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| Final REPORT |
| Annual Partnership Performance Report 2014 |
| Draft Report  For DFAT – Australian Aid only |
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# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

|  | **English** | **Indonesian** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ACDP | Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership | Kemitraan untuk Pengembangan Kapasitas dan Analisis |
| ADB | Asian Development Bank | Bank Pembangunan Asia |
| AIBEP | Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program | Program Pendidikan Dasar Australia - Indonesia |
| APBN | National Budget | Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara |
| APPR | Annual Partnership Performance Report | Laporan Tahunan Kinerja Kemitraan |
| AQC | Aid Quality Checks | Evaluasi Kualitas Bantuan |
| ATOG | ACDP Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis ACDP |
| AUD | Australian Dollar | Dolar Australia |
| *Balitbang* | National Office for Research and Development | Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan |
| BAN-S/M | Board of National Accreditation – School/Madrasah | Badan Akreditasi Nasional-Sekolah/Madrasah |
| *Bappenas* | Ministry of National Development Planning | Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional |
| BEAP | Basic Education Access Planning | Perencanaan Akses Layanan Pendidikan Dasar (Paldikdas) |
| BOS | School Operational Grants | Bantuan Operasional Sekolah |
| BOS SM | Operational Grants for Secondary School | Bantuan Operasional Sekolah – Sekolah Menengah |
| BPSDMPK & PMP | Education and Culture Human Resources Development and Education Quality Assurance Office | Badan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan dan Penjaminan Mutu Pendidikan |
| BPU | Unit of Learning (see UoL) | Bahan Pembelajaran Umum |
| BSM | Cash Transfer for Poor Students | Bantuan Siswa Miskin |
| C1 | Component 1 of the Education Partnership: School Construction | Komponen 1 Kemitraan Pendidikan: Pembangunan Sekolah |
| C2 | Component 2 of the Education Partnership: Capacity Building | Komponen 2 Kemitraan Pendidikan:Pembangunan Kapasitas |
| C3 | Component 3 of the Education Partnership: Madrasah Accreditation | Komponen 3 Kemitraan Pendidikan: Akreditasi Madrasah |
| C4 | Component 4 of the Education Partnership: ACDP | Komponen 4 Kemitraan Pendidikan: ACDP |
| CAT | Core Advisory Team | Tim Penasehat Inti |
| CHS | Complaints Handling System | Sistem penanganan aduan |
| CMC | Construction Management Consultant | Konsultan Manajemen Pembangunan Sekolah |
| CPD | Continuous Professional Development | Pengembangan Keprofesian Berkelanjutan Kepala Sekolah / Madrasah |
| CRS | Construction Reporting System | Sistem Pelaporan Pembangunan Sekolah |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee | Komite Bantuan Pembangunan |
| DAK | Specific-Purpose Grant | Dana Alokasi Khusus |
| DAPODIK | Education Management Information System (MoEC) | Data Pokok Pendidikan (Sistem Informasi Manjemen Pendidikan dikembangkan Kemdikbud) |
| DEO | District Education Official | Pejabat Dinas Pendidikan Tingkat Kabupaten |
| DFAT | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade | Departemen Luar Negeri dan Perdagangan Australia |
| DFAT AIP | DFAT Aid Investment Plan | Rencana Investasi Dana Bantuan DFAT |
| DG | Directorate General | Direktorat Jendral |
| Dikdas | Basic Education | Pendidikan Dasar (jenjang SD/SMP) |
| Dikmen | Secondary Education | Pendidikan Menengah (jenjang SMA/SMK) |
| DIPA | Budget Implementation Line Items | Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran |
| EBR | Evaluation Baseline Report | Laporan Baseline Evaluasi |
| ECBP | Evaluation Capacity Building Program | Program Peningkatan Kapasitas Evaluasi |
| EMIS | Education Management Information System (MoRA) | Sistem Informasi Manajemen Pendidikan  (dikembangkan Kemenag) |
| EOCO | End of Component Outcome | Tujuan Akhir Komponen |
| EOPO | End of Partnership Outcome | Tujuan Akhir Kemitraan/Program |
| EP | Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia | Kemitraan Pendidikan Australia-Indonesia |
| EP-PMS | Education Partnership – Performance Management System | Sistem Manajemen Kinerja Kemitraan Pendidikan Australia-Indonesia |
| EPOS | Education Partnership Outreach Services | Pelayanan Jangkauan Kemitraan Pendidikan |
| ESSP | Education Sector Support Program | Program Dukungan untuk Sektor Pendidikan |
| FKIP | Faculty of Teaching and Pedagogy | Fakultas Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan |
| FM | Field Monitor | Petugas Pemantau Lapangan |
| GA | Grant Agreement | Kesepakatan Hibah |
| GER | Gross Enrolment Rate | Angka Partisipasi Kasar (APK) |
| GoA | Government of Australia | Pemerintah Australia |
| GOG | Governance Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Tata Kelola Pemerintahan |
| GoI | Government of Indonesia | Pemerintah RI |
| HI-ECD | Holistic Integrated – Early Childhood Development | Program Pendekatan Menyeluruh dan Terpadu untuk Perkembangan Anak Usia Dini |
| HRMD | Human Resources Management and Development (ProDEP Component) | Manajemen dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia (Komponen ProDEP) |
| ICR | Independent Completion Reporting | Laporan Independen Penyelesaian Program/ Kegiatan |
| IDC | Indefinite Delivery Contracts | Kontrak Pelaksanaan Tidak Tentu |
| IDR | Indonesian Rupiah | Rupiah Indonesia |
| ITOG | Infrastructure Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis Infrastruktur |
| JSE | Junior Secondary Education | Pendidikan Sekolah Menengah Pertama |
| JTU | Joint Technical Unit | Unit Teknis Gabungan |
| K2P | Knowledge to Policy | Dasar Pengetahuan untuk Kebijakan |
| *Kandep* | District Office of MoRA | Kantor Departmen Agama |
| *Kanwil* | Provincial Office of MoRA | Kantor Wilayah Departmen Agama |
| KKG | Teacher Working Group | Kelompok Kerja Guru |
| KKKS | Principal Working Group | Kelompok Kerja Kepala Sekolah |
| KKM | Madrasah Principal Working Group | Kelompok Kerja Kepala Madrasah |
| KPI | Key Performance Indicator | Indikator Kinerja Utama |
| KSI | Knowledge Sector Initiative (DFAT Program) | Inisiatif Pengetahuan Sektor (Program DFAT) |
| LPMP | Education Quality Assurance Agency | Lembaga Penjaminan Mutu Pendidikan |
| LPPKS | Principal Development and Empowerment Agency | Lembaga Pengembangan dan Pemberdayaan Kepala Sekolah |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation | Monitoring dan Evaluasi |
| MDC | Madrasah Development Center | Pusat Pengembangan Madrasah |
| MI | Islamic Elementary School | Madrasah Ibtidaiyah |
| MoEC | Ministry of Education and Culture | Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan |
| MoF | Ministry of Finance | Kementerian Keuangan |
| MoHA | Ministry of Home Affairs | Kementerian Dalam Negeri |
| MoRA | Ministry of Religious Affairs | Kementerian Agama |
| MTOG | Madrasah Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis Madrasah |
| MTR | Mid-term Review | Riviu pada Pertengahan Program |
| MTs | Islamic Junior Secondary School | Madrasah Tsanawiyah |
| NES | National Education Standard | Standar Nasional Pendidikan |
| NSIP | New School Induction Program | Program Induksi untuk Sekolah Baru |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development | Organisasi untuk Kerja Sama Ekonomi dan Pembangunan |
| OJL | On-the-Job-Learning | Pembelajaran dalam Tugas |
| OMT | Operational Management Team | Tim Manajemen Operasional |
| PAF | Performance Assurance Framework | Kerangka Penjaminan Kinerja |
| PD | Professional Development | Pengembangan Profesi |
| PDSP | MoEC Centre for Education Data and Statistics | Pusat Data dan Statistik Pendidikan |
| *Penma* | MoRA Directorate of Madrasah Education | Direktorat Pendidikan Madrasah |
| PEO | Provincial Education Offices | SKPD Pendidikan di Tingkat Provinsi |
| PIKAT | Integrative Education Facilities for Remote Indigenous Communities | Pendidikan Integratif untuk Komunitas Adat Terpencil |
| PISA | Program for International Student Assessment | Program Penilaian Siswa tingkat Internasional |
| PKB KS/M | Continuing Professional Development for School/ Madrasah Principals | Pengembangan Keprofesionalan Berkelanjutan bagi Kepala Sekolah/ Madrasah |
| PMF | Performance Milestone Framework | Kerangka Capaian Kinerja |
| PMU | Twelve Years Universal Education | Pendidikan Menengah Universal 12 Tahun |
| POM | Performance Oversight and Monitoring | Monitoring dan Pengawasan Kinerja Kemitraan Pendidikan Australia-Indonesia |
| PPCKS | Principal Preparation Program | Program Penyiapan Calon Kepala Sekolah |
| PPKPPD | Local Government Educational Capacity Building Program | Program Pengembangan Kapasitas Pendidikan Pemerintah Daerah |
| PPKSPS | Supervisor Professional Development | Program Pendampingan Kepala Sekolah oleh Pengawas Sekolah |
| PPIP | Principals Performance Improvement Program | Program Peningkatan Kinerja Kepala Sekolah |
| PPP | Principals Preparation Program | Program Penyiapan Calon Kepala Sekolah |
| P4TK | Centre for Development and Empowerment of Teacher and Education Personnel | Pusat Pengembangan dan Pemberdayaan Pendidik dan Tenaga Kependidikan |
| P4TK BOE | P4TK in the field of Automotive and Electronics | P4TK Bidang Otomotif dan Elektronika |
| *Pusbang tendik* | Centre for the Development of Education Personnel | Pusat Pengembangan Tenaga Kependidikan |
| QA | Quality Assurance | Penjaminan Mutu |
| QAI | Quality at Implementation | Kualitas pada Pelaksanaan |
| QRS | Quality Reporting System | Sistem Pelaporan Berkualitas |
| *Renstra* | Strategic Planning | Rencana Strategis |
| RKAS/M | School/Madrasah Annual Budget | Rencana Kerja Anggaran Sekolah |
| RKS/M | School/Madrasah Work Plan (4-year) | Rencana Kerja Sekolah/Madrasah |
| RKT | School/Madrasah Annual Workplan | Rencana Kerja Tahunan |
| RPJMD | District Medium-Term Development Plan | Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah |
| RPJMN | National Medium-Term Development Plan | Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional |
| RPJPN | National Long-Term Development Plan | Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional |
| SATAP | Sekolah Satu Atap | One Roof School |
| SBM | School Based Management | Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah |
| SCC | School Construction Committee | Komite Pembangunan Sekolah |
| SDTOG | Staff Development Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis untuk Pengembangan Staf |
| SI | Social Inclusion | Inklusi Sosial |
| SMP | Junior Secondary School | Sekolah Menengah Pertama |
| SNIP | Sub-National Implementation Partners | Mitra Pelaksana Sub-Nasional |
| SPD | Supervisor Professional Development | Program Pendampingan Kepala Sekolah oleh Pengawas Sekolah |
| SP&FM | Strategic Planning and Financial Management (ProDEP Component) | Perencanaan Strategis dan Manajemen Keuangan (Komponen ProDEP) |
| SRP | School Reconstruction Program | Program Rekonstruksi Sekolah |
| SSQ | School Systems and Quality | Program Sistem dan Mutu Sekolah |
| SSS | Senior Secondary School | Sekolah Menengah Atas |
| TOG | Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis |
| TNP2K | National team for the acceleration of poverty reduction | Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan |
| UPPAM | Madrasah Accreditation Implementation Unit at Central MoRA | Unit Pelaksana Akreditasi Madrasah di tingkat Pemerintah Pusat |
| UPPAMDA | Madrasah Accreditation Implementation Unit at District Level | Unit Pelaksana Akreditasi Madrasah di tingkat Daerah |
| UPPAMPROV | Madrasah Accreditation Implementation Unit at Provincial Level | Unit Pelaksana Akreditasi Madrasah di tingkat Provinsi |
| UoL | Unit of Learning | Badan Pembelajaran Umum (lihat BPU) |
| USB | New School Unit | Unit Sekolah Baru |
| USD | United States Dollar | Dolar Amerika Serikat |
| VFM | Value for Money | Nilai yang diperoleh untuk dana tertentu |
| WiPS | Working in Partner Systems | Bekerja dalam Sistem Mitra |

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POM is fully accountable for the content of this report: the views contained in this report do not necessarily represent those of the Education Partnership, the Governments of Indonesia or Australia, or of the people consulted during the fieldwork.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

***What is the Education Partnership?***

The AUD 524m investment in the Education Partnership (EP) is Australia’s largest development initiative in Indonesia. Australia is supporting the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to achieve its policy goals in relation to access, quality and governance of basic education.

The EP’s vision is to improve education service delivery in Indonesia. The EP focuses its effort on the attainment of four End-of-Partnership-Outcomes (EOPOs):

* Enrolment in JSE in participating districts increases (Component 1).
* Management of schools and Madrasah improves in participating districts (Component 2).
* Quality of Madrasah service provision improves (in line with National Education Standards) in targeted districts (Component 3).
* ACDP evidence is incorporated in relevant education sector policies, regulations, plans and budgets (Component 4).

These EOPOs describe the highest level of change over which the EP has significant influence. The EP uses various modalities to deliver its support, e.g. earmarked budget support (Components 1 and 2), project delivery (Component 3), and technical assistance to Government of Indonesia (GoI) agencies (Components 1-4). Since late 2013, the majority of expenditure in Components 1 and 2 has been made through government systems.

***What is the APPR?***

The Annual Partnership Performance Report (APPR) provides an objective assessment of program achievements, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges. As such, it speaks to the Australian Government’s aid scrutiny objectives, whilst also seeking to inform program management decisions and strategic dialogue between the Governments of Australia and of Indonesia about sector performance and emerging priorities. The APPR is produced by the EP Performance Oversight and Monitoring (POM) team. POM’s analysis of EP performance is framed by the OECD DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. As such, it also complies with the DFAT’s earlier Quality Reporting System (QRS) and the upcoming Aid Quality Checks (AQC) system.

***What is POM’s overall assessment of EP performance?***

2014 has been a period of relative uncertainty and considerable change for both institutional partners, brought on by the installation of a new government in Indonesia and the ongoing reorganisation and refocusing of Australia’s aid program. Against that backdrop, this year’s APPR offers a timely assessment of progress to date and an analysis of existing challenges and opportunities. The EP has both the time and the resources available to make a considerable difference to Indonesia’s education sector. POM is encouraged to see that EP interventions remain relevant to the policies and priorities of both governments and/or to the needs of the education sector. Gains have been made to the efficiency of EP delivery in 2014 and, overall, POM has greater optimism about the EP’s likely contribution to the expected EOPOs. Nevertheless, more needs to be done to secure a fitting, lasting legacy to the governments’ investment. The foundations have been laid; the partners are now obliged to generate optimal returns and to capture, share and apply the lessons accruing from the investment to date.

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 1?***

* By December 2014, 764 schools had been built in 232 districts across 29 of the 34 provinces in Indonesia. These new schools have created a total of 3,129 new classrooms and an additional 112,644 student places. Only three of the 767 schools (<0.5%) foreseen within Cycles 1 and 2 remain incomplete as at December 2014. At least 15,000 students are currently enrolled in EP schools.
* Partners have shown commendable appetite to make incremental improvements to the delivery of C1, as witnessed in the strengthening of key site selection, construction monitoring and site selection processes during 2014. POM believes that C1 will probably achieve EOCO 1, i.e. an “increase in availability of places in JSE”. It also has greater confidence in 2014 than in 2013 that the EP investment will make a contribution to the End-of-Partnership-Outcome of increased enrolment, even if the total number of new enrolees (vis-à-vis transferees from existing schools) is unlikely to be known by the end of the EP.
* These positives must be considered in light of two concerns:
  + There remains need for C1 to systematically and comprehensively report accurate enrolment figures at all newly built schools so that the return on the EP investment is duly captured.
  + The menu of options on offer to district stakeholders remains unnecessarily restrictive, even if partners have recently committed to exploring variants of the 6-classroom model for new junior secondary schools (USBs).
* Overall, Component 1 displays excellent and improved efficiency (score: 6), but its relevance (score: 3) is reducing as DFAT’s education priorities shift towards education quality. Its effectiveness and (likely) impact and sustainability are all satisfactory (score: 4).

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 2?***

* Component 2 recorded a number of notable achievements in 2014, the most important being the commencement of ProDEP implementation in July 2014. Over 20,000 officials receiving training in 2014, with a reported “satisfaction” rate of 90% i.e. significantly above the 80% required in the Performance Assessment Framework. A further 2,726 officials at 546 schools received training within the New Schools Induction Program.
* The C2 investment remains in line with commitments made by GoI and GoA to support the education quality agenda, and there are strong indications that ProDEP-related indicators will be included in the next MoEC *Renstra*. POM is also encouraged to see that ProDEP activities and approaches are well aligned with the EP’s intention to see participating principals apply their improved professional competencies (EOCO 2) and thereby improve the management of schools and madrasah in participating districts (EOPO 2). Most ProDEP-related output-level indicators in the Performance Assessment Framework are on track (though the reported low number of Continuous Professional Development participants is a concern). The delivery of NSIP is highly efficient.
* These positives must be considered in light of two concerns:
  + Institutional partners have yet to seek clarity on the avenues by which to achieve the financial sustainability of ProDEP.
  + The content of the Continuous Professional Development Units of Learning do not fully reflect the varying requirements of individual principals in a variety of settings (e.g. large/small schools; rural/urban location; school/madrasah).
* Overall, Component 2 has displayed improved efficiency in 2014 (score: 5) and it remains highly relevant (score: 5). However, increased attention should be paid to measures that will safeguard its effectiveness (score: 3) and its impact and sustainability (score: 4).

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 3?***

* C3 has supported over 2,500 madrasah to date – well above the expected target of 1,500 madrasah. Moreover, from an institutional perspective, there is a growing sense of interest in and commitment to the EP model of support, as witnessed in the draft MDC Regulation and the transference of responsibilities held by MoRA’s Unit for Implementing Madrasah Accreditation (UPPAM) to Ministry sub-directorates in 2014.
* Efficient delivery of C3 activities in 2014 has enabled achievement of EOCO 3.1: *targeted madrasah are ready for accreditation*. Five hundred and nineteen (519) Phase 1 madrasah have been assessed by BAN S/M, with 89% receiving accreditation level of A or B. Fifty-three (53) madrasah made gains of three accreditation levels and 192 madrasah gained two levels. There is also evidence that service provision is improving in both targeted and non-targeted madrasah, though the extent to which this is translating to sustained change in the quality of madrasah education service provision in targeted districts (EOPO3) is currently unknown.
* These positives must be considered in light of two concerns:
  + At the level of individual madrasah, POM is not convinced that the achievement of EOCO 3.1, which focuses on accreditation, is necessarily driving improvements in the quality of education service provision expected at the EOPO level.
  + With only limited progress being made with respect to the achievement of EOCO 3.2 – *the system for madrasah quality improvement is strengthened* – there remains untapped opportunity for the EP to make a significant contribution to strengthening and sustaining the systems necessary to drive improvements in the quality of madrasah service provision in targeted *districts* and at a provincial or even national level.
* Overall, Component 3 displays commendable and improved relevance (score: 5), but its efficiency has declined in 2014 (score: 4) and there remains significant scope to improve both impact and sustainability (score: 3) and to safeguard its effectiveness (score: 4).

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 4?***

* ACDP continues to make steady progress. At the beginning of December 2014 it had completed 24 activities in total. A further 13 activities were ongoing. Together, these 37 activities constitute nearly USD 29m of contracted commitments. Notable achievements in 2014 include the delivery of background papers to Bappenas that were used during the preparation of the education chapter of the upcoming Medium Term Development Plan (RJPMN) for 2014-19, the preparation of draft strategic plan for Papua Tanah, and delivery of several important studies, including the largest study of teacher absenteeism conducted in the world to date.
* ACDP continues to demonstrate high levels of external relevance, i.e. to the Governments of Indonesia and Australia. It is in line with GoI policy needs and it is in keeping with DFAT’s commitment to support Knowledge-to-Policy measures. Moreover, there is evidence that the investment is generating pockets of success, with reports of ACDP evidence being both utilised (EOCO 4) and then incorporated into key documents and frameworks (EOPO4).
* These positives must be considered in light of two concerns:
  + There is insufficient evidence of a ‘critical mass’ of reported change at the EOPO level, i.e. of ACDP evidence being incorporated into sector policies, regulations, plans and budgets.
  + Whilst sustainability was not foreseen within the design of ACDP, the lack of discussion about any expected institutional legacy represents a missed opportunity to generate a better return on the USD 50m investment.
* Overall, whilst Component 4 remains relevant (score: 4), there remains significant scope to improve efficiency and impact (score: 3) and to actively promote sustainability (score: 2). Further effort should be made to cement its effectiveness (score: 4).

***What did the APPR conclude about program oversight?***

* Implementing and institutional partners have demonstrated a strong commitment to the timely, responsive and prudent delivery of program outputs, and an increased commitment to achieve the EOCOs. It is also apparent that the degree and nature of strategic or transformational engagement between institutional partners has improved in 2014. This must continue. Strong strategic engagement will translate, through the provision of clear, strategic direction to implementing partners, into an increased contribution to EOPOs and, hence, program effectiveness and impact.
* Relationships between the managers and the implementing agencies are strong and parties should take credit for the incremental adjustments and improvements that have characterized program implementation. In particular, implementation of the School Systems and Quality (SSQ) contract has been typified by adaptive management, which has contributed to greater efficiency and improved prospects for effectiveness.
* There remains the need for the institutional partners to ensure that the EP is in line with the governments’ overarching development aspirations. On one level this requires due consideration and promotion of the ‘traditional’ (and important) development principles of sustainability and capacity building. On another level it requires due consideration and alignment with the ’new aid paradigm’ and its promotion of, *inter alia*, value for money, private sector engagement and combatting corruption. Against that backdrop, POM notes the ongoing absence of social inclusion and value for money strategies or frameworks, potentially at the expense of securing optimal developmental returns.
* With considerable time left on the EP and an estimated AUD 250m to be committed, challenges must be tackled and opportunities must be grasped. Of particular note is the need for the partners to resolve the affordability, means and/or appetite to sustain a range of EP-supported initiatives, not least of which is ProDEP. Equally, it is incumbent on the partners to clarify their respective expectations in relation to several outstanding matters, including the extent and mechanisms for MoRA’s engagement in the management of ProDEP and the future participation of madrasah principals in CPD (C2), and the nature and degree of expected results accruing from ACDP and the role of ACDP in the pursuit of those results (C4).

***What next steps are proposed?***

Based on its findings, the APPR offers a total of 28 recommendations. These are presented over the page.

Key recommendations

| **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Component 1** | | |
| R1: Institutional partners, with the support of SSQ, should identify which C1 systems and processes have the greatest potential to be sustained (adopted ‘as is’ or adapted to fit) (refer to §2.4.2). | \*\*\* | MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| R2: Institutional partners should consider the commissioning of supplementary analyses of the key success factors for sustainability, including appraisal of approaches to and lessons learned during the implementation of similar activities (refer to §2.4.2). | \*\* | MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| R3: Accurate enrolment figures of all newly built schools should be systematically and comprehensively reported (refer §2.4.3). | \*\* | MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| R4: A survey instrument should be proposed in POM’s EOPO 1 Evaluation Study endline in 2015 to disaggregate between new enrolees and transferees (refer §2.4.3). | \*\* | POM and DFAT |
| R5: The impact of the NSIP and enhanced site selection process should be analysed and documented (possibly through an evaluation study) (refer §2.4.3). | \* | MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| **Component 2** | | |
| R6: A long-term sustainability strategy that resolves issues of affordability, financing and institutional responsibilities and capabilities should be developed, maintained and implemented by June 2015 (refer §3.4.5). | \*\*\* | MoEC and MoRA (with DFAT and SSQ support) |
| R7: GoI’s expectations for MoRA’s long-term involvement and role in ProDEP should be clarified, i.e. whether MoRA is expected to be able to implement and sustain ProDEP within its environment after the EP (refer §3.4.5). | \*\*\* | MoEC and MoRA (with DFAT and SSQ support as appropriate) |
| R8: ProDEP should be ‘marketed’ as a cohesive, integrated package of professional development so as to guard against selection of individual modules or components (refer §3.4.5). | \*\* | MoEC and MoRA (with the support of the Eligible Entities and SSQ) |
| R9: A broad range of UoLs that takes adequate account of the varied competencies of principals should be made available to principals (refer §3.4.3). | \*\* | MoEC and MoRA (with SSQ support) |
| R10: Small schools/madrasah in rural areas should be prioritised during the selection of supervisors and principals (schools) (refer §3.4.3). | \*\* | Eligible Entities (with guidance from MoEC/MoRA and SSQ support as appropriate) |
| R11: Responsibility for the design, delivery modalities and quality assurance functions for ProDEP should be transitioned from C2 to an appropriate entity appointed by Badan (see §3.4.5). | \*\* | MoEC |
| Component 3 | | |
| R12: Priority should be given to assisting MoRA in the immediate development of a comprehensive ‘Grand Design’ or ‘Road Map’ that will guide future efforts to continuously improve the quality of madrasah (refer §4.4.5). | \*\*\* | MoRA (with SSQ support and facilitation) |
| R13: Lessons from the implementation of C3 – specifically those which contribute to a better understanding of the processes and systems required to improve quality – should be collated, analysed and presented for discussion and consideration as part of the ‘Grand Design’ (refer §4.4.2). | \*\*\* | MoRA (with support from SSQ) |
| R14: Priority initiatives identified by the ‘Grand Design’ should be supported with appropriate specialized technical assistance and adequate resources from C3 (and subsequent DFAT support) (refer §4.4.3). | \*\*\* | SSQ and DFAT |
| R15: An analysis of the appropriate levels of Block Grant funding required to meet accreditation standards and to improve the quality of education services provided should be conducted and this should take due account of different types and circumstances of madrasah (refer §4.4.2). | \* | MoRA (with support from SSQ) |
| R16: Introduce Leadership and Community Engagement training and negotiate better engagement with ProDEP training programs (refer §4.4.4). | \*\* | MoRA (with SSQ facilitation and assistance) |
| R17: Ensure rigorous selection, professional development (including linking with ProDEP) and monitoring of mentors (and supervisors) and work to build a cadre of educational professionals for improving madrasah education quality (refer §4.4.4). | \*\* | MoRA (with SSQ facilitation and assistance) |
| **Component 4** | | |
| R18: The ADB TA Report and ACDP M&E Strategy should be reviewed and updated to include suitable success metrics (refer §5.4.3). | \*\*\* | ACDP Secretariat and the ADB (with support from the GoI, EU, DFAT and POM) |
| R19: The portfolio of investments should be managed more strategically such that the Secretariat looks beyond output-level deliverables to the pursuit of the agreed outcomes, for example by maximising the potential of its ‘back catalogue’ of concluded activities and by exploiting the synergies between activities (refer §5.4.3). | \*\*\* | ACDP Secretariat (with direction and guidance provided by DFAT, the EU and GoI as appropriate) |
| R20: The ACDP Secretariat should invest in full-time, dedicated M&E resources so as to improve results tracking and reporting, and to facilitate learning, continuous improvement and strategic management of its portfolio (refer §5.4.3). | \*\*\* | ACDP Secretariat and ADB (with input from DFAT, the EU and GoI as appropriate) |
| R21: Institutional partners should, as part of the negotiations concerning the proposed budget-neutral extension of ACDP, reach a shared understanding or agreement about:   * the nature of any intended institutional legacy; * whether ACDP’s current institutional home is the most appropriate to attain that legacy; * what supporting measures are required by GoI to pursue any intended institutional legacy; and * what is expected of ACDP to build the necessary foundations for that legacy (refer §5.4.5). | \*\* | GoI, DFAT and the EU (with input from the ADB) |
| **Program Oversight** | | |
| R22: EP managers should identify and agree upon key strategies for the realisation of EP EOPOs and ensure that EP workplans align with key strategies (refer §6.3.2). | \*\*\* | GoI and DFAT (with support from TOGs, implementing agencies, POM) |
| R23: A formal mechanism to identify, review and share lessons learned from the implementation of the EP should be established and then applied to the new AIP priorities and programs (refer §6.3.2). | \*\* | DFAT |
| R24: EP managers should identify and maximise cross-component synergies through stronger EP portfolio management (refer §6.3.2). | \*\* | GoI and DFAT |
| R25: Institutional partners, with the support of implementing partners, should define a clear strategy that explains how the EP translates DFAT’s and GoI’s policies on equity and equality into action (refer §6.3.2). | \*\*\* | DFAT and GoI (with support from SSQ and POM) |
| R26: Institutional partners, with the support of implementing partners where appropriate, should identify relevant social inclusion indicators, milestones and targets for incorporation into the Performance Milestone Framework (refer §6.3.4). | \*\*\* | DFAT and GoI (with support from SSQ and POM) |
| R27: EP managers should develop an action plan identifying adjustments required to the EP to respond to the development principles articulated within Australia’s “new aid paradigm” (refer §6.3.4). | \*\* | DFAT |
| R28: As part of the above, agreement on a utilitarian VFM framework should be reached early in 2015 (refer §6.3.4). | \*\*\* | DFAT and POM (with input from Implementing Partners as appropriate) |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; Orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; Green (\*) - low urgency*



**Introduction, Approach and Methodology**

# Introduction

## The Education Partnership

The Government of Australia (GoA) has been investing in Indonesia’s basic education sector for a number of years, most notably through the flagship AUD 395m Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program (AIBEP) (2006-2011) and now through the Australia-Indonesia Education Partnership (EP): a five-year, AUD 524m[[1]](#footnote-1) program that has operated from mid-2011 and will continue to operate until mid-2016.

Australia is supporting the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to achieve its policy goals in relation to access, quality and governance of basic education (defined as primary and junior secondary education). The EP’s vision is to improve education service delivery in Indonesia. To achieve this, it focuses on three goals:

* To increase participation in Junior Secondary Education (JSE) schooling.
* To improve the quality of education in public and private schools, including Madrasah.
* To improve sector governance through increased use of evidence for decision-making.

The EP recognizes that these goals are aspirational and are influenced by a multitude of factors, many of which are outside the control or even direct influence of the Partnership. As such, the EP focuses its effort on the attainment of four End-of-Partnership-Outcomes (EOPOs):

* Enrolment in JSE in participating districts increases (Component 1).
* Management of schools and Madrasah improves in participating districts (Component 2).
* Quality of Madrasah service provision improves (in line with National Education Standards) in targeted districts (Component 3).
* ACDP evidence is incorporated in relevant education sector policies, regulations, plans and budgets (Component 4).

These EOPOs describe the highest level of change over which the EP has significant influence (see the current[[2]](#footnote-2) EP logic architecture in Annex I). The EP uses various modalities to deliver its support, e.g. earmarked budget support (Components 1 and 2), project delivery (Component 3), and technical assistance to GoI agencies (Components 1-4). Since late 2013, the majority of expenditure in Components 1 and 2 has been made through government systems.

## The Annual Partnership Performance Report

### Objective

The EP remains Australia’s largest ever bilateral program. It is important that the program generates significant ‘developmental return’, that implementation is carefully scrutinized, and that results and lessons are captured, shared and fed into decision-making processes. The EP Performance Oversight and Monitoring (POM) team is charged with generating timely evidence and actionable recommendations so that the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and its partners can safeguard Australia’s investment in the EP; improve EP management and implementation; strengthen education policy dialogue with the GoI; and guide future Australian investment in the Indonesian education sector.

The Annual Partnership Performance Report (APPR) provides an objective assessment of program achievements, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges. As such, it speaks to DFAT’s aid scrutiny objectives, whilst also seeking to inform program management decisions and strategic dialogue between the Governments of Australia and of Indonesia about sector performance and emerging priorities.

The 2014 APPR – POM’s third, full APPR of the EP – reports and analyses program performance in 2014. It seeks to deliver:

* A clear, concise and evidence-informed picture of achievements over the year.
* A clear and concise commentary about concerns and possible challenges in 2015-16.
* A set of action-oriented recommendations.

### Approach

POM’s analysis of EP performance draws on OECD’s DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. As such, it also speaks to the requirements of GoA’s Quality Reporting System (QRS) and the upcoming Aid Quality Checks). Annex II explains the APPR interpretation of the DAC criteria and the Rating Scale used under the QRS and in this APPR is presented in Annex III.

The performance of each EOPO is scored, using the same system and guidelines contained within GoA’s Independent Completion Reporting (ICR) framework. The rating scale used with the previous DFAT Quality Reporting System (QRS) and the upcoming Aid Quality Checks (AQC) system has been adopted. Scores for 2013 are also presented such that the reader can see the evolution of component performance.

In 2013, POM believed it was too early to provide defensible scores in some cases, particularly in the case of *impact*, i.e. long-term change. This year POM has sought to score all criteria, though in some cases, such as impact and sustainability, the score and the narrative speak to probability or likelihood. In all cases POM has scored the component and not the performance of individual implementing partners working within the component.

### Methodology

The APPR assessment process was conducted in October-December 2014. It contained nine key steps:

* **Step 1: A critical appraisal and revision of the EP Analytical Framework** (see Annex V).
* **Step 2: A desk review and screening** of every report related to EP performance that was submitted or received by POM in 2014 (see Annex IV).
* **Step 3: Semi-structured interviews with key informants**, with a view to further developing and testing POM’s understanding of key matters. Lines of enquiry drew on insights gleaned from the desk review (see Annex VI for a list of persons consulted and those approached but unavailable).
* **Step 4: An internal POM APPR workshop** in mid-November during which POM staff identified and discussed key findings, messages and implications.
* **Step 5: A series of half-day Component and Program Oversight meetings with key EP stakeholders from institutional and implementing partners** between 19th and 27th November 2014 during which emerging findings were presented and discussed.
* **Step 6: Preparation, submission and discussion of a Critical Issues Report that reflected the issues discussed at the aforementioned meetings**, submitted to DFAT on 3rd December 2014.
* **Step 7: Circulation of draft Component and Program Oversight** chapters to Component Managers and DFAT Unit Managers on 17th December 2014 for review, and specifically to correct any factual inaccuracies.
* **Step 8: Production and submission of the Draft APPR to DFAT on 31 December 2014.**
* **Step 9: Submission of the Final APPR to DFAT** following factual corrections on basis of comments received from DFAT.

### Caveats and limitations

Every effort has been made to present credible, robust and evidence-informed findings and recommendations. Nevertheless, there are always limitations. Of particular note is the absence of EP-wide performance data that speak to the content of the EP Performance Milestone Framework (PMF). With approval and implementation of the PMF commencing at various points in Q2-3 of 2014, the 2014 APPR frequently speaks to the spirit but not the letter of the PMF.

## Report structure

The layout of the APPR seeks to present information in a succinct and logical manner. Guidance on the contents of the report has been taken from the Monitoring and Evaluation Standards developed by the DFAT-Jakarta Evaluation Capacity Building Program (ECBP). More specifically, this report includes, as Annex VII, an assessment of its compliance with the proposed features listed in ‘Standard 3: Initiative Progress Reporting’.

The APPR is divided into three parts:

* Part A “zooms in” on component-by-component performance: it considers the context in which the component operates; it highlights the achievements of the past year; it analyses progress and performance in relation to the DAC criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance and sustainability; and it proposes recommendations for action in light of that analysis.
* Part B “zooms out” by examining program oversight, and specifically issues pertaining to the EP’s delivery, management, governance and cross-cutting developmental objectives.
* Part C describes conclusions and presents a consolidated set of recommendations.

Each recommendation in the APPR is accompanied by a nominated stakeholder who is assigned prime responsibility for implementation. Recommendations are presented by a color-coded system that indicates the relative immediacy of the issue.

Footnotes and endnotes are utilized throughout the document: footnotes are employed to provide clarification on a point; endnotes are employed to reference a source.



**Part A: Zooming in**

***Component performance***

# Component 1: School Construction

## Introduction

### The EP investment

The Government of Australia is supporting GoI to build up to 1,150 new junior secondary schools (USBs) and one-roof junior secondary schools (SATAPs), creating up to 160,000 new student places between 2011 and 2016[[3]](#endnote-1). The resulting increase in available student places in participating districts (EOCO) is expected to lead to an increase in enrolment in Junior Secondary Education (JSE) in participating districts (EOPO).

The supply of new JSE places is expected to provide (prospective) learners with improved physical access to JSE. The closer proximity of schools to households is also expected to reduce financial barriers to enrolment (costs of student transportation and/or lodging) and therefore enable continued and improved participation[[4]](#endnote-2). Within participating districts, the investment is expected to have an impact on JSE enrolment and retention rates, and rates of transition of students from primary to junior secondary school.

The GoA seeks to focus its EP investment on districts with low junior secondary enrolment rates[[5]](#footnote-3) so as to reduce inter-district disparities in enrolment rates. In doing so, it wishes to make a contribution to the GoI target of increasing the percentage of districts with a JSE Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of 90% or greater, to 85% by 2014 from 75% in 2011[[6]](#endnote-3). It also expects to assist Indonesia to deliver on its 2010-14 *Renstra* targets by improving access to nine years of basic education for boys and girls, and children with physical disabilities, in un-served and under-served areas of the country[[7]](#endnote-4).

Component 1 does not expect to deliver systemic change[[8]](#footnote-4) in government policy, planning and service delivery, though indirect benefits may accrue. The primary output is the construction of new schools and the additional places they offer learners, with the expectation that increased enrolment (the expected outcome) and sustained participation (the expected goal) will follow.

All schools are expected to be fully operational within six months following completion of construction, and be capable of delivering effective formal and non-formal education services[[9]](#endnote-5). This expectation requires that the schools be fully staffed and equipped (e.g. with laboratory equipment and books), and have accessed the necessary GoI operational funds to run and maintain the schools[[10]](#endnote-6). The Grant Agreement between GoA and GoI provides for the SATAPs to receive an initial “start-up” grant upon school completion to ensure smooth initial operations; the USBs do not have the same entitlement.

Once the schools are built, the EP, and specifically Component 2, delivers a New School Induction Program (NSIP) in school-based management to school management teams. Upon completion, the participants are expected to demonstrate a statistically significant increase in knowledge, which should then be applied when conducting their duties.

* + 1. The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

Support provided through Component 1 is delivered through a combination of technical assistance and budget support to MoEC[[11]](#endnote-7). Technical assistance and training are provided by the managing contractor that holds the School Systems and Quality (SSQ) contract. Funding for school construction is channelled through GoI systems, thus overall responsibility for the construction process lies within MoEC.

In that context, GoA provides:

* AUD 155m of grants[[12]](#endnote-8) to fund the community-based JSE school construction.
* Technical assistance and training to MoEC, School Construction Committees (SCCs) and District Education Officials (DEOs) concerning site selection and subsequent monitoring of school construction.
* Training in SBM for principals, school committees, DEOs and community members through the New School Induction Program (NSIP).
* Support to the establishment and implementation of a MoEC-managed Complaint Handling System (CHS).
* Financing of supplementary independent audits.
  1. **Context**

While the official national GER figure for 2012/2013 rose above 100%, it has since fallen back to 97% (see Table 1). This is probably due to the increased number of JSE aged children (+4%), set against the minimal increase in the numbers of students in JSE (+0.7%). The result is that the gap between 2014 enrolment rate and the MoEC 2014 *Renstra* Target has widened.

Table 1: JSE enrolment 2011/12 to 2013/14


|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2011/2012 | 2012/2013 | 2013/2014 |
| # JSE enrolled students | 12,605,112 | 12,796,074 | 12,891,887 |
| # JSE Aged Children | 12,672,739 | 12,775,079 | 13,303,300 |
| National GER | 99.5% | 100.2% | 97% |
| MoEC specific GER | 76.5% | 77.6% | 74.28% |

Source: MoEC PDSP data

* 1. **Achievements**

By December 2014, 764 schools – 279 USB and 485 SATAP – had been built in 232 districts across 29 of the 34 provinces in Indonesia (see Figure 1). Construction of these new schools has led to the creation of 3,129 new classrooms[[13]](#footnote-5) and an additional 112,644 student places[[14]](#footnote-6). Only three of the 767 schools (<0.5%) foreseen within Cycles 1 and 2 remain incomplete as at December 2014.

Figure 1: Distribution of Component 1 schools across provinces



The support provided by the SSQ team to MoEC has been wide-ranging and instrumental in achieving this progress. It included[[15]](#endnote-9):

* site verification and review of school proposals;
* compliance analysis of school sites;
* monitoring of school construction quality and progress;
* identification of issues at the field level and reporting to MoEC and DFAT;
* support to the resolution of field issues;
* compilation of school data into financial and administrative compliance reports;
* training of school construction committees (SCC) and construction management consultants (CMC);
* establishment of the Joint Technical Unit (JTU) between MoEC and SSQ; and
* implementation of the NSIP for principals, teachers and school committee members of all EP schools built in 2013.
  1. **Analysis**
     1. Relevance

From a sector perspective, the EP investment in JSE school construction remains in line with MoEC’s access agenda and school construction remains of interest to the GoI. While MoEC spending on new school construction has declined in recent years, the unexpected reduction in GER (see Table 1) has re-energised government initiatives, and MoEC now reports that it needs to construct an additional 4,700 SMP schools if it is to achieve the 2010-14 *Renstra* enrolment target[[16]](#footnote-7).

From an Australian perspective, DFAT’s education priorities have shifted towards education quality and there will be an associated reduction of support to Indonesia’s access agenda post-EP. POM understands that this is evidenced in the absence of any school construction-related objective in the upcoming DFAT Aid Investment Plan and it may also be reflected in the Partnership’s decision to reduce the overall funding to Component 1 from AUD 210m to AUD 155m. These changes in emphasis away from school construction should not undermine the importance of the achievements of C1. Nevertheless, the changes point to a decline in the external relevance of school construction with respect to current Australian development policies and priorities.

POM believes the internal relevance of Component 1 to have remained unchanged since the beginning of the EP. The component continues to offer only a limited response mechanism to fulfil the objective of increased enrolment: only one type of activity (school construction) is offered and for just two types of schools (3-class SATAP and 6-class USB), despite the opportunity to support and promote other measures that would contribute to the attainment of the EOPO. Such measures include both construction and non-construction solutions, such as additional and rehabilitated classrooms, and retrieval programs respectively.

* + 1. Efficiency

The implementation of C1 is managed by MoEC, with technical support provided by SSQ. The first cycle of construction started in September 2012 and was finalized by May 2013. The second cycle was implemented from August 2013 to July 2014. The third cycle started in September 2014 and is still ongoing. One thousand, eight hundred and sixty-five participants from Cycle 1 schools have benefited from the NSIP training[[17]](#endnote-10), which should provide upsides for the acceleration of school-based management capacity in newly constructed schools.

The number of schools built within each cycle has declined from Cycle 1 to date (see Table 2). This reflects several factors, including the increase of unit cost, the reduction in overall budget available to C1, and the restricted ability of districts to nominate new school sites, i.e. it becomes increasingly difficult for (target) districts to identify new school sites year-on-year and as the number of ‘obvious’ sites are depleted. In addition, it might also be the case that the greater stringency applied during the selection process has ‘screened out’ applicants that might have been endorsed in earlier cycles[[18]](#footnote-8).

Table 2: School construction per cycle (as of December 2014)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Cycle** | **SATAP** | **USB** | **Total** | **Incomplete Schools** |
| **1** | 336 | 115 | 451 | 2 USB |
| **2** | 150 | 166 | 316 | 1 SATAP |
| **3** | 107 | 131 | 238 | n/a |
| **TOTAL** | 593 | 412 | 1,005 | 3 schools |

Source: SSQ Component 1 management team

There is strong evidence to suggest that selection and construction of schools has become increasingly efficient, with noticeable improvements made to the management of the construction process. Since the start of the second cycle, SSQ has strengthened the monitoring and reporting of the school construction process by providing detailed information about the status of construction on a bi-weekly basis. Moreover, the mandate and role of field monitors has also evolved since initial implementation. This has resulted in greater direct observation and improved implementation of corrective actions, which when taken together have ensured better oversight of the construction process. Similarly, partners have made incremental improvements to the Complaints Handling System and the site selection process, which have resulted in better case management of any arising issues and more effective and compliant site selection. These improvements offer valuable lessons for the delivery of GoI-constructed infrastructure that could and should be disseminated to other interested parties.

From an audit perspective, the auditors reported that the financial statements relating to Cycles 1 and 2 were prepared in accordance with the financial reporting requirements of the Grant Agreements without qualification. A compliance review that sampled 63 out of the 316 schools built in Cycle 2 identified a number of non-compliance issues, but only one issue was classified as suspected fraud, which was duly reported to DFAT. The number of Suspected Fraud Reports issued for Cycle 2 was significantly down from Cycle 1 (see Table 3).

This apparent improvement in performance might reflect improved implementation processes and the timely and full actioning of recommendations outlined in earlier audit reports. Where non-compliance occurs it likely reflects the low capacity of some SCC to effectively interpret detailed procedures manuals[[19]](#endnote-11).

Table 3: Incidence of Suspected Fraud and Non-Compliance

| **Risk** | **SCC Compliance Review for Cycle 1** | **SCC Compliance Review for Cycle 2** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Fraud** |  |  |
| Fraud Issues | 9 | 1 |
| **Non-compliance** | | |
| Procurement and Inventory Related Issues | 12 | 8 |
| Financial Related Issues | 27 | 12 |
| Reporting Related Issues | 4 | 5 |

Source: SCC Financial Compliance Review Report 2012 and 2013

* + 1. Effectiveness

It is noteworthy that in 2014 C1 provided additional resources to support targeted districts to draft and submit proposals to MoEC. C1 has also made a conscious effort to strengthen the verification of proposals submitted by districts to ensure better compliance of proposals with agreed criteria. POM believes that these efforts have enhanced the prospects of the component achieving its EOPO.

At least 15,239 students are currently enrolled in EP schools[[20]](#footnote-9) [[21]](#endnote-12), surpassing the PMF annual milestone for 2013 of 9,600 students[[22]](#footnote-10). This significant over-achievement arises partially from the discrepancy between the assumptions made in calculating the PMF targets and/or milestones and realities in the field. The PMF assumed that schools would only enrol students after the completion of school construction. However, this is not always the case: some schools, mostly SATAPs, enrol students before the construction is completed[[23]](#footnote-11).

The total number of enrolees in EP schools is expected to increase in the coming 2-3 years because:

* existing students in the earlier grades should remain enrolled as they advance, while new enrolees will continue to enter the school; and
* schools constructed under Cycles 2, 3 and 4 will accept students as they are completed.

However, whilst the enrolment data are encouraging, it is important to note that there remains limited opportunity to track and verify the attainment of the EOPO. Complete enrolment figures may only be known by 2019, i.e. once all schools have been operating for a full three years and therefore once all SMP grades have been populated. In addition, the number of ‘new enrolees’[[24]](#footnote-12) *vis-à-vis* ‘transferees’[[25]](#footnote-13), which necessarily influences changes to district GER rates, is and will largely remain unknown[[26]](#footnote-14).

* + 1. Impact

The impact of the Component 1 investment can be considered on two levels. At school-level, the prospects for long-term benefits are evident. EP-funded facilities are regarded as being of a high construction standard; a status confirmed through both internal and external evaluations[[27]](#endnote-13) [[28]](#endnote-14). This should ensure that the buildings realise their expected lifetime[[29]](#footnote-15) and without placing excessive maintenance burdens on the school and district government.

At a systemic level, however, the prospects for long-term benefits are less clear, in particular with respect to the future resourcing of the new schools. Should one use data collected from a survey of principals undergoing NSIP training (see Table 4 below), there is cause for concern about the ability of the education system, particularly at district level, to adequately resource the newly constructed schools. With an average of only three teachers per school, the challenges to adequately staff new schools may compromise the contribution of Component 1 to the attainment of Goal 2, i.e. to the improvement of education quality. However, should one use GoI data, the numbers tell a very different story[[30]](#footnote-16); a story that suggests that the new schools built in Cycle 1 are very well staffed[[31]](#footnote-17) and classrooms are well populated.

Table 4: Enrolment and Resourcing in Cycle 1 Schools

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Data Source** | **Schools Constructed** | **Schools Sampled** | **Number of Students** | **Number of Teachers** |
| **Survey on NSIP\*** | 451 | 227 (50%) | 15,239 | 739 |
|  |  | **Average per School** | 67 students | 3 teachers |
| **DAPODIK\*\*** | 451 | 359 (80%) | 37,321 | 4,347 |
|  |  | **Average per School** | 104 students | 12 teachers |

\*Source: NSIP Survey as presented in SSQ Mid-year Progress Report   
\*\*Source: http://dapo.dikdas.kemdikbud.go.id/exreport/w/000000

The seemingly conflicting story could be explained by a number of factors:

* NSIP survey data were collected during the NSIP training that took place from September 2013 to June 2014[[32]](#endnote-15). Some schools had only been operational for three months.
* DAPODIK data were collected during the first semester of the 2014/2015 academic year, by which time schools had been fully operational for one full academic year.
* Frequently, public schools only report their civil servant teacher numbers and omit contract teachers whereas DAPODIK will report all teachers, resulting in higher teacher numbers.

Clearly, there is ongoing need for accurate data. Only then will the impact of the constructed schools become apparent. However, it is noteworthy that there are inevitable risks associated with the construction of schools in remote areas with low population densities. Specifically, POM remains concerned that the EP may be contributing to a proliferation of small schools, which could lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of teaching and management resources and an associated effect on student/teacher ratios and/or the quality of services provided.

Ninety-four percent of Cycle 1 and Cycle 2 schools[[33]](#footnote-18) have a student/teacher ratio below the national average of 18.6 students per teacher (see Figure 2, below). Disaggregating by SATAP and USB, almost all SATAP (99%) were under the national average, with 73.5% below half the national average. For USB the situation is slightly better, with 90% and 49% of schools respectively.

Figure 2: Student Teacher Ratio at a Sample of Cycle 1 and Cycle 2 Schools

Source: http://dapo.dikdas.kemdikbud.go.id/exreport/w/000000

* + 1. Sustainability

The sustainability of school construction, operations and maintenance, as well as increases in GER depend on a range of factors, some of which the EP has control over (e.g. appropriate site selection) and others where EP has limited control (e.g. the willingness and capacity of districts to support the school). There is a strong likelihood that EP schools will provide sustained benefits, not least given the quality of the infrastructure provided.

From a systems perspective, the likelihood of specific processes and systems being sustained in MoEC is variable and much depends on their being institutional appetite and incentive to take things forward. For example, POM understands:

* The current utilisation of field monitors (FM) is unlikely to continue after the EP finishes because they are not part of the current Indonesian construction process (as defined by Ministry of Public Works decree 45/2007[[34]](#footnote-19)). Should there be a desire to retain the FM mechanism, it may be advisable to attach the function to another sub-directorate[[35]](#endnote-16), thus broadening its scope to all activities of the directorate.
* The use of the Complaints Handling System is likely to continue albeit its scope and utilisation may evolve over time.
* The current construction manuals, guidelines and training modules/aids (including training methods) developed under the EP will be adopted or adapted by MoEC.
* The site selection unit and associated procedures may continue, not least if a specific manual were to be formalised and bundled with the existing implementation guidelines (re: e.g. earthquake resistance, use of non-toxic materials, etc.).
  1. **Summary and recommendations**

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 5. The rating scale used with the previous DFAT Quality Reporting System (QRS) and the upcoming Aid Quality Checks (AQC) system has been adopted. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, on increasing the likelihood of achieving EOPO 1 are made in Table 6 below.

Table 5: Component 1 scorecard

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **Score 2013** | **Score 2014** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| **Relevance** | 4 | 3 | * Whilst school construction remains relevant to MoEC’s strategic planning access targets, DFAT’s education priorities have shifted towards education quality and there will be an associated reduction of support to Indonesia’s access agenda post-EP. * POM remains circumspect about the internal relevance of Component 1, believing the menu of options on offer to be unnecessarily restrictive. | * The decrease in score is associated with the change in DFAT’s priorities. |
| **Efficiency** | 5 | 6 | * Almost all targeted schools in Cycle 1 and 2 (763 of 767) are complete and operational. * Preparation and verification of site selection has improved considerably. * The CHS and construction monitoring processes have been strengthened | * The increase in score reflects the incremental improvements made to selection and construction management processes, coupled with the timely delivery of expected construction targets. |
| **Effectiveness** | 3 | 4 | * C1 will probably achieve the EOCO, i.e. an “increase in availability of places in JSE”. * The likelihood of C1 achieving the EOPO has been strengthened by the enhancement of the site selection process but the number of new enrolees (vis-à-vis transferees from existing schools) will not likely be known by the end of the EP (besides for cycle 1 that is covered by the POM evaluation) | * The increase in score reflects the improved prospects of the EOPO being achieved. |
| **Impact** | TE | 4 | * The prospect for school-level impact is positive: the quality of EP-funded facilities is high, which should ensure a full lifetime with reduced maintenance costs. * The prospect for impact at an aggregate level (i.e. at district and national levels) is unconfirmed as there are uncertainties around long-term resourcing of constructed schools. | * The impact score reflects positive school-level impact and assumes only very limited concerns about future resourcing of schools. |
| **Sustainability** | 4 | 4 | * At a systemic level, the likelihood that Component 1 processes and systems will be sustained is variable: some aspects (e.g. CHS, training guidelines and manuals) will likely be used post-EP, other are less likely (e.g. field monitors, site selection process) | * There is no guarantee that C1 management processes, however efficient, will be sustained. |

Table 6: Component 1 key findings and recommendations

| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C1 has made notable year-on-year improvements to the efficiency of the delivery of school construction. These are directly attributable to the prevalence of enhanced management processes and systems. There is a clear opportunity to institutionalise those enhancements (see §2.4.2). | R1: Institutional partners, with the support of SSQ, should identify which C1 systems and processes have the greatest potential to be sustained (adopted ‘as is’ or adapted to fit). | *\*\*\** | MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| R2: Institutional partners should consider the commissioning of supplementary analyses of the key success factors for sustainability, including appraisal of approaches to and lessons learned during the implementation of similar activities. | *\*\** | MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| Prospects for attainment of the EOPO have been enhanced by improvements to the site selection process and the delivery of the NSIP. The headline enrolment figures are encouraging but i) they do not necessarily reflect additional enrolment and ii) the extent to which EP is making a contribution to additional enrolment (vs. transferees) is unknown (see §2.4.3). | R3: Accurate enrolment figures of all newly built schools should be systematically and comprehensively reported. | *\*\** | MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| R4: A survey instrument should be proposed in POM’s EOPO 1 Evaluation Study endline in 2015 to disaggregate between new enrolees and transferees. | *\*\** | POM and DFAT |
| R5: The impact of the NSIP and enhanced site selection process should be analysed and documented (possibly through an evaluation study). | *\** | MoEC (with SSQ support) |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*

# Component 2: School and District Management

* 1. **Introduction** 
     1. The EP investment

Component 2 seeks to improve the management of schools and madrasah in participating districts(EOPO) through the application of improved professional competencies of principals (EOCO)[[36]](#endnote-17). With the Continuous Professional Development (CPD) for principals at its core, the EP-supported Professional Development for Education Personnel Program (ProDEP) also consists of Supervisor Professional Development (SPD), Human Resource Management and Development (HRMD), Strategic Planning and Financial Management (SP&FM), and the Principal Preparation Program (PPP). ProDEP is implemented in 250 districts (approximately one-half of Indonesia’s total number of districts) and involves the participation of the two different ministries responsible for basic education, MoEC and MoRA.

Component 2, in coordination with Component 1, also implements the New School Induction Program (NSIP) that is designed to support effective school-based management in newly constructed schools. In addition, Component 2 is piloting the Principal Performance Improvement Program (PPIP) which seeks to meet the special development needs of individual principals with unsatisfactory performance during appraisal.

The role of Component 2 has shifted over the years from an initial focus on designing, developing and piloting professional development programs, to assisting MoEC in ProDEP implementation[[37]](#endnote-18), monitoring and evaluation, and quality assurance.

ProDEP is largely financed by the Government of Australia (GoA) through a Grant Agreement with the Government of Indonesia with a budget of up to AUD 110m. The Government of Indonesia finances, *inter alia*, staff salaries, allowances and honoraria, and office space and office equipment[[38]](#endnote-19). Grant Agreement funds are in addition to GoA funds for Component 2 managed activities including NSIP, the quality assurance of C2 programs and the provision of ongoing technical assistance to MoEC and MoRA.

POM acknowledges that the NSIP accounted for a significant part of the budget managed by SSQ Component 2 in 2014[[39]](#footnote-20)[[40]](#endnote-20) and the assessment of the performance of C2 during 2014 considers both ProDEP and NSIP.

* + 1. The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

ProDEP is implemented by a number of Eligible Entities.

* At the national level, ProDEP is implemented through *Pusbangtendik* under the Board of Development for Human Resource Education and Culture and Education Quality Assurance (Badan PSDMPK & PMP) of MoEC. It has overall responsibility for ProDEP coordination.
* At the subnational level, ProDEP is implemented by the Board of Education Quality Assurance (LPMP), the Centre for Development and Empowerment of Teachers and Education Personnel (P4TK), and the Board of School Principal Development and Empowerment (LPPKS) (see Table 7)[[41]](#endnote-21).

**Table 7: Roles and responsibilities of Eligible Entities**

| **ProDEP components** | | **Eligible Entities** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **LPMP** | **P4TK** | **LPPKS** |
| CPD | Primary school | ✓ |  | ✓ |
| Junior secondary school |  | ✓ |  |
| On line |  | ✓ |  |
| SPD | Primary school | ✓ |  | ✓ |
| Junior secondary school |  | ✓ |  |
| HRMD |  | ✓ |  |  |
| SP&FM |  | ✓ |  |  |
| PPP |  | ✓ |  | ✓ |

NSIP is implemented directly by Component 2 through the engagement of trained facilitators from LPMP and P4TK[[42]](#endnote-22), while C2 work on PPIP[[43]](#endnote-23) concentrated on the design, the development of guidelines, and the subsequent piloting.

**3.2 Context**

Implementation of ProDEP in 2014 was hampered by the demands of the implementation of Curriculum 2013 - a key priority for the previous Government of Indonesia. Whilst commitment to Curriculum 2013 has declined sharply with the installation of the new government, education quality is still high on the priority list. Referring to trends in past PISA[[44]](#footnote-21) results, the new Minister of Culture and Primary and Secondary Education, Anies Baswedan, stated recently that Indonesia’s education is in a “state of emergency”[[45]](#footnote-22). He expects Indonesia’s leaders at provincial and district levels to play a role in improving education[[46]](#endnote-24). A similar statement on education quality for madrasah was made by the Minister of Religious Affairs, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, who indicated that madrasah have long been perceived as “backward and static” and should nowadays become a symbol of education progress[[47]](#endnote-25).

Changes to the policy and political landscape are being mirrored by changes to the organisational environment. This may include an upcoming restructuring of the MoEC as well as the Badan[[48]](#footnote-23) and, therefore, of *Pusbangtendik*. From an operational perspective, the new regulation from the Ministry of State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform that limits the use of hotels by ministries (thereby potentially constraining the delivery of ProDEP training by Eligible Entities) might be a challenge to ProDEP implementation. However, given that in 2015 all Eligible Entities will be required to use government facilities to implement ProDEP this should not be a significant factor in 2015.

**3.3 Achievements**

Component 2 recorded a number of notable achievements in 2014, the most important being the commencement of ProDEP implementation in July 2014[[49]](#endnote-26). A range of stakeholders have now been trained within the GoI-led ProDEP, as summarised in Table 8 over page.

Further notable achievements include:

* CPD: All Units of Learnings (UoLs) have been designed, including six new generic UoLs on Mentoring, Coaching, Scientific Publication, Innovative Products, Child Protection, and Inclusive Education. In addition, Component 2 has developed a basic ICT module for supervisors and principals who will participate in ProDEP through an online learning modality. The first four of the six generic UoLs mentioned above have been handed over with the expectation that they will be implemented by *Pusbangtendik*, with the other two ready to be implemented in 2015. For 2014, CPD was delivered through face-to-face training, though pilots have been conducted to test opportunities for online delivery during 2015[[50]](#endnote-27). In addition, SSQ C2 has supported MoEC to align its performance management system with the new GoI requirements for appraisal of civil servants due for implementation in 2015 (which has the potential to make CPD more relevant to principals’ career advancement[[51]](#endnote-28)).
* SPD: Learning modules were handed over to *Pusbangtendik* with training commencing in August 2014. Training of trainers (ToT) for three batches of supervisors was completed. SSQ C2 assisted *Pusbangtendik* to develop the new regulations for the recruitment, training, selection and CPD of Supervisors[[52]](#endnote-29). Once issued, the new regulation has the potential to improve the effectiveness of ProDEP through the better selection of supervisors.
* DEO/PEO: All modules for HRMD and SP&FM were designed and handed over to *Pusbangtendik*.
* PPP: The roll out of the PPP by Component 2 was completed and future PPP activities will be carried out by GoI through LPPKS.
* PPIP: After delays due to competing priorities within MoEC, work on the preparation for the PPIP started and a pilot is currently being implemented.
* NSIP: Component 2 delivered NSIP training workshops for 443 schools constructed under the EP construction Cycle 1 and training for Cycle 2 schools commenced in September 2014.
* Satisfaction level: The percentage of participants enrolled in ProDEP modules undertaken to date and who are “satisfied” by the training stands at over 90% i.e. significantly above the 80% requirement in the PAF.

**Table 8: Persons trained by ProDEP**

| **Theme** | **Persons trained in 2014(a)** | | | | | | **Annual Total** | **Annual milestone (f)** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **MoEC** | | | **MoRA** | | |
| **Male** | **Female** | **Total** | **Male** | **Female** | **Total** |
| **CPD** | 9,856 | 4,799 | 14,655 | 1,291 | 488 | 1,779 | 16,434 | 20,000 |
| **SPD** | 2,512 | 665 | 3,177 | 280 | 98 | 378 | 3,555 | 4,000 |
| **HRMD** | 49 | 14 | 63 | 15 | 0 | 15 | 78 | 100 |
| **SP&FM (b)** | 776 | 141 | 917 | 196 | 34 | 230 | 1,147 | 1,250 |
| **PPP (c)** | 865 | 870 | 1,735 |  |  |  | 1,735 | 1,840 |
| **PPIP (d)** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0 |
| **NSIP (e)** | 1,983 | 743 | 2,726 |  |  |  | 2,726 | 546 schools |
| **GRAND TOTAL** | **16,041** | **7,232** | **23,273** | **1,782** | **620** | **2,402** |  |  |

Notes: (a) ProDEP related data are accurate as at 31 December 2014; NSIP data are accurate as at 5 December 2014.

(b) At the time of writing, a number of Eligible Entities have yet to disaggregate participants based on sex and ministry for SP&FM. This leads to a mismatch between male and female participants and the total number.

(c) The number includes participants who were directly financed by districts.

(d) PPIP will only commence in 2015. The pilot commenced in 2014.

(e) NSIP data include pilot activities in Bengkulu with 30 participants. NSIP is not conducted for madrasah. There is no NSIP participant target in the PAF and the PMF - it only provides the target for number of schools.

(f) The annual milestone identified in this column refers to the annual PAF/PMF milestone for 2014.

Source: Data from Component 2: NSIP data received on 9 December 2014, ProDEP (updated) data received on 30 January 2015, but reflect achievements from January – December 2014.

**3.4 Analysis**

3.4.1 Relevance

From a GoI perspective, a professional development system for principals and education officials remains relevant to government priorities. Interviews conducted with GoI officials[[53]](#endnote-30) revealed that ProDEP-related indicators have been included in MoEC’s draft *Renstra* 2015-19[[54]](#footnote-24). Although still subject to approval, this inclusion is a firm indication that improved management of education services will remain a priority for GoI. Nevertheless, its relative importance to the new administration is still uncertain as recent statements made by the Minister of Culture and Primary and Secondary Education have placed a strong emphasis on the role of teachers[[55]](#endnote-31), with little reference to the role of principals and education managers, leading to lack of clarity (at least to POM) on the administration’s vision for ProDEP.

From an Australian perspective, improvement in education quality and, by extension, improvement in education management, firmly remains a DFAT priority. It is likely to feature as a key outcome within DFAT’s upcoming Indonesia Aid Investment Plan (AIP).

From an internal relevance perspective, the ProDEP approach is fully consistent with the attainment of the EOCO. ProDEP is also broadly consistent with the EOPO. In time, to maintain relevance, it will be necessary to include new UoLs and to update existing UoLs to ensure consistency with any changes in government regulations and templates. It will also be necessary to utilise a wider range of delivery modalities, including online learning and cluster based modalities to facilitate efficient access of all principals to the training program.

The NSIP is designed to “build a core school-based group including principal, teachers, and school committee / community members able to manage the new schools most effectively and to plan for the future”[[56]](#endnote-32). The NSIP has the potential to complement ProDEP which is designed to improve the capacity of individuals (e.g. principals), while the NSIP is designed to improve the capacity of key stakeholder groups[[57]](#footnote-25). The program includes asset management and maintenance, handling of BOS funds, school accounting practices, and working with the community[[58]](#endnote-33), i.e. competencies that contribute to effective school management. From a conceptual perspective, NSIP therefore appears to be relevant to the achievement of the EOCO and the EOPO. However, NSIP’s actual contribution can only be known if an evaluation of the program’s contribution to the EOCO and EOPO is conducted.

3.4.2 Efficiency

ProDEP was initially envisaged to start in late 2013[[59]](#endnote-34) but its launch was delayed until July 2014 because of GoI’s commitment to roll out Curriculum 2013. This delay restricted C2 expenditure in the GoA fiscal year, July 2013 - June 2014[[60]](#endnote-35). Similarly, Eligible Entities were reported to have only spent, on average, 49%[[61]](#endnote-36) of their annual budget by November 2014. In some cases, the low reported spending was not caused by the lack of implementation of activities, but merely due to the limited capacity of eligible entities in reporting expenditures. For example, LPMP Kepri has a reported spending of 6%[[62]](#endnote-37) despite having completed all activities[[63]](#endnote-38).

The capacity of Eligible Entities to implement ProDEP is reported by SSQ to be varied. The capacity of the “least confident” trainers[[64]](#endnote-39) (for example, those in LPMP West Papua and LPMP Papua) will need to be improved so that they can deliver the same level of quality as other Eligible Entities. Further ToT and ongoing capacity development for Eligible Entities’ personnel and systems will be carried out in 2015.

C2 has met the majority of the output-level ProDEP milestones for 2014. But timely reporting could be an area of improvement in the future. During the SDTOG on 30 October 2014 it was reported that only 30%[[65]](#footnote-26) of the PAF annual milestone for CPD had been achieved[[66]](#endnote-40). The low level of achievement reported was not because a small percentage of participants had been trained, but rather because Eligible Entities had not entered the required data into the system (SIMDIKLAT) in time to be included in the report[[67]](#endnote-41). Based on updated data from C2, 82.2%[[68]](#endnote-42) of the CPD annual milestones were achieved by 31 December 2014. However, madrasah principals only account for 8.9% of the participants in CPD - below the target of 15%. It is worth noting that the participation of MoRA officials in SP&FM training is reported to be at 20%[[69]](#endnote-43).

Yet meeting the PAF quantitative targets within a shorter period of time could have consequences that might affect the quality and effectiveness of the training. It is understood that the On-the-Job Learning (OJL) phase of CPD had to be adapted in 2014 to cope with the late implementation of ProDEP: stakeholders agreed to reduce the OJL time available from three months to six weeks in 2014, albeit maintaining the expected 200 hours of OJL support[[70]](#endnote-44). Whilst it is possible to take two modules at the same time – as CPD is being implemented in 2014 – C2 provided advice to MoEC that this approach may create too heavy a workload for some principals[[71]](#endnote-45). Although these decisions are justified from an efficiency perspective, stakeholders must remain conscious of the possible adverse consequences on the component’s effectiveness.

NSIP was implemented with impressive efficiency in 2014. Of the 451 targeted schools in the PMF, almost 100%[[72]](#endnote-46) have participated in NSIP. In addition, the methodology used in NSIP workshops and the impact it has on participant learning has been acknowledged and praised by GoI[[73]](#endnote-47). Furthermore, according to SSQ’s own evaluation (see Table 9), NSIP has surpassed benchmarks set by the World Bank for the delivery of training in Indonesia[[74]](#footnote-27) [[75]](#endnote-48).

**Table 9: NSIP training results**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Indicator** | **NSIP achievement** | **World Bank Benchmark** |
| % of participants scored the effectiveness at least ‘above average’ | 94% | 80% |
| % of participants scored the relevance as at least ‘above average’ | 97% | 80% |
| % of courses demonstrated statistically significant learning | 100% | 80% |

Source: NSIP Evaluation Report June 2014.

To substantiate these very positive results in improving trainee competencies, NSIP advisors visited a number of Phase 1 schools that have participated in NSIP training to observe the longer term effects of the NSIP training. Although the advisors made the observation that school committees have been strengthened, this was counterbalanced by evidence that there were only a limited number of visits made by school supervisors. This may indicate that school supervisors are not applying their improved competencies once they return to the field[[76]](#endnote-49).

3.4.3 Effectiveness

Whilst it is still relatively early to form a definitive judgment on the effectiveness of ProDEP (i.e. the extent to which the management of schools and madrasah has improved), the ProDEP design includes measures that should foster the application of training, rather than just the improvement of individual competencies, and the associated improvement in school management. The ‘In-On-In’ approach to training is designed to mitigate the problem commonly faced by training where participants demonstrate improvements in skills and knowledge during the training program but then disregard their application when returning to their original environment.

The selection of UoLs as part of a “customized” training package is considered a key strength of ProDEP. All supervisors have been trained in all seven Level One UoLs and principals have been able to make two choices from the seven offered[[77]](#footnote-28). In support of the government’s priority roll out of Curriculum 2013, there has been a mandatory requirement for all participants to take the UoL on curriculum management, essentially restricting the choice to one UoL. The effectiveness of ProDEP will be improved in the future with more specific targeting of UoLs to principals who will benefit from the development of the specific competencies that they require.

There is potential for ProDEP to evolve and to incorporate lessons from other successful initiatives, such as the approach to quality assurance utilised in NSIP that prevents the erosion of knowledge commonly faced by the cascade model of training. Furthermore, the program may generate positive unintended consequences. A GoI official[[78]](#endnote-50) stated that ProDEP could improve relationships between central and local governments, since it requires and enables - in its current form and given MoEC’s decentralized education system – increased engagement between different levels of government.

Despite these encouraging developments, POM believes that ProDEP continues to face several challenges, all of which weigh on ProDEP’s potential effectiveness:

* In Indonesia, one supervisor tends to be responsible for several schools. According to ACDP’s School and Madrasah Principals and Supervisors Competencies Baseline Study, over 45% of MoEC supervisors are responsible for between 10 and 20 schools each and 54% of MoRA supervisors are responsible for more than 20 schools each[[79]](#endnote-51). According to Component 2[[80]](#endnote-52), the number of supervisors for MoEC schools is in line with international trends. The bigger issues are the processes by which supervisors are appointed, the lack of funding for travel (particularly to remote locations), and the lack of supervision of supervisors in many districts to ensure that they are doing their work properly. For madrasah, the main issue is the insufficient number of school management supervisors[[81]](#footnote-29). This situation undermines achievement of the ProDEP target of 15% of principals participating in CPD being from the Islamic education sector because principals can only participate after their school management supervisor has been trained.
* For optimal effectiveness, ProDEP must be closely related to principals’ appraisal, promotion, rewards/incentives, recognition and academic credit. Each of these contributes to principals’ career advancement which in turn requires the proper application of principal performance appraisal. The linkage between CPD and principals’ career aspirations will be clearer once new processes and instrumentation to align performance management with GoI requirements for appraisal of civil servants are introduced in 2015.
* Given the importance of the competency-based nature of ProDEP, implementation will benefit from a quality assurance mechanism to ensure that UoLs match principals’ competency requirements. At the moment it is unclear how and when such assessments take place.
* The effectiveness of ProDEP (at least under the EP) depends in part on the extent to which madrasah receive proportional benefits.

3.4.4 Impact

Until ProDEP, Indonesia did not have a comprehensive professional development system for education personnel. As such, ProDEP has tremendous potential to improve the management of schools and madrasah in a country with over a quarter of a million principals and over fifty million students from primary to senior secondary levels[[82]](#footnote-30) [[83]](#endnote-53). To maximise its impact, system adaptation will be inevitable. This is likely to include on-going revision of the number and content of the UoLs, as well as a widening of the range of delivery modalities.

POM considers that ProDEP’s best prospects for impact will be realised if:

1. it is successfully implemented through to the end of the EP;
2. the ProDEP product offering continues to adapt and evolve in line with the Indonesian context;
3. ProDEP’s impact, value and affordability can be demonstrated to stakeholders and financiers to better ensure buy-in; and
4. a sustainable source of funding is identified, most likely from districts which, according to GoI officials[[84]](#endnote-54), are projected to have a major role in sustaining the funding for ProDEP implementation after the closure of the EP.

3.4.5 Sustainability

LPPKS has carried out campaigns to “socialize” the usefulness of PPP – an important albeit smaller element of the ProDEP – in around 300 districts. One hundred districts[[85]](#endnote-55) have since indicated a willingness to finance PPP. In a decentralized education system, in which decisions are made by regents and mayors, such initiatives are important if districts are to buy-in and if financial sustainability is to be secured.

Whilst these signals are encouraging, there exists a range of challenges to the sustainability of the ProDEP initiative. All require consideration. They include:

* **Securing commitment**: There is a risk that the positive effects of engaging local leaders may diminish once new leaders are elected. Consequently, ProDEP must generate a ‘critical mass’ of local support if it is to be sustained. However, it is unclear to POM how ProDEP stakeholders intend to do so but it will probably require tailored strategies for different situations. Entities located at the provincial level, such as LPMPs, are probably best suited to engage with district governments but it is noteworthy that they are limited by their mandate and budgetary constraints[[86]](#footnote-31).
* **Identifying financiers:** It remains important to clarify the identity of expected funders and any cost sharing structures. POM also believes that more discussions are required about the perceived affordability of ProDEP given SSQ estimated costings of Rp3.7 million per UoL per principal[[87]](#endnote-56).
* **Delivery capacity:** The ability, willingness and mandate of Eligible Entities to deliver ProDEP in the long term require continued attention. Without support from the EP, Eligible Entities with widely varying capacities to deliver training [[88]](#endnote-57) need to be able to provide services of similar quality. Whilst there is evidence that trainers from P4TK actually perform better than those from LPMP[[89]](#endnote-58), the core expertise of P4TK trainers lies in subject specific content and methods and not in school management. Six P4TKs that have a vocational education mandate are currently being considered as Eligible Entities[[90]](#endnote-59) to implement the online learning. POM is concerned that their core expertise seems to be divorced from the knowledge and competencies required to support improvements to school management practices. Moreover, MoEC Regulation No. 6 / 2009 on the Organization and Work Procedures of LPPKS identifies LPPKS as the institution with the mandate to conduct professional development for principals. However, its training function in ProDEP is on a par with other implementing agencies, despite its mandate and its geographical base in Solo and limited resources vis-à-vis its responsibilities. Once the EP is over, a strengthened LPPKS or an entity appointed by Badan could be considered to perform the critical functions of content design, delivery modalities and quality assurance now carried out by C2.
* **MoRA involvement**: In spite of consistent engagement between relevant stakeholders, POM remains concerned about the likelihood of ProDEP being sustained in the MoRA environment, recognising its relatively small staffing levels[[91]](#endnote-60). MoRA has seemingly been neutral to including ProDEP in its *Renstra* for 2015-19 and whilst MoRA is a full member of the SDTOG, it has limited direct involvement in the implementation of ProDEP.
* **The ProDEP package**: POM believes there is a risk that the finite resources held by districts might lead them to pick and choose between different ProDEP elements, thereby undermining the potential and intent of the entire system. POM recognises that institutional and implementing partners have acknowledged the need to promote the ProDEP model as a whole package of professional development.[[92]](#footnote-32) Whilst POM welcomes this acknowledgement it also notes that effective promotion can only occur in earnest once the impact of CPD and other elements of ProDEP are demonstrated.

For NSIP, sustainability remains a considerable challenge. Despite the positive results outlined in SSQ’s evaluation of NSIP, NSIP still appears to be treated by institutional and implementing partners in a manner akin to a ‘stand-alone’ project. By way of example, POM understands that the provision of NSIP training for schools built under Cycles 3 and 4 of Component 1 has yet to be approved[[93]](#endnote-61) and POM is not aware of any significant discussion about if and how to sustain the NSIP after the closure of the EP.

**3.5 Summary and recommendations**

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 10, below. The rating scale used with the previous DFAT Quality Reporting System (QRS) and the upcoming Aid Quality Checks (AQC) system has been adopted. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, the necessary measures to increase the likelihood of achieving EOPO 2 are provided in Table 11.

**Table 10: Component 2 scorecard**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **2013 Score** | **2014 Score** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| **Relevance** | 5 | 5 | * The investment rationale for ProDEP remains strong and it remains in line with commitments made by GoI and GoA to support the education quality agenda. * There are strong indications that ProDEP-related indicators will be included in the next MoEC *Renstra*. * ProDEP activities and approaches are aligned with the EOCO and the EOPO. * NSIP contributes to the internal relevance of C2 but NSIP has not become an explicit policy priority for GoI and GoA. |  |
| **Efficiency** | 3 | 5 | * GoI-led ProDEP commenced in 2014 after delays associated with competing GoI priorities. * Most output-level PAF indicators for 2014 are on track apart from the number of participants and the percentage of MoRA principals enrolled in CPD. * The adaptation of the on the job learning phase of CPD in 2014 should allow for achievement of output level targets. * The delivery of NSIP is highly efficient. Almost all Cycle 1 schools have received training. | * Current data indicate low number of reported CPD participants. The score of 5 assumes an increase in the number of CPD participants by the end of 2014. |
| **Effectiveness** | TE | 3 | * For optimal effectiveness, the delivery of ProDEP must be closely related to principals’ appraisal, promotion, rewards/incentives, recognition and academic credit. * More effort is needed by institutional and implementing partners to ensure madrasah participation in ProDEP. * The prospect of achieving the EOPO (i.e. by 2016) is constrained by the first roll out of CPD in 2014 that limited selection of UoLs to two UoLs (one of which was mandatory). * NSIP is highly efficient at output level, but it is unknown how it contributes to the EOCO and therefore to the EOPO. |  |
| **Impact** | TE | 4 | * The improved visibility of ProDEP in 2014 offers opportunity for the attainment of long-term benefits, specifically with regard to the achievement of Goal 2. * Greater ProDEP impact will be achieved if the content is tailored to specific circumstances, e.g. on small schools in rural areas. * NSIP will have to be scaled up beyond EP constructed schools in order to have long term effects. |  |
| **Sustainability** | 3 | 4 | * The successful “socialization” of PPP to districts points to the possibility that financial sustainability can be secured. * Clarity is required on the future financing of the system. * The sustainability of ProDEP within MoRA environment is less clear due to MoRA’s limited involvement in the design, implementation, and evaluation. * In its current state, NSIP is not designed to be sustainable. | * The year-on-year improvement in the score is mainly due to LPPKS’ efforts in securing district interest in PPP. * Likelihood of ProDEP inclusion in MoEC *Renstra* is an indication for availability of funding from the national budget. |

**Table 11: Component 2 key findings and recommendations**


| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Institutional partners have yet to seek clarity on the avenues to achieve the financial sustainability of ProDEP after EP completion (see §3.4.5). | R6: A long-term sustainability strategy that resolves issues of affordability, financing and institutional responsibilities and capabilities should be developed, maintained and implemented by June 2015. | \*\*\* | MoEC and MoRA (with DFAT and SSQ support) |
| Institutional partners appear to have different aspirations about the sustainability of ProDEP within MoRA environment (see §3.4.5). | R7: GoI’s expectations for MoRA’s long-term involvement and role in ProDEP should be clarified, i.e. whether MoRA is expected to be able to implement and sustain ProDEP within its environment after the EP. | \*\*\* | MoEC and MoRA (with DFAT and SSQ support as appropriate) |
| One hundred districts have seemingly bought into PPP, but at the moment there is no evidence that the different ProDEP elements will be adopted or adapted (see §3.4.5). | R8: ProDEP should be ‘marketed’ as a cohesive, integrated package of professional development so as to guard against selection of individual modules or components. | \*\* | MoEC and MoRA (with the support of the Eligible Entities and SSQ) |
| The selection of UoLs as part of a “customized” training package targeting variable principal competencies is considered a key strength of ProDEP. The effectiveness of ProDEP will be improved in the future with more specific targeting of UoLs who will benefit from the development of the specific competencies that they require (see §3.4.3). | R9: A broad range of UoLs that takes adequate account of the varied competencies of principals should be made available to principals. | \*\* | MoEC and MoRA (with SSQ support) |
| R10: To increase impact, small schools/madrasah in rural areas should be prioritised during the selection of supervisors and principals (schools). | \*\* | Eligible Entities (with guidance from MoEC/MoRA and SSQ support as appropriate) |
| A lack of sufficient clarity about who will fulfil the quality assurance functions for ProDEP after EP completion (see §3.4.5). | R11: Responsibility for the design, delivery modalities and quality assurance functions for ProDEP should be transitioned from C2 to an appropriate entity appointed by Badan. | \*\* | MoEC |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*

1. **Component 3: Islamic School Accreditation**
   1. **An introduction** 
      1. The EP investment

Component 3 (C3) of the EP seeks to improve the quality of madrasah service provision in line with National Education Standards (NES) in targeted districts (see Figure 3). Specifically, Component 3 was designed to support the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) to achieve one of its *Renstra* targets: that all madrasah are accredited against the NES, with a minimum of 50% at Level ‘B’, by the end of the 2014-2015 academic year. In turn, the EP is expected to contribute to improvements in the quality of madrasah education services.

**Figure 3: C3 logic architecture**



The EP investment is deemed to be important for a number of reasons:

* Madrasah provide education services to about 14% of the primary and junior secondary school age population[[94]](#footnote-33). They are also one of the main providers of education in less advantaged communities.
* There are an estimated 38,315 madrasah (MIs and MTs), of which 92% are private[[95]](#endnote-62).
* There are significant disparities in the quality of education between public schools/madrasah and private madrasah[[96]](#endnote-63).
* Approximately 72% of private madrasah were not accredited at the time of the EP design[[97]](#footnote-34). As of 2013, due to a range of contributing factors[[98]](#footnote-35), that estimate had fallen to 13% of madrasah[[99]](#endnote-64) [[100]](#footnote-36).
* While only registered madrasah can access government funds[[101]](#footnote-37), only accredited madrasah are permitted to have students participate in national examinations and provide “leaving” or graduation certificates that enable students to apply for other formal educational opportunities.

The EP supports the work of the MoRA Directorate General for Islamic Education (PENDIS) through the Directorate for Madrasah Education (PENMA). It works specifically with the Unit for Implementing Madrasah Accreditation (UPPAM) and various contracted Sub-National Implementation Partners (SNIPs).

Component 3 is unique in the sense that it is the only component that is expected to deliver two distinct results. The first result concerns improvements to the readiness of 1,500 madrasah to secure accreditation. The second result – approved in early 2014 during a revision of the EP logic architecture – concerns the strengthening of the systems required to improve madrasah quality (EOCO 3.2).

To support delivery of the first line of work (i.e. that associated with EOCO 3.1), a variety of institutions have been contracted as SNIPs[[102]](#footnote-38) to support improvements in madrasah quality. Up to 1,500 targeted madrasah[[103]](#footnote-39) in 13 provinces are expected to receive technical assistance and support from the contracted SNIPs, as well as financial support in the form of Block Grants of AUD 10,000. An additional unspecified and ultimately non-targeted number of madrasah receive technical assistance and training only.

The SNIPs deliver technical assistance and support to each madrasah through a package of training programs and mentoring services. This includes assistance with the preparation and implementation of a madrasah development plan (RKM). The RKM is intended to guide the madrasah to plan and align efforts that will enable it to meet the accreditation requirements of the NES as assessed by the *Badan Akreditasi Nasional Sekolah* (BAN S/M)[[104]](#footnote-40), whilst ultimately guiding its efforts to improve the quality of education services provided by the madrasah.

EOCO 3.2 requires a program of work that tests and promotes a system-wide model for strengthening madrasah quality. Specifically EOCO 3.2 seeks to demonstrate how a MoRA-SNIP-Madrasah ‘systems’ model could enable and support continuous improvements to madrasah service delivery, and support MoRA to adapt and trial C3 approaches to madrasah quality improvement, using finance from the State Budget (*Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara*).

* + 1. The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

C3 activities are managed and implemented by the managing contractor for the SSQ in close collaboration with UPPAM, the Bureau of Planning, the Bureau of MoRA Supervisors, and the Provincial (*Kanwil*) and District (*Kandep*) Offices of MoRA. Block Grants are transferred directly to SNIPs and targeted madrasah by the SSQ managing contractor. Technical assistance is provided by the SSQ managing contractor directly to MoRA (national, provincial and district) and to the contracted SNIPs. SNIPs facilitate the delivery of training programs and provide technical assistance, primarily in the form of mentoring to madrasah.

* 1. **Context**

Officials in MoEC and MoRA continue to view accreditation and national examination results as indicators and drivers of educational quality[[105]](#footnote-41). Accordingly, MoRA believes that improved accreditation rates would offer sector stakeholders the necessary confidence that madrasah can provide good quality education services. To assist with the accreditation effort, the Ministry signed a three-year MoU with BAN S/M in 2011 to increase the number of madrasah to be included on its annual accreditation quota. This decision is likely to facilitate the measurement of the EP’s targets but it may not be sustainable in the longer term.

There is currently no established national system to support the continuous improvement of madrasah quality.

* 1. **Achievements**
     1. With regards to EOCO 3.1

C3 has supported over 2,500 madrasah to date[[106]](#footnote-42). Of these madrasah, 1,500 madrasah have been targeted for the full suite of support from C3 which has been and is being delivered over three different time periods or phases. During the first phase, which started in July 2012 and finished in December 2013, C3 supported 565 targeted madrasah in seven provinces. Assistance during the second phase, which started in June 2013 and ended in November 2014, supported 519 targeted madrasah in 11 provinces. C3 recently commenced its third phase, which will see support provided to 416 targeted madrasah in seven provinces between September 2014 and March 2016.

In addition to the 1,500 targeted madrasah, C3 expects to support at least 1,500 ‘non-targeted’ madrasah by providing them with access to training programs and SNIP support (see Table 12, below). To date, C3 has also trained nearly 200 SNIP mentors[[107]](#footnote-43) with the expectation that they will be able to provide support services to madrasah in the future.

**Table 12: C3 Phases of Support to Madrasah**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Phase** | **Madrasah type** | | **Mentors** |
| **Targeted** | **Non-targeted** |
| **Phase 1** | 565 | 24 | 90 |
| **Phase 2** | 519 | 1,452 | 102 |
| **Phase 3** | 416 | --\* | 82 |
| **TOTAL** | **1,500** | **1,476** | **274\*\*** |

Notes: \* Phase 3 started in September 2014. SSQ is tracking and reporting the number of non-targeted madrasah that receive EP support e.g. from SNIPs

\*\* The total number of individual mentors will be less than reported as some have participated in more than one phase

Source: SSQ Component 3 management team

* + 1. With regards to EOCO 3.2

There is a growing sense of interest in and commitment to the EP model of support. At the national level, the draft MDC Regulation, prepared by MoRA in 2014, provides a SNIP-derived framework for the operationalization of MDCs in all provinces, supported by a national MDC that will provide necessary strategic guidance. Meanwhile, UPPAM’s restructuring saw a shift in responsibilities back to MoRA sub-directorates, thereby demonstrating a re-institutionalization of the functions performed by UPPAM.

From an operational perspective, MoRA has made year-on-year increases in the number of upgraded madrasah it supports and, modelled on the provision of Block Grants, over 150 madrasah[[108]](#footnote-44) are scheduled to receive support in 2015 through grants sourced from the national budget[[109]](#endnote-65). This represents a significant increase on the 25 madrasah supported in 2014 and the 24 in 2013. MoRA is also engaged in ongoing efforts, with the support of C3, to implement, improve and incorporate the madrasah accreditation database with the existing MoRA Education Management Information System.

At the sub-national/provincial level, it is encouraging to note occurrences of SNIPs and madrasah (both targeted and non-targeted) successfully applying C3 guidance concerning the acquisition of funds from other sources to support improvements to madrasah[[110]](#footnote-45). There is also reported evidence[[111]](#endnote-66) of strengthened SNIP networks, with the main stakeholders being provincial and district offices of MoRA, district and provincial governments, members of parliament, District Education Councils, Provincial Accreditation bodies and communities served by madrasah. Evidence of strengthened networks has not been consistently reported in a format that would enable a detailed analysis of contributions of C3 to systems strengthening at the sub-national level[[112]](#footnote-46). One would expect however that C3 support could be instrumental, under certain conditions, in introducing changes to sub-national systems[[113]](#footnote-47).

* 1. **Analysis**
     1. Relevance

EOCO 3.1 – *targeted madrasah are ready for accreditation* - remains highly relevant to GoI given that MoRA is seeking to increase the number of madrasah accredited by BAN S/M. The MoRA *Renstra* 2015-2019, which is under development, is likely to indicate that the pursuit of accreditation remains a policy priority. EOCO 3.2 – *the system for madrasah quality improvement is strengthened –* appears to be of increasing relevance, as demonstrated by MoRA’s commitment to, *inter alia*, develop a ‘Grand Design’ that will guide the government’s efforts to improve the quality of service provision; the aforementioned draft MDR Regulation; the use the national budget to ‘upgrade’ a limited number of madrasah using a modified C3 Block Grant approach; and, ongoing efforts to strengthen and integrate the accreditation database and within the MoRA EMIS.

For DFAT, improvement of madrasah service provision continues to remain an important part of its wider package of support to education quality improvement in Indonesia. Whilst POM understands that there is no specific mention of Islamic education in the preliminary draft objectives of the upcoming DFAT Aid Investment Plan (AIP), the proposed country outcomes will continue to directly relate to continuing efforts to support improvements in the quality of education – which, for Indonesia, will necessarily include madrasah.

The internal relevance of C3 investments to the attainment of the End-Of-Partnership Outcome (EOPO3) - *improved quality of madrasah service provision* – is improving, albeit at the present time it remains somewhat disconnected and activities are largely bound by the primary focus on accreditation rather than an expanded focus on quality (see later sections of this Chapter)[[114]](#footnote-48).

* + 1. Efficiency

From a delivery perspective, the implementation of Phases 1 and 2 has been managed well, with good progress made against the 2014 targets outlined in the PMF (see Table 13).

**Table 13: C3 Achievements against Output Targets**

| **Output**  **Indicators\*** | **Milestones** | | **Explanation for Variance** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2014 Target** | **Achievement** |
| Number of training sessions provided per year by SNIP to madrasah | 7,602 | 8,128 (107%) |  |
| Number of mentoring visits per year provided to targeted madrasah\*\* | 21,720 | 17,407 (80%) | Mentor visits to remote areas less frequent |
| Number of madrasah supported by MoRA with quality improvement activities (other than EP) | 40 | 49 (123%) | ‘Upgrading’ of additional madrasah initiated by MoRA |
| Number of provinces in which there is evidence of improvement of networking and relationships between sub-national stakeholders | 11 | 13 (118%) | Two additional provinces have been included |
| Number of KKM trained by SNIPs in targeted districts | 120 | 93 (78%) | Some SNIPs have not implemented the entire training package |
| Number of targeted madrasah who improve their overall score by at least one level against accreditation criteria | 1,086 | 975 (90%) | BAN S/M has not completed and/or reported on assessments for all Phase 2 madrasah\*\*\* |

Notes: \* The indicator measure is for ‘targeted’ madrasah only. An estimated 1,476 non-targeted madrasah in Phase 1 and 2 have benefited from EP support, which, when taken together, significantly improves the efficiency and VFM of the C3 investment.

\*\* The indicator measure is for ‘targeted’ madrasah. It only includes the data from Phase 1. Again, should the non-targeted madrasah be included then there would likely be efficiency and VFM benefits.

\*\*\* There is some concern that BAN S/M may not have the resources or time to assess all of the madrasah supported by EP which would make the measurement of EP achievements against targets difficult to determine. This is particularly relevant as the MoU between MoRA and BAN S/M has ended – a MoU wherein MoRA was providing funds to BAN S/M to assess EP supported madrasah[[115]](#footnote-49).

Source: SSQ Component 3 management team

From a financial perspective, C3 reported an underspend of AUD 3,857,653 or 33.2% during the 2013-14 fiscal year, resulting in a decrease in the efficiency related to expenditures for the current year as compared to the previous year. The main reason for the underspend is the later than expected implementation of Phase 3, which resulted in a delay in the release of the Block Grants and in the conduct of a number of preparatory training activities. The SSQ team has indicated that with the initiation of Phase 3 in September 2014, overall component expenditure will be back on track during fiscal year 2014-2015.

To ensure the efficient and effective use of financial resources and compliance with agreed procedures for implementation, both SSQ and POM have undertaken financial and compliance audits on grants provided to madrasah and SNIPs. As reported in the 2013 APPR, the POM audits raised a number of issues that likely reflected the limited capacity of madrasah to administer grants competently. In 2014, two audit engagements were undertaken: an audit of compliance relating to Block Grants to Phase 2 madrasah (completed); and, an audit of compliance relating to Block Grants to Phase 2 SNIPs (draft). The 2014 audits have raised a number of non-compliance issues (see Table 14, below), although no suspected fraud issues were noted. The audits also found year-on-year improvements, which may be explained by revisions to operating guidelines and SSQ’s implementation of enhanced internal control procedures. SSQ has reported two suspected fraud cases for Phase 2 madrasah[[116]](#footnote-50).

**Table 14: Number of non-compliant findings (2014 POM audits)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Category** | **Madrasah** | **SNIPs (draft)** |
| Procurement | 6 | 3 |
| Financial | 14 | 16 |
| Reporting | 5 | 2 |
| Program | 2 | 4 |
| Total | 27 | 25 |

Source: Audit of compliance with control systems and procedures relating to  
 Block Grants to SNIPs & Madrasah – Stage 1 and 2, November 2014

From a more technical perspective, and with regards to activities within EOCO 3.1, evidence emerging from POM’s EOPO 3 mid-line evaluation study and from data provided by C3[[117]](#footnote-51) raises some concern about the efficiency of providing standardized Block Grants of AUD 10,000 per madrasah. Since there is evidence[[118]](#endnote-67) that different madrasah require different types of inputs to meet standards, there may be value in allocating varying levels of Block Grant funding to madrasah based on their RKM and assessed requirements to meet accreditation standards[[119]](#footnote-52). The same concern may be applied to the level of funding provided to the SNIPs, since each SNIP faces different circumstances in the implementation of their contract obligations[[120]](#footnote-53). Whilst it may be too late for the EP to respond, there might be important lessons to be learned, not least for MoRA as it develops its Grand Design.

On a positive note, the 2013 APPR called for better targeting of madrasah in response to the findings that it required almost four times as many resources to improve a madrasah classified at a B level than what was required for a madrasah assessed at the TT or C level[[121]](#endnote-68). POM welcomes the continuing positive measures taken by C3 partners which have resulted in 77% of Phase 3 madrasah being at the TT level and 23 % at level C. POM acknowledges that targeting madrasah with significantly lower assessment levels in Phase 3 could well present additional challenges (and perhaps added costs) in providing the support necessary to attain the same levels of success observed with the Phase 1 accreditation results.

With regards to activities within EOCO 3.2, the efficiency story is less certain. Although the requirement to provide support to strengthening madrasah quality improvement systems was identified after the initiation of C3, with subsequent inclusion in the EP logic architecture in early 2014, the call for more attention to be given to achieving this outcome was highlighted in the EP-POM Critical Issues Report of April 2014. Whilst the draft 2015 SSQ Annual Work Plan indicates an intention to provide greater support to MoRA in areas related to systems strengthening, C3 might have done more to harness earlier opportunities to make headway in this workstream.

It is also worth noting that it is difficult to assess the efficiency of EOCO 3.2 as the indicators in the PMF are primarily focussed on the development and initial implementation of a GoI madrasah improvement strategy, i.e. the ‘Grand Design’. The deferment in early 2014 of anticipated C3 support to MoRA in favour of the provision of ACDP (C4) support to the development of MoRA’s *Renstra* has clearly impacted the attainment of EOCO 3.2 related milestones under C3.

* + 1. Effectiveness

When considering the effectiveness of C3, POM seeks to answer the following question: to what extent and how has EP-funded support improved the quality of madrasah service provision in targeted districts? The EP logic architecture indicates that improved quality of madrasah service provision in targeted districts (EOPO3) will be achieved by preparing madrasah for accreditation (EOCO 3.1) and by strengthening the system for madrasah quality improvement (EOCO 3.2).

Available evidence points to the following:

1. The efficient delivery of C3 activities in 2014 has enabled achievement of EOCO 3.1. However, only limited progress has been made with respect to the achievement of EOCO 3.2.
2. There is evidence that service provision is improving in both targeted and non-targeted madrasah, though the extent to which this is translating to change in the targeted districts (EOPO 3) is, as yet, unknown.
3. The limited progress made in relation to EOCO 3.2 in 2014 makes it unlikely that EOCO 3.2 has contributed in any significant way to the achievement of EOPO 3.
4. At the level of individual madrasah, POM is not convinced that the achievement of EOCO 3.1 is necessarily driving improvements in the quality of all facets of madrasah education service provision[[122]](#footnote-54).

Whilst these findings represent a positive story overall, POM is keen to understand the drivers of progress at EOCO and EOPO level.

***Attainment of EOCO 3.1***

C3 continues to place considerable emphasis on the attainment of EOCO 3.1 and POM is confident that C3 will achieve its target of improving the readiness of 1,500 madrasah to seek accreditation. Indeed, evidence derived from Phase 1 madrasah suggests that EP support has enabled madrasah to acquire advanced levels of accreditation[[123]](#endnote-69). Five hundred and nineteen (519) Phase 1 madrasah have been assessed by BAN S/M, with 89% receiving accreditation level of A or B. A further 3% secured accreditation at Level C. Fifty-three (53) madrasah made gains of three accreditation levels and 192 madrasah gained two levels[[124]](#endnote-70).

With regards to the drivers, there are indications that the provision of direct financial support to madrasah – the Block Grants – has been effective in improving facilities and the provision of teaching and learning equipment and materials. Both are consistent with the standards prescribed by the NES which are assessed during the accreditation process. Initial concerns that the provision of Block Grants may inhibit receipt of external funding[[125]](#footnote-55) and community support have not materialised. Indeed, recent findings from the EOPO 3 mid-line evaluation study suggested that the Block Grants have been effective in facilitating additional support from other agencies and community stakeholders.

***Attainment of EOCO 3.2***

Whilst attention provided by C3 to systems strengthening is increasing, limited progress was made towards EOCO 3.2 in 2014. Moreover, in POM’s view the support that was provided appeared to be primarily focused on accreditation efforts rather than improvements to the systems that are required to support improvements in the quality of education service provision[[126]](#footnote-56). As such, it is unlikely that the EOCO 3.2 workstream has, as of now, made much contribution to the achievement of EOPO 3.

Even so, for reasons of ‘scale’, POM is pleased to note the inclusion of a systems strengthening workstream in 2014 and the ongoing commitment to this in 2015. To focus attention on contributing to the attainment of EOCO 3.2, C3 may wish to consider targeted specialist technical assistance to support MoRA in: 1) the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the MoRA ‘upgrading’ and ‘replication’ initiatives; 2) finalization of and implementation guidance for the MDC Regulations; 3) Identifying lesson learned from the C3 model (SNIP/Mentor/Madrasah) to inform the development of the ‘Grand Design’. This support to systems strengthening offers opportunity for the EP to move beyond support to strengthening systems for accreditation to make significant contributions to improvements in the quality of madrasah service provision:

* in targeted districts, and specifically within and beyond those targeted and non-targeted madrasah benefiting from EP support[[127]](#footnote-57); and
* beyond targeted districts, i.e. at provincial and national levels.

***Pursuit of EOPO 3***

The EP logic assumes that the attainment of the EOCOs is necessary[[128]](#footnote-58) for the achievement of EOPO 3. Whilst POM considers that this assumption holds for EOCO 3.2, POM questions whether the focus on accreditation is a guarantee of quality improvement.

Findings from POM’s EOPO 3 mid-line evaluation study[[129]](#footnote-59) indicate that some sampled madrasah view accreditation as an end rather than as a means to achieve improved quality, possibly compounded by C3 viewing itself as a vehicle to assist madrasah to secure accreditation. Of course the attainment of accreditation has considerable benefits in itself: unaccredited madrasah cannot secure MoRA funding and are unable to issue tests and graduation certificates. However, there remains a risk that a madrasah’s investment in the pursuit of accreditation and the pursuit of quality may be imbalanced (noting that the two are not always mutually compatible). On the other hand, POM believes that systemic improvements offer the potential for EP benefits to extend beyond individual madrasah to *targeted districts* (see EOPO 3) and even to provincial and national levels.

For that to happen, it is important that C3 pursues a comprehensive ‘systems’ approach and for this to focus on quality, and not on accreditation *per se*. POM hopes that the inclusion of strategies for improved madrasah education service provision in the upcoming *Renstra* will provide the necessary framework for EP support and allow for an integrated approach to improved service provision.

* + 1. Impact

The long-term benefits of C3 – its impact – may be evident at two levels:

* At individual madrasah level, for example, in changes to the quality of education services provided accruing from improvements to resourcing and teaching and improvement in the perception of the community that a higher level of accreditation indicates higher quality and thereby elicits additional support from the community.
* At the systems level, for example in ‘scaled’ support to a broader number of madrasah accruing from changes in the capacity of key stakeholders to guide and support continuous quality improvement processes in the sector.

As the EOPO 3 mid-line evaluation study notes, there is evidence that the EP has had positive effects on individual targeted and non-targeted madrasah. Improvements in the condition of facilities, the availability of teaching and learning resources (particularly libraries) and teaching quality are observable in both targeted and non-targeted madrasah[[130]](#footnote-60). At a different level, it is also noteworthy that madrasah have improved capacity to attract financial or technical support from sources outside the EP, attributable in many cases to the work of the SNIPs and mentors[[131]](#footnote-61). As the quality of the madrasah has improved, community and other support for the madrasah has increased, which has led to increased financial and in-kind support to the madrasah as well as increased enrolment[[132]](#footnote-62).

The greatest impacts are observable where there are ‘good’ madrasah principals supported by ‘good’ mentors. POM therefore suggests that significant gains to the quality of madrasah may be attained by targeting support to promising or ‘good’ madrasah principals and by ensuring that mentors/supervisors have a strong capability to support madrasah principals[[133]](#footnote-63). Whilst there is evidence of good prospects for long-term benefit at individual madrasah, the outlook at a systems level is less clear. The nature and degree of systemic change generated, strengthened and/or supported by the EP remains below expectation at this stage (even if it is evolving). It is critical that the opportunity offered by the upcoming Grand Design be harnessed.

* + 1. Sustainability

A number of events and changes in 2014 point to there being good opportunity for stakeholders to sustain the benefits accruing from the investment to date. Of particular note is the emergence of the MDC Regulation; the endorsement and adoption by MoRA of the EP-supported Madrasah Accreditation Operational Procedures Manual; the use of the national budget to support ‘modified’ Block Grants; and the shifting of UPPAM functions to MoRA sub-directorates[[134]](#footnote-64).

Whilst these positives are noteworthy, POM also considers the loss of momentum regarding support to the proposed “Grand Design” for systemic improvement in madrasah education quality to be disappointing. POM understands that the original intention had been for the Grand Design to provide strategic direction for improving the quality of madrasah education and to have the Grand Design prepared before the *Renstra* in order for it to inform the direction that the *Renstra* would chart[[135]](#endnote-71)[[136]](#footnote-65). With support now being provided after (or at best concurrently with) the *Renstra*, the Grand Design is now viewed by MoRA and DFAT as more of a ‘Road Map’ that will be used to guide the implementation of the *Renstra*.

* 1. **Summary and recommendations**

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 15, below. The rating scale used with the previous DFAT Quality Reporting System (QRS) and the upcoming Aid Quality Checks (AQC) system has been adopted. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, what measures are needed to increase the likelihood of achieving EOPO 3 are provided in Table 16.

**Table 15: Component 3 scorecard**

| **DAC Criterion** | **2013 Score** | **2014 Score** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Relevance** | 4 | 5 | * External relevance for MoRA is high as evidenced by MoRA’s continuing commitment to accreditation and quality improvement. * External relevance for DFAT also remains high as C3 is aligned with DFAT’s commitment to improve the quality of education in Indonesia. * Internal relevance improved by focus on efforts to strengthen the systems needed to improve madrasah quality. |  |
| **Efficiency** | 5 | 4 | * The delivery of accreditation-related support madrasah has been very efficient, with output-level milestones largely being met. * Delays in the implementation of Phase 3 have resulted in expenditure inefficiencies. * POM is concerned about the efficiency of standardized Block Grant allocations. * The efficiency of EOCO 3.2-related support is difficult to assess. Whilst there has been increased attention to supporting systems, these efforts appear somewhat uncoordinated, disconnected and continue to be focused on accreditation in their design and in their delivery | * While the pursuit of accreditation targets has exceeded expectations insofar as non-targeted madrasah are concerned (EOCO 3.1), there has been difficulty assessing EOCO 3.2 efficiency. This, combined with the delays in Phase 3 implementation and concerns over standardized Block Grants, has resulted in a ’downgrade’ from a 5 to a 4. |
| **Effectiveness** | 4 | 4 | * While EP support has been effective in *preparing madrasah for accreditation* (with very positive accreditation results from Phase 1), there is evidence from the EOPO 3 evaluation that the efforts to support accreditation may not result in improvements in quality. * Support to *strengthening systems for improving quality* has been limited, which necessarily constrains the contribution to EOPO 3. * Attention is required to strengthen the capabilities of principals, mentors and supervisors as improvement in the quality of madrasah education services will depend on effective leadership and management capabilities of these education professionals. | * Absence of a Grand Design which would provide a strategic perspective for madrasah quality improvement could impede the effectiveness of systems-related activities. * It is noted that training for principals, supervisors and mentors in leadership and resource mobilization is proposed by C3 in the 2015 work plan. |
| **Impact** | TE | 3 | * Tangible and observable gains in accreditation levels are evident at the individual ‘targeted’ and ‘non-targeted’ madrasah level. However, these gains in accreditation will not necessarily drive improvements in quality of madrasah educational services. * Delays in the development of the Grand Design and the resultant change in focus of the GD from the strategic to the operational level and the over-emphasis on accreditation may limit the potential impact of EP support. | * There is considerable opportunity to reach beyond the current provision of support (primarily for accreditation purposes) to madrasah, targeted districts and SNIPs. * A clear distinction between accreditation and madrasah education quality needs to be made and adjustments made in implementation activities to increase the potential impact on quality and less so on accreditation gains. |
| **Sustainability** | 2 | 3 | * Changes at the individual madrasah level may be sustained. * A range of positive ‘systemic’ signs are evident, e.g. the proposed MDC Regulation, ‘replication’ efforts and the transfer of UPPAM functions to sub-directorates of MoRA. * However, these are offset by the lack of clarity about the benefits to be sustained, the absence of a comprehensive quality improvement strategy. |  |

**Table 16: Component 3 key findings and recommendations**

| **Finding** | **Recommendations** | **Level of Urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Absence of a comprehensive strategy for the continuous improvement of madrasah (although there is a strategy for accreditation) (see §4.4.5). | R12: Priority should be given to assisting MoRA in the immediate development of a comprehensive ‘Grand Design’ or ‘Road Map’ that will guide future efforts to continuously improve the quality of madrasah. | \*\*\* | MoRA (with SSQ support and facilitation) |
| Lessons from the implementation of C3 that could inform the development of madrasah quality improvement systems at the national and sub-national level are not being systematically captured, analysed and discussed with MoRA for adaptation and/or adoption (see §4.4.2). | R13: Lessons from the implementation of C3 – specifically those which contribute to a better understanding of the processes and systems required to improve quality – should be collated, analysed and presented for discussion and consideration as part of the ‘Grand Design’. | \*\*\* | MoRA (with support from SSQ) |
| The EOCO3.2 workstream lacks direction (see §4.4.3). | R14: Priority initiatives identified by the ‘Grand Design’ should be supported with appropriate specialized technical assistance and adequate resources from C3 (and subsequent DFAT support). | \*\*\* | SSQ and DFAT |
| The same level of Block Grant funding is provided to each madrasah regardless of requirements to meet accreditation standards (see §4.4.2). | R15: An analysis of the appropriate levels of Block Grant funding required to meet accreditation standards and to improve the quality of education services provided should be conducted and this should take due account of different types and circumstances of madrasah. | \* | MoRA (with support from SSQ) |
| Limited attention of training programs to strengthen the knowledge, skills and abilities of principals in leadership and community engagement (see §4.4.4). | R16: Introduce Leadership and Community Engagement training and negotiate better engagement with ProDEP training programs. | \*\* | MoRA (with SSQ facilitation and assistance) |
| The quality of SNIP support and particularly the mentors, varies widely with weak mentors having little influence on quality improvement (see §4.4.4). | R17: Ensure rigorous selection, professional development (including linking with ProDEP) and monitoring of mentors (and supervisors) and work to build a cadre of educational professionals for improving madrasah education quality. | \*\* | MoRA (with SSQ facilitation and assistance) |

*Legend: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*

1. **Component 4: Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership**
   1. **An introduction** 
      1. The EP investment

Component 4 of the EP seeks to promote the use of evidence in the development and implementation of education sector policies, plans and budgets. It does so through the activities of the Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP): a facility that seeks to “promote education sector-wide policy research and dialogue”[[137]](#endnote-72). The ACDP responds to requests made by relevant GoI ministries, most notably Bappenas, MoEC and MoRA. It does so by delivering two types of activities[[138]](#endnote-73):

* The delivery of demand-driven research and technical support, e.g. technical studies, reviews and assessments (predominantly)[[139]](#footnote-66); technical papers[[140]](#footnote-67); and, training[[141]](#footnote-68).
* The organisation of technical meetings, focus group discussions and workshops at the request of GoI stakeholders[[142]](#footnote-69).

These are delivered within three output areas, namely:

* Legislative and regulatory reforms.
* Capacity development and organisational change.
* Information and communication systems.

Participating decision-makers are expected to utilise ACDP analytical work in relevant policy, planning and budgeting processes (the End of Component Outcome) and then incorporate ACDP evidence in relevant education sector policies, regulation, plans and budgets (the End of Partnership Outcome 4). This, in turn, is expected to make a contribution to the three goals of the Education Partnership, most notably Goal 3: Education sector governance improves.

* + 1. The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

The Government of Australia and the European Union (EU) provide a total of approximately USD 50m[[143]](#footnote-70) to support implementation of the ACDP. The Government of Indonesia provides further contribution to the value of USD 5m in the form of office accommodation, transport, and remuneration and per diems for counterpart staff.

The ACDP technical oversight group (ATOG) is co-chaired by the Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Culture in Bappenas, the Head of Balitbang (MoEC), and the Director General of Islamic Education (MoRA). The ATOG is scheduled to meet quarterly and is responsible for, *inter alia*, reviewing and approving ACDP’s annual work plan, approving reports, and organizing technical dialogue between GoI, DFAT and the EU. ATOG membership includes senior officials from MoEC, MoRA, Bappenas, MoF, MoHA, DFAT and the EU.

ACDP’s executing agency is MoEC’s National Office for Research and Development (Balitbang), with its Head acting as Director of the ACDP. The ACDP Program Manager, who is the Head of the Centre for Research and Policy at the Balitbang, is responsible for day-to-day management of the program, and this includes preparing the annual work plans and budgets and coordinating dissemination and publication of ACDP reports.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is responsible for managing and administering the ACDP on behalf of the Balitbang. The ADB has contracted an Operational Management Team (OMT) and a Core Advisory Team (CAT) to provide technical support to the implementation of the program, with both teams being based in the ACDP Secretariat at the Balitbang. The OMT provides administrative and management support services such that the agreed activities and outputs are delivered in a timely and professional manner. Its primary responsibilities include procurement and subsequent oversight of contracted services. The CAT supports the ACDP Program Director and Program Manager with the preparation and implementation of ACDP activities.

All contract activities are procured through a competitive bidding process either among prequalified Indefinite Delivery Contracts (IDC) consortia or individually recruited consultants.

* 1. **Context**

The ACDP started in January 2011 and is currently scheduled to close in December 2015. The policy and political environment within which ACDP operates has experienced a period of flux over the last twelve months. Following the installation of the new President in October 2014, the responsibilities of the former Ministry of Education and Culture have evolved, with the new Ministry of Culture and Elementary and Secondary Education handling the period up to and including senior secondary education, and the new Ministry of Research and Technology and Higher Education overseeing higher education and research. The mandate of the Ministry of Religious Affairs has remained unchanged, whilst Bappenas now reports directly to the President rather than the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Throughout 2014, Bappenas led and coordinated preparatory activities for the upcoming Medium Term National Development Plan (RPJMN) (2015-19). The RPJMN will set new priorities within the framework of the longer-term RPJPN (2005-25). It will include national development strategies and policies, programs within technical ministries, a macroeconomic framework, and investment and financing policy. At the same time as the RPJMN was being drafted, the Ministries have been developing their Strategic Plans (*Renstras*) for 2015-19 (with support from the ACDP). These will be aligned with the RPJMN in due course.

A joint EU-DFAT mid-term review (MTR) was conducted in Q3-4 of 2014, with a view to providing partners with an independent assessment of ACDP’s performance, and a set of key lessons and practical recommendations to guide ACDP’s future. The MTR team submitted their final report in October 2014.

* 1. **Achievements**

ACDP continues to make steady progress. At the beginning of December 2014 it had completed 24 activities in total. A further 13 activities were ongoing[[144]](#endnote-74). Together, these 37 activities constitute nearly USD 29m of contracted commitments (see Table **17**17).

**Table 17: Status in November 2014 compared to November 2013**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Theme** | **Status (30 November 2013)** | **Status (30 November 2014)** |
| **Value of contracted commitments (USD)** | 19,629,052 | 28,708,071 |
| **# of person-months procured through IDC consortia** | 687  of which 140 person months (20%) are for international TA and 547 person months (80%) are for national TA | 1,090  of which 223 person months (21%) are for international TA and 867 person months (79%) are for national TA |

Source: 2013 APPR; ACDP data provided to POM by Alan Prouty, 15 December 2014

The benefits have been shared across the three focal ministries. MoEC entities have been named as lead agencies in 65% of the 37 completed or ongoing activities to date; Bappenas in 44% of cases and MoRA in 38% of cases. However, of those 26 activities to date that have had a sole “lead agency”, MoEC has secured nearly 50% of the benefit (see Table 18). Thirteen different MoEC entities have obtained support since 2011[[145]](#footnote-71), with the Balitbang having been directly ‘targeted’ as a “lead agency” in at least eight of the 37 completed or ongoing activities to date.

**Table 18: Spread of beneficiary “lead agencies” across the focal ministries and provincial governments**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Bappenas** | **MoEC** | **MoRA** | **Aceh** | **Papua** |
| **Incidence across all the completed or ongoing activities (n = 37)\*** | 15 (47%) | 24 (65%) | 13 (35%) | 1 (3%) | 2 (5%) |
| **Incidence across the completed or ongoing activities where there is just one “lead agency” (n = 26/37)** | 8 (31%) | 12 (46%) | 3 (12%) | 2 (8%) | 1 (4%) |

\* i.e. in those studies where one or more than one lead agency is named.

Source: POM calculations based on ACDP’s mid-2014 report and as reviewed by John Virtue, 09 December 2014

Examples of notable achievements in 2014 include:

* Delivery of *A* *Paper on Higher Education Governance and Management* (ACDP 034F), which was presented at a high-level roundtable meeting in January 2014 as part of the preparation of the education chapter of the upcoming RPJMN. It is anticipated that aspects of the paper will be infused into the RPJMN (and presumably the *Renstras*) in due course. Additional support to the preparation of the RPJMN included identification of options to strengthen partnerships in sector governance (ACDP 034C) and analysis of the relationship between Minimum Service Standards and the quality of the learning environment (ACDP 034D)[[146]](#endnote-75).
* Delivery of *A Rapid Assessment of the Cash Transfer for Poor Students Program (BSM)* (ACDP 038), which entailed fieldwork at 1712 schools and madrasah in six regions of the country over a three-month period. It provided a range of key findings and policy options that spoke to improved targeting and implementation. Bappenas has since proposed further analysis and review of key governance issues related to the BSM[[147]](#endnote-76).
* Delivery of a *Teacher Absenteeism Study* (ACDP 011), which entailed fieldwork at 900 primary and junior secondary schools – reportedly the largest teacher absenteeism conducted in the world to date[[148]](#endnote-77).
* Preparation of draft strategic plan as a key output within *Rural and Remote Area Education Strategic Planning for Tanah Papua* (ACDP 039), with the plan now being used to support policy options in the RPJMD[[149]](#footnote-72), *Renstra* and the annual plan. The policy options may pave the way for mother tongue-based education and teacher training reforms in Papua[[150]](#endnote-78).

Other notable deliverables include the *Overview of the Education Sector in Indonesia 2012* (ACDP 002), which was praised by the OECD review team in mid-2014, and the *School and Madrasah Principals and Supervisors Competencies Baseline Study* (ACDP 007), which provided validation and impetus to the ProDEP, which commenced under GoI leadership in 2014 (see Section 3 of this report).

Besides the demand-driven research activities, ACDP organised and facilitated a number of meetings for key GoI stakeholders during which key policy constraints and opportunities were discussed (see Table 19).

**Table 19: Levels of participation in ACDP activities**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Events held** | **Stakeholders involved** |
| **Activity-stream #1: Research work/studies** | 79 (53%) | 2,639 (48%) |
| **Activity-stream #2: Meetings, FGDs, workshops** | 71 (47%) | 2,887 (52%) |
| **TOTAL** | 150 | 5,526 |

Source: ACDP

* 1. **Analysis**
     1. Relevance

From an external relevance perspective, ACDP has performed well. From an Indonesia perspective, the new government is seeking to make policy-making “more evidence-based”[[151]](#endnote-79). Moreover, whilst data on the number expressions of interest or proposals received by ACDP are not readily available[[152]](#endnote-80), there is evidence of demand and of ACDP’s response to the same. There have been year-on-year increases in the number of activities financed by ACDP (see Table 20) and an increase in the number of “lead agencies” (or clients) supported by ACDP (see Table 21).

**Table 20: ACDP activities/year**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **2014** |
| **Total number of research activities started** | 7 | 8 | 10 | 12 |
| **USD value of research activities started** | 4,210,072 | 4,480,039 | 5,505,823 | 6,050,438 |
| **Average USD value of the research activities** | 601,439 | 560,005 | 550,582 | 504,203 |

Source: POM calculations based on ACDP’s mid-2014 report and as reviewed by John Virtue,   
09 December 2014

**Table 21: Number of lead agencies/year**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **2014** |
| **# of “lead agencies” supported\*** | 6 | 9 | 10 | 10 |

\* A lead agency might have been benefited from more than one activity during the year but they are only counted once in the table

Source: POM calculations based on ACDP’s mid-2014 report and as reviewed by John Virtue,  
 09 December 2014

From the perspective of the Government of Australia, the objective of ACDP is in line with DFAT’s broader commitment to support evidence-informed decision-making. In the context of the Indonesia country program, ACDP is one of several DFAT knowledge-to-policy (K2P) investments, with the others including the Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI), support provided to TNP2K through the DFAT-funded Poverty Reduction Support Facility, and, in the education sector, the upcoming INOVASI program.

Whilst ACDP demonstrates strong external relevance, POM’s view of ACDP’s internal relevance is more circumspect. The existing deliverables provide a necessary foundation for the pursuit of evidence utilisation (i.e. the EOCO) but POM questions the extent to which the design and current approach is sufficient insofar as the attainment of the EOPO is concerned. This will be discussed in the following sections (e.g. Effectiveness).

* + 1. Efficiency

POM notes the concerns raised in the MTR about the procurement process (e.g. with regards to the consortia’s poor sight of the pipeline and the current method of procurement not being “set up for rapid response contracts”[[153]](#endnote-81)). For POM, however, this is one aspect of a broader set of issues concerning responsiveness – critically important given that the relevance and utility of individual outputs inevitably declines should windows of opportunity be missed.

ACDP’s record insofar as responsiveness is concerned appears to be mixed. On a positive note, the considerable attention provided to the identification and planning of activities is often warranted and valued. Similarly, ACDP has been able to ‘turn-around’ ToR very quickly. From an implementation perspective, the CAT has a proven track record of ‘stepping in’ in cases of under-performing service providers[[154]](#endnote-82) and its commitment to provide GoI partners with good quality deliverables is praiseworthy (as also noted in the MTR).

These positives are counter-balanced by areas of concern. The need for the CAT to ‘step in’ in cases of under-performance speaks to the variable quality of some service providers, which may in turn raise questions about procurement. Moreover, the act of ‘stepping in’ may have an adverse effect on other duties expected of the CAT staff members. Several stakeholders – within and outside the Secretariat – have expressed concern about the overall production time, i.e. from conception of an idea to receipt of the final product[[155]](#endnote-83). The concerns are not necessarily focused on the length of the implementation period – stakeholders know what ACDP does and does not offer – but rather concern about the perceived long lead-in times. On occasion, the overall production timetable has meant that opportunities have been missed[[156]](#endnote-84). Whilst it is unknown whether the production timetable has resulted in some agencies and individuals not seeking assistance (i.e. whether there is latent, untapped demand), POM believes it is prudent for ACDP to consider the circumstances in which an output or product is ‘good enough’ so as to safeguard efficient and effective performance, and relevance and utility, elsewhere.

From a portfolio perspective, POM notes that ACDP’s allocation of financial expenditure to particular output areas is approximate, recognizing that most studies are complex and can contribute to multiple outputs. As such, one cannot draw conclusions about relative priorities and trend data. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the original allocation to Output 1 (legislative and regulatory forms) was about USD 7.8m, whereas that to Output 2 (capacity development and organisational change) was about USD 23.4m. POM notes that the relative weighting of the outputs was revised in the ACDP Financing Plan, with Output 1 growing to USD 20m and Output 2 shrinking to about USD 14.9m[[157]](#endnote-85). The reasons are not evident to POM but the reallocation is consistent with the EOPO of ACDP evidence being “incorporated in relevant education sector policies, regulations, plans and budgets”.

* + 1. Effectiveness

From a delivery perspective, ACDP’s six-monthly and annual reports only make reference to one of its two delivery arms, i.e. that of research activities. The reports make no reference to the number, nature, role and results associated with its second activity-stream, i.e. that of facilitating meetings, focus group discussions and workshops that are not directly linked with the research activities. As such, it is not possible for POM to comment about the actual or potential effectiveness of the external meetings, other than to say that one civil servant did express acknowledgement and gratitude for the insights they offered during the RJPMN planning processes[[158]](#endnote-86). If ACDP believes that its second activity-stream is important and that it should be valued by external parties[[159]](#endnote-87), this must be reflected in ACDP’s own reporting and tracking of results.

Insofar as the research activities are concerned, it is noted that ACDP has sought to diversify its product offering with the introduction, in 2013, of so-called “rapid responses” (see Table 22)[[160]](#endnote-88). Their emergence is positive. However, there is a danger that their contribution to the overall make-up of ACDP’s portfolio is over-stated. The MTR reports that about 30% of ACDP research can be considered as “rapid response” studies. POM finds no evidence of this. POM believes that no more than 14% of studies to date have been titled “rapid responses”, with the implementation phase typically ranging from one month to three and a half months in duration. POM advises that ACDP will track the results and relative merits of rapid compared to non-rapid activities in due course.

**Table 22: Rapid responses within ACDP’s portfolio of completing and ongoing research activities (by start year)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **2014** | **Total** |
| **# of rapid response activities** | 0 | 0 | 4\* | 1\*\* | 5 |
| **# of non-rapid response activities** | 7 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 37 |
| **Rapid responses as a % of total activities** | 0% | 0% | 40% | 8% | 14% |

*\* ACDP 013A; 034D; 034F; 038; \*\* ACDP 041A*

Source: POM calculations based on ACDP’s mid-2014 report and pipeline, and as reviewed by John Virtue,   
09 December 2014

Clearly, ACDP and its partners cannot and should not guarantee that every activity will be a success, i.e. it is improbable that all findings, options and/or recommendations will be actioned by GoI. Any such expectation would be unrealistic. The political and institutional environment evolves and therefore needs and priorities change and agendas shift. As such, partners need to regard ACDP activities as a portfolio of investments. Some investments will do well; others will not. The relevance and utility of some may fade with time; others will develop slowly and gain relevance and utility with time.

In line with the notion of ACDP managing an investment portfolio, individual activities are displaying varying degrees of success. In some areas, ACDP has secured apparent ‘big wins’ in which evidence has been both utilised (EOCO) and then incorporated (EOPO) into key frameworks. By way of example:

* Evidence and proposals made within ACDP 034 have been incorporated into the technocratic draft of the RPJMN, with potential upsides for the content of the MoEC and MoRA *Renstras*.
* The ACDP study, *Rural and Remote Area Education Strategic Planning for Tanah Papua* (ACDP 039), has been used during the preparation of the provincial *Renstras* and the *Pendidikan Integratif Komunitas Adat Terpencil (PIKAT).* The evidence has also been used as a central reference for “revitalisation” of the *Fakultas Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan* (FKIP) of the University of Cendrawasih[[161]](#endnote-89).

Such successes are counter-balanced by those activities which are deemed to be less successful or which may develop only very slowly. Cases in point include a *Review of a Decade of Gender Mainstreaming in Education* (ACDP 005), the focus of and client base for which might have been too broad to enable real traction, and the *General Senior Secondary Education Financing Study* (ACDP 004), the quality of which is considered to be comparatively poor[[162]](#endnote-90).

Nevertheless, with there being signs of evidence incorporation, ACDP can rightly claim to have contributed to its EOPO target. The question then becomes one of sufficiency: is ACDP delivering enough? POM believes not. At present, POM cannot point to a ‘critical mass’ of reported change at the level of incorporation, i.e. at the EOPO. Moreover, where change has occurred, it is frequently unclear how much has changed and the importance of that change; ACDP’s role in supporting the change process; and, the contribution of others to the changes described. POM’s ongoing evaluation of EOPO 4 will illuminate the extent and nature of drivers of change in due course but the comparative case study of four activities will only examine less than 10% of ACDP’s activities. It is imperative, therefore, that ACDP and its partners help to articulate what results have been achieved and the process by which they were realised. Tracking and reporting results in K2P programs has its challenges, both technical and political-institutional[[163]](#footnote-73). That necessitates making a real commitment to monitoring and to sharing experience. To date, however, ACDP’s USD 300,000 budget-line for M&E remains unutilised, despite ACDP having expensed or committed nearly USD 29m elsewhere. Opportunities to share experience with other K2P programs, such as the KSI, remain unexploited.

The question of expectation is central to any evaluation of ACDP’s success. The Secretariat, the ADB, the EU, DFAT and GOI are guided by the ADB Technical Assistance Report of May 2010. It, and the subsequent ACDP M&E Strategy of July 2012, state that ACDP’s “outcome will be to contribute to the government’s efforts to strengthen the education system and sustain organisational performance over the next 15 years by modernizing the system, improving service empowerment, and enabling better regional and international competitiveness”[[164]](#endnote-91). POM continues to regard that framing of the ACDP outcome and the absence of suitable performance indicators and targets as cause for concern[[165]](#footnote-74).In response to this situation, POM and ACDP developed a Performance Milestone Framework in the first half of 2014 that spoke to the EP’s logic architecture. The PMF, and the associated targets and milestones, were subsequently approved by DFAT in late 2014.

Notwithstanding the emergence of the PMF, POM is aware that the ACDP, ADB, GoI, EU and DFAT remain guided by the ADB TA Report: it is what guided the 2014 MTR and it is what informs legal and financing arrangements between the respective parties. POM notes that the Secretariat continues to believe that it is appropriate that they be expected to “inform” at an outcome-level, though POM also acknowledges that the Secretariat believes that all parties are committed to seeing ACDP realize policy gains and that it seeks itself playing a role in terms of facilitating the utilization and incorporation of evidence. Whilst this is welcomed, all parties must acknowledge that outcome statements inform stakeholders’ understanding of both expectations and respective roles and responsibilities, and shape the tactics deployed in the pursuit of those objectives. Should ACDP’s objective be to inform, then it would be regarded as being highly effective. Should it be to advocate for the utilisation and incorporation of evidence in key policy processes, then POM’s view of its current effectiveness is more circumspect[[166]](#footnote-75).

* + 1. Impact


As POM noted in its 2013 APPR, should evidence be provided at the right time, in the right format, and to the right people, there is tremendous potential for activities to deliver long-term benefits. POM remains of that view. By way of example, should critical evidence and options or recommendations contained in ACDP 034 be incorporated in the RPJMN, and the MoEC and MoRA *Renstras*, ACDP may make an important contribution to the trajectory of the education sector until 2019 and potentially beyond. Equally, with its annual budget of +/- IDR 11 trillion or AUD 1.1bn any contribution to the improved performance of the BSM mechanism would offer considerable impact and value for money.

As it stands, POM believes there remains untapped potential for ACDP to deliver greater impact; to cement the potential gains. At least two opportunities exist. Looking back, it is probable that the back catalogue of concluded activities holds unrealised potential. As previously noted, some activities might be ‘slow burners’ that requiring nurturing. The relevance of others might have been weak at the time of eventual delivery (e.g. because of a change in GoI personnel or policy). However, relevance and potential utility can change. Institutional and political realities are fluid, and therefore ACDP’s back catalogue of concluded activities must not be overlooked at the expense of the ongoing and pipeline activities. For optimal utility and value for money, ACDP’s portfolio must be strategically managed, the relevance of earlier investments be tracked (in case new opportunities emerge), and effort must be made to conduct ‘meta-analysis’ and to re-package evidence to target stakeholders.

Looking forward, ACDP needs sight of GoI’s ongoing and planned research outputs. Despite the CAT’s apparent efforts, the Secretariat reportedly does not have access to the Centre for Policy Research’s or *Puslitjak*’s annual research pipeline (worth USD 3.7m in 2014[[167]](#endnote-92)). Neither did the MTR team[[168]](#endnote-93). This should be a cause for concern, even though the *Puslitjak* Director and researchers participate in ACDP events and receive benefit from technical assistance (e.g. in the form of a Statistician and an IT Specialist).

On a separate level, ACDP needs to look beyond the mere provision of evidence, i.e. the production of outputs. Assuming ACDP is committed to the attainment of the EOCO and the EOPO, it needs to make a conscious effort to promote and to advocate; to actively position ACDP, its services and its evidence so that it can maximise the return on the investment (all the while recognising the respective roles of GoI and ACDP in decision-making processes). In reality, the role that ACDP plays should differ in accordance with the task and client in question (see Figure 4). Tactics should vary but all the while with a clear line of sight on the attainment of ACDP’s objective. However, as noted above, perceptions of the effectiveness and impact of the investment will ultimately be shaped by what is expected of it and POM continues to believe that ACDP could offer more.

**Figure 4: ACDP’s objectives and associated functions**



Note: The shaded bars denote different activities, with ACDP’s objective and associated functions varying from case to case. Should a client have direct access to policy and decision-making processes then ACDP’s objective of evidence incorporation may be realised by ACDP merely informing, aggregating and compiling evidence. In other cases, ACDP may need to play a stronger intermediary role, in which it helps to share ideas or even promotes or advocates for evidence utilisation.

* + 1. Sustainability

In last year’s APPR, POM observed that “ACDP was conceived as a means to an end; the Secretariat will not be sustained after the lifetime of the donor investment. Nevertheless, ACDP and therefore the GoI will secure sustained benefits if recommendations made within specific ACDP deliverables are acted upon”. POM’s view of C4 sustainability has evolved over the last year, in part to reflect the revised Analytical Framework of September 2014 but also in recognition of ACDP’s institutional base and its close engagement with a range of GoI stakeholders. Whilst there exists potential for activities to deliver considerable impact, POM believes that there is a risk that ACDP will generate limited sustained benefit at an institutional level. POM also now considers that this would be a missed opportunity and believes that ACDP should be tasked to move in that direction. ACDP’s interest in designing a ‘policy research capacity development’ initiative in mid-2014 is encouraging, even if it were intended to focus on policy research and not on institutional sustainability *per se*.

POM is concerned that any existing potential for institutional sustainability will go unrealised because of the apparent lack of discussion about – perhaps even aspiration for – an institutional legacy. Consideration of any institutional legacy has at least two component parts. First, it concerns the rules, norms, customs and practices that enable or disable evidence-informed decision-making within government structures, and the potential for ACDP to support changes to levels of awareness, understanding, behaviour, approach and commitment over its lifetime. Secondly, it concerns the institutional home within which ACDP resides. ACDP’s current location and assignment to MoEC’s Balitbang may have upsides in terms of support to MoEC’s mandate but, should there be aspirations for ACDP to leave a lasting institutional footprint insofar as sectoral planning and implementation is concerned, it may be necessary to consider whether ACDP’s current formal attachment to just one of the three line ministries and outside of the Bappenas structure creates limitations (despite the make-up of the TOG membership).

* 1. **Summary and recommendations**

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 23, below. The rating scale used with the previous DFAT Quality Reporting System (QRS) and the upcoming Aid Quality Checks (AQC) system has been adopted. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, what measures are needed to increase the likelihood of achieving the EOPO 4 are provided in Table 24, below.

**Table 23: Component 4 scorecard**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **2013 Score** | **2014 Score** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| **Relevance** | 4 | 4 | * High external relevance. ACDP is in line with GoI policy needs and is in keeping with DFAT’s commitment to support Knowledge-to-Policy measures. GoI reportedly sees utilisation as an important objective of ACDP. * However, POM remains concerned about the delivery of ACDP from an internal relevance perspective. The deliverables provide the necessary building blocks for the attainment of the EOCO but the current activities – the current tactics – are insufficient should partners be seeking to deliver a ‘critical mass’ of change at the EOPO level | * ACDP would score a 5 if considered from an external relevance perspective alone. * POM notes the Secretariat’s willingness to appoint an M&E resource and the role of the MTR in facilitating that change. |
| **Efficiency** | 3 | 3 | * Continued evidence of mixed performance and responsiveness. * ACDP displays a strong QA function. Attention paid to the design phase is often valued and warranted. However, the positives are offset by frequently voiced concern about the overall production timetable. | * The Performance Milestone Framework was approved in late 2014 so there has been insufficient time (and evidence gathering) to make detailed comment about progress against output-level targets. As such, the 2014 APPR speaks to the spirit and not the letter of the PMF. |
| **Effectiveness** | 4 | 4 | * Pockets of success, with reported evidence of both utilisation (EOCO) and incorporation (EOPO). Nevertheless, there is insufficient evidence of a ‘critical mass’ of reported change at the EOPO level. * POM continues to believe that ACDP holds untapped potential and feels that there remains scope to improve the return on the investment. | * The scores refer to the outcome – the EOPO – statement used by the EP, not that used by the ADB. * POM notes the Secretariat’s willingness to appoint an M&E resource and the role of the MTR in facilitating that change. |
| **Impact** | TE | 3 | * Considerable potential exists, e.g. see support to BSM and Papua. * After four years of implementation one might expect to see greater signs of early indications of impact. | * Should a greater number of activities display potential to generate long-term benefits, the score may increase in future years. * Attention is frequently made to improvements to the capacities and competencies of national consultants but there is no evidence that this is routinely measured and nor is it seen as an intended direct effect of the investment. |
| **Sustainability** | 4 | 2 | * Sustainability not foreseen in the ADB design document * Lack of discussion about any expected institutional legacy. * Represents a missed opportunity to generate a better return on the USD 50m investment. | * GoI stakeholders seemingly regard ACDP as being of several outlets for research work. Upon completion, the ACDP option will be removed from the ‘menu’. * POM’s understanding of sustainability within/of ACDP has evolved over the last year, hence the change in score. In 2013 POM restricted its consideration to the likelihood of activities delivering sustained benefit. |

**Table 24: Component 4 key findings and recommendations**

| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The ACDP is guided by the ADB TA Report of May 2010. EP Logic Architecture and the EP PMF have limited traction beyond POM and DFAT, and may not have been seen by all ACDP stakeholders (see §5.4.3). | R18: The ADB TA Report and ACDP M&E Strategy should be reviewed and updated to include suitable success metrics. | \*\*\* | ACDP Secretariat and the ADB (with support from the GoI, EU, DFAT and POM) |
| The framing of ACDP’s outcome statement and the absence of suitable performance indicators and targets in the ADB TA Report and the ACDP M&E Strategy provide insufficient clarity about what is expected of ACDP at an outcomes level (see §5.4.3) |
| ACDP holds untapped potential but this will go unrealised so long as investments are considered on an activity-by-activity basis (see §5.4.3) | R19: The portfolio of investments should be managed more strategically such that the Secretariat looks beyond output-level deliverables to the pursuit of the agreed outcomes, for example by maximising the potential of its ‘back catalogue’ of concluded activities and by exploiting the synergies between activities. | \*\*\* | ACDP Secretariat (with direction and guidance provided by DFAT, the EU and GoI as appropriate) |
| ACDP’s tracking and reporting of results is weak (see §5.4.3) | R20: The ACDP Secretariat should invest in full-time, dedicated M&E resources so as to improve results tracking and reporting, and to facilitate learning, continuous improvement and strategic management of its portfolio. | \*\*\* | ACDP Secretariat and ADB (with input from DFAT, the EU and GoI as appropriate) |
| Prospects for institutional sustainability may go unrealised so long as limited attention is paid to defining and pursuing any institutional legacy (see §5.4.5) | R21: Institutional partners should, as part of the negotiations concerning the proposed budget-neutral extension of ACDP, reach a shared understanding or agreement about:   * the nature of any intended institutional legacy; * whether ACDP’s current institutional home is the most appropriate to attain that legacy; * what supporting measures are required by GoI to pursue any intended institutional legacy; and * what is expected of ACDP to build the necessary foundations for that legacy. | \*\* | GoI, DFAT and the EU (with input from the ADB) |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*



**Part B: Zooming out**

***Program Oversight***

1. **Program Oversight**
   1. **An introduction**

The EP is delivered through a blend of aid modalities, including earmarked budget support (C1, C2), project support (C3), and a financial contribution as part of multi-donor support (C4). At a day-to-day level, the EP is managed by the Basic Education Unit of the Development Cooperation Section of the Jakarta Office of DFAT.

An EP Governance Oversight Group (GOG) is mandated to meet at least once every six months. It is responsible for aligning the program with emerging sectoral priorities; monitoring performance against the targets set in the ESSP Joint Results Framework (JRF); facilitating GoI, DFAT and EU involvement and support for ESSP monitoring and evaluation processes; and, providing high level strategic responses to monitoring reports so as to guide program direction.

In addition to the GOG, four Technical Oversight Groups[[169]](#footnote-76) (TOGs) have been established, one under each of the four EP components. They are responsible for approving workplans and procurement plans; the coordination and approval of major technical reports; and, ongoing management, monitoring and oversight of the delivery of the EP. The TOGs are scheduled to meet every three months.

* 1. **Context**

2014 has been a period of relative uncertainty and change for both institutional partners. From a national perspective, the third Indonesian presidential election was held in July 2014, with the General Elections Commission announcing a victory for Joko Widodo. He and his vice-president, Jusuf Kalla, were sworn in on 20 October 2014, for a five-year term. The presidential election was preceded by a general election held in April 2014 to renew the mandate of the national and regional legislatures. In Australia, a federal election was held in September 2013 in which the incumbent Labour Party government was defeated by the Liberal/National Coalition opposition.

Whilst the ramifications of the political changes in Indonesia are only just starting to be felt, the change in Australian government at the end of 2013 has already led to significant reorganisation and refocusing of international development assistance with the absorption of AusAID within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. During 2014, a new development policy and a new performance framework were released, introducing key shifts in the aid program. The associated new strategic framework identified the purpose of the Australian aid program as “promoting Australia’s national interests by contributing to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction”[[170]](#endnote-94). This requires a foundation of strong human development and therefore improved education services remains essential to both building a skilled and competitive workforce and to lifting living standards.

With respect to timeframe, the EP is around two-thirds complete (40 months out of 60). DFAT is expecting or is considering requests for budget-neutral extensions to all components. Table 25 indicates that around 50% of the overall budget has been expensed, i.e. funds have left GoA accounts.

**Table 25: Education Partnership Expenditure (as at 10 November 2014)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **AUD (millions)** | **Overall budget**  **(June 2011 – June 2016)** | **Current spend**  **(as at 10/11/14)** | **% spent** |
| **C1** | $239,000,000[[171]](#footnote-77) | $134,799,695 | 56.40% |
| **C2** | $179,726,512 | $77,583,308 | 43.17% |
| **C3** | $48,426,296 | $26,779,781 | 55.30% |
| **C4** | $25,000,000 | $20,000,000 | 80.00% |
| **Support** | $31,847,192 | 12,394,956 | 38.92% |
| **Total** | **$524,000,000** | **$271,557,739** | **51.82%** |

Source: DFAT

The Education Partnership now finds itself part of an evolving DFAT aid investment portfolio that will be articulated in the upcoming country Aid Investment Plan (AIP) for Indonesia. The external relevance of each specific component has been discussed in earlier sections of this report, but it seems that the place of the Education Partnership as a flagship program within Australia’s development portfolio in Indonesia will depend upon how the investment resonates with the objectives of the new AIP. The EP’s focus on education quality (through Component 2 and Component 3) is likely to remain relevant to DFAT objectives as will the higher-level focus of Component 4 on improved sector governance. However, given GoI’s achievements in the area of access and its own transition to a focus on quality, support to GoI‘s access agenda is of less relevance to GoA and, as such, is unlikely to be a focus of the AIP.

In summary, it is evident that the next phase of DFAT aid investments will be aligned with both Australia’s and Indonesia’s evolving development agenda. As such, it is possible that the EP (or specific investments therein) could find itself being relatively marginalised. POM considers this would represent a missed opportunity. With at least 20 months remaining – over 30 months if extensions are granted - there is considerable time left on the program to optimise EP results. Furthermore, with about AUD 250m to be committed over the remaining period of the program, there remains opportunity for partners to invest wisely. The foundations have been laid. The challenge now is to ensure the continued relevance of the EP to the evolving development agendas of both countries, to maximize the developmental return on the investment being made and to capture and learn lessons for future programming.

* 1. **Analysis**
     1. Program delivery

POM has previously acknowledged the range of delivery arrangements within the EP and has argued that they were ‘appropriate for purpose’. POM continues to believe that the modalities offer good opportunity to pilot and trial initiatives through project support and to build capacity through systems development, whilst instilling and supporting GoI ownership. That should, in principle, increase the likelihood of long-term impact and sustainability, whilst also guaranteeing delivery of outputs.

Insights garnered over more than three years of implementation would suggest that the prospects for facilitating sustainable, systemic change are more prevalent where the investment is not only designed to deliver such change but also where it works in partnership with and through partner (government) systems[[172]](#footnote-78). Whilst Component 1 and Component 2 are at very different stages of maturity, they both display positive signs of national ownership and good prospects for delivering sustained benefits over the long-term.

Conversely, experience would suggest that opportunities to secure systemic change and longer-term results are often harder to exploit when implementing partners are external to government structures and/or where they are regarded by key stakeholders as being fixed-term “projects”. Although this modality can offer quick, short-term gains, they appear to offer fewer opportunities for institutional sustainability. Components 3 and 4 are cases in point. Both operate in a “projectised” arrangement and both have realized demonstrable results but neither was originally designed to deliver systemic change or institutional sustainability

Component 3 is now taking up the challenge and is seeking to cement its progress both within the broader objective of improved madrasah education quality and within a sustainable institutional framework (refer to Section 4). Whilst ACDP has clearly developed very good networks with the lead agencies for which it provides services, it has paid comparatively limited attention to developing the capacity of Balitbang, its designated counterpart. Opinions differ as to the extent of institutional sustainability originally intended within Component 4, but POM now considers it an urgent priority to seek agreement between the institutional partners on the intended legacy of the investment in the ACDP.

Whilst the approach of Working in Partner Systems (WiPs) offers the advantages alluded to above, it is also recognized that there are concerns about WiPS with respect to accountability. For that reason, POM is tasked to conduct a series of financial audits and compliance reviews to provide DFAT with evidence such that it can protect and be held accountable for its investment. The focus of the audit program is now on those Australian funds that are managed through partner government systems and which are bound by the processes outlined in the associated Grant Agreements between the two governments. POM’s Consolidated Audit Report 2013[[173]](#endnote-95) noted the high levels of non-compliance with rigorous procedures across those components audited by POM. However, it also noted that the non-compliance should not be considered to be symptomatic of a high degree of fraud. On balance, and given the low level of materiality of specific occurrences of non-compliance, the positive developmental impact afforded by the WiPS approach outweighs any significant accountability concerns.

* + 1. Program management

In terms of direct or transactional management of the EP, implementing and institutional partners have demonstrated a strong commitment to timely, responsive and prudent delivery of program outputs. They have also increasingly demonstrated a commitment to achieving the EOCOs. This positive assessment mirrors the generally commendable performance of individual components with respect to efficiency in so far as the attainment of output and EOCO PMF targets is concerned.

Relationships between the managers and the implementing agencies are strong and all parties should take credit for the incremental adjustments and improvements that have characterized program implementation. In particular, the ‘traditional’ managing contractor arrangement typified by the School Systems and Quality (SSQ) contract has permitted flexibility and adaptive management despite the somewhat inflexible EP design. There has been less evident flexibility within the management arrangements of Component 4, which might be explained by the ADB’s status as an ‘elevated’ implementing partner: one of a donor and peer to the EU and DFAT, yet one that is also contractually obliged by the EU and DFAT to deliver an agreed scope of services to GoI.

POM believes that the degree and nature of strategic or transformational *engagement* between institutional partners has improved in 2014. Positive examples include the clarification of school construction targets; the launch and increased visibility of ProDEP; and the commitment to the development of a madrasah quality improvement strategy. Strong strategic engagement between institutional partners will translate, through the provision of clear, strategic direction to implementing partners, into an increased contribution to end of partnership outcomes and, hence, program effectiveness and impact. Items requiring attention in the near future include:

* + The expectations of the respective partners around:
  + The extent and mechanisms for MoRA engagement in the management of ProDEP and the participation of madrasah principals in CPD (C2).
  + The nature and extent of, and the necessary support to, systemic change in MoRA and the development of a strategy to support continuous improvement of Madrasah quality (C3).
  + The nature and degree of expected results accruing from ACDP and the role of ACDP in the pursuit of those results (C4).
  + The affordability, means and/or appetite to sustain a range of initiatives:
  + The field monitoring system, Complaints Handling System, access planning training, site selection processes and NSIP (C1).
  + The implementation of ProDEP (C2).
  + The madrasah quality improvement strategy (C3).
  + The current model of outsourced evidence collection and analysis (C4).
    1. Program governance

An elaborate governance structure has been developed for the EP. POM has commented before[[174]](#endnote-96) that the complex structure is probably inevitable and may be necessary given the range of actors and agencies involved in the EP. The quality of collaboration and engagement at the GOG and TOGs has reportedly improved in 2014[[175]](#endnote-97), but the frequency of interaction remains sub-optimal.

During 2014, one GOG meeting was held[[176]](#footnote-79) and five TOG meetings were held[[177]](#footnote-80). This represents only 50% and 30% respectively of the prescribed number of meetings. It may well be that the quarterly schedule for TOG meetings is unrealistic and unwarranted, especially given the seniority of and the demands upon the key participants in the meetings.

POM has previously promoted the utilisation of the governance forums to discuss EP and component performance[[178]](#endnote-98).The discussion about the 2013 Annual Partnership Performance Report at the ITOG[[179]](#endnote-99), the SDTOG[[180]](#endnote-100) and the ATOG[[181]](#endnote-101) provided important opportunities to assess the sufficiency of results realised to date and the future direction of the current investment. This formal platform for POM communication about the performance of the EP provides an excellent adjunct to the less formal methods utilised.

Clearly, the TOG meetings require a substantive agenda to justify their occurrence and a more satisfactory arrangement, at least for some components (e.g. C1), may be to schedule bi-annual meetings that coincide with the availability of key performance information and/or key activity approvals. In addition, attention could be focused on the articulation of an agenda with strategic issues that require clear resolution. Such an approach would require more groundwork to ensure key actors are adequately briefed prior to the meetings.

The ambitious objectives for the GOG meetings (see Section 6.1) are unlikely to be fully achieved. As it stands, the GOG is a necessary forum for the authorization of EU funding tranches and it fulfils that role as well as providing an opportunity for engagement at the highest level.

* + 1. Cross-cutting Issues

To secure optimal developmental return on the investment, consideration is given to a range of cross-cutting issues that would enable the EP to be delivered in an equitable and inclusive manner and in line with the overarching development aspirations of the institutional partners and the international development community.

**Disadvantaged groups**

It is apparent that there was only limited articulation of cross-sectoral program objectives in the design of the EP. Even so, the design document categorically states that the EP “will support gender equitable and inclusive (disability) education policies”[[182]](#endnote-102). This commitment to social inclusion was reinforced with the recent introduction of DFAT’s ten key strategic-level targets[[183]](#endnote-103), as outlined in the Government’s new development policy. These strategic targets noted the need for greater “consideration of ways to enable more disadvantaged members of society, such as people with disabilities, to access the same opportunities as others and improve their quality of life” and the requirement to “empower women and girls”.

The 2013 APPR assessed EP performance in relation to disadvantaged groups by considering social inclusion[[184]](#footnote-81) as a means to pursue equality, and social targeting[[185]](#footnote-82) as a means to pursue equity[[186]](#endnote-104). In 2014, the EP has implemented a number of discrete activities and delivered several products that seek to promote equality and equity. Examples include:

* + The inclusion of socially inclusive practices within PPP modules, Principal CPD UoLs, SPD, the NSIP materials and the Access Planning module.
  + The development of a social inclusion monitoring instrument by SSQ M&E advisers, which was subsequently used by MoRA.
  + The delivery of several ACDP reports requested by GoI, such as the study on BSM effectiveness (poor groups) and support to mother tongue education in Papua (ethnic groups).

Of particular note in 2014 has been SSQ’s appointment of a full-time Social Inclusion Advisor (SIA). This is encouraging and POM also welcomes the observation that the advisor’s mandate is not necessarily restricted to SSQ activities[[187]](#endnote-105). Nevertheless, there remains the need for the institutional partners to define and implement an overarching social inclusion strategy for the EP, within which the SIA (and others) can frame their work. In support of that, DFAT’s own recent assessment of the EP in 2013-14 in relation to gender equality offered a critical assessment of the Partnership’s current performance[[188]](#footnote-83), [[189]](#endnote-106). In the absence of a social inclusion strategy, the EP ambitions with respect to equality and equity remain ill-defined and there is an associated risk that the nature, extent and sufficiency of the overall developmental return of the EP will be unquantifiable.

With risk comes opportunity. The independent mid-term review of the AusAID *Development for All* strategy[[190]](#endnote-107) argued that Australia is regarded as a leading donor in disability-inclusive development. This perception should be upheld. Minister Julie Bishop has recently spoken on the need to promote and mainstream[[191]](#endnote-108), [[192]](#endnote-109) gender and disability issues such that groups are empowered and that “no one is left behind”. Stronger articulation of the EP’s aspirations in this regard has therefore now become critical and, given the size, institutional reach and potential impact of the investment, the EP could become a leader in the translation of DFAT (and GoI) development policy into action.

**Broader developmental agenda**

Whilst the cross-cutting objectives in the EP *design* only refer to gender and disability, POM believes that the EP managers remain responsible for aligning the program with the broader evolving development agenda. On one level this requires due consideration and promotion of the “traditional” (and important) development principles of sustainability and capacity building. On another level it requires due consideration and alignment with the ’new aid paradigm’ and its promotion of, *inter alia*, value for money, private sector engagement and combatting corruption.

Whilst DFAT’s new aid policy and performance framework make little reference to capacity building[[193]](#footnote-84) or to sustainability[[194]](#footnote-85) *per se*, both remain internationally acknowledged building blocks to effective development assistance. The emerging post-2015 agenda recognises, for example, the importance of capacities and institutions in the pursuit of development outcomes, “signalling that a transformative agenda requires transformed institutions”[[195]](#endnote-110). Equally, it is well understood that returns are greatest where development assistance offers streams of sustained benefits. The EP offers the potential to deliver both, i.e. to support the emergence of transformed institutions and a range of sustained benefits. However, neither happens naturally: the opportunities need to be identified and managed. At present, the EP’s commitment to help build the capacity of key institutions is variable and POM believes there is opportunity to cement benefits made at output level by also improving institutional capacity.

From a sustainability perspective, SSQ’s conception and initial implementation of a Sustainability Matrix for Components 1-3 is welcomed. Nevertheless, for optimal benefit the institutional partners will need to engage on the issues arising and, at times, offer the necessary strategic direction if priorities are to be set, if risks are to be managed or mitigated, and should the managers be committed to realising the opportunities available.

Turning to the ‘new aid paradigm’, Australia’s aid program identifies ten key strategic targets “to ensure the aid program is well managed, achieves value-for-money and makes progress in delivering key Government priorities, as outlined in the Government’s new development policy”. The strategic target for VFM (#8) requires that DFAT delivers “high standards of value-for-money in at least 85 per cent of aid investments”[[196]](#endnote-111). The emergence of VFM as a cross cutting issue in development assistance was first recognised by the Education Partnership in 2012. POM has promoted its consideration from a program performance perspective since early 2013 and DFAT commissioned an options paper to consider how best to apply the concept of VFM to the EP in late 2013. DFAT in Canberra released its VFM Principles in March 2014 and DFAT Jakarta prepared a draft Position Paper on VFM within the EP in August 2014. Building on the Position Paper and the VFM Principles, POM produced a detailed VFM Framework in September 2014. Subsequent to follow-up discussions, DFAT asked POM to submit a further iteration of the framework.

The ongoing absence of an agreed VFM framework compromises the assessment and reporting of the EP’s VFM proposition. For this reason and given the strong commitment of DFAT to VFM, POM continues to believe an agreement on a utilitarian framework is a priority and that this necessarily requires DFAT to provide clear direction and parameters to any VFM work stream.

* 1. **Recommendations**

Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, what measures are needed to increase the likelihood of achieving the EOPOs and contributing to the goals of the EP are provided in Table 26, below.

**Table 26: Program Oversight key findings and recommendations**

| **Finding** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| There is considerable time left on the EP and an estimated AUD 250 million to be committed. There is ample opportunity to maximize the investment made and to build on the foundations laid to date (see §6.3.2). | R22 EP managers should identify and agree upon key strategies for the realisation of EP EOPOs and ensure that EP workplans align with key strategies. | \*\*\* | GoI and DFAT (with support from TOGs, implementing agencies, POM) |
| R23 A formal mechanism to identify, review and share lessons learned from the implementation of the EP should be established and then applied to the new AIP priorities and programs. | \*\* | DFAT |
| R24 EP managers should identify and maximise cross-component synergies through stronger EP portfolio management. | \*\* | GoI and DFAT |
| R25 Institutional partners, with the support of implementing partners, should define a clear strategy that explains how the EP translates DFAT’s and GoI’s policies on equity and equality into action. | \*\*\* | DFAT and GoI (with support from SSQ and POM) |
| Stronger articulation of the EP’s aspiration with regards to social inclusion has become critical (see §6.3.4). | R26 Institutional partners, with the support of implementing partners where appropriate, should identify relevant social inclusion indicators, milestones and targets for incorporation into the Performance Milestone Framework. | \*\*\* | DFAT and GoI (with support from SSQ and POM) |
| Whilst the EP design restricts cross-cutting objectives to gender and disability, POM believes that the EP managers remain responsible for aligning the program with the evolving development agenda (see §6.3.4). | R27 EP managers should develop an action plan identifying adjustments required to the EP to respond to the development principles articulated within Australia’s “new aid paradigm”. | \*\* | DFAT |
| R28 As part of the above, agreement on a utilitarian VFM framework should be reached early in 2015. | \*\*\* | DFAT and POM (with input from Implementing Partners as appropriate) |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*



**Part C: Conclusions**

1. **Conclusions**

The end of 2014 represents the two-thirds completion point in the implementation of Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. 2014 has been a year of relative uncertainty and considerable change for both institutional partners, brought on by the installation of a new government in Indonesia and the ongoing reorganisation and refocusing of Australia’s aid program. Against that backdrop, this year’s APPR offers a timely assessment of progress to date and an analysis of existing challenges and opportunities. The findings and recommendations contained in this report should be used to guide implementation in 2015 and beyond.

Table 27, below, provides a summary of each component’s performance against the five DAC criteria, coupled with mean scores for each DAC criterion. POM’s scores from 2013 are also presented so that readers can see how performance has evolved over time. Whilst overall comparison between 2013 and 2014 scores is compromised to some degree by a number of TE (or “Too Early” to judge) scores in 2013, it is satisfying to note that mean scores for efficiency and effectiveness have increased. This reflects POM’s position that the partners have displayed a strong commitment to the timely, responsive and prudent delivery of program outputs and an increasing commitment to the achievement of the EOCOs as an enabler of the EOPOs. Mean scores for relevance (4.25, i.e. positive) and sustainability (3.25, i.e. less positive) have remained the same. For the 15 criteria that were scored in both 2013 and in 2014, six (40%) have increased and only three (20%) decreased. Six (40%) have remained the same. Greatest gains have been made in the DAC criterion of efficiency.

With specific regards to EP performance in 2014, POM believes the EP program to be relevant (4.25) and its implementation to be highly efficient (4.50). Though the picture differs from component to component, POM is more confident in 2014 than 2013 about the attainment of the EOPOs and POM is therefore largely positive about program effectiveness, though it continues to believe that greater returns could be generated (3.75). POM also considers there to be reasonable prospects for long-term benefits to be realized at an individual school or beneficiary level (3.50), but it strikes a cautionary note about the prospects for institutional sustainability (3.25).

Table 27: Combined scorecard

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **C1 Score** | | **C2 Score** | | **C3 Score** | | **C4 Score** | | **Mean EP Score** | |
| **2013** | **2014** | **2013** | **2014** | **2013** | **2014** | **2013** | **2014** | **2013** | **2014** |
| **Relevance** | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | **4.25** | **4.25** |
| **Efficiency** | 5 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | **4.00** | **4.50** |
| **Effectiveness** | 3 | 4 | TE | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | **3.66** | **3.75** |
| **Impact** | TE | 4 | TE | 4 | TE | 3 | TE | 3 | **TE** | **3.50** |
| **Sustainability** | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | **3.25** | **3.25** |

Whilst all of the component interventions remain highly **relevant** with respect to the national policies and priorities of the Government of Indonesia, a reframing of Australia’s aid objectives in 2014 has tempered elements of the external relevance of what is, by design, a broad sectoral support program. POM’s assessment of the EP’s internal relevance – a measure of the appropriateness of the approaches and interventions used to achieve the program’s objectives – points to an uneven picture, with the relative inflexibility of the approaches being adopted to improve access increasingly outweighed by the flexibility of the approaches being adopted to improve education quality. The external relevance of the EP is unlikely to alter much between now and the EP’s conclusion but imaginative and proactive management could pay dividends in terms of its internal relevance and therefore its probable effectiveness.

Overall, the EP continues to score very well with respect to **efficiency.** Good performance has typically been informed by the pragmatic management choices made by both institutional partners and, in the main, by implementing partners. In particular, POM has recognised that improved performance has resulted from strong collaboration *between* institutional and implementing partners and a willingness to adapt and to adjust program delivery.

POM is cautiously optimistic about the EP’s **effectiveness**, in terms of its likely contribution to the expected EOPOs, though it believes that both implementing and institutional partners should do more to generate the best possible developmental return on the investment. POM is encouraged by the growing appetite to support systemic change and it would welcome continued effort in this regard in 2015. With requests for component extensions due to be considered in early 2015, there is ample time and funds to build upon the foundations that have been laid. Importantly, there is also ample opportunity to commit to the higher order objectives and requirements that will improve the prospects for effectiveness, impact and sustainability.


POM distinguishes in its assessment of long-term benefits between those accrued at an individual level and those at an institutional level. In so doing, POM assesses the prospects for long-term **impact** at an individual school, student or principal level to be relatively strong. However, POM is less optimistic about the EP’s overall institutional legacy, even if it is encouraged to see a growing interest in supporting measures that will facilitate systems strengthening. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that POM considers the prospects for **sustainability**, at an institutional level, to be questionable. All the same, with strong strategic engagement and a willingness to look beyond delivery there is no reason why the prospects cannot be improved.

Overall, the EP made good progress in 2014. That momentum must be sustained in 2015. With considerable time left on the EP and an estimated AUD 250m to be committed, opportunities must be grasped. Should that happen, there is every possibility that the partners will generate results befitting of the scale and ambition of the EP.

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**Annexes**

Annex I: EP Logic Architecture



Annex II: Interpretation of DAC Criteria

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Relevance** | | The extent to which the investment is suited to program goals and objectives and to the policies and priorities of the GoI and GoA |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent are EP interventions appropriate to the Indonesian education sector? (External) * To what extent are the EP interventions in line with Australian development policy and priorities? (External) * To what extent are the activities and outputs consistent with the attainment of EOCOs and EOPOs and goals? (Internal) | |
| **Efficiency** | | A measure of how economically (in relation to time and cost) inputs are converted to outputs (and EOCOs) |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent are the output- and EOCO-level milestones being achieved on time? And in accordance with agreed budget envelopes? * Could the same quality and quantity of deliverables and the same level of change/results have been achieved with less investment? | |
| **Effectiveness** | | The extent to which an investment attains its end-of-partnership targets |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent and how has JSE enrolment in public schools increased in EP targeted districts? * To what extent and how have EP-funded professional development initiatives improved the management of schools and Madrasah? * To what extent and how has EP-funded support improved the quality of madrasah service provision? * To what extent is systemic change occurring within C3’s targeted districts (and elsewhere, and what is the EP’s contribution to the same? * To what extent and how is ACDP evidence that relates to the EP incorporated in relevant education sector policies, regulations plans and budgets? * To what extent has the EP delivered or contributed to unforeseen results that could be deemed to be on a par with EOCOs and EOPOs? * Is there evidence that the EP has generated unforeseen costs and are they deemed to be at an acceptable or unacceptable level? | |
| **Impact** | | The overall *long-term effect* produced by an investment. This includes positive and negative changes produced by a development investment (directly or indirectly, intended or unintended). |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to student participation in JSE? (Goal 1) * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to the improvement of the quality of education in public and private schools? (Goal 2) * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to increased use of evidence for education sector decision making? (Goal 3) | |
| **Sustainability** | | The extent to which the benefits are likely to continue after DFAT funding to the EP has been withdrawn |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent will the key benefits be sustained once GoA’s investment ceases? * Is there evidence of partners adopting, adapting, taking to scale and financing the outputs, approaches, tools, etc. implemented in the EP? * Do beneficiaries have sufficient ownership, capacity and resources to maintain the benefits after GoA funding has ceased? | |

Annex III: APPR Rating Scale (based on DFAT QRS and AQC)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Rating scale** | |
| Less than satisfactory | Satisfactory |
| 1: Very poor quality; needs major overhaul | 4: Adequate quality; needs some work |
| 2: Poor quality; needs major work to improve | 5: Good quality |
| 3: Less than adequate quality; needs significant work | 6: Very high quality |
| TE: Too early to rate | |

Annex IV: List of Documents Reviewed

This annex lists all reports reviewed by POM relating to EP performance as Step 2 of the APPR preparation process (see Section 1.2.3). It is not a list of all documents referenced in the APPR.

|  |
| --- |
| **Report** |
| **ACDP** |
| Education Sector Support Programme – Results Framework Report 2013 |
| ACDP Six Monthly Progress Report – End 2013 |
| ACDP Six Monthly Progress Report – Mid 2014 |
| Education Sector – Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership Indonesia – Mid-term Review. Final Report |
| **DFAT** |
| Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia First Joint Monitoring Visit of School Construction, 2013 – Engineering and Technical Evaluation Mission Back To Office Report #3 – October 21 - November 6, 2013 (with annexes) |
| Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia First Joint Monitoring Visit of School Construction, 2013 – Engineering and Technical Evaluation Mission Back To Office Report #4 – January 20 – February 4, 2014 (with annexes) |
| Management Response: 2013 Annual Partnership Performance Report |
| Alexander and Lloyd Group (2014). Independent Monitoring of School Construction Technical Evaluation Mission 27 October-10 November 2014. Back to Office Report (Final) |
| **POM** |
| Annual Partnership Performance Report 2013 |
| POM Six Monthly Report - July to December 2013 |
| POM Six Monthly Report – January to June 2014 |
| POM Annual Workplan and Budget 2014 |
| Critical Issues Report: Final Report |
| Education Partnership Technical Document Repository System (Draft) |
| The Ability and Willingness of Districts to Pay for CPD: Options Framework |
| Value for Money Scoping Exercise: Final Report |
| Annual Sector Financial Report (2012): Final Report |
| Disability and learning outcomes: a design-implement research study on ProDEP, learning outcomes and children with disabilities: Concept Note |
| Thematic Literature Review for Component 2 |
| School Sites Selection Analysis Concept Note |
| EOPO 1 Evaluation Options Paper |
| EOPO 2 Evaluation Options Paper |
| EOPO 3 Evaluation Options Paper |
| EOPO 4 Evaluation Concept Note |
| Performance Milestone Framework: Guidance Note |
| C1 School Construction Committee (SCC) Financial Compliance Audit for 2012 School Construction Cycle – Phase 1 |
| C1 School Construction Committee (SCC) Financial Compliance Audit for 2012 School Construction Cycle – Phase 2 |
| C1 MoEC Internal Control and Compliance Review for 2012 School Construction Cycle – Phase 2 (Draft) |
| C1 Annual Financial Statements Audit for 2013 School Construction Cycle |
| C1 MoEC Internal Control and Compliance Review for 2012 School Construction Cycle – Phase 1 |
| Audit of compliance with control systems and procedure relating to Block Grants to SNIPs & Madrasah – Stage 1 |
| Audit of compliance with control systems and procedures relating to Block Grants to Madrasah – Stage 2 |
| Consolidated Audit Report 2013: Draft Report |
| **SSQ** |
| Evaluability Assessment 2013 |
| M&E Plan 2014 |
| ME014 Component 1 The 2012 Construction Cycle Final Evaluation Report |
| ME015 Component 1 The 2013 Construction Cycle Evaluation Report |
| ME016 Component 2 The New School Induction Program Evaluation Report |
| SSQ Mid-Year Progress Report 2014 |
| SSQ Annual Progress Report 2014 |
| Basic Education Access Planning (BEAP) Module – Implementation Report |
| Final Report - ProDEP Socialization and Eligible Entity Capacity Review and Training Needs Analysis 2014 |
| SSQ Annual Plan 2015 |

Annex V: EP Analytical Framework 2014

The EP Analytical Framework (AF) is designed to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the performance of the Education Partnership in line with the overarching development themes of the Governments of Indonesia and of Australia and with respect to internationally accepted criteria laid down by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.

The AF allows POM to formulate their assessment of the performance of the EP when considering a broad range of quantitative and qualitative performance material and both written and oral information. The framework is used to undertake a rigorous review of performance literature, to identify pertinent lines of enquiry for stakeholder interviews, and to guide the narrative of the Annual Partnership Performance Report (APPR) itself.

The September 2014 version of the Analytical Framework is a revision of that submitted by POM to DFAT as part of the *Education Partnership – Performance Management System* in June 2012. The Analytical Framework was also revised in preparation for the 2013 APPR process in October 2013.

For this iteration of the AF, headline changes include:

* The sections are restructured so that they align to the flow of the 2013 APPR and the expected flow of the 2014 APPR.
* Detailed “lines of enquiry” are included, so that POM can better ‘bridge’ headline questions and the actual performance picture.
* Judgement criteria are included for those sections concerned with the DAC criteria so as to ensure consistency in understanding, application and scoring.

The changes should facilitate a more efficient report production process, allow greater and more rigorous routine analysis of performance information throughout the year and help POM to do justice to the breadth of change resulting from the EP.

It should be noted that the POM does not seek to answer each and every “line of enquiry” in the framework. The lines of enquiry are structured as prompts to encourage a rounded appreciation of performance set against the DAC criteria and associated headline questions. It is recognised that there is significant variation in the quantity and quality of accumulated evidence and it is acknowledged that there may be contestability of issues and findings. It is expected, however, that the depth of enquiry laid out in the framework and the associated review process will facilitate sound professional judgement.

The content of the AF is aligned with and/or draws upon key documents and standards, including the OECD-DAC criteria and DFAT M&E Standards. Some lines of enquiry stem from other POM frameworks, including those associated with the evaluation concept notes and the 2013 Annual Sector Monitoring Report. Lessons learned about the application of the revised AF will be captured in 2015 and may result in further revisions to the framework in 2015.

**EP Analytical Framework**

| **Section 1: Context and Headline Results** | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1.1** | **Context** | | | Key sectoral changes from June 2011 to date, particularly in the last calendar year |
| **Headline questions** | | | * Have there been notable changes to the sectoral context, particularly in the last 12 months? | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | | | * What progress is the sector (and its sub-sectors) making in relation to EP goals? * Are there any differences at a national versus a sub-national level? * Have there been any key shifts in GoI and GoA policy and strategy? | |
| **1.2** | **Results** | | | Planned and actual results |
| **Headline questions** | | | * What anticipated results have been realized to date at output, EOCO and EOPO level? * What anticipated results did we expect to realize at output, EOCO and EOPO level by this time? * What anticipated results do we expect to see at output, EOCO and EOPO level by the end of the EP? * What anticipated results do we expect to see at output, EOCO and EOPO level beyond the lifetime of the EP? * Is there clarity and consensus about anticipated results? | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | | | Actual results to date | * What has been achieved to date at output, EOCO and EOPO level? |
| Expected results to date | * Is the rate of progress in line with expectation? * Was there any significant under or over-achievement against the milestones? * Were the variations to the scope or scale of achievement foreseen and/or should they have been? |
| Projected results to end of EP | * Is the projected rate of progress satisfactory, i.e. is the EP on track to achieve the results and on time? |
| Projected results beyond EP | * What results are expected and by when? |
| **1.3** | **Additional change** | | | Unanticipated changes/results |
| **Headline questions** | | * Is there evidence of unanticipated changes/results arising from the EP investment? | | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | | * Have any unanticipated but positive/negative changes/results emerged? * Do we know the extent to which the EP can claim attribution or contribution to those changes/results? * Is there any evidence of additional or reduced financing being made available to EP-supported initiatives by partners other than DFAT and, if so, do we know the extent to which the changes can be attributed to the EP? * Is there evidence of the EP leveraging in additional resources (financial or in-kind) to help undertake, sustain (adopt or adapt) and/or take to scale the EP interventions? | | |

| **Section 2: Performance against the DAC criteria** | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2.1** | **Relevance** | The extent to which the investment is suited to program goals and objectives and the policies and priorities of the GoI and GoA | |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent are EP interventions appropriate to the Indonesian education sector? (External) * To what extent are the EP interventions in line with Australian development policy and priorities? (External) * To what extent are the activities and outputs consistent with the attainment of EOCOs and EOPOs and goals? (Internal) | | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | External | * What issues are being addressed by EP interventions, and how critical are these issues to the sector? * When considered from a sector perspective, to what extent are the objectives of the EP still valid? * Are the interventions in line with Australia’s development policy and priorities? * What are the ‘headwinds’ and ‘tailwinds’ in the political-institutional environment and to what extent may these affect program relevance? * To what extent are the interventions and objectives of comparatively high political importance to GoI? * To what extent are the investments well suited to the expressed priorities and needs of target beneficiaries? * Are there new or emerging opportunities in the sector context which could be (better) exploited? | |
| Internal | * Should the EP re-assess program objectives and activities in light of the progress being made against PMF targets and any key changes in the sectoral context? * Do the components inform and strengthen each other so as to better address identified problems and contribute to the goals of the EP? * Are the program assumptions, are they credible and realistic? | |
| **Indicative judgement criteria** | Headline | * The extent to which the investment is in line with Indonesian education policies and political priorities (External) * The extent to which the investment is in line with Australian development priorities (External) * The extent to which the EP activities are fit for purpose with respect to the achievement of the goals, EOPOs and EOCOs (Internal) | |
| Additional considerations | * The degree to which policies and priorities have evolved since program design/commencement * The timing and magnitude of any changes to the political and institutional environment within which the EP operates * Appreciation of the reasons why investment choices were made (e.g. at the expense of others and in recognition that the EP was only ever intended to be a partial response to identified problems) | |
| **2.2** | **Efficiency** | A measure of how economically (in relation to time and cost) inputs are converted to outputs (and EOCOs) | |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent are the output- and EOCO-level milestones being achieved on time? And in accordance with agreed budget envelopes? * Could the same quality and quantity of deliverables and the same level of change/results have been achieved with less investment? | | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | * Is there evidence to suggest that the same resources could have generated more results or achieved greater change? * Are the costs associated with particular administrative and management tasks disproportionate when considered against their perceived/actual benefit? * To what extent have any risks associated with milestone attainment been effectively mitigated and managed by both implementing and institutional partners? | | |
| **Indicative judgement criteria** | Headline | * The extent to which output- and EOCO-level milestones are being delivered on time, i.e. from program commencement to date and, secondly, within the year in question * The extent to which output- and EOCO-level milestones are being delivered on budget | |
| Additional considerations | * Recognition of any unpredictable events that had significant bearing on the attainment of output-level milestones. * Recognition that the milestones and targets encapsulated in the PMF are maximums; maximums that, in some components (e.g. C1), cannot be exceeded. As such, satisfactory scores may be permissible where extenuating circumstances exist (e.g. where there is evidence that informed decisions have been taken to prioritise quality and sustainability over short-term quantifiable results). * Recognition of defensible circumstances in which inputs were deployed to pursue strategic results that were not initially planned, i.e. where the component has sought to respond opportunistically and in ways that were consistent with or supportive of the high-level aspirations at Goal and EOPO level. | |
| **2.3** | **Effectiveness** | The extent to which an investment attains its end-of-partnership targets | |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent and how has JSE enrolment in public schools increased in EP targeted districts? * To what extent and how have EP-funded professional development initiatives improved the management of schools and Madrasah? * To what extent and how has EP-funded support improved the quality of madrasah service provision? * To what extent is systemic change occurring within C3’s targeted districts (and elsewhere, and what is the EP’s contribution to the same? * To what extent and how is ACDP evidence that relates to the EP incorporated in relevant education sector policies, regulations plans and budgets? * To what extent has the EP delivered or contributed to unforeseen results that could be deemed to be on a par with EOCOs and EOPOs? * Is there evidence that the EP has generated unforeseen costs and are they deemed to be at an acceptable or unacceptable level? | | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | General | * To what extent is there clarity and consensus about the expected nature, quality and extent of program results at EOCO and EOPO level? * Is there evidence that the EP theory of change is working in practice? * Are key assumptions holding true (validity)? * What factors have enabled/inhibited success? * Have any constraints been identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the institutional and implementing partners and what, if anything, can be done to mitigate/manage/address key constraints? * What is the strongest evidence that attests to the effect (and scale and quality) of the component/program? | |
| C1 | * Does C1 activity affect JSE enrolment rates? * Does C1 activity affect the number of years of JSE completed? * Does C1 activity affect JSE completion rates? * Does C1 activity affect transition rates from primary to JSE, and JSE to senior secondary? | |
| C2 | * What is the increase in the prevalence of effective school management practices in participating schools and Madrasah? * What is the degree to which effective school management practices have improved in participating schools and Madrasah? * How did the school management practices of participating schools and Madrasah improve as a result of EP-funded support? * How do external factors and conditions affect school management practices in participating schools and Madrasah? | |
| C3 | * What is the increase in the prevalence of quality education services of targeted madrasah? * What is the degree to which the quality of education services in targeted and participating madrasah improved? * How did the quality of education services in targeted and participating madrasah improve as a result of EP-funded support? * What is the effect of external factors and conditions on the quality of education services in the targeted and participating madrasah? * Is there evidence of key stakeholders adopting and adapting C3 outputs, tools and approaches? | |
| C4 | * What were the targeted/ expected changes in education sector policies, regulations, plans and budgets? * Have similar changes occurred? * What contributed to the changes? * What influence did ACDP have on those changes? * What influence did ACDP evidence play in that contribution? | |
| **Indicative judgement criteria** | Headline | * The extent to which EOPO-level milestones are being delivered on time * Degree of confidence that the EOPO target will be delivered by the end of the partnership | |
| Additional considerations | * Degree of confidence that the EOPO targets will be delivered within 6-12 months of partnership end * Recognition of the nature, quality and magnitude of unforeseen results and benefits where these have ‘standing’ at EOCO and EOPO level * Nature and extent of any unforeseen costs associated with the attainment of EOPO-level milestone and targets (i.e. displacement considerations) | |
| **2.4** | **Impact** | The overall *long-term effect* produced by an investment. This includes positive and negative changes produced by a development investment (directly or indirectly, intended or unintended). | |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to student participation in JSE? (Goal 1) * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to the improvement of the quality of education in public and private schools? (Goal 2) * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to increased use of evidence for education sector decision making? (Goal 3) | | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | General | * Is there evidence to suggest that the EP/Components are likely to make a demonstrable contribution to intended Goals? * What long-term impact will the investment likely deliver? * Are there any factors which may impinge on the realisation of impact or quality, reach and coverage of the program deliverables? * Which risks show the greatest likelihood of preventing, impeding or delaying the achievement, quality and/or timeliness of the intended Goals? * What opportunities exist to enhance the extent, quality and timeliness of Goal-level change? * Has the severity and/or probability of the risks changed over the last 12 months? * What corrective mechanisms are required to improve manage/mitigate the risks or to reduce the consequences if/when they occur? | |
| Goal 1 | * Is there evidence of increased JSE school participation? * Is there evidence that EP interventions are contributing to increased student participation in schooling? * Is there evidence that EP interventions are influencing motivation and incentives for student participation? * Is there evidence that EP interventions have improved opportunities for students to participate in JSE? | |
| Goal 2 | * Is there evidence of improved quality in public and private schools? * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to education quality improvement? * To what extent have any improvements to the competencies of Principals and Supervisors contributed to the quality improvements? | |
| Goal 3 | * Is there evidence that ACDP-derived evidence, feedback and advice is being acted upon? * To what extent can we point to increased use of evidence for education sector decision making? * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to increased use of evidence for education sector decision making? | |
| **Indicative judgement criteria** | Headline | * Degree of confidence that the EOPOs, if/when achieved, will make a demonstrable contribution to Goal-level change. | |
| Additional considerations | * Evidence that points to the probability of Goal-level change within 3 years of EP end. * Recognition of any negative effects and consideration of the overall ‘net change’ (positive, negative) to the practices and behaviours of beneficiaries and the broader system * The nature, quality and magnitude of the likely impacts (planned, unplanned) | |
| **2.5** | **Sustainability** | The extent to which the benefits are likely to continue after DFAT funding to the EP has been withdrawn | |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent will the key benefits be sustained once GoA’s investment ceases? * Is there evidence of partners adopting, adapting, taking to scale and financing the outputs, approaches, tools, etc. implemented in the EP? * Do beneficiaries have sufficient ownership, capacity and resources to maintain the benefits after GoA funding has ceased? | | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | Aspirations | | * Is there clarity and consensus about what the sustained benefits are expected to be? * What investments and activities would partners (MoEC, SNIPs…) like to continue beyond the EP? * What needs to happen for this ambition to be realised? * What are the major factors influencing sustainability? * Are there any items that are clearly not sustainable? Were they intended to be and, if so, what lessons can be learned? * Has the sustainability of key EP benefits been sufficiently planned for in the design and implementation of the components? * Has the phase out of EP interventions been prepared and communicated appropriately? |
| Readiness (including ability and willingness) | | * Is there clarity and consensus about who will do what and who will pay for what? * Is there clarity about related costs? * Can partners point to examples of adoption and adaptation? * To what extent are institutions and systems well placed to continually adapt the benefits in ways that are appropriate and proportional to changing context and needs? * Are there areas that require additional strengthening or support? Are they foreseen within the EP or by an identified stakeholder? |
| Risks and opportunities | | * Are there any ‘stop-go barriers’ to adoption and adaptation (e.g. in terms of necessary regulatory change, in terms of financing commitments, structural changes, capacity, products and processes such as manuals…)? * Are there new or evolving contextual factors that may affect the sustainability of EP investments? * What corrective mechanisms are required to improve manage/mitigate the risks for sustainability or to reduce the consequences if/when they occur? * Are there new or emerging opportunities in the sector context which may be exploited to contribute to EP success? How should these opportunities be grasped and by whom? What benefit might this have for the EP? Are the factors clear? * What are the implications for DFAT’s current commitments should there be significant risk of unsustainability? |
| **Indicative judgement criteria** | Headline | | * The extent to which the appropriate stakeholders have expressed meaningful commitment towards sustaining the benefits (with written, financing commitments surpassing verbal commitment). * There being clear evidence of adoption and adaptation (and the scale of the same) |
| Additional considerations | | * The extent of clarity about actual costs and necessary building blocks (e.g. any regulatory change) * The extent of clarity about who will do what and who will pay for what after the conclusion of DFAT funding (or current financial commitments in the case of non-DFAT funding) * The ‘readiness’ of identified stakeholders to assume responsibility and their willingness and ability to meet obligations * The existence or otherwise of any ‘killer risks’ |

| **Section 3: Cross-cutting issues** | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **3.1** | **Beneficiaries** | | * The immediate beneficiaries of EP investment, e.g. the eligible entities in C2, the SNIPs in C3, and those making requests of ACDP in C4. * The intermediate beneficiaries, e.g. the principals and supervisors securing PD (C2) and the madrasah receiving support from the SNIPs in C3. * The ultimate beneficiaries, i.e. the students. |
| **Headline questions** | * How have EP interventions affected different beneficiaries? * Who has received the benefits and is that in line with GoA policies, strategies and/or guidelines? * Do targeting measures exist and, if so, are these applied and have they been successful? * Are there alternative views, especially as these views concern important, controversial or disappointing findings? | | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | Social Inclusion | * Who are the direct and indirect beneficiaries of EP interventions? * What are the expected and unexpected impacts on those beneficiaries? * To what extent are the EP interventions still relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries? * Does the EP purposefully reach identified “special groups”, and provide the opportunities for equitable participation? * Does the EP enable “special groups” to enjoy program benefits in an equitable manner with others in that community or population? * Does the EP address any particular needs that “special groups” may have that may not be shared by the wider population? | |
| Gender | * To what extent do the interventions promote the equitable participation of, and benefits for, women and men? * To what extent has the EP promoted gender equality in the Indonesian education sector? * To what extent are EP interventions addressing particular gender gaps in the education sector in Indonesia? * Has the delivery of EP interventions been sufficiently gender appropriate? * Are EP interventions facilitating increased women’s empowerment and voice in decision-making and leadership? | |
| Disability | * To what extent has the EP promoted disability-inclusive education in Indonesia? * Are EP interventions sufficiently enabling people with disability to access the same opportunities for participation, contribution and decision making in the Indonesian education sector? | |
| **Indicative judgement criteria** | Headline | * The extent to which benefits are distributed in line with expectations * The probability of benefits being realised by the ultimate beneficiaries (i.e. extending beyond capture by immediate and intermediates beneficiaries) | |
| Additional considerations | * The degree to which policies and priorities have evolved since program design/commencement * The extent to which investments were designed and implemented to address the priorities identified in agreed broad social inclusion frameworks/strategies * The extent to which investments were designed and implemented with the principles of specific disability-inclusive development in mind * The extent to which investments were designed and implemented in a specific gender-sensitive way | |
| **3.2** | **Delivery arrangements** | The ways in which the investment is delivered | |
| **Headline questions** | * Have the most appropriate implementation arrangements, modalities and/or delivery mechanisms been utilised to maximise results? | | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | * Is the blend – the combination – of current modalities the most appropriate way to manage risk and to deliver intended results? * Is there evidence to suggest that the current arrangements may enable or impede program impact and sustainability? * Is there added value of working through GoI systems? Are there advantages or disadvantages? | | |
| **Indicative judgement criteria** | Headline | * The likelihood of anticipated results being achieved on time and within budget as a consequence of the current arrangements * The likelihood of key risks being mitigated or managed as a consequence of the current arrangements * The likelihood of there being sustained benefits as a consequence of the current arrangements | |
| Additional considerations | * The existence of realistic alternatives, not least at the time of design and commencement | |
| **3.3** | **Management and governance** | The formal and informal arrangements and processes by which the EP is managed and governed by the partnership. | |
| **Headline questions** | * Is there evidence that governance and management arrangements are effective? * Is there evidence to suggest that the program is managed and governed in the spirit of the “partnership”? * Are there alternative views, especially as they concern important, controversial or disappointing findings? | | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | Governance | * Are the responsibilities of key partners being fully and effectively discharged? * Are the GoG and ToG structures operational and effective? * Is there evidence to suggest that the GoG and ToG structures deliver their mandates? * Is the optimal balance between transactional and transformational engagement being realised within the governance arrangements? * To what extent have key partners coordinated their activities with other stakeholders and will this have benefit for the attainment of the EOPOs and Goals? (Coordinated-related question) * To what extent has the program complemented and contributed to the work of other stakeholders within and beyond the EP? (Complementarity-focused question) | |
| Management | * Are the EP management arrangements sufficiently supportive of effective and responsive program delivery? * Do the management arrangements provide effective feedback loops regarding program performance? * Are key decisions taken in a consultative and timely fashion? * Are there alternative views, especially as they concern important, controversial or disappointing findings * How does the program effectively mitigate key risks associated with the investments? How well do key stakeholders think it does so? * What corrective mechanisms are required to improve manage/mitigate the risks or to reduce the consequences if/when they occur? | |
| Other | * Are lessons about the objectives, design and delivery of the program being learned and shared effectively? What expectations exist? * Is there evidence of DFAT, GoI and partners applying lessons learnt (e.g. for the benefit of the current investment)? | |
| **Indicative judgement criteria** | * The extent to which the GoG and ToG structures discharge their mandates in an effective and timely manner * The extent to which the EP Managers discharge their mandates in an effective and timely manner * The extent to which there is an appropriate balance between transactional and transformational/strategic engagement between key partners * The extent to which risks (e.g. to results, sustainability, continued relevance) are identified, mitigated and/or managed in an appropriate and timely manner * The extent to which performance information is used to influence the trajectory and quality of the current investment * Evidence of the EP contributing to existing programs (Complementarity) * Evidence that the EP does not duplicate existing work (Complementarity) | | |
| **3.4** | **Value for Money** | | Ensuring the best results possible are obtained from the money spent |
| **Headline questions** | * Has the holistic and long-term value of the EP been adequately articulated? * How much has been spent to achieve the results described? * Is there evidence to suggest that the EP (and its individual components) offers Value for Money? | | |
| **Lines of enquiry** | Value | | * What wider benefits/changes – the positive and negative externalities – are seen * What are the forecasted net economic benefits of specific investments? * For how long will benefits be derived, to what degree and in what scenarios? * Are the deliverables of high quality and are they considered as being of high quality by beneficiaries? * Is there evidence of government and non-government commitment to sustain and/or scale-up support after the closure of EP support? |
| Actual and expected spend | | * What are the opportunity costs for program participation and do those affected feel these costs are acceptable? * What have been the anticipated and unforeseen costs that have contributed to the value of the EP? * How do the actuals compare with expectation? * How do the actuals compare with any valid comparison (e.g. year-on-year or cycle-to-cycle or phase-to-phase, old programs, GoI programs)? |
| **Indicative judgement criteria** | * The likelihood that the EOCOs and EOPOs will be achieved by 2016 * The extent of additional benefits, and their nature and potential/actual magnitude * The duration of the ‘benefit period’ * The probability of there being sustained benefit * The probability of there being systemic change * Recognised trade-offs between economy, efficiency and effectiveness. * Confidence levels about data quality and coverage | | |

Annex VI: List of Persons Consulted

| **Name** | **Title** | **Date of Consultation** | **POM Staff Present\*** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Niken Wardhani | Program Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT | 22/10 | **SM**, PK, IV |
| Joanne Dowling | Unit Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT | 22/10 | **SM**, PK, IV |
| Karen Taylor | Operations Manager, EPOS | 22/10 | **SM** |
| Suluh Adiwibowo | Senior Infrastructure Adviser, SSQ | 22/10 | **IV**, PK |
| Meliana Istanto | Site Selection Coordinator, SSQ | 22/10 | **IV**, PK |
| Jihad Saad | Component 1 Manager, School Construction, SSQ | 22/10 & 24/10 | **SM**, IV |
| Aziz Purwanto | Head of Infrastructure Section, Directorate of JSE Management, MoEC | 23/10 | **PK,** MS |
| Dedi Karyana | Head of Facilities Section, Directorate of JSE Management, MoEC | 23/10 | **PK**, MS |
| Bia Puspita | Program Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT | 23/10 | **NI** |
| Julia Wheeler | Senior Program Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT | 23/10 | **SM** |
| Dewi Sudharta | Program Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT | 23/10 | **SM** |
| Aryanti Savitri | Senior Program Manager, Basic Education Unit, Development Cooperation, DFAT | 24/10 | **PK** |
| Sri Novelma | Program Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT | 24/10 | **PK**, SM |
| Yudi Herman | Sub Section for Evaluation, Technical and Functional Non Educator Staff Development Section, Center for Education Personnel Development, MoEC | 27/10 | **PK**, NI |
| Fiona Kotvojs | Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser, SSQ | 27/10 | **NC** |
| Bambang Indriyanto | Director of Center for Policy Research, MoEC | 28/10 | **SM** |
| Peter Marien | Attaché – Programme Manager, Education and Public Financial Management, European Union | 28/10 | **NC,** SM |
| Taufik Hanafi | Minister Expert Staff, MoEC | 28/10 | **IV,** NI |
| Abdul Munir | Component 3 Manager, Madrasah Accreditation, SSQ | 28/10 | **NI**, IV |
| Nurkholis Setiawan | Director of Madrasah Education, MoRA | 29/10 | **NI**, IV |
| Sarah Leslie | Senior Program Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT | 29/10 | **NC**, SM |
| Muljani Nurhadi | National Adviser, ACDP | 29/10 | **SM** |
| A. Syafi'i | Head of Education and Education Personnel Sub Directorate, Madrasah Education Directorate, MoRA | 29/10 | **IV** |
| Jenny Donohoe | First Secretary, Development Cooperation, DFAT | 29/10 | **NC** |
| Graham Dawson | Component 2 Manager, Education Quality, SSQ | 30/10 | **NC,** PK |
| Yaya Kardiawarman | Senior Professional Development Advisor, SSQ | 30/10 | **NC,** PK |
| Alison Atwell | International Adviser Provincial and District Development, SSQ | 30/10 | **NC,** PK |
| John Virtue | Education Sector Governance & Capacity Development Advisor, ACDP | 30/10 | **SM**, NI |
| Alan Prouty | Operational Management Specialist, ACDP | 30/10 | **SM**, NI |
| David Harding | Senior Education Advisor, ACDP | 30/10 | **SM**, NI |
| Basilius Bengoteku | Education Sector Research and Capacity Planning Advisor, ACDP | 30/10 | **SM**, NI |
| Abdul Malik | Education Sector Research, Information & Accountability Advisor, ACDP | 30/10 | **SM**, NI |
| Rob Kingham | Islamic Education Specialist, SSQ | 31/10 | **NI** |
| Sam Muller | Operations Manager, SSQ | 31/10 | **NC**, SM |
| Jerry Strudwick | Lead Education Specialist, DFAT | 31/10 | **NC**, SM |
| Hannah Birdsey | Counsellor, Education and Scholarships, DFAT | 31/10 | **NC**, SM |
| Subandi Sardjoko | Director of Education, Ministry of National Development Planning | 03/11 | **SM**, NC |
| Rohmat Mulyana | Head of Institutional Sub Directorate, Madrasah Education Directorate, MoRA | 03/11 | **NI**, IV |
| Nurul Islam | Head of Madrasah Supervision, Education and Education Personnel Sub Directorate, Madrasah Education Directorate, MoRA | 03/11 | **PK** |
| Dadang Sudiyarto | Secretary of Research and Development Agency, MoEC | 07/11 | **SM,** PK |
| Murray O’Hanlon | First Secretary, Development Cooperation, DFAT | 07/11 | **NC** |
| Achmad Zufar | Consultant at Directorate of Junior Secondary Education Management, MoEC | 11/11, 12/11 & 13/11 | **IV,** NC, PK |
| Susetyo Widiasmoro | Head of Sub-directorate for Infrastructure and Facilities, Directorate of Junior Secondary Education Development, MoEC | 12/11 & 13/11 | **IV,** NC, PK |
| Didik Suhardi | Director of Junior Secondary Education Management, MoEC | 13/11 | **NC,** IV, PK |
| Abi Sujak | Secretary of Board of Education and Culture Human Resources Development & Education Quality Assurance, MoEC | 17/11 | **NC,** PK |
| Muhammad Hatta | Head of Center for Education Personnel Development , MoEC | 21/11 | **NC,** PK |
| Komarrudin Amin | Director General of Islamic Education, MoRA | Meetings scheduled\*\* | **NI,** IV |
| Nina Sardjunani | Deputy of Human Resource and Culture, Ministry of National Development Planning | Meetings scheduled\*\* | **NC,** SM, PK |
| Sutarum Wiryono | Senior Project Officer (Education), Asian Development Bank | Feedback Session\*\*\* | All |

\* POM Staff: NC = Nick Clinch; IV = Ingga Vistara; SM = Simon Milligan; PK = Paskal Kleden; NI = Nelson Ireland; MS = Maulyati Slamet (POM staff identified in bold led the interview.

\*\* Meetings were scheduled with these key informants but, for reasons beyond control, the consultations did not take place.

\*\*\* Pak Sutarum was invited to the APPR Feedback session on 25th November but was unable to attend.

Annex VII: ECBP M&E Standards: Standard 3: Initiative Progress Reporting

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No** | **Feature of Progress Report** | **EP-APPR Compliance** |
| 3.1 | There is an executive summary that communicates the key information required for QAI reporting | See Executive Summary. |
| 3.2 | The relevant aspects of the context are adequately described | Each component section and the program oversight section have an individual section on Context. |
| 3.3 | There is a reflection on the continuing relevance of the expected end-of-program outcomes | Each component section has an individual section on Relevance. |
| 3.4 | An assessment of the adequacy of progress toward sustained end-of-program outcomes is described | Assessment of progress against DAC criteria are scored for each component. Specifically, sections on Effectiveness consider adequacy of progress towards EOPOs. |
| 3.5 | The quality, reach and coverage of key outputs or deliverables for the reporting period are described | Achievements are listed for each component. |
| 3.6 | The adequacy of progress implementing the annual plan is described | n/a (implementing partners provide reporting against annual plans). |
| 3.7 | A reflection on the adequacy of planned inputs to meet the expected end-of-program outcomes is provided | Assessment of progress against DAC criteria are scored for each component. Specifically, sections on Efficiency consider adequacy of planned inputs to meet EOPOs. |
| 3.8 | The adequacy of progress against the budget is assessed | Adequacy of EP progress against budget is considered in Program Oversight, Section 6.2. |
| 3.9 | The efficiency and effectiveness of key management or implementation system is assessed or demonstrated | Each component section has an individual section on Efficiency and Effectiveness. In addition Management and Governance of the EP are considered under Program Oversight, Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 respectively. |
| 3.10 | The report achieves a fair balance between reporting of positive or negative issues or achievements | The report is prepared in an independent manner and focuses on both positive and negative aspects of performance. |
| 3.11 | The report provides credible evidence of claims made | Considerable evidence is presented and referenced to justify claims |
| 3.12 | Important lessons are summarised | Findings and associated recommendations are summarised in each section and in the Executive Summary. |

**F:\WORK\EPOS\REPORT & STATIONARY\emf\Red stripe.emfAustralia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia**

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1. The original budget for the Education Partnership was AUD 500m. A minute was signed by the Director General of AusAID on 23 April 2013, increasing the value of the EP from AUD 500m to AUD 524m. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. As at end of December 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Email from DFAT Subject: Official wording: new school building targets, 8 December, 2014 [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
4. AusAID. Draft. The Education Partnership Theory of Change. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
5. Districts with low junior secondary enrolment were initially defined as districts with a JSE-GER of <90%. This was subsequently revised in 2013 to <95%. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
6. An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, Schedule 1. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
7. An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, Schedule 1. AusAID Agreement No. 60472.. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
8. i.e. a change in practice and/or relationships which create better performance, e.g. in terms of the services received by end users. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
9. An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, Schedule 1. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
10. An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, Schedule 1. AusAID Agreement No. 60472.. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
11. An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, Schedule 1. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
12. Email from DFAT Subject: Official wording: new school building targets, 8 December, 2014 [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
13. The number of classrooms is obtained by multiplying the number of USB by 6, and by multiplying the number of SATAP by 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
14. The number of additional student places is calculated by multiplying the number of classrooms by 36 (Minimum Service Standards). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
15. SSQ. Annual Progress Report 2014, p.3, [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
16. According to MoEC 2013 statistics, this represents 13% of the number of existing SMP schools. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
17. SSQ. Annual Progress Report 2014, p.19. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
18. The selection process has continuously been strengthened cycle-on-cycle. This means Cycle 3 selection process is much more stringent than Cycles 1 and 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
19. POM (2014). Consolidated Audit Report 2013 (submitted to DFAT 29 October 2014), pp. 5-7, 10-11. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
20. Based on information collected from 227 out of 409 new principals in receipt of NSIP training in Cycle 1 schools. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
21. SSQ. Mid Year Progress Report 2014, p.4. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
22. While the data is released in 2014, the data collected from these principals are for academic year 2013/2014 which made it fit for the 2013 PMF milestone being evaluated at the end of 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
23. This is made possible by utilising existing SD facilities to house SM classes. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
24. New enrollees are defined as prospective students who would not attend JSE schooling if the EP school was not constructed. The decision not to attend JSE schooling was for various reasons (e.g. no accessible JSE schooling, insufficient funding for transport costs, etc.). These new enrollees will have a direct effect on GER. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
25. Transferees are defined as prospective students who would attend JSE schooling even if EP schools had not been constructed, albeit attending existing JSE schooling would be more expensive. These students will not directly increase GER of the districts. Nevertheless these students may result in improved GER as they would be less likely to drop-out from school. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
26. The POM evaluation (whose results will be known in 2015) will only provide information on the additionally of enrolment (i.e. new enrollees figures) for schools constructed under Cycle 1, i.e. before major improvements in site selection process took place. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
27. SSQ, ME015 Component 1 The 2013 Construction Cycle Evaluation Report, p.31 [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
28. Alexander and Lloyd Group (2014). Independent Monitoring of School Construction Technical Evaluation Mission 27 October-10 November 2014. Back to Office Report (Final), Annex 3, Conclusions. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
29. The Ministry of Public Works decree (PermenPU No. 45 2007) regulates that government owned buildings must have a lifespan of 50 years. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
30. It must be noted that NSIP data reflect the 2013/2014 academic year, while the DAPODIK data reflect the 2014/2015 academic year. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
31. Curriculum 2013 or the previous KTSP curriculum consists of approximately 10 subjects. Each subject requires four hours per week from the teacher for every class, with a maximum of six classes (for USB). This results in a maximum of 24 hours per week for every subject teacher. Thus every school ideally requires only 10 subject teachers, with additional teachers for additional religious subjects (beyond Islamic education) and the principal. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
32. SSQ, Annual Progress Report 2014, p. 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
33. C1 schools in this analysis comprise Cycle 1 and Cycle 2 schools that are identifiable on the DAPODIK website. Out of 767 schools, only 612 are identifiable on the website. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
34. The Ministry of Public Works decree (PermenPU No. 45 2007) only regulates Construction Management Consultants. The same Ministry of Public Works decree also limits the budget allocated for monitoring purposes to 1.5% - 6% of the construction budget. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
35. Interview with MoEC officials, 13 November 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
36. DFAT. EP Program Logic, 26 May 2014 [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
37. SSQ. Annual Progress Report 2013, p.22. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
38. Grant Agreement Deed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program. AusAID Agreement No. 64705, p. 4. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
39. The 2014 budget managed by SSQ Component 2 consists of AUD 1,899,763 for NSIP and AUD 2,348,983 for ProDEP. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
40. SSQ. Annual Plan 2014, pp.47-57 [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
41. SSQ / Pusbangtendik, Sosialisasi Program Hibah, Professional Development for Education Personnel (ProDEP), power point presentation, Jakarta March – April 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
42. SSQ The New School Induction Program (NSIP) Evaluation Report, June 2014, p. 12 [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
43. SSQ. Mid-Year Progress Report 2014, p.17. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
44. Program for International Student Assessment. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
45. The Minister of Culture and Primary and Secondary Education stated that the roll-out of Curriculum 2013 is currently on hold and schools are advised to revert to the 2006 curriculum (KTSP). Curriculum 2013 will only be implemented in those 6,221 schools that have implemented the curriculum in the past three semesters. See <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/12/07/anies-nixes-much-maligned-2013-curriculum.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
46. ACDP, ‘Pendidikan Indonesia Gawat Darurat’, *Republika*, 2 December 2014, p.5. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
47. ACDP, ‘Madrasah Kian Diminati’, *Republika*, 18 November 2014, p.22. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
48. Anecdotal evidence indicates that this might only happen in 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
49. DFAT. Weekly Update 4 July 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
50. SSQ, Annual Progress Report 2014, pp.12-14 [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
51. SSQ. Mid Year Progress Report 2014, p.17. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
52. SSQ. Weekly Update 12 March 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
53. Discussion with MOEC official, 28 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
54. The indicators comprise: 1) Percentage of principals who work according to standards; 2) Percentage of supervisors with increased competencies and professionalism; 3) Percentage of principals with increased competencies and professionalism. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
55. The Jakarta Post, ‘Anies highlights teachers role in mental revolution’, 24 November 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
56. SSQ, New School Induction Program (NSIP), Evaluation Report, June 2014, p. vi. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
57. Persons trained under NSIP include supervisors, principals, teachers, treasurers and school committees, (see NSIP Evaluation Report, 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
58. SSQ, New School Induction Program (NSIP), Evaluation Report, June 2014, p. vi. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
59. SSQ, Mid-Year Progress Report 2014, p.14. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
60. SSQ. Annual Progress Report 2014, p.52. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
61. Board of Development for Human Resource Education and Culture and Education Quality Assurance, *Circulation Letter Number 29479/J/LL/2014*, 27 November 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
62. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
63. Comment by Santi Savitri, APPR feedback discussion 05 January 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
64. SSQ, ProDEP Socialization and Eligible Entity Capacity Review and Training Needs Analysis 2014, Final Report, p.10. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
65. According to Component 2, the low number of participants in CPD is not because training is not on track, but because Eligible Entities have not entered the required data into the system. A reporting workshop is planned for 6-9 January 2015 during which time the numbers should be updated. It is probable that an updated number of CPD participants will be reported at the next SDTOG, scheduled to be in early 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
66. Minutes of the SDTOG Coordination Meeting, October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
67. DFAT, written feedback to the APPR, 30 January 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
68. Updated ProDEP data, provided by C2 on 30 January 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
69. Board of Development for Human Resource Education and Culture and Education Quality Assurance,

    *Rapat Koordinasi SDTOG 30 Oktober 2014*, handout, p.14. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
70. Email from Graham Dawson, 21 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
71. Email from Graham Dawson, 18 December 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
72. Email from Graham Dawson, 22 December 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
73. SSQ. Mid-Year Progress Report, 2014, p.20. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
74. The World Bank benchmark for courses demonstrating statistically significant learning is 80%. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
75. SSQ, New School Induction Program (NSIP), Evaluation Report, June 2014, p 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
76. SSQ, Annual Progress Report 2014, p. 20. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
77. As presented in the SDTOG on 13 February 2015, all Level One Uols were offered to participants with most participants taking the UoL on Curriculum and Academic Supervision. The UoL least taken by participants were Management of New Students and Financial Management. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
78. Interview with Muktiono Waspodo, 28 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
79. ACDP. School and Madrasah Principals and Supervisors Competencies Baseline Study 2013. p. 25. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
80. Email from Graham Dawson, 18 December 2014 [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
81. A large number of current supervisors are devoted to managing Islamic Studies. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
82. Numbers of students in the 2013/2014 school year at primary level: 29,973,015; junior secondary level: 12,891,887; senior secondary level: 9,830,287. The number includes students from special schools, Madrasah, and packages A, B and C. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
83. Enrolment data for school year 2013/2014, sourced from: <http://dapo.dikdas.kemdikbud.go.id/exreport/> [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
84. Interview with Yudi Herman, 27 October 2014; and with Abi Sujak, 17 November 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
85. Interview with Santi Savitri, 24 October 2014; and with Yaya Kardiawarman, 30 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
86. LPMPs’ core mandate is education quality assurance, and therefore the budget available to them to engage with district stakeholders to stimulate buy-in for ProDEP activities might be limited. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
87. SSQ, Annual Progress Report 2014, p.62. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
88. SSQ, ProDEP Socialization and Eligible Entity Capacity Review and Training Needs Analysis 2014, Version 2, August 2014, p.28. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
89. Email from Graham Dawson, 18 December 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
90. Minutes of the SDTOG Coordination Meeting, 30 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
91. DFAT written feedback provided on 30 January 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
92. POM (Research) proposed to look at district willingness and ability to pay for ProDEP, but was asked to postpone by both DFAT and SSQ to allow time for “demonstration effects” from ProDEP training to occur. Subject to DFAT agreement, the study is planned to be implemented in 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
93. POM. PMF Guidance Note, p.13. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
94. 10% at the primary level and 23% at the junior secondary level. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
95. MoRA. ‘*Profil Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam Tahun Anggaran* 2012/ 2013’. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
96. DFAT. Education Partnership Theory of Change 2013 Version 12, p 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
97. As reported in the SSQ Annual Report for 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
98. The 2014 SSQ Mid-Year Progress Report reported that “a number of factors contributed to this significant result, including extensive socialisation of accreditation, and the IDR 28 billion MoRA allocation to increase the quota for accreditation in 2013. The results have re-energised MoRA’s commitment to madrasah quality improvements.”The adoption and adaptation by MoRA of LAPIS systems and products, a regular budget allocation to support accreditation in MoRA’s Renstras (including funds to support BAN S/M to conduct accreditation madrasah), the 2013 Madrasah Registration regulation and the work of C3 in support of MoRA accreditation efforts are also viewed as significant contributors to the ongoing successful drive for the accreditation of madrasah. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
99. SSQ Mid-Year Report 2014, p. 22. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
100. The percentage of madrasah that remain unaccredited, however, may be an underestimation as the total number of madrasah remains unknown. Additionally, this number may not account for newly established madrasah, ‘pre-school’ madrasah (recognized as part of the formal system in 2014) or those madrasah whose previous accreditation has lapsed and thus require reaccreditation. The C3 supported accreditation database aims to provide MoRA with both registration and accreditation for all levels and types of madrasah. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
101. POM has been advised by C3 that MoRA has expressed their intention that at some point in the future only accredited madrasah will be eligible for support – noting that accreditation will serve as a minimum service standard for madrasah. This regulation, although not fully implemented, has been cited as one of the reasons madrasah, on their own initiative, are seeking to become accredited. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
102. The initial implementation of Component 3 included different institutions as SNIPs – universities, NGOs and Madrasah Development Centres – to test a variety of modalities to provide services to improve the quality of madrasah. On the request of MoRA, all contracted SNIPs on Phase 3 are Madrasah Development Centres. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
103. The target of 1500 madrasah was divided for implementation through three phases of support – Phase 1 – 565; Phase 2 – 519; Phase 3 - 416. The term ‘targeted’ refers to the madrasah that received Block Grants, training programs and technical assistance through mentors. Additional madrasah participated in training programs and received the technical assistance of mentors – these madrasah are referred to as ‘non-targeted’ by C3 and as ‘participating’ madrasah by EP-POM. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
104. The BAN S/M is the independent national agency for the accreditation of schools and madrasah. EP does not provide support to the BAN S/M. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
105. MoRA stated during the 2014 APPR presentation on C3 that accreditation, based on the NES, is the formal instrument used by government to measure the quality of madrasah. C3 is mandated to implement government policy by supporting and strengthening the accreditation program (EOPO 1). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
106. The madrasah supported by C3 include the 1,500 ‘targeted’ madrasah which received Block Grants, technical assistance and training. In addition, C3, through the work of the SNIPs, has extended its support to over 1,000 additional madrasah that receive SNIP support through the providing of technical assistance and training, but these madrasah are not provided Block Grants. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
107. In addition to mentors, there have been similar numbers of trainers prepared to deliver training programs. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
108. Three hundred madrasah were foreseen in SSQ’s Annual Progress Report for 2014 but this has since been reduced to 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
109. Confirmation of the number of 150 madrasah was made by a MoRA official during discussions at the 2014 APPR C3 presentation. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
110. One aspect of the C3 model is the mobilization and acquisition of funds from sources other than the BOS funds from the national government to support private madrasah. Primarily this is directed to obtaining funds from local government and other local sources. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
111. SSQ Annual Progress Report 2014, p.28. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
112. Initial findings of the pilot testing of the Systemic Change Mapping Framework (SCMF) – an attempt to ‘capture’ systemic change resulting from C3 support – revealed that there was limited utility in analysing available reports (i.e. SNIP reports) to analyse changes in sub-national systems to support madrasah quality. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
113. C3 and POM, as a result of the early findings of the SCMF pilot testing, are proposing a comparative research study of MDCs who have successfully implemented SNIP contracts and effected good results with respect to madrasah improvement. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
114. The SSQ Annual Progress Report for 2014 indicates that “MoRA’s Strategic Framework for Madrasah Accreditation continues to be the platform for EP support to systems strengthening.” [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
115. There is an indication from MoRA that the proposed 2015 budget may provide funds to again support BAN S/M in conducting accreditation for madrasah that are supported by C3 Phase 3 and the madrasah included in the MoRA upgrading and replication initiatives. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
116. SSQ technical assistance support to Phase 2 SNIPs was predominantly focused on management and finance. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
117. C3 is collecting information on the attainment of different levels of accreditation of the madrasah support through C3. Early indications are that there is little difference in the attainment of accreditation levels between Block Grant and non-Block Grant recipients. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
118. ADB. Madrasah Education Development Project Completion Report, 2014, p. 7 and p. 55. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
119. In defence of the uniform amount of Block Grants allocated, some have argued that if there is a differential Block Grant funding formula there would need to be very clear criteria and processes for determining allocations to avoid undue competition for funds between madrasah and potential influence on amounts to be allocated. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
120. Anecdotal evidence from discussions with C3 management indicates that some flexibility in the standard grant allocation of AUD 400,000 per SNIP (in particular for Phase 3) is being considered to allow for differential costs, primarily in relation to the costs of transportation to reach the more remote/isolated madrasah. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
121. SSQ. Evaluation of Component 3, Phase 1. ME011, p. 36. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
122. The EOPO 3 Midline Evaluation findings noted that some aspects of madrasah service provision demonstrated significant improvement, such as the quality of infrastructure, sanitation and availability of teaching and learning resources, but less evident in the quality of the teaching and learning process. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
123. SSQ Annual Progress Report 2014, p.23. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
124. SSQ Annual Progress Report 2014, p.23. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
125. The EOPO 3 baseline evaluation study indicated that Block Grants may inhibit support from madrasah stakeholders. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
126. The SSQ Annual Progress Report for 2014 indicates that “MoRA’s Strategic Framework for Madrasah Accreditation continues to be the platform for EP support to systems strengthening.” [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
127. POM has been provided with information that suggests some targeted districts and, even more so, the targeted provinces through the SNIPs, have adopted and are applying, to varying degrees, selected aspects of the C3 model of support for madrasah improvement. This situation requires further investigation by C3 and by POM. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
128. But is not sufficient in and of itself. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
129. The EOPO 3 evaluation study employs an alternative quality assessment framework of 33 indicators derived from an international survey and synthesis of findings on school effectiveness best practices. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
130. The SSQ evaluation of Phase 1 and the EOPO 3 mid-line evaluation study of Phase 2 reported greater than expected changes in non-targeted madrasah. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
131. C3 is in the process of collecting and collating information on the extent of contributions that are being made to madrasah that are coming from a range of sources other than from C3 support. This information will be provided by C3 in future reports. C3 has also advised that, based on the experiences of Phase 1 and 2 in securing external funding, the SSQ Annual Plan has proposed to include training on resource mobilization that will target the madrasah principal, supervisor, mentor, community, private sector and state enterprises. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
132. In some instances, the initial announcement that the madrasah had been selected for participation in the EP resulted in increased levels of support and attention from the community as well as increased enrolment – even prior to the implementation of any activity to improve the level of accreditation. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
133. C3 has advised that the SSQ 2015 Annual Plan has proposed to include leadership training that will target the madrasah principal, supervisors and mentors. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
134. UPPAM was established as a temporary ad hoc unit within the Directorate for Madrasah Education and functions that were within MoRA sub-directorates were taken on by UPPAM. The shift of UPPAM functions to sub-directorates is actually a return to the previous institutional modality – although it is a positive development for sustainability. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
135. Interview with MoRA official, October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
136. The 19 May 2014 version of the MoRA and DFAT Joint Concept Paper: A Strategy to Establish a Continuous Program of Madrasah Quality Improvement – The “Grand Design” states that the “Directorate of Madrasah Education will complete a “Grand Design for Improving Madrasah Quality” as a clear articulation of its quality agenda and to inform the upcoming Renstra.” The footnote to this statement advises that “*ideally, the GD will be annexed to the Renstra as a critical input*” (page 2). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
137. ACDP. Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid-2014, September 2014 (Revision), p.1. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
138. Education Sector – Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership Indonesia. Mid-term Review. [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
139. For example, ACDP 001: Early Childhood Development Strategy Study; ACDP 015: Mid-Term Review of the Education *Renstra*s; ACDP 020: Evaluation of International Standard Schools; ACDP 021: Overview of the Islamic Education Sector. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
140. For example, ACDP 034F: Paper on Higher Education Governance and Management and ACDP 034D: Paper on MSS and the Quality of the Learning Environment [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
141. For example, ACDP 037: Capacity Building for Evaluation of Education Policies, Strategies and Programs through Overseas Course and Workshop. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
142. For example, ACDP 013A: Support to Textbook Development. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
143. Each donor provides funding in their own currency and so the total funds available will depend on exchange rate variations. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
144. Email from John Virtue, 09 December 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
145. Including a range of different Directorate Generals, Directorates and units. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
146. ACDP. Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2014, September 2014 (Revision), p.26. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
147. ACDP. Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2014, September 2014 (Revision), p.33. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
148. Roundtable discussion with ACDP Secretariat, 31 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
149. *Rencana* *Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah* or local medium term development plan. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
150. ACDP. Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2014, September 2014 (Revision); roundtable discussion with ACDP Secretariat, 31 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
151. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/12/22/hopes-on-the-economic-upside-in-indonesia/#more-44642> (accessed 22 December 2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
152. Telephone conversation with John Virtue, 09 December 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
153. Education Sector – Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership Indonesia. Mid-term Review. Final Report. October 2014, p.8. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
154. Roundtable discussion with ACDP Secretariat, 31 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
155. To safeguard anonymity sources cannot be provided. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
156. Interview with GoI civil servant. [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
157. ACDP. Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2014, September 2014 (Revision), p.87. [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
158. Interview with Subandi Sardjoko, 03 November 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
159. Alan Prouty, Roundtable APPR discussion about POM’s draft findings of ACDP, 25 November 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
160. Roundtable discussion with ACDP Secretariat, 31 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
161. Minutes of the ATOG Meeting, 08 July 2014, paragraph 26 (David Harding), [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
162. Roundtable discussion with ACDP Secretariat, 31 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
163. From a PMF perspective, the challenges are further complicated by there being different degrees and types of utilization at the EOCO level, and there being different degrees of importance attached to different policies, regulations, plans and budgets at the EOPO level [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
164. ADB (May 2010). ADB Technical Assistance Report: Republic of Indonesia: Education Sector Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership, p.7. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
165. Note the associated concerns expressed in POM’s 2013 APPR. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
166. It is frequently noted by the Secretariat that ACDP’s demand-led response (and seemingly by implication, an associated emphasis on ‘informing’) is consistent with the Jakarta Commitment of 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
167. <http://kemdikbud.go.id/kemdikbud/sites/default/files/rkakl2014.pdf>. (accessed 03 January 2015) [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
168. Education Sector – Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership Indonesia. Mid-term Review. Final Report. October 2014, p.18. [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
169. Infrastructure Technical Oversight Group (C1); Staff Development Technical Oversight Group (C2); Islamic School Accreditation Technical Oversight Group (C3); and the Analytical and Capacity Development Technical Oversight Group (C4). [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
170. http://aid.dfat.gov.au/aidpolicy/Pages/home.aspx [↑](#endnote-ref-94)
171. This figure includes a grant of $210,000,000. A reduction to $155,000,000 has yet to be ratified within the Subsidiary Arrangement (Source DFAT). [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
172. The Working in Partner Systems (WiPS) approach. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
173. POM (2014). Consolidated Audit Report 2013 (submitted to DFAT 29 October 2014), pp. 5-7. [↑](#endnote-ref-95)
174. POM (2013). Annual Partnership Performance Report, p.49. [↑](#endnote-ref-96)
175. Interview with Hannah Birdsey, 31 October 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-97)
176. One GOG meeting was held on 3 June 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
177. One ITOG meeting was held on 13 May 2014; two SDTOG meetings were held on 17 June 2014 and 30 October 2014; no MTOG meetings were held; and two ATOG meetings were held on 8 July 2014 and 18 December 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
178. POM (2013). Annual Partnership Performance Report, p.51. [↑](#endnote-ref-98)
179. Minutes of Infrastructure Technical Oversight Group (ITOG) Meeting, 13 May 2014 [↑](#endnote-ref-99)
180. Minutes of the SDTOG Coordination Meeting, 17 June 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-100)
181. Minutes of the Meeting of the Technical Oversight Group of the Education Sector Analytical & Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP), 8 July 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-101)
182. Australia Indonesia Partnership (2010). Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia – A Contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, pp.33-34. [↑](#endnote-ref-102)
183. http://aid.dfat.gov.au/aidpolicy/developmentpolicy/Pages/strategic-performance-targets.aspx [↑](#endnote-ref-103)
184. Social inclusion (SI) typically concerns the pursuit of equal opportunity. It requires the identification of who is prone to exclusion (e.g. because of gender, location, disability, language) and requires that a program ensures that the identified groups receive equal access to opportunities and appropriate support to ensure equitable results. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
185. The notion of social targeting is related to social inclusion but is different. It concerns the pursuit of equitable outcomes (vis-à-vis the pursuit of equal opportunity). It goes beyond social inclusion by seeking to ensure that benefits are distributed fairly. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
186. POM (2013). Annual Partnership Performance Report, pp.42-43. [↑](#endnote-ref-104)
187. Sam Muller, comment at EP Communications Working Group Meeting held at Cyber II, Jakarta, 5 December 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-105)
188. The EP received a “3” for Gender Equality in the DFAT Indonesia Aid Program Performance Report 2013-14, implying "less than adequate quality; needs significant work". [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
189. DFAT (2014). Aid Program Performance Report 2013-14 Indonesia, p.39 [↑](#endnote-ref-106)
190. Linda Kelly and Lorraine Wapling (2012). AusAID Development For All Strategy Mid-Term Review Report [↑](#endnote-ref-107)
191. http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2014/jb\_mr\_140618.aspx [↑](#endnote-ref-108)
192. http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2014/jb\_sp\_140213.aspx?ministerid=4 [↑](#endnote-ref-109)
193. Other than in relation to trade and an expectation that Australia will help to “build the capacity of developing countries to participate in the global trading system.” [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
194. Only “sustainable economic growth”. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
195. United Nations Development Group (2014). Delivering the Post-2015 Development Agenda: opportunities at the national and local levels. [↑](#endnote-ref-110)
196. DFAT (2014). Strategic Targets for the Aid Program: Technical Note, Target 8: Ensuring Value for Money. [↑](#endnote-ref-111)