular to determine core funding amounts. As indicated in the Independent Review, Australia should review the share of core and earmarked funding it provides to multilateral organisations, and consider substantial core funding increases to organisations. Oxfam agrees these increases should be made on a case-by-case basis, linked to effectiveness, capacity and relevance. At the same time, the strategic use of earmarked funding may be appropriate in particular circumstances.
- 1.8 Australia needs to ensure effective monitoring mechanisms for assessing its core contributions to multilateral organisations. Given that overall core funding will likely increase, this will require commensurate increases in Australia's own monitoring and evaluation capacity and processes, and appropriate resourcing. The monitoring and evaluation of core contributions should facilitate meaningful and informed participation of civil society groups that are target groups or primary stakeholders of key multilateral institutions. Such reviews may not need to occur annually, but on a rolling or as needs basis across the portfolio.

About this submission

- 1.9 This submission focuses, as per the AMA Terms of Reference, on the effectiveness of selected multilateral organisations. It provides assessment and analysis for these organisations, and emphasises information of particular relevance for the AMA. We also make specific recommendations in selected areas. In some cases, we also refer to information relevant to broader and ongoing considerations of multilateral effectiveness.
- 1.10 This submission draws on Oxfam's in-country programming experience and long standing policy dialogue with the Australian Government and with multilateral institutions. We look forward to further direct consultation with AusAID on the AMA, and to continued dialogue regarding multilateral development cooperation and effectiveness.
- 1.11 The following multilateral organisations and themes are addressed in this submission:
- Asian Development Bank and World Bank
 - Multilateral institutions and private sector development
 - Multilateral agency performance in humanitarian response
 - OCHA
 - WFP
 - UNHCR
 - UNICEF
 - UNDP
 - UNISDR

- FAO
- Climate Financing

2 Asian Development Bank and World Bank

- 2.1 Oxfam has a long-standing regular dialogue with the Australian government in regard to aid delivery through multilateral development banks (MDBs), including through the MDB round-table, project and policy monitoring, information sharing with AusAID and coordinated interaction with the Australian representatives on the boards of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank.
- 2.2 The 2011 Independent Review suggests potential “substantial” increases in funding to the ADB and World Bank. If well directed and monitored, these increases have the potential of leading to poverty reduction. However, in each of the above forums through which we engage with the Australian Government, we have shared our analysis and policy critique on the ADB and World Bank, and our assessment that if poorly directed, their projects and programs can have adverse impacts on poverty reduction and sustainable development. For aid delivery through MDBs to deliver positive outcomes, the banks must significantly improve their modus operandi and implementation.
- 2.3 In addition, current trends at some MDBs threaten to roll back achievements on accountability, safeguards and due diligence in project and program implementation.ⁱ **Concurrent with its increased contributions to the MDBs, the Australian Government has the obligation to influence developments in these institutions so that they contribute to demonstrable positive outcomes on the ground that are verified by target group evaluations, and that prevent adverse impacts and regressive trends. This will require AusAID to seriously assess current staff allocations for monitoring and engaging with the MDBs, and increase them in line with increased funding allocations.**

Comments on AMA components

- 2.4 The following section is a summary analysis of selected components of the AMA methodology. The comments are specific to the ADB due to Oxfam Australia’s experience and evidence base on that institution. In some cases, similar analyses can be made for the World Bank.
- 2.5 We also draw your special attention to the Oxfam-Mannagum discussion paper “Banking on Aid”, which analyses the role of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in the Australian aid program, and the implications of this.

Component 1: Delivering results on poverty reduction and sustainable development in line with mandate

Poverty reduction

- 2.5.1 Since the ADB defined its overarching goal as poverty reduction in 1999, it has taken various approaches to promoting this goal. Following the redefinition of the goal in 1999, it pursued an approach that included an increased percentage of direct poverty reduction projects. However, this approach was eventually abandoned and replaced by a broader project

classification model. The ADB has now restated its poverty reduction and growth model which relies on infrastructure-driven macro-economic growth.

- 2.5.2 This approach presents two substantial weaknesses. Firstly, it fails to assess and safeguard against the trade-offs of large-scale infrastructure for local communities. Despite the ADB's safeguard policies, large-scale projects often result in local communities being worse off than before the project.ⁱⁱ In Oxfam's view, these negative impacts are a result both of the lack of the implementation of the ADB's current safeguard policies, and also of the remaining inadequacies of these policies (see Oxfam 2010).
- 2.5.3 Secondly, while the ADB has developed a complex and multi-layered performance monitoring system, there is very little information about the distributive effect of macro-economic growth generated by large-scale infrastructure projects. The discrepancy in the ADB's achievements in its 2010 development effectiveness review (ADB 2010) in outputs (good) and outcomes (poor) underlines the need for the ADB to ensure that its operations have the intended results.
- 2.5.4 In addition, inputs into the ADB's performance evaluation are dominated by views of those considered *clients* by the ADB, namely governments and private sector. There is very little traceable input from the ADB's target communities. **The Australian Government should encourage the ADB to be true to its mandate of poverty reduction and to redirect its emphasis towards views and needs of its direct target groups and develop better mechanisms to do so.**

Sustainable development

- 2.5.5 In recent years, the ADB has publicly recognised the need for growth and development to be sustainable and inclusive. (Strategy 2020; Asia 2050). It is not clear, however, whether the ADB is addressing this adequately in policy and practice.
- 2.5.6 For instance, even though it has produced a series of guiding documents that call for an adapted growth model, the ADB's modus operandi remains largely centred around macro-economic targets and measurements. According to information provided by the ADB to Oxfam in March 2010, its 1997 Guidelines for the Economic Assessment of Projects are still being used as the basic methodological framework for cost-benefit analysis. These guidelines focus on "maximizing (sic) net output or income" in a way that ensures "consistency with the Bank's focus on the social sectors and the environment." (ADB1997: 1) The larger part of these guidelines focuses on economic valuations of projects. A very small section under project sustainability deals with environmental sustainability.
- 2.5.7 The environmental sustainability section that does exist requires that even though it may not always be possible to put monetary values on all types of environmental impacts, environmental costs and benefits should be as explicit as possible (in project accounting). (ADB 1997: 45) The accompanying appendix on economic valuation of environmental impacts, however, contains different wording. Conceding that environmental accounting is still evolving, it requires that only Category A projects (category with most significant environmental impacts) or large project should be valued for environmental cost-benefits.

The case of the Song-Bung 4 Hydropower Project in Vietnam demonstrates how a predominantly economic analysis skews the true project costs and benefits. Approved in 2006, Song Bung 4 is classified as Category A for environmental impacts under ADB's categorisation system, the category with the highest environmental impacts. The Environmental Impact Assessment (SWECO 2007a) details significant environmental impacts such as ecological fragmentation, loss of topsoil, increased erosion, and a reduction of fish yield from 70 percent to 90 percent with minimum flow release.

According to the Main Report for Phase II of Song Bung 4, (SWECO 2007b), the economic valuation of the costs and benefits of the project were undertaken in accordance with the ADB's Guidelines for Economic Analysis of Projects (1997), which given that the project is Category A would have required an environmental cost-benefit analysisⁱⁱⁱ.

Despite the requirement under Category A, however, it appears that this recognized cost-benefit valuation was not applied for Song Bung 4. Instead, the costs related to environmental (and social) impacts cited in the project documents only calculate the cost for mitigating impacts (SWECO 2007 a, p. 117, Table: Investment Costs of SB 4). Based on this calculation of mitigation only, the environmental cost for the project is valued at USD 0.56 million, equating to 0.2 % of the total investment cost, and the social mitigation cost is valued at USD 18.03 million equating to 7 % of the total investment cost. Had the environmental cost benefit analysis valued the services and assets of the impacted environment, the investment cost balance for the project would have resulted in different numbers.

- 2.5.8 The ADB should update its traditional modelling framework with current best practices. Much new material has been developed on integrated cost benefit accounting. The UK National Ecosystems Assessment Technical Report (2011) and the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity initiative, hosted by UNEP (TEEB 2011) are cutting edge methodologies that provide tools for valuing the economic benefits of natural assets.
- 2.5.9 Even though the ADB, like other development partners, has started to emphasise and recognise the need for inclusive growth, there is little information available as to how this will translate into changes in ADB operations. **The Australian Government should promote inclusive growth and address growing inequity, and the ADB should detail and implement a concrete plan towards this objective.** The tool of benefit sharing^{iv} (see World Commission on Dams 2000) could be one tool among a series of measures to ensure inclusive growth and prevent unsustainable trade-offs.
- 2.5.10 **The Australian Government should urge the ADB to mainstream best practices in integrated cost-benefit accounting to ensure that projects are economically, environmentally and socially sustainable. This also includes actively using the environmental and social data produced by**

its various knowledge centres, such as the Core Environment Program of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) or the Poverty Knowledge Database and the Independent Evaluation Department (IED).

Component 4: Strategic management and performance

Staff incentives

2.5.11 ADB donors, including Australia, have put much emphasis on human resources reform within the organisation, some of which has been implemented. One of the major gaps in this reform, however, pertains to staff incentive structures. Even though there may have been adjustments to how staff are rewarded, loan processing is still a key feature of ADB performance assessment. Despite repeated calls from civil society, including Oxfam, the ADB has not made safeguard policy compliance a significant part of staff assessment and incentives. If the ADB is serious about mainstreaming safeguard policies and promoting sustainable development, it is essential that staff members are assessed and rewarded against these criteria.

Institutional learning

2.5.12 The extent of institutional learning within the ADB is unclear. The ADB's operational departments, knowledge and research units, its independent evaluations department and the Asian Development Bank Institute produce a plethora of studies, evaluations, research and analysis. However, it appears that much of the evaluations and data produced is not used to inform and guide general ADB operations or specific projects. Some of the projects under the GMS projects are unlikely to have been designed and approved in their current form if environmental data had been taken into account (see Oxfam 2006).

2.5.13 In some cases, it appears that ADB project and program designs may either ignore or go against IED findings and recommendations. One such example is the design of technical assistance project for mitigation of resettlement-induced poverty and debt for the Highway 1 Project. This was based on a micro-credit scheme, despite IED findings that micro-credit is an unsuitable poverty reduction measure for impoverished communities^v (ADB 2007). Oxfam has not undertaken an overall assessment of how many ADB projects contradict IED recommendations. **However, Oxfam encourages the Australian government to urge the ADB to abide by the findings of its own evaluations in future program and project design.**

Component 5: Cost and value consciousness

2.5.14 As illustrated under component 1, in the instance of safeguards, the ADB's approach to costing and the overvaluing of economic indicators may lead to a skewed cost-benefit analysis that ignores long-term social and environmental costs and benefits and that ultimately jeopardises long-term sustainable development. Oxfam's experience of ADB project and policy monitoring is that the ADB tends towards avoiding upfront cost at the risk of paying higher long-term or mitigation costs. Effective cost and value consciousness would

assess costs in a way that short term gains are not offset by long-term losses. In this sense, it is disappointing that some parts of the ADB still take a defensive approach when it comes to safeguards implementation and promotion. **The Australian Government should encourage the ADB to recognise the value of safeguard policies for long-term sustainable, inclusive growth and promote them as a comparative advantage and selling point rather than take a defensive position. Country systems should be developed in this spirit and the ADB should not shy away from its obligation to monitor and enforce safeguard policy implementation.**

Component 7: Transparency and accountability

Transparency

- 2.5.15 The ADB is probably one of the forerunners on transparency amongst the multilateral development banks. The last public communications policy provided more access to ADB documents, and the ADB's website is fairly accessible and navigable when searching for ADB documents.
- 2.5.16 The ADB's greatest weakness regarding transparency and information disclosure is its failure to effectively reach project affected communities. While English-speaking NGOs are able to utilise the ADB's project and policy documents, this information is inaccessible for most of ADB's intended target groups, including extremely poor people. **The ADB should improve its outreach and communication with project affected communities and target groups in appropriate language, format and medium.**

Accountability

- 2.5.17 Oxfam has provided detailed comments on the ADB's Accountability Mechanism Review, which are still relevant given the current direction of the review (for details on Oxfam submissions and papers, see Annex 1). In summary, despite the Accountability Mechanism, there have been very few tangible improvements for project affected communities who have suffered harm due to ADB projects. The current proposed Accountability Mechanism has not built-in improvements in this regard.
- 2.5.18 Even if the Accountability Mechanism will be significantly improved in line with civil society recommendations, the ADB's commitment to accountability must go further. **The Australian Government should signal to Bank Management that it in particular, that it must be prepared to suspend projects until they have been brought back in to compliance to prevent further harm. Where harm has already occurred due to policy violations, it must provide adequate budget for redress. In serious cases of continued policy violations during project implementation by the borrower, Bank Management should not shy away from project cancellation.** A recent example of taking such a necessary last resort-measure is the decision by the World Bank to suspend its entire portfolio to

Cambodia in light of the gross policy violations by the Cambodian government in regard to involuntary resettlement.

3 Multilateral institutions and private sector development

- 3.1 Economic growth is an important contributor to poverty alleviation. Oxfam recognizes that, providing appropriate regulations and controls exist, the private sector can be a driver of economic growth and poverty reduction – and that multilateral organisations have an important role to play in financing and supporting private sector development in developing countries.
- 3.2 Oxfam's work in relation to private sector involvement in the mining, hydropower, infrastructure, garment and apparel sectors, and increasingly in agribusiness, demonstrates the need for better implementation of corporate accountability and corporate governance initiatives. Private sector influence on development outcomes represents a complex dynamic; and due diligence is required to identify, mitigate, prevent and remedy adverse impacts.
- 3.3 Multilateral organisations, such as the World Bank, IFC and the ADB have developed performance standards and safeguard policies to foster responsible investment and sustainable project development. These instruments, and others such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, have grievance and redress mechanisms that are critically important to assist in upholding international standards, ensuring the IFIs and multinational enterprises meet their own standards and commitments, and in providing a mechanism for redress and remedy for communities when things go wrong and a project has an adverse impact.
- 3.4 In addition, the recently adopted UN "Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Protect, respect and remedy framework" is well placed to influence the human rights policy and practice of both multilateral organisations and the private sector. This includes key areas of their operation and potential impact, such as progressing sustainable development, investment in infrastructure and other large scale projects, and business activities through supply chains and business relationships.
- 3.5 **In light of the above, and the Independent Review's recommendation for increased emphasis on private sector development, the Australian Government should give particular attention to assessing multilateral effectiveness in this area. Performance against safeguard policies and accountability standards and international standards (including OECD and UN Guidelines) should be key criteria for assessing effectiveness.**
- 3.6 One way to achieve this would be to restructure the Australian National Contact Point (for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises) so that it is inter-departmental in composition, becomes independent of those parts of Government whose role it is to promote and fund international business activity, and reports to parliament on both promotional activities and cases raised through the complaint mechanism.

4 Multilateral Agency Performance in Humanitarian Response

- 4.1 ^{vi}Significant Australian funding support for strengthened United Nations (UN) administered coordination mechanisms and the UN Cluster system should remain a key component of Australia's humanitarian assistance. An increasing effort should also go into ensuring that UN agencies cohesively invest in building the national capacity of

both government and civil society, for humanitarian response, emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction (DRR).

- 4.2 Oxfam Australia notes that the performance of UN humanitarian agencies and UN administered funding mechanisms has varied significantly across different countries and crises, depending on the strength of UN country leadership and of UN agencies as funds managers.
- 4.3 Furthermore, we note that one effect of increased donor investment in the UN humanitarian system has been increased NGO reliance on UN agencies to access humanitarian funding.^{vii} Whilst in some contexts multilateral funding mechanisms have resulted in timely disbursements to implementing agencies, in many others delays and inability to access funds have had hindered program delivery to affected communities.
- 4.4 Oxfam Australia encourages Australia to use its ongoing support to the UN Humanitarian System to leverage necessary improvements in UN performance, leadership and transparency, and to increase efforts to ensure that national actors can respond to the growing numbers of disasters and people affected. The AMA and the proposed annual updates offer an important opportunity not only to monitor the effectiveness of UN agency performance in humanitarian response, but also to apply appropriate pressure to challenge poor UN performance, demand increased accountability and improve funding arrangements to ensure predictable, timely and cost efficient disbursement.
- 4.5 In capturing some of Oxfam's experiences in engaging with relevant UN organisations, UN managed-pooled funds and the Cluster System, Oxfam Australia makes the following recommendations to the Australian government:

4.5.1 UN agencies must improve their engagement with national stakeholders and have greater investment in building national capacity to respond to emergencies.

The Humanitarian Reform Process and the Cluster Approach, adopted in 2005, has the capacity to facilitate better links between international humanitarian actors and national and local authorities and civil society. However, evaluations of the Cluster Approach have found that, in many cases, its international focus has undermined national ownership of emergency response due to a failure to appropriately integrate national and local actors in coordination mechanisms.^{viii} Promoting national capacity (of both government and civil society) to lead, coordinate and respond to disasters should be a key component of UN agencies programmes in-countries. Recognising the global trends toward a greater number of emergencies and increasing numbers of people affected,^{ix} Australia should ensure that all multilateral agencies include disaster risk reduction as a core element of programs in at-risk countries. In addition, in the event of a disaster that overwhelms national capacity, UN-led leadership and coordination systems should complement and support, not over-ride, existing mechanisms when appropriate systems exist.

4.5.2 Continued Australian humanitarian funding to UN agencies and multilateral funding mechanisms must include a demand for increased UN transparency and accountability.

The UN-led humanitarian reform requires strong and visionary leadership from UN agencies, with a commitment to transparency and accountability. In 2010, the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) initiated a process to lead to transformative change within the humanitarian system based on the urgency imposed by global humanitarian trends and the failure of humanitarian reform to live up to expectations. Leadership, funding, coordination and accountability remain major obstacles to the efficient operation of the humanitarian system. Clusters have not been found to actively promote or strengthen the participation of affected populations^x. Australia should increase its engagement with the humanitarian reform process at the global and country level to provide more consistent support, and should ensure that funding procedures both require and enable aid agencies to consult with, and respond to feedback from, crisis-affected communities.

There is a general lack of transparency about how and when UN agencies have disbursed funding provided by donors. This is particularly problematic with the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). As such, it is difficult to know where these funds were ultimately spent and to evaluate whether they have had a positive impact. Australia should require UN partners to be more transparent about their disbursement of funds and to demonstrate that the provision of funding is timely, predictable and cost-effective.

4.5.3 Australia should encourage improved partnerships between NGOs and UN Humanitarian agencies.

In 2009, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) implemented over USD\$400 million through over 600 NGOs. While this is only 25% of UNHCR's overall budget, it represents a significant proportion of UNHCR's delivery of goods and services in refugee camps around the world. Similarly, a large percentage of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)'s emergency operations are carried out by NGOs; and in 2010, 52% of the World Food Programme (WFP)'s total food was distributed by over 2000 NGOs. Despite this heavy reliance on NGOs and the better understanding of the local context that these NGOs have, UN agencies have yet to move from working with partners as service delivery organisations to engaging collaboratively with civil society based on the Principles of Partnership^{xi}, shared objectives and risks, complementary approaches and mutual transparency.

Improvements must also be made in UN-NGO funding, where there is evidence of UN bias in allocation of UN-administered funds. Allocations are often targeted to maximise the income of large UN agencies rather than on the basis of greatest need or comparative advantage.^{xii} Additionally, the majority of local and national NGOs have extremely limited access to these funds.^{xiii} Through its ongoing support to UN humanitarian agencies, Australia should therefore support a specific initiative to take joint practical action to ensure that UN-NGO funding partnerships are 'fit-for-purpose'.^{xiv}

4.5.4 In order to ensure Australian aid supports rapid response to humanitarian crises, diversified funding streams remain critical.

Whilst continued Australian support for multilateralism is important, channelling humanitarian funds through multilateral institutions has not proven to be effective for rapid response.^{xv} Accessing a greater proportion of

official funding through UN channels has administrative and operational implications for NGOs, often resulting in significant delays and incurring high transaction costs. Therefore it is critical that Australia maintains diversified funding streams in crisis, including continued bilateral grant funding to partners including NGOs. Sufficient funding through a range of funding mechanisms remains critical to retain timeliness, flexibility and broad coverage, to promote innovation, and to ensure sufficient funding to non-UN actors, in particular local and national NGOs and partners.

Assessment of UN Agency humanitarian performance:

4.6 *The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)*

- 4.6.1 OCHA plays a critical leadership role in the coordination of humanitarian responses and Australia should continue to provide financial support. Oxfam recognises and appreciates the strong partnership we have with OCHA, particularly in advocacy. The ERC's statements to the Security Council on protection of civilians, her willingness to speak boldly and firmly on humanitarian issues and to stand up for humanitarian principles in the face of great political pressure should be highly commended and supported by Australia.
- 4.6.2 However, more strategic analysis and development is required to ensure that OCHA's long term programme, funding and staffing activities are clearly prioritised and appropriately resourced. Blockages in recruitment of OCHA staff and in the appointment of qualified humanitarian coordinators, including a slow centralised recruitment system, decrease OCHA's effectiveness. These challenges are particularly evident at field office level, where difficulties in finding permanent staff and a reliance on secondments have led to high turnover and a lack of consistency and institutional memory. This has recently been witnessed in Afghanistan, where OCHA had no permanent head of office between May and September 2011, and almost no senior staff in country during Eid at the end of August. As such, there was an overall lack of coordination of sector assessments, leading to an incomplete picture of impacts of the crisis, which in turn has affected donor funding levels.
- 4.6.3 OCHA should give greater emphasis on field-level operations, including addressing staffing gaps and better coordination of fundraising priorities to ensure adequate support and attention is dedicated to under-funded country offices. Australia can support these processes by increasing engagement with OCHA offices at the field level, and leveraging funding to ensure strategic direction and the development of clear and coherent objectives and workplans.

4.7 *World Food Program (WFP)*

- 4.7.1 WFP, as the largest provider of food aid, is crucial to ensuring that appropriate food, nutrition and livelihoods needs are met. WFP has committed to undertake reforms in their ways of working, and these should be encouraged by Australia as part of their ongoing funding to WFP. Traditionally, WFP programming has focused on in-kind food aid.

- 4.7.2 In recent years, WFP has started to look at other forms of support, including Food-for-Work and Cash-for-Work, which may be a better option when markets are still functioning and prices are not rising sharply. WFP should be encouraged to undertake more holistic analysis of markets and food prices, to ensure that its programmes do not flood markets and support the agricultural sector and longer-term economic recovery. Australia is encouraged to leverage its continued funding to WFP to reduce inappropriate food aid, and promote a sectoral shift towards cash programming in situations where this is appropriate and preferable.
- 4.7.3 Oxfam, WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on a global level have developed the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Horn of Africa Plan of Action, and Oxfam have good working relationships with WFP on every level. This was particularly noted in Laos during the 2009 response to Typhoon Ketsana where Oxfam supported a WFP food distribution^{xvi}. However, in many circumstances, most clearly highlighted during the Horn of Africa drought, WFP's coordination, information sharing and communications with partners and other key stakeholders has been problematic. It has been difficult to get accurate and timely information about WFP's food pipeline (not just food aid delivered in country, but delivered to people), strategies for shortfalls, and basic communications regarding food distributions. Increased transparency is crucial so that partners can provide accurate information to target groups about the assistance they are likely to receive. It will also allow the humanitarian community to collectively plan to overcome challenges in the response together and work to ensure all target groups are able to receive the basic requirements needed for humanitarian relief and recovery.

4.8 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

- 4.8.1 Oxfam has been working with UNHCR almost since its inception, by helping to provide water and sanitation in refugee camps and appreciates the motivation and professionalism of the vast majority of UNHCR staff.
- 4.8.2 UNHCR's commitment to a coordination and leadership role through the Protection Cluster must improve. Too often, in too many countries, Protection Cluster coordinators do not know what the Cluster should do, do not adequately engage NGOs, and have other UNHCR responsibilities that take them away from their Protection Cluster work. It is not that UNHCR cannot coordinate the Cluster - there are several cases where UNHCR staff members have proven to be excellent Cluster coordinators – but that UNHCR staff are not encouraged to prioritise their Cluster responsibilities. Often they are provided with little guidance or support on how to coordinate the Cluster, or have little background in the broader definition of humanitarian protection (such as the International Committee of the Red Cross' Protection Standards). The Australian Government should promote better coordination of the Protection Cluster by UNHCR as essential for humanitarian reform to function in situations of conflict.

4.9 UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)

- 4.9.1 Oxfam appreciates the openness in our relationship with UNICEF and the collaboration between the agencies has been synergistic, leading to innovations in the field and strong coordination in the WASH sector globally and in most countries.
- 4.9.2 The past few years have seen significant challenges for UNICEF, particularly in Pakistan, both in the 2009 IDP crisis and 2010 flood response. Oxfam and other NGOs have worked closely with UNICEF to address the issues that have arisen and UNICEF is making internal changes in the management of clusters, technical expertise in the field and headquarters, new contracting procedures and more frequent contact with partners on the ground and at headquarters. UNICEF held a consultation with NGOs in December 2010 and a consultation with cluster partners in the same month. Australia should encourage implementation of the recommendations emerging from these meetings, in particular, stronger cluster leadership in-country at national and sub-national level and smoother negotiation of partnership agreements.

4.10 United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

- 4.10.1 Oxfam Australia's engagement with UNDP on humanitarian issues has been limited, but a positive working relationship has been established around armed violence issues, through UNDP's Pacific Centre and Papua New Guinea country office. UNDP has demonstrated a willingness and openness to work collaboratively and in partnership with civil society, including playing an active role as an observer in the Pacific Small Arms Action Group chaired by Oxfam. UNDP's Pacific Centre has also sought to facilitate increased civil society participation in relevant discussions on armed violence.
- 4.10.2 At a global level, Oxfam encourages UNDP to assume greater leadership in supporting humanitarian operations in-country. In a majority of countries, the UN Resident Coordinator (RC), who is funded and managed by UNDP, is also appointed as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), with little consideration of humanitarian competencies or experience. In Yemen, this has meant the UN Country team does not have deep experience of complex crises, and has been unable to leverage a greater commitment to humanitarian principles from the government, or to negotiate greater access to affected people. UNDP should demonstrate their commitment to accountable and transparent selection of humanitarian leaders, by adopting more robust recruitment and selection processes to ensure that qualified HCs are appointed.
- 4.10.3 Oxfam notes that UNDP plays a leading role in supporting disaster risk reduction (DRR) and recovery in more than 100 countries.^{xvii} Australia should encourage UNDP to engage closely with UN humanitarian agencies in contingency planning and in order to ensure cohesiveness and integration of DRR as a core element of UN agency programs. Oxfam notes the potential synergy between AusAID funded-DRR programs led by NGOs under the Humanitarian Partnership Agreement (HPA) and those supported by UN agencies. Better links between UNDP (which engages closely with government agencies responsible for disaster management on DRR initiatives) and NGOs (which frequently work with communities and local civil

society) may improve overall cohesion of DRR activities. AusAID is well placed to facilitate increased dialogue with UNDP and NGOs on this issue.

- 4.10.4 Furthermore, UNDP's close engagement with government also provides it with important avenues to promote humanitarian principles, which should be encouraged in order to build national capacity and leverage needed support or access.

4.11 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat (UNISDR)

- 4.11.1 UNISDR performs a unique and crucial coordination function. There are some weaknesses in UNISDR which have been highlighted in numerous evaluations, in particular, its current administrative and financial management processes, and the need for more clarity around UNISDR's strategic value-add and role in coordinating partners.^{xviii} These do not appear to have been resolved.
- 4.11.2 To make most efficient use of the relatively limited resources of UNISDR, the leadership team needs to establish a clear focus. This should be based on increasing the momentum to achieve the goals of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) on DRR and on enhancing coherence and commitment to risk reduction globally, nationally, locally and within the UN system. The Mid Term Review for the HFA has identified the need for improvements in the governance of HFA implementation, in particular identification of over-arching national authorities at government level, with responsibility and accountability for all the different aspects of DRR^{xix}. UNISDR has actually been quite successful in supporting the development and increasing the number of national DRR platforms, an important move from advocacy and general awareness-raising towards facilitating actual action on HFA commitments. However the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of national platforms vary.^{xx} Improved coordination with and assistance to relevant partners at country level to drive initiatives and processes is essential to enhance consistency in the quality and long-term viability of DRR platforms across countries and regions.
- 4.11.3 The timeline for the HFA concludes in 2015, at which time it is likely that further work will need to be done in order to meet all of its objectives. The HFA Mid Term Review found that prevailing views on a post-2015 framework for DRR underscored the need to ensure solid and structural links with international framework agreements on sustainable development and climate change, and called for a broad consultative process.^{xxi} Australia should encourage UNISDR to look strategically beyond 2015 and to play a leading role in shaping the future development architecture, in line with these recommendations.

5 UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Overview

- 5.1 In an increasingly globalised world, many determinants of food security are trans-boundary and require effective multilateral agencies and agreements if they are to be addressed. Yet, global food security governance remains characterised by ineffective agencies, and patchwork attempts at reform.
- 5.2 In Oxfam's view this state of global food security governance is partly the result of uncertainty surrounding the role of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Reform of the FAO should be the key plank of building an effective global food security governance system. Member governments such as Australia need to support reform processes. This includes ensuring the FAO has the funding required to reform with growth.

The role of FAO

- 5.3 According to an independent external evaluation, the FAO's 'role in global governance has declined in comparison with that of others',^{xxii} including global forums such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO).^{xxiii} Despite this, the FAO remains the only organisation with the mandate to address many issues, especially those to do with agricultural production and the management of natural resources. However, its membership has generally failed to give serious consideration to its global governance role.^{xxiv} Oxfam's view is that reform of the FAO should be the key plank of building an effective global food security governance system.^{xxv}
- 5.4 One of FAO's technical committees, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), provides an avenue for reform.^{xxvi} However, it has lacked high-level political involvement, has previously failed to adequately consider ways of improving food access and utilisation in addition to availability, and has failed to adequately involve other UN agencies and civil society.
- 5.5 As the role of FAO and its technical committees has declined, the influence of other organisations has increased – but often in ways which have contributed to, rather than reduced, food insecurity. For instance, the WTO, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have historically required developing countries to rapidly open their markets, undermining local production and trade through cheap food imports, and resulting in increasing dependence on global markets.^{xxvii} The FAO has the mandate and expertise to govern food security issues, and should remain the governance body at the centre of the global food system.
- 5.6 Oxfam appreciates AusAID's renewed political emphasis on food security, particularly small-scale agriculture and social protection, within a comprehensive approach that takes into account the role of the multilateral agencies involved in food security. We make the following specific recommendations in relation to those agencies.

Recommendations:

- 5.7 **Ensure that FAO has the funds it needs to reform with growth, and encourage its senior management to speed up the reform process**
 - 5.7.1 As recommended in the Independent External Evaluation, it is vital that FAO is reformed with growth, so that it can play its distinctive role in the governance of food security, particularly in relation to agriculture and natural

resources. However, it is reasonable to also require FAO's senior management to work harder to increase the speed and effectiveness of reform and ensure that the organisation works in collaboration with other institutions.

5.8 Support reform of the Committee on World Food Security so that it can become the central high-level political pillar of global food security governance

5.8.1 Australia has been supportive of the reform plan agreed during the 35th Session of the CFS and for the Bureau to move ahead with rapid implementation. During implementation, the scope and limits to the role of the CFS and its relationship with other global institutions, forums, and mechanisms need to be more clearly defined.

5.9 Ensure that international food funding mechanisms respect key governance principles and are informed by the CFS

5.9.1 Existing and new food funding mechanisms should have governance structures which allow the participation of developing countries, and CSOs as well as relevant UN agencies and programmes.

5.10 Invite CSOs, NGOs, and their networks to autonomously establish a global co-ordination mechanism

5.10.1 Civil society has a critical role to play in informing the development of global policies, regulations and financial decision-making as well as monitoring and reporting on progress at national, regional, and global levels.

5.11 Agree to deposit National Declarations of Commitment and Plans of Action in an International Public Register of Commitments (IPRC)

5.11.1 To ensure accountability, all governments should deposit their Declarations of Commitment and Plans of Action to implement the Right to Food in an IPRC, to be administered by the reformed CFS Advisory Group, and agree to in-country monitoring of the delivery of commitments..

6 Climate Financing

6.1 The Australian Multilateral Assessment is considering a number of funds that engage in climate financing. These funds include, The Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, the Climate Investment Funds, the Global Environment Facility and the UNFCCC Least Developed Countries Fund.

6.2 Amongst these funds Oxfam Australia believes that the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund is the most appropriate: it incorporates the principle of country ownership, it is accountable to the Conference of The Parties (COP) and it is perceived as legitimate by developing countries.

6.3 More broadly, Oxfam recognises that there are several issues with the way climate financing has occurred to date. Firstly, there are too many funds with too little money. There are currently around 20 dedicated climate funds and a number of non-climate focused funds that fund adaptation. Amongst these funds, there is significant duplication which undermines effectiveness and increases the burden of transaction costs. Secondly, climate finance governance has largely mirrored traditional donor/recipient aid dynamics. For example, the Climate Investment Funds are largely run by multilateral development banks in which developed countries are the major

shareholders. Developing countries often have weak representation in the climate finance decision-making processes. Thirdly, current climate finance institutions do not adequately consider issues of gender. Adaptation and mitigation policies that fail to consider gender will at best be inefficient, and at worst exacerbate poverty and food insecurity.

6.4 In order to address many of these issues, Oxfam supports the operationalisation of the global Green Climate Fund (GCF). COP 16 in Cancun established a Transitional Committee to design the GCF.^{xxviii} When established, this fund should be the primary mechanism for the delivery of climate finance, and should also be the primary channel for Australia's climate finance. It should:

- ensure that at least 50 per cent of funds are dedicated to adaptation
- provide full participation for civil society and stakeholders
- incorporate the principles of country ownership
- ensure women are represented at all levels of governance and implementation.

6.5 The Australian aid program should prepare to allocate funds to the GCF: it is vital to climate negotiations that governments start indicating that they will provide public financial support, and budgeting for it. In addition, funding will be required over the next couple of years for running costs associated with its establishment.

6.6 Ultimately, financing for climate change should be new and additional to existing aid commitments, including to reach 0.7 percent of GNI. This also applies to the Australian Government's commitment to reach 0.5 percent of GNI by 2015. While the Government works towards this objective, it can play a key role in supporting the GCF, and in ensuring budgetary provision for this.

Endnotes

ⁱ Examples of regressive trends are the current proposed revisions to the Accountability Mechanism and the reduced safeguards and oversight in multi-tranche finance facilities at the ADB, and the World Bank proposed approach to safeguards under the proposed Program for Results lending instrument.

ⁱⁱ Newer project examples include the Highway 1 Project in Cambodia, the Railway Rehabilitation Project in Cambodia, the Citarum Integrated Water Management Project in Indonesia and the Khulna-Jessore Drainage Rehabilitation Project in Bangladesh. For more details on these and other ADB projects with adverse impacts, see www.forum-adb.org

ⁱⁱⁱ Environmental cost-benefit accounting is broadly understood as assigning economic values to environmental services or assets (Richard, P. et al 1994; Boyd, J & Banzhaf, S. 2007).

^{iv} The approach of benefit sharing recognises that adversely impacted people are entitled to project benefits. The nature of agreed benefits takes different forms, such as project revenue, project benefit related outcomes, such as irrigated land, natural resources and/or community services and household related services. Several mining companies in Australia actively implement benefit sharing with affected communities.

^v This TA ended up not being approved by the Japanese Poverty Reduction Fund, to whom the Cambodia Resident Mission proposed it.

^{vi} A list of acronyms for this section is provided in Annex 2

^{vii} Stoddard, A (2008)

^{viii} Steets, J, Grünewald, F., Binder, A., de Geoffroy, V., Kauffmann, D., Krüger, S., Meier, C., & Sokpoh, B.

^{ix} See Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction

^x See Cluster Approach Evaluation Phase 2, April 2010,

^{xi} For more information see NGOs and the Humanitarian Reform Project

^{xii} In the 2009 Pakistan IDP Crisis, where many donors gave the bulk of their funds to UN agencies to disburse onwards to implementing partners, UN agencies received more than 40% of funding for their projects as opposed to NGOs receiving just 5%. This was despite the fact NGOs were estimated to have 80% of overall implementing capacity.

See Dempsey, B. (2010)

^{xiii} The share received by local NGOs through country level pooled funds is around 5% of the total channelled through the country.

Multilateral and UN funding mechanisms are not well suited to benefit these actors for several reasons. Experience illustrates that when UN agencies sub-contract NGOs, it is generally taken for granted that NGOs pre-fund or supplement partial funding in order to start projects, and no guarantees of future funding or backdating of contracts are provided. This has not worked well for smaller and local NGOs since they lack large funds of their own for set up costs. Furthermore, whilst international NGOs sub-contracted by UN agencies may further sub-contract local partners, the even shorter funding cycles and unreliability of receiving funding quickly means they are far less likely to do so.

See Global Humanitarian Assistance (2011)

Schuemer-Cross, T (2009)

^{xiv} For more information see a joint policy briefing by Action Aid, CAFOD, CARE, Christian Aid, IRC, Islamic Relief Worldwide, Oxfam and Save The Children, March 2009

^{xv} See Joint Agency Briefing Paper (2011)

Dempsey, B. (2010)

Bennett, N, (2009)

Oxfam Briefing Paper (2007)

^{xvi} Oxfam was requested by WFP to include a food component in its non-food item distribution in 3 districts in southern Laos - Tayoi, Samoi and Kalum. For more information on this program see

<http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp219973.pdf>

^{xvii} UNDP, Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery

http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_do/integrating_risk.shtml

^{xviii} Office of Internal Oversight Services, Internal Audit Division (2010)

Dalberg Global Development Advisers (2010)

^{xix} International Strategy for Disaster Reduction,(2011)

^{xx} Dalberg Global Development Advisers (2010)

^{xxi} Strategy for Disaster Reduction,(2011)

^{xxii} Independent External Evaluation of FAO, p.173.

<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/012/k0827e02.pdf>

^{xxiii} *Ibid.*

^{xxiv} *Ibid.*

^{xxv} For further background on governance of the global food security system, see Oxfam Briefing Note, Bridging the Divide - The reform of global food security governance, Oxfam International, 2009

^{xxvi} CFS was established as a result of the food crisis of the 1970s, following recommendations from the 1974 World Food Conference. It was intended to serve as a forum for the review and follow-up of policies concerning all aspects of world food security.

^{xxvii} See Oxfam International (2002)

^{xxviii} Oxfam has produced a number of reports on climate financing and has made several submissions to the Transitional Committee for the Green Climate Fund. These can be provided upon request.

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Annex 1: Submissions and publications relevant to the ADB and World Bank

ADB - Accountability:

RELEVANCE: These submissions relate to the current ongoing review of the ADB's Accountability Mechanisms. They point out weaknesses and strengths of the current mechanisms, and of the proposed mechanism based on Oxfam experiences in supporting affected communities in filing complaints and expert analysis.

Oxfam Australia submission on the ADB's Consultation Paper for Accountability Mechanism, April 1, 2011

<http://www.oxfam.org.au/resources/filestore/originals/OAus-ADB-AM-review-0411.pdf>

Oxfam Australia submission on the ADB's Working Paper for the Accountability Mechanism, June 1, 2011

<http://www.oxfam.org.au/resources/filestore/originals/OAus-AM-W-Paper-0611.pdf>

Letter by Oxfam Australia ED to ADB in regard to second Consultation Paper for the Accountability Mechanism, August 22, 2011

<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Accountability-Mechanism-Review/am-review-comments-2011-Oxfam-Australia2.pdf>

ADB – Safeguards

RELEVANCE: This publication summarises the key elements of the 2010 ADB Safeguard Policy Statement and describes strengths and remaining weaknesses.

Policy submissions made to the ADB during the safeguard policy review are available on request.

Oxfam Australia 2010, *Understanding the ADB's Safeguard Policy: What protections does the Bank's new Safeguard Policy provide for communities and the environment?*

<http://www.oxfam.org.au/resources/filestore/originals/OAus-ADBSafeguards-0610.pdf>

RELEVANCE: This publication demonstrates serious social and environmental impacts experienced by communities in cases where ADB safeguard policies were not implemented.

Oxfam Australia 2007, *Safeguarding or disregarding: Community experiences with the Asian Development Bank Safeguard Policies*

<http://www.oxfam.org.au/resources/pages/view.php?ref=195&k=>

World Bank – Safeguards

RELEVANCE:

This joint civil society letter, endorsed by Oxfam International, presents civil society's concerns with the World Bank's proposed review of its safeguard policies and highlights the need for the World Bank to go beyond a commitment not to weaken existing policies but improve safeguards policies in light of their short-comings.

Joint Civil Society Letter to World Bank President in regard to proposed safeguard policy review, August 31, 2011

World Bank - Program for Results

RELEVANCE: This submission points out the strengths and risks of the proposed World Bank Program for Results lending. In particular, the submission highlights a flawed consultation process

and demonstrates how the process and instrument in its proposed form could lead to undermining the World Bank's safeguard policies.

Oxfam International submission on concept note on Program for Results Instrument, July 2011, *available on request*

ADB – Obstacles to sustainable, inclusive development

RELEVANCE: This case study highlights the adverse impacts of involuntary resettlement and documents the disproportionate amount of time and resources required to address the impacts of safeguard policy violations retroactively. It was commissioned as an independent evaluation by Oxfam Australia.

Pinto, F, Sarou, L., and Sherchan, D., September 2011. *The Other Side of Success: Community Perspectives about the Support to Affected People of the Highway One Project and the use of the ADB Accountability Mechanism: A Case Study Evaluation*. Available on request.

RELEVANCE: This study provides an analysis of some of the unintended consequences of the ADB's infrastructure driven development program targeted at macro-economic growth in the Mekong region in which poor communities are often highly dependent on natural resources,

Oxfam Australia 2007, *Hidden Costs: The underside of economic transformation in the Greater Mekong Subregion*

http://www.oxfam.org.au/resources/pages/view.php?ref=213&search=hidden%2Ccosts&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=

RELEVANCE: This study highlights the challenges the ADB faced in designing an environmentally and socially sustainable initiative in the Tonle Sap Basin and demonstrates discrepancies between different parts of ADB's development portfolio in the Mekong.

Oxfam Australia 2006, *Can the ADB save the Tonle Sap from Poverty? An analysis of the Asian Development Bank's operations in the Tonle Sap Basin*.

http://www.oxfam.org.au/resources/pages/view.php?ref=156&search=tonle%2Csap&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=

Australian aid delivery through multilateral development banks

RELEVANCE:

Banking on Aid presents data which more describes the role of the banks within Australia's aid program and surveys the arguments being made for and against them – it argues that the role of the banks in Australian aid should be the subject of more critical debate.

Mannagum & Oxfam Australia 2011, *Banking on Aid: An examination of the delivery of Australian aid through the World Bank and Asian Development Bank*

http://www.mannagum.org.au/whats_on/banking-on-aid

Annex 2: Multilateral Agency Performance in Humanitarian Response

ACRONYMS

CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ERC	Emergency Response Coordinator
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
NGO	Non-government organisation
RC	Resident Coordinator
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNISDR	UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction Secretariat
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WFP	World Food Programme