

**TIMOR-LESTE COUNTRY PROGRAM REPORT: JOINT REVIEW OF ADVISER POSITIONS
FUNDED BY THE AUSTRALIAN AID PROGRAM**

Overview

Between June and December 2010, Australia and our partner countries jointly reviewed the use of advisers across the aid program in order to ensure that all positions are delivering clear development results and represent value for money. [A Joint Adviser Review Report](#) was released on 15 February 2011, which provided a synthesis of the findings and key recommendations from individual country reviews, including country specific adviser figures and narrative.

Australia worked bilaterally with a large number of partner country governments to review each adviser position. While the underlying Review methodology and the core content of country-specific reports is consistent across programs, in each case the final country-specific Review Report reflects decisions made by the joint Review teams as appropriate for the specific cultural and language context. As a result there are some presentational differences between reports.

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the joint Review process undertaken between the Governments of Timor-Leste and Australia.

It is important to note that the Review process involved an assessment of the value and effectiveness of each adviser position – not the performance of individuals in those positions. The Review focused on the role of each position in meeting agreed country program objectives and development outcomes. On the basis of this assessment, the continued funding of adviser positions by AusAID was jointly considered and agreed with partner governments.

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1. Executive Summary

1.1. Introduction

1. Over the past ten years advisers have played an important part in Australia's response to the challenges facing Timor-Leste. Today they continue to deliver much-needed services in health and water and sanitation, and work in a diverse range of professional areas including public sector financial management, health financing, pharmacy, nutrition, medicine, legal drafting, engineering and agricultural research. However in recent times the use of advisers has attracted criticism, including from Timorese leaders who worry that advisers have cost too much, and produced few tangible results. A number of independent reviews have also questioned AusAID's emphasis on advisers.

2. In May this year Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade announced that AusAID would work with partner governments to jointly 'confirm the priority attached to each adviser position¹ and whether it is an effective response to mutually agreed development needs and priorities.' Ministers and officials of *Republica Democratica De Timor-Leste* (RDTL) met with AusAID throughout July and August to undertake this review,² the findings of which are contained in this report. The review was jointly overseen by Vice Prime Minister Coordinator of Management and Administrative Affairs of the State for RDTL, and Minister Counsellor Development Co-operation, AusAID.

3. The joint review builds on efforts of the last 18 months to reduce Australia's dependence on advisers and to enhance value for money in Timor-Leste. Actions have included negotiating reductions in packages; terminating positions early; ceasing automatic extensions; rejecting salary increases; declining requests for new positions; and restructuring programs to reduce the focus on advisers.

4. However serious weaknesses in Timor-Leste's labour market³ have left RDTL little choice but to rely on external experts to spend its resources well in the short term, while it deals with the longer term challenge of addressing systemic skills gaps. Together with the anticipated increases in both the RDTL⁴ and Australia's development assistance budget,⁵ it is likely that future demands on the aid program will result in the placement of greater

¹ For the purposes of this review an 'adviser' provides advice – to one or more interlocutors – on the strategic direction **and/or** implementation of the Australian aid program. See Annex 1 for a detailed definition of 'advisers' as used in this review.

² See Annex 2 for a list of RDTL and Australian representatives involved in the review.

³ Only half of Timor-Leste's adult population is literate and most people rely on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods. According to the UNDP's 2009 *Human Development Report*, Timor-Leste's adult literacy rate is estimated at 50.1 percent, which places it 138th of the 182 countries for which there were data in 2007. A 2008 study assessed that while some progress has been made, only 59 per cent of public servants had completed secondary school and only 7 per cent held a Bachelor's degree or higher.

⁴ Timor-Leste's budget has increased significantly in recent years and it is anticipated that RDTL will continue to increase spending in coming years. The total 2010 budget was \$637 million, which constitutes a 750 per cent increase on the 2003/04 budget of \$74.6 million. Donor funds have also reduced as proportion of combined sources spending throughout this period – from 66 per cent in 2003/04 to 24 per cent in 2010.

⁵ There is bipartisan commitment to increasing Australia's annual ODA to 0.5 per cent of GNI by the 2015-2016 financial year.

numbers of advisers. Against this backdrop, AusAID will work closely with RDTL to ensure that adviser positions are agreed judiciously, and that robust processes allow the placement of advisers only when they are shown to be the most effective, value for money response to agreed development needs and priorities.

1.2. Review Findings

Commitment to adviser positions

5. The joint review confirmed that all adviser positions supported the shared development priorities of RDTL and AusAID, and that none were of such low priority to warrant immediate cessation. Of the 82 adviser positions in place in 2010/11 financial year it was agreed that:

- 49 positions were of high priority and should continue (21 of these with amendments);
- 29 positions would be phased out by June 2012;
- A further 4 are currently under design, and will be agreed with RDTL in coming months.⁶

Findings and recommendations regarding the effectiveness of advisers

6. The review also looked at the effectiveness of adviser positions and whether there were any actions that could be taken to improve their use in the Timor-Leste Country Program.

7. There is a need to clearly define and agree the purpose of adviser positions. Most Australian-funded adviser positions mix purposes by combining 'gap-filling' and capacity building duties. In these situations the 'gap-filling' functions tend to take precedence. This sometimes led AusAID and RDTL to expect different things from an adviser, which on occasion led to differences of opinion regarding the purpose of the position.

Recommendation 1 (for RDTL and AusAID): Jointly identify and agree on the purpose of each adviser position. Where functions are a mix of capacity building and other duties (i.e. mixed), agree the approximate proportion of time which will be spent on each.

Recommendation 2 (for AusAID): Do not delegate discussions with RDTL regarding senior adviser positions to implementing partners.

8. It was difficult to determine what adviser positions 'add up to' and whether they are contributing to the achievement of overall program objectives. This was due to the fact that **expected results were often ill-defined** and the assumptions about how change was expected to occur were questionable.

Recommendation 3 (for RDTL and AusAID): Discuss, agree and document an explanation of how adviser assignments are expected to lead to agreed results.

Recommendation 4 (for RDTL and AusAID): Agree on how to monitor progress towards achieving results (who will monitor what, when and how).

⁶ See Annex 3 for specific detail on adviser positions.

9. There is broad international recognition that **the traditional adviser-national counterpart model⁷ has had limited success**. However it continues to be used in the Timor-Leste Country Program. AusAID and RDTL should move away from using this approach for capacity development.

Recommendation 5 (for AusAID and RDTL): Agree to abandon the use of the adviser-counterpart model as an approach to capacity development, except where it is demonstrated to be the most effective response to meeting program objectives.

10. **Partner country ownership of adviser management processes is crucial** to inculcating strong ownership and effectiveness of adviser inputs. However the quality of adviser management practices across the program was mixed with some programs reflecting sound practice, and others demonstrating room for improvement.

Recommendation 6 (for AusAID and RDTL): Agree guidelines for the identification and management of adviser positions which support joint RDTL-AusAID decision-making.

Recommendation 7 (for AusAID): The ability to speak Timor-Leste's official and working languages (in particular Tetun) should be more heavily weighted in recruitment processes. Language training should be undertaken as part of adviser assignments where necessary.

11. All programs funded by AusAID in Timor-Leste support a range of capacity development interventions.⁸ However the joint review found that advisers remain the preferred form of support for RDTL, and that there needs to be a more meaningful exploration of alternatives to adviser positions.

Recommendation 8 (for AusAID): Gather and share information regarding the cost and development effectiveness of a range of forms of assistance with RDTL and program implementing partners.

Recommendation 9 (for AusAID): Encourage RDTL to acquire the skills it needs from the international market. This would promote capacity development in the usual way of staff learning from effective managers who model good practice and sound work ethics.¹

⁷ That is, where an adviser works closely with an individual to build his or her capacity alone.

⁸ These include, among other things scholarships; short, long-term and on-the-job training; internships; equipment supply; exchanges; study tours; grants; vocational training and development of training materials, manuals and procedures

1.3. Implementing the review recommendations

12. In the coming months AusAID and RDTL will agree on how to wind down the 29 positions that were jointly identified for phase out through the review process. All of these positions will be brought to completion by June 2012.

13. RDTL and AusAID should agree a mechanism for managing future requests for advisers. Timor-Leste's Strategic Development Plan 2011 – 2030 proposes to establish the Economic Policy and Investment Agency (EPIA). This body may be the appropriate agency to play a role in co-ordinating adviser support as it is expected to have authority to coordinate ministry requests for assistance. Until this function is clarified AusAID will work closely with relevant RDTL authorities to improve the use of advisers in the aid program by integrating good practice into existing processes of priority setting, program design and planning, and monitoring and review.

14. AusAID will undertake analysis to compare the cost and development effectiveness of adviser positions vis-à-vis different types of support within the context of Timor-Leste. This analysis will be shared with RDTL and implementing partners and will inform the development of guidelines on the use of advisers in Timor-Leste, to be completed in first half of 2011.

2. Background

2.1. Timor-Leste country context

15. Timor-Leste's history has considerably shaped the character and capacity of its public sector. The withdrawal of Portugal in 1974 was followed by military occupation by Indonesia in the following year. Indonesia's contested rule came to an end in 1999, following a popular vote for independence, and in the several weeks that followed Timor-Leste's public sector infrastructure was all but destroyed. The public sector workforce also disintegrated with the flight of the largely Indonesian upper echelons of the public service.

16. From October 1999 the UN transitional government attempted to build the institutions of a new state, but faced tensions between building capacity and getting the job done. Two years later, the newly independent Timor-Leste inherited a bare-bones governance structure and faced the challenge of building its public sector virtually from scratch in a context of severe skills shortages.⁹ A 2008 study assessed that while some progress has been made, only 59 per cent of public servants had completed secondary school and only 7 per cent held a Bachelor's degree or higher.

17. Against this backdrop, consecutive governments had little choice but to draw upon the skills of international advisers. They ran the country under the first UN mission (1999-2002), and imported a range of practices of public administration from around the world. Timor-Leste's government and bureaucracy found it difficult to mediate the conflicting advice on policy priorities and modes of public administration, and existing systems and capacity were

⁹ See note 3 above.

often overlooked in a rush to build institutions modelled on a range of approaches from elsewhere.¹⁰ This uncoordinated approach has resulted in scepticism within some quarters of RDTL regarding the value of international advisers.

18. Timorese law currently prohibits the recruitment of non-citizens to positions within the public service despite the fact that it is not presently possible to secure some skills from the local labour market. This has forced RDTL into a position where it can only recruit ‘advisers’ from the international market to fill these skill gaps, rather than in-line personnel. RDTL now maintains its own budget line for consultancies¹¹ which is symptomatic of its attempts to equip itself with the human resources it needs to spend the increasing state budget.¹² As such Australian-funded advisers increasingly constitute a reduced proportion of whole-of-sector expenditure, and many are now helping RDTL to spend its own funds. A sizeable proportion of RDTL’s own budget for consultancies is being spent on national advisers, which is likely playing some part in stemming the flight of talented Timorese public servants to higher-paying jobs with international organisations. On the other hand the growth of national advisory positions is also weakening the structure of the public service by attracting senior public servants to positions that offer higher salaries and reduced responsibilities.

19. AusAID supports a range of capacity development interventions including scholarships; short, long-term and on-the-job training; internships; equipment supply; exchanges; study tours; grants; vocational training; and development of training materials, manuals, procedures and protocols. As a matter of general practice, programs are making efforts to consider capacity development issues more holistically by addressing the competencies and capabilities of organisations, institutions and systems in the context of meeting development objectives.¹³ This is a promising trend away from individual capacity development approaches and has enabled programs to become more targeted and strategic in their use of adviser positions. However this joint review found that advisers remain a clear preference for RDTL, and that there remains a clear ongoing need for adviser support. As a recent report of Australia’s Office of Development Effectiveness noted:

*East Timor has a civil service with severe shortages of people with experience and knowledge of how to organise the most basic functions of public sector management.*¹⁴

20. While AusAID is working to reduce its reliance on advisers, severe skills shortages leave RDTL little choice but to rely on external experts to spend its resources well in the short term, while it deals with the longer term challenge of addressing systemic skills gaps.

¹⁰ P. Lyon, *Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in Timor-Leste: Discussion Paper*, AusAID, June 2007, p.3

¹¹ This is referred to as ‘Professional Services’ in the budget. The allocation for this line item has risen from USD 24 million in 2009 to USD 38 million in 2010 so that it is equivalent to 40% of the Government’s 2010 civil service salary budget of USD 97 million. It has also increased as a percentage of the Government’s total budget (from 3.5% in 2009 to 5.9% in 2010).

¹² See note 4 above.

¹³ For example, RWSSP is focused at present on building the capacity of DNSAS financial systems with a view to eventually channelling funds through them. JSSF is working with the Office of the Prosecutor General to establish a case management system which will improve the effectiveness of the justice system as a whole.

¹⁴ M. Foster, *Improving the Provision of Basic Services for the Poor: Linkages with Broader Public Sector Reform, East Timor Case Study*, AusAID, August 2009.

Together with the anticipated increases in both the RDTL budget¹⁵ and Australia's development assistance to Timor-Leste, it is likely that future demands on the aid program will result in the placement of greater numbers of advisers. Against this backdrop, AusAID will work closely with RDTL to ensure that adviser positions are agreed judiciously, and that robust processes allow the placement of advisers only when they are shown to be the most effective, value for money response to agreed development needs and priorities.

2.2. International experience with the use of advisers

21. International research into the use of 'technical assistance personnel' is a useful point of reference for assessing the effectiveness of AusAID's use of advisers in the Timor-Leste Program. Some of the key findings relevant to the joint review are summarised below:

- Capacity development is about building the competencies and capabilities of groups, organisations, systems, sectors and society as a whole for improved performance, not just individuals.¹⁶
- The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) proposed a basic typology of adviser functions described in Table 1 below. While combining these functions in a single position can be advantageous, when they are in competition 'doing' functions generally take precedence over capacity development.¹⁷

Table 1: Typology of Adviser Positions¹⁸

Adviser Type	Description
Gap filling / Implementation	Helps an organisation carry out its work in lieu of locally available personnel.
Advisory	Provides expert advice to a partner country on a defined area of specialisation where this is not locally available.
Capacity Development	Assists individuals, organisations and systems in developing capabilities and enhancing performance.
Financial Control / Project Management	Ensures that external resources are used efficiently and transparently and to ensure accountability facilitating capacity development and mentoring change.
Policy Dialogue ¹⁹	Engages in policy dialogue with partner governments. Sometimes in lieu of representatives of development organisations, or to supplement their activities.

¹⁵See note 3 above.

¹⁶AusAID, *Policy Note 1: Capacity Development Overview*, October 2009, p.1

¹⁷T. Land, *Joint Evaluation Study of Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel: What can we learn from promising experiences?*, Synthesis Report, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), September 2007, pp.32-3

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p.33. This supports the findings of Lyon's report which found that 'TA is expected to develop capacity whilst getting on with the job. Doing both is not always possible and so capacity development as an objective therefore often gets subordinated.' Lyon, p.5

¹⁹This is an additional category identified by Lyon in the context of technical assistance personnel supported by AusAID in Timor-Leste. Lyon, p. 5

- Partner countries and development partners should be clearer about the purpose of advisers. This enables more accurate TOR, better matching of candidates to the role, and helps establish transparent performance expectations.²⁰
- Countries need to take charge of the management of advisers to enhance ownership, commitment to and effectiveness of adviser inputs.²¹
- There is broad international recognition that the traditional adviser-national counterpart model has had limited success as an instrument for capacity development.²² This model has been discredited on the basis that it may:
 - be supply driven;²³
 - create a situation where advisers sit outside of government structures and cannot therefore strengthen them by being part of them;
 - depend on the individual whose capacity is being developed remaining in the position for the period of the assignment and beyond;
 - assume skills can be readily transferred from external experts to local counterparts, when in fact capacity development emerges from building relationships of trust, mutual accountability and genuine partnership.²⁴
 - undermine the confidence of counterparts by implying that they are incapable of doing their job, and require an external expert to tell them what to do.²⁵
 - strip government of capacity by paying much higher than the government wage to attract multilingual Timorese to positions supporting the large number of advisers who cannot speak local languages.

2.3. Scope and methodology of the review

22. The review was undertaken via a combination of data collection, document review, one-on-one conversations and group discussions. Ministers and senior and working level officials of RDTL met with AusAID throughout July and August to discuss the priority of the 82 adviser positions that will be in place in the 2010/11 financial year under five programs directly managed by AusAID through managing contractor or partnership arrangements:

- Australia Timor-Leste program of Assistance for Specialised Services (ATLASS);
- The Justice Sector Support Facility (JSSF);
- The Public Sector Capacity Development Program (PSCDP);
- The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program (RWSSP);
- The Seeds of Life Program (SOL).

23. The findings of these discussions were captured in the review report, the development of which was overseen by Vice Prime Minister Coordinator of Management and Administrative Affairs of the State for RDTL, and AusAID's Minister Counsellor Development Co-operation.

²⁰ *Ibid*

²¹ ECDPM, p.5

²² Berg claimed that it has 'failed as an instrument for capacity building' *Rethinking Technical Cooperation" - Reforms for Capacity Building in Africa* Regional Bureau for Africa, Development Alternatives Inc., Elliot J. Berg, Coordinator, 1993.

²³ ECDPM, p. 22

²⁴ AusAID, *Policy Note 1*, p.4

²⁵ Foster, p. 28

24. Australia delivers much of its support to Timor-Leste through multilateral agencies. Advisers engaged in this way were excluded from the review as these organisations have their own recruitment processes and remuneration frameworks.

25. The following constraints with the process should be acknowledged:

- It was generally agreed that the use and effectiveness of advisers was a controversial issue in Timor-Leste. However not one position was deemed “low priority” by RDTL and almost all were considered essential and performing well. Generally, one or two extra positions were requested per program. The implication that low priority positions could be phased out may have hindered frank discussion.
- The frankness of discussions may have also been improved had AusAID’s Timorese personnel led discussions with RDTL staff in Tetun rather than through translation.

3. Review Findings

3.1. Commitment to Adviser Positions

26. The Australia Timor-Leste Country Strategy 2009 – 2014 sets out how Australian Official Development Assistance will assist the Government and people of Timor-Leste to achieve their national priorities. It was confirmed that the 82 positions reviewed supported these priorities and that none were of such a low priority as to warrant immediate cessation.

27. Of the 82 adviser positions in place in 2010/11 financial year it was agreed that:

- 49 positions were high priority should continue (21 of these with amendments);
 - 29 positions would be phased out by June 2012;
 - A further 4 are currently under design, and will be agreed with RDTL in coming months.
- See Annex 2 for specific detail regarding commitment to adviser positions.

28. A further 43 positions were jointly reviewed by RDTL and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) through a separate review process.

3.2. Current use of advisers in the country program – key statistics and trends

29. Analysis of data collected shows the following key statistics and trends in the use of advisers in the Timor-Leste Country Program:

- 66 per cent of advisers are internationals, 34 per cent are Timorese nationals;
- 66 per cent of advisers are men and 34 per cent are women;
- All but one of the international adviser positions fall within AusAID’s interim guidance on long term adviser fee rates. National adviser contracts adhere to the draft RDTL guidance on national adviser fee rates in all but one case.²⁶
- The Timor-Leste Country Program demonstrates adherence to the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines which are designed to ensure value for money.

²⁶ Regarding Recruitment, Salary Rates and Other Benefits for Consultants (National and International) Paid Under The Ministry Of Finance’s State Budget.

30. See Annex 4 for further statistics regarding the use of advisers in the Timor-Leste Country Program

3.3. Findings and recommendations regarding the effectiveness of advisers positions

31. The following constitute the main findings related to the effectiveness of adviser positions. They corroborate much of the learning contained in literature in this field.

Clearly define and agree the mix of functions in an adviser position

32. The review found that it is difficult for advisers to balance a mix of ill-defined gap-filling, capacity building, financial control and policy dialogue functions, and doing so can obscure the primary purpose and lead donors, counterparts and advisers to develop different ‘mental models’ of adviser positions.²⁷ This was most apparent in positions attached to senior RDTL counterparts, in which case AusAID often added capacity building functions to position descriptions²⁸ despite the fact that these advisers typically undertake line functions. In fact in most cases AusAID also supports advisers to Ministers and senior officials as a means of opening opportunities for policy dialogue, meaning that the functions these advisers are expected to perform are threefold. It is therefore not surprising that there are different expectations of what advisers should be working towards.

33. The proposition that where ‘doing’ and capacity building functions are combined, the ‘doing’ functions typically take precedence²⁹ resonated with both AusAID and RDTL, but it was also recognised that balancing these competing demands is a challenge for advisers. By supporting the immediate ‘doing’ priorities of partners, advisers can become a respected member of the team, generating trust and credibility with colleagues. However this can also create the expectation that an adviser will assume a particular role over the longer term, and this may potentially constrain their ability to implement other functions. RDTL and AusAID agreed that it was appropriate for advisers to spend some of their time on duties that were not part of their main purpose, but that where this was not agreed it could cause some concern. It was also agreed that where these tasks take up a large proportion of an adviser’s time, it indicated that different ‘mental models’ had developed and that the purpose of the position should be jointly revisited.

34. Where different views have formed regarding the purpose of a position, it is difficult for advisers to balance two sets of expectations – those of the development partner funding their position on the one hand, and the counterpart they are advising on the other. At senior levels, this was manifest in the expression of concerns about the extent to which advisers were serving the needs of donors over RDTL.³⁰ It was clear from discussions that senior level

²⁷ ATLASS advisers suggested it was critical to simultaneously demonstrate medical competency while mentoring and training counterparts on the job. In relation to RWSSP, the Minister of Health sought support for speech writing which created the opportunity to inform him of work being undertaken on sanitation issues.

²⁸ For example, the TOR for a senior policy adviser outlines the in-line functions of a Chief of Staff, but starts with the statement, ‘**the primary responsibility of the Senior Policy Adviser is to develop capacity within the office**’.

²⁹ ECDPM, p.33.

³⁰ One senior political counterpart felt that advisers were ultimately accountable to donors and structured their activities to meet the needs of donors rather than those of his office.

RDTL representatives would prefer full responsibility for directing the work priorities of advisers. It is also clear that AusAID retains an interest in assuring the quality of advice, and losing opportunities to engage in policy discussions with RDTL. Joint needs would be more effectively addressed through a frank and detailed dialogue regarding RDTL and AusAID's respective expectations for the position.

Recommendation 1 (for RDTL and AusAID): Jointly identify and agree on the purpose of each adviser position using the categories outlined in Table 1. Where a position incorporates functions from more than one category, agree an approximate proportion of time which will be spent on each. This will enable a more accurate TOR, better matching of potential candidates and the establishment of transparent performance expectations.

Recommendation 2 (for AusAID): Do not delegate discussions with RDTL regarding senior adviser positions to implementing partners.

Clearly define and track progress towards expected outcomes

35. AusAID's 2009 Annual Program Performance Report (APPR) for the Timor-Leste program found that while the majority of initiatives are aligned with RDTL national priorities, effectiveness was commonly hampered by ill-defined outcomes, inappropriate interventions and questionable assumptions about how change was expected to occur. The joint review found that these issues were also evident at the level of individual adviser positions.

36. Across the program there was a tendency to conflate outcomes with outputs³¹ and advisers are consequently focused on what they are doing and producing (inputs/outputs) rather than the performance improvement that RDTL and AusAID would like to achieve (outcomes/results). A robust articulation of how adviser inputs were expected to lead to changes in performance (theory of change) was also lacking in most cases.

37. While it is possible to point to achievements in which advisers have been pivotal, it is difficult to draw a link between adviser positions and achievement of program objectives. Most programs measured the delivery of outputs rather than outcomes and could not point to the contribution of advisers to overall program objectives. RDTL and AusAID are therefore currently unable to determine what adviser inputs 'add up to', whether adequate progress is being achieved, and whether changes are necessary to realise success.

Recommendation 3 (for RDTL and AusAID): Discuss, agree and document an explanation of how adviser assignments are expected to lead to agreed results.

Recommendation 4 (for RDTL and AusAID): Agree how to monitor progress towards achieving results (who will monitor what, when and how). Where an adviser is placed as part of a broader activity, contribution to achieving activity results should be assessed.

³¹ Questionnaire responses indicated overwhelmingly that outcomes for each adviser position were clearly defined, realistic and that progress towards achieving outcomes was on-track. However, analysis of TOR and work plans indicated that in the majority of cases, positions do not clearly define outcomes.

Stop using the adviser-counterpart model for capacity development

38. As noted above, there are a number of weaknesses with the adviser-counterpart model as a capacity development approach. However it continues to be utilised with some frequency in the Timor-Leste Country Program. Many of the documented weaknesses of this model were evident in the Timor-Leste experience, and it was difficult to point to capacity development outcomes. For example:

- There was evidence of high counterpart turnover, within a context where there are not enough Timorese with the necessary skills to make the most of adviser inputs.³² The benefits of capacity development efforts often accrued to individuals who may or may not remain within government.
- Many officials pointed to the ability to build the confidence of counterparts as an important characteristic for advisers. However advisers interviewed indicated that the placement of an adviser immediately diminishes confidence by the implication that the counterpart cannot do his/her job alone and requires the support of an external expert. Overcoming the initial effect of the placement takes time and effort.
- One senior counterpart expressed concern that advisers are not leaving anything behind due to the fact that they are not integrated into the structures of government.³³

13. It is recommended that AusAID and RDTL move away from this approach as a mechanism for capacity development.

Recommendation 5 (for AusAID and RDTL): Agree to abandon the use of the adviser-counterpart model as a form of capacity development assistance, except where it is demonstrated to be the most effective response to meeting program objectives.

Improve adviser management practices

39. Partner country ownership of adviser management processes is crucial to the effectiveness of adviser inputs.³⁴ Specifically, it is important that decisions relating to the identification of needs and options for support, preparing TOR and tender documentation, recruitment processes, induction and management accountability are made jointly with RDTL.³⁵ With these standards in mind the quality of adviser management practices across the program was mixed. Some counterparts expressed a wish to be more closely involved in agreeing positions and recruitment processes in the future, and AusAID and implementing partners committed to doing so in the future.

³² Very few (only 13 per cent), adviser counterparts had been in position for more than two years while 85 per cent of advisers had been attached to counterparts for one year or less.

³³ It would be better, he argued, if advisers could be integrated into government, were accountable for the performance of their work areas and could model good behaviour for personnel with whom they have a direct supervisory relationship.

³⁴ ECDPM, p.5

³⁵ ECPDM, p. 22

40. Feedback from RDTL indicated the following lessons for improved performance in managing advisers:

- Counterparts were more likely to feel strong ownership of an adviser position if they jointly identified the need for the position with AusAID or the implementing partner. Counterparts that were provided with the opportunity to comment on or modify TOR expressed the view that they had not been consulted on the position.
- Informal interactions regarding the development of TOR were less likely to generate a sense of genuine consultation.
- Documentation regarding positions (eg. TOR, CVs) should be developed/provided in Tetun, even where there is some capacity to speak English.
- Involving RDTL counterparts in the broad design of a program is not sufficient to ensure ownership of a particular adviser position identified as part of that process.
- Counterparts were reluctant to participate in recruitment processes that were conducted in English due to lack of confidence with language skills.
- Involving a single RDTL officer in a program tender process is not a substitute for engaging RDTL in adviser recruitment.

41. The ECDPM study found that accountability of advisers to the host organisation is important for ensuring productive working relationship between the host organisation and the adviser, as well as ownership of the products and services delivered³⁶. While most programs exhibited dual lines of accountability (reporting to RDTL on substantive issues, and the implementing partner on contractual and performance issues), this was generally well understood by RDTL officials, who felt able to lead and manage advisers. RDTL also indicated that the ability to communicate effectively was of paramount importance, and that ‘good’ advisers usually spoke at least one of Timor-Leste’s official or working languages or in addition to English (ie. Tetun, Portuguese or Bahasa Indonesia).

Recommendation 6 (for AusAID and RDTL): Agree guidelines for the identification and management of adviser positions which support joint RDTL-AusAID decision-making in identifying needs and options for assistance, preparing TOR and tender documentation, recruitment processes, induction, management accountability and performance assessment. Induction should support advisers to be effective in their roles, but also guide RDTL counterparts on how to manage and make the most of advisers.

Recommendation 7 (for AusAID): The ability to speak Timor-Leste’s official and working languages (in particular Tetun) should be considered in recruitment processes. Where advisers do not have these language skills, they should be required to undertake language training as part of their assignment

Jointly and more meaningfully explore alternative approaches to adviser positions

42. All programs funded by AusAID in Timor-Leste support a range of capacity development interventions including scholarships, short, long term and on-the-job training, internships; equipment supply, exchanges, study tours, grants, vocational training and development of

³⁶ ECDPM, p.22

training materials, manuals, procedures and protocols. Across the program, advisers are just one of a number of approaches adopted to meet capacity development and other program objectives.

43. Through the joint review process, RDTL was asked to consider whether advisers were the most appropriate form of support to meet their needs. Almost all counterparts expressed the view that advisers were appropriate, but that alternatives should also be considered. Generally, however, they were not prepared to relinquish advisers in favour of other forms of support, and it was clear that advisers remain a preference for RDTL. There are a perhaps a number of factors driving this preference:

- The ability to access free expertise to plug gaps is an appealing proposition in an environment where it is difficult to attract and retain quality personnel. Advisers are particularly attractive when compared with alternatives like training and scholarships which can result in a short term reduction in capacity due to the fact that they take staff off-line for sometimes lengthy periods.³⁷
- Advisers have been very widely used in Timor-Leste and RDTL is familiar and comfortable with this form of support. Lack of familiarity with the potential benefits of alternatives may result in reluctance to try new things.
- There is a level of prestige attached to being counterpart to an adviser which exceeds that of training courses and other capacity development approaches.

44. The review also found that at present there is no meaningful process for exploring alternatives to advisory support either within individual programs, or across the country program as a whole. Programs do not, as a matter of general practice, compare the cost and development effectiveness of a range of approaches, and there is limited discussion with RDTL of the opportunity costs associated with opting for one form of support over another. In the absence of such comparators, a superficial consideration of alternatives is unlikely to persuade counterparts to move away from this default mode of support.

Recommendation 7 (for AusAID): Gather and share information on cost and development effectiveness of a range of forms of assistance to support informed joint assessments of the opportunity costs of advisers vis-à-vis other forms of assistance.

Recommendation 8 (for AusAID): Encourage RDTL to acquire the skills it needs from the international market to fill in-line positions. This would promote capacity development in the usual way of staff learning from effective managers who model good practice and sound work ethics. RDTL could overcome the prohibition on placing non-nationals in public service positions by placing them on contracts, with the objective of managing their department in such a way that subordinate personnel are trained to replace them.

4. Implementing the review recommendations

4.1. Phasing out adviser positions

³⁷ In a reference to another donor, one senior counterpart noted that advisers are often accepted by government, particularly when there are no alternatives offered. The investment is often wasted because the advisers are not addressing priorities and are often underutilised.

45. AusAID and RDTL will agree on how to wind down the 29 positions that were jointly identified for phase out through the joint review process. All positions marked for phase out will be brought to completion by June 2012. Exit strategies will be developed for these positions through Phase 2 of the review process. See Annex 3 for detail.

4.2. Agree process/mechanism for discussing and managing future adviser requests

46. RDTL and AusAID should negotiate a mechanism for discussing and managing future requests for advisers. There is currently no forum, other than the Council of Ministers, which has responsibility for this level of cross government co-ordination. However Timor-Leste's Strategic Development Plan 2011 – 2030 proposes the establishment of the Economic Policy and Investment Agency (EPIA) which is expected to have a mandate to coordinate ministry requests for assistance, including advisers.³⁸

47. Until this cross government co-ordination function is clarified AusAID will work closely with relevant RDTL authorities to improve the use of advisers in the aid program by integrating good practice into existing processes of priority setting, program design and planning, and monitoring and review. This will require the development of shared guidelines to be completed in the first half of 2011. They will constitute a living document which is regularly updated on the basis of monitoring and will:

- Support joint decision making in identifying needs and options for support, preparing TOR and tender documentation, recruitment processes, induction and management accountability.
- Include a 'business case template' for each new adviser position. The business case must be approved by RDTL and AusAID. It will ensure that the position:
 - aligns with shared RDTL and AusAID priorities;
 - is the most appropriate response to agreed needs and outcomes based on cost and development effectiveness considerations.
- Mandates that AusAID and RDTL discuss the need for proposed positions and to clarify the purpose(s) of the position prior to negotiating TOR.
- Identifies a process for developing agreed adviser work plans which clearly outline the anticipated end of assignment outcomes for the position, and document how change is expected to occur.

48. AusAID will undertake analysis to compare the cost and development effectiveness of advisers vis-à-vis different types of support within the context of Timor-Leste. This analysis will inform the abovementioned guidelines.

49. AusAID will initiate discussions with RDTL around the establishment of a longer term mechanism (perhaps under the EPIA) to ensure that adviser requests align with government priorities.

³⁸ Republica Democratica De Timor-Leste, *Strategic Development Plan 2011 – 2030*, p.20

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Annex 1 – Definition of ‘advisers’ for the purposes of this review

AusAID released a definition of advisers in May 2010. The intention of introducing a standardised definition was to reduce confusion over the terms “technical assistance” and “adviser”, and to therefore ensure consistency across agency reporting on, and analysis of, adviser use and remuneration. This definition has been further refined – certain Whole-of-Government (including AusAID) deployees should be considered to be “advisers” and, for the purpose of this review, short term advisers (less than 6 months) are not included. See Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: AusAID definition of Advisers for purposes of joint review

Adviser: An adviser provides advice – to one or more interlocutors – on the strategic direction and/or implementation of Australian aid. This includes personnel that perform one or more the following functions:		
(1) Provide technical expertise and advice to counterpart governments and/or other in-country development partners such as NGOs, churches	(2) Provide technical expertise and advice to AusAID	(3) Engaged to provide leadership and oversight and/or technical inputs for the delivery of an AusAID activity
Methods of engagement: - Directly by AusAID - Through a managing contractor or NGO - WofG deployees (including AusAID DPS) - Contracted by WofG agency using ODA funds	Methods of engagement: - Directly by AusAID on a commercial contract or a non-ongoing employment contract - Through a managing contractor	Methods of engagement: - Through a managing contractor - Directly by AusAID
Eg: Technical project/program staff based in a counterpart office; WofG deployee or AusAID DPS based in a national or provincial govt office	Eg: Thematic adviser based in a Post	Eg: Team Leaders or Program Directors

Not included:

- Short term advisers (inputs of less than 6 months).
- Adviser positions on activities funded (entirely or in part) by AusAID which are being implemented by partner governments or multilateral organisations and where the advisers were procured using their procurement processes.
- Whole-of-government deployees and AusAID DPS staff whose primary role is the management of aid program activities (those that fall within category (1) above **will** be included).
- Volunteers.
- Personnel deployed under the Australian Civilian Core or the Emergency Rapid Response Team.
- Head office staff/company representatives of managing contractors, other implementing organisations or NGOs.

Annex 2 – List of RDTL and AusAID representatives involved in review

Name	Title	Agency/Organisation
The Australia Timor-Leste Program of Support for Specialised Services		
Dr Mendes	Head of Surgery Department	National Hospital of Guido Valadares
Miriam Smith	Second Secretary	AusAID
Armandina Gusmão-Amaral	Program Manager	AusAID
Eric Vreede	Team Leader	Australia Timor-Leste program of Support for Specialised Services
Justice Sector Support Facility		
Dra Ana Pessoa	Prosecutor General of Timor-Leste	Office of the Prosecutor General
Francisco Caceres	Director General	Ministry of Justice
Jemal Sharah	Counsellor Development Co-operation	AusAID
Darian Clark	First Secretary	AusAID
António Vitor	Program Manager	AusAID
Craig Ewers	Team Leader	Justice Sector Support Facility
Public Sector Capacity Development Program		
Mario Viegas Carrascalão	Vice Prime Minister	Office of the Vice Prime Minister
Arcanjalo Leite	Minister of State Administration	Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management
Florindo Perreira	Secretary of State for Administrative Reform	Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management
Liborio Perreira	President	Civil Service Commission
Jesuina Gomes	Commissioner	Civil Service Commission
Abel Fatima	Interim Director General	Civil Service Commission
Betty Exposto	Chief of Staff	Office of the Prime Minister
Belarmino Neves	Director	National Institute of Public Affairs
Letencio de Jesus	Former Director	National Institute of Public Affairs
Jemal Sharah	Counsellor Development Co-operation	AusAID
Darian Clarke	First Secretary	AusAID
Luis De Sousa Sequeira	Program Manager	AusAID
Mário Mesquita	Acting Director	National Directorate for Aid Effectiveness, MoF

John Walsh	Team Leader	Public Sector Capacity Development Program
Amber Davidson	Activity Manager and Capacity Building Adviser	Public Sector Capacity Development Program
Maria Braz	Activity Manager and Capacity Development Adviser	Public Sector Capacity Development Program
Rural Water and Sanitation Support Program		
Jose Magno	Director Community Health Services	Ministry of Health
Tomasia de Sousa	Head of Environmental Health Department	Ministry of Health
Rita Soares	Sanitation Project Officer	Ministry of Health
Martinus Nahak	DSAD Program Coordinator	National Directorate for Water and Sanitation, Ministry of Infrastructure
Gustavu da Cruz	Head of Department of Administration, Finance and Human Resources	National Directorate for Water and Sanitation, Ministry of Infrastructure
Elias Moniz	Head of Department of District Water and Sanitation	National Directorate for Water and Sanitation, Ministry of Infrastructure
Jão Jerónimo	Director of Water and Sanitation	National Directorate for Water and Sanitation, Ministry of Infrastructure
Rui de Sousa	Head of Department of Planning and Development	National Directorate for Water and Sanitation, Ministry of Infrastructure
Jão Piedade	Head of Department of Sanitation	National Directorate for Water and Sanitation, Ministry of Infrastructure
Jeff Prime	First Secretary	AusAID
José Perreira	Program Manager	AusAID
Keryn Clark	Team Leader	Public Sector Capacity Development Program
Seeds of Life		
Lourenço Fontes	Director General	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
Gil Rangel	Director	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
Adalfredo Ferreira	Director	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
Jeff Prime	First Secretary	AusAID
Jão Fernandes	Program Manager	AusAID
Rob Williams	Team Leader	Seeds of Life
Harry Nesbitt	Program Co-Coordinator	Seeds of Life

Annex 3 – Commitment to Adviser Positions

#	Program	Current Position	Commitment to Positions	Comments
1	PSCDP	Human Resource & Training Adviser, INAP	Amend	INAP requested that position be amended slightly to encourage advisers to coordinate more closely with Civil Service Commission.
2	PSCDP	Human Resource & Training Adviser, INAP	Amend	INAP requested that position be amended slightly to encourage advisers to coordinate more closely with Civil Service Commission.
3	PSCDP	Senior Adviser Office of the Prime Minister	Keep	TOR remains relevant.
4	PSCDP	Aid Effectiveness Adviser, Ministry of Finance	Keep	TOR remain relevant
5	PSCDP	Human Resource Development Adviser, Civil Service Commission	Keep	TOR remain relevant
6	PSCDP	Internal Governance Adviser, Civil Service Commission	Keep	TOR remain relevant
7	PSCDP	Legal Adviser, Civil Service Commission	Keep	TOR remain relevant

8	PSCDP	Legal Adviser, Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management	Phase out	Phase-out by July 2011 as position may be replaced by different capacity-development focus within the Ministry.
9	PSCDP	Senior Adviser, Office of Vice Prime Minister	Phase out	Position will have achieved purpose by Feb 2011 of establishing the Office of the Vice Prime Minister.
10	PSCDP	Governance Adviser, Office of Vice Prime Minister	Keep	ToR remain relevant
11	PSCDP	Team Leader - Core	Keep	ToR remain relevant
12	PSCDP	Human Resource Management Adviser	Keep	TOR remain relevant.
13	PSCDP	Human Resource & Capacity Development Adviser - PSCDP	Keep	TOR remain relevant
14	PSCDP	Activity Manager & Capacity Development Adviser - PSCDP	Keep	TOR remain relevant
15	PSCDP	National Adviser - INAP	Keep	TOR remain relevant
16	PSCDP	National Adviser - INAP	Keep	ToR remain relevant
17	PSCDP	National Adviser - Office of Prime Minister	Phase out	Phase out by July 2011 as position has achieved its purpose.

18	PSCDP	National Adviser - Civil Service Commission	Keep	ToR remain relevant
19	PSCDP	National Adviser - Civil Service Commission	Keep	ToR remain relevant
20	PSCDP	National Adviser - Civil Service Commission	Keep	ToR remain relevant
21	PSCDP	National Adviser - MoAF	Phase out	Position now falls outside of the revised scope of the program. The contract will complete in August and will not be renewed.
22	PSCDP	Food Security Adviser	Phase out	Position was in place in order to produce a specific output - a food security policy. This will complete shortly and there will be no further extension to the position.
23	PSCDP	Agriculture Corporate Management Adviser	Phase out	The program sharpened its focus in 2009, and this position now falls outside of the revised scope of the program. The position will end in August 2010 and will not be renewed.
24	ATLASS	Anaesthetist/Team Leader	Keep	ToR remain relevant
25	ATLASS	Emergency physician	Keep	ToR remain relevant
26	ATLASS	General Surgeon	Keep	ToR remain relevant
27	ATLASS	Orthopaedic Surgeon	Under design	Position currently under development
28	RWSSP	Team Leader	Keep	ToR remain relevant
29	RWSSP	Capacity Building Advisor	Amend	ToR remain relevant, but require minor amendments to reflect shifting program focus.

30	RWSSP	Environmental Health Advisor	Phase out	ToR remain relevant. However, funding for the position ceases in June 2011, and the position will not be extended beyond this time.
31	RWSSP	Water Supply and Sanitation Advisor	Amend	This position initially focused on traditional capacity building approaches such as scholarships and workplace management. It will be amended to focus on the organisational development issues associated with a transition to greater use of government systems.
32	RWSSP	National Engineering Adviser	Amend	ToR remain relevant, but require minor amendments to reflect shifting program focus.
33	RWSSP	Sanitation Advisor	Amend	The position supports DNSAS in policy and planning advice, greater sectoral coordination, mechanisms for improved quality of design & delivery. This role will continue, possibly amended in light of progress in this area.
34	RWSSP	Community Development Advisor	Amend	The position will soon be amended to focus more closely on issues related to decentralisation and use of local government structures. Capacity building activities currently undertaken by this position will be shifted.
35	RWSSP	Gender Advisor	Phase out	Many of the duties associated with position will be assumed by a national project staff member. This is planned for post 30 June 2011.

36	RWSSP	Behaviour Change & Communications Advisor	Phase out	Funding for this position ceases in December 2011. RDTL was of the view that the position should continue, but be amended slightly to allow advisers the flexibility to support senior officials and the Minister where necessary.
37	RWSSP	District Water and Sanitation Engineering Advisor 1	Phase out	High level skills were initially required to establish systems and processes for district engineering. Will be phased out over this year as the capacity of counterpart government officers increases in the twelve districts of East Timor.
38	RWSSP	District Water and Sanitation Engineering Advisor 2	Phase out	See above
39	RWSSP	Water Resources Management & Climate Change Adviser	Phase out	Funding for this position ceases in June 2011. The position will be phased out on this basis. RDTL is of the view that the position should continue.
40	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 1	Phase out	It is intended this position will be phased out as government capacity grows. Instead of one officer per district it is intended that there will be one officer for every 2 districts – from Dec 2011 to June 2012.
41	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 2	Phase out	See above
42	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 3	Phase out	See above
43	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 4	Phase out	See above
44	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 5	Phase out	See above

45	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 6	Phase out	See above
46	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 7	Amend	The TOR for this position will be amended to take on additional responsibilities from Dec 2011 - June 2012. Each position currently has responsibility for one district. This will transition to two districts over this period
47	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 8	Amend	See above
48	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 9	Amend	See above
49	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 10	Amend	See above
50	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 11	Amend	See above
51	RWSSP	Community Development Officer 12	Amend	See above
52	JSSF	Senior Management Adviser, Civil Society & Grants CS	Phase out	This position is currently funded until January 2011. Current resource planning for 2011 is underway and additional services through 2011 may be required.
53	JSSF	Civil Society Adviser - Anti Violence and Access to Justice Program	Keep	ToR remain relevant

54	JSSF	Facility Manager/Team Leader	Amend	TOR remain broadly relevant, but there is agreement to scale back position requirements in final two years of Program.
55	JSSF	HRM Adviser	Keep	ToR remain relevant
56	JSSF	Senior Management Adviser - Office of Prosecutor General	Phase out	This position will finish in September and will not be extended beyond this time in line with a shift in the focus of the program.
57	JSSF	Finance & Budget Execution Officer	Amend	TOR remain relevant. The position is shared across the courts and the OPG, and it has been requested that the position TOR be amended to outline a specific schedule for the adviser's inputs.
58	JSSF	Executive Coordinator, Ministry of Justice	Phase out	This position will finish in November, and will not be extended beyond this time because the position has achieved its purpose.
59	JSSF	HRM Assistant, OPG	Keep	TOR remain relevant
60	JSSF	OPG Project Officer	Keep	Note position will shift over time to support the Case Tracking Information Management Project in the OPG and PNTL.
61	JSSF	NGO Project Officer	Keep	ToR remain relevant
62	JSSF	IMP Project Officer	Keep	ToR remain relevant
63	JSSF	HRM Assistant OPG	Keep	TOR remain relevant
64	JSSF	Technical Adviser, Architect OPG	Phase out	OPG expressed some concerns regarding progress against the TOR, but this was due to contractor delays. Position was considered a priority. It will be phased out once agreed projects are delivered.

65	JSSF	Assistant Technical Adviser, Architect OPG	Keep	TOR remain relevant
66	JSSF	IT Assistant OPG	Phase out	In the next RDTL budget period these advisers will be shifted onto the OPG budget. This has been agreed with OPG
67	JSSF	IT Assistant OPG	Phase out	See above
68	JSSF	IT Assistant OPG	Phase out	See above
69	JSSF	IT Assistant OPG	Phase out	See above
70	JSSF	Logistic Assistant OPG	Phase out	See above
71	JSSF	Activity Liaison - Strategic Planning	Keep	TOR remain relevant but will be amended in consultation with counterparts as the project progresses
72	JSSF	Court Clerk, Suai	Phase out	In the next RDTL budget period these advisers will be shifted onto the Courts budget. This has been agreed with the Courts
73	JSSF	Court Clerk, Suai	Phase out	See above
74	Seeds of Life	Team Leader	Amend	Position is considered high priority but will be amended in coming months so take on new responsibilities associated with SOL 3
75	Seeds of Life	Seed Production officer	Amend	See above
76	Seeds of life	Research extension advisor	Amend	See above
77	Seeds of Life	Research extension advisor	Amend	See above
78	Seeds of Life	Social Economics	Amend	See above

79	Seeds of Life	Climate change	Amend	See above
80	Seeds of Life	Regional Adviser 1	Under design	Position currently under development
81	Seeds of Life	Regional Adviser 2	Under design	Position currently under development
82	Seeds of Life	Regional adviser 3	Under design	Position currently under development

Annex 4 – Key Statistics and trends in the use of advisers

1. Gender and nationality

Analysis of data collected shows that 66 per cent of advisers are internationals and 34 per cent nationals. Overall, 66 per cent are men and 34 per cent women. However, the percentage ratio of 41 percent of international advisers are women as compared to 19 per cent of national advisers.

Table 1: Gender Disaggregation

	Male No.	%	Female No.	%
Total #	41	66%	21	34%
International	24	59%	17	41%
National	17	81%	4	19%
Total Fees		69%		31%
Days Worked		72%		28%

2. Procurement

The Timor-Leste Country Program demonstrates adherence to the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines. As a matter of general practice, international adviser positions are filled through competitive recruitment processes that are internationally advertised (national positions are advertised locally), and rates are negotiated on the basis of industry norms.³⁹ Only four of the 82 reviewed positions were filled using processes that were not openly tendered, but still adhered to the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines.⁴⁰

PSCDP and JSSF have also built value for money considerations into tender processes to ensure that adviser fees are considered alongside technical suitability for the position.⁴¹

3. Adviser experience

Table 3 below illustrates the development experience of national and international advisers, and the Timor-Leste experience of international advisers. The majority of national advisers have between 5 years or less development experience whereas

³⁹ ATLASS, for example surveys the rates of other medical NGOs such as Medecins Sans Frontier, Red Cross and Aspen Medical, before negotiating comparable fees with its own advisers.

⁴⁰ The ATLASS and SOL Team Leaders were identified in program design documentation on the basis of appropriate skills, qualifications and existing competitive rates. In the case of JSSF, two positions were filled by way of direct engagement on the basis of specialised skills, experience and existing below market rates..

⁴¹ These programs apply a technical to price ratio of 80:20 to all positions as an additional means of measuring of value for money. A weighting is applied to tender scores so that a tenderer's technical suitability makes up 80 per cent of the final score, while price constitutes 20 per cent. This is the approach utilised by AusAID to measure value for money in its own procurement processes.

almost half of the international advisers have between 6-15 years development experience.

Table 3: Timor Leste and Development Experience

Advisor Experience in Timor Leste			<i>Prog Total</i>	Intern'l	National
Timor Leste Experience >4 years	32%	Dev Exp 0-5 years	52%	32%	94%
Timor Leste Experience < 4 years	36%	Dev Exp 6 - 15 years	34%	47%	6%
National	32%	Dev Exp 16 - 30 years	14%	21%	0%