

Australian Multilateral Assessment

March 2012

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Abbreviations and explanations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AF	Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMA	Australian Multilateral Assessment
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIFs	Climate Investment Funds
COMSEC	Commonwealth Secretariat
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GAVI	GAVI Alliance
GCDT	Global Crop Diversity Trust
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	International Financial Institution
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
MAR	Multilateral Aid Review
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDG	Millenium Development Goal
MLF	Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
MOPAN	Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
PIDG	Private Infrastructure Development Group
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Executive summary

The Australian Multilateral Assessment (AMA) delivers on a commitment in *An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a real difference—Delivering real results* to assess the effectiveness of Australia's key multilateral partners.

The AMA is designed to:

- > provide a firm base of information about the effectiveness and relevance of multilateral organisations, from the perspective of the Australian aid program
- > inform decisions on funding allocations in the 2012–13 budget
- > design a rating system that can be used on an annual basis to inform decisions on subsequent funding allocations and policy engagement.

The AMA is not the final word on how the Australian aid program views multilateral organisations. Australia will use the findings of the assessment as a platform to build greater evidence over time on multilateral effectiveness to guide policy and funding decisions. The findings will also help to shape Australia's future engagement on multilateral issues.

In recent years Australia has channelled a growing proportion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) through multilateral organisations, including United Nations agencies, global funds and the multilateral development banks. In 2010–11, total funding to the 42 multilateral organisations included in the AMA was \$1.6 billion, or around 37 per cent of ODA.

The large and growing amount spent through multilateral organisations reflects the value that Australia assigns to working in partnership with these organisations. Multilateral organisations add value through:

- > the legitimacy they bring and weight they add to addressing challenging development issues through their wide membership
- > the leadership role they play in international development efforts, for example by championing the Millennium Development Goals
- > their expertise and global reach which brings a wealth of information and lessons learned
- > the global standards they set in sectors such as health, education, food security, human rights, humanitarian assistance and labour standards
- > their lead in coordinating donor efforts at global, sector and country levels and in response to trans-boundary challenges such as epidemics or climate change

- > mobilising large-scale investments with financing leveraged from capital markets and the private sector.

The AMA assessed organisations against the development-related aspects of their mandate. As such, results for organisations with mandates that stretch well beyond development, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Monetary Fund, must be interpreted with caution. For these organisations, the ratings do not reflect how well the institution as a whole is doing its job, but rather how their results, relevance and organisational behaviour contribute to Australia's development objectives.

Methodology

The AMA considered 42 multilateral organisations against an assessment framework that includes seven components. The first three components relate to results and relevance, and the other four components relate to organisational behaviour:

Results and relevance

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests
3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system

Organisational behaviour

4. Strategic management and performance
5. Cost and value consciousness
6. Partnership behaviour
7. Transparency and accountability

The seven components were broken into 24 criteria. Ratings of Very strong, Strong, Satisfactory, Weak or Not applicable were given for each organisation against each criterion.

Ratings were determined based on the benchmarks outlined in Appendix 1.

Every possible effort was made to use objective evidence when scoring. The AMA report was subject to three separate peer review processes.

Ratings

The AMA used the following sources of evidence to inform assessments and ratings:


- > publicly available documentation, including reporting of the multilateral organisations themselves and reports from the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN)¹
- > engagement with the headquarters of multilateral organisations
- > consultations with partner governments, civil society and other donors
- > analysis and reporting from the Australian government, including overseas missions
- > consultations with stakeholders including Parliamentary committees and non-government organisations (NGOs)
- > public submissions.

The overall ratings for the multilateral organisations are summarised in the following scattergram. The vertical axis ('results and relevance') represents the average ratings for criteria in components 1 to 3 of the assessment framework, while the horizontal axis ('organisational behaviour') represents the average rating for criteria in components 4 to 7.

While the scattergram enables a quick overview, the ratings reflected need to be treated with caution because: future potential is not included in the ratings; all criteria are weighted equally despite the reality that not all criteria are equally important for all organisations; and the methodology of assessing organisations against their mandate favours small and specialist organisations.

¹ MOPAN is a network of 16 bilateral donors, established in 2003, that undertakes joint annual assessments of approximately six multilateral organisations in approximately 10 countries.

Summary of criteria ratings



ADB: Asian Development Bank
 AF: Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund
 AfDB: African Development Bank
 CGIAR: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
 CIFs: Climate Investment Funds
 COMSEC: Development Programmes of the Commonwealth Secretariat
 FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
 GAVI: GAVI Alliance
 GCDT: Global Crop Diversity Trust
 GEF: Global Environment Facility
 GFATM: Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria
 GFDRR: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
 GPE: Global Partnership for Education (Formerly Education for All Fast Track Initiative)
 ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
 IDB: Inter-American Development Bank
 IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development
 IFC: International Finance Corporation
 ILO: International Labour Organization
 IMF: International Monetary Fund (Trust Funds)
 IOM: International Organization for Migration
 LDCF: UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Least Developed Countries Fund

MLF: Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
 OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
 PBF: United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
 PIDG: Private Infrastructure Development Group
 UNAIDS: Joint UN Program for HIV/AIDS
 UNCDF: UN Capital Development Fund
 UNDP: UN Development Programme
 UNEP: UN Environment Programme
 UNESCO: UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
 UNFPA: UN Population Fund
 UN-Habitat: UN Human Settlements Programme
 UNHCR: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
 UNICEF: UN Children's Fund
 UNISDR: UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction Secretariat
 UNMAS: UN Mine Action Service
 UNOCHA: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
 UNODC: UN Office of Drugs and Crime
 UNRWA: UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
 WFP: World Food Programme
 WHO: World Health Organization

Major findings

As would be expected when assessing 42 multilateral organisations of different sizes and mandates, there is significant variation in findings. However, seven general findings emerge.

Coordination is improving across the multilateral system but more is needed

The AMA found examples where the multilateral system is working more coherently than it has in the past. Despite this progress, there is scope for significant improvement in how multilateral organisations work together in food security, emergency assistance and climate change. These areas suffer from overlapping mandates, with too many organisations attempting to raise funds and run programs on the same sets of issues. Multilateral organisations also need to work better together in many fragile and conflict-affected countries.

The UN ‘Delivering as One’ approach should become the norm

Evidence shows that the UN’s Delivering as One approach is working well across most of the eight pilot countries. In Vietnam, for example, the AMA saw the dividends that can be realised when UN agencies work closely together. There is scope to do more to advance Delivering as One including by speeding up processes at headquarters level to harmonise business practices in areas such as human resource practices and legal agreements.

Joint assessments of multilateral effectiveness can be strengthened

Efforts by bilateral donors to jointly assess multilateral effectiveness have strengthened in recent years thanks to the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). Nevertheless, MOPAN’s approach has limitations that are driving donors towards undertaking their own assessments. Over time, there is scope to encourage greater synchronisation between the various donor efforts to assess multilateral organisations, including MOPAN.

Reform is prevalent

Of the 42 multilateral organisations assessed in the AMA, 15 have major reform efforts underway. In some cases reform is fundamental and institution-wide, designed to address major shortcomings and make major improvements in institutional effectiveness, although embarking on reform does not automatically lead to improvements in effectiveness. In most cases where major reform is underway, further analysis is required on the prospects of reform efforts and the implications of this for budget and policy decisions.

Results measurement and reporting: focus is welcome but risks must be managed

Many multilateral organisations are investing heavily in their capacity to measure and report on results. This increased attention to monitoring and reporting on results is encouraging. However, there are risks and missed opportunities in the way that this agenda is evolving. There is scope for greater collaboration and sharing of best practice across multilateral organisations, and for more systematic capturing of the views of partners and beneficiaries.

Insufficient attention to value for money

The lowest ratings in the AMA were in relation to the component on ‘cost and value consciousness’. This is also the area in which the AMA found the least amount of evidence. This suggests that a focus on cost effectiveness, a critical element in ensuring value for money, is not a high priority for most multilateral organisations, their governing bodies or donors. There is scope for a greater attention to ensuring value for money, particularly in relation to cost effectiveness.

Effectiveness varies at country and regional levels

A theme that emerged during the AMA was the considerable variation in the effectiveness of many multilateral organisations at country-level (i.e. some organisations perform well in some countries but poorly in others). Factors driving this differ across multilateral organisations, but one key element is the quality of in-country teams. There may be scope for a greater focus by governing bodies and donors on how to improve the overall quality of in-country teams through measures such as human resource management reforms.

Budget implications of ratings and findings

The AMA’s terms of reference state that the findings will feed into the Australian Government’s aid budget process. With regard to core funding (funding not tied to a specific purpose), the ratings and findings will be one important element in informing funding decisions, but other key factors include:

- > existing funding levels (which vary widely across the 42 organisations assessed in the AMA)
- > the organisation’s need for additional funding and its capacity to effectively absorb it (which was not assessed in the AMA)
- > particular sectoral, thematic or geographic priorities the government wishes to target
- > the prospects of reform efforts leading to improvements in effectiveness. Potential improvements in effectiveness are not captured in the ratings and in some cases further analysis is needed on the likelihood of reform succeeding.

Thirteen organisations rate as very strong or strong across most (at least six) of the seven AMA components and not rated as weak against any component. With these organisations, the Australian Government can have a high degree of

confidence that increases in core funding will deliver tangible development benefits in line with Australia's development objectives, and that the investment will represent good value for money.

These organisations are:

- > Asian Development Bank
- > Climate Investment Funds
- > GAVI Alliance
- > Global Crop Diversity Trust
- > Global Environment Facility
- > Global Partnership for Education
- > International Committee of the Red Cross
- > International Finance Corporation
- > Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
- > Private Infrastructure Development Group
- > UN High Commissioner for Refugees
- > World Bank
- > World Food Programme.

A further sixteen organisations are rated as very strong or strong on a majority of components (at least four) and are not rated as weak on any component. With these organisations, the Australian Government can have a reasonably high degree of confidence that increases in core funding will deliver tangible development benefits in line with Australia's development objectives, and that the investment will represent good value for money. However, funding decisions for these organisations should consider organisation-specific findings.

These organisations are:

- > African Development Bank
- > Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
- > Inter-American Development Bank
- > International Fund for Agricultural Development
- > International Monetary Fund Technical Assistance Trust Funds
- > International Organization for Migration
- > Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
- > UN Capital Development Fund
- > UN Children's Fund
- > UN Development Programme
- > UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (incorporating the Central Emergency Response Fund)

- > UN Peacebuilding Fund
- > UN Population Fund
- > UN Relief and Works Agency
- > UNFCCC Least Developed Countries Fund
- > World Health Organization.

Eight organisations are rated as at least satisfactory on every component and not rated as weak for any component. With these organisations, decisions on whether to increase core funding should be made case-by-case following closer examination of AMA findings. Some of these organisations are new or undertaking significant reform efforts, and further analysis of the prospects of reform leading to improvements in effectiveness may be needed.

These organisations are:

- > Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
- > Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria
- > International Labour Organization
- > Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund
- > Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
- > UN Environmental Programme
- > UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction Secretariat
- > UN Office of Drugs and Crime.

Five organisations are rated as weak on at least one component. For all these organisations, further analysis is required before decisions are made on core funding levels. Most of these organisations are in the midst of significant reform efforts, and more analysis of the prospects of reform leading to improvements in effectiveness may be needed to inform decisions on future funding and policy engagement.

These organisations are:

- > Commonwealth Secretariat Development Programmes
- > Food and Agriculture Organization
- > UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- > UN Human Settlements Programme
- > UN Mine Action Service.

The UN Mine Action Service appears to function reasonably effectively on the ground in spite of weaknesses in aspects of its corporate systems.

The findings will be an input into decisions by country and thematic teams on non-core funding (funding tied to a specific purpose). The AMA findings will not be decisive, however. Country and thematic teams will need to continue to base their non-core funding decisions primarily on their own analysis of the

organisation's effectiveness in the particular country or sector in which it is operating. This is particularly the case at country-level given the AMA finding that there is a wide variation in the effectiveness of many multilateral organisations across countries and regions.

Policy implications of ratings and findings

The AMA findings are also designed to provide information to help inform future policy engagement with multilateral organisations. The policy implications of the findings will be taken forward through the multilateral engagement strategy for the aid program. The AMA findings will be a key input into the Strategy, due to be finalised and published in 2012.

The multilateral engagement strategy will outline how the Australian aid program will pay more attention to managing its largest multilateral partnerships. It will also describe how Australia will manage multilateral partnerships where funding levels do not justify a major investment of time in managing the partnership.

Ongoing ratings system

Subject to approval by the AusAID Executive, the multilateral engagement strategy will provide details of an ongoing system for tracking multilateral effectiveness. This system will comprise:

- > an annual multilateral performance scorecard prepared in August of each year reporting the effectiveness of the Australian aid program's multilateral partners, including major developments against the AMA's seven components
- > more systematic reporting on multilateral effectiveness at country-level
- > addressing performance concerns through a formal process
- > conducting a five-yearly comprehensive assessment of multilateral effectiveness.

1. Introduction

A. Purpose

The AMA is designed to:

- > provide a firm base of information about the effectiveness and relevance of multilateral organisations, from the perspective of the Australian aid program
- > inform decisions on funding allocations in the 2012–13 budget
- > design a rating system that can be used on an annual basis to inform decisions on subsequent funding allocations and policy engagement.

The AMA is not the final word on how the Australian aid program views multilateral organisations. Australia will use the findings of the assessment as a platform to build greater evidence over time on multilateral effectiveness to guide policy and funding decisions.

B. Overview

The AMA delivers on a commitment in *An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a real difference—Delivering real results* to assess the effectiveness of Australia's key multilateral partners.

An Effective Aid Program for Australia states Australia will increase its support for multilateral organisations found to:

- > be effective and achieving results for the poorest people
- > operate in line with Australia's development objectives and priorities
- > represent value for money.

The assessment looks at 42 multilateral organisations for how well they meet the principles that guide Australia's aid program.

Section 2 of this report outlines the methodology and approach used for the assessments, including the criteria used to assess, how stakeholders were engaged, how evidence was gathered and how ratings were determined. The full methodology for the assessment and the terms of reference are on the AusAID website (www.ausaid.gov.au).

Section 3 provides an overview of the assessment ratings and findings, including:

- > a scattergram that summarises the ratings in relation to ‘results and relevance’ and ‘organisational behaviour’
- > major findings from the report in relation to:
 - coordination across the multilateral system
 - the UN Delivering as One approach
 - scope for strengthening joint assessments of multilateral organisations
 - the prevalence of reform
 - the focus on monitoring and reporting of results
 - variations in performance at country-level.
- > the implications of the ratings and findings for funding decisions
- > how the ratings and findings will help inform future policy engagement.

Section 4 presents the findings for each of the seven components of the AMA. Areas for improvement are highlighted as areas for potential focus in the future.

Section 5 summarises the assessment findings for each of the 42 multilateral organisations and their ratings against the 24 criteria. The full assessment findings for each multilateral organisation are available on the AusAID website.

Section 6 recommends a proposed approach for the ongoing monitoring of multilateral effectiveness. This includes publishing an annual scorecard on effectiveness and addressing performance concerns through a formal process.

C. Australia’s current multilateral engagement

In recent years Australia has channelled a growing proportion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) through multilateral organisations, including UN agencies, global funds and the multilateral development banks. In 2010–11, total funding to the 42 multilateral organisations included in the AMA was \$1.6 billion, or around 37 per cent of ODA.


The large and growing amount spent through multilateral organisations reflects the value that Australia assigns to working in partnership with these organisations. By working with multilateral organisations, Australia increases the overall impact of its aid program. Multilateral organisations add value through:

- > the legitimacy they bring and weight they add to addressing challenging development issues through their wide membership
- > the leadership role they play in international development efforts, for example by championing the Millennium Development Goals
- > their expertise and global reach which brings a wealth of information and lessons learned
- > the global standards they set in sectors such as health, education, food security, human rights, humanitarian assistance and labour standards

- > their lead in coordinating donor efforts at global-, sector- and country-levels and in response to trans-boundary challenges such as epidemics or climate change
- > mobilising large-scale investments with financing leveraged from capital markets and the private sector.

The breakdown of the \$1.6 billion channelled through the 42 multilateral organisations included in the AMA is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Official Development Assistance Provided by Australia to Multilateral Organisations in 2010–11



* GCDT and MLF represent average yearly contributions


Australia’s largest multilateral partner, by far, is the World Bank, with total funding of \$505 million in 2010–11. The four next largest multilateral partners in 2010–11 were the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Funding to these five organisations totalled over \$1 billion in 2010–11, 60 per cent of the funding to the multilateral organisations included in the AMA.

Of the 42 multilateral organisations included in the AMA, 30 received core funding in 2010–11 as shown in Figure 2. Core funding is defined as money that is not earmarked (tied) for a particular purpose. Core funding can either be provided on a voluntary basis, with the amount determined by Australia, or through ‘assessed

contributions', in which case the amount is based on a determination of each member's capacity to pay (generally linked to the size of the economy). Figure 2 shows voluntary core contributions in blue and assessed contributions in red.

Aggregate core funding in 2010–11 to the organisations included in the AMA was \$642 million.

Figure 2: Core Funding Provided by Australia to Multilateral Organisations in 2010–11




Again the World Bank is the largest recipient of core funding, although the differential between it and other organisations is much lower.

Australia has been increasing core funding to a range of multilateral organisations over recent years, recognising that they need secure, long-term funds for strategic planning and reform, and to be able to respond to developing country priorities.

Since 2008, Australia has entered into formal partnerships with 11 multilateral organisations. Most partnerships specify increases in core funding over a multi-year period, in addition to outlining joint priorities and how success will be measured.

For those multilateral organisations that receive core funding through the Australian aid program, there are considerable variations in the proportion that core funding represents of total Australian funding. This is shown in Figure 3, which shows core funding as a percentage of total funding through the aid program in 2010–11.

Figure 3: Core Funding as a Proportion of Total Funding Provided by Australia to Multilateral Organisations in 2010–11



Of the 30 multilateral organisations that receive core funding, 15 receive more than 75 per cent of their funding through the Australian aid program as core funding (nine of these organisations do not accept non-core funding).

For most of the Australian aid program’s largest multilateral partners, however, the majority of funding is provided as non-core. This reflects the collective decisions of managers of country and sector programs to enter into funding arrangements with these multilateral partners. For example, in the case of the World Bank, the non-core funding in 2010–11 comprised some 83 separate funding agreements across various countries and sectors of the aid program.

Figure 4 shows the provision of assessed contributions, voluntary core contributions, and non-core funding to the 42 multilateral organisations.

Figure 4: Official Development Assistance Provided by Australia to Multilateral Organisations in 2010–11 by Type of Funding





Figure 5 shows the alignment of the \$1.6 billion in funding provided through multilateral organisations in 2010–11 with the five strategic goals the Australian aid program. This shows both core funding (which is divided across the goals in accordance with the overall funding allocations of organisations) and non-core funding earmarked for specific purposes.

Figure 5: Official Development Assistance Provided by Australia to Multilateral Organisations in 2010–11, Allocated by Strategic Goal



* Contributions of less than \$7.5m are attributed to 'Other'. In some cases this category includes organisations listed elsewhere on the graph.

The strategic goal of 'humanitarian and disaster response' receives the largest amount of funding through multilateral organisations, approximately \$400m in 2010–11. Of the 42 organisations assessed in the AMA, 17 received funding in support of this goal.

'Sustainable economic development' received the second largest amount of funding, with over half of the funding for this strategic goal is allocated to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.

The goals of 'saving lives', 'effective governance' and 'promoting opportunities for all' also receive substantial support through Australia's multilateral contributions.

Funding categorised as 'crosscutting' spans across multiple strategic goals.



Methodology and approach



2. Methodology and approach

The AMA's terms of reference were approved by the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and published on AusAID's website in late August 2011.

The terms of reference included the rationale for determining which multilateral organisations would be included in the AMA. Forty-two met this definition and were included in the assessment.²

A methodology for the AMA was developed based on the terms of reference. The methodology was refined through discussions with Australian Government departments and representatives of Australian non-government organisations (NGOs). It was published on AusAID's website and provided to relevant multilateral organisations in early September 2011.

An important aspect of the methodology is that organisations are assessed against their effectiveness in delivering the development-related aspects of their mandate.

A. Assessment framework

The framework includes seven components comprising 24 criteria. The first three components relate to results and relevance ('why we fund') and the other four components relate to organisational behaviour ('how they perform').

The full set of components and criteria are outlined in Appendix 1. They are summarised below.

Results and Relevance (Why we fund)

Component 1: Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate (Criteria: Delivers results; Monitors and reports results; Targets poorest)

Component 2: Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests (Criteria: Supports Australia's objectives; Aligns with strategic goals of aid program; Focuses on crosscutting issues; Effective in fragile states)

Component 3: Contribution to the wider multilateral development system (Criteria: Promotes coordination; Makes a critical difference; Promotes knowledge, policy or innovation)

² Of note, UN Women (which did not meet the definition for inclusion because it did not exist in 2010–11) was not included in the assessment because it is too early to make judgements in relation to many of the criteria.

Organisational behaviour (How they perform)

Component 4: Strategic management and performance (Criteria: Clear strategy and plans; Effective governing body; Uses monitoring and evaluation systems; Effective leadership and human resource policies)

Component 5: Cost and value consciousness (Criteria: Management scrutinises costs; Cost effectiveness a focus of programs; Challenges partners on value for money)

Component 6: Partnership behaviour (Criteria: Works effectively with others; Aligns with partner priorities and systems; Provides voice for stakeholders)

Component 7: Transparency and accountability (Criteria: Routinely publishes information; Clear process for resource allocation; Strong accountability mechanisms; Promotes transparency of partners)

B. Ratings

Ratings of Very strong, Strong, Satisfactory, Weak or Not applicable were given for each organisation against each criterion. The average of the criteria ratings within each component was used to form the component rating. All criteria were weighted equally. Scores of 'Not applicable' were not included in the computation of the component rating. The benchmarks used to determine criteria ratings are outlined in Appendix 1.

The ratings are evidence-based, and so do not reflect reform efforts that have been initiated but have not yet had time to prove their impact. The implications of this are discussed in Section 3.

C. Evidence

The AMA used the following sources of evidence to inform assessments and ratings (further details are provided in Appendix 1):

- 1. Publicly available documentation**, including reporting of the multilateral organisations themselves and assessments by others
- 2. Engagement with the headquarters of multilateral organisations**, including meetings at headquarters level with 38 multilateral organisations
- 3. Consultations with partner governments, civil society and other donors**, including through field visits to Indonesia, Solomon Islands, Vietnam, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Ethiopia
- 4. Analysis and reporting from within the Australian government**, including outcomes from recent high level consultations and recent reviews of the African Development Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development

5. **Response to a survey by 26 Australian overseas missions**
6. **Consultations with Australian stakeholders**, including Parliamentary associations and Australian NGOs
7. **Public submissions** (the 11 submissions received are listed in Appendix 2).

D. Peer Review

The AMA report was subject to three separate peer review processes:

1. a peer review panel comprising a representative of the Australian development NGO community, an independent consultant and a senior AusAID official with no other engagement in the AMA
2. an Inter-Departmental Committee comprised of representatives from all Australian government departments that have engagement with the multilateral organisations included in the AMA
3. a cross section of AusAID officials.

3. Assessment ratings and findings

This section provides an overview of the ratings of the assessment and presents these in a scattergram. Some qualifications to the ratings arising from the methodology are noted. Seven major findings that cut across the organisation-specific findings are presented. The section concludes with the implications of the findings for budget and policy decisions.

A. Overview of ratings

The overall ratings for the 42 multilateral organisations included in the AMA are summarised in the scattergram (Figure 6).

The vertical axis ('results and relevance') represents the average rating of criteria in components 1 to 3 of the assessment framework, while the horizontal axis ('organisational behaviour') represents the average rating of criteria in components 4 to 7.

On most of the seven components and 24 criteria, ratings of the 42 multilateral organisations are spread over a broad range. High ratings were received by a mixture of multilateral development banks (MDBs), UN agencies, 'vertical' or specialist funds and the International Committee of the Red Cross.


Organisations that mobilise or deliver large amounts of funding had higher average ratings than others in relation to the 'results and relevance' criteria.

Newer organisations and those with specialised mandates had higher average ratings than others in relation to the 'organisational behaviour' criteria.

Organisations with a humanitarian mandate had higher average ratings than those with a development mandate.

UN organisations received a wide range of ratings, although their average ratings are slightly lower than the overall average.

Figure 6: Summary of Criteria Ratings for Multilateral Organisations



- ADB: Asian Development Bank
- AF: Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund
- AfDB: African Development Bank
- CGIAR: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
- CIFs: Climate Investment Funds
- COMSEC: Development Programmes of the Commonwealth Secretariat
- FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
- GAVI: GAVI Alliance
- GCDT: Global Crop Diversity Trust
- GEF: Global Environment Facility
- GFATM: Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria
- GFDRR: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
- GPE: Global Partnership for Education (Formerly Education for All Fast Track Initiative)
- ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
- IDB: Inter-American Development Bank
- IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development
- IFC: International Finance Corporation
- ILO: International Labour Organization
- IMF: International Monetary Fund (Trust Funds)
- IOM: International Organization for Migration
- LDCF: UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Least Developed Countries Fund
- MLF: Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
- OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
- PBF: United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
- PIDG: Private Infrastructure Development Group
- UNAIDS: Joint UN Program for HIV/AIDS
- UNCDF: UN Capital Development Fund
- UNDP: UN Development Programme
- UNEP: UN Environment Programme
- UNESCO: UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- UNFPA: UN Population Fund
- UN-Habitat: UN Human Settlements Programme
- UNHCR: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNICEF: UN Children's Fund
- UNISDR: UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction Secretariat
- UNMAS: UN Mine Action Service
- UNOCHA: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- UNODC: UN Office of Drugs and Crime
- UNRWA: UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
- WFP: World Food Programme
- WHO: World Health Organization

B. Qualifications on ratings arising from the methodology

While the scattergram enables a quick overview, the ratings reflected need to be treated with caution in at least three respects:

1. Future potential is not included

The current position of multilateral organisations on the scattergram must be weighed with the potential for future improvements in effectiveness. As discussed in Section 2, ratings were determined on demonstrated effectiveness. If reform efforts were underway, credit was given only where there was evidence of the reforms being implemented successfully.

Future potential not being included works against relatively new multilateral organisations (such as the climate change-related funds), organisations in the midst of major reforms that show promise but are not yet proven (such as the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research), and organisations that are both new and undertaking reforms (such as the Global Partnership for Education).

Initiating reform does not guarantee improvements. But for those organisations with reforms underway, if and when reform efforts lead to demonstrable improvements in effectiveness, the ratings will improve.

2. The methodology weighs all criteria equally, but reality is not that simple

The criteria are all weighted equally as any other approach would be unhelpfully complex. In reality, however, not all criteria are equally important to all organisations. Therefore, an examination of the specific findings and ratings at the component and criteria level for each organisation is needed before decisions are made in relation to policy and funding decisions.

For example, the UN Mine Action Service received low ratings in some of the 'organisational behaviour' criteria for not having some institutional documents or systems. But because of its small size, the absence of these institutional structures does not appear to be a major impediment to its operational effectiveness.

3. Assessing organisations against their development-related mandate has implications

The decision in the methodology to assess organisations in relation to their development-related mandate avoids judging them against unfair or unrealistic benchmarks. But the drawback of this approach is that the AMA does not assess the extent to which each organisation's mandate is appropriate or adds significant value to overall development efforts.

Assessing organisations against their development-related mandate resulted in a range of ratings in Components 1 and 3 being higher than they would have been had assessments been made against fixed benchmarks. In Component 1 it

affected ratings on ‘delivering results’ (1a) and ‘targets poorest’ (1c). In Component 3 ratings against all three components were affected, although some weight was given to the scale and importance of each organisation’s activities in the overall multilateral system.

Assessing organisations in relation to their mandate favours smaller organisations and those with specialised roles.

C. Major findings

As would be expected when assessing 42 multilateral organisations of different sizes and mandates, findings are broadranging. However, seven general findings emerge. These relate to common challenges facing both multilateral organisations and donors that have not yet been fully addressed. The first three findings relate to issues above and beyond engagement with individual organisations. The final four findings relate to sub-sets of the organisations assessed in the AMA.

While not distracting from the primary purpose of this report—to review these multilateral organisations in terms of their results, relevance and organisational behaviour—these findings are worth considering because they have implications for the way Australia moves forward with its multilateral engagement. The findings are broad ranging and any action taken may be best pursued with like-minded countries.

1. Coordination is improving across the multilateral system but more is needed

The AMA found examples where the multilateral system is working more coherently than it has in the past. For example, the:

- > Global Partnership for Education shows promise in bringing greater coherence to development efforts in the education sector
- > extent of collaboration between the multilateral development banks (MDBs) has lifted sharply over recent years, as demonstrated by initiatives such as the Common Performance Assessment System (designed in 2005 to promote dialogue among the MDBs on managing for development results) and agreements on the cross-debarring of companies that misappropriate funds
- > the UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction Secretariat and Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction have made substantial progress since 2006 in uniting policy and funding efforts of all development stakeholders behind the Hyogo Framework for Action commitments.

Despite this progress, there is scope for significant improvement in how multilateral organisations work together in food security, emergency assistance and climate change. These areas suffer from overlapping mandates, with too many organisations attempting to raise funds and run programs on the same sets of issues. Multilateral organisations also need to work better together in many fragile and conflict-affected countries.

With climate change, ongoing international negotiations offer an opportunity to strengthen complementarity of mandates and coordination among climate change related organisations and funds to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of climate financing.

With food security, the establishment of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee shows early promise in creating a global food security cluster, co-led by the Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Programme, integrating food aid, agriculture and other livelihood interventions. More work is needed to increase effectiveness and reduce transaction costs by promoting clarity of mandates and strengthening coordination of multilateral organisations.

With emergency assistance, many multilateral organisations have introduced recent reforms designed to help improve coordination and effectiveness given the difficulties experienced with the international community's response to disasters such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods. These include innovative approaches such as using internet applications for collecting data and new technologies enabling community participation. Some multilateral organisations are taking measures to improve surge capacity, for example establishing rosters of trained staff and streamlining business processes for more rapid responses. Despite improvements, there remains a need to clarify mandates and establish appropriate roles and responsibilities of organisations in emergency response situations. The development of new tools and systems, such as sharing data, strengthening local networks and improving access to technology will help.

Effective coordination among multilateral organisations remains a particular challenge in fragile states. The 2011 World Development Report found that multilateral organisations have not delivered effective and efficient engagement despite good understanding of requirements. This finding is consistent with AMA's finding from Australian overseas missions in several fragile states.

At headquarters level, the UN–World Bank Post-Crises Cooperation Agreement aims to establish a more effective partnership between them in their approaches to fragile states. Although it was slow to gain traction, in recent times there has been signs of positive movement towards genuine partnership, including the exchange of liaison officers into World Bank and UN headquarters. This helped with progress towards country-level cooperation in four pilot countries in Africa.

2. The UN 'Delivering as One' approach should become the norm

Evidence shows that the UN's Delivering as One approach is working well across most of the eight pilot countries. This evidence is supported by the increasing number of countries volunteering to take on the approach.

In Vietnam, for example, the AMA saw the dividends that can be realised when UN agencies work closely together. Delivering as One in Vietnam has been underway since 2006. The AMA visit confirmed the findings of a 2010 country-led evaluation, by Derek Poate et al in *Country-led Evaluation Delivery as One: UN Pilot Initiative in Vietnam (May 2010)* that 'the performance of the reform is

remarkable and brings forward many lessons for expanding the initiative to other countries.’ Sixteen UN agencies now work under a single agreed plan aligned with government priorities and implemented through donor funds channelled into a single pool. Progress is reported through a joint monitoring and evaluation framework. The UN resident coordinator is the single entry point for all program and policy dialogue with UN agencies.

In Vietnam the government, other donors, international NGOs and UN agencies all spoke positively about the impact of the Delivering as One reforms. Government representatives said UN programs are now more coherent, better coordinated and better reflect the government’s national priorities. The government and other donors see the UN as now playing a more effective convening role. Representatives from UN agencies noted the efficiencies in jointly managing administrative processes such as recruiting, banking and printing, resulting in a reduction of administrative costs per officer from US\$200 in 2006 to US\$116 in 2011.

Most stakeholders felt the success of Delivering as One in Vietnam was primarily due to country-specific factors such as strong leadership from the government and the UN Resident Coordinator and the willingness of donors to pool funding into one fund. Apart from initiating the reform agenda, UN headquarters has played little part in driving the reforms in-country, partly because there is no formal mandate from members that this is the way the UN should do business. There is scope to do more to speed up processes at headquarters level to harmonise business practices, particularly in areas such as streamlining staffing conditions and human resource practices, reducing legal impediments, achieving cost effective collaboration and removing complications affecting legal agreements.

During the field visit to Indonesia, where Delivering as One has not yet rolled out, the AMA found that efforts to promote coherence among UN agencies were far less advanced. Representatives of government, civil society and other donors felt there was insufficient collaboration and coordination among UN agencies. A new ‘partnership development framework’, designed as a single plan for the UN in Indonesia, does not appear to be a strong driver for individual UN agencies to consolidate activities around core areas where they have a comparative advantage. One donor representative summarised the views of many when describing the UN effort in Indonesia as a ‘many-headed hydra’, with agencies nibbling at each other’s mandates.

Given the clear benefits of Delivering as One, there is scope to explore ways to encourage its adoption as the norm. Ways forward may include:

- > ensuring that key elements of Delivering as One pilots are institutionalised by the UN system in the quadrennial comprehensive policy review as the way of doing business in all program countries
- > encouraging the governing bodies of individual UN funds and programs and specialised agencies to promote greater coordination and collaboration with other UN agencies at country-level, including by increasing harmonisation of business practices, working to remove constraints to collaboration in areas

such as human resources and legal frameworks, and helping fund coordination functions from core resources

- > working with other donors at country-level to send clear signals to UN agencies on the desirability of better coordination, including by providing un-earmarked pooled funding for UN country programs where possible.

3. Joint assessments of multilateral effectiveness can be strengthened

Efforts by bilateral donors to jointly assess multilateral effectiveness have strengthened in recent years thanks largely to Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). MOPAN is a network of 16 bilateral donors, established in 2003. It undertakes joint annual assessments of a select number of multilateral organisations (approximately six) in a select number of countries (approximately 10).

MOPAN aims to provide bilateral donors and other stakeholders with necessary performance information on the effectiveness of multilateral organisations. It consolidates efforts to maximise the scope of information gathered while minimising duplication of burden on all stakeholders. The Australian Government endorses these principles as an active member and strong supporter of MOPAN. MOPAN was an important source of information for the AMA for some multilateral organisations and also for some review components.

Nevertheless, MOPAN's approach has two limitations. First, it does not assess the delivery of development results, but rather focuses on how well multilateral organisations function and their partnership behaviour (although MOPAN is now in the very early stages of piloting moves to include a development results component). Second, it is selective in its coverage of organisations based on the importance of the multilateral organisation to all MOPAN members. As a result, some multilateral organisations looked at under the AMA have never been assessed by MOPAN, and for others the last MOPAN assessment was undertaken some years ago.

These dual constraints, combined with increasing interest from donors in ensuring they get value for money from their multilateral contributions, are driving donors towards undertaking their own assessments. Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK—all members of MOPAN—have undertaken some form of separate multilateral assessment over recent years. This is understandable, and some national element to assessments will always be needed to reflect the priorities or government requirements of individual donors. But there is a risk that too many disparate efforts to measure multilateral effectiveness will stretch the capacity of multilateral organisations, as well as their partners and beneficiaries. It also risks creating a situation in which reviews using slightly different criteria or performance benchmarks for organisational effectiveness will confuse stakeholders.

The Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recently undertaken work on emerging lessons on 'good multilateral donorship', one of which is to maximise

use of joint assessments, independent evaluation findings and third-party analysis. The AMA attempted to do this, but sees scope for donors to work together through MOPAN to further efforts at joint assessment to meet the growing demands for comprehensive information on multilateral effectiveness.

MOPAN is considering options to strengthen links with the multilateral-related work of the Development Assistance Committee.

Over time, ways to promote greater joint donor effort on multilateral assessments may include:

- > encourage an increase in MOPAN assessments (both the number of organisations assessed and the number of countries surveyed each year)
- > continue to move towards including an assessment of the effectiveness of delivering development results in MOPAN's methodology
- > encourage, over time, greater synchronisation between MOPAN and other efforts to assess multilateral organisations, particularly with gathering evidence on effectiveness. This may include links with assessments by bilateral donors (including from outside the OECD where there is interest) and perception surveys undertaken by multilateral organisations themselves.

4. Reform is prevalent

There is a remarkable amount of significant reform underway across multilateral organisations.

In some cases it is fundamental and institution-wide, designed to assess major shortcomings and make major improvements in institutional effectiveness. Often such reforms are taking place over several years and being driven hard by the organisation's governing body, senior management or both. In other cases it is designed to address specific weaknesses, for example the need for improved communications, accountability practices or human resource policies.

Major reform efforts are underway in the following multilateral organisations:

- > Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
- > Commonwealth Secretariat Development Programmes
- > Food and Agriculture Organization
- > Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
- > Global Partnership for Education
- > Inter-American Development Bank
- > International Labour Organization
- > International Monetary Fund Technical Assistance Trust Funds
- > UN Development Programme
- > UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- > UN Environment Programme
- > UN Human Settlements Programme

- > UN Population Fund
- > UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
- > World Health Organization.

Embarking on reform does not automatically lead to improvements in effectiveness. The degree to which the AMA could assess the prospects for reform success varied across organisations. Where reforms show significant promise for improvements in effectiveness, this is noted in assessment reports. But, as previously indicated, ratings are based on evidence of effectiveness and do not factor in *potential* improvements from partially implemented reforms.

In most cases where major reform is underway, further analysis is required on the prospects of reform efforts and the implications of this for budget and policy decisions.

5. Results measurement and reporting: focus is welcome but risks must be managed

Many multilateral organisations are investing heavily in their capacity to measure and report on results. During discussions with multilateral organisations at headquarters and in the field, it was evident that almost all are focused on improving their capacity to measure and report on results.

Improving results management is a key focus for many of those organisations in the midst of major reform efforts. For example, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research is in the development stages of establishing a results-based management system.

But improving results monitoring and reporting is also a focus for organisations that have had results-based management systems in place for many years, including those that received high ratings for the relevant criterion in the AMA. For example, the Asian Development Bank, the World Food Programme and the GAVI Alliance all have well established and proven systems for results measuring and reporting, yet are taking iterative steps to improve them further.

The strong results measurement and reporting focus appears to be driven by factors such as:

- > increasing demands from governing bodies
- > senior management recognising that improved results measurement can help with strategic decision making
- > increasing links by donors between their funding decisions and the demonstration of tangible and cost effective results.

This increased attention to monitoring and reporting on results is encouraging. However, there are risks and missed opportunities in the way that this agenda is evolving. The following observations are made with the acknowledgment that developing and implementing results-based management systems cannot be resource neutral and that systems take time to become embedded.

- > There is scope for greater shared effort across multilateral organisations to develop common systems or learn from each other's experiences. Some multilateral organisations are developing, or are in the early stages of implementing, complex systems. In some cases this is creating confusion at country-level. Overly complex systems, or systems requiring significant additional resources to implement effectively, may not produce the desired information or may take substantial country-level resources away from planning and delivering activities. Sharing experience and best practice may help to ensure the right balance between developing and implementing results-based management systems. One example of good practice is the World Food Programme and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) working closely together and learning from each other on results-based management.
- > Some multilateral organisations with mandates that do not involve direct delivery of tangible results are struggling to find appropriate indicators to measure success. As reporting on results continues to improve across most organisations, and donors increasingly link funding decisions to results, this raises the risk that multilateral organisations playing important roles in areas such as standard setting or coordination, or areas such as governance where results are difficult to measure, may face funding shortfalls. There may be scope for the international community to collaborate on developing best-practice approaches to monitoring and measuring results in difficult-to-measure areas such as governance, standard setting and coordination.
- > There is considerable variation in how well multilateral organisations seek the views of partners and beneficiaries when monitoring and reporting on results. Some do so as an integral part of their monitoring and evaluation processes. Others undertake periodic surveys. There may be scope for greater collaboration and sharing of best practice across multilateral organisations to systematically seek the view of partners and beneficiaries when monitoring and reporting on results.

6. Insufficient attention to value for money

In undertaking the AMA, a striking feature was the shortage of available evidence in relation to the component on 'cost and value consciousness'.

Few organisations publish details about the measures they have in place at the institutional or program level to minimise the costs required to deliver outputs and outcomes. This is in spite of downward pressure on the administrative budgets of many organisations in recent years, either due to a shortage of funding or under direction from their governing bodies.

Without firm information on measures to promote cost effectiveness at the program level, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the results delivered by organisations represent value for money.

A further problem in assessing cost effectiveness is the lack of consistency in how organisations classify administrative costs. These differing interpretations make it difficult to compare relative efficiency and cost effectiveness between organisations.

Although most governing bodies pay attention to the overall size of the administrative budget, the AMA found little evidence of governing bodies focusing heavily on improving cost effectiveness at the program level (with a few exceptions such as the International Finance Corporation and the Private Infrastructure Development Group).

There may be scope for a greater focus by organisations and their governing bodies on ensuring attention to cost effectiveness, as a key part of promoting value for money, at both an institution and program level. There may also be scope for cost effectiveness and value for money to feature more prominently in dialogue between organisations and donors.

7. Effectiveness varies at country and regional levels

A theme that emerged during AMA field visits and through the survey of Australian overseas missions was the considerable variation in the effectiveness of many multilateral organisations at country-level.

In the case of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, Australian overseas missions in Latin America report that it is generally effective; while Australian overseas missions in Pacific Island countries report wide variance in the effectiveness of its programs across countries and areas of focus; while in Indonesia, consultations with stakeholders during this AMA field visit revealed that many consider UNDP programs have little impact.

The World Bank and the World Food Programme (WFP) are other examples. AMA visits and reporting from overseas missions shows that most stakeholders consider the World Bank to be highly effective in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vanuatu but struggling to be effective in East Timor. WFP was found to be highly effective in most countries, but AusAID has not continued bilateral program support with the WFP in Indonesia due to concerns about its effectiveness.

At regional-level, the International Labour Organization and International Organization for Migration were assessed as performing well in Asia, thanks in large part to strong regional and country teams. This boosted the ratings of these organisations in AMA.

Factors driving the varying degrees of effectiveness at country and regional levels differ across multilateral organisations. The extent of attention to monitoring and evaluation, the extent of institutional flexibility in processes and the extent to which partnerships are an organisational priority are all important factors.

But one key factor that came through time and again during AMA visits and in the survey from Australian overseas missions was the quality of in-country teams. For example, the AMA found that the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which is facing some challenges at institutional level with its development mandate, was highly effective in Sri Lanka and the Horn of Africa, in large part due to high-calibre personnel. In their survey responses, Australian overseas missions in small and fragile states, particularly in Papua New Guinea and the Pacific, frequently cited the quality of in-country teams as a decisive factor in the effectiveness of multilateral organisations.

The AMA found many examples where multilateral organisations are undertaking efforts to improve their resourcing levels and the calibre of their in-country teams. A range of multilateral organisations with humanitarian mandates have upgraded their surge and stand-by capacity to give them access to a wider pool of talent to send to the field in emergency situations.

Nevertheless, there may be scope for a greater focus by governing bodies and donors on how to improve the overall quality of in-country teams. This could include measures such as continued reform to human resource policies and practices, a focus on placement processes to ensure the skills and experience of in-country staff match needs, and more rigorous implementation of performance management.

D. Budget implications of ratings and findings

The findings will feed into the Australian Government's aid budget process in which resource allocation will be based upon the criteria of poverty, national interest, capacity to make a difference and current scale and effectiveness.

This section outlines how the AMA findings will help to inform budget decisions.

1. Core funding

With regard to core funding (funding not tied to a specific purpose), the ratings and findings will be one important element in informing funding decisions, but other key factors include:

- > existing funding levels (which vary widely across the 42 organisations assessed in the AMA)
- > the organisation's need for additional funding and its capacity to effectively absorb it (which was not assessed in the AMA)
- > particular sectoral, thematic or geographic priorities the government wishes to target
- > the prospects of reform efforts leading to improvements in effectiveness. Potential improvements in effectiveness are not captured in the ratings and in some cases further analysis is needed on the likelihood of reform succeeding.

Thirteen organisations rate as very strong or strong across most (at least six) of the seven AMA components and not rated as weak against any component. With these organisations, the Australian Government can have a high degree of confidence that increases in core funding will deliver tangible development benefits in line with Australia's development objectives, and that the investment will represent good value for money.

These organisations are:

- > Asian Development Bank
- > Climate Investment Funds
- > GAVI Alliance

- > Global Crop Diversity Trust
- > Global Environment Facility
- > Global Partnership for Education
- > International Committee of the Red Cross
- > International Finance Corporation
- > Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
- > Private Infrastructure Development Group
- > UN High Commissioner for Refugees
- > World Bank
- > World Food Programme.

A further sixteen organisations are rated as very strong or strong on a majority of components (at least four) and are not rated as weak on any component. With these organisations, the Australian Government can have a reasonably high degree of confidence that increases in core funding will deliver tangible development benefits in line with Australia's development objectives, and that the investment will represent good value for money. However, funding decisions for these organisations should consider organisation-specific findings.

These organisations are:

- > African Development Bank
- > Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
- > Inter-American Development Bank
- > International Fund for Agricultural Development
- > International Monetary Fund Technical Assistance Trust Funds
- > International Organization for Migration
- > Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
- > UN Capital Development Fund
- > UN Children's Fund
- > UN Development Programme
- > UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (incorporating the Central Emergency Response Fund)
- > UN Peacebuilding Fund
- > UN Population Fund
- > UN Relief and Works Agency
- > UNFCCC Least Developed Countries Fund
- > World Health Organization.

Eight organisations are rated as at least satisfactory on every component and not rated as weak for any component. With these organisations, decisions on whether to increase core funding should be made case-by-case following closer examination of AMA findings. Some of these organisations are new or undertaking significant reform efforts, and further analysis of the prospects of reform leading to improvements in effectiveness may be needed.

These organisations are:

- > Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
- > Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria
- > International Labour Organization
- > Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund
- > Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
- > UN Environmental Programme
- > UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction Secretariat
- > UN Office of Drugs and Crime.

Five organisations are rated as weak on at least one component. For all these organisations, further analysis is required before decisions are made on core funding levels. Most of these organisations are in the midst of significant reform efforts, and more analysis of the prospects of reform leading to improvements in effectiveness may be needed to inform decisions on future funding and policy engagement.

These organisations are:

- > Food and Agriculture Organization
- > Commonwealth Secretariat Development Programmes
- > UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- > UN Human Settlements Programme
- > UN Mine Action Service.

The UN Mine Action Service appears to function reasonably effectively on the ground in spite of weaknesses in aspects of its corporate systems.

2. Non-core funding

The AMA findings will be an input into decisions by country and thematic teams on non-core funding. Findings will paint a picture for country and thematic teams of the institutional strengths and weaknesses of multilateral organisations. This will help inform decisions on whether or not to pursue potential partnerships with multilateral organisations.

The AMA findings will not be decisive, however. Country and thematic teams will need to continue to base their non-core funding decisions primarily on their own analysis of the organisation's effectiveness in the particular country or sector it is operating in. This is particularly the case at country-level given

the AMA finding that there is a wide variation in multilateral organisations effectiveness across countries and regions.

E. Implications of the ratings and findings for future policy engagement

The AMA findings are also designed to provide information to help inform future policy engagement with multilateral organisations through the aid program. Subject to the approval of the AusAID Executive, the policy implications of the findings will be taken forward through the multilateral engagement strategy for the aid program.

The multilateral engagement strategy will outline how the Australian Government will implement the commitments in *An Effective Aid Program for Australia* to enhance Australia's engagement with multilateral organisations. This will include:

- > devoting greater senior management resources to developing and managing relationships with key partners
- > placing key partnerships on a strategic footing in terms of policy engagement and funding, avoiding micromanagement
- > using Australia's 'seat at the table' to exert more influence over policy and program directions and better monitor effectiveness
- > seeking appropriate recognition for Australian contributions
- > better monitoring performance and relevance through introduction of a multilateral rating system, including measures to deal with under-performance.

The AMA findings will be a key input into the strategy. In relation to the ongoing ratings system, Section 6 of the AMA describes a proposed system for monitoring the performance of multilateral organisations over time to inform budget and policy decisions. The multilateral engagement strategy will provide more detail on means of taking this forward.

Most of Australia's largest multilateral partners rated reasonably well in the AMA, but findings show that even the highest rated organisations have scope to improve their effectiveness. The multilateral engagement strategy will set a platform for Australia to sharpen its engagement with its largest multilateral partners. The multilateral engagement strategy will be a key input, along with separate decisions about resource allocations, into organisational engagement strategies that will:

- > identify specific areas where Australia will pursue improvements in effectiveness
- > outline means of pursuing these improvements, including working with other like-minded countries or through governing bodies where appropriate
- > identify how improving effectiveness will be monitored and measured.



Component-level findings




4. Component-level findings

This section outlines major findings for each of the seven components in the AMA. Average ratings for the criteria within each component are presented in Figures 7–13. Major factors that affected average rating scores within each component are noted, as are the potential implications of these factors for Australia’s future priorities.

A. Component 1: Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

The average of each organisation’s criteria scores for component 1 is presented in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate



Within this component, the lowest scores were for criterion 1b (monitoring and reporting results) which received the second-lowest average rating of all 24 criteria. As outlined in the previous section, one major AMA finding is that almost all multilateral organisations are now focused on improving their monitoring and reporting of results. If these efforts are successful, the average rating of this criterion will increase over the next few years.


Weaknesses in monitoring and results reporting made it difficult in some cases to make accurate assessments on criterion 1a (delivering results). All multilateral organisations could point to tangible results from their activities. But generally, it was difficult to make an accurate overall assessment of the extent to which results represent value for money at the institution level. With improved results reporting, these assessments should become easier in the future. Further improving results reporting is a potential priority to pursue through the multilateral engagement strategy.

The methodology for assessing criterion 1c (targets poorest) took account of organisational mandates. Nevertheless, the multilateral development banks tended to only rate as 'Satisfactory' against this criterion, with feedback from Australian overseas missions and Australian NGOs suggesting that attention to targeting the poorest was inconsistently applied in planning and implementing activities at country-level.

B.Component 2: Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests

The average of each organisation’s criteria scores for component 2 is presented in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests.



The average rating for this component was the highest of all seven components. The reason is that the ratings for criterion 2a (supports Australia’s objectives) and criterion 2b (aligns with the strategic goals of the aid program) were the two highest of the 24 criteria. The ratings for these components are reasonably highly correlated with existing funding levels.

Ratings for criterion 2c (focuses on crosscutting issues) and criterion 2d (effective in fragile states) were heavily bunched in ‘Satisfactory’ and ‘Strong’. The shortage of ‘Very strong’ ratings for these two components suggests that most organisations have scope to improve their attention to crosscutting issues and effectiveness in fragile states. Crosscutting issues and effectiveness in fragile states are potential priorities to pursue through the multilateral engagement strategy.


On crosscutting issues, most organisations focus quite prominently on gender in their policies and operations, although with varying degrees of success in terms of impact on programs. The AMA found less evidence in many organisations of attention to disability, the environment and climate change as crosscutting issues, at either policy or program level.

On fragile states, some organisations, such as the World Bank, received credit for their strong policy framework and analytical work in engaging in fragile states, despite mixed results in effectiveness at country-level.

C. Component 3: Contribution to the wider multilateral development system

The average of each organisation’s criteria scores for component 3 is presented in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Contribution to the wider multilateral development system



The average ratings for this component were the second highest in the AMA.

As previously discussed, these ratings were complicated by the decision in the methodology to rate organisations on the development aspects of their stated mandates.


In retrospect, ratings under this component could have usefully been separated from the general principle of assessing organisations in relation to their stated mandate. This would have enabled a first-principles assessment of the value of each organisation’s mandate and the extent to which it adds to the overall multilateral system and to aggregate development efforts.

Any changes to the methodology for assessing this component will be considered as part of development of the ongoing ratings system discussed in Section 6, which will be taken forward through the multilateral engagement strategy.

D. Component 4: Strategic management and performance

The average of each organisation’s criteria scores for component 4 is presented in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Strategic management and performance



Of the 42 multilateral organisations in the AMA, only the International Finance Corporation received an average rating of very strong on this component, suggesting that most have scope to improve their strategic management and performance.

Criterion 4c (using monitoring and evaluation systems) received the lowest average ratings of all 24 criteria. While almost all multilateral organisations have monitoring and evaluation systems, the AMA found mixed results on the extent to which these systems inform decision making. In particular, there was a shortage of evidence across many organisations of examples where monitoring and evaluation systems were used to promptly realign or amend programs that were not delivering results. Ineffective monitoring and evaluation systems also represent a constraint to organisations improving monitoring and reporting of results (criterion 1b).

Ratings for criterion 4d (leadership and human resource policies) were below the average of the 24 criteria in the AMA. This is a concern given the finding on the importance to effectiveness of high-calibre staff at country-level.


Thus improving the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation systems and human resource policies are potential priorities to pursue through the multilateral engagement strategy.

There was a wide spread of ratings on criterion 4b (governing body effectiveness). The effectiveness of the governing body is obviously a key consideration in determining whether it provides a useful vehicle to pursue improvements in effectiveness.

E. Component 5: Cost and value consciousness

The average of each organisation's criteria scores for component 5 is presented in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Cost and value consciousness



The average rating for this component was the lowest of the seven components in the AMA. It was also the component in which the AMA found the least amount of evidence; and therefore where levels of confidence in the ratings are lowest.

The relatively low ratings and lack of evidence in this component suggests that cost and value consciousness is not a high priority for most multilateral organisations, their governing bodies or donors. This may change over the coming years as multilateral organisations and donors focus more on achieving and demonstrating value for money.

Addressing some of the weakness or lack of evidence in areas related to cost and value consciousness is a potential priority to pursue through the multilateral engagement strategy.


The highest rating organisations under this component engage with the private sector or involve the private sector in their governing bodies. While this is not

appropriate for all multilateral organisations, there may be some lessons from this that can be shared across the multilateral system. This may be an issue worth further analysis.

F. Component 6: Partnership behaviour

The average of each organisation’s criteria scores for component 6 is presented in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Partnership behaviour



Ratings for this component were bunched in the middle. None of the 42 organisations in the AMA received an average rating of ‘Very strong’ or ‘Weak’.

These ratings suggest that almost all multilateral organisations now focus on partnerships, many no doubt prompted by the increased emphasis on aid effectiveness over the past decade. The scores for criterion 6a (working effectively with others) are generally quite high, although feedback from Australian overseas missions suggests that for some organisations, partnership behaviour remains variable at country-level and relies heavily on the quality of in-country teams.

Ratings were much lower for criterion 6b (aligning with partner priorities and systems). In most cases this related to frequent use of parallel structures to government such as project implementation units.


Ratings were also relatively low in relation to providing voice for partners and other stakeholders in decision making. Determining ratings for this criterion was difficult because in several cases multilateral organisations provided adequate voice for partner governments but not for civil society or beneficiaries.

Thus greater alignment with partner government systems and greater voice for civil society and beneficiaries in decision making are potential priorities to pursue through the multilateral engagement strategy.

G. Component 7: Transparency and accountability

The average of each organisation’s criteria scores for component 7 is presented in Figure 13.

Figure 13 : Transparency and accountability



Average ratings were quite variable across the four criteria in this component.

Ratings were quite high for criterion 7a (routinely publishing information). In a large number of cases this reflected recent improvements in information disclosure, probably due to the positive impact of initiatives such as *Publish What You Fund* and the *International Aid Transparency Initiative*.

Ratings were also quite high for strong accountability mechanisms. This is reassuring from a development effectiveness perspective. It is also a critical element in considering which multilateral organisations have systems that can safeguard and effectively use Australian taxpayer funds.

Average ratings were much lower for criterion 7b (clear process for resource allocation). In many cases this reflects the heavy dependence of multilateral organisations on earmarked funds. Some organisations, including several that rated very highly, rely almost entirely on funds from donors that are tied to a specific purpose. For these organisations, the lack of funds available for discretionary purposes makes it impossible to allocate resources on the basis of objective criteria. This reliance on earmarked funds raises broader concerns on the capacity of organisations to prioritise based on development impact rather than donor preferences. The impact of this heavy reliance on donor funds, and potential remedies, may be a consideration in budget decisions and an issue worthy of further analysis.

Average ratings were also low with regard to criterion 7d (promoting transparency and accountability of partners). The AMA found relatively little evidence on this issue and this is a potential priority to pursue through the multilateral engagement strategy.




Assessment summaries



5. Assessment summaries

Adaptation Fund

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund (AF) was established at the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in November 2001. AF's goal is to support concrete adaptation activities that reduce vulnerability and increase capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change. Australia regularly attends AF Board meetings as an observer. AF is financed by a two per cent levy on certified emission reductions issued for clean development mechanism projects and ad hoc voluntary donor contributions. As of September 2011 total contributions received from donors amounted to US\$86 million and the fund's Trustee had generated US\$168 million through the sale of certified emissions reductions. Australia has pledged \$15 million to AF but has not yet begun to disburse this.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>It is too early to measure AF's results because it has only been funding projects since September 2010.</p> <p>AF has developed a results-based management framework that draws on the experience of other funding mechanisms, in particular the Global Environment Facility (GEF). AF focuses at outcome level and ensures project-level results are aligned and aggregated at fund level. At least one project outcome and output indicator must link to AF's overall strategic results framework, while other indicators are project specific. It is too early to assess whether this system will be effective, but it appears to be robust.</p> <p>AF targets the poorest and most vulnerable when approving funds. Its strategic priority focuses on the most vulnerable communities and in project proposals applicants must outline how their project provides social, environmental and economic benefits, with a particular reference to vulnerable communities.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS N/A
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST STRONG
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>Supporting AF aligns with one of the Australian Government's climate change objectives of helping to shape a global climate change solution.</p> <p>Its work also aligns with the aid program's strategic goal of sustainable economic development, which states that the aid program should reduce the negative impacts of climate change and other environmental factors.</p> <p>AF's work does not explicitly target the most vulnerable developing countries.</p> <p>AF takes a project-based approach, rather than a more strategic, programmatic approach.</p> <p>Operational policies and guidelines have recently been updated to include gender considerations. Gender issues must now be addressed in all AF proposals and AF must consider gender issues when reviewing proposals and evaluating projects.</p> <p>AF does not have a policy on people with disability.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM SATISFACTORY
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY

<p>The crosscutting issue of climate change is the core of AF's mandate.</p> <p>AF has funded some projects in fragile states. However, the different operating environment of fragile states is not a key factor in its decision making.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>AF plays a limited role in coordinating adaptation efforts. It is one of several global climate change adaptation funds. However, it is the largest channel for adaptation financing within the UNFCCC. With a view to future efficiency and effectiveness, UNFCCC parties should consider the respective roles of the Green Climate Fund and AF and how they can effectively work together and complement each other's mandate and operations.</p> <p>AF has not yet provided large-scale financing or specialist expertise on adaptation. It contributed to the development of norms and standards for the delivery of climate finance through the development of a direct access model allowing national entities that meet robust fiduciary requirements to apply direct for funding.</p> <p>AF has developed and trialled innovative approaches such as direct access and sourcing funding from the sale of certified emission reductions arising from clean development mechanism projects. Direct access is now being trialled in a limited way by the GEF and was considered as a model in the design of the Green Climate Fund.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>


ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>AF has a clear mandate to support climate change adaptation activities. Its Board developed the Strategic Priorities, Policies and Guidelines, approved by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. This document outlines AF's strategic priorities and states that decisions on funding allocations must take into account specific criteria. However, there is no evidence that AF has a clear, overarching strategic planning document. AF's Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund have information on policies and procedures.</p> <p>The Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol has ultimate authority over AF. This has delayed implementation of some of AF's policies and procedures, as AF's Board must forward certain policies and procedures to the conference for approval and the conference only meets once a year.</p> <p>AF's Board, comprising most developing countries, operates relatively effectively for its size. The working relationship between the Board and AF's Secretariat has continuously improved. The Board acknowledges the Secretariat's extensive and important workload and approved further positions within the Secretariat to strengthen its capacity.</p> <p>In September 2011, the Board decided the GEF's Evaluation Office would fulfil the role of AF's evaluation body for three years. The office and AF's Secretariat were asked to prepare the final version of the monitoring and evaluation framework. However, it is too early to judge how this framework will link to decision making.</p> <p>Leadership and decision making by AF's Board is sound. Its Secretariat is located in the GEF and is subject to GEF human resources policies. The GEF has been assessed by the Australian Multilateral Assessment as having satisfactory human resource policies, with staff hired in accordance with World Bank procedures.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>When assessing project and program proposals, AF's Board pay particular attention to cost effectiveness. However, it is difficult to assess if value for money is a regular focus because project proposals are reviewed at AF's Project and Programme Review Committee meetings which are closed to observers. While full Board sessions are open, the substantive deliberations of the Committee are not discussed during Board meetings (this issue is considered further under transparency considerations).</p> <p>Cost effectiveness is a focus and AF policies require project and program proposals to be assessed for cost effectiveness. Implementing agencies applying for AF funding must outline their cost effectiveness measures, including comparisons with the cost of other possible interventions.</p> <p>AF challenges partners to consider value for money through its funding application processes. However, there is no reference to value for money in the Model Legal Agreement between the Board and implementing entities.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Overall, AF works effectively with partners and relevant stakeholders. Partnerships are generally viewed as effective. Through a direct access model, partner governments can access resources without involving traditional multilateral implementing agencies. The accreditation process to become an implementing agency requires agencies to meet robust fiduciary standards. While some prospective agencies have found it difficult to meet accreditation requirements, AF's internationally accepted fiduciary standards are needed to ensure integrity of the direct access model.</p> <p>AF has no field presence so working with partners is key to operational effectiveness. The application of the accreditation process ensures AF selects effective implementing partners.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

<p>AF requires projects to align with country priorities. AF-funded projects must align with national development plans, including adaptation plans. All AF project proposals must be approved by designated country authorities who confirm they are in line with country priorities.</p> <p>AF provides a voice for stakeholders through its project design process. Project proposals must describe the consultative process and list stakeholder consultations undertaken as part of project preparation. AF is formalising civil society participation in its Board meetings.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>AF publishes most of its operational documents on its website. Reports on the meetings of the full AF Board are published. Board reports include key outcomes from major committee meetings such as the Project and Program Review Committee, the Ethics and Finance Committee and meetings of the Accreditation Panel that recommends the accreditation of implementing agencies to the Board.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p> <p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p>
<p>AF has published criteria for allocating resources in line with its strategic priorities which must be taken into account when decisions on resources are made. The rationale for decisions on allocating resources is conveyed in Board reports.</p> <p>Transparency would be significantly enhanced if the default position for committee meetings was open to observers, with an option to close during sensitive discussions, as is the arrangement for full AF Board meetings.</p> <p>The World Bank, as AF’s Trustee, operates with strong internal controls, sound fiduciary management and sound audit compliance. These are all applied to all AF funding. AF promotes transparency and accountability in its implementing agencies and agencies seeking accreditation.</p>	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

African Development Bank

Note: This assessment is based primarily on an assessment by the Australian Government in 2011 undertaken independently of the Australian Multilateral Assessment process.



<p>Until recently AfDB's results monitoring and reporting was not as far advanced as the Asian Development Bank and World Bank. In September 2010 it adopted the One Bank Results Management Framework, combining output and intermediate outcome reporting to enable more systematic results reporting at institution level.</p> <p>AfDB directly targets Africa's 40 least developed countries and focuses to a degree on the poorest people at activity level.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>AfDB's level of experience and on-the-ground presence in African countries makes it a valuable partner for Australia given Australia's limited presence in Africa. Its work supports Australia's interests in a better trade environment and a more economically stable Africa. AfDB's work is closely aligned with the Australian aid program's strategic goals of sustainable economic development and promoting opportunities for all.</p> <p>The gender policy and action plan has targets and promotes gender equality and mainstreaming gender.</p> <p>AFDB has made some progress integrating climate change mitigation across core operations.</p> <p>There is little focus on the needs of people with disability.</p> <p>AfDB has significant experience in delivering in fragile states and established the Fragile States Facility in 2008 specifically to support economic recovery in fragile situations. It actively adjusts programs to address the operational risks in individual fragile states.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p>
	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG</p>


3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating STRONG
<p>AfDB is a trusted partner of African governments and plays an effective role in promoting donor coordination at regional and country-levels. As an African-majority owned organisation with a mandate to spur economic growth and reduce poverty, AfDB is becoming more of a force in the global multilateral architecture.</p> <p>AfDB's respect from African governments and the high-level access this brings means it can play a leadership role in policy dialogue, particularly on sensitive and difficult issues such as corruption. There is evidence of increased impact directly linked to larger interventions and portfolio sizes.</p> <p>AfDB produces a broad range of research, analytical work, policy papers and data that provide useful insights into some of the development challenges facing Africa.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>AfDB has a clear mandate and over recent years has tightened its priorities around areas where it has a comparative advantage, particularly infrastructure and regional integration. Core commitments are set out in its clear and overarching strategy document, the <i>Medium Term Strategy 2008–2012</i>.</p> <p>AfDB's Board provides adequate oversight of its policies and operations. The Board has a mixed record in promoting reform, however. It successfully challenged management on limiting staff salaries but was slow to agree to a roadmap on advancing decentralisation.</p> <p>In 2011, AfDB published its first annual development effectiveness review, a credible report and an exercise in openness and transparency. Its independent Operational Evaluation Department provides strong and credible oversight of AfDB's use of monitoring and evaluation systems. It has an organisation-wide system for monitoring and evaluating program performance although it could evaluate a higher percentage of its programs. The 2010 Multilateral Organisation</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG

<p>Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) report rated AfDB as strong on monitoring and evaluation and noted that donors at headquarters consider monitoring and evaluation to be an area of strength for AfDB.</p> <p>Since 2005, AfDB has enjoyed very strong and transformative leadership under its President. More improvements in human resource management are needed, particularly with transparency and the meritocracy of appointment processes, performance-incentive structures and career progression.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>The Governing Body and management regularly focus on value for money. AfDB is a lean, efficient organisation. Administrative costs were 9.2 per cent in 2010, down from 10.9 per cent in 2009.</p> <p>AfDB requires that value for money is considered in programming and its Board ensures compliance, although measures to improve cost effectiveness do not feature prominently in AfDB's program documentation.</p> <p>AfDB provides technical support to partner countries to focus on strengthening transparency and accountability. Value-for-money considerations are not systematically included in agreements with partners.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>AfDB generally enjoys strong relationships with government partners and engenders trust. Building effective partnerships is a factor in decision making.</p> <p>Independent studies of AfDB performance are mixed in their assessment of the effectiveness of the organisation against the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. The 2008 <i>Survey on Monitoring The Paris Declaration</i> found that only 57 per cent of AfDB aid flows are reported on country budgets, compared to 71 per cent for the World Bank. AfDB recognises it needs to better align with the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda and make more regular use of government systems.</p> <p>The 2009 MOPAN report found mixed views on the extent to which AfDB involves clients and beneficiaries in its activities and little evidence of engagement with</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>women and marginalised groups. Partner governments considered that overall AfDB performed adequately in providing a voice for stakeholders. MOPAN found that AfDB respects the views of partner governments and, in turn, member governments have a good sense of ownership of activities.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>AfDB is a signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative, but it is not yet fully compliant.</p> <p>AfDB allocates resources and reports on its intentions in accordance with published criteria, including through its Mid-term Strategy 2008–2012 and annual report. Resources are allocated in accordance with a transparent performance-based allocation formula.</p> <p>MOPAN’s 2009 report rated AfDB’s performance on financial accountability to be adequate but mixed, with corporate audits meeting international standards. Issues raised by independent assessments are addressed. However, its policy on corruption is not implemented in a sufficiently timely way at country-level.</p> <p>Some AfDB programs focus on strengthening transparency and accountability in the management of public resources, at country, sector and regional levels. AfDB is a party to the cross-debarment agreement (in which entities found guilty of misdemeanours in one organisation face sanctions from all organisations) with the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank Group and the World Bank.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION</p> <p>STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION</p> <p>VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>

Asian Development Bank

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been a major source of development finance for the Asia-Pacific region throughout the 45 years since it was established in 1966. This Australian Multilateral Assessment considers two arms of ADB: the Asian Development Fund (ADF), which provides concessional lending and grants to low income countries; and the Ordinary Capital Resources, which lends to middle-income countries.

ADB's members are the countries of the Asia-Pacific, plus a set of non-regional countries which contributed most of its original capital and which periodically contribute funds for ADF. The governing bodies of ADB are the Board of Governors, in which all member countries are represented with voting power broadly proportional to their contributions to ADB's capital, and the Board of Directors with 12 seats, in which each director represents a single member or a constituency of members. The Board of Governors has delegated most of its powers to the Board of Directors, which has full-time members.

Australia has one of the largest shareholdings in ADB, and has representatives continuously in leading positions in a constituency on the Board of Directors. Australia has also been one of the main contributors to ADF at every replenishment. Australia also has large and growing cofinancing arrangements with ADB at country, sector and regional levels. In 2010–11 Australian funding to ADB totalled \$167.1 million, including \$87.0 million in voluntary core contributions to ADF and \$80.1 million in noncore funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>ADB delivers large-scale aggregate results across developing countries in the Asia-Pacific in its priority sectors. The average success rate of completed ADB projects is approximately 65 per cent, slightly below the other multilateral development banks. The 2010 Development Effectiveness Review showed a declining trend in the delivery of development outcomes from recently completed operations. Management has put in place a broadranging plan of action to address this. Feedback from Australian overseas missions is generally positive regarding results delivered by ADB projects on the ground, including in Indonesia and PNG, although feedback from Asia is generally more positive than from the Pacific.</p> <p>In progressive steps since 2008, ADB has formed an exemplary framework of the results at all levels expected from its operations, and reshaped its system of reporting within this framework. ADB's results based management has been rated highly in the 2010 MOPAN report, in a CIDA strategy for engagement with ADB, and in the <i>UK-Multilateral Aid Review</i>.</p> <p>ADB has taken a range of measures over the past decade to increase its poverty focus and each individual ADB project includes an initial poverty and social analysis. Nevertheless feedback from non-government organisations, civil society representatives and Australian overseas missions suggests the success of applying measures to promote a focus on the poor during implementation of activities is mixed in practice.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS VERY STRONG
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY

2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>ADB's activities stretch across all of the Australian aid program's strategic goals, but the majority align most closely with the goal of sustainable economic development. ADB supports Australia's broader economic interests through its distinctive contributions to regional integration.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES VERY STRONG</p>
<p>The geographical scope of ADB operations aligns well with where Australia has its largest bilateral programs. ADB is a large and growing partner for Australia, with the level of co-financing reaching \$80.1 million in 2010–11.</p>	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG</p>
<p>ADB management has generally been very responsive to issues and concerns raised by Australia during partnership talks and senior-level visits. The extent of engagement and responsiveness at country-level is more variable.</p>	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>ADB's policy for mainstreaming gender issues in operations is comprehensive, although ADB is not on track to reach its overall target for the proportion of projects with positive gender effects. Feedback from Australian overseas missions highlighted examples of where ADB was proactively incorporating gender issues into activities.</p>	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Environment policies are well developed, and the proportion of projects supporting environmental sustainability has increased sharply in recent years.</p>	
<p>Feedback from Australian overseas missions in fragile states points to mixed levels of success. Perceived lack of flexibility in processes and relatively centralised decision making were cited as constraints to effectiveness. This feedback comes in spite of ADB's program of progressively decentralising staff over the past decade and related measures designed to improve flexibility of decision making at country-level. Management has recognised the need to take decentralisation further and is implementing human resource and organisational policy reforms to address this.</p>	

3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating STRONG
<p>Like the other regional development banks in their respective regions, ADB plays a distinctive role in Asia-Pacific by contributing to common regional development issues and regional cooperation in addressing them. It plays a valued coordination role in a range of sectors at both regional and country-levels.</p> <p>ADB's role in policy dialogue complements the roles of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Generally ADB takes a cautious, tactful line, which is appropriate, but in some cases its contributions to policy dialogue have been seen as unhelpful from the perspective of other development partners. The scale of finance available from ADB is substantial and for countries that are not creditworthy this can make a critical difference to development outcomes.</p> <p>ADB produces and publishes a large amount of high-quality analytical material related to its operational and advisory work, which is widely used by development stakeholders and seen as generally valuable.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE VERY STRONG
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>ADB's Strategy 2020 is a clear guide to operations and priorities. It has focused ADB's activities on areas of comparative advantage, such as infrastructure and regional economic integration. The ADB provides progress reporting against its Strategy 2020 in its annual reports. The AMA received mixed feedback regarding how well strategic management plays out at the country-level. In Indonesia, stakeholders consistently praised ADB for consolidating its program on what it does best. But feedback from some Australian overseas missions and submissions to the review cited examples of weaknesses in program implementation.</p> <p>ADB's governing bodies are generally effective. Its Executive Board provides day-to-day oversight of decision making and has a constructive relationship with senior management.</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY


<p>ADB's evaluation framework is sound. There is an adequate system for formulating management responses to evaluations, and the system regularly informs decision making, for example by adapting projects or programs on the basis of mid-term evaluations.</p> <p>ADB senior management have shown strong leadership in providing clearer strategic direction, driving a range of reforms and achieving a substantial general capital increase.</p> <p>In the 2010 Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network survey stakeholders rated the ADB as inadequate on managing human resources, the only inadequate rating of the 21 key performance indicators. Recent formal improvements in staff management policies have been introduced. These appear to be having some positive impact but it is too early to conclusively judge success.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Cost control and value for money figure adequately in ADB's routine processes of preparing and monitoring budgets for operational projects and organisational programs, and in oversight by senior management and the Board of Directors. The ADB's overall administrative costs are low relative to most other multilateral development banks, at 2.3 per cent of lending in 2010–11.</p> <p>All projects involving ADB finance are subject to economic analysis which includes estimating their rate of return. An adequate rate of return is a threshold requirement.</p> <p>ADB promotes value for money among partners through its country-level advice and technical assistance on budget preparation, public investment programs, public financial management, project management and procurement.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>

<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>ADB's partnership behaviour is sound in formal terms and the ADB generally has very strong relationships with partner governments. Feedback on partnerships with other donors and civil society is more mixed. Australian overseas missions provided both good and bad examples of partnership behaviour.</p> <p>The 2010 MOPAN report was generally positive about the ADB's alignment with country systems, including its use of public financial management systems and reducing use of project implementation units. MOPAN did identify some areas for improvement, including use of developing member country procurement systems and participation in program-based approaches.</p> <p>Adequate policies are in place for environmental and social safeguards in ADB projects. However, feedback from Australian overseas missions and Australian NGOs suggests that in some cases, ADB does not provide sufficient support to implementing agencies to effectively implement safeguards or devote sufficient resources to oversight of compliance.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS</p> <p>STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS</p> <p>WEAK</p>
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating VERY STRONG</p>
<p>ADB is a member of the International Aid Transparency Initiative and has strong policies on disclosure. These policies are put into practice with timely and substantive reports accessible on its website. For all developing member countries, ADB country strategies are formed through extensive consultation, and published after their adoption.</p> <p>Available shares of ADF resources (concessional lending or grants), for eligible developing member countries, are determined through a published formula which reflects country performance, country size (as measured by population) and economic need (as measured by gross national income per capita).</p> <p>The 2010 MOPAN report rated the ADB as strong in areas of internal audits, organisation-wide external audits and its anti-corruption policy, although it found external audits at regional, country and project level were an area of concern.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION</p> <p>VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION</p> <p>VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS</p> <p>STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS</p> <p>VERY STRONG</p>

<p>ADB's operational requirements provide very strong incentives for partners to be accountability and transparency in their operations. The performance of partners in these areas affects future funding. The ADB is a party to the cross-debarment agreement (in which entities found guilty of misdemeanours in one organisation face sanctions from all organisations) with the African Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank Group and the World Bank.</p>	
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Climate Investment Funds

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), launched in 2008, are climate financing instruments established to help developing countries pilot low-emissions and climate-resilient development. CIFs are administered by the World Bank and comprise two funds—the Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund. These funds include renewable energy, forest and adaptation sub funds. Each fund and sub fund is governed by small committees made up of equal numbers of developed and developing country members. A range of civil society, indigenous and private sector stakeholders are included as observers. CIFs are a partnership among five development banks (the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank Group) to support developing country participants to develop and deliver activities. Donors have pledged funding to CIFs totalling US\$6.5 billion and the funds are expected to leverage more than US\$30 billion in multilateral development bank and private finance. Since 2009 Australian support to CIFs totals \$185.5 million. In 2010–11, Australian funding totalled \$27.9 million, all of which was provided as voluntary core contributions.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>CIFs have demonstrated positive early signs of progress, but most are just moving into the implementation stage so tangible results are only now emerging.</p> <p>CIFs are designed to deliver at scale and achieve transformational results. With solid results-based management frameworks and reporting in place, CIFs ensure performance information is used to improve program quality.</p> <p>The funds recognise the vulnerability of the poorest to climate change, and ensure that least developing countries and small island states are among its pilot countries.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS STRONG
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>The mandate of CIFs is well aligned with the Australian aid program strategic goals of saving lives and sustainable economic development, as well as Australia's broader international and climate change objectives.</p> <p>CIFs address gender in design documents and results-based management frameworks. The November 2010 internal <i>Strategic Environment, Social and Gender Assessment</i> of CIFs, recommended additional indicators are incorporated into the frameworks, including gender-disaggregated data. Recently approved measures to improve the operations of the CIFs call for the multilateral development banks to mainstream gender considerations with CIFs clients, projects and country programming.</p> <p>CIFs do not have policies on people with disabilities, although to the extent that these policies exist in the multilateral development partners, each partner is expected to comply in all its work with its own policies and procedures.</p> <p>CIFs undertake work in fragile states but it is not a specific focus. It is too early to assess how effective their work in fragile states will be.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG
	FOCUSSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES N/A


3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating STRONG
<p>CIFs play a critical role managing and dispersing climate change financing. Around US\$6.5 billion has been pledged by donors to support national investment plans and more than US\$30 billion in funding has been leveraged from multiple sources including governments, multilateral development banks, private sector and bilateral agencies. It is effective in this role and is relied upon by a broad range of development stakeholders.</p> <p>CIFs are currently the largest climate funds. Their role in developing strategies and trialling models for climate change action, particularly in light of its focus on transformational change, is filling an important development niche. It is being used by many as a model for development, including by the Copenhagen Accord's Green Climate Fund, in part because of its equitable and efficient governance arrangements and ability to leverage significant amounts of private funds.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE VERY STRONG
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>CIFs have a clear mandate. Each fund and sub fund has well developed strategies and design documents, detailed guidelines and governance frameworks. Investment plans are in place for individual country interventions.</p> <p>CIF's governing Trust Fund Committees, made up equally of developed and developing country representatives, make consensus decisions on funding and appear to have been effective in holding stakeholders to account.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation regimes are in place but largely untested to date. An independent evaluation of the Clean Technology Fund operations, and the impacts of its activities, is scheduled to be carried out jointly after three years of operations by the independent evaluation departments of its multilateral development banks partners.</p> <p>Leadership of the CIFs is sound and strong systems to inform decision making are in place. CIFs human resources functions are shared or affiliated with</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY VERY STRONG
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG

<p>associated multilateral development banks so staff working standards and management's policies are considered satisfactory.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>The Trust Fund Committees, comprising donor and recipient country representatives, hold stakeholders to account on value for money issues. CIFs require cost effectiveness to be considered in all investment plans, project proposals and administrative budgets. The funds have a very low administrative-cost-to-funding ratio compared with other multilateral organisations. Planned spending on administration is around two per cent (2009–14). CIFs aim to challenge and support development partners to think about value for money in key policy and program choices related to climate change investments.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Multilateral development banks, recipient countries and Clean Technology Fund Committee members have demonstrated a willingness and capacity to work in new ways under the fund model.</p> <p>Country ownership and alignment with partner priorities and systems are important factors in investment plans and other fund programs. Developing country partners take the lead on initiating programs with support from multilateral development banks. The developing country government is expected to ensure open and transparent consultation with stakeholder community groups and engagement with other development partners.</p> <p>Developing country partners take the lead on initiating programs. Civil society, indigenous and private sector stakeholders are active observers and have a voice in CIFs' governing arrangements.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating STRONG
<p>CIFs are not members of the International Aid Transparency Initiative but do have a disclosure policy that calls for the release of country investment plans, both in-country and on its own website. Recently approved measures to improve the operations of the CIFs call for the CIFs to ensure its compliance with the IATI and to report back to the Trust Fund Committees on its compliance.</p> <p>Resource allocation is open and transparent. Allocations are made on a country-led basis and agreed by the governing bodies by consensus. The World Bank is the Trustee for CIFs and strong internal controls, fiduciary management and audit compliance apply.</p> <p>CIFs also promote some transparency in partners. For example they require partners to make key program documents publicly available and hold and report on consultations with domestic stakeholders when designing investment plans. In most countries, fund loans are to be reflected in the national budget.</p>	ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY
	CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG
	STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS VERY STRONG
	PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY

Commonwealth Secretariat Development Programmes

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC) is an inter-governmental organisation responsible for delivering services to the 54 member states of the Commonwealth. Its basic mandate encompasses two broad goals:

- > democracy—to support member countries to prevent or resolve conflicts, strengthen democratic practices and the rule of law, and enhance the protection of human rights
- > development—to support pro-poor policies for economic growth and sustainable development in member countries.

In global terms, COMSEC's expenditure on development work is small (about \$50 million a year). Its overall portfolio (democracy and development work) consists of around 400 small activities covering meetings, advisory services, technical assistance, policy development work, advocacy and consensus building. Australia contributed \$13.5 million to COMSEC's development programs in 2010–11. This comprised \$9.5 million of voluntary core contributions, \$3.9 million of assessed contributions and \$0.1 million in non-core funding. Australia is the third largest donor to COMSEC (after the United Kingdom and Canada).

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating WEAK
<p>COMSEC’s development work is consistent with its broad mandate, but its ability to monitor and report on performance and results in relation to its development work is weak.</p> <p>COMSEC has a comparative advantage in areas such as peace and democracy building and the challenges faced by small states. There are a few clear success stories, such as on debt management, Maritime Boundaries and the ‘Hub and Spokes programme’ on trade capacity-building. But considering the breadth of COMSEC’s activities, these successes are relatively sparse. This is, in part, because COMSEC does not have a sound monitoring and evaluation system.</p> <p>Its next COMSEC Strategic Plan (2012–16), to be developed in early 2012, will be critical to improving COMSEC’s ability to report on performance and manage on the basis of results.</p> <p>COMSEC’s work on low income small states overlaps with important areas where the Millennium Development Goals are lagging, but numbers of poor people and human development indicators are not prime determinants of its budget allocations. This in part due to the fact that funding for Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation comes from broad cross section of developed and developing country members and its programs are designed to assist a cross section of members.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS WEAK
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS WEAK
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY
2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>COMSEC’s focus on peace and democracy building, and the challenges faced by low income small states, align well with Australia’s interests.</p> <p>Some of COMSEC’s activities align with Australia’s strategic goal of effective governance, but the relatively small scale of most of its activities is a limitation on its importance as a partner.</p> <p>COMSEC has a reasonable record of promoting gender equality among its members, but most programs give insufficient weight to crosscutting issues including the environment, gender and disability.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM SATISFACTORY
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES WEAK
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG

COMSEC has a generally positive record on work in fragile states, particularly in supporting the resolution of internal conflicts.	
3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
COMSEC has been quite effective in promoting collaboration among development partners in niche areas such as debt management and trade negotiation. However, the small size of its development programs means COMSEC cannot play a pivotal or influential development role at global or national levels.	PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY
While COMSEC is a small player in international development efforts, it has developed norms and standards outside mainstream development sectors, which are useful. COMSEC sets standards, explicitly or implicitly, for the Commonwealth's core values and principles including democracy, just and honest government and fundamental human rights and the rule of law. It is one of the few multilateral organisations with a mandate to work in these areas.	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG
COMSEC has produced some useful policy and knowledge work in areas related to democracy, human rights and teacher migration issues relating to small developing states.	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
COMSEC's record on strategy and planning has been historically poor, with a lack of prioritisation of activities across its broad mandate reducing its effectiveness and impact. COMSEC has introduced measures designed to improve this, including implementing a results-based planning and budgeting system designed to reallocate significant resources to higher priorities from lower priority work. The effectiveness of this has not yet been evaluated.	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS SATISFACTORY
COMSEC's Board of Governors and Executive address the many critical issues affecting the organisation and its performance, but the absence of adequate performance reporting makes it difficult to exercise full oversight and provide clear guidance.	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS WEAK
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY

<p>The organisation faces challenges in consistently monitoring and evaluating program performance but senior management is implementing improvements. For example, COMSEC has introduced ARTEMIS (an integrated project design and management information system), and is strengthening its evaluation function.</p> <p>COMSEC's leadership is attempting to drive reform on other fronts also. During consultations at Headquarters, senior management provided significant detail on reform efforts initiated over the previous 12 months. COMSEC has faced challenges in the area of human resources over recent years. These are being addressed through the implementation of a new human resource competency framework and finalisation of a staff handbook. However, as noted by the Eminent Persons Group, COMSEC faces challenges in attracting and retaining the best staff given its current terms and conditions of employment.</p> <p>Momentum for reform was reinforced at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Perth, where leaders gave instructions on reforming the organisation and tightening its mandate. At this point it is too early to judge the success of these efforts, although the Chair of the Audit Committee gave a positive report on the direction and pace of reform at the Meeting of the Board of Governors in May 2011.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating WEAK</p>
<p>COMSEC's management attention to cost control, value for money and cost effectiveness is not systematic and needs strengthening. Cost control and value for money are of ongoing concern to its governing bodies. These governing bodies regularly scrutinise budgets, but cannot always assess value for money due to gaps in financial and performance information. COMSEC management has instigated some measures to focus on cost efficiencies, such as a recent Travel Audit which found weaknesses that management has accepted and committed to address. But there remains scope for more systematic attention to means of improving cost effectiveness.</p> <p>COMSEC's effective work on debt management has helped some members improve aspects of their budgeting and disbursement. For example, its public</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS WEAK</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS WEAK</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>


<p>sector management program promotes value for money and cost effectiveness, and has provided useful public financial management tools and training.</p>	
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Positive feedback from developing countries suggests COMSEC works constructively with most member governments. Its ability to adapt assistance and advise on partner priorities and capabilities is a strong point.</p> <p>COMSEC's alignment with partner country priorities and systems is hard to assess. The 2008 CFTC evaluation concluded that, although it is usually responsive to member Governments' needs, there was little evidence of other Paris Principles (such as formal donor coordination) being applied at country-level. The review recommended the creation of Technical Cooperation Frameworks to assist in addressing this. COMSEC is currently developing these frameworks, however it remains too early to assess how effective these efforts will be.</p> <p>Developing country governments have a strong voice in COMSEC's governance and programs.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>COMSEC's record on transparency in resource allocation, budget management and operational planning is improving off a low base. While COMSEC does not have a formal information disclosure policy, it publishes summary information on its activities, programs and results, including audited financial statements, evaluation reports and progress reports. Much of this is descriptive and does not link to allocations, however.</p> <p>COMSEC has a large number of activities and operations underway at any one time and it is difficult to track expenditure and attribute expenditure correctly.</p> <p>Until recently, COMSEC had a rather poor record in aspects of its financial management (for example, underspending), risk management (for example, information technology security) and fraud prevention (for example, fraudulent claims associated with official travel). It has taken steps to strengthen budget and other corporate systems and processes. Examples</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION WEAK</p> <p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

include adopting International Public Sector Accounting Standards, developing a new budget framework based on best international practice, adopting a risk management framework and implementing better procurement processes.

The Australian Multilateral Assessment found limited evidence that COMSEC promotes transparency and accountability with partners, although some of COMSEC's activities and tools in financial management and public sector management help to promote accountability.

Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is a global partnership among 15 international agricultural research centres that conduct research into agriculture, forestry and fisheries in collaboration with national agricultural research institutions, advanced research institutions, private sector research entities and other partners for the purposes of development. It exists to foster cooperation and priority setting among the research centres and encourage the coordination of funding for them from governments (both from the developed and developing countries), private business, foundations and other donors. As an international network it has existed for 40 years. The World Bank is a trustee and administrator of the funds contributed to CGIAR, as well as one of the main donors.

This assessment does not seek to assess individual International Agricultural Research Centres, but rather the system as a whole.

CGIAR is currently undergoing fundamental reform designed to enhance its performance against many of the assessment criteria. The fundamental nature of these reforms means the findings and ratings in this assessment should be regarded as subject to significant change should the reforms prove successful in increasing effectiveness over coming years.

Total CGIAR revenue in 2010 was US\$696 million, almost all of it funding from members and nonmember donors. Expenditure was US\$657 million. Australia has been a regular contributor to CGIAR. In 2010–11 Australia increased its funding levels to become CGIAR's seventh largest donor, with total contributions of \$41.4 million, comprising \$13.6 million of voluntary core contributions and \$27.8 million in non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>CGIAR delivers tangible results towards global efforts to secure food supply in a way that meets food security, nutrition and health, environmental sustainability, and poverty reduction challenges. It estimates that about 7250 varieties of food crops have been bred using genetic materials from its research centres—these are being used in about 60 per cent of the world’s food crop areas to improve varieties. CGIAR research centre innovations have greatly increased the productivity of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in developing countries.</p> <p>Under past and present structure, the CGIAR system has produced a rolling program of evaluations of research centres and programs. This has included several studies documenting CGIAR’s overall impact at global level and in specific regions. For example the economic benefits of the CGIAR system as a whole were estimated to be up to US\$120 billion, roughly double investment levels. However, there has not been a systematic attempt to routinely capture results from across the CGIAR system.</p> <p>CGIAR has taken recent steps to improve monitoring of results through the establishment of the International Science and Partnership Council and an Independent Evaluation Arrangement. It is too early to judge how helpful CGIAR output reports and evaluations under these newly reformed structures will be.</p> <p>Current research programs bring greatest benefit to the poorest and others with inadequate food supplies, but a major principle of ongoing reforms is to address food challenges with a more coordinated and increased impact on poverty alleviation, nutrition and health, and environmental sustainability.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY

<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>CGIAR’s research network contributes to improving varieties of food crops and other agricultural products and to environmental sustainability in a way that directly serves Australia’s interests as an agricultural producer and food consumer. Australian economists have estimated that wheats developed by the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (known by its Spanish acronym CIMMYT), which is a CGIAR research centre, have increased the value of outputs from the Australian wheat industry by at least \$750 million.</p> <p>CGIAR objectives are well aligned with the Australian aid program’s strategic goal of sustainable economic development through improving food security by investing in agricultural productivity and indirectly in saving lives.</p> <p>Recently CGIAR has responded to urging by donors to pay more attention to the gender aspects of agricultural practices and innovations, but the development and implementation of a new policy is a work in progress. The same is true of other crosscutting issues which are central to new reforms underway in CGIAR. These are expected to be substantially enhanced.</p> <p>None of CGIAR centres is based in a fragile state. Where centres have found themselves in fragile situations, they have temporarily relocated to protect scientific programs and intellectual assets (for example, the Africa Rice Centre relocated from Cote d’Ivoire to Benin).</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p>
	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES N/A</p>
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>International coordination of agricultural research for development is CGIAR’s mandate. Each of its 15 research centres is a hub of contacts. Contacts, including agricultural ministries, universities, extension agencies, agribusinesses and others liaise and cooperate on initiatives. Despite the positive aspects of this, CGIAR has acknowledged it needs to perform a more catalytic role that better realises the potential synergies between its centres and the many other players in the global research system.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>

<p>Over the last three years it has taken action to strengthen its coordinating role by changing its structure and operation. There remains much to be done to reduce duplication and improve prioritisation in the centres' research programs.</p> <p>Expenditure through CGIAR, totalling US\$657 million in 2010–11, forms the lifeblood of the international agricultural research system.</p> <p>Promoting knowledge and innovation is at the core of CGIAR's business as leaders in agricultural research and the results of are seen as highly valuable by stakeholders in relation to food security. For example, a 2008 study put the overall annual economic benefits of CGIAR research on the three main cereals at about US\$0.8 billion for maize, US\$2.5 billion for wheat and US\$10.8 billion for rice in Asia alone, far exceeding the investment in this work. CGIAR also funds innovative research work through its centres, including through the influential International Food Policy Research Institute.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>CGIAR's newly developed strategy and results framework has added considerable clarity to its plans and directions. The framework has been instrumental in delivering 15 CGIAR research programs which will drive future direction of CGIAR research. Each program must relate directly to the strategic framework and has been judged accordingly by CGIAR's Consortium Board and Fund Council.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY</p> <p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Following lengthy negotiations, donors and other stakeholders in the CGIAR system have established a new form of governance. The research centres are represented on the Consortium Board with funding arrangements determined by the Fund Council. The new governance bodies have been supportive of reform efforts and have taken action to help shape the operations of the new system. Stakeholders generally see these two entities as showing good progress albeit open to improvement.</p> <p>Good progress has been made in developing a suitable resultsbased management system, which has been applied to new, large international research programs.</p>	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>CGIAR's network has a system of monitoring and evaluation which is adequate, but being improved.</p> <p>In general, CGIAR research centres have up-to-date and adequate management practices for recruiting staff, training and development. The recent agreement to develop one corporate system led by the Consortium for program, financial and personnel administration across all centres is promising, but still a work in progress.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>CGIAR research centres vary in their ratios of indirect to direct costs. The average is high, but this is understandable in the circumstances of an international network. The boards of individual centres oversee issues of accountability and cost effectiveness. The centres' accounts and expenditures have been available for appraisal by all parties including donors, and no general complaints have been registered. The new CGIAR structure is intended, once fully operational, to give higher prominence to value for money considerations. Estimated rates of return on CGIAR's investment in crop improvement research range from 39 per cent in Latin America to more than 100 per cent in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. The fact that such assessments have been made indicates the importance attached to rates of return and cost effectiveness, in planning and in accountability processes. This is likely to be reinforced under the new one corporate system.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY N/A</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>CGIAR research centres have extensive partnerships which have been adapted to their functions. This includes arrangements with governments, national agricultural research systems, non-government organisations and others. The quality of these partnerships is generally high, although naturally it varies among the research centres.</p> <p>CGIAR is generally responsive to partner governments' agriculture ministries. Concerns have been expressed about the quality of consultations with national agricultural research systems and non-government organisations and these are to be addressed as part of current reforms.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>The governance arrangements of CGIAR, especially its widely representative Funders Forum and Global Conference of Agricultural Research for Development, provide adequate voice for stakeholders given the nature of its mandate.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>CGIAR research centres, their governing bodies and CGIAR’s Independent Science and Partnership Council have adequate practices of publishing relevant information on their respective websites. Not all relevant information is available through the CGIAR website and an upgrade of the website is underway.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>CGIAR’s transparency in allocating funds among its centres and research programs is limited by its dependence for most of its funding on earmarked donor contributions. Of total contributions in 2010, only 34 per cent were not earmarked. This figure is expected to change with the proportion of earmarked donations shrinking over time. Although the fund council considers resourcing issues at virtually every meeting, there are not currently clear arrangements for governing bodies setting priorities among research centre programs. Work is underway on a process for setting priorities across the CGIAR network and linking this to resource allocation.</p>	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION WEAK</p>
<p>Both under its former arrangements and in the new structures, CGIAR has given importance to financial accountability and auditing at levels that meet donor requirements. There is no evidence of any major incidents of financial mismanagement or inadequate transparency in financial matters.</p>	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Where CGIAR centres enter into service agreements with third parties they are normally required to enter suitable contractual and transfer agreements. The centres are accustomed to this practice as a basic management tool.</p>	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

Food and Agriculture Organization

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the lead United Nations (UN) agency for agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development. Its mandate is to offer member states the technical and policy capability to raise their levels of nutrition, improve agricultural productivity, better the lives of rural populations and contribute to the growth of the world economy while safeguarding natural resources.

Food security has become a central focus of FAO. Its reformed Committee on World Food Security plays a significant role in contributing to the global governance of food security.

FAO's overall program of work is funded by assessed and voluntary contributions. In 2010 it implemented programs and projects with a value of US\$903 million. FAO operates in 138 countries. In 2010–11, Australia provided \$17.9 million to FAO, including \$10.3 million of assessed contributions and \$7.6 million of non-core contributions.

Australia is an active member of FAO and co-chairs, with New Zealand, its South West Pacific regional group. FAO is undergoing one of the most comprehensive reform programs in the UN system—the results of which are only just beginning to show.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>FAO performs functions which are important in addressing key aspects of poverty and sustainable development. Its weak results framework is a major constraint in demonstrating results.</p> <p>FAO's functions of standard-setting, providing specialist expertise and compiling and distributing information seem to be fulfilled. The most positive feedback from Australian overseas missions was in relation to FAO's work in emergency relief, including in the Horn of Africa. This is consistent with feedback received during Australian Multilateral Assessment's field visit to Sri Lanka, where the government praised FAO for providing seeds and farming inputs for displaced farmers immediately after peace was restored to the northern provinces in 2009.</p> <p>FAO's work in animal disease control, notably avian influenza and the global eradication of rinderpest, and illegal fishing are other examples where FAO has made a major contribution. FAO also contributes to tangible achievements through its involvement in normative and standard setting bodies. FAO has also played an important role assisting governments and International Financial Institutions to program US\$4 billion of investments in agriculture in 2010.</p> <p>FAO's reporting framework enables only a limited assessment of results. The framework lacks indicators with benchmarks and targets at country and program levels. A new results-based framework has been introduced to support the Medium Term Plan (2010–13). A substantial improvement in results reporting is likely in the next biennium (2012–13) because of a step up in the specification of expected results in FAO's program of work and budget.</p> <p>Feedback at country-level indicates FAO programs in-country sometimes lack focus and strategic direction. Its standard-setting and knowledge functions tend to benefit entire populations rather than just the poorest. However, some of its functions, such as contributions to early warnings of food emergencies, have the greatest benefit for poorest countries and regions.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS WEAK
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY

2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>FAO's mandate relates directly to the strategic goals of Australia's aid program of investing in sustainable economic growth through improved food security, and less directly to private sector development and reducing the negative impacts of climate change.</p> <p>FAO's distinctive functions of helping to set, maintain and implement international standards for foods, and its shared function of contributing to food security, are important for Australia's broader interests as a major food-producing nation and agricultural exporter. They also help to underpin agricultural development in developing countries, including least-developed countries, by providing a forum for developing the common standards necessary to participate in global markets and develop domestic production.</p> <p>The 2011 Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) report on FAO indicates that FAO performs adequately on crosscutting issues.</p> <p>A recent FAO gender audit report found that performance on gender issues has not been particularly strong and that FAO sets its gender targets lower than the levels recommended by the UN. FAO has taken steps to address this, including by raising its target to equal representation by men and women at the professional and higher categories, increasing funding specifically for gender issues and targeting a further increase in gender-related activities in the coming biennium.</p> <p>The 2011 MOPAN assessment reports that FAO gives no specific attention to disability-inclusive development. FAO's work on disabilities in rural areas was discontinued as it was not part of the strategic framework endorsed by member states.</p> <p>FAO has a generally good record of responding to crises, including in fragile states, and of coordinating and assisting other agencies through the food security cluster which it co leads with the World Food Programme.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p>
	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG</p>

3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating STRONG
<p>FAO has a number of functions which are important in the multilateral development system, for example co-leading with the World Food Programme the global food security cluster in emergency and post-emergency interventions and coordinating across the United Nations system recovery of rural livelihoods. It fulfills these functions to a fair extent. FAO actively promotes multilateral cooperation. It coordinates the Committee on World Food Security, which is the only multilateral forum for food security issues, bringing together member countries, relevant UN agencies, international organisations, civil society, the private sector and philanthropic organisations.</p> <p>FAO has a distinctive role in setting norms and standards. Among other roles it supports the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and the International Plant Protection Convention and providing the secretariat of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which facilitates the exchange and conservation of plant genetic material related to agriculture. FAO also leads global policy in areas of significant importance to least developed and developing countries, including on illegal fishing, land tenure and agricultural chemicals.</p> <p>In general, FAO's knowledge products are distinctive and of a high standard. It makes significant contributions to knowledge about aspects of agricultural production and food insecurity, including as the international lead in producing global statistics, analysis and reports (such as the food price index, the annual State of Food and Agriculture reports and annual State of Food Insecurity in the World reports). FAO also plays an important role in providing reports on agricultural output and medium and long-term outlook for food and agriculture. The G20 recently recognised FAO's lead role in this area, by requesting it host the Agriculture Food Market Information System, which aims to improve agricultural market information and minimise food price volatility and its effects on the most vulnerable.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SATISFACTORY
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION VERY STRONG

ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating WEAK
<p>FAO's mandate is extremely broad and its programs at global level and regional level aim for a wide range of expected results, which seem in number and content to be out of proportion to the resources likely to be available for the organisation to pursue them. The program of institutional reforms launched in 2008 for the five years 2009–13 (the 'Immediate Plan of Action') seems to be making good progress and is likely to bring improvements in planning and management for the next biennium 2012–13. As of now, however, it is not possible to say that the institutional reforms have produced substantial improvements across the organisation.</p> <p>FAO does not do well in allocating resources to the highest priorities according to country needs and/or its comparative advantage, or in reallocating resources to where it obtains the best results. A key constraint to this is the varying and divergent views of its 191 member states that make up its governing bodies, making the setting and changing of priorities extremely difficult. FAO needs to narrow its focus to those areas where it can deliver the most significant results.</p> <p>FAO is planning to develop, by the end of 2012, a country programming framework for each country in which it operates. These will guide FAO activity and investment in each country and give much more transparency to its operations and results. The rapid and effective development of these frameworks in the countries in which FAO operates will help with prioritisation and resource allocation at a country-level.</p> <p>FAO has an adequate evaluation policy, which includes formulating management responses to evaluation lessons, and presenting opportunities for attention by its governing bodies. FAO's evaluation unit seems to be independent and productive. A management response to each evaluation indicates whether recommendations are fully, partly or not accepted. There is little information about the extent to which evaluations and management responses lead to useful lessons that are applied, as appropriate, to new programs.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS WEAK</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY WEAK</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES WEAK</p>

<p>FAO's leadership has not been strong. Feedback at country-level confirms that the quality of country managers is critical to FAO's effectiveness. In the 2011 MOPAN assessment of stakeholders the lowest score amongst the 21 indicators was for managing human resources. Recent changes in internal leadership and human resources management have the potential to make demonstrable improvements at country-level if strongly pursued by the incoming Director General.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>FAO does not perform well in cost effectiveness at country-level. Some improvements have been made through the current institutional reforms to improve cost effectiveness at the organisation-wide level. The 2007 Independent External Evaluation found that FAO management had taken positive actions to achieve efficiency savings however it also identified a number of further areas where FAO could increase cost effectiveness such as administration and headquarter costs.</p> <p>Available evidence, notably from the 2011 MOPAN assessment and feedback at country-level from Australian overseas missions, suggests that benchmarking and cross-agency comparisons are not widely used, and that value for money is not generally a strong part of the institutional culture at regional and country-levels.</p> <p>The 2011 MOPAN assessment found questions remained about procurement and contract management systems, including as they related to cost effectiveness. MOPAN cited a 2007 evaluation and 2008-09 external audit which found procurement and contract management systems unsatisfactory due, among other things, to the absence of comparative data to measure cost and delivery times.</p> <p>The AMA understands that FAO does not fund other entities to any great extent, and therefore the criteria 'challenges partners on value for money' does not apply.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS WEAK</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY N/A</p>

6. Partnership behaviour	Component Rating STRONG
<p>FAO generally performs well in terms of partnership behaviour, particularly in emergency assistance. For example, during the response to the Horn of Africa drought and famine crisis, some non-government organisations reported that FAO was accessible, especially for smaller partners. They also reported that FAO acted as an effective facilitator, co-ordinator and bridge to governments. Reports from Australian overseas missions in Latin America noted that FAO plays an important coordinating role in the agricultural sector with a strong focus on longer-term issues such as ensuring supplies to rebuild stocks for the following year's crops.</p> <p>In most instances, FAO's role in-country is limited to technical assistance. However, feedback from Australian overseas missions suggests that FAO has been effective in humanitarian relief situations where close engagement with partner systems is required.</p> <p>At country-level there are examples of where FAO has given voice to stakeholders, for example working in an inclusive way with non-government organisations in the Horn of Africa. This is also demonstrated at a global level through reform to the Committee on World Food Security, which brings together civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders to discuss food security issues.</p>	WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY
	PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG
7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>FAO operates with a reasonable degree of transparency and accountability. It publishes information about its operational and organisational matters at whole-of-organisation level, and this information is generally adequate in scope and content. All documents submitted to governing bodies (including policies and evaluations) are available on FAO's website. However, its policy on disclosure is not stated, and FAO has not signed up to the International Aid Transparency Initiative.</p> <p>At global-level, FAO allocates its budget through a complex prioritisation process involving judgement, consultation with member states and negotiations among them. Biennial budgets are mostly set out in global terms and do not include country breakdowns of program components.</p>	ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY
	CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION WEAK
	STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY
	PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS N/A

FAO's Office of the Inspector General reported institutional weaknesses in accountability mechanisms, including at country-level. FAO management has outlined an extensive set of remedial measures which have been, or are being taken. Measures put in place by FAO management are appropriate, but it too early to judge if they are effective in practice.

The AMA understands that FAO does not fund other entities to any great extent and therefore the criteria 'promotes transparency in partners and recipients' does not apply.

GAVI Alliance

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The GAVI Alliance (GAVI) is a global health partnership between private and public sector entities committed to saving children's lives and protecting people's health by increasing access to immunisation in low income countries.

GAVI was formally launched at the World Economic Forum in January 2000, with a mission 'to save children's lives and protect people's health by increasing access to immunisation in poor countries.' It was established as a funding mechanism for supporting immunisation and health systems, and for introducing new vaccines in developing countries. GAVI directly helps to reduce child mortality (MDG 4) but also indirectly contributes to the achievement of all the Millennium Development Goals.

In its Strategy and Business Plan (2011–15), GAVI has identified these four strategic goals to guide its actions:

1. Accelerate the uptake and use of underused and new vaccines by strengthening country decision making and introduction (vaccine goal).
2. Contribute to strengthening the capacity of integrated health systems to deliver immunisation by resolving health systems constraints, increasing the level of equity in access to services and strengthening civil society engagement in the health sector (health systems goal).
3. Increase the predictability of global financing and improve the sustainability of national financing by accessing new and predictable resources (funding goal); and focus on the successful implementation of GAVI's co-financing policy (co-financing goal).

4. Shape vaccine markets with regard to pricing and supply security and make catalytic investments to facilitate introduction of appropriate vaccines (market shaping goal).

GAVI works through partners (for example, United Nations Children’s Fund and the World Health Organization) to deliver its mission and objectives. Partners include multilateral and bilateral organisations, developing country governments, public health and research institutes, civil society and vaccine manufacturers from industrialised and developing countries. Partners may be involved in: (i) developing GAVI’s policies and programs; (ii) supporting delivery; and (iii) governance of GAVI. Between 2011 and 2015 GAVI aims to fully immunise more than 250 million children and avert another four million additional deaths during the first decade.

In-country, GAVI targets its work on:

- > Low Income Countries Under Stress and those in the poorest and fragile financing groups—these countries receive a significant proportion of GAVI funding
- > the balance between health system-related support and vaccine support, which varies by country group.

GAVI’s cash-based programs represent about 15 per cent of its disbursements, which totalled approximately US\$64 million a year in 2009 and 2010, and consisted of programs to support immunisation services, health systems strengthening and civil society organisations.

Australia is one of 18 bilateral donors to GAVI and sits on its Board in a joint constituency with Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States. Since 2006, Australia has provided \$79 million to GAVI Alliance in direct contributions, with another \$155 million to be provided by 2013. Australia is also contributing \$250 million over 20 years (2010–30) to GAVI’s International Finance Facility for Immunisation. In 2010–11, Australia provided \$42.9 million to GAVI, all of which was provided as voluntary core contributions.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating VERY STRONG
GAVI has established a strong track record in delivering against its mandate. It has demonstrated impressive results against all its strategic objectives and in helping progress towards MDG 4 targets. Its contribution and impact has been confirmed by independent evaluations and peer reviews.	DELIVERS RESULTS VERY STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS STRONG
The approach to implementing and monitoring health and immunisation systems and strengthening programs to improve the sustainability of interventions could be strengthened.	TARGETS POOREST VERY STRONG

<p>GAVI specifically targets the poorest countries and within these countries those who are most vulnerable to diseases that are preventable by vaccination. The poorest and most fragile states receive the highest total disbursements per surviving child. GAVI programs address the specific health needs of vulnerable and disadvantages groups, particularly those in the poorest communities.</p> <p>GAVI has a clearly articulated focus on the MDGs and on the most vulnerable groups. Through its approach GAVI has garnered a high level of international support and cooperation to address MDG targets and priorities.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>GAVI’s mission of saving children’s lives and protecting health through immunisation is closely aligned with the Australian aid program’s strategic goal of saving lives. GAVI and the Australian aid program also share common overarching goals of strengthening health systems and building partnerships for better health outcomes.</p> <p>GAVI has strong and effective gender policies. As vaccines can prevent disability in some instances (for example, polio), GAVI should look at how it could use a similar approach to measure its impact on people with disability.</p> <p>GAVI is developing a better understanding of how to tailor its program for fragile and conflict-affected contexts. GAVI’s plan to adopt a formal policy on its approach towards fragile states, as discussed at its November 2011 Board meeting, is positive. It demonstrates GAVI’s willingness to adjust its financing mechanism and country delivery modes to ensure more effective impact in fragile or vulnerable countries.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG</p>

3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating STRONG
<p>GAVI plays a critical role in enhancing international efforts by providing a common platform for donors, the private sector, research agencies and the UN to support global immunisation. It plays a lead role in coordinating often fragmented and overlapping efforts and reducing duplications in the global health architecture.</p> <p>GAVI has been highly successful in securing a significant increase in the level of international funding for vaccinations through innovative financing mechanisms. This is making vaccines more affordable and strengthening the capacity of the poorest countries to implement vaccination programs. GAVI has not shied away from difficult issues and has been bold and innovative in addressing the cost and supply of vaccines, previously a major impediment to broader vaccine coverage.</p> <p>Through its research and analysis of the international context and market situation, GAVI has created new models for vaccine supply and market development.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE VERY STRONG
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>GAVI's strategic and operational plan is coherent and clear. It has a set of targets and indicators that effectively support management requirements for performance information and data collection, which inform program decisions.</p> <p>Its governing structures engage effectively with its Secretariat and external stakeholders and provide active, regular inputs to the organisation's policies and management. GAVI's Board and its committees play an essential role in guiding its work.</p> <p>The Board structure is sufficiently representative to ensure GAVI benefits from competent, robust dialogue on the technical and operational aspects of its portfolio.</p> <p>GAVI's monitoring and evaluation framework is robust and establishes a solid framework for program review and analysis. Some weaknesses in data collection and reporting have been identified. GAVI has shown</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS VERY STRONG
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG

<p>commitment to addressing these, particularly at country-level. GAVI could better monitor and develop indicators for health system strengthening.</p> <p>Improvements in GAVI's monitoring and evaluation system may be necessary in light of plans to roll out new vaccines. A more comprehensive system based on solid baseline data and accurate forward estimates would allow more sophisticated modelling and better allow donors to track contributions by region and country.</p> <p>GAVI has good leadership and human resource policies in place and the organisation functions very efficiently. GAVI will need to ensure its ratio of country program staff is appropriate to implement its programs and manage risks efficiently.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>There is good evidence that GAVI's approach is cost effective. Embedded in its operating model is the high value it places on efficiency gains and on reducing costs for partner governments.</p> <p>GAVI works to drive down costs by bundling demand, which gives them the ability to get better prices and security in the marketplace. This is important however GAVI recognises that sustainability requires that there are multiple manufacturers and competition in the market.</p> <p>GAVI's Board regularly reviews program budgets and forward plans and expects to see careful, rigorous justification on all new proposals against cost-efficiency standards. Its Secretariat has developed an innovative approach to managing costs and reducing the burden placed on partners, particularly for vaccine purchases.</p> <p>GAVI's co-financing model is effective and successful in strengthening ownership by countries. At the same time it helps countries embed value and cost-efficiency criteria into their health decisions.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS VERY STRONG</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>

6. Partnership behaviour	Component Rating STRONG
<p>GAVI has adopted the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness targets and partnership principles and has acted to improve its alignment with country systems and to coordinate with partners. Its inclusive governance structure involves all stakeholders in decisions.</p> <p>GAVI prides itself on its public–private partnership model—which translates from the Board composition through its committee structure and to the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committees in-country.</p> <p>Supporting national priorities and alignment with national health systems forms a key part of GAVI’s 2011–2015 Business Plan.</p> <p>GAVI is perceived by most partners as being flexible and open to feedback on major issues. There is evidence that GAVI considers feedback from partners when revising its policies and programs. GAVI actively looks for ways to collaborate more effectively with civil society organisations, including with a permanent seat on its Board and participation in a number of advisory bodies and task teams.</p>	WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG
	PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS VERY STRONG
7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating VERY STRONG
<p>GAVI is a signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative and places all documentation on its web site where it is easily available, providing full transparency across all areas of management and strategic decision making. It also posts detailed information on all country partner programs. This supports a high level of accountability among partners.</p> <p>GAVI uses country reporting, in conjunction with its own research, to carefully monitor resource allocations and disbursements. There is clear evidence it makes adjustments on feedback and forecasting demands.</p> <p>Established policies and procedures meet the highest standards of financial and fiduciary controls, both in GAVI’s own management operations and in its partners’ management operations.</p>	ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION VERY STRONG
	CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG
	STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS VERY STRONG
	PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG

<p>GAVI helps partners comply with their financial requirements by monitoring support and simplifying documentation and data-collection systems. Its co-financing model strengthens ownership and embeds high financial and management standards in country's own systems.</p>	
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Global Crop Diversity Trust

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Global Crop Diversity Trust (the Trust), established in 2003, has the mandate of conserving and improving genetic resources for the world's major food crops for food security worldwide. Its work is at the intersection of climate change, food security and water scarcity.

The Trust's work aligns with the Australian aid program's strategic goal of sustainable economic development. Projects involve work on 276 crop collections in 133 national institutions in more than 88 countries. The annual budget for 2011 was US\$11.5 million.

The Australian Government, through the Australian Agency for International Development, is an inaugural and leading donor to the Trust's endowment fund and is currently the fourth biggest contributor. Australia has committed \$20.8 million to the endowment fund since 2003. Australia did not provide a contribution to GCDT in 2010–11.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

The Trust has demonstrated good results since beginning operations in 2003. Its work on crop diversity makes a valuable contribution to food security and, to an increasing extent, climate change adaptation. It focuses on food crops that are the most important for food security in the poorest countries. The Trust has set targets for the preservation of 24 major crops and tracks progress annually.

Component Rating SATISFACTORY

DELIVERS RESULTS
STRONG

MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS
SATISFACTORY

TARGETS POOREST
SATISFACTORY

<p>The Trust's reporting systems provide good information at technical level but do not systematically capture data enabling reporting on development outcomes.</p> <p>The Trust's prioritisation of its work takes account of which food crops are most important for the food security of people in poor countries, as well as which food crops are most vulnerable in their genetic material.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>The Trust's work aligns with the Australian aid program's strategic goals of sustainable economic development through food security and climate change adaptation. It also aligns with Australia's broader interests in agricultural research and development, including through the Svalbard Global Seed Vault in which Australia has deposited more than 10 000 seed samples to secure the conservation of critical crops.</p> <p>The Trust's work directly contributes to environmental sustainability.</p> <p>Senior management has considered gender equality and consulted with gender experts to identify possible gender impacts of the Trust's work. However, discussions concluded that its work is too far upstream of the wide range of gender issues further down the production chain to have significant impact.</p> <p>The Trust supports a considerable number of genebanks in fragile states. It has provided additional support to genebanks to perform their key functions through capacity building support and providing essential equipment.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES N/A</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>The Trust plays a small but critical global coordination role in the conservation of diversity within crops of importance to food security. It has successfully identified the most important individual collections for major crops and established partnerships with relevant genebanks for their regeneration and preservation.</p> <p>The Trust was established to address the chronic funding shortage for important collections for crop</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>

<p>diversity. It established the endowment fund to provide funding in perpetuity for the 24 major crops that are vital for global food security. The Trust has been very successful in raising funds that will make a critical difference to global crop diversity and food security.</p> <p>The Trust has developed information management systems for use by genebanks to make greater use of genetic resources. Various information systems of this type existed, but not at global level. As a result, the Trust's work has created a common platform for global crop diversity.</p> <p>The Trust also plays a valuable role in raising the profile of the global challenges of food security and climate change through its website and media outreach.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>The Trust's mandate is clear, focused and articulated to its stakeholders. Its mandate is outlined in its fund disbursement strategy, which is its key strategic document. The pragmatic approach of the Trust's management has translated into effective resource and program management ensuring that its work remains focused.</p> <p>A significant strength is the quality of the Trust's current leadership. The drive and tenacity of leadership has been a key factor in successes such as the establishment of the Svarlbard Global Seed Vault, a backup of the world's crop diversity. The Trust's leadership has also raised nearly US\$220 million in funds through the efforts of two full-time equivalent staff.</p> <p>The Trust recognises the importance of measuring the performance of its long-term grants and uses a set of common performance indicators to work with its partners to reach agreed targets.</p> <p>The Trust's management and governance, through its Executive Board and Donor's Council, are effective at driving changes to improve performance. It also attracts and retains high-calibre staff.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>

<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>The Trust’s Executive Board and senior management have taken important steps to understand the costs of operating genebanks and have set targets for its endowment fund.</p> <p>The Trust continues to gain good results from relatively small investments.</p> <p>Its endowment fund target is currently US\$470 million but this is undersubscribed (by approximately one third). Given this, the Trust is conscious of costs. It uses the funding decision tree it developed to assess proposals, including for cost effectiveness. The Trust is a very small organisation with no field presence and, as such, is able to keep operational costs to a minimum.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>The Trust’s success depends on the effectiveness of its partnerships with a range of credible global organisations and best-practice research institutions. It maintains 133 partnerships in 89 countries and reports on these partnerships in its annual report card.</p> <p>The Trust also works in effective coordination with Bioversity International, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research and the Food and Agriculture Organization. It uses its strong networks in the private sector and academia to further its work and promote the importance of global crop diversity.</p> <p>The Trust’s work aligns with the internationally agreed priorities for the preservation of major crops, outlined in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS N/A</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating STRONG
<p>The Trust displays a high degree of transparency and accountability in its operations. Its website is comprehensive and it posts online content relating to its internal operations, including summaries of Executive Board meetings. It also posts information on its outcomes and performance reports for its activities.</p> <p>The Trust’s fund disbursement strategy has guidelines and criteria for allocating resources which are systematically applied. The funding decision tree it has developed outlines the requirements partners must meet to be eligible to receive Trust funding.</p> <p>The Trust has sound policies and processes in place which support good financial management (including the appointment of independent financial advisers and external auditors). It has developed transparent criteria for funding and encourages transparency and accountability in its partners through carefully monitored common performance indicators.</p>	ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG
	CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG
	STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG
	PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG

Global Environment Facility

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) operates as the financial mechanism for the major international environment conventions: United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change; Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention to Combat Desertification; and Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. It also supports other multilateral initiatives including the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. GEF funds practical programs and shapes policy reform in developing countries and economies-in-transition for climate change, biodiversity, ozone depletion, persistent organic pollutants, degradation of land, international water systems and promoting sustainable livelihoods.

Since GEF's establishment in 1991, it has allocated approximately US\$10 billion to more than 2800 projects aimed at improving the global environment. Resources are replenished every four years by member states. Australia has allocated \$335 million to GEF since 1991, including \$105 million to the fifth replenishment (2010–14). In 2010–11, AusAID provided \$22.5 million to GEF, all of which was provided as voluntary core contributions.

Australia shares a seat on the governing GEF Council with the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>GEF supports sustainable development by delivering tangible results in improving the global environment in line with the conventions it serves. For example, GEF has supported climate change adaptation and mitigation activities in more than 154 countries. Over time, GEF investments are expected to directly reduce 1.7 billion tons of greenhouse gas emissions. With biodiversity, GEF has supported the creation or management of more than 2302 protected areas covering more than 634 million hectares as well as protecting and planning for more than 265 million hectares of productive lands.</p> <p>GEF, in line with its mandate, focuses its reporting on the environmental impact of its activities. Although this reporting is clear and accessible, it is difficult to make an accurate overall assessment on the extent to which GEF activities are reducing poverty. In 2011, 88 per cent of GEF projects were reported to be performing at a moderate to solid level or above.</p> <p>GEF is implementing a revised results-based management framework, which should enable it to report more comprehensively on results and impact. The proposed framework appears to be robust.</p> <p>Within its System for Transparent Allocation of Resources, GEF use a gross domestic product per capita indicator to relatively increase the amount of funding allocated to poorer countries. However, GEF does not specifically target poor communities within countries.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS STRONG
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY

<p>2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>GEF's activities align with the Australian Government's climate change and environmental objectives. Australia is a member of the key multilateral environmental agreements for which GEF serves as the financial mechanism.</p> <p>GEF's work strongly aligns with the Australian aid program's strategic goal of sustainable economic development, by reducing the negative impacts of climate change and other environmental factors.</p> <p>GEF has only recently adopted a gender mainstreaming policy (May 2011) setting out comprehensive requirements for GEF partners. GEF has also adopted a new environment and social safeguards policy addressing a number of crosscutting issues such as Indigenous and cultural rights.</p> <p>The crosscutting issue of climate change is addressed as the core of GEF's mandate.</p> <p>GEF has no policies specifically addressing issues of disability.</p> <p>GEF does not have a policy or special procedure for working in fragile states. However, it provides funding to fragile states focusing on Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developing Countries (LDCs). For example, GEF's Pacific Alliance for Sustainability provides US\$98.6 million to Pacific Island Countries, leveraging a further US\$108.4 million in co-financing. The proportion of total GEF Trust Fund resources provided to SIDS and LDCs has increased from 11.9 per cent (GEF-3) to 18.4 per cent (GEF-4).</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p>
	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>As a central financial mechanism for the major environment conventions, GEF effectively coordinates the international response to these conventions and, thereby, plays an important coordinating role in the multilateral development system.</p> <p>GEF also administers the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Country Fund. It also provides secretariat services for the Adaption Fund, established under the Kyoto Protocol, which provides some degree</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p>
	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>

<p>of efficiency and coordination across the complex multilateral architecture for climate change.</p> <p>GEF provides large scale financing. Since its establishment in 1991, it has been the largest funder of environment projects and has allocated US\$10 billion to more than 2800 projects aimed at improving the global environment. This funding has been supplemented by more than US\$47 billion in co-financing.</p> <p>GEF promotes knowledge through its Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel, which is effective at providing specialist scientific and technical advice on environmental challenges and practical advice about how to address these challenges. It provides this advice to a range of stakeholders including GEF recipient countries and GEF implementing agencies.</p> <p>GEF has adopted a GEF-wide knowledge management initiative to enable its knowledge, information and data to be identified, captured, and made easily accessible to all of its partners and stakeholders. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of this fairly new initiative.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>GEF has a clear mandate and strategy to address global environmental issues and help developing countries meet their obligations under global environment conventions. The GEF-5 Focal Area Strategies document outlines GEF’s focal areas of biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation and chemicals, while its GEF-5 Programming Document outlines its operations and activities for the five-year-period covered by the fifth replenishment.</p> <p>In response to recipient requests and GEF evaluations, GEF is undertaking reforms as part of its fifth replenishment to streamline project cycles and improve its overall efficiency.</p> <p>GEF governing bodies (its Assembly and Council) are effective in guiding management. The level of adoption of Council decisions is monitored by the independent GEF Evaluation Office.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p> <p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>


<p>The evaluation office implements a range of high-quality monitoring and evaluation processes which include performance evaluations, country portfolio evaluations, impact evaluations, thematic evaluations and overall performance studies. An independent peer review of the office in 2009 concluded that its independence ‘is assured’ and that ‘the credibility of its reports is high’.</p> <p>GEF evaluation generally informs decision making. For example, for each replenishment period, its evaluation office completes an Overall Performance Study to review its effectiveness and provide recommendations. GEF has been highly responsive to the recommendations and incorporates them into its replenishments.</p> <p>The current leadership is strong and has overseen reforms to help improve effectiveness.</p> <p>GEF has satisfactory human resource policies and monitors the gender balance and proportion of staff from developing countries. Recruitment of staff is in accordance with World Bank procedures.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>GEF continues to improve the cost effectiveness of its activities. GEF estimates that its climate change mitigation portfolio has avoided or prevented carbon emissions for a cost of less than US\$2 per ton.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>GEF’s internal administrative costs are quite low in proportion to its external expenditure, noting that it does not implement projects directly.</p>	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Within partner agencies, GEF provides a standard project cycle management fee to manage project implementation. In November 2011 the Secretariat established a working group to review the full fee structure for agencies and decrease the total cost.</p> <p>Within individual projects, management costs have been reduced from an average of 15 per cent under GEF-3 to five per cent in GEF-5. GEF only scrutinises project management budgets when they exceed the five per cent threshold.</p>	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>The roles and responsibilities of implementing agencies outlined in the GEF Instrument include ensuring the cost effectiveness of GEF-financed activities. However, the GEF project identification form does not require cost effectiveness to be demonstrated.</p>	
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Generally, GEF’s partnerships are viewed as effective by relevant stakeholders. GEF works closely with its partner agencies—European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Food Agriculture Organization, International Fund for Agriculture Development, International Development Bank, joint agencies, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environmental Programme, United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the World Bank—which play a key role in managing GEF projects on the ground. GEF also works directly with Convention secretariats, which, along with its partner agencies attend GEF council meetings.</p> <p>GEF values align with partner country priorities. GEF has supported 40 countries to complete National Portfolio Formulation Exercises. This tool assists partner governments to coordinate overall environment sector activities based on country priorities. There is some variability in the level of ownership between different countries. GEF is working to improve country ownership including through a pilot to increase the number of GEF implementing agencies, with a particular focus on national agencies.</p> <p>GEF supports a network of more than 600 accredited environment and sustainable development non-government organisations and the network is represented at council meetings.</p> <p>The GEF Instrument requires implementing agencies to cooperate with relevant stakeholders. The Project Identification Form requires applicants to identify all key stakeholders involved in a project and outline their respective roles as applicable.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating VERY STRONG
<p>GEF has high levels of transparency and publishes all documentation on its website. Its project database is publicly available and easily accessible on the Internet. However, GEF is not a member of the International Aid Transparency Initiative.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
<p>Resource allocation is transparent through GEF's System for Transparent Allocation of Resources, which is consistently applied and allows countries to know in advance how much money is available to them.</p>	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION VERY STRONG</p>
<p>GEF's trustee is the World Bank and strong internal controls, fiduciary management and audit compliance are applied to all of its funding.</p>	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS VERY STRONG</p>
<p>GEF is encouraging transparency and accountability in partners by applying minimum fiduciary standards to all GEF implementing agencies, which include a strong transparency component.</p>	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG</p>

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) was launched in 2006 by the World Bank as a partnership within the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction system with the UN, donors and developing countries.

The partnership comprises 39 countries and eight international organisations. It was established to mainstream disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate adaptation in country development strategies by supporting country-led and country-managed implementation of the commitments under the Hyogo Framework for Action. GFDRR also provides assistance for disaster resilient recovery and reconstruction.

Australia is a leading donor. Since 2007 Australia has provided \$26.4 million to GFDRR. In 2010–11, Australia provided \$13.4 million in non-core funding to GFDRR.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
Since its launch, GFDRR has responded to the growing needs and demands of countries, currently funding more than 120 disaster risk reduction (DRR) and inter-related climate risk management programs in many disaster-prone low and middle-income countries.	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
A 2010 independent evaluation by Universalia found GFDRR has increased political awareness of DRR as a development objective in many countries.	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY

<p>GFDRR’s results framework reflects its partnership charter’s focus on mainstreaming DRR and climate change adaptation in country development strategies, creating new tools and instruments and building capacity to promote an enabling environment, particularly at country-level. However, the framework remains broad and there are some gaps in its coverage meaning that some of its reporting is not systematic.</p> <p>Despite the inability of its results framework to demonstrate clear and tangible outcomes, and a reporting and communication focus on the breadth of its activities rather than results, GFDRR has been effective in many areas.</p> <p>GFDRR supports progress towards the Millennium Development Goals by targeting support to low income countries and those most vulnerable to risk of disasters and climate changes impacts. However, GFDRR’s focus is on building partnerships with national governments, rather than systematically targeting the poorest communities.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>GFDRR’s strategic focus and programs are closely aligned with the strategic priorities and objectives of Australia’s aid program. It has been flexible and responsive to Australia’s concerns for a sharper focus on the needs of Pacific Island countries. Its work aligns directly with two of the five strategic goals of the Australian aid program—saving lives and humanitarian and disaster response. GFDRR plays a critical role in supporting countries to incorporate DRR into their national plans and in supporting stronger coordination among actors.</p> <p>Australia has established close and active engagement with GFDRR through financial contributions and its current role as the 2011 Co-Chair of the Consultative Group.</p> <p>GFDRR has a sound approach to gender mainstreaming although there is a need to give greater visibility to its efforts in gender and the Consultative Group is seeking specific outcomes in this area.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>There is a clear and cohesive approach to environmental issues, particularly climate change adaptation, although there has been limited visibility of its progress in mainstreaming climate change adaptation.</p> <p>GFDRR does not have a specific focus on fragile states but it has demonstrated effectiveness in supporting weak countries in post-disaster assessments, recovery and in developing country action plans for DRR.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>GFDRR has demonstrated effective capacity to enhance international coordination around the Hyogo Framework for Action agenda and to strengthen donor and government collaboration on DRR. It has, however, had difficulty in demonstrating value from the US\$28 million it has allocated to its Track 1 work with UNISDR. There is a need for the working relationship between GFDRR and UNISDR to be more transparent and for results from the collaboration to be reported on.</p> <p>GFDRR leverages increasing levels of international support and funding for its program and injects significant amounts of new financing into DRR activities, including by leveraging additional investment from the World Bank through its normal country support program.</p> <p>GFDRR has been innovative in harnessing technology to support the development of new tools and data sources. These improve coordination and help collate disaster assessment funding requirements quicker. Simple and high-quality tools for community and beneficiary involvement in local data collection and post-disaster monitoring have also been developed.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>


ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>GFDRR's results-based management system is aligned with its mandate and grounded in the principles of the Hyogo Framework for Action. There is scope for clearer links in the results framework between strategic goals and operational decisions.</p> <p>The Consultative Group, GFDRR's policy-making body, provides adequate oversight of policy and operations. However, it has now grown to 47 members and there is some concern that its size might make it less effective as a decision making body. The Results Management Council's role is to provide technical advice to the Secretariat and the Consultative Group. There may be a case to reorganise GFDRR's management arrangements to streamline its decision making and technical advisory functions. GFDRR is aware of this need, and options for reorganising its governance arrangements will be discussed at the 12th Consultative Group Meeting.</p> <p>The 2010 independent evaluation by Universalialia recommended GFDRR establish an evaluation plan and to strengthen impact evaluation methodology. This work is still in process and will be presented to the RMC for technical endorsement.</p> <p>GFDRR's Secretariat is engaged, energetic and responsive. It has seized opportunities to take the DRR agenda into new areas and to enlarge the GFDRR partnership. However, it needs to devote more time to strategic and analytical reporting on GFDRR progress at program- and country-levels. The Secretariat's communication products could usefully include more information on where GFDRR is heading and why.</p> <p>GFDRR relies on the World Bank for many of its human resources and financial management support functions. It is effectively covered by the policies and procedures of the World Bank in relation to staff recruitment, performance assessment, disciplinary procedures and security.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>GFDRR’s approach to cost efficiency and value is essentially determined by World Bank standards and procedures. Since 2006 US\$320 million has been pledged to GFDRR, US\$153 million received and US\$103 million disbursed, with around 11 per cent going to management and administration.</p> <p>The Consultative Group reviews GFDRR’s cost structure through financial reports and budget documentation. Its results-based management system enables it to track expenditure and link costs to project performance.</p> <p>GFDRR is managed by the World Bank on behalf of participating donors and other partnering stakeholders. It therefore brings a strong level of cost effectiveness and value consciousness to its program development.</p> <p>One way GFDRR pursues programmatic cost effectiveness and works with partners on value for money, is through the development of cost effective technological and innovative solutions to DRR issues. Some examples include trialling improvements to risk assessment, disaster mapping and risk insurance. GFDRR’s risk analysis and reduction work provides strong incentives for partner governments to invest in risk mitigation thereby contributing to lowering the costs involved with post-disaster recovery efforts.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>GFDRR’s partnership model is effective in strengthening collaboration among key stakeholders in the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction system and GFDRR has been effective in its global advocacy for DRR. GFDRR could do more to demonstrate how its partnership with UNISDR achieves results.</p> <p>GFDRR’s partnership with Australia at headquarters level is excellent. In countries where Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the World Bank–GFDRR are active in DRR, collaborations are progressing but at times communications from World Bank–GFDRR country offices to AusAID counterparts need to improve to avoid duplication.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

<p>GFDRR places high value on working within country systems, as its effectiveness in mainstreaming DRR depends on integrating strategies and plans across whole of government. It collaborates closely with national and local authorities on implementation. There are doubts as to the level of host government ownership of GFDRR's post disaster needs assessments but the Secretariat is aware of this.</p> <p>GFDRR has been generally willing to engage with stakeholders and is now proactive in seeking new layers of engagement with civil society and local communities.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating VERY STRONG</p>
<p>GFDRR provides open and transparent access to its documents through its website. It has a strong policy on disclosure and adheres to the principles of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) via the World Bank's commitment to IATI.</p> <p>GFDRR's results based management system is used to determine the allocation of financial resources and to monitor performance against disbursement milestones. GFDRR's procedures relating to fund application and project designs and implementation are transparent and the application process easily understood.</p> <p>GFDRR has sound financial management systems with transparent accounting procedures and policies. Oversight, financial, fraud and integrity systems all fall within the World Bank's high standard frameworks.</p> <p>GFDRR has strong requirements in its operations that promote transparency and accountability of partners for GFDRR-funded activities. Through its capacity-building activities GFDRR also helps country authorities implement stronger accountability frameworks.</p> <p>GFDRR operations are generally partner-led and built on accountability and leadership from government.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG</p>

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) was created to dramatically increase resources to fight three of the world’s most devastating diseases—tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS—and to direct resources to areas of greatest need. Since its inception in 2002 the Global Fund has become the largest multilateral funder in global health. It provides approximately two-thirds of international financing to fight tuberculosis and malaria, and one-fifth of its international financing for HIV/AIDS. It also funds targeted health systems strengthening.

Established as a public–private partnership in global health, the Global Fund brings together a diverse stakeholders ranging from governments, other multilateral organisations and affected communities. Its model is based on the concepts of country ownership and performance-based funding, progressively disbursing funds to countries as they achieve agreed targets. The Global Fund has approved US\$22.4 billion in funding for grants in 150 countries. It is a financing mechanism based in Geneva with no in-country presence, so its results represent the collective effort of countries and development partners.

In 2011 a major review of the Global Fund’s fiduciary control mechanisms was conducted by a high-level independent panel. The review was a response to growing concerns with the Global Fund’s capacity to detect and address fraud. The review’s recommendations, entitled *Turning the Page from Emergency to Sustainability*, guides the Global Fund’s transition from being set up to respond to a global health emergency to a more mature and sustainable financing institution. The recommendations are also incorporated into the current reform work of the Global Fund’s Board and Secretariat.

The Global Fund is currently undergoing fundamental reform designed to address the shortcomings of funding and scenario planning that played out in late 2011. The nature of these reforms means the findings and ratings in this assessment should be regarded as subject to significant change should the reforms prove successful in increasing effectiveness over coming years. Since 2004 Australia has provided \$240 million to the Global Fund in core contribution. As part of its current three-year pledge, Australia has committed to provide an additional \$180 million by 2013. In 2010–11, Australia provided \$30.0 million in voluntary core contributions.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

Component Rating **STRONG**

Since its formation, the Global Fund has demonstrated significant development results in line with its interventions. Its programs have provided HIV treatment for an estimated 3.3 million people, tuberculosis treatment for 8.2 million people, and distributed 230 million insecticide-treated bed nets for preventing malaria worldwide.

DELIVERS RESULTS
VERY STRONG

MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS
SATISFACTORY

TARGETS POOREST
STRONG

The Affordable Medicines Facility for malaria, hosted and managed by the Global Fund, promotes a public-private partnership to expand access to lifesaving medicines. The introduction of a subsidy, paid to manufacturers on behalf of buyers of the most effective malaria drugs, artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) has seen retail prices for treatments fall dramatically in several participating countries.

The results of the Global Fund programs have been independently verified, including by Results International and World Vision and through the Five Year Evaluation of the Global Fund and the UK Multilateral Assessment. An overall assessment of its success in delivering results, however, would require consideration against efficiency, integration and value for money indicators, which are not readily available at an aggregate level.

The Global Fund has established country-based systems to monitor and review health outcomes, but these do not show direct attribution for outcomes. The systems do focus on the sustainability of grant-funded programs given available resources.

<p>The introduction of counterpart financing requirements in 2011 in order to increase contributions from national sources is a positive step to promote sustainability. The Global Fund has also signed the Paris Declaration, Accra Action Agenda and has contributed to partnership approaches to support aid effectiveness and predictability of funding.</p> <p>Most Global Fund grants have been disbursed in low income countries. Its new strategy (2012–16) targets the most at-risk populations in the worst affected countries and favours low income countries.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Australia’s core contribution to the Global Fund complements its bilateral health programs and extends the reach of the aid program to places where Australia’s presence is limited, for example some African countries. Nevertheless there is scope for the Global Fund to pay greater attention to the Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for nearly 50 per cent of childhood deaths worldwide.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG</p>
<p>Global Fund programs are well aligned with the Australian aid program’s strategic goals: most directly the goal of saving lives, particularly of poor women and children through greater access to quality maternal and child health services; and supporting large-scale disease prevention, vaccination and treatment.</p> <p>A strength of the Global Fund is its ability to address issues related to gender equality, sexual orientation and gender identity. It encourages country partners to act by encouraging them to reference the comprehensive set of guidelines of technical partners (WHO, UNAIDS and UNDP). However, more urgent work is required to ensure country implementing agencies meet the standards and practices required, particularly where minorities do not have legal recognition or may be actively discriminated against. The nature of the Global Fund’s work means it has a limited focus on environmental issues although its Secretariat has been implementing a Green Initiative aimed at reducing waste, saving energy, cutting down on carbon emissions and increasing environmental awareness. The Australian Multilateral Assessment found no evidence of an explicit focus on disability-related issues.</p>	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>The Global Fund has provided substantial funding to fragile states and has had success in some fragile states contexts. However, the performance-based nature of its funding has created challenges for some fragile states with weak health systems. The Global Fund’s fiduciary risk management in fragile states requires significant strengthening as identified by the high level independent panel.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>The Global Fund has developed several new mechanisms and processes to promote coordination. With the World Bank and the GAVI Alliance, and the coordinating support from WHO, the Global Fund has developed the health systems funding platform for harmonised support for health systems. The platform is still at pilot stage and the Global Fund needs to work with other partners to accelerate its roll-out.</p> <p>At country-level, the Global Fund has developed the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM). This has provided country teams with a framework for national agencies and stakeholders to work together with a single focus of addressing the disease priorities of that country. The Australian Multilateral Assessment received positive feedback on the CCM from Australian overseas missions in Burma and Papua New Guinea. In some contexts however, CCMs have not been effectively implemented, as confirmed by feedback to the Australian multilateral Assessment from some Pacific Island countries.</p> <p>The Global Fund was formed to fill a critical gap in tackling the three diseases and since its formation it has grown to become a large player in international aid architecture. It has been very effective in coordinating large-scale finance directed at the three diseases. It has also been reasonably successful in attracting funding from private sector contributors, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.</p> <p>In addition to developing innovating funding mechanisms, the Global Fund has established an innovative approach to delivery with decision making and reporting mechanisms devolved to country partners. This overall model has some weaknesses and</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p>
	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>the Global Fund must adopt a more robust approach to delivering and managing grants in line with available resources.</p> <p>The Global Fund’s innovative performance-based approach has been successful but has also generated burdensome reporting requirements particularly for countries with limited capacity. Feedback from Australian overseas missions in Burma, Pacific Islands posts, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu noted that the Global Fund’s procedures and policies often overwhelm implementing partners.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>The Global Fund has a clear mandate backed by a clear strategic framework. It was created to dramatically increase the resources needed to tackle HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, and direct resources to areas of greatest need. It delivers in line with this mandate and has so far avoided mission creep.</p> <p>Changing circumstances mean the Global Fund’s strategic planning processes have had to be revised. It has historically been demand-driven with substantial available funding meaning there has been no requirement to prioritise or revise allocations based on an assessment of country needs. However, this has now ceased with a move away from round-based financing and funding limits requiring greater scrutiny of country performance and operational efficiencies. The reduced forecast of resources available for 2011–13 and the Panel’s findings on the delivery model highlight the need to revise the Global Fund model and review its resource forecasting methodology, as well as the timing and nature of its reporting to its Board. The latest round of grants was cancelled.</p> <p>The Board and management structures provide for effective, if over-detailed, scrutiny of Global Fund operations. The panel considered that the Board had in some ways been too active in over-scrutinising the Global Fund’s portfolio and not taking an overarching perspective on policy and wider strategic issues. The Board has approved new governance reforms to address this.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES</p> <p>WEAK</p>

<p>The Global Fund’s strategic framework includes a set of performance measures against which it regularly reports progress and which it uses to analyse trends and identify areas for improvement. Its monitoring and evaluation framework has been effective in providing information on key indicators of delivery and performance. The framework could be improved through a stronger focus on outcomes and impact. Enhanced scrutiny on country performance measures and better tailoring measures to country context will help improve impact monitoring.</p> <p>The Global Fund is experiencing leadership issues. The relationship between the management teams of the Secretariat and the Office of the Inspector General was described as ‘unacceptable’ by the panel. The Executive Director and Inspector General have expressed their commitment to improve their working relationship.</p> <p>The Global Fund has good policies in place on human resources, gender and ethics, supported by regulations and procedures. This includes a Code of Conduct and policy HIV/AIDS in the workplace.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Formal systems exist for the Global Fund’s governing bodies to regularly scrutinise costs at activity level. However, recent events and the panel’s findings suggest there has been insufficient focus by management on the overall cost structure and financial position of operations.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS WEAK</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>The Global Fund recognises the need to develop new tools to measure cost effectiveness as an element in its grant mechanism. The Secretariat needs to urgently strengthen financial planning and management systems so the Global Fund can be more reactive to global financial trends and provide accurate and timely estimates to its governing body. If fully implemented, the changes proposed by a recent review of the Fund’s fiduciary control mechanisms will provide greater assurance there is a more robust approach to cost efficiencies and value for money criteria.</p>	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>


<p>The Global Fund’s grant process has been restructured to bring value for money criteria into the financing chain. This needs to be implemented further. The Global Fund can do more to integrate value for money and effectiveness principles from the very first step in its business model, when countries fill in grant application forms.</p> <p>A phased approach is used for grant allocation, with performance at the initial stage determining release of funding in later stages. This approach has resulted in greater efforts by partners to demonstrate cost savings and efficiency gains in the early stages of implementation.</p>	
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Without an ongoing country presence the Global Fund relies on its technical partners (for example, the World Bank, World Health Organization, United Nations Children’s Fund and donors) to provide ongoing support to Principal Recipients throughout the grant application and management process. While the Global Fund has developed strong relationships with these partners at institutional level, there is some evidence this model does not always translate to effective partnerships at country-level. In 2011 the Global Fund’s own reporting showed it was lagging on indicators in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness principles relating to joint missions with other donors and joint analytic reports with other donors.</p> <p>In 2011 the Global Fund’s assessment against the Paris Declaration principles related to ‘ownership and alignment’ showed it was on track against four of the five indicators (it was assessed as lagging in terms of recording aid in national budgets). Nevertheless, Australia’s experience is that the Global Fund needs to do more work to integrate its programs into national processes and strengthen country systems. For example, Australia’s overseas mission in Vanuatu reported that the Global Fund’s program is largely implemented outside of government systems. The Global Fund has instituted some measures to improve alignment with country systems, such as through national strategy applications. It should be noted that the Secretariat had launched work towards a ‘new grant architecture’ in 2010 which takes positive steps to align consolidated grants with country reporting.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

<p>The Global Fund provides a strong voice for partners in decision making through the public–private partnership model of its governing board, its committee structure and the CCM at country-level. The governance model incorporates Northern and Southern non-government organisations, and communities living with the three diseases. The Global Fund has also introduced the principle of ‘dual-track financing’, encouraging countries to use a civil society organisation and a government recipient for grants.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>The Global Fund became a signatory of the International Aid Transparency Initiative in June 2011, strengthening its commitment to transparency. It is an active member of the initiative’s Technical Advisory Group. Extensive documentation on Global Fund activities is available on its web site, including detailed financial statements, annual plans, corporate reports and audits, demonstrating a fully transparent and open attitude to sharing information about its work.</p> <p>The Global Fund does not have a clear process for resource allocation. It did not need one in the past, however, given that funding was available to meet demand.</p> <p>Recent events suggest the Global Fund’s focus on resource mobilisation was at the detriment of risk management and scenario planning. While the forecasted decrease of funding available for 2011–13 has mainly been the result of factors beyond the control of the Secretariat, senior management failed to provide the Board, donors and recipient countries with timely and important information on the financial situation. The Secretariat needs to revise its approach to financial management and forecasting.</p> <p>The Secretariat needs to revise its approach to financial management and forecasting. The Global Fund needs to put in place strong measures to protect its resources and ensure appropriate fiduciary controls and safeguards both within the Secretariat and in-country. These have been assessed as insufficiently robust to identify key risks or address weak financial controls at country-level.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION WEAK</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS WEAK</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG</p>

A number of mechanisms are in place to reduce costs and encourage accountable and transparent behaviour by Global Fund partners. For example, its Price and Quality Report provides procurement and quality information for key health products and is an important source of information on prices for partners. The Global Fund also supports its partners (World Health Organization and others) to develop standard service unit costs for key interventions. For these measures to work effectively the Global Fund needs to closely monitor performance and enhance engagement with stakeholders in some countries.

Global Partnership for Education

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Global Partnership for Education (GPE)—formerly known as the Education for All Fast Track Initiative—is a global partnership supporting the education sector in developing countries, with a focus on accelerating progress toward the United Nations' Education for All goals.

GPE was established in 2002, hosted by the World Bank, as a compact between recipient countries and donors which linked increased donor support for primary education to recipient countries' policy performance and accountability for results. It provides funds and technical expertise to help countries create and implement education sector plans.

GPE has 46 partner countries and 43 have had their plans or interim plans (for fragile states) endorsed since 2002. Between 2003 and 2010, donors pledged US\$1.9 billion to GPE's Catalytic Fund with US\$2.03 billion allocated to 37 countries in Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Australia is currently the eleventh biggest donor to GPE, providing \$22.0 million in 2010–11 in voluntary core contributions. In November 2011 Australia pledged contributions of \$270 million over the next four years.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>Reporting from GPE focuses on improving development outcomes in countries where it operates and can demonstrate strong development results. For example, GPE's 2010 annual report highlighted that among its 46 partner countries, the proportion of children who completed a full cycle of primary education increased from 58 per cent in 2000 to 72 per cent in 2008.</p> <p>GPE's analysis shows that improvements in education outcomes in GPE-supported countries are better than in countries without GPE support. Feedback from Australian overseas missions on GPE's impact at country-level is also generally positive.</p> <p>At present, however, GPE does not have the systems needed to clearly identify how its support for country-owned plans and processes is responsible for these improved outcomes. This attribution challenge is partly unavoidable given the nature of GPE's funding model which involves pooling of funds and implementation by partners. Nevertheless GPE is developing a monitoring and evaluation strategy and a results framework to track performance and measure delivery. These have been piloted in several countries.</p> <p>All GPE support is directed at low income countries.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS WEAK
	TARGETS POOREST STRONG
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating VERY STRONG
<p>In 2011, GPE developed three new strategic directions that align closely with three of Australia's priorities: girls' education; fragile states; and quality and learning outcomes. Australia's investment in GPE extends the reach of Australia's education assistance to countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America where assistance in the sector would otherwise be limited to higher education scholarships.</p> <p>GPE has been responsive to key issues raised by Australia, including ensuring that Small Island Developing States are eligible for grants. This has had a positive impact on countries of significant strategic and national security interest to Australia including East Timor, Pacific Island countries and Papua New Guinea.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES VERY STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG
	FOCUSSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG

<p>GPE’s mandate directly aligns with the Australian aid program’s strategic goal of promoting opportunities for all. Education is the flagship of Australia’s aid program. The Australian Government considers education as one of the best investments it can make in Australia and overseas, as investment in education results in economic development. GPE is the only global partnership helping to improve education in the world’s poorest countries.</p> <p>GPE has a strong focus on gender parity in education. Strategies to achieve gender parity in primary school are a requirement for GPE endorsement and all tools developed by GPE require gender-disaggregated monitoring and reporting. GPE pursues special strategies to address the needs of disadvantaged children in low income countries such as those affected by HIV/AIDS or those living with disability. GPE was party to the development of the Education for All Equity and Inclusion in Education Guide.</p> <p>GPE emphasises environmental protection in program design and implementation, especially as related to school construction. GPE-funded school construction programs, such as those in Sierra Leone in 2010, include capacity building workshops for construction contractors on environmental impact.</p> <p>Almost half of GPE funding is allocated to fragile states. GPE has invested considerable time and effort to ensure its model is flexible enough to respond to the unique needs of these states. In 2010, GPE developed new processes and guidance specifically for countries in crisis and post-conflict situations to give countries with the most challenging environment access to GPE support.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>As the only global partnership focusing exclusively on education in developing countries, GPE plays a critical role in global coordination within the multilateral system. Before its establishment there was no clear international leadership on education in developing countries. GPE is an important, inclusive global forum and plays an important role in keeping education (in particular Education for All Goals and Millennium Development Goal 2 on universal primary completion) on the international agenda.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY</p>

The GPE model promotes donor coordination and harmonisation and has been praised by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and United Nations as a model of aid effectiveness. GPE's Board and committees bring together major education donors, partners and stakeholders including United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Bank and major civil society organisations to engage in significant global education policy dialogue.

GPE also plays a critical role in improving coordination between stakeholders at country-level in the education sector and has done so effectively in several countries of importance to Australia's aid program, including Afghanistan, East Timor, Laos, Nepal and Papua New Guinea.

The GPE funding instruments are the only significant pooled funding mechanism in the education sector. Since its establishment in 2002, GPE has allocated more than US\$2 billion to 37 countries in support of their education sector plans from its Catalytic Fund. A 2009 independent evaluation concluded that the need for GPE is as great as ever.

GPE was established to play a lead role in mobilising resources to fill key gaps in funding for education at country-level. Despite this, the 2009 evaluation assessed that to date GPE has had a limited positive effect on increasing the level of external financing for education. GPE responded by identifying new targets for fundraising and potential new donors, including private foundations.

GPE has recently improved its capacity to provide specialist policy development support by establishing a Country Support Team and a Global Good Practices Unit, although it is too early to assess the impact of these initiatives.

ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>At the November 2011 meetings, GPE's Board prioritised the development of a strategic plan to consolidate policies and objectives and provide a strong platform for strategic management going forward. It remains to be seen whether these improved governance arrangements will significantly improve GPE's strategic management and performance, but early indications are positive.</p> <p>Throughout 2011, GPE's Secretariat has increased its capacity to monitor grant implementation at country-level and is conducting quarterly reviews of grant performance, with sanctions for underperformance.</p> <p>Since 2009, GPE has been working to implement reforms informed by recommendations of its independent evaluation and experience gained since partnership inception. Good progress has been made in improving governance, including appointing an independent chair of the Board of Directors and strengthening the Secretariat.</p> <p>In June 2010, GPE established a Technical Oversight Committee to support the development of its new monitoring and evaluation strategy. It also established a Strategy Reference Group to refine its strategic directions. Monitoring and evaluation is part of all programs but to date this has had limited influence on decision making.</p> <p>Later in 2010 the Board approved a new goal statement, outcome indicators and service delivery areas within its new results framework, and agreed to streamline its trust fund arrangement into a single fund. In 2011 the Board endorsed an updated needs and performance framework, a reconfigured quality assurance review process and the structure and terms of reference of a new Financial Advisory Committee.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>


5. Cost and value consciousness	Component Rating
<p>GPE senior management and its Board focus on value for money. This is evidenced by the inclusion of two related key guiding principles in its Charter—lower transaction costs and development results, and value for money.</p> <p>The GPE model is cost effective. It does not create parallel structures, but uses existing government systems and draws on donor partner resources at country-level through the method of supervising entities of grants and coordinating agencies of programs.</p> <p>The 2009 evaluation found a lack of clarity around Catalytic Fund procedures which resulted in high transaction costs. There is evidence that GPE is seeking to address this through clearer procedures and strengthening the role of its in-country local education groups to monitor progress at country-level. Progress is evident. For instance, since 2007 GPE trust funds have doubled disbursement rates and reduced the time taken to move from decisions on allocations to signing grant agreements—from 12 to 18 months to an average of 5.5 months. In November 2010 the Catalytic Fund Committee tasked the Secretariat to assess underperforming grants and potentially cancel them or reduce their allocation.</p> <p>A key feature of GPE’s approach is increasing domestic resources for education and so GPE challenges and supports partners to think about value for money and affordability over the long term as part of proposal development and approval processes. As evidence of this policy in action, at its replenishment pledging conference in November 2011 developing country partners committed to increasing their domestic spending on education by more than US\$2.5 billion between now and 2014.</p>	<p>STRONG</p> <p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS</p> <p>STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS</p> <p>STRONG</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY</p> <p>STRONG</p>

6. Partnership behaviour	Component Rating STRONG
<p>The 2009 evaluation of GPE’s partnership behaviour concluded it was unbalanced and largely donor led. GPE has responded with a number of reforms including a revised Charter and accountability matrix that articulate the roles and responsibilities of various partners in GPE operations (including partner countries, donors and civil society organisations). GPE has engaged well with civil society organisations considering them to be important stakeholders in the education sector.</p> <p>A major strength of the GPE model is its ability to reinforce the focus of education donors on supporting country-owned plans and processes. GPE has incorporated the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda for Action principles into its approach and directs resources to support partner country priorities as articulated in their education sector plans.</p> <p>Increasing partner country voice was one of six key areas for reform identified in GPE’s response to the independent evaluation. At country-level, recent examples from Afghanistan and East Timor indicate improvement in promoting partnerships with governments. At system level, GPE’s 19-member Board and 15-member Financial Advisory Committee now includes equal representation from donors and partner countries. This has had important implications for the transparency of decision making on resource allocations.</p> <p>GPE has engaged well with civil society organisations considering them to be important stakeholders in the education sector as implementers with a key role to play in policy discussions and independent monitoring. Civil society, from developed and developing countries, is represented on GPE’s Board and Financial Advisory Committee.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating STRONG
<p>GPE has produced a range of key documents for developing country partners, including guidelines on developing proposals and information on the appraisal process. It publishes relevant documents on its website, such as Board decisions and some general information on donor contributions, allocations and fund disbursement. This information is limited, however, and does not include detailed breakdowns by country or operational costs.</p> <p>GPE trust funds are subject to the World Bank’s financial accountability requirements and use its strong systems of financial management, audit, risk management and fraud prevention. Evidence of the effectiveness of these systems includes fast and effective responses to recent instances of fund misuse in Kenya and Nepal (which occurred before GPE funding was included in the pooled fund).</p> <p>To be eligible for GPE grant funding countries must develop detailed, costed education sector plans endorsed by GPE and local donor groups. GPE convenes donors and stakeholders around the plan to harmonise implementation and allocates funds to fill identified funding gaps.</p> <p>A key risk for GPE is the need to mobilise considerable new funds from existing and new donors to meet the anticipated increase in the number of proposals from partner countries. The successful replenishment process undertaken in 2011, resulted in US\$1.5 billion in committed funds for 2011–14.</p> <p>GPE is developing a policy and communications protocol on the misuse of trust funds, a policy on conflicts of interest, and a monitoring and evaluation strategy which will strengthen transparency and accountability.</p>	ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY
	CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY
	STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG
	PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG

Inter-American Development Bank

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was established in 1959 and is the largest source of development financing and expertise for sustainable economic, social and institutional development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its goal is to reduce poverty and inequality, and achieve sustainable growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. Within these two overarching objectives, the IDB has five priority areas: social policy for equity and productivity, infrastructure for competitiveness and social welfare, institutions for growth and social welfare, competitive regional and global international integration, and protecting the environment. Along with traditional loans and financing, the IDB provides grants, technical assistance and undertakes research. It has 48 member countries, including 26 from Latin American and the Caribbean.

Australia is not a member of the IDB. Australia's involvement with the IDB to date has been small scale and limited to microfinance projects in the region through the Multilateral Investment Fund, an arm of the IDB. In 2010–11, Australia provided \$5.0 million to IDB in non-core funding. In 2011 Australia agreed to establish a \$10 million trust fund with the Multilateral Investment Fund to finance several microfinance projects in the region.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IDB demonstrates clear results across most sectors and programs, as reported in its Development Effectiveness Overview. Management self-report that 85 per cent of projects undertaken in 2009 were expected to meet their development objectives at completion, and can point to clear examples such as connecting 12 470 homes to potable water and constructing 826 temporary classrooms following the 2010 Haiti earthquake.</p> <p>Australia has had positive experiences of IDB's development results in Latin America through the Multilateral Investment Fund, including through a co-finance activity in Peru which has already trained 33 000 women entrepreneurs in business skills and financial literacy.</p> <p>IDB's Results Framework 2012–2015 was approved in 2010, providing four outcome indicators: regional development goals, output contribution to regional goals, lending program priorities, and operational effectiveness and efficiency. Indicators with corresponding baselines and targets were published in the 2008–2009 Development Effectiveness Overview.</p> <p>Although IDB operates primarily in middle-income countries many activities focus on the poorest. Financing directly aimed at reducing poverty and inequality currently stands at 40 per cent of expenditure and IDB has a target to increase this to 50 per cent by 2015.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS VERY STRONG
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>IDB's five priority sectors align well with the Australian aid program's strategic goals of promoting sustainable economic development, opportunities for all and effective governance.</p> <p>IDB's credibility and experience in Latin America and the Caribbean make it a natural partner for Australia in its relatively new program of development assistance in the region. IDB is good at ensuring donor visibility.</p> <p>IDB is strengthening efforts to mainstream gender into its activities but is at an early stage in this relative to</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES SATISFACTORY
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM SATISFACTORY
	FOCUSSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY

<p>other multilateral development banks. IDB's record of environmentally sustainable development is stronger and it is a lead implementing partner of the Climate Investment Funds in the region. The IDB does not have a formal policy on disability-inclusive development.</p> <p>IDB has adapted its institutional structure for its Haiti program, the region's only fragile state.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>IDB leads some coordination efforts at regional level, although this is not a major focus. It relies on a collaborative approach to development, thereby minimising proliferation of donor efforts: in 2010, 67 per cent of IDB missions were coordinated with other agencies. It has a strong relationship with the World Bank, the other major multilateral donor in the region.</p> <p>IDB is the largest source of development financing and expertise in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its relatively large-scale operations enable it to trial innovative approaches to difficult policy areas such as climate change.</p> <p>IDB produces a range of useful research, analytical work and data on the region's specific development challenges, such as the MIF's contributions to microfinance. A high proportion of respondents in the 2011 Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) report considered the quality of IDB inputs to policy dialogue as adequate or higher, indicating its contributions are generally viewed as valuable.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</p>	
<p>4. Strategic management and performance</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>IDB's leadership has introduced a range of reforms in recent years that have improved effectiveness. The most important relate to improvements in its strategic management, including through an integrated strategy document that is linked to its new results framework and takes IDB through to the next decade. This document provides line-of-sight from the overarching strategy through to country strategies and, again, through the development of activities, lending, monitoring, reporting and evaluating.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p> <p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY</p>


<p>The Board of Governors has provided support and guidance on IDB's reform agenda. The MOPAN report rated IDB quite strongly on its use of evaluation findings to inform decisions and noted that its Office of Oversight and Evaluation provides strong support for monitoring and evaluation systems.</p> <p>In 2009, IDB introduced the Progress Monitoring Report, which monitors quantitative and qualitative aspects of projects in implementation, outputs, and costs. Projects identified as not delivering results are allocated a proportion of the supervision budget for the following year. A 2011 independent review of the IDB's evaluation function concluded this framework provided the IDB with a comprehensive self-assessment system.</p> <p>Human resource management reforms have recently been introduced such as results-based remuneration, increased focus on career development and a leadership development program. Although it is too soon to evaluate the impact of these reforms, early signs are encouraging. The MOPAN assessment noted the high calibre of IDB staff.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Improving value for money and reducing costs is a priority for the IDB's governing body. The Board of Governors regularly considers methods of reducing administrative costs and the IDB has introduced monitoring the use of country procurement systems across its programs, and regularly scrutinises the cost of staff numbers.</p> <p>IDB requires that all new program proposals include consideration of whether alternative methods of achieving the outputs are available, and what the cost differential between approaches would be.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation tools have recently improved, enabling IDB to continue to monitor these costs on an ongoing basis. These same policies apply to IDB's partners, ensuring that they too consider value for money.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>

<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>IDB is well respected by partner governments and has strong relations with the few other donors in the region, notably the World Bank. It also maintains strong partnerships with the private sector, for example its partnership with PepsiCo to address water and sanitation challenges.</p> <p>Currently, less than half of IDB funds are channelled through partner systems. IDB processes are being reviewed against the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness under the 2009 ‘Strategy for strengthening and use of country systems’, and progress against these principles is now being tracked in the IDB’s annual Development Effectiveness Overview. This should help improve the organisation’s alignment with partner government systems.</p> <p>A close and effective relationship is maintained with a wide range of civil society organisations throughout the region. This includes annual meetings with IDB, jointly determined agendas and ongoing collaboration through a civil society council in each of the IDB’s 26 borrowing member countries. Collaboration ensures civil society organisations have ongoing opportunity to contribute their views on program and policy design.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Overall, IDB is transparent and accountable. Its access to information policy presumes disclosure of information.</p> <p>IDB is a signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative but is not yet fully compliant with the standard.</p> <p>Systems for allocation of capital are clear, transparent and well understood by partners.</p> <p>IDB manages its programmatic risks (including strategic, financial, compliance, operational and social risks) through a risk matrix system, and internal audit and fraud prevention adheres to international standards. IDB created the Office of Institutional Integrity in 2007, tasked with detecting, investigating, and preventing prohibited practices in IDB Group financed activities.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>The significant proportion of IDB funding that is not recorded by recipient governments is a constraint to promoting transparency and accountability among its recipients. However, IDB is a party to the cross-debarment agreement (in which entities found guilty of misdemeanours in one organisation face sanctions from all organisations) with the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and World Bank.</p>	
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International Committee of the Red Cross

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a humanitarian organisation whose unique mandate is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and of other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC works in accordance particularly with the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. The ICRC is the guardian of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols and Statutes.

ICRC is a private organisation under Swiss Law, and is governed by an Assembly, an Assembly Council and a Directorate. The Assembly has between 15 and 25 members whose role is to establish the ICRC's general policy, its general objectives and institutional strategy, approve the budget and accounts and monitor its activities. ICRC's total expenditure in 2010 was \$1.08 billion.

ICRC is an important partner in Australia's humanitarian aid program. Australia is a member of the ICRC Donor Support Group (DSG). Australia views this as a very useful forum to influence ICRC's policy and strategy. In 2010 Australia provided more than \$33 million to ICRC, making it ICRC's ninth largest donor. In 2010–11, Australia contributed \$40.0 million to ICRC, including \$18.0 million of voluntary core contributions and \$22.0 million in non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>ICRC uses its unique position and mandate to effectively operate in situations of conflict. It is often the only humanitarian organisation able to access vulnerable populations.</p> <p>ICRC contributes to the Millennium Development Goals indirectly through its programs of assistance to individuals and communities. It also manages health programs, which target vulnerable communities and individuals, particularly women and girls. In 2010, ICRC provided health treatment to 5.2 million people and passed more than 305 000 messages between members of families separated as a result of armed conflict, disturbances or tensions.</p> <p>ICRC implements results based management through all its programs, although not in a standard way across all programs. Standard reporting already provides worldwide outcome indicators by program, but ICRC is strengthening its results-based monitoring and reporting by moving from a narrative reporting approach to one based more specifically on documented evidence of results. ICRC is introducing measures to collect higher level indicators, which should improve its capacity to report on organisation-wide results.</p> <p>ICRC works effectively in many low income countries and among communities most affected by poverty and the consequences of conflict. It has developed a strong track record of effectively targeting people in need and delivering efficient operations in these contexts.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS VERY STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST VERY STRONG
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating VERY STRONG
<p>As an impartial, neutral and independent organisation the ICRC's humanitarian mission is of fundamental importance to Australia. Its role in protecting lives and the dignity of people in conflict and crisis is closely aligned to Australian concerns and priorities.</p> <p>ICRC's work aligns strongly with the Australian aid program's strategic goals of saving lives and humanitarian and disaster response.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES VERY STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES VERY STRONG
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES VERY STRONG


<p>ICRC has strong and effective policies and practice for crosscutting issues, most notably gender and disability.</p> <p>ICRC has used its neutrality, impartiality and independence to build a long, impressive track record of working effectively in conflict-affected and fragile states. It maintains a strong presence in many areas where government has effectively disappeared and where other humanitarian actors are unable to work. ICRC's unparalleled access in some of the most fragile countries together with its ability to deliver under difficult circumstances make it a trusted partner of many governments, including Australia.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating VERY STRONG</p>
<p>ICRC has the specific mandate of guardian of the Geneva Conventions.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p>
<p>Through its analysis, research and advocacy work, ICRC plays a leading role in global dialogue and discussion on international humanitarian law.</p>	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE VERY STRONG</p>
<p>The ICRC-managed international humanitarian law database is easily available online and provides states and other stakeholders with a comprehensive source of information on international humanitarian law and principles. This is a significant contribution to the humanitarian agenda and the international legal framework. Regionally based legal advisors provide support to the development of relevant law through National international humanitarian law committees</p>	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION VERY STRONG</p>
<p>At country-level ICRC is effective in supporting the work of host National Societies and Movement members, strengthening the capacity of national societies and convening international assistance to address emergencies and conflicts and to understand emerging challenges. While independent of the United Nations (UN) system it collaborates well with UN agencies working in the cluster system.</p>	

ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>ICRC's strategy is clear and aligned closely with its mandate.</p> <p>ICRC's governing bodies function effectively in their role of informing and directing the organisation on institutional strategy, policy, general objectives and decisions.</p> <p>ICRC has improved its approach to monitoring and performance reporting and its current reporting framework provides comprehensive, detailed information on inputs, outputs and outcomes over time. It is introducing measures to strengthen its results-based management and collect higher level indicators, which should enhance its ability to use performance information more systematically when making decisions.</p> <p>Leadership is strong and management practices sound, meeting international standards for good human resource management principles. Staff are supported through training and career development, have access to their personnel information and are supported with health and security services.</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES VERY STRONG
5. Cost and value consciousness	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>ICRC's governing bodies regularly scrutinise its operations and budget and provide feedback on efficiencies and cost savings. It has undertaken reviews of procurement and logistic procedures and introduced measures to reduce transaction costs and streamline operational management for field officers.</p> <p>Cost effectiveness factors do not feature explicitly in ICRC's planning documentation and cost effectiveness is not a prime factor in operational decision making. However the ratio of operational costs to support costs is closely monitored by the Directorate and the need for appropriate levels of administrative costs is consistently included in dialogue between the Directorate and operations.</p> <p>ICRC works with national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies on project quality management and also has a good set of procurement principles that take into account cost and value considerations.</p>	MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG
	COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY
	CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY

<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>ICRC has strong and effective relations with the International Federation of the Red Cross and national societies. Generally, it depends on its national societies to implement programs and provide assistance. ICRC therefore relies on the structure of its national societies to coordinate with the national government.</p> <p>Alignment with government systems and structures is not always possible or appropriate given ICRC’s mandate. Nevertheless its approach to program planning is consultative and carefully related to priorities and needs across ICRC partner countries.</p> <p>ICRC often works with communities or groups outside the ambit of formal government systems or those suffering because of national events. It has in place effective ways to gather feedback from partners and beneficiaries.</p> <p>In the arena of international humanitarian law ICRC is very effective in collaborating with a diverse range of organisations and stakeholders.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS VERY STRONG</p>
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>ICRC publishes an extensive amount of information on its programs and analyses and reports on country situations on a range of issues relating to its mandate and concerns. Where legal arrangements allow, it provides donors with additional access to confidential or sensitive material, with suitable protections in place.</p> <p>ICRC’s budget allocation process is constrained by unpredictability and earmarking of funding, which inhibits its ability to plan its resources allocation closely in line with its outlined priorities and needs.</p> <p>As a Swiss-registered organisation, ICRC must comply with the highest standards of financial and legal accountability. It maintains effective review and budget management systems to meet these standards.</p> <p>ICRC has a strong policy position against fraud, setting a zero tolerance. It routinely undertakes risk and compliance audits of its operations.</p> <p>ICRC has agreements in place with their national societies that provide appropriate assurance over use of funds.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

International Finance Corporation

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is part of the World Bank Group. It is the largest global development institution focused on private sector development in low income and other emerging markets.

IFC's purpose is to create opportunity for people to escape poverty and improve their lives by:

- > promoting open and competitive markets in developing countries
- > supporting companies and other private sector partners where there is a gap
- > helping to generate productive jobs and deliver essential services to the underserved.

IFC pursues its goals by mobilising finance of various kinds for private sector investment and by providing advisory services to build the private sector in developing countries.

IFC is a major player in global development finance, generating new investment commitments of around US\$12.2 billion in 2010–11 in addition to advisory service operations with an approved value of US\$820 million. It usually generates a profit, some of which it contributes to the International Development Association (IDA). Australia's shareholding in IFC is two per cent of the subscribed share capital, making Australia the twelfth largest shareholder. In 2010–11, Australia provided \$4.8 million to IFC as non-core contributions, and signed approximately \$17m of new contracts with IFC.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IFC has a strong record on delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with its mandate. It reports that its work in the East Asia-Pacific region alone in 2010–11 was expected to support 72 000 jobs, reach 157 000 farmers and facilitate about US\$12.3 billion in loans to micro, small and medium enterprises. In Pacific Island countries, IFC has increased its lending levels over recent years and supported important reforms such as the Vanuatu Government’s privatisation efforts.</p> <p>IFC has a very strong capacity to monitor and demonstrate results through its Development Outcomes Tracking System. According to the system, 72 per cent of IFC investment projects were rated as having high development effectiveness in 2010 (same as in 2009), exceeding IFC’s long-run target of 65 per cent. Results are confirmed by an external assessor and validated by an internal results measurement team. A sample of results is also validated by the World Bank Group’s Independent Evaluation Group.</p> <p>In 2011 the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group report supported IFC’s approach to fighting poverty. But the report also urged IFC to strengthen its focus on poverty, calling for more IFC projects to have explicit poverty alleviation or pro-poor objectives. Partly in response, IFC recently introduced an action plan to strengthen its focus on the poor.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS VERY STRONG
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY
2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IFC’s efforts to promote private sector development, particularly in Pacific Island countries, support Australia’s broader interests in a prosperous and secure region. IFC has been responsive to Australia’s urgings to increase staffing and lending levels devoted to Pacific Island countries.</p> <p>IFC’s purpose closely aligns with the Australian aid program’s strategic goal of promoting sustainable economic development. It also supports the strategic goals of saving lives and promoting opportunities for all. Examples include generating innovative approaches</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY

<p>to increasing the efficiency of water supply and treatment and to improving water security.</p> <p>IFC has improved its performance on crosscutting issues, in particular gender equality. It recently published a gender-sensitive policy paper—the Gender Dimensions of Investment Climate Reform—which is being widely used in the development community, including by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development.</p> <p>IFC has strong policies and safeguards in place on environmental issues and strengthened environmental safeguards will be introduced in 2012. The Australian Multilateral Assessment gathered limited evidence on how well the safeguards work in practice.</p> <p>The first of IFC’s strategic pillars includes strengthening its focus on fragile states. Together with its partners, IFC produced A Rough Guide to Investment Climate Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries. Overall, IFC’s approach to, and record in, working in fragile states has improved over recent years with its commitment to do more work in low income countries.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>IFC has made contributions at global and national levels to improving the coordination of development efforts, particularly in strengthening private sector contributions. It has contributed to coordination within the multilateral system through strengthening collaboration with other arms of the World Bank Group over recent years, particularly in the East Asia and Pacific region.</p> <p>An important example of IFC’s work in developing norms and standards is the Equator Principles—its performance standards for environmental and social risk management. These principles are now used by 72 financial institutions worldwide. Thirty-two Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development export credit agencies use them as a benchmark for example. IFC provides, or mobilises, large-scale finance for investment operations.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>

<p>It is a knowledge leader and innovator in strengthening the private sector's contributions to development. For example, IFC has taken an innovative approach to addressing food security by establishing the Agriculture Price Risk Management Facility in 2011.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating VERY STRONG
<p>IFC has a clear mandate, a sound medium-term strategy and effective annual planning processes which translate priorities into resource and program management. Each year it conducts an annual strategy exercise, the results of which it feeds into the annual IFC Road Map (discussed and approved by its Executive Board). These elements are strongly aligned, interlinked and tracked.</p> <p>IFC has effective governance. It is a dynamic, well-run organisation seeking to improve its relevance and performance. The Executive Board provides sound oversight over IFC's operations and helps encourage moves in its strategic direction, for example towards a greater focus on low income countries.</p> <p>IFC uses its strong framework on results management (Development Outcomes Tracking System and Corporate Scorecard) to realign or amend underperforming programs. It has put in place internal structures to capture and disseminate knowledge to empower staff to deliver quality services to clients.</p> <p>IFC's leadership has successfully overseen strong program-level performance (despite the difficulties of the global financial crisis) and shifts in strategic direction over recent years. Its system of staff incentives encourages excellence and rewards good performance (relating to achievement of its objectives).</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS</p> <p>VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY</p> <p>STRONG</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS</p> <p>VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES</p> <p>VERY STRONG</p>


<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating VERY STRONG</p>
<p>IFC's Executive Board and Budget Committee scrutinise its budget annually and this is a central aspect of strategic decision making. Cost control and value for money are put under the microscope, usually focusing on four measures: investment productivity; advisory project expenditures as a proportion of total advisory expenditures; IFC comparative cost ratios; and administrative costs as a proportion of total commitments.</p> <p>Rates of return and/or cost effectiveness are important considerations in all IFC operations. Financial rate of return estimates are an essential part of any investment operation and are examined at design and approval stages. Financial returns are monitored systematically during implementation.</p> <p>As a for-profit organisation, IFC has a vested interest in inculcating value for money into its partners' thinking. IFC clients know that the size of its investment depends critically on their demonstrating value for money and value for money considerations are a key part of agreements with partners.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>IFC works with a wide range of partners: private sector businesses, international financial institutions, donors, developing country governments and civil society. It seeks out these partners to increase the size and development impact of its operations.</p> <p>Feedback on IFC's partnership behaviour in the Pacific is positive.</p> <p>IFC applies World Bank Group standards and disciplines on alignment. Given the private sector nature of its mandate, working through country systems does not generally apply to IFC in the way it does for most multilateral organisations.</p> <p>Following past concerns by some stakeholders, IFC is conscious of the need to take social impacts into account, in particular to ensure its investment operations are developed and implemented in consultation with all relevant partners.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>IFC's independent Office of Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman provides a vehicle for complaints from people affected by its projects. Like similar mechanisms in other multilateral organisation, there are mixed views on how effectively this works to safeguard the interests of affected peoples.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>IFC is strongly committed to transparency and accountability, and has a good record on financial issues, and more general, risk management.</p> <p>IFC's access to information policy provides evidence of its commitment to enhance transparency. The policy's firm presumption is to disclose information unless there is a compelling reason not to do so.</p> <p>IFC's criteria for determining which activities it will support are clear. To allocate resources at the regional and sub-regional levels, IFC develops an annual Road Map which provides an overview of proposed financing activities.</p> <p>IFC has robust financial management and accountability systems and adheres to World Bank standards and disciplines. It is subject to Executive Board scrutiny, the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group evaluations, to internal and external audit, and to the World Bank Group's Integrity Vice-Presidency (responsible for investigating allegations of fraud and corruption).</p> <p>IFC has very strong incentives within its agreements with partners to promote transparency and accountability. Achieving value for money is a key factor in future funding for partners and IFC exercises tight scrutiny over the implementation of agreements.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS VERY STRONG</p>

International Fund for Agricultural Development

Note: This assessment is based primarily on an assessment by the Australian Government in 2011 undertaken independently of the Australian Multilateral Assessment process.

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is a specialised agency of the United Nations focused on reducing poverty and food insecurity in rural areas of developing countries. It seeks country-specific solutions to increasing the access of rural poor people to financial services, markets, technology, land and other natural resources. In 2010, IFAD was supporting US\$2 billion worth of loans and grants to 92 countries.

Australia was a founding member of IFAD, but announced its intention to withdraw from the organisation in June 2004 and therefore did not provide any contributions in 2010–11. Australia is considering resuming its membership.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>In 2010 IFAD reported that more than 90 per cent of projects were rated ‘moderately satisfactory or better’ for expected impact on poverty measures; gender equity and target population; and effectiveness of thematic areas. Tangible aggregate results for 2009 showed 4.8 million active borrowers (mainly female) for rural financial services; 4.9 million hectares of land under improved management; 322 000 hectares of land being rehabilitated; and 28 000 marketing groups formed.</p> <p>IFAD’s good results framework, with appropriate quality indicators, is used to push for continual improvement. Independent assessments, such as by the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network, confirm IFAD’s strong focus on results.</p> <p>IFAD has a pro-poor focus at country-level. In 2010, 84.5 per cent of its program and project financing was to low income, food-deficit countries and 56.3 per cent to least developed countries.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS STRONG
	TARGETS POOREST STRONG
2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IFAD has demonstrated strong interest and responsiveness in discussions on Australia potentially resuming its membership.</p> <p>There is close alignment between IFAD’s work and the Australian aid program’s strategic goal of sustainable economic development through agriculture and rural development. IFAD works with poor rural people in some areas where Australia has limited presence, including in parts of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and South Asia, making it a useful partner in expanding Australian assistance to these areas.</p> <p>Gender is now largely integrated into IFAD’s business processes although there some variability in promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment across projects and countries.</p> <p>IFAD is increasing its attention to environment issues.</p> <p>IFAD works extensively in fragile states. The 2010 MOPAN report found that partner governments</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG


<p>generally agree that IFAD’s procedures take into account local conditions, an important factor in adjusting to the particular needs of fragile states.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>In most countries IFAD has not engaged systematically at national policy level or with donor coordination platforms, although this in part reflects its mandate to focus on smallholder farmers.</p> <p>IFAD has been a voice for smallholders in a range of forums, such as the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research and the Committee on World Food Security.</p> <p>IFAD has often been a good incubator of innovative pilots and new approaches but there is scope to sharpen its focus on scaling up its work in a more systematic way to achieve substantial and sustainable development impact.</p> <p>IFAD has had some influence over international agendas and policy on agriculture, including its role as chair of high-level food security issues at the World Economic Forum and its contribution to the development of the Agricultural Information Management System.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</p>	
<p>4. Strategic management and performance</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>IFAD’s clear and well-targeted mandate comes through in its strategic focus of its policies and programs. Strategic planning and guidance has improved through reform processes over the past few years.</p> <p>The Executive Board and management agree on the need for future reform and largely agree on how to get there, including through the IFAD Strategic Framework 2011–2015; results measurement framework; and external appointment of a new Director of Human Resource Management.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation systems have been strengthened through reform, resulting in greater attention to project quality and greater impact through knowledge management and innovation.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p> <p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>

<p>IFAD has sound leadership, with management demonstrating a track record in implementing organisational change, including taking hard decisions (such as no increase in general staff costs in 2011). However, management is still addressing challenges in human resource management.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>IFAD's Executive Board introduced an institutional efficiency ratio in 2005 which gradually reduced the proportion of its budget spent on administration (although costs remain high relative to most other multilateral organisations).</p> <p>IFAD uses rates of return in its program decisions and economic analysis processes subject to formal appraisal.</p> <p>IFAD monitors cost efficiencies at country-level. It works with governments and trains partners on financial management. This encourages value for money.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>IFAD invests heavily in partnerships. For example, it has a US\$1.5 billion co-financing agreement with the Islamic Development Bank. Other stakeholders consider IFAD to be an effective partner.</p> <p>IFAD does not make strong use of country systems, such as engaging in sector-wide arrangements, due to concerns this will remove it too far from its main role of on-the-ground engagement with poor farmers. This represents both a strength and weakness of IFAD's model.</p> <p>IFAD provides a strong voice to stakeholders on the ground through its focus on rural poor beneficiaries. IFAD consistently monitors the way it engages stakeholders and beneficiaries in its activities and this informs decision making.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS WEAK</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IFAD routinely publishes its reports on its website, including evaluation reports, annual reports and strategy documents.</p> <p>The clear and transparent Performance Based Allocation (PBA) system seeks to balance country needs while rewarding good performance. In 2008, 94 per cent of IFAD’s annual resource commitments were made in line with the PBA.</p> <p>Independent assessments conclude that IFAD has good systems for audit, anti-corruption, risk management and procurement but needs to improve the efficiency of its financial management and speed up its disbursement rates.</p> <p>IFAD periodically raises accountability issues including fraud prevention, and collusive, corrupt and coercive practices with partners, particularly through the training it provides.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

International Labour Organization

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

Established in 1919, the International Labour Organization (ILO) is the United Nations (UN) specialised agency that deals with the world of work. At the core of its remit, ILO is responsible for drawing up and overseeing international labour standards and assisting member states to ratify and implement those standards. These standards include the fundamental principles and rights at work, namely, freedom from forced and child labour and discrimination, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. ILO conducts more than 1000 technical cooperation programs in more than 80 countries with the help of some 60 donor institutions worldwide.

ILO has decentralised the management of most activities to its regional, area and branch offices in more than 40 countries across Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and the Pacific.

In 2010–11, Australia provided \$17.7 million to ILO, comprising \$10.2 million of assessed contributions and \$7.5 million in non-core funding, some of which was for agreed activities under the Australia–ILO Partnership Agreement 2010–15. The assessed contribution represents the equivalent of 1.7 per cent of the total regular budget, and is the thirteenth highest assessed contribution by a government. Activities funded include labour-based road works and skills development in East Timor and market development in Sri Lanka.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>ILO demonstrates many tangible development results from its activities at country-level. For example, the ILO–International Finance Corporation Better Work Programme in Southeast Asia has resulted in the extension of labour rights and improved working conditions for millions of workers in the garment industry. Nevertheless, the quality of activity implementation varies across country and regional offices.</p> <p>ILO also has more work to do in systematically assessing the impact of its capacity-building activities and better linking its program outcomes to broader developmental goals. Use of Decent Work Country Program reviews has helped in improving reporting, but these efforts can continue and go further. Similarly, while ILO has made a concerted effort to embed results-based management practices across the board, implementation appears to be a top-down process that has yet to be fully implemented at country-level.</p> <p>Much of ILO’s work, particularly related to its normative and international standards setting role, is targeted at a cross section of society and not limited to targeting the poorest of the poor.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY
2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>ILO has been a useful partner for Australia in promoting normative processes and technical assistance. Working with ILO has allowed Australia to build linkages in the Asia-Pacific region on labour and employment issues that support Australia’s national and regional interests, including regional economic stability.</p> <p>There is good alignment between the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda and the Australian aid program’s strategic goals of promoting opportunities for all, sustainable economic development and effective governance.</p> <p>ILO has a strong gender unit at headquarters level with a dedicated team of 20 gender specialists and a 130-strong network of gender focal points. At country-level, there is evidence of a focus on gender issues.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM SATISFACTORY
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY


<p>For example, in Sri Lanka ILO works with the government on its gender equality and the world of work program.</p> <p>ILO effectively promotes skills development and employment opportunities for people with disability.</p> <p>ILO's mandate does not specifically refer to working in fragile states but it has had some successes in these states and in fragile situations.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>ILO plays a specialised role through effective provision of policy and expertise in labour statistics and research. It is a standard-setting institution and has played a critical role in developing international labour standards since its inception in 1919. In this time, it has developed 189 legally binding conventions, 201 non-binding recommendations and a number of declarations, including the collation of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.</p> <p>Other normative areas of ILO work that are particularly valuable include freedom of association and combating child labour. ILO's International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour is seen as one of its most successful initiatives and is the largest of its kind in the world.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p>
	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>
<p>ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</p>	
<p>4. Strategic management and performance</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>ILO has a clear mandate and strong links from this mandate through its operational plans and strategies. There remains some criticism that it can be sometimes inconsistent in applying its strategy and plans to operationalise its mandate.</p> <p>ILO's Governing Body is tripartite, representing workers, employers and the governments of member states. Such a structure is unique in the UN system. The Governing Body provides adequate oversight of management performance.</p> <p>In recent years, ILO has produced higher quality program and budget documents and has moved to a more streamlined reporting system that describes priorities under the 19 outcomes of its Strategic Policy Framework with measurable indicators. This has led to</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>better and more consistent implementation of monitoring and evaluation systems.</p> <p>Recent efforts at headquarters level to more strategically align ILO programs and projects need to be maintained and extended across all levels and offices of the organisation.</p> <p>ILO has a strong leadership team among its senior executive. Priorities under its Human Resources Strategy 2010–15 include addressing in-house resolution of staff conflict and countering a ‘silo mentality’ culture.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>While ILO’s Governing Body and annual International Labour Conference have good formal oversight across budgets and scrutinise costs, a culture of cost awareness needs to be embedded across the organisation.</p> <p>The Governing Body generally considers value for money and has demonstrated responsiveness to the concerns of member states in relation to its budget. In March 2011 it initiated budget cutting and efficiency measures, including establishing an ongoing expenditure review committee to provide members with direct input into budgetary processes and proposals throughout each two-year budget cycle. The first report of this committee is due before the end of 2011.</p> <p>There is little evidence that ILO challenges its partners to seek more efficient approaches to budgeting and disbursement.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY WEAK</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Partnership is at the core of ILO’s structure and mandate. Its tripartite structure enables governments, employers and workers of each member country to participate as equal partners in its activities. From this perspective, ILO is highly effective in bringing key stakeholders together.</p> <p>ILO’s approach to partner country priorities and systems in the implementation of its Decent Work Agenda is guided by overarching principles of country ownership and alignment with partner priorities.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>Feedback at country-level indicates significant variation in ILO's engagement with partners. For example, in China ILO was commended for providing technical advisory services to the government on legislation for employment promotion and social insurance law, and in working with non-government organisations and universities to promote the employment rights and employability of people with disability. In Kiribati, however, ILO was subject to strong government criticism for its piecemeal and inflexible support for youth employment.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>ILO has taken steps to improve its transparency and accountability. Its use of its biennial program and budget document to outline resource allocation is adequate, and its use of internal and external audit functions is good.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>ILO publishes a wide range of material on its website, but it could be better at publicly releasing project assessment information and encouraging higher standards of transparency and accountability in its partners.</p>	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>While its accountability systems appear to generally work well, ILO has impressed with its commitment to developing stronger frameworks and policies relevant to transparency, accountability and governance.</p>	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS WEAK</p>

International Monetary Fund

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), set up in 1946, promotes international monetary cooperation, exchange rate stability and the balanced growth of international trade. It provides member countries with policy advice, lending to support economic adjustment, and technical assistance. IMF technical assistance and training assist mainly low and lower middle-income countries to build human and institutional capacity for effective economic policymaking. It focuses on areas such as monetary and fiscal policy, the exchange rate system, expenditure management, tax policy and administration, financial sector stability and statistics. Typically, this means that its poverty impacts are indirect.

The Australian Multilateral Assessment focuses on IMF-administered technical assistance trust funds for eight regional centres and special purpose trust funds such as those dealing with anti-money laundering, combating the financing of terrorism, tax policy and administration, and managing natural resource wealth. There is a particular focus on the IMF regional centre in the Pacific and its topical trust fund dealing with the management of natural resource wealth. IMF spends US\$250 million of its operating budget of US\$1 billion on technical assistance, which includes funding for the technical assistance trust funds.

Australia provided \$16.9 million in 2010–11 in non-core funding to IMF Trust Funds. This included Australian support to regional technical advisory centres in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and IMF regional training institutes in Singapore and India. Australia has also agreed to contribute \$5 million to the Topical Trust Fund for Managing Natural Resource Wealth.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>IMF has a good record of producing results from its technical assistance and training activities. For example, a 2009 evaluation found the Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre had improved outcomes in one or more Pacific Island countries in the areas of medium-term budgeting, fiscal reporting, revenue collection, value-added tax implementation and financial sector supervision and statistics.</p> <p>A tracer study of the India Training Program conducted in mid-2011 showed that participants were highly positive about the impact of the training, with 90 per cent reporting that the training had improved their job performance, 94 per cent reporting it had created additional career opportunities and 81 per cent reporting it led to greater responsibilities.</p> <p>IMF reporting on results has been hampered by inadequate results frameworks. Until recently IMF has relied on its Technical Assistance Information Management System. IMF and donors have recognised this system does not adequately track progress and results at activity or program level.</p> <p>IMF recognises that it must be more rigorous in its objectives for Technical Assistance and measurement of Technical Assistance results. It has established a working group on implementing results based management which is overseeing a new framework offering a systematic approach to the strategic planning and monitoring of technical assistance that emphasizes results. If adopted, the new framework will improve IMF's ability to monitor and evaluate results.</p> <p>The mandate and operations of the IMF's technical assistance and training activities do not lend themselves to a direct focus on the poorest.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS WEAK
	TARGETS POOREST N/A

2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IMF's technical assistance activities are well aligned with the Australian aid program's strategic goals of sustainable economic development and effective governance. Its work promoting the economic development of low income countries also supports Australia's broader interests in promoting improved economic management in developing countries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>IMF has generally been responsive to issues raised by Australia, particularly relating to the Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre (PFTAC).</p>	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p>
<p>IMF technical assistance and training programs are designed primarily to support the IMF's mandate which means they focus on macroeconomic and macro-financial issues. This limits the applicability of crosscutting issues such as environmental sustainability in its operations. Gender balanced participation in its training activities, however, is an important issue for consideration.</p>	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>IMF has adapted its training to give greater weight to gender equity of its participants but there is scope to do more as gender balance remains weighed towards men in a number of activities including the AusAID supported India training centre program. Disability-inclusive development is somewhat relevant to the IMF's training institutes, but the AMA did not find evidence of disability-inclusive policies being integrated into these programs.</p>	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG</p>
<p>Feedback from Australian overseas missions in the Pacific suggests PFTAC programs have adequately adjusted to the differing operating environments of small and fragile states. In many fragile states the IMF (in coordination with other donors) provides technical assistance in areas critical for stabilisation, such as assisting central banks or finance ministries with macroeconomic advice.</p>	

3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IMF's regional technical assistance centres play an important role in coordinating development efforts of donors (bilateral and other such as the World Bank and the regional development banks) in their areas of focus.</p> <p>IMF plays a lead role in setting norms and standards on macroeconomic stability and financial sector surveillance. Its technical assistance helps partner countries understand and apply these norms and standards, and identify and implement economic policies which promote economic stability.</p> <p>IMF is not a development organisation, but it continues to make substantial contributions to development knowledge through its statistics (for example, its international financial statistics) research (for example, on the world economy as well as on financial and monetary issues) and experience in helping countries restore economic stability and prevent instability. IMF shares this knowledge and experience well with others through its publications, on its website and through its participation in meetings and dialogues.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IMF's overall policy and planning framework for technical assistance is adequate. Technical assistance priorities are currently determined through bottom up process based on demands from countries. This process will be considerably strengthened through a new strategy that is under preparation. This will provide a clear overarching institutional strategic framework to better steer demand-based assistance.</p> <p>IMF's governing bodies have been effective in guiding management, as evidenced by improvements in the quality of its technical assistance and training and by the increasing interest of donors in its programs. The Board regularly discusses matter relating to technical assistance policy matters, including a November 2011 technical assistance strategy following a report prepared by a high-level working group.</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG

<p>IMF is in the process of improving its monitoring and evaluation systems through phasing in results-based management. This will enable more systematic tracking of progress of objectives against outcomes and indicators. The IMF currently undertakes periodic evaluations and the performance of all technical assistance activities is assessed semi-annually or annually and at completion.</p> <p>IMF has a strong record on leadership and human resource management as evidenced in the performance of the Regional Technical Assistance Centres. Evaluations and other feedback have attributed this success to the quality of the IMF experts in the centres and the way they are managed.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>IMF's Executive Board looks at value for money when it examines IMF's operational and administrative budget each year. This budget (roughly US\$1 billion) has been subject to a 'no real increase' constraint for the past three years, following sharp resources in the previous year.</p> <p>With regional and topical technical assistance, the lack of direct evidence as well as shortcomings in results frameworks make it hard to gauge value for money. Donors scrutinise costs at IMF steering committee meetings.</p> <p>IMF remains committed to improving the costing of technical assistance. A recent AusAID quality report on the Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre concluded that it is a cost effective mechanism for providing technical assistance compared to others, such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.</p> <p>IMF's technical assistance and training promotes more efficient approaches by partner governments to budgeting and disbursement.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>


<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>IMF works effectively with partners on technical assistance and training programs. According to the evaluation of the Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre and AusAID’s recent quality report, IMF is working very effectively with other partners in the Pacific, including Pacific Island countries, the World Bank and key donors.</p> <p>Pacific Island partners see IMF’s technical assistance as highly responsive to their priorities and well adapted to individual country circumstances. For example, the Central Bank in Honiara, Solomon Islands, stated that IMF has been useful in training staff in the institutes located in Washington and Singapore. Staff that had completed courses gained valuable skills and were rapidly promoted.</p> <p>IMF supports the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda for Action. Its performance in aligning with partner country priorities through the Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre has been strong.</p> <p>Feedback from Australian overseas missions suggests staff at the centre have a good reputation for consulting partners on project design and implementation.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>IMF has a transparency and disclosure policy. It strives to disclose documents and information on a timely basis unless there are strong and specific reasons to argue against this.</p> <p>IMF’s website and publications are comprehensive on its normal lending operations, but information on regional and topical technical assistance operations, and the regional training centres, is limited.</p> <p>IMF’s technical assistance and training budgets are primarily allocated to where the need is greatest against the overall objectives of these programs. In the Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre, for example, resource allocation, budget management and operational planning are strong and transparent for its stakeholders.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG</p>

IMF applies very high standards to its overall financial management, including its management of its technical assistance trust funds. Its administrative budget is prepared in accordance with international financial reporting standards. Auditing is thorough and includes work by an external audit firm, internal audit and its independent external audit committee.

IMF's transparency and disclosure policy encourages its member countries to be as open as possible about their economies, budgets and economic and financial policies.

International Organization for Migration

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

Established in 1951, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is an inter-governmental organisation working in the field of migration. It has 132 member states with another 17 states and organisations holding observer status. IOM works closely with governments, inter-government and civil society partners to help ensure the orderly and humane management of migration. It promotes international cooperation on migration issues and assists the search for practical solutions to migration problems.

IOM has offices in more than 100 countries. Approximately 7100 staff work on more than 2300 projects in 460 field locations.

In 2010, IOM's total expenditure was US\$1.4 billion. It receives administrative funding through assessed contributions of member states, but most funding is directly provided by donors (primarily Member States) to undertake specific projects.

Australia provides both ODA eligible and non-ODA eligible funding to IOM. In 2010–11, Australia provided IOM with \$37.1 million in ODA-eligible non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>IOM's Constitution outlines clear and comprehensive functions, addressing interlinked issues associated with migration and the movement of people. It achieves tangible results in many developing countries. In 2011 assistance was provided to more than 115 000 displaced persons to relocate and more than 100 000 persons to resettle under the auspices of a memorandum of understanding IOM has with the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees.</p> <p>In Australian Multilateral Assessment field visits to Indonesia and Sri Lanka, virtually all stakeholders consulted were positive about IOM effectiveness in delivering results. The contribution each activity makes to IOM's overall mission and results is sometimes not clear, however. This is largely because most funding is earmarked by donors for specific activities.</p> <p>Further improvements to its results framework are needed to enable IOM to better demonstrate and communicate its contribution to humanitarian and development results.</p> <p>Many IOM programs assist with the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable people, such as displaced persons in emergency and post-crisis situations and victims of human trafficking, but the level of targeting of the poorest across its suite of programs in developing countries is unclear. However, IOM activities and projects are determined by Member States and other beneficiaries' priorities.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS WEAK
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IOM's development-related activities align well with the Australian aid program's strategic goal of humanitarian and disaster response.</p> <p>Australia is a long-standing member of IOM and values it as a flexible, responsive partner in implementing international migration policy goals.</p> <p>IOM gives priority to supporting regional processes that shape and address migration policy challenges, and responds to emergencies to assist displaced people, both of which are priority issues for Australia.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES VERY STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES VERY STRONG


<p>In 2010, IOM's largest expenditure was on projects dealing with people movement, emergency and post-crisis migration management activities, much of which was directed to Asia-Pacific.</p> <p>IOM has a formalised approach to gender issues and has established a framework for addressing these in its programs. Feedback from Australian overseas missions is mixed about how well this is applied in practice.</p> <p>IOM has an extensive, effective record of working in fragile states and in marginal areas responding to the movement of people across borders and in displacement and resettlement camps. Community stabilisation and development are also areas of work of the organisation in post crisis settings.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>IOM plays an important and leading role in working with United Nations agencies to manage migration. This extends to supporting migrants and internally displaced persons with shelter and other essential services and in managing the orderly movements of often large numbers of people. In these areas IOM performs very effectively and provides a high level of expertise to addressing fast moving and critical migration issues.</p> <p>IOM contributes to innovative approaches and the development of norms and standards primarily relating to principles and practices on managing migrants and the application of international law on migration. Its contribution in these areas is substantial although the degree of its actual influence cannot be assessed with certainty.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY</p>

ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>At the level of strategic focus and objectives IOM has a well-articulated planning framework. All projects and programs link to its broader strategic objectives.</p> <p>IOM's governance bodies appear to be relatively effective in providing oversight of IOM's strategic direction, performance and other governance issues.</p> <p>Evaluation systems are in place and there is good field-level review and assessment, with evidence to show learning at this level feeds into project adjustments and changes. However, there appears to be limited broader evaluation undertaken by IOM independently of donor requests although this is largely due to reliance on earmarked funding and limited funding available for core functions, including evaluation.</p> <p>IOM has strong leadership and an effective, transparent approach to human resource management. Its reform process was managed consultatively and in an open and transparent manner. Good staffing practices are in place to support staff through these changes.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES VERY STRONG</p>
5. Cost and value consciousness	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IOM management has been prompt in identifying the urgency of reforming its cost and organisation structures to improve its financial and operational position. It was quick to develop and implement a package of reforms and operational adjustments to achieve necessary changes. Its governing bodies have supported and been effective in overseeing reforms. The changes are ongoing but early evidence, including feedback from the Australian Multilateral Assessment field visit to Sri Lanka, indicates significant improvements in the cost effectiveness of field-level operations and significant cost savings in the operational budget at headquarters and in field offices.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY N/A</p>

6. Partnership behaviour	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IOM has developed wide-ranging partnership arrangements with United Nations agencies, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and other migration stakeholders and has developed formal and informal consultation mechanisms to engage with partners on its work.</p> <p>To the extent possible it works through national project-management arrangements and regularly consults with governments on national and international issues relating to migration policy and management.</p> <p>There is evidence from evaluations and reviews of IOM projects that it is responsive to the views of beneficiaries and community groups, particularly in implementing livelihood projects and providing migrant services.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>
7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating STRONG
<p>IOM has good policies for transparent and accountable information-sharing practices. It publishes extensively on its website and reports regularly to members.</p> <p>The capacity to develop a stronger resource allocation framework is constrained by IOM's reliance on earmarked funds.</p> <p>IOM has established effective oversight and audit systems. Financial scrutiny and reporting on budget and expenditure patterns meet international standards.</p> <p>IOM provides members with detailed financial statements and identifies areas where budget forecasts are not met or require realignment to meet its portfolio demands.</p> <p>Financial guidelines establish how IOM should promote transparency and accountability in partners and recipients.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

Established in 1996 in response to a 1994 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution, UNAIDS is the successor to the World Health Organization's Global Programme on AIDS. UNAIDS draws on the experience and strengths of its co-sponsors (10 UN system organisations) in providing assistance to build country and community capacity, and mobilising political and social support to prevent and respond to the threat of HIV.

Australia engages with the UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board as a member of a constituency with Canada, Greece, New Zealand and Turkey. The Australia–UNAIDS Partnership Framework (2009–12) focuses on the Asia-Pacific region. Under the framework Australia will provide \$25.5 million over three years. Funding to UNAIDS through the Australian aid program in 2010–11 totalled \$10.7 million, including \$8.5 million of voluntary core contributions and \$2.2 million of non-core contributions.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

UNAIDS reports clearly on the outputs of its work. In 2010, for example, it supported the development of epidemiological estimates in 151 countries and supported 41 countries to develop national strategic plans or operational plans. However, understandably given its mandate, UNAIDS has struggled to measure and report on the development impact of its work.

Component Rating SATISFACTORY

DELIVERS RESULTS
SATISFACTORY

MONITORS AND REPORTS
RESULTS
SATISFACTORY

TARGETS POOREST
STRONG

<p>In June 2011, UNAIDS approved its Unified Budget, Results and Accountability Framework 2012–2015 (UBRAF). This framework strengthens links between investments by Cosponsors and progress against UNAIDS’ strategic goals and paves the way for better reporting on impact, although it includes a large number of indicators which could create difficulties in implementation. It is too early to determine the framework’s effectiveness.</p> <p>The UBRAF places greater emphasis on better targeting support to countries with the highest disease burden, with a focus on the ‘high impact’ priority countries, which are mostly in Africa but include six countries in Asia.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNAIDS contributes to the Australian aid program’s strategic goal of saving lives. It is well aligned with the Australian Government’s HIV strategy <i>Intensifying the response: Halting the spread of HIV</i> in terms of prioritising HIV prevention, focusing on key populations and inclusive country-led responses. UNAIDS work also supports Australia’s broader interests in the health-related Millennium Development Goals and human rights.</p> <p>UNAIDS’ geographic focus is not well aligned with Australia’s strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific region. Although UNAIDS has a presence in 15 Asia-Pacific countries, only six of UNAIDS’ ‘high impact’ priority countries are in the region: Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand. Australia’s extra-budgetary funding to the Regional Support Team for Asia and the Pacific in part addresses this issue.</p> <p>UNAIDS is strong in mainstreaming gender and human rights into its work is advocating for enabling social and legal environments. This is supported by its action plan for gender equality, which has improved gender disaggregated reporting and increased the involvement of women in national planning. However, the proportion of UNAID’s budget allocated to gender-specific activities remains low.</p> <p>UNAIDS does not have specific policies to working in fragile states but its focus on the ‘high impact’ priority countries means it operates in a range of fragile-state environments.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>


<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNAIDS' coordination role extends to: leadership and advocacy; coherence and partnership; and mutual accountability. Its complex structure has previously made this coordination role challenging, and has resulted in an unclear delineation of responsibilities between organisations. UNAIDS' newly implemented Division of Labour and more transparent budgeting framework will likely improve its effectiveness in this area, but it is too early to determine results.</p> <p>UNAIDS contributes to the development of normative frameworks and guidelines, in collaboration with the World Health Organization, across a range of areas, including antiretroviral treatments, HIV and tuberculosis and infant feeding. However UNAIDS can do more to ensure guidance is relevant to concentrated and low-level epidemics. UNAIDS has also played a catalytic role in increasing financing for HIV from all sources from US\$300 million in 1996 to US\$15 billion in 2010 for low and middle-income countries. UNAIDS is a creative organisation, and develops innovative and valuable policies such as 'Know your epidemic, know your response' and the UNAIDS Investment Framework.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>
<p>ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</p>	
<p>4. Strategic management and performance</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNAIDS set out new objectives in its 2011–15 strategy, presenting a clear vision for its work and the work of its co-sponsors. The strategy is clearly structured and includes an extensive framework for monitoring progress and guiding future directions.</p> <p>UNAIDS' governing body is effective in scrutinising policy and governance arrangements, and regularly directs reforms based on evaluation recommendations.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation has been adequate but the Unified Budget and Workplan was a constraint on the effectiveness of evaluation as it did not clearly link inputs and outcomes. The new framework, which requires each cosponsor to measure and evaluate its own programs according to a series of well-defined indicators, should provide a basis for improving monitoring and evaluation in the future.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCES SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>UNAIDS has also recently reformed its administrative and human resources systems. While signs are encouraging it is too early to adequately evaluate effectiveness.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Management regularly scrutinises budget allocations, cost and source priorities. UNAIDS has clear guidelines for resource allocation and expenditure reporting, although further targeting of resources based on evidence will ensure more strategic investments in HIV. In recent years, areas of cost reductions have included travel and administrative systems.</p> <p>UNAIDS has previously been criticised for the high transaction costs associated with its Unified Budget and Workplan. It has worked to address this through the introduction of a clearer Division of Labour, and has considered the performance of its Cosponsors in the allocation of its 2012–13 resources.</p> <p>Attempts to improve cost effectiveness of partners include establishing criteria for demonstrating comparative advantage, and collaboratively developing new lower-cost treatments.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNAIDS works effectively with partners, and is committed to improving these partnerships—for example through its new Division of Labour. It also actively seeks out new partners.</p> <p>UNAIDS demonstrates leadership in the area of alignment through its Three Ones strategy (one national HIV strategy, one national authority, one national monitoring and evaluation framework). The Second Independent Evaluation noted that UNAIDS was not sufficiently active in addressing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness principles. However, since then UNAIDS has taken steps to improve its alignment with the principles. For example, it has become an active member of the International Health Partnership (IHP+), which attempts to align donor countries and organisations with a single country-led national health strategy. Only time will tell if these efforts are successful, however.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

<p>UNAIDS provides strong technical support to Global Fund financed programs. The Global Fund works to clarify technical assistance and capacity building needs at country-level. To ensure more targeted technical support is available, UNAIDS needs greater resourcing in some countries (such as Papua New Guinea) and for these staff to have appropriate levels of technical expertise.</p> <p>UNAIDS provides a voice for stakeholders at the institutional level, but is less consultative at program level. NGOs and people living with HIV are represented on UNAIDS' governing board, and it brings together a wide range of stakeholders from community, government and donors. However, the second independent evaluation suggested that involvement of people living with HIV in the design and implementation of programs could be improved and made more meaningful.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNAIDS makes available a wide range of documents on its website, including board papers, policy documents, performance monitoring reports and budget information. However, it lacks a formal information disclosure policy, and is not a signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative.</p> <p>UNAIDS' resources have been allocated according to the unified budget and work plan, which provides a clear process for allocation of some, though not all, resources. This may be improved to some extent in the future through the UBRAF, which incorporates clear explanations of the process and criteria to be used for resource allocation, but this new framework is yet to be fully implemented.</p> <p>UNAIDS has appropriate financial management policies in place and has adopted the International Public Sector Accounting Standards for financial management. Financial audits are regularly undertaken.</p> <p>Through its Division of Labour and the new strategic framework, UNAIDS has embedded a robust accountability framework for the work of its partners. However there is less evidence that UNAIDS promotes transparency among these partners and is able to hold them accountable for results.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

Least Developed Countries Fund

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) was established under the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at its seventh session in Marrakech, Morocco, in 2001. It supports least developed countries to identify their urgent and immediate climate change adaptation needs through the preparation and implementation of national adaptation programs of action.

LDCF is governed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council, which meets as the LDCF Council. GEF is the LDCF's Secretariat and the World Bank is the trustee. As at 30 September 2011 the total pledged to the fund was US\$420.8 million. Australia provided \$6.3 million in 2010–11 in voluntary core contributions, and has pledged another \$15 million, which will be distributed to the AF during 2012-2013. Australia engages in LDCF's operation through its seat on its Council and as party to the UNFCCC negotiations.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

Component Rating **STRONG**

LDCF has only recently started to fund projects and more time is needed to assess concrete results. So far, 46 countries have completed national adaptation programs of action and submitted implementation projects. The first annual monitoring reviews and project implementation reviews were presented in May and November this year. The reviews indicate that the overwhelming majority of LDCF projects have made satisfactory progress towards development objectives, although it is still early days.

DELIVERS RESULTS
SATISFACTORY

MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS
STRONG

TARGETS POOREST
STRONG

<p>LDCF operates out of GEF facilities and uses its results-based management system. GEF is implementing a revised results-based management framework, which should enable it to report more comprehensively on results and impact. The proposed framework appears to be robust.</p> <p>By its nature LDCF focuses only on the poorest countries. Its processes maximise benefits for the poorest within these countries. For example, guidance to the national adaptation programs of action stress that the poor living in least developed countries are the most vulnerable and in need of extra protection. The programs also require that in-country consultation take place with special attention given to the voice of the poor. However, the level of these consultations varies from country to country.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>LDCF activities align with the Australian Government’s broader objectives for climate change and environmental sustainability.</p> <p>LDCF’s work aligns with the aid program’s strategic goal of sustainable economic development, which states that the aid program should reduce the negative impacts of climate change and other environmental factors.</p> <p>GEF’s policies on crosscutting issues apply to LDCF. GEF has only recently adopted a gender mainstreaming policy (May 2011) that sets out comprehensive requirements for its partners. GEF has also adopted a new environment and social safeguards policy addressing crosscutting issues such as Indigenous and cultural rights.</p> <p>LDCF does not have a policy on people with disability.</p> <p>Climate change is addressed as the core of LDCF’s mandate.</p> <p>LDCF has successfully worked with fragile states that are also least developed countries to develop the national adaptation programs of action, although LDCF has not specifically outlined whether it adjusts its procedures to accommodate fragile states.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>

3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>LDCF fills the niche role of working with least developed countries to develop and implement national adaptation programs of action. As well as assisting these countries in identifying their urgent adaptation needs, the programs of action add value to the climate change financing system because least developed countries can use them to leverage adaptation funding from other climate change funds, such as Climate Investment Funds.</p> <p>LDCF serves as a key channel for fast-start finance towards addressing the immediate effects of climate change on the world's poorest and most vulnerable. LDCF has leveraged US\$919 million in co-financing, more than US\$4.2 for each dollar contributed by LDCF. It plays a leading role in setting norms and standards for national adaptation programs of action and adaptation planning more generally for least developed countries.</p> <p>The LDCF promotes knowledge of adaptation among least developed countries. The Least Developed Country Expert Group—related to LDCF through the UNFCCC—provides specialist expertise and issues useful guidance to least developed countries on issues related to LDCF.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SATISFACTORY
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>LDCF's clear mandate is to address the special needs of least developed countries on climate change adaptation. The Revised Programming Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change for the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund covers LDCF's operations from 2010–11 to 2013–14. The national adaptation programs of action provide strategies for how adaptation needs should be addressed in each least developed country. Decisions on projects and funding approval are made in line with programs of action.</p> <p>The LDCF Council functions under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. Decisions by the Conference of the Parties are made in the context of broader international climate change negotiations and take into account political and practical realities, which</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG


<p>can be difficult for Council to interpret and difficult for GEF to implement. LDCF's Council is effective in guiding GEF's Secretariat.</p> <p>LDCF's Council agreed to apply GEF's monitoring and evaluation system to regularly assess and evaluate its work. GEF's Independent Evaluation Office provides Council with evaluation products to improve effectiveness. A key product is the Overall Performance Study which reviews GEF's effectiveness over each replenishment period (including a review of LDCF) and provides recommendations against findings. GEF has been very responsive to recommendations and has consistently incorporated them into replenishment periods.</p> <p>LDCF relies on GEF for leadership and human resources. Current GEF leadership is strong and has overseen reforms to help improve GEF's effectiveness. GEF has been assessed by the Australian Multilateral Assessment as having effective and satisfactory human resource policies, with staff hired in accordance with World Bank procedures.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>LDCF relies on GEF for cost and value consciousness. GEF continues to improve the cost effectiveness of its activities. GEF has estimated that its climate change mitigation portfolio has avoided or prevented carbon emissions for a cost of less than US\$2 per ton. It has established thresholds for project management budgets but only scrutinises these when thresholds are exceeded.</p> <p>In November 2011, GEF's Secretariat established a working group to review the full fee structure for agencies to decrease the total cost of the fee structure.</p> <p>In 2011, LDCF's operating costs were three per cent of the overall value of the Fund. Costs are kept to a minimum by housing LDCF in the GEF and keeping staffing numbers low.</p> <p>GEF provides a standard project cycle management fee to implementing agencies to manage GEF and LDCF project implementation. Project management costs have been reduced from an average of 15 per cent (under GEF-3) to five per cent in GEF-5.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>GEF's internal administrative costs are quite low in proportion to its external expenditure, noting that it does not implement projects directly.</p> <p>The summary of the negotiations of the Fifth Replenishment of the GEF outlines the roles and responsibilities of implementing agencies, which includes ensuring cost effectiveness. However, LDCF's Project Identification Form does not ask funding applicants to explain how the investment will be cost effective.</p>	
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>LDCF works closely with implementing agencies to improve program effectiveness and its relationship with recipient countries.</p> <p>Measures include those carried out by the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, which conducts regional workshops to help recipient countries develop, update and implement national adaptation programs of action and better understand LDCF application procedures.</p> <p>LDCF generally aligns with country priorities as national adaptation programs of action are strongly country-driven. However, feedback from least developed countries on LDCF project development and approval processes has been mixed on country ownership, with some recipient countries suggesting they are not fully consulted and that implementing agencies do not update them on project proposal status.</p> <p>Guidelines on preparing national adaptation programs of action provide for the voice of stakeholders in decision making. There is a participatory process with stakeholders and, in particular, local communities. The degree of stakeholder engagement, however, varies from country to country and there have been reports of participation being limited because insufficient time has been allocated for local community consultations.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating STRONG
<p>LDCF is transparent and systematically publishes all documentation on its website. GEF's Secretariat maintains a project database easily accessible through the Internet, allowing the public to access all documents and information on approved projects. However neither GEF nor LDCF are members of the International Aid Transparency Initiative.</p> <p>LDCF is transparent and systematic in allocating resources. Under the balanced access principle, funding is available to all least developed countries on an equal basis. Funding is not provided on a first-come, first-serve basis, which would favour countries with higher institutional capacity. However, this approach has led to some problems, with countries with greater capacity being unable to access further funding. This is because a large proportion of LDCF's resources are notionally allocated to countries not yet ready to access funding.</p> <p>As LDCF's trustee, the World Bank's strong internal controls, fiduciary management and audit compliance are applied. Transparency and accountability in partners is promoted through the application of minimum fiduciary standards to all LDCF implementing agencies, which include a strong transparency component.</p>	ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG
	CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG
	STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS VERY STRONG
	PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG

Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The mandate of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF) is to assist developing country parties to the Montreal Protocol phase out ozone depleting substances. The fund is replenished by donors on a three-year basis.

Over the period 1991 to 2011, pledges amounted to more than US\$2.9 billion. Australia contributes funding through the Australian Agency for International Development, and is one of 14 members of the Executive Committee that manages MLF. Since 1994 Australia has contributed \$74 million to the fund. Between 2005 and 2010, Australia provided average yearly voluntary core contributions of \$3.5 million, however it did not provide any funding in 2010–11.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

MLF has a strong record in supporting the reduction of ozone depleting substances and is very good at communicating its impressive environmental results. For example, with MLF assistance, developing countries have permanently phased out 446 798 tonnes of ozone depleting substances. Global observations have verified that atmospheric levels of key ozone depleting substances are going down.

Component Rating **STRONG**

DELIVERS RESULTS
STRONG

MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS
STRONG

TARGETS POOREST
N/A

<p>However, MLF does not have a specific mandate to achieve development outcomes, and therefore is not as strong at communicating how these environmental outcomes lead to broader development outcomes.</p> <p>MLF plays a role in improving effectiveness through results monitoring. It consistently monitors project implementation and project development. MLF’s Senior Monitoring and Evaluations Officer undertakes project evaluations and results inform project design and decision making.</p> <p>MLF’s mandate means its activities do not directly target the poorest.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Australia has been a leading supporter of international efforts to protect the ozone layer since the 1980s and is active in MLF.</p> <p>MLF’s work aligns with the Australian aid program strategic goal of sustainable economic development, in particular reducing the negative impacts of environmental factors.</p> <p>MLF focuses on the crosscutting issue of environmentally sustainable development as part of its mandate. It also aims to mitigate the effects its activities have on climate change. For example, incentives are provided to enterprises to select climate-friendly alternative technologies.</p> <p>MLF does not have a policy on gender or people with disabilities. Instead it relies on the policies and action plans of its four implementing agencies—United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the World Bank.</p> <p>A number of projects in fragile states are supported by MLF, including successful projects in Afghanistan. MLF does not have a specific model, nor does it provide guidance to implementing agencies working in fragile states. Instead it relies on the policies and procedures of its implementing agencies.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM SATISFACTORY</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>


3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating STRONG
<p>MLF has been successful in coordinating global efforts to phase out the use of ozone depleting substances. Through its guidelines and project implementation, it has coordinated international efforts to fundamentally transform a range of industries including aerosol, foam, fire suppression, metered-dose inhalers, refrigeration and air conditioning.</p> <p>MLF has provided large-scale funding of more than US\$2.8 billion up to December 2011, to support more than 6800 projects and activities in 144 developing countries to phase out ozone depleting substances.</p> <p>It fills a policy and knowledge gap by raising awareness in developing countries on ozone depleting substances and providing technological support and technical assistance to help developing countries reach their targets. This has generally been effective as evidenced by MLF's results.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>MLF has a clear mandate to assist developing countries in phasing out ozone depleting substances in line with the Montreal Protocol. It develops country programs for all relevant countries, setting out a strategy and action plan for each country to follow to phase out the consumption and production of ozone depleting substances according to Montreal Protocol schedules. Its Policies, Procedures, Guidelines and Criteria document covers what has been decided in this area by the parties to the Montreal Protocol and its Executive Committee. The document guides MLF's decision making.</p> <p>MLF's Executive Committee is effective and follows guidance from the Meeting of the Parties. The Executive Committee guides the work of MLF's Secretariat at every meeting. The Secretariat is very responsive to formal and informal requests from the Executive Committee.</p> <p>MLF has a sound framework for monitoring and evaluating projects and activities which commences with a business planning process. The Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Officer undertakes sectoral</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p> <p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>

<p>analyses and evaluates country phase out plans. Four assessments of the Fund have been initiated by Montreal Protocol Parties in 1994, 1996, 2004 and a review was initiated in 2010, which will be presented to Parties in 2012.</p> <p>MLF leadership is effective and has succeeded in achieving impressive results by driving initiatives and focusing on value for money. MLF staff are competent and hired on a meritocratic basis.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>MLF's Executive Committee and Secretariat systematically scrutinise costs and assess value for money for every project through the business planning process and before it is approved. Cost guidelines must be adhered to by implementing agencies. Before project approval, the Secretariat scrutinises project plans and negotiates variable costs with each implementing agency. The Executive Committee then scrutinises the costs again. While there is sometimes disagreement between the Executive Committee, the Secretariat and implementing agencies, this process ensures high rates of return and cost effectiveness of proposals before approval.</p> <p>Through this process, value for money is systematically considered when planning programs. Problems are picked up through periodic progress reports and the tracking of project delays and finances. They are addressed as they arise.</p> <p>Through this and other processes, MLF challenges its implementing partners and partner countries to consider cost and value for money.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS VERY STRONG</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>MLF generally works well with its implementing agencies (UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO, the World Bank and various bilateral agencies). It also works effectively with partner governments by providing funds for institutional strengthening to support and develop local capacity to implement Montreal Protocol commitments and meet phase out targets.</p> <p>MLF relies on partner implementing agencies and government systems to implement activities. Implementing agencies are well versed in working</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>within country systems. For example, in setting import and export quotas, the agencies work within systems operating in-country. For some countries at present, there is a high level of consultation on integration of HCFC phase out activities in national level energy efficiency or climate strategies.</p> <p>Civil society is not well represented in MLF's Executive Committee, with only one industry and one green representative attending as observers and only to intervene at the Chair's discretion. However, there are no limits on the number of non-government organisations able to attend, although organisations have to apply in advance or join the delegation of an approved observer.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>MLF publishes and makes available on its website all policies, procedures, guidelines, criteria and Executive Committee decisions and funding allocations. In addition, all meeting documents are publically available.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
<p>Resource allocations are based on the volume of ozone depleting substances that need to be funded for phase out, work programs costs for technical assistance, demonstration projects and institutional strengthening, as well as standard costs. With hydrochlorofluorocarbons, the Executive Committee passed detailed guidelines prescribing how each country's allocation will be calculated.</p>	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG</p>
<p>UNEP provides treasury services to MLF's Secretariat and is responsible for all financial management and ensuring accounts are audited. All financial documents are made available to the Executive Committee. UNEP has been assessed by the Australian Multilateral Assessment as satisfactory on this criterion.</p>	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>MLF's guidelines clearly set out the expectations of partners on transparency and accountability.</p>	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG</p>

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is the leading United Nations (UN) entity on human rights. It has a unique mandate provided by the UN General Assembly to promote and protect human rights for all. OHCHR provides assistance, such as technical expertise and capacity development in the areas of administration of justice, legislative reform and electoral processes, to help implement international human rights standards on the ground.

OHCHR's work encompasses three broad areas: human rights standard setting; monitoring; and implementation. Funding from the UN regular budget provides around 40 per cent of OHCHR's resources with the remainder coming from donor voluntary contributions. For 2010–11, US\$141.1 million has been allocated to OHCHR from the UN regular budget.

Australia has provided OHCHR with \$6.4 million in voluntary contributions over the past three years. This includes core funds and funds earmarked for the Regional Office for the Pacific and Special Procedures.

In 2010–11 Australia provided OHCHR with \$2.4m in total funding, including \$1.9 million in voluntary core contributions and \$0.5 million in non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>OHCHR points to many country-level results from its work, particularly with legislative and policy changes that promote and protect human rights. However, it has little reporting about its results and impact at organisational level. This makes it difficult to assess its overall effectiveness in delivering results.</p> <p>OHCHR is working to improve its monitoring and reporting of results. It has invested in new internal reporting systems and its strategic management plan for 2010–11 provides a stronger basis for measuring impact in key areas.</p> <p>While the nature of OHCHR’s work means its programs are not only targeted at the poorest, its work generally does include consideration of the poor and has broad benefit for the poorest and most vulnerable in society. OHCHR aims to strengthen the inclusion of human rights norms and principles in poverty reduction strategies and policies.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS WEAK
	TARGETS POOREST STRONG
2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>OHCHR’s work cuts across all the strategic goals of the Australian aid program, but most directly aligns with the goal of promoting effective governance to enhance justice and human rights. By working to implement human rights, OHCHR’s activities help to create enabling environments for development. Its work also aligns with Australia’s strong commitments to promote and uphold human rights more broadly.</p> <p>OHCHR’s role in reviewing national compliance with international human rights standards and reporting on areas where human rights violations are impacting on development outcomes is valuable to the aid program.</p> <p>A strong focus on gender equality is found in OHCHR’s programs, in recognition that the empowerment of women is central to political and economic development.</p> <p>OHCHR has made significant advancements promoting the rights of people with disability, and supporting states in implementing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY

<p>OHCHR has considerable experience working in fragile states, including through human rights monitoring and contributing to peace building initiatives. While recognising the significant challenges involved in working with fragile states, OHCHR's performance in securing real and lasting results in these environments has been mixed.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>OHCHR plays a central role in strengthening cooperation among national human rights institutions, civil society and international organisations concerned with promoting and protecting human rights. It contributes to the development of human rights knowledge and awareness and provides relevant guidance on UN development programs. OHCHR coordinates and chairs the UN Development Group Human Rights Mainstreaming Mechanism which is designed to mainstream human rights issues within UN policies and operational activities.</p> <p>OHCHR has a unique role as Secretariat to the Human Rights Council. It also supports other UN bodies and committees dealing with human rights issues.</p> <p>A range of publications, reports, guidance and advocacy tools are posted on OHCHR's website, designed to share knowledge and increase awareness about human rights issues and best practices. These are seen as adding value by development stakeholders.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</p>	
<p>4. Strategic management and performance</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>OHCHR's current strategic plan is a good improvement on previous plans, providing greater clarity on priorities and ways to measure success. It sets out how OHCHR will play its role as: a source of technical expertise to all UN and non-UN bodies concerned with promoting and protecting human rights; and as a reviewer and watchdog of implementation and compliance. It is too early to judge, however, how effective the current strategic plan will be in ensuring clearer prioritisation, planning and reporting at country-level.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY</p> <p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY</p>


<p>OHCHR is mandated by, and reports to, the UN General Assembly, which entrusts it with a high level of independence and initiative. OHCHR is strengthening its monitoring framework and linking it to its strategic management plan. In contrast to previous years, the Annual Report is now more aligned with reporting against the results identified in the Strategic Management Plan.</p> <p>OHCHR's current leadership team is actively pushing forward its reform agenda.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>OHCHR has oversight systems in place on cost effectiveness and regularly provides reports to the General Assembly with management responses on implementation.</p> <p>OHCHR has taken measures to reduce costs and improve value for money but has not been able to quantify the level of its efficiency gains. No evidence was found on how OHCHR takes cost effectiveness into account in its program decisions, however this assessment does note that OHCHR reviews staff costs with a view to cost effectiveness. OHCHR and has indicated it intends to establish a review mechanism in 2012 to identify areas where efficiency gains can be made. Financial obligations arising from its Secretariat role, over which OHCHR has limited control, constrains its ability to ensure cost effectiveness.</p> <p>Given the nature of its work OHCHR has limited opportunity to challenge partners on value for money issues.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY N/A</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>OHCHR works with an extensive range of partners at international, national and regional levels. It has developed good relations with key institutions responsible for promoting and protecting human rights, including at national level. Investigation into human rights situations is an important aspect of its mandate, and at times OHCHR's monitoring and reporting role negatively impacts on its ability to engage constructively with governments.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS WEAK</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

<p>OHCHR’s field offices have not always succeeded in building good partnerships or alignments with partner governments. Relationships in countries including Cambodia, Nepal and Somalia have been strained at times and have impacted on OHCHR’s ability to function effectively.</p> <p>OHCHR’s engagement with Pacific Island countries, through its regional office in Suva, has been poor. For example, OHCHR failed to properly assist Pacific governments to prepare for, attend and implement their Universal Periodic Reviews.</p> <p>OHCHR works with many actors and most are generally satisfied with the extent of engagement. This includes those directly affected by conflict and violence. OHCHR has developed a good consultative mechanism to incorporate civil society organisation views and inputs into its approaches. The expansion of capacity in its civil society unit and the publication of the <i>Handbook for Civil Society</i> should help further with dialogue and collaboration.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>As a UN organisation, OHCHR fully complies with UN requirements for transparency and accountability. This includes sound financial and audit oversight systems and the regular reports on its performance it provides to the General Assembly. It releases key information on its website.</p> <p>OHCHR’s mandate, particularly its monitoring and reporting role, can give rise to political sensitivities. For this reason, it is imperative that OHCHR preserve its high degree of independence and autonomy vis-à-vis governments. This is particularly important with resource allocation.</p> <p>Some of OHCHR’s work also necessitates engagement with states in private, to foster confidence and cooperation. Given this, the current level of transparency through regular reports to the General Assembly and Human Rights Council, and the information available on OHCHR’s website, is appropriate.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>In its secretariat role, OHCHR is instructed by the Human Rights Council to perform a range of tasks, including organising meetings, preparing reports, and dispatching fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry. The ad hoc and unpredictable nature of this tasking, over which OHCHR has little control, requires OHCHR to be flexible and adaptable in allocating resources.</p>	
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Private Infrastructure Development Group

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) is a multi-donor organisation established in 2002. It has nine members: Australia (joined in 2011), Austria, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the World Bank Group.

PIDG is intended to overcome market and institutional failures constraining private sector participation in infrastructure development in developing countries. The companies and facilities in the group mobilise private sector investment for infrastructure. PIDG has two channels through which private sector investment is mobilised: the facility channel—commercial and development financial institutions provide financing to PIDG vehicles alongside equity from PIDG members (through a trust); and the project channel—private sector investment alongside the investment of PIDG vehicles. As Australia only recently became a member of PIDG, Australia did not provide any contributions in 2010–11.

As of June 2011, PIDG members had disbursed US\$456 million to PIDG companies and facilities. This has been used to support 99 projects and 45 grants in 45 countries. Of these projects, 62 per cent were in Sub-Saharan Africa and 27 per cent in the Asia-Pacific region.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>PIDG attracts private investment into infrastructure projects that have identifiable and substantial development benefits. It operates as a lean organisation but catalyses very large private investments in frontier areas of infrastructure.</p> <p>From PIDG's start in 2002 to August 2011, projects that had reached financial closure involved private sector investment commitments of US\$15.9 billion from the US\$456 million investment by PIDG donors. These projects are expected to provide new and improved infrastructure services to almost 140 million people.</p> <p>PIDG has a results-based system of monitoring at facility and project levels. Projects that have been physically built and that are actually delivering services on the ground (typically two to three years after financial close) are monitored for actual impacts to ensure private sector investment and development targets are being delivered. Both ex-ante and ex-post development impact indicators are monitored, updated and published by PIDG's Program Management Unit.</p> <p>Most of PIDG's work, in terms of project numbers and values, has been in low income countries and focused on under-served areas and populations. The nature of the work results in services being provided or improved for those who have not had access in the past.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS STRONG
	TARGETS POOREST STRONG
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>PIDG contributes to sustainable economic development by increasing opportunities for well-designed public-private partnerships in infrastructure and removes legislative and regulatory impediments to doing business in developing countries. This serves Australia's broader interests in global and regional economic development.</p> <p>PIDG's work has a high degree of alignment with the strategic goals of the Australian aid program in the areas of sustainable economic development and effective governance through improved governance, provision of jobs, infrastructure and services and improved market operations.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES WEAK
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY

<p>PIDG does not systematically capture information on or report on crosscutting issues (such as gender or disability) in its work or systematically analyse the implications of its work on these issues. However, two studies aimed at improving the disaggregation of gender related data by the PIDG Facilities and improved understanding of the links between infrastructure investment and its impact on women and girls have been commissioned by the PIDG Programme Management Unit (one in collaboration with the International Finance Corporation) and are currently underway.</p> <p>PIDG’s objectives include promoting private investment in infrastructure in postconflict states and around 20 per cent of its activities to date have been in fragile states. PIDG is investigating ways to increase the amount of work it undertakes in fragile and post-conflict countries.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>PIDG has helped mobilise US\$16 billion of public works since 2002. It performs an effective coordinating role between governments, donors and the private sector. It is innovative in its own concept and structure, and in the nature of its facilities.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p>
<p>PIDG has filled a critical gap in the development field and has successfully leveraged donor funds to secure significant private sector development in projects and areas that, despite potential, may have been overlooked or neglected by other development mechanisms.</p> <p>The successive formation of companies and facilities in the group reflects a process of close observation of market conditions and readiness to experiment in filling gaps. For example, PIDG responded during the recent financial crisis by creating the innovative Infrastructure Crisis Facility–Debt Pool. This innovative approach is seen as valuable by its stakeholders.</p>	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>


ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>PIDG’s clear strategy is set out in its constitution. Beneath this is a set of operating principles effectively carried through into resource and program management. There is a clear line from its constitution through to planning, monitoring and delivering operations.</p> <p>PIDG’s management model is drawn from the private sector. Each corporate entity has a board with professional expertise which contracts through tender for management of the facility according to stated objectives. This model effectively keeps all PIDG companies and facilities focused on applying the operating priorities and policies determined by donor members. It maintains control over all operational aspects.</p> <p>PIDG’s organisation-wide framework for monitoring and evaluation projects is sound. Evaluation reports (and other information) are used to reassess and adapt the operation of its companies and facilities.</p> <p>Human resource management practices include rigorous merit-based appointment and promotion and substantial performance incentives.</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY VERY STRONG
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG
5. Cost and value consciousness	Component Rating VERY STRONG
<p>PIDG companies and facilities continuously strive to control costs and get value for money—their aim is to make profit and they work in a framework of incentives related to that.</p> <p>PIDG states that its annual administration costs are currently 0.5 per cent of disbursed funds under management.</p> <p>Rates of return and cost effectiveness are treated as crucial. Its companies keep control of expenditure through a budget process and audit. All costs are audited annually by external auditors and audit reports forwarded to donors for comment. Full financial details of all of facilities are presented to donors for detailed examination and review.</p>	MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS VERY STRONG
	COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS VERY STRONG
	CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY VERY STRONG

<p>PIDG adheres to European Union–World Bank procurement processes (as relevant) to minimise costs while achieving maximum value for money.</p> <p>All loans and guarantees issued by its facilities are subject to detailed due diligence by relevant managers which ensures the implementing partner has adequately addressed all issues, including value for money.</p> <p>If local partners in developing countries lack experience in how to achieve maximum value for money, PIDG provides grant support through its Technical Assistance Facility to build their capacity.</p>	
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>PIDG collaborates constructively with development finance institutions and multilateral banks to fill gaps by identifying and/or preparing projects. It works closely and effectively with other multi-donor facilities, such as the Public–Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility.</p> <p>PIDG, by definition, works in what developing country governments determine is needed through public–private partnerships in infrastructure. All PIDG supported projects are required to be in line with national government priorities and policies whether they are initiated in direct response to formal requests from governments for assistance or by private sector/ commercial developers of infrastructure projects. In the case of a number of transport, energy and water infrastructure activities, PIDG works successfully through partner government systems.</p> <p>PIDG facilities apply the environmental and social standards of the European Union or International Finance Corporation (World Bank) to its projects. PIDG regularly consults with local civil society organisations in designing and implementing activities.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating STRONG
<p>PIDG recently upgraded its group policy on transparency by specifying the types of information it will make publicly available. Its disclosure practice corresponds to the policy and is adequate. It publishes information in conformity with standard commercial practice.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
<p>PIDG is investigating whether it is appropriate and possible to implement the International Aid Transparency Initiative guidelines on information standardisation.</p>	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>PIDG's criteria for allocating resources, and its procedures generally, are transparent for its donors and easy enough for other partners to understand and follow. PIDG provides technical assistance where capacity to understand and use systems are insufficient.</p>	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS VERY STRONG</p>
<p>Very strong systems for financial management, audit, risk management and fraud prevention are in place. Risk management takes the form of policies in investment companies, including for portfolio diversification, and documented, step-wise processes for committing funds on the basis of risk-weighted expectations of adequate returns.</p>	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG</p>
<p>PIDG seems generally to promote transparency in its business partners. It is in the process of developing a Code of Conduct, to be adopted by all elements of its structure. Commitment to transparency will be one of the code's nine elements.</p>	

United Nations Capital Development Fund

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations Capital Development Fund's (UNCDF) mandate is to bring services to people who are underserved or overlooked entirely by the private sector and their own government. UNCDF works as part of the UN system to extend financial services and basic government services to poor people in least developed countries. It focuses on Africa and Asia, often in countries struggling to recover from crisis or conflict, and has a growing portfolio in the Pacific in partnership with Australia. UNCDF provides support in 48 least developed countries and expenditure in 2009 totalled around US\$40 million.

Australia does not provide UNCDF with core funding. In 2010–11, Australia provided UNCDF with \$3.9 million in non-core funding for programs in the Pacific.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
UNCDF demonstrates clear outputs from its programs. For example, its mobile money services have reached more than 300 000 people in the Pacific in just over a year. During the Australian Multilateral Assessment field visit to Solomon Islands, stakeholders were positive about the high quality of technical assistance provided by UNCDF.	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY

<p>UNCDF has, however, found it challenging to accurately measure the development results of its activities. It has increased focus on results monitoring and, in addition to publishing an annual report on results achieved, has increased the number of mid-term and final reviews it conducts each year. Still, UNCDF needs to do more to demonstrate development outcomes.</p> <p>Although UNCDF operates exclusively in least developed countries, it does not systematically ensure that it targets the poorest people within these countries. UNCDF generally works in rural areas, however, where there is often a higher proportion of poorer individuals.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNCDF makes a small but valuable contribution to the Australian aid program's strategic goal of sustainable economic development by improving incomes, employment and enterprise opportunities. Its programs are well aligned with AusAID's Financial Services for the Poor Strategy. Approximately one-third of UNCDF resources are allocated to the Asia-Pacific region, and its efforts to promote private sector growth support Australia's broader interests in regional prosperity and stability.</p> <p>UNCDF programs are usually implemented jointly with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and so UNDP's sound environment and gender policies are used in UNCDF programming.</p> <p>UNCDF is an effective actor in fragile states. The Australian Multilateral Assessment field visit to Solomon Islands and feedback from East Timor suggests it adapts its policies and programs to suit these contexts well.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES SATISFACTORY</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG</p>


<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNCDF plays a niche but useful role within the wider multilateral development system. It supports the coordination of microfinance within the UN system by convening interagency meetings and promoting unified approaches to inclusive finance.</p> <p>Regionally, UNCDF successfully coordinates a range of government and non-government partners to implement the Pacific Financial Inclusion Program (PFIP). PFIP is an example of the sector development approach that UNCDF utilises across Asia and Africa.</p> <p>UNCDF often develops innovative approaches which are later scaled up by larger multilateral development banks, such as mobile banking in the Pacific. Its policy innovation is supported by the quality of the technical assistance it provides.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>
<p>ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</p>	
<p>4. Strategic management and performance</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNCDF's key strategy document is the Corporate Management Plan 2010–2013. This clear and overarching document is framed around four strategic objectives which are closely related to UNCDF's mandate.</p> <p>UNDP's Executive Board also serves as UNCDF's governing body and UNCDF has opted into UNDP's accountability mechanisms and processes. Given UNCDF's relatively small size and the openness of its senior management to engagement with stakeholders, the lack of a dedicated governing body does not appear to be a major constraint to effectiveness.</p> <p>UNCDF uses UNDP evaluation policies. Australia's experience is that UNCDF undertakes effective monitoring but does not adequately evaluate the poverty or other social impacts of its financial service programs.</p> <p>Leadership at headquarters level has overseen the successful expansion of UNCDF's activities in the Asia-Pacific region. Feedback from Australia overseas missions suggests UNCDF exerts strong and effective leadership at country-level, including on the Pacific Financial Inclusion Program in Fiji.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY</p> <p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>

<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>As an organisation with relatively modest resources, UNCDF's management pays close attention to cost effectiveness and value for money.</p> <p>UNCDF uses its scarce resources to leverage capital flows from other partners, governments and the private sector. It makes strong use of analysis on cost efficiencies at activity level, as feedback from the Pacific Financial Inclusion Program confirms.</p> <p>UNCDF challenges partners to think about value for money through performance-based agreements and grants. Partners who do not meet minimum and performance-based conditions do not receive further investment funding.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNCDF works effectively with key partners including donors, governments, the private sector and civil society. It often convenes multi-stakeholder groups at country and program levels to promote stronger partnership between others. It plans to continue to build strategic partnerships, including with non-traditional funders.</p> <p>UNCDF has placed strong emphasis on partner country ownership and leadership and aligns its work appropriately to partner government priorities given the nature of its mandate.</p> <p>UNCDF does not typically work with ultimate beneficiaries but expects its partners to understand client needs in delivering financial services and to design products accordingly.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNCDF is a recent signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative, but is not yet fully compliant with the standard.</p> <p>UNCDF adheres to UNDP's information disclosure policy. It publishes a full list of projects and a broad range of operational reports, including evaluations and strategy documents.</p> <p>There does not appear to be a publicly available rationale for resource allocation, although UNCDF's heavy reliance on earmarked funding is a constraint to achieving this.</p> <p>UNCDF largely relies on effective UNDP processes and systems in relation to accountability and transparency, for example the UNDP Accountability Framework.</p> <p>UNCDF promotes transparency in its partners through the nature of its operations. In addition, partners are required to report on a range of financial and social indicators to demonstrate both financial and performance accountability.</p>	ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG
	CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION WEAK
	STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG
	PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG

United Nations Children's Fund

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations Children's Fund's (UNICEF) mandate is to advocate for the protection and promotion of the rights of children, to meet children's basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential. Its Medium Term Strategic Plan 2006–13 covers five focus areas: child survival and development; basic education and gender equality; HIV/AIDS and children; child protection; and policy advocacy and partnerships for children's rights. In 2010 UNICEF's income was US\$3.7 billion (US\$2.7 billion in regular resources and almost US\$1 billion in non-core resources).

Australia was the ninth largest overall government donor to UNICEF in 2010 with funding of \$140 million. In 2010–11, Australia provided UNICEF with \$139.8 million in total funding, comprising \$25.4 million in voluntary core contributions and \$114.4 million in non-core funding. UNICEF is an important humanitarian partner and Australia was the fourth largest government donor to UNICEF's humanitarian operations in 2010. Australia will provide core funding to UNICEF totalling \$93.6 million from 2008–12.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>Evidence from regional aggregates in UNICEF’s <i>State of the World’s Children 2011: Adolescence: An Age of Opportunity</i> report shows that UNICEF delivers strong, tangible development results. Its achievements in 2009 and 2010 include the vaccination of close to 170 million children against measles, support for the reintegration of 28 000 children from conflict-affected countries and the delivery of more than 574 million vitamin A capsules in 2009 to ward off blindness and bolster the immune system.</p> <p>Reporting from Australian overseas missions was generally positive about the results from UNICEF’s programs, including in Indonesia, some Pacific Island countries and the Philippines, although reporting was less positive from Cambodia and Vanuatu.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation processes are sound and increasingly feeding back into improving aid effectiveness. While UNICEF’s monitoring of results at program level is strong, its capacity to aggregate development results at organisational level is less well developed and this is being addressed.</p> <p>UNICEF targets the poorest people, the poorest countries and works extensively in conflict and post-conflict environments.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS STRONG
	TARGETS POOREST VERY STRONG
2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating VERY STRONG
<p>UNICEF’s strategic priorities in health, child survival and education are closely aligned with Australia’s interests. Australia and UNICEF have a very strong partnership at institutional level, although the effectiveness of collaboration at country-level varies. UNICEF is a strong partner for Australia in Asia and the Pacific, and its global presence extends the Australian aid program into regions where Australia has limited presence.</p> <p>UNICEF’s mandate and strategic objectives have a very high degree of alignment with four of the five strategic goals of the Australian aid program—saving lives, promoting opportunities for all, effective governance and humanitarian and disaster response.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES VERY STRONG
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES VERY STRONG

<p>UNICEF is highly responsive to gender, disability and environment issues and has been expanding its specialist knowledge within its Headquarters, including through the appointment of a Senior Adviser on Children with Disabilities.</p> <p>UNICEF has guidance on working on complex emergencies, humanitarian situations and post-conflict and post-disaster situations. It has extensive experience and demonstrated effectiveness in working in these states and in and conflict-affected areas, allocating 50 per cent of its country-level resources to countries listed as 'fragile' by the OECD Development Assistance Committee.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>As one of the major cluster lead agencies UNICEF has a central role in ensuring the Inter-agency Standing Committee cluster system, and the whole humanitarian architecture, works effectively and is continually improved. For example, UNICEF was an instigator of, and continues to play a key role in, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies and the Emergency Response Coordinator's transformative agenda. But as a lead agency it must also take some responsibility for weaknesses in the cluster system. UNICEF is committed to establishing a Global Cluster Coordination Unit in Geneva in 2012. UNICEF could do more to push broader development coordination reform.</p> <p>UNICEF plays a critical role in setting norms and standards on a range of children's development and rights issues. This work is valuable and valued by other donors.</p> <p>Management actively pushes for greater country-level engagement by UNICEF in the UN's Delivering as One approach.</p> <p>In some sectors, UNICEF operates on a large financial scale. For example its water, sanitation and hygiene programs total 40 per cent of all expenditure in this sector.</p> <p>UNICEF has many examples of policy work and innovation at program level, although reporting from Australian overseas missions highlighted some examples of policy work and taking innovations forward that were poorly executed.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE VERY STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY</p>


ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNICEF has a clear mandate and a strong strategic focus on the needs of children. According to the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network's (MOPAN) 2009 assessment, UNICEF's partners found that a key strength of the organisation is its ability to translate its mandate into strategy and plans. Despite this clarity of purpose, UNICEF's decentralised structure means it sometimes finds it challenging to prioritise work at county level.</p> <p>UNICEF's Executive Board successfully holds management to account, for example in pursuing management action in response to the relatively critical evaluation of its gender policy in 2008.</p> <p>Despite introducing a new evaluation policy in 2008, country-level feedback indicates mixed quality of reporting, particularly on demonstrating impact and sharing lessons learned. There is no systematic approach to when humanitarian evaluations will be conducted, although efforts are now underway to remedy this through standardised procedures and staff training.</p> <p>UNICEF's leadership is driven to pursue reforms such as improved aggregation of results, the design and implementation of stronger procedures for emergency response and greater institutional support to the Delivering as One agenda.</p> <p>MOPAN respondents rated UNICEF as 'barely adequate' on several human resource systems and practices, despite often having strong human resources at country-level.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>

5. Cost and value consciousness	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>There is evidence to suggest that UNICEF’s senior management make decisions that improve cost effectiveness. For example, in 2010 UNICEF identified US\$79 million of reductions driven from: operational efficiency gains (US\$34.6 million); reduction in staff and related costs (US\$19.5 million); and investment projects (US\$24.9 million). UNICEF’s current biennial support budget (management and program support costs) includes targets to further reduce expenditure on administration to 11.5 per cent of total expenditure for the current biennium, reduced from nearly 20 per cent in 2004. Further, each country office now reports on the operational efficiency gains realised for the year through the annual report.</p> <p>UNICEF generally considers value for money in planning and implementing its programs but its reporting against this aspect of its work is not comprehensive.</p> <p>UNICEF gives low key attention to partner efficiencies that will achieve better results for children. For example, it supports periodic analysis of social sector budget allocations, with the aim of identifying opportunities to increase the allocation of resources for greatest impact on children.</p>	MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG
	COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY
	CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY
6. Partnership behaviour	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNICEF generally has a good reputation with partner governments. The 2009 MOPAN assessment found that responses from partner country governments towards UNICEF were generally highly positive, particularly in respecting partner government views and providing valuable inputs to policy dialogue.</p> <p>MOPAN, however, found that UNICEF did not use country systems adequately. This is consistent with feedback from several Australian overseas missions that cited examples of UNICEF working outside of frameworks agreed by partner governments, for example, in Fiji. UNICEF could more effectively consult with beneficiaries to develop expected results.</p>	WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS WEAK
	PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY

<p>Evidence is mixed on UNICEF’s approach to engaging key stakeholders to improve effectiveness, in particular engagement with civil society. During the Australian Multilateral Assessment field visit to Indonesia, civil society representatives were very positive about UNICEF’s engagement with beneficiaries in designing and managing their programs, particularly in Papua. However, in its submission to the Australian Multilateral Assessment, Save The Children raised questions over the consistency of UNICEF’s commitment to working with community service organisations, saying its willingness to collaborate with civil society (including children and youth) at country-level was sometimes lacking.</p> <p>Recent changes to UNICEF’s Programme Cooperation Agreement guidance emphasise the need for stronger partnerships with community-based organisations.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNICEF published an Information Disclosure Policy in late 2010 to ensure that all but confidential information on its programs and operations was easily accessible on its website. It is considering joining the International Aid Transparency Initiative.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
<p>UNICEF has clear criteria for allocating core resources and makes this information publicly available. The criteria are systematically applied.</p>	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG</p>
<p>UNICEF has effective audit, risk and accountability processes in place. For example, in Bangladesh, it transparently and appropriately handled a case of misuse of funds at district level, fully recovering the funds and taking legal action against a staff member. UNICEF carries out corporate audits that comply with international standards and internal financial audits provide objective information to its Executive Board.</p>	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p>
<p>Agreements with partners focus on accountability, fiscal responsibility and measures to reduce the risk of corruption, although UNICEF does not require partner governments to show all aid received in their national budgets.</p>	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

United Nations Development Programme

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a central and major player in the development work of the UN system. UNDP's mandate focuses on four key pillars: poverty reduction and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); democratic governance; crisis prevention and recovery; and environment and sustainable development.

UNDP delivers programs, activities and technical assistance through five regional and 129 country offices. It has a major role in enhancing the UN system's collective development impact by coordinating and driving more effective cooperation between UN development agencies. In 2010 UNDP received approximately US\$5.3 billion (close to US\$1 billion in core funding and US\$4.3 billion in non-core contributions).

In December 2008 Australia signed a partnership framework with UNDP. The framework sets out shared objectives and outlines Australia's core funding commitment to UNDP totalling \$68.3 million, increasing from \$12.5 million in 2008 to \$23.3 million in 2011. Australia also provides significant earmarked funding through thematic funds and specific programs and projects at country-level. In 2010–11 Australia provided \$98.9 million to UNDP, including \$18.3 million in voluntary core contributions and \$80.7 million in non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>Overall UNDP has a satisfactory record of delivering results with a key strength being UNDP’s strong programmatic focus on poverty reduction in low income countries. However, performance remains variable across countries and themes, in part due to its broad mandate and differing human resource expertise in-country. Further strengthening of its results framework, which is a key focus of the UNDP Administrator’s reform program, will provide a sound basis for improved collection and communication of results in future.</p> <p>UNDP can point to an array of program-level successes, such as supporting democratic elections in a range of countries, including fragile states. Nevertheless evidence from Australian Multilateral Assessment field visits to Bangladesh and Indonesia, as well as country-level feedback, indicates that in some countries results fall substantially short of reasonable expectations. In Indonesia, for example, most stakeholders saw UNDP as spreading its resources too thinly across a large number of small or pilot interventions.</p> <p>UNDP has used a results-based management system since the 1990s. This was strengthened recently after independent reviews in 2008 and 2009 found weaknesses in the system itself and its application. UNDP is also developing a new results framework under its Strategic Plan 2014–2017, but it is too early to judge how effective these changes will be in improving the allocation of program funds and facilitating better reporting on aggregate results.</p> <p>UNDP focuses on the poorest through its own programs and its analytical work. Many of its knowledge products, such as its Human Development Index and its Poverty and Social Impact Analysis provide all development stakeholders with tools to target those most in need.</p> <p>UNDP plays a lead role within the UN to help countries identify constraints to meeting the MDGs and to mobilise increased attention to the areas targeted by the MDGs.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST STRONG

2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNDP's policies and programs align well with all five of the strategic goals of the Australian aid program. UNDP's global reach is an asset in countries where it is not feasible or practical for Australia to operate. UNDP's key role within the UN system also supports Australia's broader interests in a strong and effective UN.</p> <p>UNDP has been responsive to issues and concerns raised by Australia at headquarters level, and feedback from Australian overseas missions is generally positive about its responsiveness at country-level.</p> <p>UNDP has a leadership role in ensuring crosscutting issues are addressed in its own policies and programs, as well as promoting integration across the UN development system.</p> <p>It has clear policies on crosscutting issues and UNDP applies them well in its programs. A sound gender policy is credibly applied and there is a strong record on environmentally sustainable development (notably through its work with the Global Environment Facility). UNDP continues to play a leading role in ensuring a disability inclusive approach to development.</p> <p>UNDP is an international leader—and a strong partner for Australia—in crisis prevention and recovery. However, its performance in fragile states is uneven. Feedback from Australian overseas missions, including in Pacific Island countries, suggests UNDP does not always effectively adjust its programs to the challenges of fragile states. Steps were recently taken to improve the effectiveness of UNDP's Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which consolidates UNDP's knowledge and experience in this area, and early signs of these changes are encouraging.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>


3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNDP plays a useful role in promoting UN coordination at country-level. It hosts and coordinates many Multi-Donor Trust Funds, and manages the UN Resident Coordinator system. In some countries it provides technical assistance to the aid coordination authority.</p> <p>UNDP has a fair delivery record on its normative functions and has contributed greatly to development knowledge. Its annual human development report (and index) is an important knowledge and policy tool used by a wide range of development agencies and practitioners across the world. Some of the specialist expertise it provides has made a positive difference to development outcomes.</p> <p>UNDP has a record of working in cutting-edge areas or tackling difficult policy or program issues. Examples include its work on crisis prevention and recovery; on democratic governance; and in challenging countries such as North Korea.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>Overall, UNDP’s policy and planning framework is sound. Its current strategic plan is clear and generally informs decision making. By and large the plan is reflected well in UNDP’s annual budget allocations and program management decisions.</p> <p>UNDP is governed reasonably effectively. Its Executive Board provides oversight over its programs, budgets, audits, new policies and corporate issues. However, the Board’s ability to provide strategic direction is weakened at times by the need to compromise to bridge political divisions between developing countries and traditional donors to reach consensus.</p> <p>UNDP’s system for ongoing monitoring needs strengthening to provide managers with more timely information on program and project progress and quality. Feedback from Australian overseas missions suggests UNDP’s response in realigning or amending programs that are not delivering results can be slow and that progress reporting is often less than timely.</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY

<p>UNDP's Administrator is pursuing an ambitious program of reforms to improve its performance and credibility, including measures to strengthen the selection of resident coordinators and other staff, and to provide better incentives for staff to focus on delivering strategic results. Some aspects of UNDP's human resource management need improving.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNDP's record on cost and value consciousness is not strong, but improvements are underway. The Executive Board and UNDP management consider value for money in strategic planning but these efforts are limited by the lack of timely and appropriate results data. Donors and others have consistently expressed concerns about UNDP's need to strengthen its cost consciousness and minimise the level of overhead charges imposed on contributions to its trust funds.</p> <p>UNDP is clearly responding to board member calls for greater efficiencies in its operations. For example, it significantly reduced its administrative costs in its most recent budget, with a US\$92 million reduction in management costs in 2010–11.</p> <p>The 2009 MOPAN found that UNDP was using performance information to guide programming decisions. UNDP's improved results based management system and its overall transparency will help to improve value for money and cost effectiveness.</p> <p>The AMA found only limited evidence of UNDP challenging partners on value for money issues.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY WEAK</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNDP has a wide array of partnerships across the UN system, with member states, donors and civil society. However, feedback from AMA field visits and Australian posts suggests the quality and effectiveness of partnerships varies.</p> <p>UNDP is uniquely placed to support partner governments. Partner governments are generally positive about UNDP's policy advice and support.</p> <p>Overall, UNDP has a good record on harmonisation and alignment and stakeholders generally view its approach as appropriate. Under its national execution</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

<p>method of delivering assistance, UNDP was one of the first organisations to use partner country budget systems.</p> <p>UNDP’s performance on providing a voice for partners and others is strong. Its Executive Board representation favours developing countries (2:1 ratio with donor members) and decision making (for example on country programs) is by consensus.</p> <p>A Civil Society Advisory Committee also promotes dialogue between senior UNDP management and civil society representatives.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNDP posts a wide range of documents on its website, including evaluation reports and management responses, and systematically applies its clear disclosure policy. It is a founding member of the International Aid Transparency Initiative and has committed to full adoption of the common aid transparency standard by 2013.</p> <p>UNDP’s budget allocations reflect published criteria, although not always convincingly at country-level. According to the 2010 Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network report this was rated adequate by donors at headquarters and national partners, but inadequate by donors at country-level. The greatest divergence of views was on the extent to which UNDP makes publicly available its criteria for allocating core budget resources.</p> <p>Overall financial management and other accountability systems are in place and are generally effective. UNDP’s audit practices have received praise, but its financial management, particularly at country-level, needs strengthening. To address this, UNDP recently introduced enhancements to its audit database system which are aimed at making it easier for country offices to provide updates, facilitating independent assessments. The Administrator’s reform program highlights the need for continued strengthening of accountability at all levels of the organisation.</p> <p>There is limited evidence that UNDP does anything more than periodically raise transparency issues with partners.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) is a specialised agency of the United Nations (UN) with the mission of contributing to building peace, alleviating poverty, sustainable development and intercultural dialogue, through education, sciences, culture, communication and information.

UNESCO is governed by an assembly of all member states which meets bi-annually, and by an Executive Board of 58 members which meets twice annually.

The largest segment of UNESCO's activities is a set of contributions to education, principally through advising member states on educational policy, co-lead on the global Education for All agenda (with UNICEF and the World Bank) and pursue education-related MDGs, especially on literacy and girls/women education. UNESCO's other activities include:

- > Providing advice to Member States on science, technology and innovation, including managing a network of scientific institutes and the International Oceanographic Commission
- > Promotion of cultural diversity and heritage, including through the 1970 Convention on World Heritage (under which the World Heritage List is established) and the 2003 Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage
- > promotion of for freedom of speech and media freedom,
- > formation of codes of bioethics and other ethical issues pertaining to science and technology

- > activities in conflict prevention, reconciliation and peacebuilding, disaster risk reduction and disaster risk management
- > cooperation with UNESCO National Commissions in member states. There is a UNESCO National Commission in Australia.

In 2010–11, Australia contributed \$7.0 million to UNESCO, comprising \$6.3 million of assessed contributions and \$0.7 million in non-core funding.

Australia also provided extra-budgetary funding for a range of activities outside of the aid program for activities in areas such as world heritage, anti-doping in sport and cultural diversity.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

Component Rating **WEAK**

UNESCO pursues a development agenda through various aspects of its mandate. There are some clear indications of positive results from some of UNESCO's activities, for example its highly regarded work on global education statistics, world heritage and oceanographic activities.

DELIVERS RESULTS
WEAK

MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS
WEAK

TARGETS POOREST
SATISFACTORY

Nevertheless, it is difficult to define and measure results in most areas of UNESCO's work, particularly at regional and country-levels. In education, UNESCO collects and reports information about its results, but reports give most weight to general outcomes or to UNESCO's own outputs (such as meetings and conferences). There is insufficient information on impacts that are attributable to UNESCO's own work. Recent efforts with a results-based management system are designed to overcome this problem. As part of its mandate as a specialised UN agency, UNESCO undertakes works on setting global normative standards and helping to operationalise these in Member States. Such work is inherently difficult to measure, but there is no evidence that UNESCO has attempted to design ways of measuring the impact of its work in these areas.

For the most part UNESCO's work is designed for the benefit of all countries, and so does not only target the poorest. Nevertheless, in the education sector UNESCO is targeting the 38 countries (all least developed countries) that are furthest from achieving the MDG goals. Moreover, a significant proportion of activities in science policy, hydrology, biodiversity, and cultural industries benefit the poorest countries.

<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNESCO’s education mandate aligns with one of the five key strategic goals of the Australian aid program—promoting opportunities for all. Australia values aspects of UNESCO’s work in the education sector, particularly in the area of statistics. However, the low levels of extra-budgetary contributions to UNESCO education programs through the aid program suggest in practice there is not substantial alignment between UNESCO and the Australian aid program. Australia has more extensive engagement in UNESCO’s work in areas such as world heritage and tsunami early warning systems.</p> <p>Gender equality is a global priority for UNESCO. It makes useful contributions to gender in its advisory work on education and consistently applies gender disaggregation in its statistical compilations.</p> <p>UNESCO makes credible contributions to environmental sustainability, both through elements of its education advice and through its work in ecological sciences, hydrology and oceanography.</p> <p>UNESCO has implemented some good initiatives in some post-conflict and fragile states, such as hosting the Secretariat for the Inter-Agency Network for Education’s Emergencies Working Group on Education and Fragility.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG</p>
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNESCO plays valuable coordinating roles in niche areas such as compiling and building capacities in education statistics and international recognition of educational qualifications. It has a mandate as global coordinator for Education for All and has been designated by the UN General Assembly as lead agency for a range of issues across its mandate, such as the literacy decade, culture of peace, culture and development and freedom of the press. While these contributions are important, in practice UNESCO does not play a large coordination role at a country-level on education or on broader development issues.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>


<p>For at least a decade, UNESCO has played distinctive roles in education, such as standardsetting for statistics, preparation of Global Monitoring Reports on progress towards the Education For All goals, and work on standards for international recognition of qualifications. Nevertheless development-related programs in other areas of education have been largely led by multilateral development banks and bilateral donors, and more recently the Global Partnership for Education.</p> <p>Through the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, UNESCO plays a valuable role in coordinating and encouraging international research into oceanic influences on weather patterns and the likely evolution of climate change.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating WEAK
<p>UNESCO's strategic objectives are not well translated into programs with clear priorities, corresponding budget allocations or expected results. Its 2010 independent external evaluation concluded that persistent efforts to improve the focus of its programs have been undermined by too many priorities, weak incentives to collaborate and lack of consensus in its governing bodies. In recent times UNESCO has made efforts to increase its programmatic focus and better clarify and improve its priorities, but it is too early to judge the success of these efforts.</p> <p>The evaluation made clear that while UNESCO's evaluation system may be suitable in formal terms it is not supported by a strong evaluation culture.</p> <p>UNESCO's Executive Board is large, with 58 members. The Executive Board has recently approved a range of measures designed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Board following a 2010 Independent External Evaluation, although it is too early to assess the impact of these measures.</p> <p>In 2010, UNESCO's Director-General brought in new senior managers as part of a program to improve performance, but it is too early to judge the impact of these leadership changes.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">WEAK</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY</p> <p style="text-align: center;">WEAK</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">WEAK</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SATISFACTORY</p>

5. Cost and value consciousness	Component Rating WEAK
<p>While there has been some progress on scrutiny of costs in the last decade, in general UNESCO does not give adequate attention to cost control and value for money. Administration costs are high, and there is little evidence that it focuses on value for money of programs.</p> <p>There is little evidence that UNESCO's Executive Board challenges programs that have poor value for money. However, with the United States having announced in November 2011 a freeze on its funding of UNESCO, the Executive Board may be compelled to take a fresh interest in cost cutting measures, including terminating underperforming programs.</p> <p>Beyond standard practices of having programs and units audited, the Australian Multilateral Assessment has no evidence that UNESCO gives systematic attention to cost effectiveness in forming and reviewing its programs.</p> <p>The Australian Multilateral Assessment did not find evidence that UNESCO challenges partners on value for money.</p>	MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS WEAK
	COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS WEAK
	CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY WEAK
6. Partnership behaviour	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>The 2010 independent external evaluation of UNESCO was critical of aspects of its partnership behaviour, including its lack of engagement with newer forms of global public-private partnerships and innovative financing vehicles. In response, UNESCO has established new partnerships over the past 12 months with a range of private sector organisations and a new partnership strategy is being developed.</p> <p>UNESCO performs adequately in aligning with partner government priorities and systems, particularly with policy advice and capacity building work.</p> <p>UNESCO's national commissions provide a direct voice for and means of participation for civil society in UNESCO programs. UNESCO has a good record of engaging and working with a wide range of civil society organisations.</p>	WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS WEAK
	ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY
	PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG

<p>UNESCO has a good record in developing policies for the inclusion of marginalised groups, particularly women in science and marginalised groups, including through community media based information and communication.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNESCO does not have a disclosure policy or a presumption of disclosure. However, substantial amounts of operational and organisational information are easily accessible on its website. Information on current programs is available on its internal system, to which delegations of member states have access, but not the public.</p> <p>UNESCO has no clear process for allocating resources across countries. This is in large part due to its heavy reliance on extra-budgetary resources for programs.</p> <p>UNESCO has an Internal Oversight Service, an independent Oversight Advisory Committee and an Ethics Office. External audits are conducted to international standards by the national audit office of a member state elected for a six-year term by the General Conference—currently the Cour des Comptes of France. UNESCO has consistently obtained unqualified audit opinions on its financial statements. It is one of the few United Nations organisations that have adopted the international public sector accounting standards. Its Internal Oversight Service is regularly subject to external peer review and has been rated strongly.</p> <p>The Australian Multilateral Assessment found little evidence that UNESCO promotes transparency of its partners, although certain programs, such as those relating to freedom of expression, promote accountability within recipient countries.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION WEAK</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

United Nations Environment Programme

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), established in 1972, is the designated authority of the United Nations (UN) system in environmental issues at global and regional levels. UNEP works with a wide range of partners, including UN entities, international organisations, national governments, non-government organisations, the private sector and civil society.

UNEP's headquarters is in Nairobi. It has six regional offices and maintains offices in Geneva and Paris. UNEP hosts several environment convention secretariats. Its mandate is to promote international cooperation in the environment sector and to assist countries in developing sustainable development strategies. It provides policy guidance to national governments and other UN agencies on environmental programs and chairs the UN's Environmental Management Group, a system-wide coordination body established to enhance inter-agency cooperation on environmental issues. It is a member of the UN Development Group. The Australian Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities has primary carriage of the relationship between Australia and UNEP and represents Australia on the UNEP Governing Council.

The Australian Agency for International Development administers Australia's annual contribution to UNEP's Environment Fund, which represents Australia's core contribution to UNEP in 2011. In 2010–11, Australia contributed \$1.1 million in voluntary core contributions.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNEP's range of results is consistent with its global policy role on promoting sustainable development. One example is its success in generating international traction around the concept of the 'green economy'. Another is the success of its technical assistance programs to help countries improve their national environmental governance, including countries in Australia's region such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, East Timor Laos, Indonesia and Vietnam.</p> <p>UNEP is improving its ability to monitor and report on its results more comprehensively. Its mid-term strategy (2010–13) focuses on implementing a results-based management program for new projects to help achieve a more objectively verifiable assessment of progress. Old projects with milestone information will be revised to feed into this newly designed Programme Information Management System. UNEP's move to entrench results-based management is an ongoing process and it is too early to assess the outcome.</p> <p>UNEP has some joint programs in place with other UN bodies to look at environmental impacts on the poor, including the UN Development Programme and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Most of its programs and work, particularly its normative work, focus at global level and intended to benefit all. They are not specifically targeted at the poor alone, although the poorest people are often disproportionately affected by issues that UNEP's work targets.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY

<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNEP’s work aligns with the Australian aid program’s strategic goal of sustainable economic development, in particular through reducing the impacts of climate change and other environmental factors on poor people.</p> <p>Beyond the development-specific linkages with the aid program, UNEP also aligns with Australia’s broader environmental objectives, particularly through its normative work on international agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.</p> <p>UNEP has more work to do with crosscutting issues (leaving aside its core business of the environment). Gender mainstreaming needs to be more systematically applied across its activities; its Gender Plan of Action needs to be renewed (it expired in 2010) and its gender policy needs to be finalised.</p> <p>No evidence was found of a policy or strategy for people with disability.</p> <p>Evidence shows UNEP has been effective in some fragile states. One success was supporting the establishment of the 2010 South Sudan Environment Act.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM SATISFACTORY</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES WEAK</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNEP chairs the UN’s Environment Management Group, a system-wide coordination body bringing together the UN’s specialised agencies, programs and organs to address a wide range of issues including water, sanitation, human settlements and environmental-related capacity building.</p> <p>As the central UN actor in the field, UNEP plays a unique role in the global environmental system. Its normative and scientific outputs are valuable contributions.</p> <p>Stakeholders value UNEP’s regular environmental assessments at global, regional, national and subnational levels as well as its thematic assessments covering land, water, agriculture, biodiversity and climate change.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>

<p>UNEP's specialisation allows it to contribute on a number of levels to environmental discussions and to lead normative work across the international environmental system.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNEP operates under a clear mandate. Its comparative advantage lies in its focus on advancing environmental management; in working with scientific and technical communities; in assessing and monitoring; and its links to environment ministries and other relevant bodies at regional level. Its medium-term strategy (2010–13) links priorities to organisational mandate.</p> <p>UNEP's Governing Council and Committee of Permanent Representatives—its formal governance mechanisms—meet regularly to provide adequate oversight and guidance.</p> <p>The monitoring and evaluation system is sound although it should be strengthened through its Programme Information Management System to provide better use of project performance data. UNEP is in the process of establishing a risk-management framework that will flag projects for review which are not meeting milestone or budget goals.</p> <p>Leadership, particularly through the Executive Director, is regarded as effective. Human resources operate under the UN's broad framework of human resource performance assessments and its human resource policies are adequate for the recruitment and placement of staff.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY</p>
5. Cost and value consciousness	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNEP's Governing Council and Committee of Permanent Representatives regularly review costs and value for money through reports and reviews of its biennial program of work and its budget. A push from senior management to instil a value-for-money mindset is underway, but it is too early to assess the impact.</p> <p>There is evidence that UNEP generally considers cost effectiveness, particularly through its strategic presence policy, which seeks to maximise its regional representation efficiency and increase its reach and impact.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>


<p>UNEP has systems in place to enable it to work with and through the established presence of the UN Development Programme as a way of achieving its program goals while saving on costs.</p> <p>UNEP’s partnership policy sets out the procedures for assessing potential partners. This includes the partner’s procurement policies, human resources management and transparency, policies on environmental safeguards and ensuring value for money.</p>	
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNEP has a solid track record in working effectively with a range of stakeholders. Its policy on partnerships strengthens this engagement and UNEP works closely with major UN agencies (UNDP in particular), partner governments and civil society organisations.</p> <p>At country-level, UNEP participates in 34 UN Development Assistance Frameworks globally and is engaged in the One UN system. It has a good track record of working closely with partner governments to increase national ownership of capacity-building initiatives.</p> <p>UNEP convenes an annual Global Major Groups and Stakeholders Forum which enables it to incorporate the voice of stakeholders into its governance and programs.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNEP is not a party to the International Aid Transparency Initiative, but is bound by UN information disclosure rules and policies. UNEP makes a range of documents available through its website, including all Governing Council papers and decisions, although the website does not clearly display project information, making it difficult to access.</p> <p>Resource allocations are made through a process of UNEP management proposals to the Governing Council for approval in the form of the biennial program of work and budget and are handled in line with its medium-term strategy.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

UNEP is bound by the UN's financial rules and policies, and has systems in place to meet reasonably good standards of financial and risk management. A broader corporate risk management framework is also being developed.

The partnership policy sets out the procedures for assessing potential partners which in turn encourages transparency in partners. This includes the partner's procurement policies, human resources management and transparency, policies on environmental safeguards and ensuring value for money.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate is to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and to resolve the refugee problems worldwide. Its main purpose is to safeguard the rights and wellbeing of refugees. It aims to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and to find safe refuge in another country, with the option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally or resettle in a third country.

It has an additional mandate concerning the issue of statelessness, as it is given a designated role under Article 11 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The General Assembly requested that UNHCR promotes the 1954 and 1961 statelessness Conventions and that it helps to prevent statelessness by providing technical and advisory services on nationality legislation and practice to States.

The UNHCR's Executive Committee and the United Nations General Assembly have authorised the UNHCR's involvement with other groups, including former refugees who have returned home and internally displaced people.

In 2011, UNHCR's budget was US\$3.32 billion. In 2010–2011, Australia provided \$40.0 million to UNHCR, comprising \$16.0 million in voluntary core contributions and \$24.0 million in non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNHCR has demonstrated results in responding to emergencies. It has the capacity to respond to a new emergency affecting up to 500 000 people and can mobilise over 300 trained personnel within 72 hours. It is also the ability to immediately mobilise resources to help respond to an emergency without delay. For example, UNHCR is working with non-government organisations (NGOs) and Tunisian and Egyptian authorities to support approximately 100 000 people who have fled violence in Libya. UNHCR also helped tens of thousands of refugees who fled violence in 2010 in southern areas of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.</p> <p>UNHCR is in the process of strengthening its results focus and has recently implemented a series of initiatives to that effect. The 2010 review <i>Measure for measure: A field-based snapshot of the implementation of results based management in UNHCR</i> conducted by UNHCR's Policy Development and Evaluation Service found that UNHCR has made significant progress in introducing results based management. However, the review went on to state that UNHCR could do more to communicate the rationale for, objectives of and the advantages to be gained from Results Based Management to staff at every level of the organisation.</p> <p>UNHCR's work is strongly aligned with the Millennium Development Goals. Through fulfilling its mandate of helping refugees and internally displaced people, UNHCR helps the poorest and the most vulnerable.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS VERY STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST VERY STRONG
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating VERY STRONG
<p>UNHCR's work aligns very closely with Australian interests. Australia has signed the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the UNHCR also plays a role in referring refugees for resettlement to Australia.</p> <p>UNHCR also aligns closely with the Australian aid program's strategic goals of humanitarian and disaster relief and promoting opportunities for all.</p> <p>UNHCR's age, gender and diversity mainstreaming strategy is well established. The aim of the strategy is to ensure gender equality so that people can enjoy rights</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES VERY STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES VERY STRONG

<p>regardless of their age, gender or background. UNHCR has taken steps to enhance the protection of people with disability by adding specific protection provisions into its planning process. A climate change policy paper is in place and UNHCR acknowledges it needs to adapt much of its environment-related planning and work to respond to population displacement induced by climate change.</p> <p>UNHCR is highly effective in operating in fragile contexts. It has established a good track record of working in a flexible and efficient way to support people in the most difficult of situations.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNHCR is mandated to lead and coordinate international action on refugees and internally displaced people. Despite immense and growing challenges, it is considered to deliver on this effectively. UNHCR's role as cluster lead has contributed to enhanced coordination and predictability of humanitarian response.</p> <p>In its role as cluster lead, UNHCR has contributed to the development of norms and standards on international humanitarian response. It has also developed tools and guidelines for use internally and by other cluster actors to ensure greater coherency and quality standards in humanitarian response.</p> <p>UNHCR provides extensive information, research findings and guidance notes to a wide range of stakeholders to keep them informed, share experiences and document lessons. An example of one of the innovative tools developed by UNHCR is RefWorld. This is a publicly available leading source of information relevant to making decisions on refugee status and includes details on origin countries, policy documents and documents relating to international and national legal frameworks.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE VERY STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>


ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNHCR has a clear mandate and 40 global strategic priorities which inform its priorities in delivering protection and assistance. However, the November 2010 report <i>Measure for measure: a field-based snapshot of the implementation of results based management in UNHCR</i> conducted by UNHCR's Policy Development and Evaluation Service stated that the global strategic priorities serve as a useful checklist of UNHCR activities, but do not necessarily inform the resource allocation process and prioritisation at the field level. Management has committed to measures to address this in 2012–2013.</p> <p>UNHCR's Executive Committee holds one annual session in Geneva at which member states hold management to account by reviewing and approving its reports, evaluations, operational plans, policies and finances. Executive Committee members have access to a range of material and can express their observations and requests for improvement against these on an ongoing basis throughout the year. However, there have been some issues with UNHCR's slow provision of reports before Executive Committee and Standing Committee meetings. This means that member states do not have enough time to adequately review documentation.</p> <p>UNHCR's Policy Development and Evaluation Service conducts a range of reviews and evaluations. However, according to the 2011 Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) report, there are gaps in UNHCR's evaluation function and more can be done to improve it.</p> <p>UNHCR leadership has established a comprehensive reform agenda. A range of sound human resources policies are in place and UNHCR has implemented a new performance management appraisal system to improve assessments and accountability for staff performance.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>

<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNHCR's governing bodies and management focus on issues relating to value for money although management information is sometimes constrained by inconsistent reporting from country networks.</p> <p>Cost effectiveness is a consideration of programs and UNHCR has satisfactory procurement procedures which are guided by the principle of value for money and require that contracts are awarded on the basis of the best competitive bid. The 2010 report of the Board of Auditors states that the UNHCR cannot fully demonstrate that it uses resources cost effectively, including that there is little evidence of a competitive selection process for the selection of implementing agencies. Improvements to these processes are underway.</p> <p>The document <i>Partnership: An Operations Management Handbook for UNHCR's Partners</i> prescribes that implementing partners should ensure that the best possible value for money is achieved for assistance activities.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNHCR works effectively in partnership with various agencies and stakeholders to address refugee issues and deliver assistance. It works closely with UN agencies through the UN Inter Agency Standing Committee, the UN Development Assistance Framework and the UN Delivering as One. Feedback during Australian Multilateral Assessments field visits and from Australian overseas missions was generally positive about UNHCR's partnership behaviour.</p> <p>As an emergency response agency, UNHCR cannot always align its work with national systems or procedures. However, in situations where it has a long-standing presence, it collaborates with national agencies. The 2011 MOPAN report states that UNHCR is seen as adequately making use of local capacities and developing local capabilities.</p> <p>Feedback from the field has generally been positive regarding UNHCR's engagement with stakeholders. According to the Australian overseas mission in Tehran, UNHCR seeks to liaise closely with all</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

<p>stakeholder organisations. The Australian overseas mission in Rangoon reported that UNHCR consults well with NGO partners.</p> <p>UNHCR has extensive partnerships with civil society and relies heavily on these partners to deliver its field operations. It also holds annual consultations with NGOs. However, some feedback from NGOs stated that their relationship with UNHCR is often based on a service delivery model, rather than mutual collaboration and that UNHCR could do more to engage collaboratively with civil society.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNHCR publishes a significant amount of reports, documents and other material on its website although not all reports UNHCR prepares are automatically made available to donors.</p> <p>Resources are allocated based on field operation needs, which are determined through a comprehensive and participatory needs assessment and planning process and according to a set of criteria.</p> <p>UNHCR’s Office of Internal Oversight Services conducts independent audits across UNHCR’s programs in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, and all expenditure is subject to external audits. Furthermore, UNHCR’s Ethics Office promotes staff understanding and observance of UNHCR’s transparency standards. Despite these strong processes, the UN Board of Auditors 2010 report noted that UNHCR faced some challenges in this area, including inadequate oversight, lack of risk management, and low financial management capacity in the field. UNHCR is working to address these concerns, and is currently developing a new risk-management approach.</p> <p>UNHCR promotes transparency among partners. For example, in the Operations Management Handbook for UNICEF Partners the organisation states that all partners should commit to transparency and information sharing so partnerships are effective.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG</p>

United Nations Human Settlements Programme

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations (UN) Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) was established in 2001 replacing the UN Commission on Human Settlements which had been operating since 1978. It is the lead UN Agency responsible for promoting sustainable urban development. Its mission is mandated by the UN General Assembly and it seeks to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all.

To guide its work, UN-Habitat states its core functions as: monitoring and research; policy development; capacity building; and financing for housing and urban development.

UN-Habitat draws its budget from three main sources: contributions from multilateral and bilateral partners for technical cooperation; earmarked contributions from donors; and a small allocation (approximately five per cent of its overall budget) from the regular UN budget.

Australia provided \$4.4 million to UN-Habitat in 2010–11 in non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UN-Habitat plays a unique role in that it is the only multilateral organisation with a focus on human settlements. It has demonstrated ability to deliver high impact results on specific projects. During the Australian Multilateral Assessment field visit to Sri Lanka, for example, stakeholders were very positive about the impact of a project delivering 4000 houses for the most vulnerable internally displaced people returning from government camps following the end of conflict in 2011.</p> <p>At broader organisational level, however, UN-Habitat recognises the need to strengthen its focus on results monitoring and reporting, and has recently implemented a new results-based management approach. It is too early to tell the impact that this will have on operations and reporting, particularly at country-level.</p> <p>While it is recognised that normative work comes with the inherent problems of attribution of results, more work could be done to demonstrate the impact of UN-Habitat’s normative work at global level.</p> <p>Many of UN-Habitat’s programs target the poorest, such as the program in Sri Lanka. Poverty orientation is a key criterion for assessment of projects for inclusion in UN-Habitat’s Work Program.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST STRONG
2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UN-Habitat’s mandate and operations align most closely with the Australian aid program’s strategic goals of saving lives and humanitarian and disaster response. Its normative work is also broadly consistent with Australia’s broader priorities on sustainable development.</p> <p>With a significant amount of its operational activities in post-conflict and/or post-disaster phases, UN-Habitat plays a unique role in providing a focus on sustainability in these phases.</p> <p>UN-Habitat has a strong focus on gender issues through implementation of its <i>Gender Equality Action Plan (2008–13)</i>. This includes initiatives such as assigning</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES SATISFACTORY
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM SATISFACTORY
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG


<p>gender focal points in the water and sanitation program and developing and training on gender-sensitive land management tools.</p> <p>UN-Habitat has a climate change policy.</p> <p>In at least some activities, UN-Habitat takes issues of disability into consideration, as seen during the Australian Multilateral Assessment field visit to Sri Lanka.</p> <p>Most of UN-Habitat’s operations occur in post-conflict and/or post-disaster settings and it uses a range of tools to guide its work, including its Strategic Policy on Human Settlements and Crisis.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UN-Habitat’s focused and unique mandate means it has a clear but narrow role in the multilateral system.</p> <p>In certain circumstances, such as in Sri Lanka, UN-Habitat has influenced government policy positions on issues such as post-conflict housing and shelter construction.</p> <p>Its contribution to policy and norms development is valuable, but it has tended to have greater success at country-level than at global level. Innovations have also tended to be strongest at country-level, with the innovations in the nature of community engagement in Sri Lanka again a good example.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SATISFACTORY</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR</p>	
<p>4. Strategic management and performance</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UN-Habitat has a clear mandate from the UN General Assembly, but its current strategic plan does not provide clear guidance to help prioritise or drive operations. In some contexts it appears to pursue objectives that fall outside of its central mandate.</p> <p>UN-Habitat’s Executive Director, appointed in October 2010, is focused on providing greater strategic clarity and is planning a more streamlined planning and reporting process for the next medium-term strategic implementation plan which will cover 2014–19.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY WEAK</p> <p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>With limited opportunity to meet for formal oversight, UN-Habitat’s Governing Council has limited ability to influence management, although reforms to governance arrangements are being explored.</p> <p>There are reasonable monitoring and evaluation policies and systems in place, but UN-Habitat’s internal monitoring and evaluation unit is under resourced at present. A 2010 UN Committee of Permanent Representatives review showed only five per cent of UN-Habitat’s 350 projects implemented since 2008 had been evaluated. UN-Habitat is taking steps to address this shortcoming.</p> <p>Human resource reforms are among the wide range of organisational reforms underway to make UN-Habitat more efficient and effective. These reforms have been introduced since the new Executive Director started.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating WEAK</p>
<p>Formal updates on costs and expenditure are handled through the Committee of Permanent Representatives that receives reports from UN-Habitat’s senior management every six months. However, this committee is not a decision making body and so lacks authority to formally scrutinise and re-adjust priorities if needed.</p> <p>UN-Habitat’s Governing Council has direct input into costs and value assessments when it meets every second year. The timing of its meetings means there are long gaps between scrutinising and questioning costs and expenditure.</p> <p>Beyond the application of standard UN procurement principles, no evidence was found that rates of return or cost effectiveness are important factors in decision making or that UN-Habitat challenges partners on value for money.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS WEAK</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS WEAK</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY WEAK</p>

<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>As an organisation that places great emphasis on its normative work, UN-Habitat has become effective at drawing on partnerships to leverage influence and resources to achieve its goals. One of its major advocacy campaigns is the World Urban Campaign, designed around promoting sustainable urbanisation policies, strategies and practices. The campaign involves more than 50 partners and is managed overall by UN-Habitat. In the field, UN-Habitat demonstrates it works well with a wide range of partners across the UN system; with community-based and non-government organisations; and with all levels of government from local to national.</p> <p>UN-Habitat has a mixed record on using partner government systems in its programs. It does a good job, however, of incorporating partner voice into its policy setting, project design and operational activity.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UN-Habitat recently (December 2011) signed up to the International Aid Transparency Initiative but it does not have a formal disclosure policy. Some project information is available online but this could be strengthened to be more comprehensive and up-to-date.</p> <p>Operating with a relatively small budget and not being an aid ‘deliverer’, UN-Habitat’s senior management allocates resources against each of the priorities identified in its strategic plan. However, the system of allocation is not clear. Steps at reforming this system are in train through the implementation of the new Project Accrual and Accounting System which will help increase transparency and accountability behind decisions.</p> <p>UN-Habitat has satisfactory accountability mechanisms due to its use of and participation in wider UN systems such as engaging with the Office of Internal Oversight Services.</p> <p>Minimal evidence was found to show UN-Habitat encourages transparency and accountability efforts in its partners.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION WEAK</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS WEAK</p>

United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations (UN) International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat (UNISDR) was established in 1999 as the successor to the Secretariat of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. UNISDR leads the organisation of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, which meets every two years and has become the main global forum for guidance on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework and share experience among stakeholders.

The formal mandate of UNISDR is given by the UN General Assembly, and is to serve as the focal point in the United Nations system for the coordination of disaster reduction and to ensure synergies among the disaster reduction activities of the United Nations system and regional organisations and activities in socio-economic and humanitarian fields.

UNISDR is under the leadership and oversight of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, who reports to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. UNISDR is a separate entity from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. UNISDR and its activities are funded wholly by extra-budgetary resources through the Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction. It has an annual estimated budget of US\$27 million in 2010 managed by a worldwide staff of about 80. Its Secretariat is in Geneva, with a liaison office in New York. It works through a network of five regional offices (Bangkok, Brussels, Cairo, Nairobi and Panama) and operates subregional offices in five other countries.

UNISDR and Australia have a multi-year agreement based on jointly agreed UNISDR activities in the Asia-Pacific region. This partnership framework

provides for \$6 million over 2010–2013. Funding of \$2.2 million was provided to UNISDR through the aid program in 2010–11, including \$2.0 million as voluntary core contributions and \$0.2 million in non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

Component Rating SATISFACTORY

UNISDR operates under a clear mandate that guides its advocacy and coordination operations. Its annual report points to a range of achievements such as the establishment of a network of more than 900 parliamentarians from 130 countries supporting disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, and the Making Cities Resilient: My City is Getting Ready program in which more than 600 cities and local governments have agreed to develop and implement local resilience strategies. But the annual report has no information about the impact of these achievements on development outcomes, in part as the demonstration of results of coordination and advocacy can only be assessed over the medium term. This reflects a general issue with ISDR’s capacity to monitor and communicate links between successful advocacy and coordinating improved development outcomes. It makes it difficult to make an overall assessment of the effectiveness of UNISDR in delivering results.

DELIVERS RESULTS
SATISFACTORY

MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS
SATISFACTORY

TARGETS POOREST
SATISFACTORY

UNISDR supports results monitoring by governments and has developed an online system for countries to monitor and self-assess progress towards Hyogo Framework for Action targets.

While UNISDR does not have a specific poverty focus, the most significant impact of its work will be on countries and populations least able to withstand the effect of economic and social disruption from natural or other disasters.

2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNISDR's mandate is aligned with the Australian aid program's strategic goal of sustainable economic development. It provides a significant level of resources to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which are highly vulnerable to natural disasters. Progress in disaster risk reduction can therefore reduce the high and recurrent costs of recovery. Australia's partnership with UNISDR also complements regional and bilateral programming for disaster risk reduction through the aid program. It also helps the Australian Agency for International Development to fulfil commitments made in its disaster risk reduction policy, specifically to foster leadership and advocacy for disaster risk reduction and support implementation of the Hyogo Framework.</p> <p>Crosscutting issues are generally well applied in programs. UNISDR has developed effective guidance on incorporating gender and other crosscutting issues into international platforms and national action plans. It is conducting a high-level advocacy campaign to promote the importance of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in sustainable development at the upcoming Rio+20 Earth Summit (2012).</p> <p>Through collaboration with partners UNISDR works effectively in fragile states and strengthens regional platforms and agreements, particularly in regions vulnerable to disasters. Indeed, the 2009 Global Assessment Report, <i>Disaster Risk Reduction: Risk and poverty in a changing climate</i>, featured analysis of risk in fragile states and in its Disaster Risk Management Program for Priority Countries (second edition published in 2011), the UNISDR/World Bank partnership (the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction) includes country programs for all fragile and risk-prone countries.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES SATISFACTORY
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG

3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNISDR’s role is primarily in coordination, knowledge and advocacy in the core area of disaster risk reduction. It has been effective in bringing key stakeholders regularly together at global and regional levels. The Mid-Term Review of the Hyogo Framework for Action (March 2011) underscored the critical contribution made by the function of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Disaster Risk Reduction in leveraging international cooperation, increasing political focus for disaster risk reduction, and fostering ‘a higher degree of coherence and commitment to risk reduction globally, nationally, locally and within the UN system’.</p> <p>However, a 2010 independent evaluation commented that stakeholders lacked clarity on the roles and responsibilities of UNISDR vis-à-vis other entities and some of its work duplicated that of other agencies. The evaluation also noted that UNISDR had not taken a strong enough role in setting the agenda for meetings and in ensuring appropriate follow up, preventing it from more strongly coordinating and stimulating concrete actions.</p> <p>Subsequent to the evaluation, UNISDR has sharpened its reporting and enhanced its coordination roles, including by hosting a 2010 detailed and comprehensive mid-term review of the Hyogo Framework for Action.</p> <p>UNISDR has collaborated effectively with other humanitarian agencies, particularly within the UN system and in regional and national efforts to support countries manage disasters and strengthen preparedness measures. It also has a strong and growing level of activity through regional and sub-regional organisations, including the Association of South East Asian Nations.</p> <p>UNISDR has published a range of useful knowledge products including the Disaster Risk Reduction in the United Nations, which documents the differing and distinct roles each actor plays and provides a glossary of terms common to disaster and risk reduction work.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SATISFACTORY
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG


ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNISDR has recently released a new strategic framework designed to strengthen its focus on strategic management throughout the organisation. The framework crystallises the series of reforms recently implemented, all designed to establish a more robust and effective results-based management system and more coherently link strategies to mandate. These changes should position UNISDR to provide better results statements to members on performance against strategic objectives, although it is far too early to judge success.</p> <p>UNISDR reports, through the Secretary-General, to the Second Committee of the General Assembly. UNISDR has productive interactions with members through the Global Platform and Regional Platforms, which provides direct feedback to the Secretariat on its operations and strategic direction.</p> <p>UNISDR has a sound system of monitoring and evaluation that extends to its partners to help them monitor and self-assess their own progress towards implementing the Hyogo Framework for Action targets goals and priorities for action.</p> <p>Leadership actively drives reforms at headquarters and at regional level. Human resource policies and practices are in line with UN standards.</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG
5. Cost and value consciousness	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNISDR has responded to identified weaknesses in its financial and resources management systems with measures to strengthen financial accountability, more effectively monitor disbursements and more accurately analyse cost structures. Implementation of reforms has been hampered in part by limitations to its funding flexibility but there is evidence it is moving in the right direction.</p>	MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY
	COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG
	CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG

<p>UNISDR has achieved some cost savings and taken steps to strengthen its analytical basis for assessing the economic costs of disasters. It has also improved its cost analysis in the context of disaster and risk assessments. The changes have enhanced UNISDR's use of probability risk assessments to measure the costs, benefits and trade-offs involved in investing in risk reduction.</p> <p>UNISDR challenges partners to prove whether their procurement procedures are based on market-based competitive bidding. Partner budgets have often been revised downwards (particularly for consultancy fees and travel costs), based on value for money.</p>	
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Through its advocacy and information-sharing processes UNISDR has established an extensive network of international and national partners. It works with the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs, World Food Programme and the World Health Organization to share information and build on institutional knowledge as a basis for crisis response. It also works effectively with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and World Bank to coordinate a regional approach to disaster risk management. There is, however, a need for the working relationship between UNISDR and the World Bank-managed Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery to be more transparent and for results from the collaboration to be reported on.</p> <p>UNISDR does not deliver programs so its approach is always through national and local systems. Its consultative processes and methodologies for needs assessment and risk analysis are firmly entrenched within national organisations and systems.</p> <p>There is an effective voice for civil society, non-government organisations and other actors to engage with UNISDR and, recently, it has established new opportunities for wider engagement with the private sector.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNISDR provides access to the information, documents, work plans, budgets and other reports prepared under its portfolio mandate. Nevertheless a 2010 independent evaluation recommended a number of improvements to its publication and dissemination program. It is not yet evident what action UNISDR has taken as a result.</p> <p>UNISDR does not have a formal disclosure policy and is not a member of the International Aid Transparency Initiative.</p> <p>UNISDR does not have a clear or transparent process for allocating resources, although this is in part driven by its ongoing funding limitations.</p> <p>The rationale for resource allocation is not clear because annual budget plans are often constrained due to shortfalls and unpredictability of available finance. A 2010 independent evaluation recommended management prioritise the allocation of its extra budgetary resources or request regular budgets for new initiatives or to extend ongoing work.</p> <p>UNISDR complies with all UN requirements for audit and financial management although it needs to develop better systems to enable more effective budget planning and tracking systems and reports.</p> <p>UNISDR organised for an external independent evaluation of its compliance standards and additional measures it should implement to improve its financial management systems. Resulting recommendations are being implemented and should help improve its accountability framework.</p> <p>All recipients of grants and consultants are required to submit financial and narrative reports. Partners are monitored for compliance before funds are released.</p> <p>UNISDR also encourages partners to be externally reviewed for accountability, such as working and complying with the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership.</p>	ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY
	CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION WEAK
	STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY
	PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG

United Nations Mine Action Service

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was established in 1997 as the focal point for all United Nations (UN) mine action activities. It is mandated by the General Assembly to coordinate the mine action assistance of the 14 UN agencies working to assist and support member states to implement mine action. In 2010 its total operating budget was approximately US\$145 million. UNMAS manages or supports National Mine Action Coordination Centres in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America. Australia provided UNMAS \$15.3 million in 2010–11, comprising \$0.3 million of voluntary core contributions through Australia's three-year core funding agreement and \$15.0 million in non-core funding. Australia is currently the eighth biggest contributor to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNMAS has produced tangible results that are improving the safety and livelihoods of hundreds and thousands of people through eliminating the threat of land mines and other explosive remnants of war. For example, the mine action program in Chad has seen mine-related casualties fall from 51 in 2009 to 17 in 2010 and 78 per cent of land cleared through the program intended for agricultural use is supporting livelihoods of the poorest.</p> <p>UNMAS has demonstrated effective results at the field-level in mine action programs in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America resulting in increased agricultural productivity, improved trade, and access to health and education services through the release of land. Despite this success, there is little evidence that UNMAS has developed a results framework to systematically monitor the quality of its work and inform management decisions. Although incidental to its mandate, UNMAS' work is substantially targeted at the poorest and most vulnerable people.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST STRONG
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>The work of UNMAS is very closely aligned with Australia's objectives on global security including peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.</p> <p>UNMAS' work in reducing the threat of land mines also closely aligns with four of the five strategic goals of the Australian aid program: saving lives, promoting opportunities for all, sustainable economic development and humanitarian and disaster response.</p> <p>UNMAS has specific policies, guidelines and activities directed at improving gender mainstreaming in mine action and assisting people with disability through its victim assistance work.</p> <p>UNMAS operates almost exclusively in fragile and conflict-affected states and does so effectively in its mine action programs and emergency response capacity.</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES VERY STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG


3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNMAS plays a unique and critical leadership role within the UN system on mine action and is increasingly playing a broader coordinating role with other stakeholders, including donors, partner governments and non-government organisations.</p> <p>UNMAS, through its global focal point and coordination function, also plays a significant role in negotiating and implementing normative frameworks on mine action such as the Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. This work is relied on by a wide range of stakeholders working on mine action.</p> <p>UNMAS provides technical expertise to national authorities and to other UN agencies in the development of norms and standards. It has partnered with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining to develop and publish international standards on mine action and advocates for the universal adoption of mine action conventions by member states, as well as compliance with relevant obligations.</p> <p>UNMAS plays a role supporting the mine action community to more universally apply technology to enable mine detection, ground preparation and mine clearance.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY

ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating WEAK
<p>UNMAS' mandate is clear, but it lacks strong strategic management without a dedicated executive board. It is also currently operating without an overarching strategy while its 2011–2015 Strategy is being finalised to take account of the (delayed) Joint Inspection Unit evaluation findings. Further, UNMAS' dual role as coordinator and implementer of mine action activities has impacted on its ability to perform a strong leadership role across the UN's mine action program.</p> <p>UNMAS has sound monitoring and evaluation systems and processes in place for some of its operations, such as in Afghanistan, but there is no evidence of a current overall framework for monitoring and evaluation of its global efforts, or appropriate mechanisms to realign programs not delivering results. UNMAS has indicated that a new organisation-wide system of targets and indicators is due to be implemented by the second half of 2012.</p> <p>UNMAS relies on generic UN recruitment processes and this has resulted in key positions being vacant, including the Director position (vacant since April 2011).</p>	CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS WEAK
	EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY WEAK
	USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES WEAK
5. Cost and value consciousness	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>As a result of a funding shortfall in the Voluntary Trust Fund, UNMAS has had to re-prioritise its programs and reduce operational costs. The trend towards a decrease in donor funding for mine action is driving UNMAS towards a greater focus on cost effectiveness.</p> <p>UNMAS considers costs and assesses value for money in its operations. UNOPS is the primary implementing partner for UNMAS reports it is cost effective. Some concerns have been raised by donors at UN Mine Action Directors Meetings about the responsiveness, delays in disbursements and the high transaction costs associated with UNMAS allocating funds to UN agencies relative to NGO implemented operations, particularly in Africa.</p> <p>Through the appointment of UNOPS as primary implementing partner, UNMAS programs challenge partners to think about value for money given the infrastructure, experience and knowledge that UNOPS brings to this role.</p>	MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY
	COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY
	CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY

6. Partnership behaviour	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNMAS works effectively in partnership with Australia and others at global level. As a relatively small organisation, it can remain flexible in its approach and respond to partner priorities. Feedback from stakeholders on this is positive.</p> <p>UNMAS provides technical assistance to build the capacity of partner governments to develop national systems for mine action, including legislation and standards. It provides substantial opportunities for partner governments and civil society in mine-affected countries to incorporate their priorities the annual portfolio of mine action projects. Feedback from Australia's overseas mission in Ramallah indicates that authorities in Gaza appreciated the role UNMAS played in clearing unexploded ordinance from the Gaza Strip following the December 2008 to January 2009 conflict.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS</p> <p>STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS</p> <p>STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS</p> <p>STRONG</p>
7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>There is scope to improve UNMAS' transparency, as documents are not always easily accessible on its website. The UNMAS annual report provides detailed financial reporting on income, including funds raised through the Voluntary Trust Fund, and expenditure, including program allocations and operating costs.</p> <p>UNMAS has implemented adequate financial and risk management systems to manage and report on its annual budget. With more than 97 per cent of its voluntary contributions being earmarked there is little discretion over resource allocation. UNMAS promotes transparency of partners through the requirement that audits are undertaken for every project upon completion.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is responsible for the coordination of humanitarian response in natural disasters and complex emergencies, and for humanitarian policy development, humanitarian financing and advocacy. Its mission is to mobilise and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors to: alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies; advocate for the rights of people in need; promote preparedness and prevention; and facilitate sustainable solutions.

Preparedness for emergency response is embedded in UNOCHA's mandate. UNOCHA helps the international humanitarian system prepare for and respond in situations where humanitarian needs exceed a government's capacity to respond. It finances its activities through two main channels: the UN's regular budget approved by the General Assembly (in 2011 this will comprise five per cent of UNOCHA's annual requirements); and voluntary contributions administered through trust funds.

In 2011, UNOCHA's program and administrative budget is US\$242 million. Australia provided \$30.0 million to UNOCHA in 2010–11, comprising \$9.0 million in voluntary core contributions and \$21.0 million in non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNOCHA has a strong mandate for humanitarian coordination. Feedback from stakeholders during the Australian Multilateral Assessment field visit to Indonesia and from Australian overseas missions suggests UNOCHA is generally effective in fulfilling its mandate, often in difficult circumstances and with limited resources.</p> <p>Given UNOCHA's coordination mandate, assessing and reporting on the impact and results from its work is more difficult than for many organisations. The Annual Report includes a range of reporting on results, but these focus primarily focused on inputs and processes, rather than the impact of UNOCHA's work. The indicators and targets used to report on progress against UNOCHA's objectives also relate mainly to inputs and processes.</p> <p>As part of a range of reform initiated in the UNOCHA in 2012 and 2013 plan and budget, OCHA launched standardised two-year performance frameworks for regional and country offices.</p> <p>The performance frameworks are designed to help communicate results through commonly agreed indicators. This includes measures to better assess the impact of OCHA's work in areas such as preparedness. The frameworks will also help improve the alignment between budgets and results.</p> <p>UNOCHA works in some of the world's least developed countries and in places where the poorest are seeking emergency support and assistance. It has been effective in focusing on the poorest and most vulnerable people in humanitarian and emergency situations.</p>	<p>DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG</p>
	<p>MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>TARGETS POOREST VERY STRONG</p>

2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNOCHA's work aligns closely with the Australian aid program's strategic goals of saving lives and humanitarian and disaster response.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p>
<p>UNOCHA is a strong and important partner for Australia in support to humanitarian and disaster risk management goals, including in the Asia-Pacific region.</p>	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG</p>
<p>UNOCHA has been responsive to issues raised by Australia in senior level talks under the partnership framework agreement signed with Australia in 2009.</p>	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG</p>
<p>UNOCHA is not an operational agency, and so crosscutting issues are less relevant than for some organisations. Nevertheless, a strong gender framework and guidelines are in place and UNOCHA collaborates with partners to mainstream gender equality in humanitarian efforts. It has been innovative in developing new gender monitoring tools and mechanisms to strengthen gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian situations and it provides training and support to cluster partners.</p> <p>UNOCHA has not developed guidelines and tools to support its partners in the areas of the environment and disability in the way it has in relation to gender issues. But it has effectively collaborated with relevant UN partners on the impact of environment and climate change in emergency and disaster situations.</p> <p>UNOCHA has extensive experience in working in complex and fragile situations, where it has effectively undertaken its responsibility for coordinating international humanitarian responses. In addition to its own strategies it provides innovative strategies and practices for humanitarian partners and contributes to the way humanitarian organisations do business in these difficult environments.</p>	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG</p>

3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNOCHA's main role is to coordinate humanitarian actors in response to emergency situations. This is a difficult task and UNOCHA must rely on other agencies to play their roles effectively, particularly in the cluster approach. Overall it has a good track record and a broad range of agencies depend on UNOCHA performing well. Its work makes a critical difference to the success of international emergency responses.</p> <p>UNOCHA plays a leading role in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the key forum for coordination, policy development and decision making between UN humanitarian and non-UN humanitarian actors. Its Emergency Relief Coordinator is the Chair and UNOCHA provides the Secretariat function. OCHA is currently leading the IASC reform agenda which is expected to lead to improved results in responding to humanitarian crises. OCHA also co-chairs several of the IASC Subsidiary Bodies.</p> <p>UNOCHA also provides effective leadership on issues such as responding to the needs of internally displaced persons and the protection of civilians.</p> <p>UNOCHA has carefully examined criticism of its performance during recent emergencies and strengthened the capacity of its response teams.</p> <p>UNOCHA provides strong analytical inputs into international debates in support of improved humanitarian practices. Its policies and guidance are widely used. An example of this is its Relief Web that provides relevant and extensive online information to support country-level relief work. Weaknesses in information management and dissemination are being addressed through improvements to its Humanitarian Dashboard and other data collection and reporting systems.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p>
	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY</p>


ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNOCHA has put significant effort in recent years into improving its strategic framework and has invested a high degree of energy in ensuring improvement processes were highly consultative.</p> <p>The current bi-annual plan is comprehensive and clear, incorporating a strong logical structure.</p> <p>UNOCHA's business planning process builds on its strategic framework. It does not have a formal governing board, but instead is governed by UN Secretariat financial rules and procedures. This poses significant challenges to its operations. Its mandate is determined by General Assembly and the UN's Economic and Social Council resolutions.</p> <p>The General Assembly has some oversight of UNOCHA's performance, particularly with their response to briefings, evaluations and revisions of resolutions.</p> <p>The OCHA Donor Support Group brings together the donors that provide an annual minimum of US\$500 000 in core funding to UNOCHA (including Australia). UNOCHA regularly seeks and follows advice from the support group, although the group operates with an informal 'advisory' structure and has no mandate to direct UNOCHA management on internal issues.</p> <p>UNOCHA has a strong evaluation culture. Its evaluation policy aligns with its strategic framework enabling UNOCHA to systematically evaluate the impact of its work.</p> <p>Leadership has been strong and effective in guiding reforms to respond to UNOCHA's weaknesses, as identified by evaluations over the past few years.</p> <p>UNOCHA has introduced innovative measures to ensure it can mobilise staff quickly when required through its strong surge mechanisms and establishment of the roster system. OCHA is also undertaking efforts in four key priority areas: staff development; ensuring gender balance among staff; managing mobility; development of tools and rapid deployment capacity.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>

<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Since 2009, UNOCHA management have taken steps to bring budgetary growth in line with projected donor income by imposing rigorous budgeting and introducing ongoing budget oversight controls. Budget reductions, aligned with UNOCHA's Strategic Framework, were made in 2010 to adjust expenditures to projected income. The Office adjusts the budget in responding to new emergencies arising during the course of a year, frequently offset by reductions to other budget lines. All changes to the budget are immediately communicated to the donor community.</p> <p>UNOCHA deploys staff for the coordination of humanitarian action and does not directly provide goods and services. However, within its limited capacity to influence costs, UNOCHA consults with the donor support group on ways to reduce its cost structure and further improve field-level costs.</p> <p>UNOCHA's central role in coordinating humanitarian affairs and the cluster system helps ensure a more effective use of funds through minimising duplication on the ground.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNOCHA works effectively in the cluster with its UN partners and through the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and Inter-Agency Standing Committee.</p> <p>UNOCHA is taking action in response to identified needs to improve its performance. This includes: strengthening its leadership in humanitarian responses; strengthening coordination among clusters; and disseminating information on a more timely basis.</p> <p>As a coordinating agency, UNOCHA works with partners to harmonise operations with partner government priorities and systems.</p> <p>National participation of civil society and other stakeholders has been patchy and concerns have been raised that UNOCHA does not engage well with local non-government organisations in the early stages of an emergency. UNOCHA is taking steps to improve relationships with civil society organisations and local stakeholders.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNOCHA practices an open and transparent approach to information. Through a number of extensive databases and websites, reliable and updated information is available on all UNOCHA operations.</p> <p>These databases and websites are effective channels for providing information on and enabling advocacy for humanitarian action. UNOCHA does not have a formal disclosure policy and is not a member of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), although an internal discussion paper has been prepared on engaging with IATI.</p> <p>The basis for allocating resources is clearly articulated in UNOCHA's strategic plan.</p> <p>UNOCHA has sound financial management systems in place and its handling of risk issues has been strengthened following a 2010 review of all work plans. UNOCHA identified and is addressing key risks. UNOCHA's financial and budgetary management systems are improving but are still vulnerable. Funds tracking and monitoring systems have been upgraded and UNOCHA is now able to track expenditure across all field offices and against each fund or budget category.</p> <p>UNOCHA is leading work on improving system-wide accountability in humanitarian situations through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on coordinating humanitarian assistance.</p>	ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG
	CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG
	STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG
	PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has a mandate to assist United Nations (UN) member states to combat illicit drugs, transnational organised crime, including corruption, people smuggling and human trafficking, and terrorism. UNODC is not solely a development agency. In 2009, UNODC spending totalled US\$232 million. Australia has consistently been one of UNODC's major donors and was the tenth largest donor in 2009. Australia provided \$5.5 million through the aid program to UNODC in 2010–11, comprising \$1.5 million in voluntary core contributions and \$4.0 million in non-core funding.

Australia is committed to provide core funding to UNODC of \$3.6 million in 2011 and \$3.2 million in 2012.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNODC's mandate is to combat transnational crime, including corruption, human trafficking and people smuggling, drug-use prevention and treatment, drug trafficking and terrorism.</p> <p>UNODC's work encompasses a wide range of development-related efforts. For example, its work in HIV harm reduction has reached thousands of HIV-positive people and their partners through 45 drop-in centres and demonstrations sites across South Asia. UNODC works to promote the coordinated provision of</p>	<p>DELIVERS RESULTS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>anti-corruption technical assistance to requesting developing countries, based on country-led priorities and as consistent with the aims of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. UNODC’s capacity building work has improved the rule of law in developing states through criminal justice reform for the police, prison and judicial systems in Afghanistan, East Africa and South East Asia.</p> <p>UNODC publishes results for its program and project based activities on the UNODC website. In 2008–2009 UNODC moved from a project-based approach to a more strategic and programmatic approach and commenced the development of multi-year thematic, regional and country programs.</p> <p>Reliance on earmarked voluntary contributions has meant that UNODC is responsive to donor priorities. It also has resulted in UNODC spreading its efforts thinly across a large number of projects.</p> <p>The majority of UNODC’s operations benefit especially disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, including countering human trafficking, running programs for drug users, implementing alternative development programs for illicit crop farmers in Afghanistan and South America, improving food security in Burma, and offering programs for victims of human trafficking and child sex tourism.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNODC’s broader mandate, including its focus on illegal drugs, human trafficking, terrorism and transnational crime, corresponds to important Australian interests.</p> <p>UNODC’s development activities align well with the Australian aid program’s strategic goals of saving lives and improving governance. Its anti-corruption, rule of law, drug-use prevention and counter-terrorism work in Asia-Pacific, East Africa and the Middle East align with Australia’s broader security and economic interests. UNODC plays an important advocacy role in these areas, which increases the impact of its capacity building assistance and that of other countries.</p> <p>Australian Government agencies report a range of views on the extent to which UNODC is responsive to issues</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p> <p>FOCUSSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG</p>

<p>and concerns raised by Australia. A common concern relates to the quality and timeliness of UNODC reporting.</p> <p>The 2010 evaluation by the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit found shortcomings in implementation of UNODC’s policy on gender, although Australia’s experience in some UNODC activities, such as human trafficking programs in Asia, has been that gender issues have been front and centre. UNODC has recently begun to undertake programs which address criminal activities affecting the environment, including illegal logging and the wildlife/timber trade.</p> <p>UNODC can operate effectively in fragile states, utilising its legal experts who have extensive law enforcement, border management, prosecutorial and prison-management expertise. Examples of UNODC’s work in fragile states include its counter piracy program in East Africa, which has improved criminal justice systems and conditions in correctional facilities.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNODC has some responsibility for coordinating some development-related efforts at country and regional levels and is seen by some development stakeholders as adding value.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNODC assists UN member states to comply with international conventions against corruption, transnational organised crime, drug control, and terrorism in its role as the Secretariat to a range of UN conventions. It undertakes these roles effectively.</p>	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p>
<p>UNODC’s research work in some cutting-edge areas focuses on difficult policy issues, such as transnational crime, and helps fill knowledge gaps for policy advisers and law enforcement officers in developed (donor) and developing countries. It does this, for example, by producing several useful annual reports such as its <i>World Drug Report</i> and the <i>Global Report on Trafficking in Persons</i>. The recent global Transnational Organized Crime Assessment has similar potential in the future, especially when it is supplemented by anticipated regional assessments, including one currently being undertaken for East Asia and the Pacific. UNODC’s</p>	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>

<p>Global Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting and Trends program assists governments to collect and analyse drug use data. This program has improved the availability of information on drug manufacturing and trafficking trends in East Asia over recent years.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNODC has a medium-term strategy (2008–11) and is preparing a strategy for 2012–15 with improved benchmarks and performance indicators. Under the close oversight of the Working Group on Governance and Finance, managed by the Member States of its two governing commissions, and the UN Joint Inspection Unit, the quality of indicators in the new strategy will be improved and a results-based culture will be fostered in the organisation.</p> <p>UNODC has two parallel governing bodies and this makes governance complex. While Member States have not expressed any immediate plans to combine these governing bodies, efforts are underway to ensure their work is effectively integrated into the 2012–15 strategy through the Working Group on Governance and Finance and independent evaluation by the UN Joint Inspection Unit, the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the UNODC’s Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU).</p> <p>The IEU is responsible for coordinating and leading evaluations of UNODC programmes and projects. Since January 2010, the IEU has guided more than 70 independent project evaluations across UNODC. In 2010 and 2011, two in-depth evaluations were conducted and published and at least two further in-depth evaluations are planned for 2011 and 2012. In the resolutions that established the IEU, the two Commissions decided that ‘adequate provisions should be made’ for the establishment of the IEU. In 2012–13 the IEU will also deploy an evaluation officer to Afghanistan to strengthen the capacity to evaluate initiatives in the region.</p> <p>In the past there have been concerns with project monitoring at the country-level. UNODC’s monitoring and evaluation systems at the agency level are currently undergoing improvements and strengthening (including through implementing a results-based</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY</p> <p>WEAK</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS</p> <p>SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES</p> <p>WEAK</p>


<p>culture) through the Working Group on Governance and Finance. The Independent Evaluation Unit will present its evaluation of UNODC's thematic and regional programming and report on its implementation status, impact and lessons learned to the commissions by the end of 2013.</p> <p>In 2010, the UN Joint Inspection Unit identified concerns with human resources management that UNODC leadership have commenced addressing in accordance with the Working Group on Governance and Finance process. The unpredictable funding base and the reliance on earmarked contributions generates particular challenges for human resource management.</p> <p>UNODC leadership was responsive and helpful in the recent restructure of its Bangkok Regional Centre. The improved operation of the Bangkok Regional Centre in recent times is testimony to the positive results that UNODC is capable of achieving in strategic management and performance.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Reduced core funding has forced UNODC management to consider cost effectiveness and value for money and institute significant cost-saving measures. UNODC has suffered from declining core funding over the years in response to the global financial crisis. Despite its growing mandate it has not received a commensurate increase in its UN regular budget.</p> <p>The cost-saving measures UNODC has been forced to undertake have weakened its program management. However, UNODC have demonstrated a capacity to deliver a strategic approach through the development of the Programmatic Approach and is continuing to work towards efficiencies in response to the Joint Inspection Unit report and other independent assessments which aim to delivery cost effectiveness.</p> <p>UNODC has underdeveloped analytical tools to promote cost effectiveness and is working to improve these tools in response to the report.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY N/A</p>

<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNODC has extensive partnerships with governments, other UN entities, international organisations, civil society groups, development banks and the private sector. These groups generally view UNODC's partnership behaviour as effective.</p> <p>Several Australian overseas missions cited historical issues with UNODC's country offices such as unresponsiveness and a tendency for unilateral decision making. The new Programmatic Approach is aimed at addressing these issues.</p> <p>UNODC has performed well in aligning its work with partner government priorities and systems. It received favourable comments on its responsiveness to partner country priorities when implementing the Joint UN's Program on HIV/AIDs and the World Health Organization's HIV Prevention Programme in South Asia.</p> <p>The views of stakeholders impact on UNODC decision making. UNODC works closely with community service organisations seeking their participation in its program of annual thematic conference. Positive feedback has been received that UNODC provides a voice for some beneficiaries, particularly in its HIV/AIDS work. During the Australian Multilateral Assessment field visit to Indonesia civil society representatives commented positively on UNODC's openness and engagement.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNODC policy and practice promotes transparency in its operations and organisational matters. It publishes a range of information on its website, but there is scope to improve the quality and accessibility of this information.</p> <p>UNODC's resource allocation is heavily driven by donor earmarked funds and, understandably, there are no criteria for resource allocation of un-earmarked funds.</p> <p>UNODC implements the Programme and Financial Information Management System (ProFi) which provides information on all aspects of program and</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p> <p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>project implementation, supporting the project lifecycle from start to finish. ProFi also provides online, real-time information and documents, both financial and substantive, to member states, headquarters and field offices around the world.</p> <p>UNODC's financial and organisational accountability mechanisms help partners to reduce corruption and prevent transnational crime.</p>	
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United Nations Peacebuilding Fund

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in 2006 at the request of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Security Council. It is a global fund designed to:

- > respond to imminent threats to peace
- > build or strengthen national capacity to promote peace
- > stimulate economic revitalisation
- > re-establish basic services.

It is one of the three central components of the UN peacebuilding architecture (alongside the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office). PBF defines its purpose as 'strengthening institutional capacities of national and local actors to avoid the lapse or relapse into violence.'

PBF has identified its comparative advantages as an ability to make quick decisions, the flexibility to support the security sector, an ability to call on the full UN system, and an ability to help fill the gap between conflict ending and larger development assistance coming online.

PBF has a complex organisational management structure. The General Assembly guides PBF's operations on the basis of an annual analytical report submitted by the Secretary-General. PBF also receives advice from its own Advisory Group, made up of 10 eminent persons with significant peacebuilding experience. This group provides advice on and oversight of, the speed and appropriateness of fund allocations and examines performance and financial reports. The head of the Peacebuilding Support Office is responsible for the overall management of PBF.

PBF's current business plan (2011–13) includes a target of US\$100 million a year in disbursements to up to 20 countries in each year. Australia is the twelfth largest donor to PBF overall. In January 2010 Australia committed \$6 million to peacebuilding efforts through the UN system, which included \$4 million over 2010–12 to PBF and \$2 million to support peacebuilding initiatives identified as priorities by the UN Peacebuilding Commission, in Burundi and Sierra Leone. In 2010–11, Australia provided PBF with \$2.0 million in non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

Component Rating **STRONG**

PBF has a unique role as an early-entry facility to bridge the transition from conflict to peace. As a funding mechanism it approves funding proposals put forward by implementing partners to implement peacebuilding-focussed projects. There are good reports of results achieved by PBF-funded projects. For example, in Burundi the PBF supported the timely return of approximately 11 000 adults associated with combatants to their communities of origin in a two-month period which was seen as a successful outcome. Feedback received from Australia's overseas mission in Nepal on the PBF indicates that projects funded there could have been stronger with a more rapid response time.

DELIVERS RESULTS
STRONG

MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS
SATISFACTORY

TARGETS POOREST
STRONG

PBF is putting considerable effort into ensuring its reporting goes beyond tracking the use of funds to include details on results, impact and overall performance. Its results framework measures quantitative and qualitative targets at global and country-specific levels. Lessons learned are applied to new country cases. However there is some criticism that the quality of monitoring and evaluation was weak, but as a result of pressure from donors is now overly prescriptive and difficult. The PBF is seeking to address this concern.

Although PBF does not have a specific policy for targeting the poorest people, its mandate, strategic plans and activities have an obvious impact on poor people throughout the countries it works in.

<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>PBF’s activities are closely aligned with the Australian aid program’s strategic goals of effective governance and humanitarian and disaster response. Its work also aligns closely with Australia’s broader interests in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Through PBF, Australian aid can extend to peacebuilding activities in areas where Australia has limited presence. The majority of PBF funding to date has been channelled to Africa and there is good scope for PBF to look for opportunities to reflect a wider geographical spread.</p> <p>PBF has good systems in place to ensure gender is mainstreamed throughout its activities. It is committed to allocating at least 15 per cent of its funding to peacebuilding projects that specifically address women’s needs. For example, its 2011 gender promotion initiative aims to allocate US\$5 million to projects specifically designed to advance gender equality.</p> <p>PBF does not appear to have policies for the environment or disability-inclusive development.</p> <p>By its very mandate, PBF is active in some of the most fragile states in the world and has a strong track record of success in difficult environments.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p>
	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG</p>
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>PBF plays a niche role in the broader UN and global post-conflict-peacebuilding architecture as it provides a funding mechanism for critical programming when few other avenues are available. PBF motivates partners (such as Security Council Mission Leadership, UNDP and other UN agencies) to identify peacebuilding priorities in partnership with governments and contribute to building a joint effort at country-level.</p> <p>PBF’s unique mandate allows it to work closely with other actors in the humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacebuilding sphere to apply its specialist experience to situations of greatest need. PBF fills a critical role of financing projects in delicate situations when there may be no other financing available. This in and of itself shows the innovative nature of its work.</p> <p>PBF fills a critical gap in the multilateral development system and is an innovative approach to funding</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p>
	<p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>


<p>much-needed activity in area sector that is often too difficult for many donors and other agencies to be involved in.</p> <p>PBF has also adopted an innovative approach to program development seeking proposals from in-country teams to identify what will work best in each circumstance. This helps prevent a default 'one-size-fits-all' approach to peacebuilding.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>PBF operates under a clear mandate supported by the UN General Assembly's request to establish a fund to focus on post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">STRONG</p>
<p>PBF operates with a business plan and performance management plan (both covering 2011–13). These documents align closely to PBF's mandate and provide clear and measurable targets.</p>	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>PBF operates under a complex governance arrangement, including:</p>	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SATISFACTORY</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > oversight from the UN General Assembly > day-to-day management by the Peacebuilding Support Office > contribution from the Peacebuilding Commission on strategic approaches > advice from and oversight of its activities, by its Advisory Group > management of country-level activities by the Joint Steering Committee co-chaired by the national government and the UN. <p>Despite these complexities, management arrangements and oversight appear to be working well.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation systems are sound. PBF management appears to be responsive to evaluation recommendations. Its leadership has successfully overseen a strengthening of systems and processes in response to the findings of a 2009 evaluation by the UN Office for Internal Oversight Services.</p> <p>Among the findings were concerns about staffing levels and continuity of staff, which appear to have been at least partially addressed, although risks relating to a reliance on secondments must be managed.</p>	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>Oversight of cost and value for money is undertaken by the Peacebuilding Support Office, which is responsible for PBF’s overall management, including setting the direction and guiding the use of its resources. Once a priority plan is approved, the head of the Peacebuilding Support Office is responsible for determining the overall funding envelope for each country. This is based on the fund’s available balance and the indicative costs of the proposed plan. In this way, every major funding proposal goes through a direct management cost scrutiny process. Cost effectiveness is also taken into consideration: if changes to funding proposals are requested by scrutineers, funds may not be transferred until everyone involved is satisfied with the budget presented.</p> <p>All PBF partners are subject to UN procurement and financial regulations, which require consideration of value for money when procuring goods or services. PBF relies on these regulations, and value for money considerations therefore do not generally feature in agreements with its partners. PBF is considering the use of performance-based allocations to further challenge partners on value for money, however this is not yet fully implemented.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>PBF has a strong and effective focus on operating with and through partners. Its funding is channelled through UN partner agencies which are then responsible for delivering the programs they proposed through PBF’s application process.</p> <p>Formal partnership arrangements are in place between PBF and the United Nations Development Program, United Nations Children’s Fund, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Organization for Migration and UN Women, in addition to 11 other agencies and programs. PBF takes an active position on reviewing its partnerships.</p> <p>PBF projects align with country priorities and systems. Examples in PBF-funded projects in Africa show it has had some success in aligning with and supporting national systems through its project implementation. The Joint Steering Committee is designed to enhance</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

<p>ownership by local governments and civil society organisations through increasing their role in prioritisation and programming.</p> <p>Stakeholders are encouraged to engage in country-level decision making (stakeholders can include government, civil society and sometimes opposition representatives). PBF has actively pursued including women in its projects.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>PBF has no formal disclosure policy but its website is comprehensive with information available on projects in place and full information on how applications can be made for funding of new activities.</p> <p>PBF is transparent in its resource allocations through a set of eligibility criteria and assessments for project proposal approval. It also has a clear formula to guide the splitting of allocations between types of projects each year.</p> <p>PBF is subject to regular UN systems in terms of financial management, audit, risk and fraud.</p> <p>Since 2010, details of PBF transfers to recipient organisations have been made publicly available online in real-time. In addition, PBF requires recipient organisations to submit project-level progress reports (including both financial and narrative descriptions) which it consolidates and publishes annually.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

United Nations Population Fund

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) assists countries in collecting, analysing and disseminating population data and supports developing policies and programs on gender and maternal health, particularly in reproductive health, including family planning, safe motherhood, HIV/AIDS prevention, gender-based violence and promoting gender equality.

UNFPA began as a trust fund in 1967 and began operating in 1969. It is one of the Funds and Programmes of the United Nations General Assembly and reports to the United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Populations Fund and the United Nations Office for Project Services' Executive Board. Australia was represented on the board in 2008 and 2009, and will again assume a seat in 2012.

UNFPA's budget in 2010 totalled US\$870 million. Australia provides UNFPA with core financial contributions through a multi-year partnership agreement (2009–13). Under this framework the Australian Agency for International Development will provide UNFPA with \$38.5 million over four years in core funding and \$4 million over four years to UNFPA's Pacific Multi-Country Programme. In 2010–11 Australia provided \$33.8 million to UNFPA, comprising \$11.5 million in voluntary core contributions and \$22.3 million in non-core funding.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>During the Australian Multilateral Assessment field visit to the Philippines stakeholders were positive about the results UNFPA was delivering despite a sometimes sensitive operating environment. Overall, however, Australian overseas missions reported a mixed picture on how well UNFPA was delivering tangible results on the ground.</p> <p>In reporting on its results, UNFPA points to substantial achievements in reproductive health such as the proportion of births attended by a skilled health professional increasing to 65.7 per cent in 2009 from 63.1 per cent in 2007 and the proportion of crisis situations where a basic sexual and reproductive services package were available, increasing to 72.2 per cent in 2009 from 57.9 per cent in 2007. However, UNFPA has not systematically measured or reported on the extent to which its own work has contributed to these development outcomes. This makes it difficult to make an overall assessment of its effectiveness in delivering results.</p> <p>UNFPA has recently instituted a development results framework designed to provide more comprehensive measuring and reporting of its own contribution to development results. This framework may help overcome current limitations in UNFPA's use of performance information and better position it to effectively inform management decisions at country and organisation levels. At the country-level, the focus on results is more advanced. The 2010 Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) report, found UNFPA to be effective with key strengths being performance oriented programming and focus on results at the country-level.</p> <p>Most of UNFPA's activities are implemented in low income countries. At country-level, UNFPA has a substantial focus on poor communities and targets those most in need of reproductive health services.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST STRONG

<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNFPA’s work is closely aligned with the Australian aid program’s strategic goal of saving lives and promoting opportunities for all. Its key role as a global partner in progressing health and gender-related MDGs supports Australia’s broader interests in global economic and social development, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.</p> <p>Senior management at headquarters and regional level have been responsive to concerns raised by Australia since the establishment of the partnership agreement.</p> <p>UNFPA performs strongly in progressing gender equality and it addresses issues of disability in its programs.</p> <p>UNFPA has shown leadership in the UN system regarding the linkages between population dynamics and climate change but there is scope for climate change and environmental issues need to be more formally embedded in UNFPA’s overall operational approach.</p> <p>UNFPA’s performance in fragile states appears to be mixed and there may be scope to strengthen its organisational approach when operating in situations of conflict and fragility.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNFPA engages as a partner in the UN’s Delivering as One pilot phase as well as in UN joint program arrangements. Senior management have pushed hard on the importance of Delivering as One, including by building this into staff appraisal systems.</p> <p>The results of Australian Multilateral Assessment field visits support evidence from the 2010 MOPAN report that suggests UNFPA is a strong contributor to promoting coordination in the UN system.</p> <p>UNFPA plays a critical role in global health architecture on reproductive health and this is recognised by donors and other stakeholders.</p> <p>The ability to influence partner government policies and programs has magnified UNFPA’s impact.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION SATISFACTORY</p>


<p>A range of useful publications and knowledge products are available on its website but UNFPA's Executive Director recognises that knowledge sharing and communication are areas that need to be improved. Reforms are underway to advance this.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>The 2010 MOPAN report on UNFPA concluded that it had a good organisational strategy based on a clear mandate. UNFPA's Strategic Plan 2008–2013 is an overarching planning document that directs organisational decision making. Feedback from Australian overseas missions suggests this translates into focused activities on the ground in areas of UNFPA's comparative advantage.</p> <p>The Executive Board provides oversight of programs, budgets, audits, new policies and corporate issues. The Executive Board has supported efforts to improve strategic and performance management, including through the recent mid-term review process. However, UNFPA's ability to provide strategic direction is weakened at times by the need to find compromise positions to bridge political divisions between developing countries and traditional donors and reach consensus.</p> <p>MOPAN assessed UNFPA as generally adequate on monitoring and evaluation but identified a number of weaknesses. UNFPA has introduced a number of improvements recently, including an Evaluation Policy and increased coverage of Country Programme evaluations. But weaknesses exist that require further attention. For example, UNFPA provides minimal program-level performance information to its governing body and other stakeholders. Again, its Executive Director has identified this as an area for improvement.</p> <p>The Executive Director is leading important reforms. While it is too early to judge success, initial signs in areas such as improved communications are promising. UNFPA has been improving its staff performance management system.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNFPA's management is making some progress on value for money issues. For example, its procurement strategy requires value for money to be considered. However, more needs to be done.</p> <p>UNFPA has a good track record on commodity pricing and quality, negotiating better prices and higher quality with suppliers of reproductive health commodities. The 2010 MOPAN report rated UNFPA as adequate overall on the timely and efficient management of contracts.</p> <p>The MOPAN report also found that the structure of UNFPA's current budget only links aid allocations to expected management results and not development results. This reduces the capacity to consider value for money in decision making. However, at the request of the Executive Board, UNFPA is moving towards using a single integrated budget for 2014. This would link budgeted amounts to the results presented in the UNFPA's strategic plan. This initiative is intended to improve the direct link between budgeting and results.</p> <p>UNFPA has taken measures to promote better value for money through promoting competition between its suppliers. For example, by promoting price competition between companies supplying condoms, UNFPA realised savings of US\$750 000 per year.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNFPA generally works well with partner governments and has been effective in ensuring population issues are included in national and local government plans. UNFPA is among the most committed UN agencies to working effectively with other parts of the UN development system. UNFPA also has strong partnerships with civil society organisations.</p> <p>MOPAN's 2010 report concluded that governments are generally happy with UNFPA's alignment with its priorities. UNFPA works with partner countries to ensure policies and programs are nationally-owned and developed. However, MOPAN reports that donors rate UNFPA as inadequate on alignment with partner government systems and use of project implementation units.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

<p>UNFPA has set up a global-level advisory board to ensure the voice of beneficiaries is heard.</p> <p>At country-level UNFPA has partnerships with civil society organisations to ensure their views are built into its programs.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNFPA publishes a range of useful information on its website. While UNFPA has an information disclosure policy it is not yet a signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative.</p> <p>UNFPA has clear, published criteria for allocating core budget resources and MOPAN suggests this is adequately applied at country-level.</p> <p>The 2010 MOPAN report rated UNFPA strongly on indicators related to internal and financial audit. It was considered weaker with risk management. UNFPA is developing an enterprise risk management system to strengthen its performance in this area.</p> <p>UNFPA’s accountability framework outlines clear processes and responsibilities in the management of its programs and has used the framework to undertake dialogue with partner countries on the importance of accountability of funds.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRONG</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is the primary United Nations (UN) agency providing protection and assistance to the five million registered Palestine refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the occupied Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank. Australia provided \$14.5 million to UNRWA in 2010–11, comprising \$11.5 million in voluntary core contributions and \$3.0 million in non-core funding. This made Australia the tenth biggest donor. Australia has established a partnership agreement with UNRWA committing to provide \$18 million in core contributions over three years from 2010.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

UNRWA has a clear mandate and its programs deliver impressive results across its four sectoral areas of operations and it has a special focus on the Millennium Development Goals relating to education and health. UNRWA has been able to demonstrate a significant contribution to the development and humanitarian needs of the Palestinian refugees.

UNRWA reports on results although its achievements are mainly expressed in output terms. It is developing a more comprehensive results framework supporting outcome-result reporting.

Component Rating **STRONG**

DELIVERS RESULTS
STRONG

MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS
SATISFACTORY

TARGETS POOREST
STRONG

<p>Its medium-term strategy (2010–15) outlines UNRWA’s new results framework but this is not fully developed and more work is required on indicators, data collection and staff training before improvements can be recorded.</p> <p>UNRWA’s programs address poverty and insecurity of social and economic livelihood and it makes a strong, direct contribution to poverty reduction among the poorest.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNRWA plays a central role in supporting development in a region of importance to Australia as well as the international community more broadly. Its mandate and programs are also closely aligned with the Australian aid program’s strategic goals of humanitarian and disaster response and saving lives.</p> <p>UNRWA generally applies crosscutting policies well. It has developed effective policies and strategies to address gender and human rights across its portfolio and is developing a framework to guide its environmental management. UNRWA has also increased its focus on disabilities through stronger policies and programs to address disability within refugee populations.</p> <p>It operates highly effectively in the fragile context of refugee settlements in the region. In mid-2011, UNRWA proved its capacity in this area by continuing to provide services to Palestinian refugees despite ongoing civil unrest in Syria.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES VERY STRONG</p>
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNRWA is effective at initiating emergency appeals to meet specific needs and in coordinating its operations and work programs with those of local authorities and international donors.</p> <p>UNRWA has established good networks which it uses to support coordination among refugee settlements and to promote coordination of service delivery and knowledge sharing. It effectively coordinates a range of international and national actors delivering services to refugees, given the very complex and politically sensitive environment in which it works.</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION N/A</p>


<p>With its annual budget of approximately US\$1 billion, UNRWA is the largest service provider to Palestinians. It provides specialist expertise in education, health and livelihood programs, though in the context of service delivery and providing basic humanitarian needs.</p> <p>Given its mandate and operations, UNRWA does not play a policy or innovation role across the multilateral system.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>UNRWA’s medium term strategy (2010–15) clearly sets its strategic goals and how these relate to its mandate. There is new emphasis in the strategy on developing a performance-based approach to planning, budget management and monitoring but the results framework is not yet fully developed.</p> <p>UNRWA’s governing bodies actively scrutinise its policies and management and provide regular, detailed feedback to management on progress with reforms. Management itself has been responsive and proactive in initiating reforms and has engaged with governing bodies in reporting on progress and milestones.</p> <p>The 2011 Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) report assessed UNWRA as having adequate monitoring and evaluation systems. UNRWA is introducing a new performance monitoring framework.</p> <p>Management has been active in supporting reform changes to ensure its targets for organisational change are achieved. The organisation has paid specific attention to improving its management systems and practices and is implementing a suite of human resources reforms to bring it in line with best practice.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>

<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>UNRWA's governing body actively monitors costs and maintains close scrutiny on its budget and financial situation. Management reports regularly on efforts to achieve cost savings and establish greater control over its budget and cost structure through financial reform. These reforms are still being developed and will take time to show results. Still, there are some indications that UNRWA can initiate savings in field operation costs as it develops its results-based budgeting system.</p> <p>While value for money is generally considered, the 2011 MOPAN report found that UNRWA was strong at linking allocations to expected results but weak on linking disbursements to reported results.</p> <p>UNRWA considers value for money in implementing programs through partners, but this is not systematic. Its programs have performance indicators with targets and benchmarks but it is not clear if these are used to encourage improvements or cost efficiencies among managers and service delivery providers.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>UNRWA has developed strong and collaborative partner relationships with a wide range of agencies and organisations. It is effective at working with partner governments despite the complex and often difficult environment in which it operates and this is an important factor in decision making. It has also established good networks and consultative processes among its beneficiaries and civil society partners.</p> <p>UNRWA does not work through government systems but does coordinate its programs with partner governments on policy and program issues. It has made important adjustments to its procedures so it can work more effectively in joint planning or needs assessment processes.</p> <p>UNRWA has a clear beneficiary focus in its operations and provides good opportunities for regular consultations with refugees.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS STRONG</p>

7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>UNRWA publishes key documents on its website but important information, such as progress and audit reports, are not easily found.</p> <p>Sound financial and fiduciary systems are in place and UNRWA is undertaking important reforms to upgrade financial practices; improve budget control and enable a more transparent approach to reporting on disbursements and financial performance. UNRWA has responded positively to donor requests for greater transparency on how the budget is prioritised between field areas.</p> <p>UNRWA complies with the UN's audit and fraud management standards. As part of its reform agenda it is pursuing stronger accountability and risk management procedures.</p> <p>UNRWA periodically raises transparency and accountability issues with partners. The 2011 MOPAN report review rated UNRWA as adequate on involving direct beneficiaries and stakeholder groups in evaluation processes.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS SATISFACTORY</p>

World Bank

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The World Bank (the Bank) provides concessionary finance and analytical and advisory services to developing countries. It has 187 member nations. This assessment considers the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).

IDA, the Bank's fund for poorer countries, is the largest multilateral channel of concessional financing to the world. It assists 81 of the world's poorest countries by providing funds to support their efforts to boost economic growth, reduce poverty and improve the living conditions of the poor. In 2010–11 new commitments of credits and grants through IDA totalled US\$16.3 billion.

IBRD aims to reduce poverty in middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries by promoting sustainable development through loans, guarantees, risk management products, and analytical and advisory services. New lending commitments from the IBRD totalled over US\$44 billion in 2010–11.

The Bank is a large and growing partner for Australia, with total funding through the aid program of \$505.3 million in 2010–11, comprising \$158.2 million in voluntary core contributions and \$347.1 in non-core funding. Australia was the second largest contributor of non-core funding to the Bank in 2010–11.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating STRONG
<p>The Bank delivers large-scale aggregate results across a broad range of countries and sectors. Overall, 77 per cent of its projects meet their objectives although effectiveness varies at country and sector levels. Clear evidence of results was presented during the Australian Multilateral Assessment field visit to Indonesia, including the National Program for Community Empowerment in Rural Areas that directly supports 34 million people across 57 000 rural villages with improved health, infrastructure and other services.</p> <p>Australian overseas missions report strong tangible results by the Bank in Afghanistan, the Philippines and Vanuatu, although results are less impressive in East Timor.</p> <p>The Bank's strong results-based management system provides clear information that is extensively used in management decisions and reporting.</p> <p>Many of the Bank's projects benefit the poorest directly or indirectly, although several independent assessments have questioned whether poverty impact assessments are adequately used by the Bank to identify the poorest beneficiaries in planning and implementing activities.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS VERY STRONG
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>The Bank's programs are closely aligned with all five of the Australian aid program's strategic goals.</p> <p>The Bank's lending and Australia's grant programs complement one another, as is evident in the large volumes of co-financing.</p> <p>The Australian Government, like many other development stakeholders, relies heavily on the Bank's research, analytical and data work at sector and global levels and often at country-level.</p> <p>The Bank plays an active role in forums of importance to Australia such as the Group of Twenty (G20).</p>	SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES VERY STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG
	FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SATISFACTORY
	EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG

<p>The Bank's presence in Pacific Island countries has sharply increased over the past five years, partly in response to urgings from Australia.</p> <p>The Bank has a strong policy record on gender issues, including its 2012 World Development Report on gender. But at operational level, the Bank struggles to consistently include a gender focus in its projects. There are now corporate commitments in IDA16 and the corporate scorecard, which may improve incentives to adequately consider gender issues at the operational level.</p> <p>The Bank does not have a formal policy on disability, although Bank policies related to poor and vulnerable populations are pertinent to persons with disabilities, and disability issues are addressed in a range of sector policies (for example, transport and education). The Bank houses the Secretariat for the Global Partnership for Disability and Development.</p> <p>Over the past decade the Bank has played a leading research and analytical role in improving donor effectiveness in fragile states and implementing institutional measures to lift its effectiveness. As a whole these measures have had some success (as indicated by improvements in the proportion of activities meeting objectives) although the Bank continues to be less effective in some fragile states, for example East Timor.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating VERY STRONG</p>
<p>In areas such as climate change and food security, the Bank's convening power, technical expertise and strong fiduciary and accountability systems mean it often manages multi-donor trust funds that support large-scale interventions and improve coordination in specific sectors.</p> <p>With annual lending through IDA of around US\$16 billion, the Bank is the largest provider of development assistance to low income countries.</p> <p>Many parts of the multilateral system and, indeed, many bilateral donors including Australia, rely on the Bank's platform role in providing research, data and analytical work. A 2010 study by the World Bank's Development Research Group found evidence that many of its publications influence development</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION VERY STRONG</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE VERY STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION VERY STRONG</p>

<p>thinking. In the 2009 Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) report stakeholders rated the Bank relatively highly for its knowledge management and contributions to policy dialogue.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>Given its broad mandate, the key aspects of the Bank's strategic management occur at country and sector levels, rather than at institution level. Country and sector strategic planning is robust and genuinely guides decision making.</p> <p>Governance arrangements work reasonably well, with the Bank's resident Executive Board holding management to account for performance on a day-to-day basis, although the Board can tend to micromanage and lose focus on strategic issues.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation practices are embedded in operations and inform decision making. The Bank's Independent Evaluation Group, which has oversight over monitoring and evaluation systems, is viewed as being broadly effective.</p> <p>Nevertheless the extent to which the Bank's procedures enable adjustments to programs based on feedback from monitoring and evaluation is an issue. The Bank was rated by stakeholders as inadequate on adjusting procedures in the 2009 MOPAN survey and feedback from Australian overseas missions also identified lack of flexibility in procedures as a concern. Recent reforms to investment lending are designed in part to increase flexibility to adjust programs.</p> <p>The Bank's management has shown strong leadership on a range of global challenges over the past few years, including through overseeing a rapid increase in lending to help mitigate the impact on developing countries of the Global Economic Crisis. In the 2009 MOPAN report stakeholders rated the Bank as adequate in managing human resources.</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>


<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>The Bank’s administrative costs are high on the surface, but this reflects the important range of non-lending functions the Bank plays such as analytical work, coordination and policy advice. Many of these services are provided to the international community as a whole. This makes it difficult to benchmark the Bank’s administrative costs against organisations that do not provide this range of ‘public goods’.</p> <p>The Bank has been operating with a flat real administrative budget since 1999 and disciplines within the budget system help constrain costs. Starting in 2009–10, all major financial and budget decisions have been brought together to ensure fully informed decision making.</p> <p>The Bank’s performance-based allocation system helps promote value for money at country-level. A 2006–07 Common Performance Assessment System analysis rated 96 per cent of Bank projects as moderately satisfactory or better on the quality and coherence of economic rationale and analysis underpinning the project. Nevertheless the IEG has highlighted a fall in the use of cost-benefit analysis over recent years.</p> <p>The Bank’s work in public expenditure management and stringent operational requirements help ensure partners focus on value for money issues.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p>
	<p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p>
	<p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>
<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>The Bank has substantially improved its partnership behaviour over the past 15 years, with decentralisation a major driving factor. Relations with partner governments and other donors have improved, although a number of Australian overseas missions overseas continue to report insufficient consultation at country-level.</p> <p>Submissions from Australian non-government organisations to the Australian Multilateral Assessment review were generally critical of the Bank, suggesting more work is needed on consistently engaging civil society at program and policy levels.</p> <p>The Bank’s programs align with partner priorities through country strategies jointly developed with partner governments. Programs must align with</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>country strategies. The 2009 MOPAN survey showed stakeholders are generally satisfied with the Bank's support of national plans. The Bank's development policy lending is provided through country systems. The use of country systems for investment lending, however, has been more mixed, particularly for procurement. The 2009 MOPAN survey rated the Bank in the low band of adequate for use of country systems, although more recent reports such as the Quality of ODA index and the 2011 OECD Paris Declaration survey rate the Bank more favourably. The Bank's management has acknowledged it wants to make greater use of country systems. Increasing the use of these systems, however, remains a contentious issue at Executive Board level.</p> <p>The Bank's safeguard policies are complex, but work well in some circumstances, as the Australian Multilateral Assessment observed during its field visit to Indonesia where project-level safeguards drove improvements to government water policy.</p> <p>Recent shareholder reforms have seen a shift in voting share towards developing countries, although in practice the greatest impact in increasing the voice of low income countries has been agreement to an additional board member from Africa. The voice of client countries in IDA replenishment processes has been improved through including borrower representatives, although their influence over decision making remains limited.</p>	
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating VERY STRONG</p>
<p>The Bank's Access to Information policy (July 2010) includes a presumption of disclosure and makes the Bank among the most transparent multilateral organisations. It was rated the most transparent donor in the November 2011 Publish What You Fund index and in the November 2011 transparency component of the Quality of Official Development Assistance index. The Bank is an active member of the International Aid Transparency Initiative and has already reached the expected standards.</p> <p>The IDA allocation system for lending is transparent in that it uses a publicly available formula, although this is quite complex and not easily understood by stakeholders.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION VERY STRONG</p> <p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION VERY STRONG</p> <p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS VERY STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS VERY STRONG</p>

<p>The Bank has robust systems for financial management, audit, risk management and fraud prevention. In the 2009 MOPAN survey, all stakeholders rated the Bank highly for its financial accountability, including for its strong external audit practices at corporate and project levels.</p> <p>The Bank's systems and processes help to promote the transparency and accountability of partners, including through the work of its specialist team of investigators and accountants in its Integrity Vice Presidency.</p> <p>The Bank is a party to the cross-debarment agreement with the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Inter-American Development Bank Group.</p>	
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World Food Programme

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) is the world's largest humanitarian organisation fighting hunger. WFP's main activities are: providing emergency food assistance, logistics and communications; providing nutritional supplements to vulnerable groups during humanitarian crises; supporting the re-establishment of livelihoods and food security in communities during recovery and transition periods; prepositioning humanitarian food reserves to prepare for future emergencies; and capacity building initiatives so governments can better manage food and nutritional security as well as boost national preparedness and response mechanisms.

Australia provided WFP with \$110.4 million in 2010–11, comprising \$35.0 million in voluntary core contributions and \$75.4 million in non-core funding. In 2011, this made Australia WFP's seventh largest donor. In 2009 Australia signed a four-year (2009–13) Strategic Partnership Agreement with WFP, with guaranteed funding of at least \$140 million to support WFP's activities and school feeding programs.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating VERY STRONG
WFP performs very effectively in its core role of providing food assistance on a uniquely large scale during humanitarian emergencies and post-emergency recovery, including in dangerous environments. Its 2010 performance report states that it provided food assistance for 109.2 million beneficiaries in 75 countries that year.	DELIVERS RESULTS VERY STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS VERY STRONG
	TARGETS POOREST VERY STRONG

<p>In responding to humanitarian crises and providing development support in transitional contexts, WFP is highly effective in targeting its work toward the greatest or most urgent food assistance needs, although it necessarily does so within occasional constraints represented by donor priorities.</p> <p>WFP delivers large-scale results meeting humanitarian needs, and in some cases development needs as well. Its global reach is unmatched and it has demonstrated capacity to deliver life-saving assistance in the most difficult circumstances.</p> <p>In addition to the provision of emergency food assistance, and consistent with its mandate, WFP also implements food assistance programs to aid in economic and social development, concentrating its efforts and resources on the most vulnerable people and countries.</p> <p>While WFP was found to be highly effective in most countries, Australia has not continued bilateral program support with WFP in Indonesia due to concerns about its effectiveness.</p> <p>The results which WFP report are verified through performance reports which draw extensively on both external and internal evaluations.</p> <p>WFP’s annual performance reports contain clear, extensive reporting of results against its five strategic objectives and its 25 subsidiary outcome indicators as well as aggregate development results attributable to WFP.</p>	
<p>2. Alignment with Australia’s aid priorities and national interests</p>	<p>Component Rating VERY STRONG</p>
<p>WFP’s mandate corresponds to the Australian aid program’s strategic objectives of saving lives; reducing poverty; and providing humanitarian and disaster response. Australia and WFP are both committed to the alleviation of human suffering in disasters and emergencies and protracted crises. In particular, Australia recognises WFP’s dual mandate to save lives in emergency situations and help build capacity to assist in preventing hunger in the future. WFP is a vital partner of Australia in providing food assistance and contributing towards food security in a range of contexts including emergency, relief and recovery contexts.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA’S OBJECTIVES STRONG</p> <p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM VERY STRONG</p> <p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES VERY STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES STRONG</p>

<p>WFP has generally shown flexibility and responsiveness to reasonable requests from Australia, as an institution and at the country-level. It has a clear, effective focus on gender equality throughout its core work, including the routine collection of sex-disaggregated data. Evaluations have found that WFP's focus on women and girls has given them visibility as beneficiaries and contributors to household food security and that women's access to food has increased considerably as a result of WFP making women the holders of food entitlements.</p> <p>WFP is doing valuable work on aspects of climate change relevant to its mandate. It is working to improve the accuracy of the prediction of climate-change effects and vulnerability mapping with which it contributes to emergency preparedness and response.</p> <p>Most of WFP's operations are implemented in fragile states. Its methods are generally effective in handling the special conditions of work in these states.</p>	
<p>3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system</p>	<p>Component Rating VERY STRONG</p>
<p>WFP makes unique and valuable contributions to the international humanitarian system, especially through its large-scale provision of logistics, telecommunications and emergency food assistance. WFP leads the logistics and telecommunications clusters in humanitarian emergencies, coordinating other UN agencies, international organisations and non-government organisations (NGOs), and in some cases offering them use of its facilities. It thus provides the 'logistical backbone' for international humanitarian responses to large-scale crises.</p> <p>WFP's logistics capacity is made available to support a range of United Nations (UN) agencies, humanitarian organisations and NGOs in the field and plays a critical role in humanitarian response efforts. WFP is responsible for the administration of the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRD). WFP stockpiles rapid response equipment and survival items and organises emergency shipments as well as technical assistance operations, maintaining a 365-day 24-hour duty service. WFP is an active proponent of interagency preparedness through its role as the Co-Chair (together with UNICEF) of the interagency body dealing with preparedness and early warning issues. WFP also co-leads the Food Security Cluster</p>	<p>PROMOTES COORDINATION VERY STRONG</p> <p>MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE VERY STRONG</p> <p>PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION STRONG</p>

<p>together with FAO, and currently chairs the UN Standing Committee on Nutrition. WFP has introduced a range of program innovations, such as pilot programs for cash and voucher transfer programs. Preliminary feedback from stakeholders has been positive with preliminary evidence showing good outcomes.</p>	
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating STRONG
<p>WFP's 36-member Executive Board represents traditional and emerging donors as well as recipient countries, and participation in it is effective. Decisions are made by majority but every effort is made to arrive at decisions by consensus. Decisions are also made transparently.</p> <p>Australia is currently an Executive Board member represented by a Permanent Representative (Australia's Ambassador to Italy) and an Alternative Representative (AusAID Counsellor, Paris).</p> <p>WFP's progressive management does well in translating objectives into resource and program management. Its strategic objectives are outlined in the <i>Strategic Plan 2008-13</i>. WFP has developed planning, budgeting and management systems which enable it to respond quickly to unforeseen and foreseen emergencies.</p> <p>Overall, WFP has a sound Monitoring and Evaluation framework relating to large-scale humanitarian operations, with an Office of Evaluation dedicated solely to this task. The framework is in the process of being further strengthened at the corporate level through implementation of new IT systems and the pending recruitment of a Chief Monitoring Officer. WFP's governing bodies and management adapt operations actively in light of monitoring and evaluation information.</p> <p>A weakness in WFP's current monitoring system is the varying capacity of country offices to collect good quality data, especially when they deliver through multiple partners and have little direct funding for support costs. The <i>Annual Evaluation Report</i> for 2010 notes this is a longstanding problem. However in 2011, WFP has worked extensively to improve its monitoring system both at headquarters and in the field. With a</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY STRONG</p> <p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS STRONG</p> <p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES STRONG</p>

<p>new monitoring strategy being rolled out from 2012, Australia will continue to monitor this policy development to assess its effectiveness in implementation particularly the new innovative programs such as cash and vouchers and twinning. WFP's governing bodies and management adapt operations actively in light of monitoring and evaluation information.</p> <p>WFP management states that maintaining the excellence and motivation of staff is a top corporate priority with staff trained in leadership, emergency response and security.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>WFP's policies and systems on cost and value consciousness are robust. Comparisons of cost per beneficiary, by program type and country of operation, are a routine part of management. The Executive Board has the opportunity to scrutinise proposals for effectiveness and cost when operations are submitted for approval (except those approved under delegated authority in emergencies). However, the level of such scrutiny varies.</p> <p>Value for money is a systematic consideration in the planning and implementation of WFP programs. Substantial cost savings have been made in the past biennium. In 2008, WFP, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Fund for Agricultural Development established a common procurement team to tender jointly for common goods, works and services at their respective three headquarters to generate savings through coordination and leveraging economies of scale. This joint team achieved substantial savings in travel and mail distribution costs.</p> <p>WFP consistently scrutinises costs in its relations with the many NGOs through which it delivers to beneficiaries. WFP reporting standards for NGOs are rigorous.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS STRONG</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS STRONG</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>

<p>6. Partnership behaviour</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>Overall, most stakeholders are satisfied with the extent of their influence on WFP operations. WFP cooperates effectively with other UN agencies, its NGO implementing partners and donors. WFP also has partnerships with private companies for fundraising and functional cooperation.</p> <p>Evaluations have found that WFP development programs are well aligned with country plans and United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks.</p> <p>WFP has received positive feedback from Australia’s overseas mission in Bangladesh for its flexible, responsive and pragmatic approach to working with other UN agencies and from Australia’s mission in Laos for the significant improvement in its coordination with government counterparts on its school meals program.</p> <p>WFP has invested significantly in structures and processes to ensure effective participation by donors, recipient government’s and NGOs as well as beneficiaries. Submissions received from Australian NGOs, raised some concerns relating to how WFP engages with NGOs, particularly as a number of NGOs seek a more equitable relationship with WFP rather than being perceived as delivery agents. Civil society representatives raised similar concerns during the Australian Multilateral Assessment field visits to Ethiopia and Kenya. There is some scope for a more well-rounded partnership particularly in policy and advocacy at the field level.</p>	<p>WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>7. Transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Component Rating STRONG</p>
<p>WFP performs well in providing information about its operations, including its budgets—subject to their unpredictability.</p> <p>The budgeting system is transparent, providing clear and timely publication of proposed budgets, running amendments to them and developing end-of-year budget reports. However, ex-ante budgets are qualified by WFP’s reliance on donors’ voluntary contributions in response to emergencies.</p> <p>WFP has a standard budgeting format for its partners, and compares their costs with local standards for similar operations and situations in country.</p>	<p>ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG</p>
	<p>CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG</p>
	<p>PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS STRONG</p>


WFP has generally good policies and practices in place for financial management, audit, risk management and fraud prevention. It made appropriate refinements following a recent inquiry into allegations that some food aid was diverted in Somalia.

WFP was the first UN agency to implement the International Accounting Practises Standards system and provides the associated Standard Project Report annually.

Transparency and accountability are promoted in WFP's relations with NGOs contracted as operational partners.

World Health Organization

OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATION RATINGS



ORGANISATION OVERVIEW

The World Health Organization (WHO) is the United Nations (UN) agency responsible for setting global norms and standards for health.

WHO's main functions, as outlined under its eleventh General Programme of Work 2006–2015, are to: provide leadership on matters critical to health and engage in partnerships where joint action is needed; shape the research agenda; set norms and standards and promote and monitor their implementation; and articulate ethical and evidence-based policy options. WHO also provides technical support designed to build sustainable institutional capacity and monitors the health situation and trends.

The World Health Assembly is WHO's supreme governing body. It comprises 194 member states and meets every year. WHO's Executive Board of 34 members usually meets twice a year—in January to prepare for and advise the World Health Assembly, and in May, immediately after the assembly's meeting, to handle more administrative matters.

The Department of Health and Ageing leads on Australia's engagement with WHO, in close collaboration with the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). Australia participates in WHO's global and regional governing bodies.

AusAID and WHO have a partnership framework (2009–13). This includes a commitment to provide \$64 million in core voluntary contributions over four years through the Australian aid program. In 2010–11 Australia provided \$68.6 million to WHO, comprising \$18.0 million in voluntary core contributions, \$9.1 in assessed contributions, and \$41.5 million in non-core funding. Australia is currently WHO's eighth largest government donor.

RESULTS AND RELEVANCE	
1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>WHO provides vital technical knowledge and international coordination for public health policy in all countries. In a development context, WHO's key roles of translating health norms and standards, providing leadership on technical health issues at the country-level, and supporting the implementation of assistance from other partner all make valuable contributions to addressing poverty.</p> <p>Both global and regional reports contain extensive and informative descriptions of results achieved in the relevant periods and of their contexts. These reports contain a mix of narratives and reporting against agreed performance indicators, arranged by Strategic Objectives (as set out in the Medium Term Strategic Plan). However, while this form of reporting makes clear the outputs and outcomes in which WHO has played a part, it does not make it clear what results are attributable to WHO itself. The 2010 Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) commented that WHO reporting on its own contribution to outcomes is an area that could be improved.</p> <p>The current WHO reform agenda being led by the Director General shows that WHO is willing to look critically at its programmatic and organisational management and to take steps to address weaknesses in its reporting of results. This includes the formulation of a clear results chain, a more robust monitoring and evaluation system and better alignment of resources to country priorities.</p> <p>Targeting the poorest is not a systematic priority of WHO, given its mandate, however WHO's work makes a valuable contribution to addressing poverty by translating health norms and standards and providing leadership on technical health issues at the country-level. WHO also makes valuable contributions to the poorest in various aspects of its activities such as advising on providing affordable health care in low income countries or disadvantaged areas of countries.</p>	DELIVERS RESULTS STRONG
	MONITORS AND REPORTS RESULTS SATISFACTORY
	TARGETS POOREST SATISFACTORY

2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests	Component Rating STRONG
<p>WHO support for implementing the International Health Regulations and coordinating international responses to health emergencies, are closely aligned with Australia's public health interests.</p> <p>WHO has been only partly responsive to efforts by Australia and other donors to ensure it funds adequately its work on maternal and child health, health system strengthening and health financing. It has also been only partly responsive to paying adequate attention to the needs of the Asia-Pacific region.</p> <p>WHO's core work is aligned with the Australian aid program's strategic goals of saving lives and promoting opportunities for all. WHO reforms should result in an increased focus on: gender, equity and human rights; health financing; and, health systems strengthening.</p> <p>The main functions of WHO are directly related to achieving health Millennium Development Goals and, more broadly, to improving global and regional health indicators. It also improves health systems and addresses emerging health issues.</p> <p>According to the 2010 MOPAN report, WHO performs well in mainstreaming the crosscutting thematic priorities of HIV/AIDS, gender equality and human rights approaches, although Australia has concerns about its performance in implementing its gender strategy.</p> <p>WHO has shown leadership on disability by cooperating with the World Bank to produce the World Report on Disability.</p> <p>WHO has no specific policy on work in fragile states, but it plays an important role in leading the health cluster in emergency situations.</p>	<p>SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S OBJECTIVES VERY STRONG</p>
	<p>ALIGNS WITH STRATEGIC GOALS OF AID PROGRAM STRONG</p>
	<p>FOCUSES ON CROSSCUTTING ISSUES STRONG</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE IN FRAGILE STATES SATISFACTORY</p>

3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system	Component Rating STRONG
<p>WHO plays a key coordination role in global health which contributes to the achievement of the health-related Millennium Development Goals, as well as effective responses to humanitarian emergencies and emerging health issues and increased aid effectiveness in the health sector.</p> <p>WHO contributes to coordination through the International Health Partnership, a group of international partners with a common interest in improving health services and health outcomes by putting the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action principles on aid effectiveness into practice. It also coordinates health clusters or sub-clusters in immediate and protracted emergencies. However, the 2010 MOPAN report, and reporting from Australian overseas missions, suggests that WHO varies in how well it fulfils these coordination functions at country-level. Strengthening of the both the leadership and coordination roles of country offices is a key priority in the current WHO reform process.</p> <p>Development of norms and standards, specialist expertise and technical advice in global health are the comparative advantages of WHO.</p> <p>WHO's knowledge products, and its sharing of them, are generally of high standard. In particular WHO plays a vital role in the rigorous development of global guidelines on a wide range of health issues that support and inform the work of other development partners.</p> <p>WHO's technical expertise and rigorous development of global health guidelines lay an essential platform for the work of other development partners. Feedback from Global Fund headquarters staff and from Australian overseas missions confirms the value of WHO's technical inputs at country-level. The Burnet Institute—an Australian non-government organisation has commented positively about its partnership with WHO in Papua New Guinea where innovative approaches to health service delivery have been implemented.</p>	PROMOTES COORDINATION STRONG
	MAKES A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE STRONG
	PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE, POLICY OR INNOVATION VERY STRONG

ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR	
4. Strategic management and performance	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>There is room for WHO to improve its strategic management performance.</p> <p>The 2010 MOPAN report noted several weaknesses in strategic planning, including the proliferation of priorities (81 organisation-wide expected results) and the lack of distinction between outputs and outcomes in much of its system for reporting results. The current reform process includes improved approaches to priority setting and the strategic management of WHO's work at global, regional and country-levels. Nevertheless, the momentum on organisational reform needs to continue for some time to ensure sustained improvements.</p> <p>MOPAN noted that weaknesses in WHO's governance arrangements make it difficult to ensure effective management, including the organisation's reliance on consensus decision making among 194 member states and weaknesses in the way its Executive Board operates. A proposal to develop elements of governance reform, including greater coherence between WHO's governing bodies, was approved recently by the Executive Board, but it is too early to judge the impact of this.</p> <p>WHO generally performs adequately in this respect, but there is room for improvement in monitoring and evaluation systems and in managing underperforming programs, departments and offices. The 2010 MOPAN report pointed out shortcomings in evaluation coverage and accessibility of evaluations. The Executive Board recently approved the development of an evaluation policy for WHO and implementation of an initial independent evaluation.</p> <p>The 2010 MOPAN report identified problems with WHO's human resource profile and management of staff, including slow and poorly managed recruitment and selection practices, limited flexibility in the workforce, the need for an improved skills mix among staff and poor performance management (particularly of underperforming staff). The Director General has the Executive Board's agreement to move forward on</p>	<p>CLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BODY SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>USES MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS SATISFACTORY</p>
	<p>EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES SATISFACTORY</p>

<p>managerial reforms, including with human resource management, and there are expectations of improvement.</p> <p>WHO's Western Pacific Region stands out for its leadership on human resource reforms at regional and country-levels, including its processes for reviewing position descriptions to ensure an appropriate balance between technical and non-technical skills, developing a strategic human resource plan for the region and initiating an executive coaching program in transformational leadership capacity for senior staff.</p>	
<p>5. Cost and value consciousness</p>	<p>Component Rating SATISFACTORY</p>
<p>WHO has not paid close attention to cost and value consciousness, but has recently formed an Independent Expert Oversight Advisory Committee to strengthen the ability of its Programme Budget and Administration Committee (PBAC) to scrutinise finance and risk issues. Further strengthening of PBAC was also recently approved as part of WHO's reform process. This is a positive development.</p> <p>WHO's current reporting allows only an approximate identification of the links between expenditure and results. For example, tables annexed to each regional director's annual report show budget implementation by budget centres but it difficult to identify value for money in comparative terms across country offices or programs.</p> <p>The introduction of WHO's global management system is an improvement in tracking costs, but is a limited tool for assessing cost effectiveness. For member states, WHO has developed tools to help them get better value for money from their health investments. Tools include: the 2010 World Health Report on health financing; guidelines on analysis of cost effectiveness in public health programs; and regional databases on the costs, impact on population health and cost effectiveness of key health interventions.</p>	<p>MANAGEMENT SCRUTINISES COSTS SATISFACTORY</p> <p>COST EFFECTIVENESS A FOCUS OF PROGRAMS WEAK</p> <p>CHALLENGES PARTNERS ON VALUE FOR MONEY STRONG</p>

6. Partnership behaviour	Component Rating STRONG
<p>For the most part WHO is a willing and effective partner for vertical funds, multilateral banks, bilateral donors and other stakeholders in the health sector. Its relations with other UN agencies are generally good, but are characterised by difficulties common with UN agencies with overlapping mandates.</p> <p>WHO hosts the secretariats of a number of global health partnerships, generally to good effect, but there are challenges with some relationships.</p> <p>In most countries WHO has close and fruitful working relations with health ministries, although in some instances the organisation could be better aligned with national health plans and/or play a stronger convening role in the sector.</p> <p>Engagement with a broad range of relevant stakeholders in developing health standards and strategies at different levels is one of WHO's strengths. However, greater formal engagement by non-member state actors in the governance of WHO remains a contentious issue. As part of the WHO reform agenda, the Executive Board has asked the Secretariat to further analyse proposals to promote engagement with other stakeholders.</p>	WORKS EFFECTIVELY WITH OTHERS STRONG
	ALIGNS WITH PARTNER PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS STRONG
	PROVIDES VOICE FOR STAKEHOLDERS SATISFACTORY
7. Transparency and accountability	Component Rating SATISFACTORY
<p>WHO does not have a formal disclosure policy but its publishing of operational and internal information is generally suitable.</p> <p>Budget transparency is significantly limited by unpredictability in its resource mobilisation and by significant differences among allocated budget, budget received and actual expenditure across budget lines. Achieving better predictability is a key part of the ongoing reform discussions, with options for more multi-year agreements with key donors/partners and a predictable collective financing approach currently being developed for consideration by Member States.</p> <p>WHO has sound policies and processes for financial accountability, including risk management and auditing. The 2010 MOPAN report found WHO to be very strong in undertaking external audits across the organisation.</p>	ROUTINELY PUBLISHES INFORMATION STRONG
	CLEAR PROCESS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION WEAK
	STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS STRONG
	PROMOTES TRANSPARENCY OF PARTNERS N/A

6. Ongoing ratings system

The terms of reference for the AMA state that the final report will:

include recommendations on the use of the rating system on an ongoing basis, including links to existing international assessment processes such as the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), and on the need for systems and processes to facilitate ongoing assessment.

1. Principles

The ongoing ratings scheme should be based on the following principles:

- a. **simplicity** through aligning to the extent possible with existing processes under Australia's aid program and existing multilateral processes where possible
- b. **proportionality** through investing the most time in assessing and engaging with organisations of most importance to Australia's aid program (as measured by the size or level of risk of investment)
- c. **clarity** on what Australia expects from engaging with multilateral organisations and how progress will be measured
- d. **consistency** to enable tracking of progress over time
- e. **efficiency** for Australian officials, multilateral organisations and other stakeholders by linking to the extent possible with existing Australian and international efforts to assess multilateral effectiveness
- f. **transparency** through publishing, on an annual basis, information about the impact and effectiveness of Australia's funding to multilateral organisations.

2. Key considerations

The ongoing ratings system should be refined and institutionalised during the development and implementation of the multilateral engagement strategy in 2012.

Implementation of the system should be undertaken in collaboration with like-minded donors such as the UK and Canada and linked with MOPAN wherever feasible and appropriate.

The system should also be aligned with and directly feed into the aid program's results framework to avoid any duplication of effort.

3. Proposed system

On the basis of these principles, the ongoing assessment of multilateral effectiveness should include: tracking performance through an annual multilateral performance scorecard; reporting on multilateral effectiveness at country-level through annual program performance reports; addressing performance concerns through a formal process; and conducting a five-yearly comprehensive assessment of multilateral effectiveness. These measures are outlined below.

a. Tracking performance through an Annual Multilateral Performance Scorecard

In August of each year an Annual Multilateral Performance Scorecard will report on the effectiveness of Australia's multilateral partners. The scorecard will be compiled by AusAID's Multilateral Aid Effectiveness section.

Input for the scorecard will come from the part of Government that leads on the development-related aspects of the relationship with each organisation, drawing on outcomes from senior level meetings, MOPAN reports and board reporting.

The scorecard will:

- > report on major developments against the AMA's seven components for multilateral organisations that receives core funding of more than \$2 million and/or non-core funding of more than \$5 million through Australia's aid program
- > report on issues or trends on the effectiveness of multilateral organisations as delivery partners at country or sector levels
- > report any changes to ratings for the seven components, whether they arise from major developments or from further evidence
- > note changes in ratings that arise due to changes made to the methodology (for example, as flagged in Section 4, a change to the methodology may be warranted in component 3 so each organisation's contribution to the wider multilateral system is assessed without regard to their stated mandates)
- > include available information on aggregate institutional results achieved by multilateral organisations and the share attributable to Australia's core contributions
- > inform core funding decisions, including relating to performance-linked funding allocations
- > be used to identify common issues or trends across multilateral organisations that can be taken forward in high-level meetings or through MOPAN discussions.

Organisations not included in the AMA may also be included in the scorecard, following an assessment of ratings against the 24 criteria.

The scorecard will be made publicly available through AusAID's website, enabling all stakeholders to see information on the impact and effectiveness of Australia's contributions to multilateral organisations.

b. Reporting on multilateral effectiveness at country-level through Annual Program Performance Reports

As a key input into the scorecard, country-level feedback on multilateral performance will be gathered systematically through a strengthened requirement that each Annual Program Performance Report (APPR) include a section on multilateral effectiveness. APPRs will briefly flag good and bad practice on the performance of all multilateral partners that engage with Australia's aid program and/or play a particularly significant role in that country. In some cases, the information in APPRs may trigger a request for more information from the area preparing the scorecard.

c. Addressing performance concerns through a formal process

Organisations that receive a 'weak' rating against one or more AMA component may be subject to a formal process of performance monitoring as follows:

- > The area within the Australian Government responsible for leading on the aid program aspects of the relationship may send a performance letter to the organisation
- > The performance letter will outline concerns about the organisation's performance, setting out expectations for improvement and how progress against expectations will be monitored and measured
- > Where appropriate, the performance letter will outline consequences if performance indicators are not met
- > Progress against the indicators in performance letters will be reported in the Annual Multilateral Performance Scorecard
- > Where progress is insufficient, the Australian Government may decide to reduce or cease funding
- > The formal performance monitoring process will be in addition to efforts to improve the effectiveness of all multilateral organisations through ongoing engagement.

d. Five-yearly comprehensive assessment of multilateral effectiveness

To complement the annual scorecard system, every five years Australia will produce a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of multilateral organisations. This should be undertaken to the greatest degree possible in collaboration with like-minded bilateral donors.

The assessment should draw, to the greatest degree possible, on information from MOPAN. Australia should work with like-minded donors over the coming years to maximise the value of information from MOPAN to minimise the amount of original assessment work Australia and other bilateral donors need to conduct.

Collaborating with others will not negate the need for an Australia-specific element of the multilateral assessment, particularly in assessing the extent of alignment with Australia's development priorities.

Appendix 1—Assessment framework and determination of ratings

Assessment framework

The assessment framework involved seven components broken into 24 criteria as follows.

Results and relevance (Why we fund)

Component 1: Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

Criterion 1a: Demonstrates development or humanitarian results consistent with mandate (Delivers results)

Criterion 1b: Plays critical role in improving aid effectiveness through results monitoring (Monitors and reports results)

Criterion 1c: Where relevant, targets the poorest people and areas where progress against the MDGs is lagging (Targets poorest)

Component 2: Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests

Criterion 2a: Allocates resources and delivers results in support of Australia's development objectives (Supports Australia's objectives)

Criterion 2b: Effectively targets development concerns and promotes issues consistent with Australian priorities (Aligns with strategic goals of aid program)

Criterion 2c: Focuses on crosscutting issues, particularly gender, environment and people with disabilities (Focuses on crosscutting issues)

Criterion 2d: Performs effectively in fragile states (Effective in fragile states)

Component 3: Contribution to the wider multilateral development system

Criterion 3a: Plays a critical role at global or national level in promoting the coordination of development or humanitarian efforts (Promotes coordination)

Criterion 3b: Plays a leading role in developing norms and standards that facilitate the achievement of development outcomes, or in providing large-scale finance or specialist expertise (Makes a critical difference)

Criterion 3c: Fills a policy or knowledge gap, or develops innovative approaches (Promotes knowledge, policy or innovation)

Organisational behaviour (How they perform)

Component 4: Strategic management and performance

Criterion 4a: Has clear strategy and plans, effectively implemented (Clear strategy and plans)

Criterion 4b: Governing body is effective in guiding management (Effective governing body)

Criterion 4c: Has a sound framework for monitoring and evaluation, and acts promptly to realign or amend programs not delivering results (Uses monitoring and evaluation systems)

Criterion 4d: Leadership is effective and human resources are well managed (Effective leadership and human resource policies)

Component 5: Cost and value consciousness

Criterion 5a: Governing body and management regularly scrutinize costs and assess value for money (Management scrutinises costs)

Criterion 5b: Rates of return and cost effectiveness are important factors in decision making (Cost effectiveness a focus of programs)

Criterion 5c: Challenges and supports partners to think about value for money (Challenges partners on value for money)

Component 6: Partnership behaviour

Criterion 6a: Works effectively in partnership with others (Works effectively with others)

Criterion 6b: Places value on alignment with partner countries' priorities and systems (Aligns with partner priorities and systems)

Criterion 6c: Provides voice for partners and other stakeholders in decision making (Provides voice for stakeholders)

Component 7: Transparency and accountability

Criterion 7a: Routinely publishes comprehensive operational information, subject to justifiable confidentiality (Routinely publishes information)

Criterion 7b: Is transparent in resource allocation, budget management and operational planning (Clear process for resource allocation)

Criterion 7c: Adheres to high standards of financial management, audit, risk management and fraud prevention (Strong accountability mechanisms)

Criterion 7d: Promotes transparency and accountability in partners and recipients (Promotes transparency of partners)

Determination of ratings

Ratings of Very strong, Strong, Satisfactory, Weak or Not applicable are given for each organisation against each criterion. The average of the criteria ratings within each component is used to form the component rating. All criteria are equally weighted. Scores of 'Not applicable' are not included in the computation of the component rating.

Ratings were determined based on the benchmarks for ratings of Very strong, Strong, Satisfactory and Weak for each criterion outlined below.

All ratings were based on assessment against the development-related aspects of organisation's mandates.

Determination of ratings involved a process of assessing both absolute and relative performance against the benchmarks on each criterion. This was done by weighing up the evidence available on the performance of each organisation in relation to each criterion, and where possible, comparing performance relative to other organisations with a similar mandate or mode of operation.

For some criteria, such as 'routinely publishes information', it was relatively easy to compare the effectiveness of approaches across organisations. For other criteria, such as 'uses monitoring and evaluation', the differences across organisations made direct comparisons difficult. In cases where comparisons were not possible, the AMA used absolute judgements against the benchmarks below.

The AMA made every possible effort to use objective evidence when scoring. A series of moderation processes and peer review meetings were used to attempt to ensure that scores were soundly based. Nevertheless, some subjective judgements were necessary given the wide variations in mandates, modes of operation and quantity of evidence across the 42 organisations in the AMA.

One consequence of the focus on evidence-based ratings is that ratings do not reflect reform efforts that have been initiated but have not yet had time to prove their effectiveness. The methodology for the AMA states that reform efforts that have been initiated will be taken into consideration in ratings. This holds true where there is evidence that reforms are already having a positive impact. Where the evidence on the impact of reforms is not yet clear, no credit has been given in the ratings.

Evidence used in determining ratings

The AMA used the following sources of evidence to inform assessments and ratings:

1. Publicly available documentation, including:

- > reporting of the multilateral organisations themselves
- > reports from the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN)
- > assessments of multilateral organisations undertaken by other bilateral donors (including the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden)
- > responses by multilateral organisations to the UK-Multilateral Aid Review findings.

2. Engagement with the headquarters of multilateral organisations

- > Multilateral organisations were advised of their inclusion in the AMA through a letter from the AusAID Director General in mid-August. They were subsequently provided with a copy of the methodology when it was finalised in early September.
- > Meetings were held at headquarters level with 38 of the 42 multilateral organisations included in the AMA.
- > Due to time constraints, the AMA was unable to meet with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in Ramallah, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna, the Montreal Protocol Fund in Montreal and the African Development Bank (AfDB) in Tunis. A meeting was held with the UNODC regional office in Bangkok. AfDB had been consulted as part of a recent Australian Government review that was a key input to the AMA.
- > Headquarters meetings focused on issues flagged by the AMA team in writing in advance of each meeting.
- > Headquarters meetings were supplemented by visits to the regional offices of a range of organisations in Bangkok and Manila.
- > Multilateral organisations were provided with an opportunity to comment on a draft of their individual assessment.

3. Consultations with partner governments, civil society and other donors

- > Field visits were undertaken to Indonesia, Solomon Islands, Vietnam, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Ethiopia to examine the effectiveness of multilateral organisations at country-level.
- > Each field visit involved consultations with the partner government, civil society representatives, other bilateral donors, multilateral organisations themselves and Australian Government representatives.

- > Each field visit focused on a subset of the multilateral organisations included in the AMA, although where evidence was found on the effectiveness of multilateral organisations that were not the explicit focus of field visits this information was included in the AMA's considerations.

4. Analysis and reporting from within the Australian Government, including:

- > annual reporting summarising the status of major multilateral partnerships
- > outcomes from recent high level consultations
- > verbal briefings from government officials in Australia and at overseas missions, including through an inter-departmental committee
- > recent reviews of specific multilateral organisations, most particularly in relation to the African Development Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development.

5. Response to a survey of Australian overseas missions

- > Australian overseas missions with accreditation to any developing country were asked to provide feedback to the AMA
- > they were asked to report against the assessment framework on any aspect of the effectiveness of any of the 42 multilateral organisations in the AMA
- > they were asked to draw on existing knowledge and were not expected to undertake original research
- > responses to the survey were received from 26 Australian overseas missions: Baghdad, Beijing, Beirut, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Cairo, Dhaka, Islamabad, Kabul, Kathmandu, Lima, Manila, Mexico City, Nauru, Nuku'alofa, New Delhi, Phnom Penh, Port Moresby, Port Vila, Ramallah, Rangoon, Santiago, Suva, Tarawa, Tehran and Vientiane.

6. Consultations with Australian stakeholders, including:

- > meetings with the chairs of Parliamentary Associations focused on development-related issues
- > a roundtable meeting with interested Australian NGOs chaired by the Australian Council for International Development
- > meetings with social partners (representatives of business groups and unions) in relation to the assessment of the International Labour Organization.

7. Public submissions

- > Public submissions were open for a six week period and closed on 25 October 2011.
- > Eleven submissions were received by the deadline. The list of public submissions received is in Appendix 2.

Benchmarks for ratings

Ratings of Very strong, Strong, Satisfactory or Weak were given in relation to each criterion. Ratings were based on the benchmarks that follow.

All ratings were made only in relation to the development-related aspects of organisations mandates and operations.

The term ‘programs’ in the definitions below covers all the development-related work of organisations, including: normative and standard-setting work; policy, advisory, research and analytical work; and program and project delivery. The term ‘value for money’ in the definitions refers to the best balance between the quality and cost of a program that is appropriate to achieve a desired outcome.

Results and relevance (Why we fund)

Component 1: Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate

Criterion 1a: Delivers results

Very strong: Clear independently verified evidence of delivering high impact development results at an institutional level and across most programs.

Strong: Clear independently verified evidence of delivering high impact development results across most programs although difficult to assess the extent to which results represent value for money at an institutional level.

Satisfactory: Evidence of positive development impact across a majority of programs, although performance may be mixed.

Weak: Inadequate evidence of positive development impact across a majority of programs (although specific programs/activities may still produce positive results).

Criterion 1b: Monitors and reports results

Very strong: Clear and widely used system for monitoring and reporting to key stakeholders on results at all levels, including aggregate reporting of development results attributable to the organisation.

Strong: Clear system and widely used system for reporting to key stakeholders on the results of programs but no systematic aggregation of reporting of development results attributable to the organisation.

Satisfactory: Organisation ensures monitoring and reporting on results to key stakeholders of all programs, but this is not done in a systematic or consistent way across the organisation.

Weak: Results from programs are not consistently monitored and/or not adequately reported to key stakeholders.

Criterion 1c: Targets poorest

Very strong: Systematic and effective effort across the organisation to target and direct the benefits of programs to the poorest and most vulnerable groups within countries/regions.

Strong: Organisations generally includes consideration of ways to maximise benefits for the poorest within program decisions.

Satisfactory: Many programs may benefit the poorest but this is not a key factor in decision making across the organisation.

Weak: Targeting of the poorest rarely or poorly considered in program decisions.

Component 2: Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests

Criterion 2a: Supports Australia's objectives

Very strong: Mandate/programs very closely aligned with Australia's interests; and/or very responsive to constructive influence from Australia on development issues.

Strong: Mandate/programs closely aligned with Australia's interests; and/or generally responsive to constructive influence from Australia on development issues.

Satisfactory: Aspects of mandate/programs align with Australia's interests; and/or been responsive to constructive influence from Australia on some development issues.

Weak: Little or no alignment with Australia's interests; and/or has generally been unresponsive to constructive influence from Australia on development issues.

Criterion 2b: Aligns with strategic goals of aid program

Very strong: Mandate/programs have a very high degree of alignment with one or more of the Australian aid program's five strategic goals.

Strong: Mandate/programs have a high degree of alignment with one or more of the Australian aid program's five strategic goals.

Satisfactory: Aspects of mandate/programs have a high degree of alignment with one or more of the Australian aid program's five strategic goals.

Weak: Mandate/programs do not align strongly with one or more of the Australian aid program's five strategic goals.

Criterion 2c: Focuses on crosscutting issues

Very strong: Organisation has clear policies on applicable crosscutting issues that evaluations show to be effectively and consistently applied in programs.

Strong: Organisation has clear policies on most applicable crosscutting issues and crosscutting issues evaluations show to be generally well applied in programs.

Satisfactory: Organisation has clear policies on most relevant crosscutting issues although these may be inconsistently applied across programs; and/or organisation lacks relevant policies but generally pays adequate attention to crosscutting issues in programs.

Weak: Organisation lacks policies on most relevant crosscutting issues and evaluations confirm does not pay adequate attention to crosscutting issues in programs.

Criterion 2d: Effective in fragile states

Very strong: Has a strong track record of operating effectively in fragile states through adjusting programs to take account of the operational environment in fragile states and (where relevant) has specific policies to guide staff and programs in fragile states that are consistently applied.

Strong: Has a good track record of operating effectively in fragile states through active adjustment of programs to take account of the operational environment in fragile states, with some success; and/or (where relevant) has specific policies to guide programs in fragile states that are generally applied.

Satisfactory: Takes into account the operational environment in fragile states when planning and implementing programs, but this is not a key factor in decision making.

Weak: Takes little or no account of the operational environment in fragile states when planning and implementing programs.

Component 3: Contribution to the wider multilateral development system

Criterion 3a: Promotes coordination

Very strong: Role in coordinating development efforts is relied upon by a broad range of development stakeholders and is seen as highly effective.

Strong: Role in coordinating development efforts is relied upon by a broad range of development stakeholders and seen as generally effective; and/or relied upon by development stakeholders in a specialised sector/theme and is seen as highly effective.

Satisfactory: Plays a role in coordinating development efforts and is seen by development stakeholders as adding some value.

Weak: Plays a role in coordinating development efforts but is seen by development stakeholders as adding little value.

Criterion 3b: Makes a critical difference

Very strong: The organisation has a critical role in setting norms and standards or providing/coordinating large-scale finance that is widely used by a broad range of development stakeholders and is seen as highly valuable.

Strong: The organisation has a critical role in setting norms and standards or providing/coordinating large-scale finance that is widely used by a broad range of development stakeholders and is seen as generally valuable; and/or are used by development stakeholders in a specialised sector/theme and seen as highly valuable.

Satisfactory: The organisation plays a role in setting norms and standards or providing/coordinating large-scale finance that is used by some development stakeholders and seen as useful.

Weak: The organisation plays a role in setting norms and standards or providing/coordinating large-scale finance that is generally not used or not seen as valuable by relevant development stakeholders.

Criterion 3c: Promotes knowledge, policy or innovation

Very strong: Knowledge products, policy work or innovations are widely used by a broad range of development stakeholders and are seen as highly valuable.

Strong: Knowledge products, policy work or innovations are widely used by a broad range of development stakeholders and seen as generally valuable; and/or are used by development stakeholders in a specialised sector/theme and are seen as highly valuable.

Satisfactory: Knowledge products, policy work or innovations are used by some development stakeholders and seen as useful.

Weak: Knowledge products, policy work or innovations are generally not used or not seen as valuable by relevant development stakeholders.

Organisational behaviour (How they perform)

Component 4: Strategic management and performance

Criterion 4a: Clear strategy and plans

Very strong: Has a clear, overarching strategic planning document that directs decision making throughout the organisation and implementation is monitored.

Strong: Has a clear, overarching strategic planning document that generally informs decision making; and/or there are organisation-wide systematic means to direct decision making but there is no overarching strategic planning document.

Satisfactory: Program-level strategies and plans inform decision making but overarching strategic planning documents are lacking or do not generally drive decision making.

Weak: Strategies and plans are not in place at program level or do not generally drive decision making.

Criterion 4b: Effective governing body

Very strong: Governing body provides clear strategic direction and (where necessary) drives and monitors improvements or reform efforts.

Strong: Governing body generally effective in overseeing strategic direction and holding management to account for performance.

Satisfactory: Governing body provides adequate oversight of management performance and (where necessary) supports management-initiated reform efforts.

Weak: Governing body does not provide adequate oversight of management performance and/or is an obstacle to management-initiated reform efforts.

Criterion 4c: Uses monitoring and evaluation systems

Very strong: Has organisation-wide systems for monitoring and evaluating program performance that meet all accountability and learning needs and are consistently applied across the organisation to inform decision making.

Strong: Has organisation-wide systems for monitoring and evaluating program performance that meet all accountability and learning needs and are generally used across the organisation and inform decision making.

Satisfactory: Ensures that monitoring and evaluation is part of all programs but the influence on decision making is generally limited to the individual program level.

Weak: Monitoring and evaluation is not a systematic requirement in programs or is not used to inform decision making or improve programs when necessary.

Criterion 4d: Effective leadership and human resource policies

Very strong: Leadership has been successful in driving changes to improve effectiveness and human resource policies facilitate the recruitment and placement of the highest calibre staff possible.

Strong: Leadership is in the process of driving changes to improve effectiveness; and/or human resource policies are generally effective in facilitating the recruitment and placement of high calibre staff.

Satisfactory: Leadership is supporting improvements to effectiveness; and/or human resource policies are adequate to recruit and place staff that can effectively perform required duties in a timely manner.

Weak: Leadership is not supporting improvements to effectiveness; and/or human resource policies are not adequate to recruit and place staff that can effectively perform required duties in a timely manner.

Component 5: Cost and value consciousness

Criterion 5a: Management scrutinises costs

Very strong: Senior management and the governing body systematically consider value for money issues in organisation-level decision making.

Strong: Senior management and the governing body regularly focus on issues relating to value for money and take action when necessary, although it is not a systematic driver of organisation-level decision making.

Satisfactory: Senior management and the governing body consider value for money in strategic planning or when taking major organisation-level decisions and take action when major issues or concerns relating to cost effectiveness and value for money arise.

Weak: Senior management and the governing body do not adequately focus on value for money when taking major organisation-level decisions.

Criterion 5b: Cost effectiveness a focus of programs

Very strong: Value for money is a systematic and important consideration in the planning and implementation of programs, a major factor in decision making and problems are pro-actively addressed.

Strong: Value for money is a systematic consideration in the planning and implementation of programs, a factor in decision making and problems are addressed as they arise.

Satisfactory: Value for money is generally considered in the planning and implementation of programs and any major problems that emerge are addressed.

Weak: Value for money considerations do not generally feature in decision making.

Criterion 5c: Challenges partners on value for money

Very strong: Value for money issues are systematic and important considerations in agreements or interactions with partners and progress is closely monitored.

Strong: Value for money issues are systematically included in agreements or interactions with partners and problems are addressed as they arise.

Satisfactory: Value for money issues are a factor, but not systematically included, in agreements or interactions partners and any major problems that emerge are addressed.

Weak: Value for money considerations do not generally feature in agreements or interactions with partners.

Component 6: Partnership behaviour

Criterion 6a: Works effectively with others

Very strong: Building effective partnerships with relevant development stakeholders is a systematic focus of decision making and relevant stakeholders consistently view partnership behaviour as effective and look to the organisation for leadership.

Strong: Building effective partnerships with relevant development stakeholders is a factor in decision making and relevant stakeholders generally view partnership behaviour as effective.

Satisfactory: Willing to work with relevant development stakeholders to improve effectiveness and a majority of relevant stakeholders generally view partnership behaviour as effective.

Weak: Partnerships with relevant development stakeholders not generally a factor in decision making; and/or a majority of relevant stakeholders generally view partnership behaviour as ineffective.

Criterion 6b: Aligns with partner priorities and systems

Very strong: Appropriate alignment with partner priorities and systems is a systematic focus of decision making and relevant stakeholders consistently view approach to alignment as best practice.

Strong: Appropriate alignment with partner priorities and systems is a factor in decision making and relevant stakeholders generally view approach to alignment as appropriate.

Satisfactory: Generally willing to align with partner priorities and systems to improve effectiveness and a majority of relevant stakeholders generally view approach to alignment as appropriate.

Weak: Appropriate alignment with partner priorities and systems not generally a factor in decision making; and/or a majority of relevant stakeholders generally view approach to alignment as poor practice.

Criterion 6c: Provides voice for stakeholders

Very strong: The views of all key stakeholders are important and systematic drivers of decision making and relevant stakeholders are satisfied with the extent of their engagement and influence on key decisions.

Strong: The views of all key stakeholders are a key factor in decision making and most relevant stakeholders are generally satisfied with the extent of their engagement and influence on key decisions.

Satisfactory: Generally willing to engage with all key stakeholders to improve effectiveness and a majority of relevant stakeholders are satisfied with the extent of their engagement and influence on key decisions.

Weak: The views of all key stakeholders not generally a factor in decision making; and/or a majority of relevant stakeholders are dissatisfied with the extent of their engagement and influence on key decisions.

Component 7: Transparency and accountability

Criterion 7a: Routinely publishes information

Very strong: Fully compliant with the International Aid Transparency Initiative requirements on disclosure of information.

Strong: Systematically releases all relevant information in a clear way that is easily accessible on its website.

Satisfactory: Releases key (but not all relevant) information on its website in a way that is reasonably accessible to stakeholders.

Weak: Does not publicly release key information in a way that is accessible to stakeholders.

Criterion 7b: Clear process for resource allocation

Very strong: Has a clear and transparent means of allocating un-earmarked resources across countries or programs that is based on objective information, consistently applied.

Strong: Systematically uses criteria to allocate un-earmarked resources across countries or programs but with some degree of subjectivity exercised by senior management or the board.

Satisfactory: Rationale for allocation of resources across countries or programs published in annual report or other key document but is not necessarily known ex-ante.

Weak: No publicly available rationale for allocation of resources across countries or programs.

Criterion 7c: Strong accountability mechanisms

Very strong: Effective financial management, audit, risk management and fraud prevention systems are in place, are key factors in decision making and are independently assessed as fully effective.

Strong: Appropriate financial management, audit, risk management and fraud prevention systems are in place, are factors in decision making and are independently assessed as generally effective.

Satisfactory: Appropriate financial management, audit, risk management and fraud prevention systems are in place (although are not generally factors in broader decision making), and any problems identified by independent assessments are addressed.

Weak: Financial management, audit, risk management and fraud prevention systems may be in place but are not subject to independent verification or have been independently assessed as inadequate.

Criterion 7d: Promotes transparency of partners

Very strong: Transparency and accountability issues are systematic and important considerations in discussions or agreements with partners.

Strong: Transparency and accountability issues generally feature in discussions or agreements with partners and any problems are addressed as they arise.

Satisfactory: Transparency and accountability issues are raised periodically in discussions or agreements with partners and any major problems that emerge are addressed.

Weak: Transparency and accountability issues do not generally feature in discussions or agreements with partners.

Appendix 2 – List of submissions

Submissions to the Australian Multilateral Assessment were received from:

- > Burnet Institute
- > International Finance Corporation
- > International Labour Organization
- > KSBSI-Indonesia
- > Manna Gum
- > Oxfam
- > RESULTS International (Australia)
- > Save the Children
- > Vanuatu Chamber of Commerce and Industry
- > Vision 2020 Australia
- > World Vision Australia.

