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| FINAL REPORT |
| Annual Partnership Performance Report 2013 |
| Draft Report  For DFAT – Australian Aid only |
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****Australian Aid—managed by GRM International on behalf of the Australian Government

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# **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

|  | **English** | **Indonesian** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ACDP | Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership | Kemitraan untuk Pengembangan Kapasitas dan Analisis |
| ADB | Asian Development Bank | Bank Pembangunan Asia |
| AIBEP | Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program | Program Pendidikan Dasar Australia - Indonesia |
| APBN | National Budget | Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara |
| APPR | Annual Partnership Performance Report | Laporan Tahunan Kinerja Kemitraan |
| AUD | Australian Dollar | Dolar Australia |
| *Balitbang* | National Office for Research and Development | Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan |
| BAN-S/M | Board of National Accreditation – School/Madrasah | Badan Akreditasi Nasional-Sekolah/Madrasah |
| *Bappenas* | Ministry of National Development Planning | Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional |
| BOS | School Operational Grants | Bantuan Operasional Sekolah |
| BOS SM | Operational Grants for Secondary School | Bantuan Operasional Sekolah – Sekolah Menengah |
| BPU | Common Learning Materials | Bahan Pembelajaran Umum |
| BSM | Cash Transfer for Poor Students | Bantuan Siswa Miskin |
| C1 | Component 1 of the Education Partnership: School Construction | Komponen 1 Kemitraan Pendidikan: Pembangunan Sekolah |
| C2 | Component 2 of the Education Partnership: Capacity Building | Komponen 2 Kemitraan Pendidikan:Pembangunan Kapasitas |
| C3 | Component 3 of the Education Partnership: Madrasah Accreditation | Komponen 3 Kemitraan Pendidikan: Akreditasi Madrasah |
| C4 | Component 4 of the Education Partnership: ACDP | Komponen 4 Kemitraan Pendidikan: ACDP |
| CAT | Core Advisory Team | Tim Penasehat Inti |
| CMC | Construction Management Consultant | Konsultan Manajemen Pembangunan Sekolah |
| CPD | Continuous Professional Development | Pengembangan Keprofesian Berkelanjutan Kepala Sekolah / Madrasah |
| CRS | Construction Reporting System | Sistem Pelaporan Pembangunan Sekolah |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee | Komite Bantuan Pembangunan |
| DAK | Specific-Purpose Grant | Dana Alokasi Khusus |
| DEO | District Education Official | Pejabat Dinas Pendidikan Tingkat Kabupaten |
| DFAT | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade | Departemen Luar Negeri dan Perdagangan Australia |
| DIPA | Budget Implementation Registration Form | Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran |
| EBR | Evaluation Baseline Report | Laporan Baseline Evaluasi |
| ECBP | Evaluation Capacity Building Program | Program Peningkatan Kapasitas Evaluasi |
| EOCO | End of Component Outcome | Tujuan Akhir Komponen |
| EOPO | End of Partnership Outcome | Tujuan Akhir Kemitraan/Program |
| EP | Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia | Kemitraan Pendidikan Australia-Indonesia |
| EP-PMS | Education Partnership – Performance Management System | Sistem Manajemen Kinerja Kemitraan Pendidikan Australia-Indonesia |
| ESSP | Education Sector Support Program | Program Dukungan untuk Sektor Pendidikan |
| FM | Field Monitor | Petugas Pemantau Lapangan |
| GA | Grant Agreement | Kesepakatan Hibah |
| GER | Gross Enrolment Rate | Angka Partisipasi Kasar (APK) |
| GoA | Government of Australia | Pemerintah Australia |
| GOG | Governance Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Tata Kelola Pemerintahan |
| GoI | Government of Indonesia | Pemerintah RI |
| HI-ECD | Holistic Integrated – Early Childhood Development | Program Pendekatan Menyeluruh dan Terpadu untuk Perkembangan Anak Usia Dini |
| ICR | Independent Completion Reporting | Laporan Independen Penyelesaian Program/ Kegiatan |
| IDC | Indefinite Delivery Contracts | Kontrak Pelaksanaan Tidak Tentu |
| ITOG | Infrastructure Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis Infrastruktur |
| JSE | Junior Secondary Education | Pendidikan Sekolah Menengah Pertama |
| JTU | Joint Technical Unit | Unit Teknis Gabungan |
| K2P | Knowledge to Policy | Dasar Pengetahuan untuk Kebijakan |
| *Kandep* | District Office of MoRA | Kantor Departmen Agama |
| *Kanwil* | Provincial Office of MoRA | Kantor Wilayah Departmen Agama |
| KKM | Madrasah Principal Working Group | Kelompok Kerja Kepala Madrasah |
| KPI | Key Performance Indicator | Indikator Kinerja Utama |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation | Monitoring dan Evaluasi |
| MDC | Madrasah Development Center | Pusat Pengembangan Madrasah |
| MI | Islamic Elementary School | Madrasah Ibtidaiyah |
| MoEC | Ministry of Education and Culture | Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan |
| MoRA | Ministry of Religious Affairs | Kementerian Agama |
| MToG | Madrasah Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis Madrasah |
| MTs | Islamic Junior Secondary School | Madrasah Tsanawiyah |
| NES | National Education Standard | Standar Nasional Pendidikan |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development | Organisasi untuk Kerja Sama Ekonomi dan Pembangunan |
| OMT | Operational Management Team | Tim Manajemen Operasional |
| PAF | Performance Assurance Framework | Kerangka Penjaminan Kinerja |
| PD | Professional Development | Pengembangan Profesi |
| PDSP | MOEC Centre for Education Data and Statistics | Pusat Data dan Statistik Pendidikan |
| *Penma* | MORA Directorate of Madrasah Education | Direktorat Pendidikan Madrasah |
| PISA | Program for International Student Assessment | Program Penilaian Siswa tingkat Internasional |
| PKB KS/M | Continuing Professional Development for School/ Madrasah Principals | Pengembangan Keprofesionalan Berkelanjutan bagi Kepala Sekolah/ Madrasah |
| PMF | Performance Milestone Framework | Kerangka Capaian Kinerja |
| PMU | Twelve Years Universal Education | Pendidikan Menengah Universal 12 Tahun |
| POM | Performance Oversight and Monitoring | Monitoring dan Pengawasan Kinerja Kemitraan Pendidikan Australia-Indonesia |
| PPCKS | Principal Preparation Program | Program Penyiapan Calon Kepala Sekolah |
| PPKPPD | Local Government Educational Capacity Building Program | Program Pengembangan Kapasitas Pendidikan Pemerintah Daerah |
| PPKSPS | Supervisor Professional Development | Program Pendampingan Kepala Sekolah oleh Pengawas Sekolah |
| PPP | Principals Preparation Program | Program Penyiapan Calon Kepala Sekolah |
| *Pusbangtendik* | Centre for the Development of Education Personnel | Pusat Pengembangan Tenaga Kependidikan |
| QAI | Quality at Implementation | Kualitas pada Pelaksanaan |
| QRS | Quality Reporting System | Sistem Pelaporan Berkualitas |
| *Renstra* | Strategic Planning | Rencana Strategis |
| RPJMN | National Medium-Term Development Plan | Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional |
| SATAP | Sekolah Satu Atap | One Roof School |
| SBM | School Based Management | Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah |
| SCC | School Construction Committee | Komite Pembangunan Sekolah |
| SDTOG | Staff Development Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis untuk Pengembangan Staf |
| SI | Social Inclusion | Inklusi Sosial |
| SMP | Junior Secondary School | Sekolah Menengah Pertama |
| SNIP | Sub-National Implementation Partners | Mitra Pelaksana Sub-Nasional |
| SPD | Supervisor Professional Development | Program Pendampingan Kepala Sekolah oleh Pengawas Sekolah |
| SRP | School Reconstruction Program | Program Rekonstruksi Sekolah |
| SSQ | School Systems and Quality | Program Sistem dan Mutu Sekolah |
| SSS | Senior Secondary School | Sekolah Menengah Atas |
| TOG | Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis |
| UPPAM | Madrasah Accreditation Implementation Unit at Central MoRA | Unit Pelaksana Akreditasi Madrasah di tingkat Pemerintah Pusat |
| UPPAMDA | Madrasah Accreditation Implementation Unit at District Level | Unit Pelaksana Akreditasi Madrasah di tingkat Daerah |
| UPPAMPROV | Madrasah Accreditation Implementation Unit at Provincial Level | Unit Pelaksana Akreditasi Madrasah di tingkat Provinsi |
| USB | New School Unit | Unit Sekolah Baru |
| USD | United States Dollar | Dolar Amerika Serikat |

# **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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POM is fully accountable for the content of this report: the views contained in this report do not necessarily represent those of the Education Partnership, the Governments of Australia or Indonesia, or of the people consulted during the fieldwork.

Amendment history

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Version** | **Notes and modifications** | **Created by/modified by** |
| 1.0 | APPR Draft Report (12 February 2014) | Creator: Nick Clinch |
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# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

***What is the Education Partnership?***

The AUD 524m investment in the Education Partnership (EP) is Australia’s flagship development initiative in Indonesia. Australia is supporting the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to achieve its policy goals in relation to access, quality and governance of basic education.

The EP’s vision is to improve education service delivery in Indonesia. The EP focuses its effort on the attainment of four End-of-Partnership-Outcomes (EOPOs):

* Enrolment in JSE in participating districts increases (Component 1).
* Management of schools and Madrasah improves in participating districts (Component 2).
* Quality of Madrasah service provision improves (in line with National Education Standards) in targeted provinces (Component 3).
* Participating policy-makers utilize analytical work to inform education sector policy, planning and budgeting (Component 4).

These EOPOs describe the highest level of change over which the EP has significant influence. The EP uses various modalities to deliver its support, e.g. earmarked budget support (Components 1 and 2), project delivery (Component 3), and technical assistance to Government of Indonesia (GoI) agencies (Components 1-4). From late 2013, the majority of expenditure in Components 1 and 2 will be made through government systems.

***What is the APPR?***

The Annual Partnership Performance Report (APPR) provides an objective assessment of program achievements, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges. As such, it speaks to the Australian Government’s aid scrutiny objectives, whilst also seeking to inform program management decisions and strategic dialogue between the Governments of Australia and of Indonesia about sector performance and emerging priorities. The APPR is produced by the EP Performance Oversight and Monitoring (POM) team. POM’s analysis of EP performance draws on the OECD DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. As such, it also complies with the Australian Government’s Quality Reporting System (QRS).

***What is POM’s overall assessment of EP performance?***

This APPR represents a mid-term assessment of progress against the DAC criteria. At this point in the life of the EP, it is important to reflect and take stock of progress to date and refocus attention on the End-of-Partnership Outcomes. Whilst EP interventions remain broadly relevant, more flexible management and strategic engagement is necessary if the efficiencies that have resulted in strong output level achievement to date are to be translated into higher-level outcomes.

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 1?***

* Four hundred and fifty schools were built in 2012-13, in 142 districts across 28 of the country’s 33 provinces. The geographical spread will be similar in subsequent years of the program, with estimated numbers of schools to be built set at 316 in 2013-14 (Cycle 2), 310 in 2014-15 (Cycle 3), and 337 in 2015-16 (Cycle 4). The 450 schools constructed in Cycle 1 offer an estimated 19,552 new places for first grade enrolment in 2013/2014.
* The notable achievements must be considered in light of two key observations:
  + The extent to which the new schools places will provide a positive and significant contribution to enrolment is uncertain.
  + The impact of Component 1 on enrolment is directly linked to the appropriateness of site location; and improving site selection is both possible and desirable.
* Overall, Component 1 displays commendable efficiency (score: 5), but its effectiveness (score: 3) is cause for concern.

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 2?***

* Component 2 registered several significant achievements in 2013, which will lay the foundations for GoI-led implementation in 2014 and beyond. Of particular note is the signature of the Grant Agreement Deed between the Governments of Australia and of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel. Necessary precursors to the signing of the GA included the development of supporting documents, the piloting of technical modules and the training of trainers.
* The notable achievements must be offset by two key observations:
  + Given the signature of the GA some two years into the five year program, the upcoming Indonesian elections and the uncertain importance placed on PD by key Indonesian policy-makers (and associated implications for GoI resource deployment), the full extent of intended program outcomes are only likely to be realised after 2016.
  + The ability and willingness of district, provincial and/or central governments to finance the PD system after the GA are untested.
* Overall, whilst the component remains highly relevant (score: 5), attention should be paid to its efficiency (score: 3) and critical questions remain about its likely sustainability (score: 3).

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 3?***

* A total of 1,106 Madrasah have been supported to date, through 12 Sub-National Implementation Partners (SNIPs) in 11 provinces and with the help of 198 mentors. As a result of the block grants and SNIP support, improved Madrasah capacity and readiness to achieve accreditation has been observed. Analysis of Phase 1 implementation indicates that all targeted Phase 1 Madrasah have achieved an accreditable standard. Besides observable progress in targeted Madrasah, there are also some encouraging indications of institutional buy-in of the EP model of support.
* The notable achievements must be offset by two key observations:
  + There remains a lack of clarity about expected changes at systemic level and, in 2013, MoRA continued to lack a clear strategy for Madrasah continuous quality improvement.
  + The impact of the AUD 35m EP investment could be restricted to target Madrasah (though there exist other effective channels to spread benefits to non-target Madrasah).
* Overall, Component 3 displays commendable efficiency (score: 5), but critical questions remain about the nature of the benefits to be sustained and how this will be achieved (score: 2).

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 4?***

* The ACDP has made steady progress to date. As at the end of December 2013 it had procured 25 activities and had planned to launch an additional seven activities in the first half of 2014. Together, these 32 activities would constitute over USD 27m of contracted commitments. The ACDP brought a number of pieces of work to conclusion in 2013; it has also organized over 100 workshops, meetings and training events to date, attracting more than 3,000 participants. The ACDP has recorded several significant ‘wins’. For example, the recommendations made in Early Childhood Development Strategy Study were included in the Presidential Decree on Holistic Integrated – Early Childhood Development.
* The notable achievements must be offset by two key observations:
  + The ACDP remains insufficiently agile and vulnerable to accusations of sub-optimal responsiveness.
  + ACDP processes and events offer DFAT opportunity to engage in more strategic dialogue with key GoI officials but this potential is under-exploited.
* Overall, whilst Component 4 remains relevant and effectiveness is adequate (score: 4), there remains significant scope to improve efficiency (score: 3).

***What did the APPR conclude about cross-cutting issues, and specifically management, governance and beneficiaries?***

* The blend of modalities used in the EP represents a sound and appropriate response to the operational environment. It appears to offer good opportunity to pilot and trial initiatives through project support and to build capacity through systems development, whilst instilling and supporting GoI ownership. That should, in principle, increase the likelihood of long-term impacts and sustainability, whilst also guaranteeing tangible output delivery.
* Whilst DFAT’s management of the EP is strong, it tends to be prescriptive and output-focused. DFAT resources focus on transactional management at the expense of transformational engagement; if the big gains are to be secured (e.g. at EOPO-level) DFAT needs to place greater emphasis on strategic engagement with key counterparts.
* From a governance perspective, the Governance and Technical Oversight Groups (GOG, TOGs) make limited use of performance information in strategic decision-making about the EP and governance meetings focus on output-level issues. Moreover, the GOG and TOG meetings are not held in line with the designated scheduling, which suggests a lack of need or of motivation.
* With regards to beneficiaries, the continued absence of a social inclusion strategy limits the assessment in the APPR. However, attempts to implement a social inclusion agenda are noted. In addition, the opportunity for increased targeting of vulnerable groups that may be excluded from EP interventions and for more outcomes-led targeting to enhance prospects for higher level achievement are indicated.

***What next steps are proposed?***

Based on its findings, the APPR offers a total of 24 recommendations. These are presented over the page.

Key recommendations

| **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Component** 1 | | |
| R1: DFAT and MoEC should reaffirm their commitment to the current EOPO (refer to §2.4.3 and 2.4.4) | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoEC |
| R2: Critically appraise coordination of school construction with other access-related initiatives within MOEC with a view to maximising the extent of EOPO achievement (refer to §2.4.3 and 2.4.4) | \*\*\* | MoEC (with SSQ and POM support) |
| R3: Further analysis of site selection outcomes should be undertaken to provide a robust basis to improve the selection process (refer to §2.4.3) | \*\*\* | POM (with MoEC and SSQ support) |
| R4: DFAT and MoEC should strengthen the site selection process by refining factors of JSE demand and supply in the selection criteria, and ensuring a strict application of these criteria (refer to §2.4.3) | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| R5: Lessons learned from EP implementation (e.g. regarding monitoring process) should be synthesised and disseminated to interested parties (e.g. MoEC and other GoI institutions/agencies involved in construction processes), should there be merit or demand (refer to §2.4.5) | \* | MoEC and SSQ |
| **Component 2** | | |
| R6: DFAT-MoEC should assign sufficient resources to C2 so as to ensure timely delivery of GA results, or should readjust the EOPO and implementation strategy accordingly (refer to §3.4.3) | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| R7: MoEC should lobby and advocate for the PD system to be included in strategic documents (e.g. the RPJMN and the upcoming Renstra), thereby enhancing political commitment to its implementation (refer to §3.4.1) | \*\*\* | MoEC (with DFAT support through ATOG and GOG; and SSQ support) |
| R8: Institutional Partners must better understand the financial capacity and willingness of all government levels to fund PD services, and develop a workable sustainability strategy (refer to §3.4.1 and 3.4.5) | \*\*\* | MoEC and DFAT (with POM and SSQ support) |
| **Component 3** | | |
| R9: DFAT and MoRA should define and agree upon the nature and extent of systemic change expected (refer to §4.4.4) | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoRA (with SSQ facilitation as required) |
| R10: EP support to systemic change should encourage and be based on a clear and resourced MoRA strategy for supporting Madrasah continuous quality improvement (refer to §4.4.4) | \*\*\* | MoRA (with DFAT and SSQ facilitation as required) |
| R11: There should be an explicit and systematic targeting of beneficiary Madrasah with low initial standards (TT if possible) (refer to §4.4.2) | \*\* | SSQ |
| R12: EP should continue and increase engagement with sub-national institutions to develop and seek support for non-targeted Madrasah, including engagement with KKM and Madrasah supervisors (refer to §4.4.4) | \* | SSQ |
| R13: EP should develop, support and monitor measures to better involve other key, but currently untargeted stakeholders (e.g. committee members, *yayasan* and community members) in Madrasah quality improvement strategies (refer to §4.4.1) | \*\* | SSQ (with POM support as required) |
| **Component 4** | | |
| R14: ACDP should continue to revise and diversify its product offering (activity types) such that it is responsive and timely, and offers value for money (refer to §5.4.2) | \*\* | ACDP (with guidance from the ATOG) |
| R15: DFAT should better articulate how, when and why it seeks to gain strategic value from its investment in the ACDP (refer to §5.4.3) | \*\* | DFAT (with ACDP support as required) |
| R16: DFAT/ACDP should make a concerted effort to identify cross-component links and to flag relevant upcoming events such that ACDP becomes a more integral part of the EP and that synergies are exploited. (refer to §5.4.3) | \* | DFAT and ACDP Secretariat |
| **Beneficiaries** | | |
| R17: Institutional partners should identify categories of beneficiaries whose targeting will increase the likelihood of EOPO achievement, and devise a targeting strategy for each component (refer to §6.2.3) | \*\*\* | DFAT and institutional partners (with POM support as required) |
| R18: Institutional partners should finalise and implement a social inclusion strategy that outlines objectives, boundaries, indicators and targets; and describes what the EP aspires to, i.e. what it should be doing, not just what it is doing (refer to §6.2.1) | \*\*\* | DFAT and institutional partners (with POM support as required) |
| R19: Institutional partners should clarify the extent to which equity is an objective of the EP and, where appropriate, explore EP targeting objectives and review selection criteria and targeting mechanisms (refer to §6.2) | \*\* | DFAT and institutional partners (with POM support as required) |
| **Management and Governance** | | |
| R20: DFAT’s management of the EP should be more flexible and adaptive, i.e. be more forward looking (at opportunities) than backward-looking (at the EP design) (refer to §7.2.2) | \*\* | DFAT |
| R21: DFAT should prioritise (varied) strategic engagement with GoI: e.g. strategic discussion on C1 and C3; advocacy of current EP approach on C2; and broader policy engagement through C4 (refer to §7.2.2) | \*\*\* | DFAT |
| R22: The articulation and agreement on the EP logic and the finalisation and socialisation of the Performance Milestone Framework (PMF) should be prioritised (refer to §7.2.3) | \*\*\* | DFAT (with POM support) |
| R23: Existing governance structures need to be more effectively engaged, utilizing performance evidence to inform strategic, higher-level decisions (refer to §7.2.4) | \*\* | DFAT and GoI through GOG and TOGs |
| R24: Institutional partners should identify potential for stronger linkages between POM and governance structures, possibly in a secretariat role (refer to §7.2.4) | \*\* | DFAT and GoI (with POM support) |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; Orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; Green (\*) - low urgency*



**Introduction, Approach and Methodology**

# **Introduction**

## **The Education Partnership**

The Government of Australia (GoA) has been investing in Indonesia’s basic education sector for a number of years, most notably through the flagship AUD 395 million Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program (AIBEP) (2006-2011) and now through the Australia-Indonesia Education Partnership (EP): a five-year, AUD 524 million[[1]](#footnote-1) program that operates from mid-2011 to mid-2016.

Australia is supporting the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to achieve its policy goals in relation to access, quality and governance of basic education (defined as primary and junior secondary education). The EP’s vision is to improve education service delivery in Indonesia. To achieve this, it focuses on three goals:

* To increase participation in Junior Secondary Education (JSE) schooling.
* To improve the quality of education in public and private schools, including Madrasah.
* To improve sector governance through increased use of evidence for decision-making.

The EP recognizes that these goals are aspirational and are influenced by a multitude of factors, many of which are outside the control or even direct influence of the Partnership. As such, the EP focuses its effort on the attainment of four End-of-Partnership-Outcomes (EOPOs):

* Enrolment in JSE in participating districts increases (Component 1).
* Management of schools and Madrasah improves in participating districts (Component 2).
* Quality of Madrasah service provision improves (in line with National Education Standards) in targeted provinces (Component 3).
* Participating policy-makers utilize analytical work to inform education sector policy, planning and budgeting (Component 4).

These EOPOs describe the highest level of change over which the EP has significant influence (see the current[[2]](#footnote-2) EP logic architecture in Annex I). The EP uses various modalities to deliver its support, e.g. earmarked budget support (Components 1 and 2), project delivery (Component 3), and technical assistance to GoI agencies (Components 1-4). From late 2013, the majority of expenditure in Components 1 and 2 will be made through government systems.

## **The Annual Partnership Performance Report**

### Objective

The EP remains Australia’s largest ever bilateral program. It is important that the program generates significant ‘developmental return’, that implementation is carefully scrutinized, and that results and lessons are captured, shared and fed into decision-making processes. The EP Performance Oversight and Monitoring (POM) team is charged with generating timely evidence and actionable recommendations so that the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and its partners can safeguard Australia’s investment in the EP; improve EP management and implementation; strengthen education policy dialogue with the GoI; and guide future Australian investment in the Indonesian education sector.

The Annual Partnership Performance Report (APPR) provides an objective assessment of program achievements, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges. As such, it speaks to DFAT’s aid scrutiny objectives, whilst also seeking to inform program management decisions and strategic dialogue between the Governments of Australia and of Indonesia about sector performance and emerging priorities.

The report is written at a time of considerable change within the Australian Aid program. The change in Government in Australia in late 2013 is having significant ramifications on the delivery of development assistance. These will likely impact the EP in 2014 and beyond. Similarly, the consequences of the 2014 elections in Indonesia will need to be monitored closely.

The 2013 APPR – POM’s second, full APPR of the EP – reports and analyses program performance in 2013. It seeks to deliver:

* A clear, concise and evidence-informed picture of achievements over the year.
* A clear and concise commentary about concerns and possible challenges in 2014-16.
* A set of action-oriented recommendations.

### Approach

POM’s analysis of EP performance draws on OECD’s DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. As such, it also speaks to the requirements of GoA’s Quality Reporting System (QRS) for both Quality at Implementation (QAI) and Independent Completion Reporting (ICR). Annex II explains the APPR interpretation of the DAC criteria and the Rating Scale used under the QRS and in this APPR is presented in Annex III.

This year’s APPR contains several structural and presentational changes to the 2012 APPR. Of note:

* Every EOPO section contains a dedicated commentary on each of the aforementioned DAC criteria.
* The performance of each EOPO is scored, using the same system and guidelines contained within GoA’s ICR framework.

These changes are regarded as being timely introductions given that the EP has just passed its mid-point. The scoring will enable improved tracking of performance from year-to-year. It also requires POM to respond to the need for clarity and justification. Where it is too early to provide a defensible score, which is frequently the case for *impact,* the report indicates as much. In other cases, such as for *effectiveness* and for *sustainability*, where several evidence sources may be unavailable until 2014 or 2015, POM has sought to score probability or likelihood, using the evidence available. In all cases POM has scored the component and not the performance of individual implementing partners working within the component.

### Methodology

The APPR assessment process was conducted in October-December 2013. It contained six key steps:

* **Step 1: A desk review and screening** of every report related to EP performance that was submitted or received by POM in 2013 (see Annex IV). All documents were screened through the lens of the EP analytical framework (see Annex V for further details).
* **Step 2: Semi-structured interviews with key informants**, with a view to further developing and testing POM’s understanding of key matters. Lines of enquiry drew on insights gleaned from the desk review. (See Annex VI for a list of persons consulted).
* **Step 3: An internal POM APPR workshop** in mid-November during which POM staff identified and discussed key findings, messages and implications.
* **Step 4: A presentation to key EP stakeholders** on 29 November 2013 to test and explore emerging findings and recommendations, and to serve as a ‘lead in’ to report preparation.
* **Step 5: Draft report production and submission to DFAT.**
* **Step 6: Final Report submission to DFAT** following factual corrections on basis of comments from DFAT.

### Caveats and limitations

Every effort has been made to present credible, robust and evidence-informed findings and recommendations. Nevertheless, there are always limitations. Of particular note is the absence of an operational EP Performance Milestone Framework (PMF). This limits clarity about performance indicators, and expected targets and annual milestones at output, EOCO, EOPO and Goal-level.

## **Report structure**

The layout of the APPR seeks to present information in a succinct and logical manner. Guidance on the contents of the report has been taken from the Monitoring and Evaluation Standards developed by the DFAT-Jakarta Evaluation Capacity Building Program (ECBP). More specifically, this report includes, as Annex VII, an assessment of its compliance with the proposed features listed in ‘Standard 3: Initiative Progress Reporting’.

The APPR is divided into three parts:

* Part A “zooms in” on component-by-component performance: it considers the context in which the component operates; it highlights the achievements of the past year; it analyses progress and performance in relation to the DAC criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance and sustainability; and it proposes recommendations for action in light of that analysis.
* Part B “zooms out” by considering, first, who benefits from the EP and, second, how the EP is managed and governed.
* Part C describes conclusions and presents a consolidated set of recommendations.

Each recommendation in the APPR is accompanied by a nominated stakeholder who is assigned prime responsibility for implementation. Recommendations are presented by a color-coded system that indicates the relative immediacy of the issue.

Footnotes and endnotes are utilized throughout the document: footnotes are employed to provide clarification on a point; endnotes are employed to reference a source.



**Part A: Zooming in**

***Component performance***

1. **Component 1: School Construction**
   1. **Introduction** 
      1. The EP investment

The EP seeks to improve access to junior secondary education by supporting GoI to build up to 2,000 new junior secondary schools (USBs) and one-roof junior secondary schools (SATAPs) between 2011 and 2016[[3]](#footnote-3). In doing so, its objective is to assist Indonesia to deliver on its 2010-14 Renstra targets by improving access to nine years of basic education for boys and girls, and children with physical disabilities, in un-served and under-served areas of the country[[4]](#endnote-1).

The GoA seeks to focus its investment on districts with low junior secondary enrolment rates. Once the schools are built, the EP provides school management teams with training in School-Based Management (SBM). Upon completion, the participants are expected to demonstrate a statistically significant increase in knowledge, which should then be applied when conducting their duties.

All the schools are expected to be fully operational within six months of construction, and be capable of delivering effective formal and non-formal education services[[5]](#endnote-2). This requires that they be fully staffed and equipped (e.g. with laboratory equipment and books), and have access to the necessary GoI operational funds to run and maintain the schools[[6]](#endnote-3). The Grant Agreement between GoA and GoI provides for the SATAPs to receive an initial “start-up” grant upon school completion to ensure smooth initial operations; the USBs do not have the same entitlement.

The supply of new JSE places is expected to provide (prospective) learners with improved physical access to JSE in the target districts. The closer proximity of schools to households is also expected to reduce financial barriers to enrolment and therefore enable continued and improved participation (e.g. by reducing the impact of high transportation costs)[[7]](#endnote-4). Within participating districts, the investment is expected to have an impact on enrolment and retention rates, and rates of transition from primary to junior secondary school. At a higher level, it is expected to reduce disparities between districts by contributing towards the GoI target of increasing the percentage of districts with a JSE GER of 90% or greater, to 85% by 2014[[8]](#endnote-5).

Component 1 of the EP does not prioritize systemic change[[9]](#footnote-4) in government policy, planning and service delivery *per se*, though indirect benefits may accrue. Rather, the key result is the construction of new schools and the additional places they are expected to offer learners, with the expectation that increased enrolment (the expected outcome) and sustained participation (the expected goal) will ensue.

* + 1. The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

Program support is delivered through a combination of technical assistance and earmarked budget support to MoEC[[10]](#endnote-6). Specifically, GoA provides:

* AUD 210m of grants for community-based JSE school construction.
* Technical assistance and training to MoEC, School Construction Committees (SCCs) and District Education Officials (DEOs) concerning site selection and subsequent monitoring of school construction.
* Training in SBM for principals, school committees, DEOs and community members through the New School Induction Program.
* Establishment of complaint handling system by MoEC.
* Financing of supplementary independent audits.

Construction Development Consultants are procured by, funded by and contracted to MoEC to assist the SCCs with the technical aspects of implementation. MoEC retains overall responsibility for the construction process.

* 1. **Context**

The notions of increased access and participation remain important priority areas for GoI. In late 2012, MoEC released plans to extend nine years of compulsory education to a 12 year universal program (*Pendidikan Menengah Universal* or PMU). The PMU Grand Design is premised on Indonesia’s need to drive growth by satisfying labour market requirements and by capitalizing on the country’s youthful population: the so-called “demographic dividend”. The PMU will adopt a three-pronged approach:



* Construction of Senior Secondary Schools (SSS) or additional classrooms on existing SSS.
* Establishment of BOS (B*antuan Operasional Sekolah)* for SSS: a so-called BOS-SM.
* Implementation of Poor Students Assistance Program (*Bantuan Siswa Miskin* or BSM) targeted at students from impoverished families.

Arguably, the PMU provides further evidence of MoEC’s continued pursuit of an access-driven education agenda until at least 2020. The PMU will not, in itself, undermine the importance of EP investments, as lessons learned from targeting JSE access may well be applicable to any improvement efforts in SSE access. Indeed, a focus on SSE is likely to have a positive “pull’ effect on JSE. However, impact could be felt if MoEC prioritize budget for PMU at the expense of JSE-centric policies and interventions.

* 1. **Achievements**

Four hundred and fifty-one[[11]](#footnote-5) schools were built in 2012-13 through the first cycle of construction, in 142 districts across 28 of the country’s 33 provinces (see Figure 1). The geographical spread will be similar in subsequent years of the program, with the estimated number of schools to be built set at 316 in 2013-14 (Cycle 2), 310 in 2014-15 (Cycle 3), and 337 in 2015-16 (Cycle 4)[[12]](#footnote-6).

Figure 1: Schools construction in 2012-13 (Cycle 1 and 2)



The 450 schools constructed in Cycle 1 offer a total of 58,656 new school places with an estimated 19,552 new places for first grade enrolment in 2013/2014[[13]](#footnote-7).

Concerns were raised by DFAT about site selection during Cycle 1 and Cycle 2, specifically about the limited number of eligible proposals received from low JSE GER districts[[14]](#footnote-8). To address these concerns, C1 partners (with support from the C2 SSQ team) have invested considerable energy in implementing access planning training in 88 districts with low GER. The training is designed to support target districts to accurately determine their enrolment rates, to assess options for tackling low GER, and then to make informed decisions based on the options available. Anecdotal feedback has been positive with some of the districts submitting a greater number and improved quality of proposals to the EP. In addition, improvements have been made to the new school proposal form and to the analysis of new school proposals. This should benefit the third cycle of construction planned in 2014-2015 (though it should be noted that whilst the access planning training provided by the EP helps districts to identify appropriate planning solutions to low GER, the EP, in line with its original design, can only offer one solution: the construction of new USB or SATAP schools).

SSQ’s Field Monitors (FM) are tasked to support MoEC in the monitoring of the school construction process. Their role was expanded in 2013 so that they are now involved in site selection verification. They have also been given authority to recommend remedial action where construction issues have been identified. It is hoped that the FMs will offer continuous coordination and improved communication among stakeholders, with upsides for risk identification and management and the proactive and timely solution of issues on-site. Early indications are positive. SSQ, for example, reports that FMs have made a significant contribution to the quality of the school construction program and that their monetary value exceeded their cost to the program[[15]](#endnote-7).

At a central level, C1 partners have established a Construction Reporting System (CRS) to collate, manage, verify and analyse construction data. A Joint Technical Unit (JTU) has also been established, with the objective of enabling improved information flow between SSQ and MoEC and therefore more effective and timely resolution of issues.

* 1. **Analysis**
     1. Relevance

From a sector perspective, EP investments in JSE school construction remain in line with MoEC’s current championing of an access agenda. Moreover, as Figure 2, below, shows, the number of known districts with a GER of <90% has steadily increased since 2008/09. Therefore, if correctly targeted, the EP’s construction agenda should contribute to incremental gains in enrolment figures in targeted districts.

Figure 2: Proportion of districts nationwide with low/high GER

*Source: PDSP data*

Whilst access challenges remain in JSE (which speaks broadly favourably to the Australian investment), the *relative* importance of EP investments vis-à-vis MoEC’s emerging priorities is less certain. MoEC believes that its future role in school construction should be limited to a fund channelling mechanism and sees districts as being ultimately responsible for initiating and providing technical and administrative oversight to school construction. This could call into question the long-term, sectoral relevance of the EP’s support to centralized decision-making and management of JSE construction between 2011 and 2016.

This assessment of relevance covers not only the extent to which an intervention is suited to national policies and priorities but also how applicable the intervention activities are to the achievement of its objectives. The original design of C1 features only a supply-side approach to the multidimensional issue of JSE access. Whilst it is understood and accepted that the EP design took account of the fact that other MOEC interventions cover other aspects of the access challenge, there are indications that parents’ choice to enrol their children in JSE is shaped predominantly by a range of demand-led variables[[16]](#footnote-9)[[17]](#endnote-8).

Consequently, to maximise increased enrolment in participating districts (EOPO 1), a more comprehensive investment response is indicated or, at least, there should be an explicit coordination of school construction with other access-related initiatives within MOEC.

* + 1. Efficiency

The implementation of C1 is managed by MoEC, with technical support from SSQ. The first cycle of construction started in September 2012 and was largely finalized by May 2013. The second cycle started in August 2013 and is ongoing. The third cycle is being planned, with a scheduled start date of August 2014. As illustrated in Table 1, 767 schools have been or are being constructed.

Table 1: Confirmed schools in Cycles 1 and 2

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Cycles** | **Schools constructed/under construction** | |
| **SATAP** | **USB** |
| **1** | 289 | 162 |
| **2** | 150 | 166 |
| **TOTAL** | 439 | 328 |

*Source: SSQ Component 1 management team*

In the second half of 2013, SSQ strengthened the monitoring and reporting of the school construction process by generating and providing detailed information about the construction process on a bi-weekly basis. The report captures the quality, quantity and nature of progress as well as compliance with financial procedures. This enables EP partners to gain an accurate understanding of the pace of progress and accountability for Australian funds, and to tackle issues in a timely fashion.

An increase in school building unit costs, updated estimates of GoI school requirements, and an adjustment of the desired standard number of classrooms in each school type all mean that the number of schools to be built is likely to be revised down to around 1,400 schools. Whilst the downgrade may reflect an appropriate management response, it may also have a detrimental impact on the expected cost effectiveness of C1.

Phase 1 of the SCC Financial Compliance Audit undertaken through POM covered 45 construction sites (i.e. about 10% of the total) and found cases of non-compliance ranging from low risk to high risk at all sites. However, only a very small number of cases (5 in total) were sufficiently suspicious for a fraud report to be lodged with DFAT. SSQ and MOEC are also proactive in identifying and reporting non-compliance issues and suspicion of fraud to DFAT. The prevalence of non-compliance issues most likely reflects the low capacity of some SCC/CMC to administer funds in line with detailed procedures manuals rather than systemic fraud. The extensive audit function within the EP provides recommendations on how non-compliance can be tackled and it is anticipated that incidence rates will decrease over time.

* + 1. Effectiveness

The EP expects to deliver an additional 187,000 places[[18]](#footnote-10) for JSE students by mid-2016 (EOCO)[[19]](#endnote-9). So far, the construction of 450 schools in Cycle 1 has generated up to an additional 58,656 places for JSE students across 142 districts[[20]](#footnote-11). Should subsequent cycles be delivered in an equally efficient manner, it is probable that the EOCO target will be achieved.

The attainment of the EOPO (i.e. an increase in JSE enrolment) is, however, less clear cut and it is not yet possible to make a definitive judgment[[21]](#footnote-12). Whilst it is recognised that considerable improvements to site selection processes have been made since AIBEP and indeed between Cycles 1 and 2 of the EP, there remain indications of sub-optimal location of some of the selected sites. Based on a typology built on proxy measures of JSE demand and supply, a preliminary analysis of the appropriateness of site locations from the EOPO 1 evaluation baseline sample[[22]](#footnote-13) suggests that just under half of the sampled schools have been constructed in locations of low supply and high demand and are therefore likely to contribute to increased enrolment. Conversely, the analysis indicates that around one tenth of schools are located in sites with both low demand and high supply which would negatively affect expected enrolment figures (and, in time, the sustainability of the schools themselves). On a positive note, however, the exercise also indicates that improved site selection is both possible and desirable, and that this can be achieved by refining the factors of supply *and* demand in the selection criteria. Given the critical importance of site selection in the realisation of the EOPO, a more robust and expanded analysis is indicated.

The number of construction sites that are situated in low GER (<90%) districts has reduced significantly between Cycle 1 and Cycle 2, both in terms of actual numbers (264 to 102) and percentage (59% to 35%). This speaks to the importance of applying appropriate targeting mechanisms for site selection. However, it is possible that, as cycles progress, the proportion of low GER districts decreases, as well as the opportunity of selecting appropriate sites within these districts, i.e. it is getting harder and harder to select appropriate sites.

* + 1. Impact

It is estimated that 84,204 students will be enrolled in EP funded schools by June 2016[[23]](#footnote-14). It is too early to assess the progress towards that target. Only schools built under Cycle 1 have opened their doors and most students have only been enrolled in the first grade of SMP. It is expected to take three years for a newly built school to reach its capacity of enrolment.

Two risks to the attainment of intended impact targets can be foreseen: (a) the additional places created (EOCO) do not necessarily lead to the enrolment of “new” children (EOPO) but instead may be filled partially or exclusively by children who move from existing schools; and (b) the construction of the new school offers a supply-side response that may need to be coordinated with demand-side initiatives offered through MOEC. It must be noted that the occurrence of the first risk would not necessarily be a bad outcome from an education perspective or indeed a developmental perspective: reduced travel time might perhaps lead to better attendance, reduced fatigue and better learning quality. From a development perspective, there may be upsides in terms of less expenditure on transport.

From a systems perspective, however, there is also the risk of a proliferation of small schools leading to inefficiencies of teachers and management resource allocation (e.g. low student / teacher ratio), compounded by limited BOS funding for each school. This might impact on the quality of the education provided. This risk can be mitigated by carefully selecting sites in locations where demand for additional JSE schools is high. Where proposals that have been submitted are not considered suitable for school construction, it makes sense for other access initiatives to be considered as a viable response for the proposal. Whilst this clearly falls outside the current mandate of the EP, the promotion of access planning through the EP is a positive indicator of the integration of the EP within the broader GoI access agenda.

* + 1. Sustainability

The sustainability analysis considers two issues: (a) the sustainability of the constructed schools; and, (b) the sustainability of the community-based school construction system. The sustainability of the schools strongly depends on the quality of their construction and their location, i.e. schools need to be well constructed and be attracting students, not least to generate the BOS funds necessary to operate and maintain the schools. The consolidation of the SSQ construction monitoring system provides a solid foundation for ensuring construction quality is up to required standards. However, as previously discussed, there are some schools that appear to be in locations of low demand or in locations seemingly displaying high demand *and* high supply, in which case enrolment numbers and BOS receipts may be lower than required for optimal performance. Further analysis of existing demand and supply around construction sites should help to clarify the sustainability of the constructed schools.

From a construction system perspective, the upcoming focus on senior secondary construction offers an opportunity for further utilization of the community-based construction model. Lessons learned in the EP school construction process – including the necessity for robust monitoring - could and should be disseminated for future school construction efforts.

* 1. **What does this mean for the EP? The bottom-line**

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 2. The ratings scale used with the DFAT QRS (QAI and ICR) has been adopted. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, on increasing the likelihood of achieving EOPO 1 are made in Table 3 below.

Table 2: Component 1 scorecard

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **Score** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| **Relevance** | 4 | * School construction is still relevant to MoEC Strategic Planning access targets. * Whilst the relevance of the C1 design is constrained by its supply-only approach, good integration of school construction with parallel demand-led GoI initiatives should allow for a holistic approach to access. | * The relevance to GoI is based on current government policies. * Incoming government may change/pursue new priorities. |
| **Efficiency** | 5 | * Almost all targeted schools of Cycle 1 (450 of 451) were completed and operational by December 2013. * Monitoring of construction process has been strengthened and has reportedly led to significant savings. * The results of improved monitoring activities are being used jointly by SSQ and MoEC to better respond to reported issues from the construction processes. |  |
| **Effectiveness** | 3 | * It is probable that C1 will achieve the EOCO, i.e. an “increase in availability of places in JSE”. * The extent (i.e. the prescribed targets) to which the EOPO will be achieved is uncertain. Optimising site selection and coordinating school construction with other access related initiatives is necessary to maximise EOPO achievement | * The information used in this section is based on POM EOPO 1 Evaluation Study. * Thus the concluding remarks may only be applied to Cycle 1 schools. |
| **Impact** | TE | * Too early to make informed judgement. | * The question of impact will be answered by EOPO 1 Evaluation but only after endline in 2015. |
| **Sustainability** | 4 | * Sustainability is dependent on site selection, i.e. schools are dependent on BOS funding and therefore having the necessary number of enrolled learners for the school to operate at an acceptable level of quality. | * Lessons learned about the community-based school construction system should be captured and shared with other agencies. |

Table 3: Component 1 key findings and recommendations

| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The extent to which the EOPO is achieved will depend upon maximising EOCO contribution as well as encouraging the contribution of other access-related initiatives (see §2.4.3 and 2.4.4) | R1: DFAT and MoEC should reaffirm their commitment to the current EOPO. | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoEC |
| R2: Critically appraise coordination of school construction with other access-related initiatives within MOEC with a view to maximising the extent of EOPO achievement. | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoEC (with SSQ and POM support) |
| There is evidence of sub-optimal location of some selected sites and improving site selection is both possible and desirable (see §2.4.3) | R3: Further analysis of site selection outcomes should be undertaken to provide a robust basis to continue to improve the selection process. | \*\*\* | POM (with MoEC and SSQ support) |
| R4: DFAT and MoEC should strengthen the site selection process by refining factors of JSE demand and supply in the selection criteria, and ensuring a strict application of these criteria. | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| A number of lessons on community-based construction processes are being learned through the EP investment (see §2.4.5) | R5: Lessons learned from EP implementation (e.g. regarding monitoring process) should be synthesised and disseminated to interested parties (e.g. MoEC and other GoI institutions/agencies involved in construction processes), should there be merit or demand. | \* | MoEC and SSQ |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*

1. **Component 2: School and District Management**
   1. **Introduction** 
      1. The EP investment

Component 2 seeks to improve the management of schools and Madrasah. Specifically, it focuses on the professional development (PD) of education personnel and, in particular, school principals, supervisors, and district and provincial education officials. The GoA seeks to support Indonesia’s efforts to develop its existing PD systems into a nationwide accredited training system.

The EP investment is deemed to be strategically important. Decentralization processes increasingly allocate greater responsibility for managing education resources to the district and school level. As such, the prevalence of weak competencies amongst the country’s estimated 293,000 principals, supervisors and district officials is deemed to be a crucial barrier to improved education quality[[24]](#endnote-10).

The EP PD system (hereafter referred to as “the system” comprises a number of sub-systems:

* A *Continuing Professional Development* (CPD) system for school principals, which contains a suite of graduated learning modules appropriate to different skill-sets, experience and job requirements.
* A *Principal Preparation Program* (PPP) for aspiring principals, which improves the skills and competencies of potential future principals, and, in principle, should enable district authorities to consider test scores when choosing principals of MoEC schools.
* The *Supervisor Professional Development (SPD) Program*, which seeks to improve the capability of the education supervisor cadre to support school principals.
* *District and Provincial Official training programs*, which contain up to three modules: Human Resource Development and Management, Strategic Planning and Financial Management, and Access Planning (the latter being targeted at those 88 districts with a JSE GER of < 90%).
* Induction training in School-Based Management (SBM) for principals and school committees of schools built with EP funding.
* A one-off training in the use of BOS funds for all school principals, relevant DEOs and school committee members.

By June 2016, the system is expected to be operational and accessible[[25]](#footnote-15) in all provinces, with school and madrasah principals, supervisors and education officials in up to 250 districts – approximately half of the country – expected to have enrolled and participated in grant-funded PD. At least 15% of the participants should come from the Islamic Education Sector (except in PPP)[[26]](#endnote-11).

The system is expected to improve the professional competencies of school and madrasah principals, supervisors and education officials[[27]](#footnote-16) [[28]](#endnote-12). When implemented, the system will enable staff to reach base-level accreditation in school and district management, leaving them better able to perform professional duties[[29]](#endnote-13). The management of schools and madrasah is expected to improve as a “direct consequence”[[30]](#endnote-14). This, in turn, is expected to contribute to an improvement in the quality of the education provided in targeted schools and districts, and to improved education service delivery nationwide[[31]](#endnote-15). Ultimately, the EP is expected to make an important contribution to the Renstra target of improving the quality of basic education (for all children).

* + 1. The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

Component 2 is delivered through a combination of technical assistance and, from late 2013, earmarked budget support in line with the Grant Agreement between the Governments of Indonesia and Australia[[32]](#endnote-16). From late 2013 MoEC, and specifically the Board of Education and Culture – Human Resources Development and Education Quality Assurance and its *Pusbangtendik*, will be responsible for implementing the system. GoA will finance the delivery of the system until 2016 and has allocated AUD 110m for this purpose.

* 1. **Context**

The focus on quality improvements in the MoEC and MoRA Renstras remains important and timely since the sector’s ability to deliver improved learning outcomes has remained stubbornly poor. Of the 65 countries surveyed in the most recent PISA report (2013), Indonesia ranked 60th in reading, and 64th in mathematics and 64th in science.[[33]](#endnote-17) Neither the scores nor the ranking has progressed much since 2009.

* 1. **Achievements**

Component 2 registered several significant achievements in 2013, which will lay the foundations for GoI-led implementation in 2014 and beyond. These achievements were a culmination of series of steps identified in the original design document that were necessary to release Australian funds. These included: a review of existing training systems and institutions; a review of related public financial management systems; the piloting and testing of the proposed system; the development of operational and financial guidelines; and the development of the Grant Agreement for the program.

Of particular note, therefore, was the signature on 04 July 2013 of the Grant Agreement Deed between the Governments of Australia and of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel. MoEC, SSQ and DFAT further developed or finalized key supporting documents, such as the overarching Procedures Manual, a Procurement Manual and a Management Information System. In addition, the PAF, which is part of the GA, has been developed (draft version) and has been used to draft the M&E plan of activities of the system[[34]](#endnote-18).

Progress has been made by MoEC in preparing the legal framework[[35]](#endnote-19) for rolling out the system (*juklak*)[[36]](#footnote-17). SSQ has facilitated workshops and provided technical assistance in drafting the new Supervisor Regulation and it was reported that the draft has been tested through a number of workshops in several provinces[[37]](#endnote-20). In addition, the MoF regulation[[38]](#footnote-18) required to allow MoEC to implement activities of the system through special account funds was signed on 17 December 2013. Activities can be funded once the MoEC *Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran* (DIPA) is approved[[39]](#endnote-21).

Besides the GA and supporting measures, technical modules were extensively piloted and trainers trained, whilst the SSQ C2 team, with the support of colleagues in C1, organized Access Planning and the New School Induction Program (see Table 4).

Table 4: Persons trained by C2 (to end of November 2013)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Theme** | **Persons trained (to November 2013)** | | **Total** |
| **Male** | **Female** |
| **Principal CPD (a)** | 672 | 536 | 1,208 |
| **Supervisor PD (a)** | 994 | 308 | 1,302 |
| **DEO Competency Training (a)** | 905 | 148 | 1,053 |
| **PEO Competency Training (a)** | 378 | 96 | 474 |
| **Principal Preparation Program (b)** | 3,154 | 1,999 | 5,153 |
| **Access Planning (b)** | 283 | 34 | 317 |
| **New School Induction Program (b)** | 323 | 138 | 461 |
| **TOTAL** | **6,709** | **3,259** | **9,968** |

*Source: (a) SSQ online database; (b) Data from C2 per 29 November 2013*

* 1. **Analysis**
     1. Relevance

In general, the introduction of a continuous professional development system for principals and education officials is relevant: professional development is a Renstra objective and competency-based PD is well accepted internationally. Other training, such as the district and provincial HRMD, are deemed positive by participants due to their relevance to their day-to-day work[[40]](#endnote-22).

SSQ has successfully piloted a range of PD modules since the start of the EP and there exists broad agreement that a competency-based, continuous professional development system represents a high quality approach to improving the capacity of this cadre of education professionals. Furthermore, EP investments in quality improvement measures remain aligned with stated GoI policy. Nevertheless, the relative priority of these investments may look doubtful when considered against those priorities which will account for the lion’s share of ministerial attention in 2013-14 and beyond, e.g. the roll-out of Curriculum 2013, and ongoing teacher certification ahead of the 2015 deadline[[41]](#endnote-23).

The future relevance of the PD system will inevitably depend upon the priorities of the next government and which will be defined in the subsequent Renstra. It seems that, even if CPD remains relevant in the international education sphere, the approach is struggling to retain priority status in the face of stiff competition from Curriculum 2013.

* + 1. Efficiency

Whilst it was hoped that the GA would be signed in early 2013[[42]](#endnote-24), it was finally signed in July 2013 and although funds had been disbursed by the end of the year, no activities were implemented. The timeframe was longer than anticipated and would suggest that the amount of preparatory work required prior to GA negotiations was underestimated. This postponed the expected transition of lead responsibility from SSQ to GoI, and the implementation of associated measures to support capacity development for *Pusbangtendik* staff thereafter[[43]](#endnote-25). SSQ responded favourably to the situation by, *inter alia*, further trialling Units of Learning and technical modalities. Whilst both institutional partners would have preferred a quicker transition into GA implementation, the methodical approach in preparing for the Grant Agreement has laid a strong foundation.

Implementation of the 2013 Curriculum began in July 2013[[44]](#endnote-26). This is likely to affect the timely roll-out of the PD system, primarily because institutions responsible for delivery of the PD system (known as “eligible entities” in the Grant Agreement) are also required to train teachers on the new curriculum. For example, SSQ reports that in 2013 the need for *Pusbangtendik* to support the implementation of the new curriculum affected their capacity to finalise the UoLs in time[[45]](#endnote-27). In addition, the capacity for relevant GoI institutions to engage at a senior level on a number of large nationwide priority programs is limited and so, whilst the GA provides the basis for an integrated delivery mechanism, concurrent claims on GoI resources will likely have a significant bearing on delivery in 2014 and 2015. Approximately 1.4 million teachers in 2014 and a further 1.3 million teachers in 2015 have to be trained for the curriculum change by the institutions that would be responsible for the delivery of training under the PD system. This clearly raises concerns about the priorities and capacities of those institutions.

Whilst the GA does not explicitly state the number of school and Madrasah principals, supervisors, and education officials being targeted by the PD system, the C2 Updated Design Document[[46]](#endnote-28) of December 2012 states that “successful implementation of Component 2 will achieve the Comprehensive Aid Policy Framework target that 293,000 school officials[[47]](#footnote-19) participate in professional development over the lifetime of the partnership”. Current estimates in the GA PAF include:

* 170,000 UoLs to be undertaken by principals;
* 24,000 training modules completed by 12,000 supervisors taking the SPD;
* 1,350 district officials undergoing an individual training course;
* 22,080 training modules completed by 1,840 principal candidates under the PPP; and
* 6,000 officials receiving NSIP training.

Combined with the 69,000 individual modules already completed by SSQ, the number of individual training modules and UoLs expected to be provided under the EP remains at just under 300,000.

* + 1. Effectiveness

Only pilot activities have taken place to date. Nevertheless, SSQ reports evidence of participants applying their learning, which gives reason for confidence concerning the attainment of the EOCO, i.e. that improved professional competencies of participating principals are applied. There is anecdotal evidence of principals who participated in the pilot CPD training (on supervision) subsequently applying their skills, leading to teachers utilizing a wider range of teaching methods and tools[[48]](#endnote-29). In addition, SSQ reports that the training has led to improved planning and accountability of expenditure, availability of facilities and work with communities[[49]](#endnote-30).

However, the extent to which the CPD provided for principals, prospective principals, district and provincial education officials, and supervisors will lead to improved school management (EOPO) and improved students’ learning outcomes (at Goal level) is as yet unclear. Three challenges should be noted:

* Whilst SSQ reports that the individual components deliver positive results, a robust assessment of the effectiveness of the system as a whole will only be possible once the system, which includes a range of technical modules and multiple service deliverers, has been in operation in an environment of competing demand on time and resources.
* Any delay to implementation will exert pressure on the attainment of stated outputs and outcomes and, more likely, on specific annual performance targets.
* Districts’ lack of compliance with MoEC’s Ministerial decrees (i.e. Ministerial Decree No. 12/2007 and Ministerial Decree No. 28/2010)[[50]](#endnote-31) has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of the PD system. The decrees seek to enforce high levels of objectivity over the selection processes of supervisors and principals which can be subjectively influenced by *bupati* or heads of the education office[[51]](#endnote-32).
  + 1. Impact

It is too soon to make an informed judgment on the likelihood and extent of impact. Nevertheless, the success and likely impact of the current approach will be shaped by, *inter alia*:

* The adequacy of training provided by the system for career advancement of participants.
* The adequacy of appointment processes, e.g. adherence to relevant ministerial decrees (i.e. Ministerial Decree No. 12/2007 on Supervisors, and Ministerial Decree No. 28/2010 on Principals).
* Appropriate GoI institutions assuming responsibility for governing, implementing, using, financing and quality assuring the system.
  + 1. Sustainability

The sustainability of the CPD system for school principals – the cornerstone of DFAT’s investment - remains unclear largely because the future organization and financing of PD at district, provincial and national level has yet to be clarified. The current PD system receives significant financing from DFAT; very little contribution has been provided by central, provincial, or district governments (and neither was it expected in the GA). The main counterpart for implementing C2 activities is *Pusbangtendik* and hence it is centrally driven. Should responsibility lay with districts, their ability and willingness to pay for professional development remains uncertain and is untested. SSQ realizes the importance of positive demonstration effects in 2014 to secure district (and possibly provincial) buy-in. Since the GA is signed between DFAT, MoEC, and MoRA, securing the cooperation of district governments is beyond the scope of the GA. However, should GoI drive towards decentralized service provision be mirrored in the provision of CPD for principals, sub-national commitment to the program at both a technical and financial level will be required to ensure future sustainability of the PD system. In the absence of such commitments, there is a risk that the PD system may be discontinued or, at least, the ambition that it be nationwide is unfulfilled.

There are uncertainties around the continued involvement of the 15% madrasah participants in the system. It is distinctly possible that Islamic education participants only secure benefit from the system because it is fully funded by DFAT[[52]](#endnote-33); there are political-institutional reasons to question the likelihood of MoEC funding the training of MoRA stakeholders after the EP.

GoI officials would typically agree that the investments made in the PD system are useful to meet Renstra targets. However, at present, there is a lack of evidence about their political and financial commitments, as well as technical capacities to fully adopt or adapt certain elements from the DFAT financed PD system[[53]](#endnote-34). The sustainability strategy due in 2014 offers a timely and important opportunity to resolve unanswered questions about the future roles, responsibility and financing of the system.

* 1. **What does this mean for the EP? The bottom-line**

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 5. The ratings scale used with the DFAT QRS (QAI and ICR) has been adopted. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, on increasing the likelihood of achieving EOPO 2 are made in Table 6, below.

Table 5: Component 2 scorecard

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **Score** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| **Relevance** | 5 | * The broad investment rationale remains sound, i.e. that the performance of education managers should be enhanced. * Pilot activities were deemed by participants to be highly relevant. * Despite the fact that the system is designed to support GoI’s current Renstra objectives, the degree of political and financial support is circumspect; indeed, the relative political importance of CPD (vis-à-vis Curriculum 2013, for e.g.) appears to be on the wane. | * The system needs to receive political commitment and be included in strategic documents (e.g. the RPJMN and upcoming Renstra). |
| **Efficiency** | 3 | * GA implementation through GoI systems has yet to commence; implementation could be delayed by competing priorities which would compromise the timely achievement of outputs. * Progress has yet to mature beyond piloting of technical options by SSQ. * On a positive note, GA related documentation has been prepared in a timely fashion. * SSQ responded appropriately to the GA delay by, *inter alia*, making incremental improvements to system components. | * “Eligible entities” will be responsible for implementing the system from 2014. It is unclear how the different capacities of the eligible entities will affect the roll-out of the program and the extent to which competing priorities will affect efficiency of delivery. |
| **Effectiveness** | TE | * SSQ evaluation reports demonstrate positive results from pilot activities but a delay to outputs is likely to delay the achievement of outcomes. * It is plausible that the effectiveness of the PD system could be undermined by districts’ lack of compliance to ministerial decrees on principals and supervisors. | * Awaiting commencement of implementation of activities and POM C2 evaluation to enable accurate scoring. |
| **Impact** | TE | * The expected results of the system could be undermined by officials’ lack of adherence of district governments to ministerial decrees (e.g. Ministerial decree No. 12/2007 on Supervisors; Ministerial decree No. 28 / 2010 on Principals). * The impact of the PD system may be influenced by its contribution to participants’ career advancement. | * Too early to provide scores for the same reasons as above. |
| **Sustainability** | 3 | * Uncertain future financial commitments from central, provincial as well as district governments. | * Sustainability strategy scheduled to emerge in 2014. |

Table 6: Component 2 key findings and recommendations

| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Given delays to the implementation of the GA, the intended program outcomes may only be achieved after 2016 (see §3.4.3) | R6: DFAT-MoEC assign sufficient resources to C2 so as to ensure timely delivery of GA results, or should readjust the EOPO and implementation strategy accordingly. | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoEC (with SSQ support) |
| GoI’s political commitment to the PD system remains unclear (see §3.4.1) | R7: MoEC should lobby and advocate for the PD system to be included in strategic documents (e.g. the RPJMN and the upcoming Renstra), thereby enhancing political commitment to its implementation. | \*\*\* | MoEC (with DFAT support through ATOG and GOG; and SSQ support) |
| Unknown ability and willingness of central, provincial and/or district government to finance the system or pay for services provided by it after the GA (see §3.4.1 and §3.4.5) | R8: Institutional Partners must better understand the financial capacity and willingness of district, provincial and central government levels to fund PD services, and develop a workable sustainability strategy. | \*\*\* | MoEC and DFAT (with POM and SSQ support) |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*

1. **Component 3: Islamic School Accreditation**
   1. **An introduction** 
      1. The EP investment

Component 3 seeks to improve the quality of Madrasah service provision in line with National Education Standards (NES) in targeted provinces. Specifically, it supports the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) to achieve one of its Renstra targets: that all Madrasah are accredited against the NES, with a minimum of 50% at Level ‘B’, by 2014-2015.

The EP investment is deemed to be important for at least three reasons:

* Madrasah educate about 22% of the population and are one of the main providers of education in poor communities.
* There are substantial disparities in education quality between public schools and private Madrasah; about 72% of Madrasah are not accredited[[54]](#endnote-35).
* Accredited Madrasah can guarantee the provision of leaving certificates and student participation in national exams.

The EP supports the work of the MoRA Directorate General for Islamic Education, the Unit for Implementing Madrasah Accreditation (UPPAM) and Sub-National Implementation Partners (e.g. universities, Madrasah Development Centres) to improve Madrasah quality. Up to 1,500 targeted Madrasah[[55]](#footnote-20) in 11 provinces will receive technical support from SNIPs and MoRA, as well as direct financial support in the form of grants of AUD 10,000. SNIPs deliver their support through a set program of training and mentoring services for each madrasah, including support to the preparation and utilisation of madrasah development plans (RKM). The RKM assists the madrasah to concentrate and align its efforts in achieving accreditation. It is expected that supported Madrasah will gain improved capacity to perform against NES and that the application of these skills will improve the quality of education services for existing and prospective learners.

The EP does not provide support to improve the accreditation process of Madrasah. The independent National Accreditation Agency (*Badan Akreditasi Nasional Sekolah* or BAN S/M) provides accreditation to schools and Madrasah based on an assessment of their performance against the NES. To become accredited, a Madrasah must apply to the BAN S/M for assessment and demonstrate performance against each NES.

EP stakeholders are aware that indirect systemic change may accrue as a consequence of testing and promoting a system-wide model for strengthening Madrasah quality. The EP therefore seeks to:

* Demonstrate to MoRA how the MoRA-SNIP-Madrasah model could enable continuous improvements to Madrasah’s service delivery.
* Support MoRA to trial different approaches to quality improvement, using finance from the State Budget (*Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara*).
  + 1. The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

C3 supports the Accreditation Unit (UPPAM) of the Directorate of Madrasah Education (PENMA) of MoRA. It is delivered by SSQ in close collaboration with UPPAM, the Bureau of Planning, the Bureau of MoRA Supervisors, and the Provincial and District Offices of MoRA (i.e. *Kanwil* and *Kandep*). The grants are transferred to SNIP and target Madrasah by SSQ. Technical assistance is provided through SSQ directly to MoRA and to the SNIPs. In turn the SNIPs provide technical assistance, primarily in the form of mentoring to the madrasah.

* 1. **Context**

Madrasah accreditation is a priority for MoRA. Responding to the fact that accreditation lists contain disproportionately low numbers of Madrasah[[56]](#footnote-21), the Ministry signed a three-year MoU with BAN S/M in 2011 to increase the number of Madrasah on its annual accreditation quota lists. This is likely to facilitate the achievement of the EP’s short-term targets but it offers no assurances beyond the EP.

There continues to be no national system of support to Madrasah continuous quality improvement. As a corollary, officials in MoRA continue to view accreditation (and national examination results) as an indicator and driver of education quality[[57]](#endnote-36). This situation, coupled to BAN S/M resource constraints, may have negative implications for the long term goal of integrating Madrasah into the NES system and of improving the quality of education delivered.

* 1. **Achievements**

The delivery of C3 support is divided into three phases. The first phase started in July 2012 (565 Madrasah in seven provinces) and finished in December, 2013. The second phase (519 Madrasah in 11 provinces) started in June 2013 and is currently ongoing. The third phase is being planned and is due to start in September 2014. As illustrated in Table 7, below, 1,106 Madrasah have been supported to date, through 12 SNIPs in 11 provinces and with the help of 198 mentors.

Table 7: C3 Phase 1 and Phase 2 support to Madrasah

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Phase** | **Madrasah type** | | **Mentors** |
| **Target** | **Non-target** |
| **Phase 1** | 565 |  | 90 |
| **Phase 2** | 519 | 102 | 108 |
| **TOTAL** | **1,084** | **102** | **198** |

*Source: SSQ Component 3 management team*

As a result of the block grants and SNIP support, improved Madrasah capacity and readiness to achieve accreditation has been reported. Analysis of Phase 1 implementation indicates significant progress in supported Madrasah, exceeding the target of the MoRA Renstra (50% B or better), with an estimated 92% of targeted Madrasah achieving B or A in simulated accreditations[[58]](#endnote-37). BAN S/M will formally assess 502 Phase 1 Madrasah in the 2013 round of accreditation visitations, with 10 more scheduled for 2014. This will provide a basis for the comparison of results[[59]](#footnote-22).

Besides observable progress in targeted Madrasah, there are also some encouraging indications of institutional buy-in of the EP model of support at different levels. For example:

* At provincial level, there are several instances of SNIPs receiving non-EP funds to provide their services to non-targeted Madrasah. For instance[[60]](#endnote-38), SNIPs in East Kalimantan and East Java support Madrasah outside of the block grants program in implementing an UPPAM block grant on quality improvement. Phase 2 SNIPs, most notably MDC South Sulawesi, have facilitated the support of new classroom building and classroom rehabilitation grants from MoRA *kanwil* to nine Phase 2 Madrasah.
* At central level, despite some uncertain and contradictory comments on the success and viability of the MDC/SNIP model of support[[61]](#endnote-39), the new PENMA Director has encouraged greater program synergy between the EP and all PENMA sub-directorates thereby strengthening the level of MoRA commitment to the EP model of support. As a direct result, grants for natural science labs are provided to 81 Phase 2 targeted Madrasah and packages of multimedia equipment are provided to 75 Phase 2 targeted Madrasah. There are also plans to use the content of the KTSP training and to scale-up its delivery to non-target Madrasah.
  1. **Analysis**
     1. Relevance

Component 3 remains relevant in a context where MoRA seeks an increase in the number of accredited Madrasah as well as improvements in the quality of the madrasah and their services. The EP model of support seems relevant with regards to identified factors influencing Madrasah performance (presented in Section 4.4.2), though some improvements are both desirable and practical:

* The EP design directly targets principal performance, though less so other actors of the Madrasah leadership triumvirate (*Yayasan* and *Komite*).
* The EP design directly targets teacher pedagogy, but to a lesser extent teacher commitment and resource mismatch.
* The EP design does not explicitly target community engagement. The role of community engagement and the potential for EP to realign its support towards it merits more attention and analysis than it currently receives.
  + 1. Efficiency

The implementation of C3 is outsourced to the SSQ Managing Contractor. SSQ priorities in 2013 included supporting Phase 1 and Phase 2 Madrasah; planning Phase 3 of the Madrasah block grants program; liaising with provincial offices of MoRA; supporting and reviewing the performance of SNIPs; and, producing monitoring and evaluation data[[62]](#endnote-40).

The implementation of Phase 1 and 2 has been managed well, with sufficient progress against set activities and without substantial delays. Overall C3 is tracking close to budget with an overspend of AUD 471,685 or 4.7% of budget over the last financial year (June 2012 to June 2013). The efficiency of the outsourcing model is likely to be analysed as part of the proposed VFM work.

Both SSQ and POM have undertaken financial and compliance audits on grant recipients (Madrasah and SNIPs). As illustrated in Table 8, below, the 2013 POM audits have raised a number of compliance issues and fraud cases that reflect the limited capacity of Madrasah to administer grants competently.

Table 8: Distribution of findings for C3 POM audits

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Category** | **Issues** | **Findings** |
| **Procurement** | 5 | 84 |
| **Financial** | 15 | 313 |
| **Reporting** | 5 | 124 |
| **Program** | 2 | 13 |
| **Total** | **27** | **534** |

*Source: POM Compliance Audit Batch B Madrasah Accreditation Project Phase 1*

The SSQ evaluation of Phase 1 reported some differences in the efficiency of support provided to those Madrasah initially assessed as TT, C or B[[63]](#endnote-41). The cost to improve Madrasah that achieve a level B in the baseline simulated accreditation is much higher (over four times as high) than the cost of similar improvements for Madrasah initially assessed as level TT. In addition, Madrasah that had already achieved a level B in the baseline simulated accreditation only achieve small improvements against the NES and it could be argued they would have been accredited regardless of support from the EP. This calls for a more acute targeting of Madrasah with low initial standards (TT if possible).

* + 1. Effectiveness

While it is too early to from a conclusive judgment on the achievement of EOPO 3, there are some preliminary suggestions[[64]](#endnote-42) that improved education service quality can be identified and attributed to EP support. These observations tend to suggest the EOPO is likely to be achieved within the lifetime of the EP.

C3 supports SNIPs to provide training and mentoring services to Madrasah in their respective provinces. Whilst SNIP capacity to develop Madrasah has reportedly improved in the areas of networking and provision of training[[65]](#endnote-43), significant future improvements (in SNIP capacity) are unlikely given the limited support to developing SNIP capacity and the lack of a dedicated strategy. This might eventually affect the ability of SNIPs to build Madrasah capacity and, in turn, affect the continuous improvement of Madrasah targeted beyond the life and scope of the EP.

Meanwhile, and as reported in the POM EOPO 3 Evaluation Baseline Report (EBR), SNIP training services are generally well received and found to be useful. Many of the grant and non-grant Madrasah that participated in the training have reportedly applied the learning in their Madrasah, leading to improved capacity in delivery of quality education demonstrated by improved teaching practice[[66]](#endnote-44). The success of mentoring services is more nuanced, due to the high variation in the quality of the mentors themselves, and the intensity and quality of their oversight (by SNIPs).

Direct support to Madrasah, in the form of block grants, appears effective: analysis of the Phase 1 endline data indicates that improvement in supported madrasah has exceeded the target of the MoRA Renstra (50% B or better) with an estimated 92% of targeted Madrasah achieving B or A and with greater improvement in MI levels than MTs[[67]](#endnote-45). Based on a preliminary analysis of Phase 2 progress, the POM EBR identifies Madrasah preparedness to receive the grant as a critical factor of success, i.e. the initial planning and budgetary allocations for the grant and the socialisation strategies employed by Madrasah to raise community awareness and support. While there are some concerns that EP block grants may inhibit other external funding and community support, there is so far no indication that it does.

* + 1. Impact

The expected impacts remain unclear at this stage, though two categories can be distinguished: individual impact at individual madrasah level (e.g. change in quality of education services and in madrasah capacity to attract external support) and systemic impact at nationwide/targeted provinces level (change in capacity to support and assess madrasah continuous improvement process). Whilst the impact on participating madrasah is likely to be high, the level of systemic change generated and/or supported by the EP remains uncertain.

Tangible and incremental gains, such as improvements in facilities’ condition and teaching quality, are already observable in individual Madrasah, mostly in madrasah that receive block grants but also in non-participating madrasah that still receive SNIP support. As reported in the SSQ evaluation of Phase 1, changes in the latter category are greater than expected and cover both physical and management issues. These changes may, in part, be spurred on by the sharing of participating Madrasahs’ learning and experience in Madrasah Principal Working Groups (KKM) and by the follow-up support provided by supervisors. It is therefore suggested that significant gains to the quality of Madrasah may be achievable by supporting KKM and the improvement in the quality of supervisors.

Less observable are general changes in the madrasah capacity to attract financial or technical support from sources outside the EP. That is unsurprising as this is mainly based on the assumption that as the quality of the Madrasah is seen to improve, community (and other) support for the Madrasah will increase, leading to increased financial and in-kind support to the Madrasah. Therefore any substantial change would not be expected for some time after observable improvements to Madrasah have occurred. There are no indications of a decrease in funding from other sources during the period of support[[68]](#endnote-46).

The current perspective on systemic change is less favourable; as a legacy of the EP design, there continues to be no clarity about the nature of the EP support to systemic change and the expected results. This situation, coupled with the absence of a MoRA strategic framework for Madrasah continuous quality improvement, jeopardises the ability to scale-up benefits of the EP investment: the impact of the EP achievements risks being restricted to participating Madrasah, or at the very best to non-participating Madrasah in SNIP supported provinces.

* + 1. Sustainability

The extent to which EP supported achievements and benefits will be sustained remains uncertain. There is a lack of clarity on the nature of the benefits to be sustained and on how this will be achieved. There is a risk that MoRA fails to provide meaningful support to implement or adapt the quality of the improvement model tested and developed under the EP once the program finishes in 2016[[69]](#endnote-47). In addition, there is uncertainty about BAN S/M resources and their capacity to include Madrasah in the accreditation process beyond the period of the Memorandum of Understanding.

Against this backdrop and given its current level of resources, it is unrealistic to expect UPPAM to be able to facilitate a system to support accreditation of Madrasah across Indonesia without significant change. Additional resources are required and greater consideration of the design of a sustainable system.

* 1. **What does this mean for the EP? The bottom-line**

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 9, below. The ratings scale used with the DFAT QRS (QAI and ICR) has been adopted. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, on increasing the likelihood of achieving EOPO 3 are made in Table 10 below.

Table 9: Component 3 scorecard

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **2013 Score** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| **Relevance** | 4 | * Most factors of Madrasah performance are covered in the EP design. * Weak consideration/ focus on community engagement. * Expected changes at systemic level are not well delineated. | * Factors influencing Madrasah performance have been defined based on a preliminary analysis of Phase 2 activities. * Block grant socialisation is thought to be instrumental in stimulating community engagement. |
| **Efficiency** | 5 | * Implementation is contracted to the SSQ managing contractor; there are no substantial delays and disbursements are on track. * Efficiency of support could be increased through targeting madrasah with lower initial standards. | * The efficiency of the outsourcing model could be examined as part of a VFM assessment. |
| **Effectiveness** | 4 | * Tangible and observable incremental gains are evident at Madrasah level, including in some non-participating Madrasah. * In the absence of clear systemic change, the EP benefits may be restricted to individual Madrasah. | * Results of the BAN S/M accreditation process might soon highlight the extent of the effectiveness of Madrasah support. |
| **Impact** | TE |  | * It is still too early to confidently assess the impact of EP activities – the first phase of support has just been finalised in December 2013. |
| **Sustainability** | 2 | * Lack of clarity about achievements and benefits to be sustained, and absence of strategy compounded by project modality. * UPPAM mandate inconsistent with level of GoI resources. * Uncertainty about BAN-S/M resources and capacity to include Madrasah in the accreditation process beyond EP life. | * With the start of the second half of the EP period, considerations about the sustainability of EP achievements and their benefits become crucial. |

Table 10: Component 3 key findings and recommendations

| **Finding** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Lack of clarity about expected changes at systemic level from EP support (see §4.4.4) | R9: DFAT and MoRA should define and agree upon the nature and extent of systemic change expected. | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoRA (with SSQ facilitation as required) |
| Absence of a clear MoRA strategy for Madrasah continuous quality improvement (see §4.4.4) | R10: EP support to systemic change should encourage and be based on a clear and resourced MoRA strategy for supporting Madrasah continuous quality improvement. | \*\*\* | MoRA (with DFAT and SSQ facilitation as required) |
| The average cost to achieve an increase in one level for a Madrasah initially accessed as a level B is over four times more than that to achieve a one level gain for a Madrasah initially assessed as a TT (see §4.4.2) | R11: There should be an explicit and systematic targeting of beneficiary Madrasah with low initial standards (TT if possible). | \*\* | SSQ |
| Impact of EP may be restricted to target Madrasah, while there exist other effective channels to spread benefits to non-target Madrasah (see §4.4.4) | R12: EP should continue and increase engagement with sub-national institutions to develop and seek support for non-targeted Madrasah, including engagement with KKM and Madrasah supervisors. | \* | SSQ |
| EP design does not explicitly target community engagement, an influential factor of Madrasah performance (see §4.4.1) | R13: EP should develop, support and monitor measures to better involve other key, but currently untargeted stakeholders (e.g. committee members, *yayasan* and community members) in Madrasah quality improvement strategies. | \*\* | SSQ (with POM support as required) |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*

# **Component 4: Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership**

## **An introduction**

### The EP investment

Component 4 of the EP seeks to promote the use of evidence in developing and implementing education sector policies, plans and budgets. It does so through the activities of the Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP). The ACDP organizes, coordinates and responds to requests from relevant GoI ministries, most notably Bappenas, MoEC and MoRA, for analytical activities, such as discrete policy research studies. Participating policy-makers are expected to utilize the analytical work to inform education sector policy, planning and budgeting (EOPO 4). This, in turn, is expected to make a contribution to improved sector governance (Goal 3)[[70]](#footnote-23).

### The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

The Government of Australia and the European Union (EU) provide approximately USD 50[[71]](#footnote-24) million to support implementation of the ACDP. The ACDP technical oversight group (ATOG) is co-chaired by the Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Culture in Bappenas, the Head of Balitbang (MoEC), and the Director General of Islamic Education (MoRA). The ATOG is scheduled to meet quarterly and is responsible for, *inter alia*, reviewing and approving ACDP’s annual workplan, approving reports, and organizing technical dialogue between the ADB, DFAT and the EU. ATOG membership includes senior officials from MoEC, MoRA, Bappenas, MoF, MoHA, DFAT and the EU.

ACDP’s executing agency is MoEC’s National Office for Research and Development (Balitbang), with its Head acting as Director of the ACDP. The ACDP Program Manager, who is the Head of the Centre for Research and Policy at the Balitbang, is responsible for day-to-day management of the program, and this includes preparing the annual workplans and budgets and coordinating dissemination and publication of ACDP reports.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is responsible for managing and administering the ACDP on behalf of the Balitbang. The ADB has contracted an Operational Management Team (OMT) and a Core Advisory Team (CAT) to provide technical support to the implementation of the program, with both teams being based in the ACDP Secretariat at Balitbang (MoEC). The OMT provides administrative and management support services such that the agreed activities and outputs are delivered in a timely and professional manner. Its primary responsibilities include procurement and subsequent oversight of contracted services. The CAT supports the ACDP Program Director and Program Manager with the preparation and implementation of ACDP activities.

All contract activities are procured through a competitive bidding process either among prequalified Indefinite Delivery Contacts (IDC) consortia or individually recruited consultants.

## **Context**

The ACDP started in January 2011 and is expected to close in 2015. From a national perspective, this year’s commentary about C4 progress is timely for several reasons:

* The ACDP has passed its mid-point and is nearly three years into implementation;
* The ACDP is expected to contribute to the achievement of GoI education objectives and targets, as outlined in the current MoEC and MoRA Renstras, both of which are due to expire in 2014,
* The Presidential elections in mid-2014 are likely to usher in changes to political appointees and key civil servants in target ministries.

With three years of relative stability soon to give way to some uncertainty in the political, policy and institutional environment within which ACDP operates, it is imperative that the most is made out of the gains made to date and that ACDP is steered successfully through the changes ahead.

From an international perspective, the ACDP modality offers learning opportunities for those donors investing in Knowledge-to-Policy (K2P) processes: a theme that is receiving increasing attention amongst development partners, and which has broader relevance to DFAT in Indonesia, e.g. see the ongoing Knowledge Sector Initiative. Of utmost important is the implicit assumption that decision-makers develop policy based on objective, high-quality evidence.

## **Achievements**

The ACDP has made steady progress to date. As at the end of November 2013 it had procured 25 activities and had planned an additional seven activities to be launched in the first half of 2014. Together, these 32 activities would constitute over USD 26m of contracted commitments (see Table 11).

Table 11: Progress against ACDP workplan (as at 30 November 2013)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Theme** | **Comment** |
|
| **# of procured activities** | 25 |
| **# of person-months procured through IDC consortia** | 687  of which 140 person months (20%) are for international TA and 547 person months (80%) are for national TA |
| **Value of contracted commitments (USD)** | 19,629,052  It is expected that an additional 7,623,505 will be contracted before the end of May 2014 |

*Source: Prouty pers. comm. to POM, 26 November 2013*

The ACDP brought a number of pieces of work to conclusion in 2013, including the School and Madrasah Principals and Supervisors Competencies Baseline Study (ACDP 007). It has organized over 100 workshops, meetings and training events to date, attracting more than 3000 participants[[72]](#footnote-25).

The ACDP has recorded several significant ‘wins’. For example:

* The recommendations made in Early Childhood Development Strategy Study (ACDP 001) were included in the Presidential Decree on Holistic Integrated – Early Childhood Development (HI-ECD)[[73]](#endnote-48).
* The content of Madrasah Education Financing Study (ACDP 003) informed discussions between the Ministers of Religious Affairs and of Home Affairs about Madrasah financing.[[74]](#endnote-49).

There is also anecdotal evidence that GoI and development partners responded favourably to the Background Report on the Education Sector in Indonesia (ACDP 002), with strong ministerial buy-in in advance of the upcoming OECD review[[75]](#endnote-50).

## **Analysis**

### Relevance

The investment choice – that of providing policy-relevant evidence and advice to key GoI ministries – remains relevant, and the upcoming election and planning cycle in 2014-15 offers further scope to influence decision making. Should that be the case, the return on ACDP investment could be high. Nevertheless, the extent of ACDP’s relevance may be undermined by any system inefficiencies, i.e. the relevance of individual outputs inevitably declines should windows of opportunity be missed. Equally, it is frequently realized that the uptake of evidence is informed by a complex array of political-institutional factors. How and when ACDP navigates these complexities, and the extent to which it uses brokers or intermediaries or indeed sees itself as a broker in K2P processes, is unclear to POM[[76]](#footnote-26).

ACDP’s interest in supporting activities that address sub-national interests and clients (e.g. in Papua) is noteworthy and reflects a desire for the ACDP to remain relevant and responsive to needs. This is also well in line with the decentralized nature of the education sector and with the effort of other DFAT programs to support such realities.

### Efficiency

As at 31 December 2013, ACDP had expended USD 10,855,256 (21.7%) of its c. USD 50m allocation. Contract commitments were valued at USD 19,955,290, with a further USD 7,268,100 expected to be committed between 01 January and 30 June 2014. Of the total USD 40,211,000 allocated to Technical Cooperation Services (i.e. output delivery) between 2011 and 2015, USD 14,081,558 was committed as at 31 December 2013, with a further USD 6,922,000 expected to be committed before 30 June 2014[[77]](#endnote-51). As such, USD 19,207,442 or 47.7% of the Technical Cooperation Services budget-line will likely remain uncommitted going into the last 18 months of ACDP life’s span.

ACDP is cognizant of the need to be responsive, relevant and timely. It has made a concerted effort to usher in a greater range of related products, such as policy briefs. Nevertheless, stakeholders remain concerned about three challenges:

* The ability of the ACDP to respond in a timely manner to the small ‘windows of opportunity’ that arise to provide key decision-makers with critical information, e.g. on options, costings, and necessary actions[[78]](#footnote-27).
* The variable performance of IDC service providers (and the associated impact on the quality and timeliness of ACDP deliverables)[[79]](#footnote-28).
* Variable reporting standards (and the associated delays to ACDP deliverables).

ACDP itself acknowledges its mixed record of delivery to date[[80]](#endnote-52). More needs to be done to improve ACDP’s ‘value proposition’[[81]](#footnote-29) if it, and its outputs, are to be regarded as being of optimal worth to key stakeholders: the persistence or re-emergence of a track record of late delivery and of variable report quality will inevitably affect the cost-efficiency of the current arrangements (and, in turn, the extent to which it attains its broader objectives).

### Effectiveness

The ACDP aspires to inform, *inter alia*, the development/revision of education policies, regulations, strategies, systems, and programs. Whilst this is laudable, there is some degree of uncertainty about what would represent a good return on the AUD 50m investment, in part because the ACDP M&E Strategy does not provide outcome-level targets[[82]](#footnote-30). Without clarity about expected results, ACDP renders itself open to criticism about its effectiveness and whether the costs are aligned with expected (and actual) benefits.

As noted above, ACDP’s output to date has contained a large number of studies that require a number of months to conceive, procure and then deliver. Whilst there is a role for ‘lengthy’ studies, it is appropriate to ask whether the weighting put on such studies offers the most effective way for ACDP to pursue its intended outcome. (It should be noted that ACDP’s CAT reports that it has successfully argued for smaller sample sizes than proposed by GoI clients).

The day-to-day operations of the ACDP are shaped by the actions of the Secretariat. As such, it should add value at both a strategic level and at an operational level, e.g. during activity identification, during quality assurance/enhancement, and in post-activity follow-up. Nevertheless, there appears to be a lack of consensus about whether ACDP’s role, and that of its sub-contractors, is (or should be) to *inform* or to *influence* decision-making (see the EOPO[[83]](#footnote-31)), and what, in turn, that means for personnel requirements, the content of ACDP deliverables and perhaps the ways in which the Secretariat and the IDC engage with the client. Equally, there appears to be uncertainty about the extent to which the Secretariat is the client or a service provider to the ultimate client, and what that means for internal quality assurance processes.

DFAT, like many donor agencies, reports a desire to engage with its counterpart government in an informed and strategic manner and, in so doing, to use its investment to leverage greater development (and other) returns. In principle the ACDP offers DFAT such an opportunity, though it is important to temper such an ambition with an acknowledgement that development partners have less scope to influence policy-making in a dynamic, well-resourced middle-income country such as Indonesia than in many less developed countries where ministries are reliant on the financial and non-financial support of donor agencies[[84]](#footnote-32). Nevertheless, there appeared to be comparatively minimal engagement between DFAT and ACDP in 2013, and it is apparent that GoA could make more of ACDP’s frequent engagement with individuals in key ministries[[85]](#footnote-33). The ACDP Secretariat would look favourably on such measures and POM notes DFAT’s recent appointment of a staff member dedicated to technical and managerial liaison with the ACDP. Equally, the virtues of the ACDP being regarded as the fourth component of the Education Partnership are recognized by most EP stakeholders but there is clear scope for more formal engagement across the component parts of the EP; where frequent dialogue exists between the ACDP and other parts of the EP it usually stems from personal relationships and prior engagement[[86]](#footnote-34) rather than a concerted effort to synergize the EP components.

### Impact

ACDP seeks to make a contribution to “the implementation of Indonesia’s medium to long term national development policies, including poverty reduction, social development, and improved regional and global economic competiveness. This includes national education sector policies and ACDP indicators at the impact level include key education sector performance indicator targets”[[87]](#endnote-53). This is evidently a long-term ambition. Much depends on ACDP’s correct reading of and response to the political landscape; much may also depend on good fortune. What is certain is that its contribution to improved sector performance before 2016 will be minimal given lag times between product conception and delivery, resultant policy change, and its subsequent bearing on sector performance. Given the plethora of factors that drive sector performance and the uncertain associated timeframes one cannot state with any confidence the likelihood of ACDP making a definite and sizeable (however defined) contribution to sector performance. The upcoming finalization of the PMF coupled with POM’s evaluation studies and routine ACDP monitoring and reporting, will inevitably assist capture of results in 2014 and 2015.

### Sustainability

ACDP was conceived as a means to an end; the Secretariat will not be sustained after the lifetime of the donor investment. Nevertheless, ACDP and therefore the GoI will secure sustained benefits if recommendations made within specific ACDP deliverables are acted upon.

## **What does this mean for the EP? The bottom-line**

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 12, below. The ratings scale used with the DFAT QRS (QAI and ICR) has been adopted. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, on increasing the likelihood of achieving EOPO 4 are made in Table 13, below.

Table 12****: Component 4 scorecard****

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **2013 Score** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| **Relevance** | 4 | * Investment in policy processes remains highly relevant but ACDP’s relevance will be undermined if/where ‘windows of opportunity’ are missed. |  |
| **Efficiency** | 3 | * Not infrequent replacement of consultants * Delays to submissions * Variable quality of reporting |  |
| **Effectiveness** | 4 | * The long lifecycle of many ACDP activities is seemingly inconsistent with the political realities of decision-making * Nevertheless, examples of evidence utilization can be cited, e.g. ACDP 001. | * ACDP should consider options to better bundle findings, i.e. so evidence is provided by theme and not just by report-by-report |
| **Impact** | TE | * Likelihood is unknown and depends on a number of factors. As such, it is very difficult to provide an accurate, defensible score * The likelihood of a number of ACDP outputs having impact-level benefits is very uncertain but should one have a direct, significant and meaningful effect on a key policy the impact of the ACDP could be significant. | * ACDP’s six-monthly reports would benefit from improved tracking/reporting of post-report measures and results. * POM’s upcoming evaluation study will support understanding of policy processes and ACDP’s impact in that regard. |
| **Sustainability** | 4 | * Sustained benefits will accrue should key report recommendations be implemented. * Insufficient routine capture, tracking and reporting of changes to the policy environment after completion of individual activities limits the extent to which POM can state with confidence that (specific) sustained benefits are likely. | * The modality – the ACDP delivery vehicle – will not be sustained and is not expected to out-live the EP.   The extent to which benefits (e.g. changes to policy content and subsequent implementation) are likely to continue after ACDP closure depends, in part, on the extent to which ACDP and its individual activities have successfully ushered in improved understanding of and attitudinal change and created ‘space’ for meaningful policy-related discussion about the issues. |

Table 13****: Component 4 key findings and recommendations****

| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The ACDP remains insufficiently agile and responsive to the needs of its client (see §5.4.2) | R14: ACDP should continue to revise and diversify its product offering (activity types) such that it is responsive and timely, and offers value for money. | \*\* | ACDP (with guidance from the ATOG) |
| ACDP processes and events offer DFAT opportunity to engage in more strategic dialogue with key GoI officials but this potential is under-exploited (see §5.4.3) | R15: DFAT should better articulate how, when and why it seeks to gain strategic value from its investment in the ACDP. | \*\* | DFAT (with ACDP support as required) |
| EP implementing partners (e.g. SSQ and POM) have a patchy understanding of upcoming ACDP events (see §5.4.3) | R16: DFAT/ACDP should make a concerted effort to identify cross-component links and to flag relevant upcoming events such that ACDP becomes a more integral part of the EP and that synergies are exploited. | \* | DFAT and ACDP |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*



**Part B: Zooming out**

***Cross-cutting issues***

1. **Beneficiaries**
   1. **Identification of beneficiary groups**

Specific beneficiary groups for the EP can be identified as:

* The immediate beneficiaries of EP investment, e.g. the eligible entities in C2, the SNIPs in C3, the Madrasah receiving block grants in C3, and those decision-makers making requests of ACDP in C4.
* The intermediate beneficiaries, i.e. those receiving benefit through the immediate beneficiaries, such as the principals and supervisors securing PD (C2) and the madrasah receiving support from the SNIPs in C3.
* The ultimate beneficiaries, i.e. the students.

As noted in the 2012 APPR, it is reasonable to expect that the nature and timing of impacts will vary. For example:

* Immediate and intermediate beneficiaries should secure benefits in the short to medium term, i.e. within the next three to five years.
* The ultimate beneficiaries – the students – may receive some benefits in the short-term (e.g. where they are enrolled in a new school) but they may only receive other intended benefits in the medium to long-term (e.g. 3-10 years), particularly where changes to service provision and ultimately learning outcomes are dependent on changes to an improved policy environment, system performance etc.
  1. **Analysis**
     1. Social inclusion

Social Inclusion (SI) typically concerns the pursuit of *equal opportunity*. It requires the identification of who is prone to exclusion (e.g. because of gender, location, disability, language) and requires that a program ensures, insofar as possible, that the identified groups receive *equal access* to opportunities, resources, information etc. In so doing, a program might promote, for example, equal investment in training opportunities for men and women.

From a design and delivery perspective, it is praiseworthy that discrete elements of the EP contain dedicated SI-related investments, e.g. the construction of ramps and accessible toilets for children with physical disabilities, and the inclusion of SI subject matter in training modules. Moreover, Implementing Partners have taken steps to address SI. SSQ, for example, has developed a range of SI Guidelines and associated tools, and these are being used during implementation. ACDP has also commissioned or completed several relevant reports, including a *Review of a Decade of Gender Mainstreaming in Education*.

Nevertheless, these gains are offset by the continued absence of an EP SI strategy or framework (see the 2012 APPR). As such, the EP lacks, *inter alia*:

* A definition of social inclusion, and a statement about why the Governments of Australia and Indonesia deem it to be important.
* An articulation of the EP’s broad approach to social inclusion[[88]](#footnote-35).
* An articulation of boundaries and omissions, e.g. because DFAT and/or GoI believe there is no demand, or insufficient limited funds, or because of an absence of a suitable entry-point, or because others are doing it, etc.
* An articulation of what the EP believes can be done and what it expects to deliver by 2016.

In the absence of a SI strategy, it remains unclear what the EP feels it should be doing with respect to SI and what targets, if any, the EP has set itself. DFAT and partners are not obliged to monitor which groups are capturing benefit from EP investments[[89]](#footnote-36). As such, POM cannot make a judgment call on progress and sufficiency of achievements.

* + 1. Social targeting

The notion of social targeting is related to social inclusion but is different. It concerns the pursuit of *equitable outcomes* (vis-à-vis the pursuit of *equal opportunity*). It goes beyond social inclusion by seeking to ensure that benefits are distributed fairly. The basis for social targeting will vary depending on the overarching objectives but it would typically entail making investments that address the specific needs of particular vulnerable groups, ensuring, insofar as possible, that program resources are directed predominantly to those intended groups. As such, it is consistent with the notion of ‘leaving no-one behind’, something that appears to be emerging as a core theme in the new Australian government’s aid framework.

The EP design does not explicitly uses social targeting to focus favourably on specific vulnerable groups. In the absence of an SI strategy, this omission has not been restored and it constrains the ability of the EP to target specific vulnerable groups.

* + 1. Outcomes-led targeting

Echoing the concept of social targeting but differing in its purpose, the notion of outcomes-led targeting relates to a systematic focus on those stakeholders that will increase the likelihood of the stated program objectives (in the case of the EP, the EOPOs) being achieved. EP implementation already employs this notion, though with variable intensity and success across the components. Given the mid-point stage of the EP and the importance of focusing on higher level achievements, it is worth considering the value of explicitly targeting categories of beneficiaries to strengthen the chances of reaching the EOPOs. Whilst care needs to be taken not to trade-off the promotion of long-lasting systemic change with the achievement of (sometimes narrower) EP objectives, outcomes-led targeting of EP beneficiaries could certainly be improved across EP components and could facilitate realisation of the EOPOs.

As an example, the intention of C1 is to improve access to nine years of basic education for boys and girls in un-served and under-served areas, but the supply-led approach to the challenge of enrolment does not represent effective targeting. The “one size fits all” approach to eligibility criteria, technical requirements and infrastructure solutions is inconsistent with the geographical realities of Indonesia and institutional partners’ desire to make incremental improvements to GER[[90]](#endnote-54). Moreover, the criterion upon which beneficiary districts are selected (district GER) represents an unreliable measure of demand (only) at an aggregated level which fails to represent demand within a realistic catchment area of selected sites.

As a further example, the baseline capacity of Madrasah benefiting from C3 support has a demonstrated, significant and inversely proportional effect on the likelihood and the extent of change achievable[[91]](#endnote-55). The SSQ baseline assessment for Phase 1 demonstrates that only 37% of the Madrasah supported under Phase 1 were below the designated pass rate to achieve the eight NES prior to receiving C3 support[[92]](#footnote-37). While this situation is indicative of poor efficiency, it also jeopardizes the effectiveness of the support provided and, in turn, reduces the likelihood of achieving the EOPO.

* 1. **What does this mean for the EP? The bottom-line**

A list of recommendations is presented in **Table 14**.

**Table 14: Beneficiaries key findings and recommendations**

| **Finding** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| There remains a lack of clarity about the targeting of specific categories of beneficiary to increase the likelihood of EOPO achievement (see §6.2.3) | R17: Institutional partners should identify categories of beneficiaries whose targeting will increase the likelihood of EOPO achievement, and devise a targeting strategy for each component. | \*\*\* | DFAT and institutional partners (with POM support as required) |
| There remains a lack of clarity about social inclusion objectives and targets (see §6.2.1) | R18: Institutional partners should finalise and implement a social inclusion strategy that outlines objectives, boundaries, indicators and targets; and describes what the EP aspires to, i.e. what it should be doing, and not just what it is doing. | \*\*\* | DFAT and institutional partners (with POM support as required) |
| There is an unclear distinction between equality and equity in the design and implementation of the EP (see §6.2) | R19: Institutional partners should clarify the extent to which equity is an objective of the EP and, where appropriate, explore EP targeting objectives and review selection criteria and targeting mechanisms. | \*\* | DFAT and institutional partners (with POM support as required) |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*

1. **Management and Governance**
   1. **Governance and management arrangements**

The EP is governed under the same structure as that which applies to the ESSP. The ESSP Governance Oversight Group (GOG) is mandated to meet at least once every six months and is co-chaired by the Vice-Minister of MoEC and the Secretary General of MoRA. Membership includes representatives from MoEC, MoRA and Bappenas, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs, DFAT and the EU.

The GOG is responsible for, *inter alia*, program alignment with emerging sectoral priorities; monitoring performance against the targets set in the ESSP Joint Results Framework (JRF); facilitating GoI, DFAT and EU involvement and support for ESSP monitoring and evaluation processes; and, providing high level strategic responses to monitoring reports and so as to guide program direction.

The MoEC’s Bureau of Planning and International Cooperation is identified as Secretariat and is nominally charged with responsibility for organisation of an Annual Program Review and the coordination of information and analysis related to the attainment of JRF targets. The program review reports form a basis for disbursement of EU funds and, in theory, it should also inform decisions on DFAT disbursement. In theory, DFAT uses monitoring and evaluation findings and recommendations to inform policy dialogue withGoI through engagement with the GOG.

In addition to the GOG, four Technical Oversight Groups[[93]](#footnote-38) (TOGs) have been established to coordinate planning and progress under each of the four program components. They are scheduled to meet every three months. They are co-chaired by designated MoEC and MoRA representatives, GoA and the EU, and are responsible for approving workplans and procurement plans; the coordination and approval of major technical reports; and, ongoing management, monitoring and oversight of the delivery of the ESSP.

At a day-to-day level, the EP is managed by the Basic Education Unit of the Development Cooperation Section of the Jakarta Office of DFAT. The EP is delivered through a blend of aid modalities including earmarked budget support (C1, C2), project support (C3), and a financial contribution as part of multi-donor support (C4).

* 1. **Analysis**
     1. Modalities and transactional management

The blend of modalities represents a sound and appropriate response to the operational environment. It appears to offer good opportunity to pilot and trial initiatives through project support and build capacity through systems development, whilst instilling and supporting GoI ownership. That should, in principle, increase the likelihood of long-term impacts and sustainability, whilst also guaranteeing tangible output delivery.

From an operational perspective, the blend of modalities and the use of managing contractors provide opportunity for institutional partners (through the GOG) to alter their tactics in response to emerging risks and opportunities. There is evidence of this occurring. In C1, for example, SSQ’s role had originally been envisioned as provider of technical support to MoEC, specifically with regards to monitoring progress and quality. However, SSQ has increasingly been involved in supporting MoEC in all aspects of program implementation: site selection and verification; school proposal review, data management, resolution of issues at field level; and providing resource persons and technical support.

The apparent shift in C1 is praiseworthy insofar as it is critically important for development partners to deliver outputs and show the tangible results of aid investments: DFAT, MoEC and SSQ took an appropriate managerial decision to bolster SSQ’s role and resources such that partners were more likely to offer timely delivery of expected outputs. Nevertheless, measures that improve efficiency and increase the likelihood of short-term results can have detrimental effects on ownership and therefore the prospects for sustainability and the probability of long-term results. As such, ongoing monitoring and capacity building activities will need to be prioritized in 2014 if the impressive operational gains are to be cemented and sustained post-2016.

* + 1. Transactional management vs. transformational engagement

DFAT’s Basic Education Unit places a heavy emphasis on transactional management, i.e. undertaking managerial activities that enable the timely delivery of contracted deliverables. For example, current EP management decisions appear to be predominantly driven by prescriptive commitments to output achievements, e.g. numbers of schools built, numbers of madrasah accredited, and numbers of reports produced. To an extent, that is an understandable and rational response to the current aid climate, in which importance is placed on the identification and management of risk and the demonstration of the “tangible results” of aid programing. There is, however, an associated cost: the merits of and opportunity for transformational engagement is often overlooked.

The timely delivery of program outputs should be regarded as an increased opportunity to secure higher-level gains, i.e. the EOPO-level targets. The EOPOs, and even more so the aspirational goals to which the EP contributes, are outside of the direct control of DFAT. Their achievement requires a different style of management and engagement; it requires DFAT to adopt the philosophy and practices of ‘transformational engagement’, i.e. strategic and politically attuned engagement that tackles issues concerning the policy and sector governance environment. The need for such engagement becomes ever greater as a program exits its inception phase and grows in maturity. At present, however, the deployment of DFAT’s Basic Education Unit’s resources appears to be disproportionally skewed towards transactional management at the expense of transformational engagement. If this is true, it may be that the EP misses the opportunity to really cement its output-level gains. As such, it runs the risk of delivering sub-optimal returns on Australia’s investment in Indonesia’s education service.

Critical to guaranteeing effective transformational engagement is strong inter-government liaison between the institutional champions (and owners) of the EP. The GOG and TOGs offer an appropriate platform for this dialogue but they need to be effectively harnessed to do so. Practically speaking, it may end up being less formal engagement that paves the way for the formal meeting that is crucial.

* + 1. Results framework

The EP is Australia’s largest ever bilateral aid program and AUD 524m remains a very significant investment by Australia. It is therefore right that expected development results be articulated and that decision-makers and implementers be held to account for program performance. Not everything will go according to plan: aid is an inherently risky business, change is complex and large programs are complicated. However, without a clear line of sight on expected results at output, outcome and goal level, it is difficult to track and assess the direction and speed of travel against expectations.

The 2012 APPR recommended that the EP logic be updated and that a Performance Milestone Framework be developed that would allow for an objective assessment of progress against targets. Both remained incomplete as at the end of December 2013. The task of developing and/or reviewing them has proved to be arduous, not least because there has been some difficulty in clearly articulating the rationale for Australia’s investment and the outputs and outcomes to be expected. This has, in turn, hampered the speed with which indicators, baselines, annual milestones and end-of-program targets have been discussed and agreed by key stakeholders.

So long as these important tools remain absent then:

* It remains difficult for POM and other EP stakeholders to capture the extent of progress to date, and to assess whether that represents an acceptable level of performance.
* The need for – the merits of – DFAT to participate in transformational engagement with GoI can be overlooked because there is little explicit requirement for it.
* Processes of vertical and horizontal accountability[[94]](#footnote-39) remain somewhat shallow because of the incomplete evidence base typically required to support such discussions.

There are opportunities for change. Indeed, there is an appetite for change. A recurrent theme during the APPR production process was the desire amongst implementing partners for stronger engagement on strategic issues between institutional partners and this will become increasingly important as systemic and transformational change is targeted.

* + 1. Governance

The distinction between governance, management and implementation may on occasions become blurred, and some organisations (DFAT and GoI, for example) have dual roles to play. Regardless of the potential blurring of responsibilities, there is unequivocal demand, on behalf of implementing partners, for strategic clarity to be provided by the institutional partners. In particular, this is sought at outcome level. For example, in Component 3, there remains uncertainty about the extent and nature of systemic change desired. There is a need for strong leadership at an institutional level and it is not the role of implementing agencies and managing contractors to engage institutional partners at that level.

An elaborate, well-designed governance structure has been developed for the EP. Whilst the structure is complex and exists in parallel to GoI and GoA permanent organizational structures, this is probably inevitable and may be necessary given the range of actors and agencies involved in the EP. However, the frequency and the quality of collaboration and engagement with and between these senior levels of program governance are inconsistent and sub-optimal.

During 2013, one GOG meeting was held[[95]](#footnote-40) and six TOG meetings were held[[96]](#footnote-41). This represents only 50% and 37.5% respectively of the prescribed number (although it should be noted that three of four planned ATOG meetings were held). The low demand for meetings could point to either a lack of need or a lack of motivation, which may in turn point to concerns about their perceived usefulness.

Whilst the GOG is a necessary forum for the authorization of EU funding tranches, the extent to which performance information is used for strategic decision-making about the EP appears limited. It also appears that the governance meetings focus on the submission of output-level progress reports, with limited performance-related discussion at outcome level. This may be that there has been a dearth of performance-related information available to the forums but, going forward, if the governance structures are to be effective, they need to focus on higher level discussions with an action-oriented agenda.

If governance arrangements are not as influential as could be, any detrimental effect will most obviously be felt at the level of the program’s overall impact and sustainability and, to a lesser extent, on its relevance (and specifically where risks go unchecked). It is likely that program efficiency and effectiveness, where the direct management of the EP is operating well, will be less affected.

* + 1. Partnership

Whilst the concept of a “partnership” within the EP should manifest itself in clearly defined joint management arrangements, it more accurately reflects a philosophy, an intention or a commitment on behalf of the two governments to work together.

DFAT’s desire to work through GoI systems wherever possible is an illustration of a commitment to a partnership approach, and one that requires a mature, trusting relationship and joint ownership of successes and failures. That commitment is well received by GoI but the relationship can be tested when GoA seeks to impose its own management standards, most notably with respect to financial control, monitoring and reporting.

* 1. **What does this mean for the EP? The bottom-line**

A list of recommendations is presented in Table 15.

Table 15: Governance and management key findings and recommendations

| **Finding** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DFAT’s management of the EP is strong but tends to be prescriptive and predominantly output-focused(see §7.2.2) | R20: DFAT’s management of the EP should be more flexible and adaptive, i.e. be more forward looking (at opportunities) than backward-looking (at the EP design). | \*\* | DFAT |
| DFAT resources focus on transactional management at the expense of transformational engagement (see §7.2.2) | R21: DFAT should prioritise (varied) strategic engagement with GoI: e.g. strategic discussion on C1 and C3; advocacy of current EP approach on C2; and broader policy engagement through C4. | \*\*\* | DFAT |
| The updating of the EP logic architecture and the development of a PMF has not yet been finalised (see §7.2.3) | R22: The articulation and agreement on the EP logic and the finalisation and socialisation of the Performance Milestone Framework (PMF) should be prioritised. | \*\*\* | DFAT (with POM support) |
| GOG and TOGs make limited use of performance information in strategic decision-making and governance meetings focus on output-level issues (see §7.2.4) | R23: Existing governance structures need to be more effectively engaged, utilizing performance evidence to inform strategic, higher-level decisions. | \*\* | DFAT and GoI through GOG and TOGs |
| GOG and TOG meetings are not held in line with the designated scheduling which suggests a lack of need or a lack of motivation (see §7.2.4) | R24: Institutional partners should identify potential for stronger linkages between POM and governance structures, possibly in a secretariat role. | \*\* | DFAT and GoI (with POM support) |

*NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency*



**Part C: Conclusions**

# **Conclusions**

December 2013 represents the mid-point in the implementation of Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. As such, it is an appropriate time to take stock of progress and to reflect on achievements to date. More importantly it is a time to use those reflections to guide the EP in its second half of implementation.

Table 16, below, provides a summary table of the scores assigned to the individual EP components. The table presents mean scores for each DAC criterion, and whilst they do not represent a “whole of EP” assessment, they do provide some guidance for the future.

Table 16: Combined scorecard

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **C1 Score** | **C2 Score** | **C3 Score** | **C4 Score** | **Mean EP Score** | **Rounded EP Score** |
| **Relevance** | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | **4.25** | **4.00** |
| **Efficiency** | 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 | **4.00** | **4.00** |
| **Effectiveness** | 3 | TE | 4 | 4 | **3.66** | **4.00** |
| **Impact** | TE | TE | TE | TE | **TE** | **TE** |
| **Sustainability** | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | **3.25** | **3.00** |

Whilst the broad scope of the component interventions remains **relevant** with respect to national policies and priorities, two points are noteworthy. Any decline in the relative political importance of an EP investment may undermine expected results and should therefore be monitored closely. In addition, the extent to which program activities and outputs are fully consistent with the attainment of stated objectives is not always certain.


The EP scores well with respect to **efficiency**, reflecting pragmatic management choices and the attention paid to the achievement of tangible outputs. This short-term focus on transactional management is and will continue to be justified so long as the balance of attention now transfers to achieving higher order objectives and therefore to **effectiveness**. To that end, it is opportune at this mid-point of the EP to take stock of the situation, to re-focus attention on the achievement of the EOPOs, and to pursue measures that will enhance the probability of benefits being sustained. By committing to and targeting the achievement of the EOPOs (as well as the EOCOs), it is possible to build upon progress to date.

Whilst it is too early to make a definitive judgment on the achievement of **impact**, it is apparent that the prospects for impact will be enhanced should EP institutional partners place more emphasis upon systemic change. Again, the challenge for the EP managers is to weigh up the balance between short- and long-term benefits. The APPR argues that both can be achieved but that proactive management choices now need to be made in favour of securing longer term benefits. In a similar vein, the pursuit of **sustainability** requires greater engagement with subnational entities so as to ensure viability and ownership of outputs and outcomes.

By assigning scores to each of the components, it is hoped that this performance report provides a challenge and motivation for institutional partners and implementing agencies to increase the relevance of the EP interventions; improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their work; and enhance prospects for impact and sustainability.

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**Annexes**

Annex I – EP Logic Architecture

Annex II – Interpretation of DAC Criteria

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Criterion** | **Key considerations** |
| Relevance\* | * The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of target beneficiaries, GoI and GoA. * The extent to which the objectives of the EP/Component remain valid. * The extent to which needs, and political and policy priorities, have evolved from stated policies. * The extent to which the activities and outputs are consistent with EP Goals and the attainment of EOPOs. * The extent to which activities and outputs are consistent with intended impacts and effects [EOPOs and Goals]. |
| Efficiency | * The cost-efficiency of EP activities. * The extent to which objectives are achieved on time. * The efficiency of modalities compared to realistic alternatives. |
| Effectiveness | * The extent to which the EP/Components are achieving the intended outcomes, i.e. the EOPOs. * The key drivers of the achievements (or failures). * The real differences made to beneficiaries as a result of the EP investment. * The magnitude of the differences. |
| Impact | * The extent to which the EP/Components are making a demonstrable contribution to intended Goals. * The key drivers of the achievements (or failures). * Positive and negative changes produced by the EP, either directly or indirectly, and intended or unintended. * The real differences made to beneficiaries as a result of the EP investment. * The magnitude of the differences. |
| Sustainability | * The extent to which the benefits of EP investment are likely to continue after funding/support has been withdrawn. * The factors responsible for the achievement or failure of the sustainability objectives. |

\* There may be tension between current policy and emerging policy direction. Moreover, it is possible that an investment may be relevant in terms of ‘policy fit’ but irrelevant in the sense that activities and outputs may be inconsistent with intended program results.

Annex III - APPR Rating Scale (based on DFAT QRS [QAI and ICR])

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Rating scale** | |
| Less than satisfactory | Satisfactory |
| 1: Very poor quality; needs major overhaul | 4: Adequate quality; needs some work |
| 2: Poor quality; needs major work to improve | 5: Good quality |
| 3: Less than adequate quality; needs significant work | 6: Very high quality |
| TE: Too early to rate | |

Annex IV – List of Key Documents and Secondary Sources Reviewed

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Report** | **Date submitted** |
| GoI: AEPI Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion Quarterly Initiative Report No 1: March 2012 - September 2012 | October 2012 |
| ACDP Six Monthly Progress Report | End 2012 |
| AusAID: First Joint Monitoring Visit of School Construction – Engineering and Technical Evaluation Mission Back To Office Report #1 – December 7 - 21, 2012 | January 2013 |
| POM: Annual Partnership Performance Report 2012 | January 2013 |
| SSQ: ME005 What value are Field Monitors adding to the quality of construction? | January 2013 |
| POM Six monthly Report – July to December 2012 | January 2013 |
| POM: Education Partnership Social Inclusion Options Paper | January 2013 |
| AusAID: Field Monitoring Model in EP Component 1: Final Evaluation Report | February 2013 |
| GoI: AEPI Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion Quarterly Initiative Report No 2: September 2012 – February 2013 | March 2013 |
| SSQ: ME006 The relationship between compliance with finance and administration criteria and construction progress | March 2013 |
| SSQ: ME007 District & Provincial HRMD Training Evaluation | March 2013 |
| AusAID: Second Joint Monitoring Visit of School Construction – Engineering and Technical Evaluation Mission Back To Office Report #2 – February 18 - March 3, 2013 | March 2013 |
| SSQ mid-year Progress Report | May 2013 |
| POM: Education Partnership Health Check #2 | May 2013 |
| SSQ: ME008 Evaluation of Learning on CPD Pilot – Stage 1 of Evaluation | June 2013 |
| POM: Assessment of District Education Infrastructure Planning Capacity | June 2013 |
| SSQ: ME009 Evaluation of CPD Pilot - Stage 2 of Evaluation | June 2013 |
| ACDP Six Monthly Progress Report | Mid 2013 |
| AusAID: Annual Partnership Performance Report 2012 – Management Response | July 2013 |
| AusAID: BOS Training: Its Implementation, Impact and Implications for the Development of Indonesia’s Education System - An Independent Review | July 2013 |
| POM Six monthly Report – January to June 2013 | July 2013 |
| SSQ: Most Significant Change at Human Resources Management for District and Province | August 2013 |
| POM: C1 Annual Financial Statements Audit | September 2013 |
| POM: Baseline Report for Evaluation of EOPO 3 | November 2013 |
| POM: Annual Sector Monitoring Report | November 2013 |
| POM: Baseline Report for Evaluation of EOPO 1 | November 2013 |
| SSQ: ME010: Construction Quality Desk Top Review | November 2013 |
| SSQ: ME011: Evaluation of Support to Madrasah Achievement of Accreditation | November 2013 |
| POM: Annual Sector Financial Report | November 2013 |
| POM: C1 MoEC Internal Control and Compliance Review | Draft |
| POM: C1: School Construction Committee (SCC) Financial Compliance Audit | Draft |
| SSQ: Most Significant Change at Continuous Professional Development Program (Makassar, Aceh, Balikpapan, Yogyakarta) | Draft |
| POM: Compliance Review of Madrasah Accreditation Program | Draft |
| ACDP 001: Early Childhood Development Strategy Study | Draft |
| ACDP002: Country Background Report on the Education Sector In Indonesia | Draft |
| ACDP003: Madrasah Education Financing Study | Draft |
| ACDP005: Review of a Decade of Gender Mainstreaming in Education | Draft |
| ACDP007: School and Madrasah Principals and Supervisors Competencies Baseline Study | Draft |
| ACDP008: Evaluation of the Supplemental Food for School Children Program | Draft |
| ACDP: ESSP Results Framework Report 2013 | Draft |
| POM: Financial Audit of 2011 BOS Training Program | To be finalised |
| POM: Compliance Review of 2011 BOS Training Program | To be finalised |
| AusAID: Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia Social Inclusion Framework | To be finalised |

Annex V – EP Analytical Framework 2013

|  | **Overarching themes** | **Key Questions** | **Sub-Questions/Prompts** | **Main Sources of Information** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC criteria** | | | | |
| 1 | **Context** | To what extent and how do EP interventions remain appropriate to the Indonesian education sector? | * When considered from an education sector perspective, do the objectives of the EP remain valid? * Is the context in which the EP operates changing and do such changes open up opportunities or elevate risks for the EP? * Do the main foci of the EP still resonate with GoI RENSTRA and GoA development policy? * In the context of other donor and GoI interventions, are there more appropriate investments that GoA should be making in the sector? |  |
| 2 | **Modalities** | Is (Are) the current modality(ies) the most appropriate in delivering the EP? | * What are the positive and negative features of the partnership approach? * Has the “partnership” changed and/or become stronger over the last year? * Is there value in working through GoI systems (WiPS) and, if so, what is that value? * Are EP component modalities appropriate to implementation and/or should they change? |  |
| 3 | **Delivery mechanisms** | To what extent are the EP delivery mechanisms effective, efficient and accountable? | * What are the advantages and disadvantages of the different delivery mechanisms utilised? * Are more imaginative or flexible mechanisms considered and is the EP able to adjust its mechanisms? * Are Australian funds used for their intended purpose and is the transfer of funds safe and accountable? * Are the EP coordination and management arrangements sufficiently supporting the delivery of the interventions? |  |
| 4 | **Sustainability** | To what extent are EP benefits likely to be sustained beyond the life of the EP? | * Has sustainability of EP benefits been adequately considered in the design of the interventions? * Have specific constraints to sustainability been identified? * Do partner institutions demonstrate a level of ownership? * Has the level of funding to sustain benefits been considered and is it likely to be forthcoming? |  |
| 5 | **Beneficiaries** | How have EP interventions impacted upon beneficiaries? | * Have the direct and indirect beneficiaries of EP interventions been identified? * What are the expected and unexpected impacts on these beneficiaries? * Which potential beneficiaries are excluded? |  |
| **EOPO** | | | | |
| 6 | **Enrolment in Junior Secondary Education** | To what extent have EP interventions contributed to increase enrolment in participating district? | * What is the evidence of increased JSE enrolment in participating districts? * How do EP interventions contribute to increase in JSE enrolment in participating districts?   + Are EP interventions influencing motivation and incentives for student enrolment?   + Have EP interventions improved district capacity to plan and supply access to JSE? * Has the EP contribution been sufficient to justify the investment? |  |
| 7 | **Management of schools and**  **Madrasah** | To what extent has management of schools and Madrasah improved in participating districts? | * What is the evidence of improved management of schools and Madrasah in participating districts? * How do EP interventions contribute to improvement in schools and Madrasah management? * What’s the role of improving P and S competencies? * Has the EP contribution been sufficient to justify the investment? |  |
| 8 | **Quality of Madrasah service provision** | To what extent has the quality of Madrasah service provision improved (in line with NES) in targeted provinces? | * What is the evidence of improved quality of Madrasah service provision in targeted provinces? * How do EP interventions contribute to improved quality of Madrasah service provision in targeted provinces?   + How have SNIP and Block grants improved the quality of Madrasah service provision?   + What are the key factors of changes in community engagement or perception Madrasah quality? * Has the EP contribution been sufficient to justify the investment? |  |
| 9 | **Utilisation of analytical work in education sector policy, planning and budgeting** | To what extent have policy-makers utilised analytical work to inform education sector policy, planning and budgeting? | * What is the evidence of increase utilisation of analytical work to inform education sector policy, planning and budgeting? * How do EP interventions contribute to increase utilisation of analytical work to inform education sector policy, planning and budgeting?? * Has the EP contribution been sufficient to justify the investment? |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Social Inclusion** | | | | |
| 10 | **Gender** | To what extent has the EP promoted gender equality in the Indonesian education sector? | * Is it apparent which gender-related issues the EP is seeking to tackle? * Are the targets and targeting measures appropriate? * What are we learning about the different impacts of EP interventions on women and men, girls and boys? * Are EP interventions facilitating increased women’s empowerment and voice in decision-making and leadership? |  |
| 11 | **Disability** | To what extent has the EP promoted disability inclusive education in Indonesia? | * Is it apparent which disability-related issues the EP is seeking to tackle? * Are GoI and GoA policies related to disability being reflected in EP workstreams. * Are the targets and targeting measures appropriate? * What are we learning about the different impacts of EP interventions on people/children with disabilities? |  |
| 12 | **Poverty** | To what extent has the EP targeted poor people? | * Given GoA’s policy focus on poverty reduction:   + How have different components targeted poor people?   + How successful has the EP been in targeting poor people? * Who is capturing the benefits? * Is that in line with expectation? * Are the targets and targeting measures appropriate? |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Value for Money** | | | | |
| 13 | **Value for Money** | To what extent does the EP represent Value for Money? | * What do we mean by “value for money” in the EP? * Are there intra-component differences? * How is the EP tracking against agreed metrics? * What related considerations do we need to be mindful of, e.g. sustainability, comparability, relativity, risk, and broader GoA policy objectives? |  |

Annex VI – List of Key Persons Consulted

| **Name** | **Title** |
| --- | --- |
| H. Susetyo Widiasmoro | Head of Sub-directorate for Infrastructure and Facilities  DG Junior Secondary Education Development |
| Aziz Purwanto | Staff at the DG Junior Secondary Education Development |
| Dedi Karyana | Head of Infrastructure Unit DG Junior Secondary Education Development, MOEC |
| Maulani Mega Hapsari | Staff at the DG Junior Secondary Education Development |
| Prof. Dr. Syawal Gultom | Head of MOEC’s Agency for Human Resource Development and Education Quality Assurance |
| Prof. Dr. Phil. H. Nurkholis Setiawan | Director of Madrasah Education |
| Jean-Bernard Carrasco | Minister-Counsellor, DFAT |
| Hannah Birdsey | Counsellor, Education and Scholarships, DFAT |
| Jerry Strudwick | Lead Education Specialist, DFAT |
| Joanne Dowling | Unit Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT |
| Donny Syukri | Program Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT |
| Niken Wardhani | Program Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT |
| Jenny Donohoe | First Secretary, Development Cooperation, DFAT |
| Bia Puspita | Program Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT |
| Sri Novelma | Program Manager, Development Cooperation, DFAT |
| Sarah Leslie | Senior Program Manager, Development Cooperation |
| Julia Wheeler | Senior Program Manager, Development Cooperation |
| Sam Muller | Operations Manager, SSQ |
| Brian Spicer | Senior Education Quality Adviser, SSQ |
| Robert Kingham | Islamic Education Specialist, SSQ |
| Tania Dora Warokka | Monitoring & Evaluation Leader, SSQ |
| Jihad Saad | Component 1 Manager, School Construction, SSQ |
| Graham Dawson | Component 2 Manager, Education Quality, SSQ |
| Roslyn Davis | International Education Adviser (Professional Development), SSQ |
| Yaya Kardiawarman | Senior Professional Development Advisor, SSQ |
| Alison Atwell | International Adviser Provincial and District Development, SSQ |
| Abdul Munir | Component 3 Manager, Madrasah Accreditation, SSQ |
| Tjipto Prakosa | Data Analyst & Training Advisor, SSQ |
| Mokhamad Iksan | Sub-National Institutional Capacity Development Advisor, SSQ |
| John Virtue | Education Sector Governance & Capacity Development Advisor, ACDP |
| Alan Prouty | Team Leader (Operational Management Specialist), ACDP |
| David Harding | Senior Education Advisor, ACDP |
| Basilius Bengoteku | Education Sector Research and Capacity Planning Advisor, ACDP |
| Abdul Malik | Education Sector Research, Information & Accountability Advisor, ACDP |
| Bambang Indriyanto | Director, Center for Policy Research, MoEC |
| Karen Taylor | Operations Manager, EPOS |
| Sarah Gray | Public Affairs Specialist, EPOS |
| Joanne Dickinson | English Language Learning Specialist, EPOS |

Annex VII – ECBP M&E Standards Standard 3: Initiative Progress Reporting

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No** | **Feature of Progress Report** | **EP-APPR Compliance** |
| 3.1 | There is an executive summary that communicates the key information required for QAI reporting | See Executive Summary |
| 3.2 | The relevant aspects of the context are adequately described | Each component section has an individual section on Context |
| 3.3 | There is a reflection on the continuing relevance of the expected end-of-program outcomes | Each component section has an individual section on Relevance |
| 3.4 | An assessment of the adequacy of progress toward sustained end-of-program outcomes is described | Assessment of progress against DAC criteria are scored for each component |
| 3.5 | The quality, reach and coverage of key outputs or deliverables for the reporting period are described | Achievements are listed for each component |
| 3.6 | The adequacy of progress implementing the annual plan is described | n/a (implementing partners provide reporting against annual plans) |
| 3.7 | A reflection on the adequacy of planned inputs to meet the expected end-of-program outcomes is provided | Each component section has an individual section on Efficiency and Effectiveness |
| 3.8 | The adequacy of progress against the budget is assessed | Not done |
| 3.9 | The efficiency and effectiveness of key management or implementation system is assessed or demonstrated | Each component section has an individual section on Efficiency and Effectiveness and one section is dedicated to Governance and Management |
| 3.10 | The report achieves a fair balance between reporting of positive or negative issues or achievements | Quasi-independence of POM lends itself to this |
| 3.11 | The report provides credible evidence of claims made | Considerable evidence is presented to justify claims |
| 3.12 | Important lessons are summarised | Findings and associated recommendations are summarised in each section |

**F:\WORK\EPOS\REPORT & STATIONARY\emf\Red stripe.emfAustralia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia**

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1. The original budget for the Education Partnership was AUD 500m. A minute was signed by the Director General of AusAID on 23 April 2013, increasing the value of the EP from AUD 500m to AUD 524m. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. As at end of November 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The official target remains 2,000 schools but a revised target of around 1,400 was proposed by DFAT in the second half of 2013 based on an increase in school building unit costs, on the desired standard number of classrooms in each school type and on GoI requirements. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Grant Agreement Deed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
5. Schedule 1, Grant Agreement Deed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
6. Schedule 1, Grant Agreement Deed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
7. AusAID. Draft. The Education Partnership Theory of Change. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
8. Schedule 1, Grant Agreement Deed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
9. i.e. a change in practice and/or relationships which create better performance, e.g. in terms of the services received by end users. This may be because JSS expansion is winding down and will not be a priority area for GoI in the future. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
10. Grant Agreement Deed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
11. 450 schools have been completed with one school incomplete – some EP reporting reports 450 schools as the total number built. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
12. This assumes revised target of 1,400 schools proposed by DFAT is accepted. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
13. The number of new places available for first grade enrolment is calculated by multiplying the number of 7th Grade (JSE 1st year) classes by the maximum number of students allowed by NES (32 students). Thus, 161 USBs yield 322 classes plus 289 7th Grade classes in SATAP, totaling 611 classes. Multiplying this figure by 32 gives 19,552 new places. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
14. 268 proposals were received from low GER districts (GER <90%) equivalent to 43% of total proposal submission in 2013 and, from those proposals, only 102 were considered eligible and selected. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
15. SSQ. 2013. SSQ C1 Evaluation: What value are Field Monitors adding to the quality of construction? (ME005) [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
16. For the EOPO 1 baseline evaluation study, POM team interviewed 956 households about their decision to send their children to JSE. From 72 of those households that choose to not send their children to JSE, 54% (39 households) indicated a lack of perceived comparative advantage of JSE education vis-à-vis other activities (e.g. work and marriage). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
17. POM. Draft. EOPO 1 Evaluation Baseline Report. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
18. Based on the revised total number of schools to be built of around 1,400. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
19. EP. Draft. Performance Milestone Framework [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
20. The number of new places made available is calculated by multiplying the number of classes from all the three grades (7th, 8th, and 9th) by the maximum number of students allowed by NES (32 students). Thus, 161 USBs yield 966 classes plus 867 classes in SATAP, totaling 1,833 classes. Multiplying this figure by 32 gives 58,656 new places. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
21. EP POM undertook a baseline evaluation study in 2013 related to the achievement of EOPO 1. Endline data will be collected towards the end of the EP at which time a definitive judgement should be possible. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
22. The EOPO 1 evaluation baseline analyses a sample of Cycle 1 sites. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
23. The figure of 84,204 students is the enrolment target in the draft Performance Milestone Framework for C1. The calculation assumes that not all the available places created by the construction of new schools will translate into increased enrolment. The figure is calculated using an average of 12 students per class for SATAP and 24 students per class in USB. This figure also take account of the fact that, by June 2016, the Cycle 4 schools will have only just started to operate and will only have 7th grade students enrolled. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
24. AusAID. Draft. The Education Partnership Theory of Change. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
25. See Key Performance Indicator (KPI) 2 from the PAF: “The National System of Professional Development is managed and operationalized effectively.” [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
26. Schedule 1, Grant Agreement Deed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program. AusAID Agreement No. 64705. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
27. To be measured by, *inter alia*, pre- and post-tests conducted by SSQ. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
28. Schedule 1, Grant Agreement Deed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program. AusAID Agreement No. 64705. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
29. AusAID. Draft. The Education Partnership Theory of Change. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
30. AusAID. Draft. The Education Partnership Theory of Change. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
31. AusAID. Draft. The Education Partnership Theory of Change. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
32. Grant Agreement Deed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the Professional Development for Education Personnel through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program. AusAID Agreement No. 60472 [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
33. OECD, PISA. 2012. Results in Focus, What 15-year-olds know and what they can do with what they know, December 2013, p. 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
34. SSQ Component 2. Weekly update, 18 December 2013, p. 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
35. GoI-GoA. Procedures Manual First Edition, Appendix 4 – Draft PAF Version 2, September 2013, p.4. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
36. This includes MoEC Regulation No. 28 / 2010 and *Juklak* for PPCKS, CPD principal/PKB KS/M, PPKSPS and PPKPPD. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
37. SSQ Component 2. Weekly update, 29 January 2013, p.1. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
38. Directorate General for Treasury Regulation No. 49/PB/2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
39. SSQ Component 2. Weekly Update, 8 January 2014, p. 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
40. SSQ. District & Provincial HRMD Training Evaluation, March, 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
41. POM. Annual Sector Monitoring Report 2013. P. 29. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
42. SSQ. Annual Plan 2013, November 2012, p. 10. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
43. SSQ. Annual Plan 2013, November 2012. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
44. The Jakarta Post, “Govt seeks to expand access to education”, retrieved from [http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/22/govt-seeks-expand-access-education.html on 5 January 2013](http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/22/govt-seeks-expand-access-education.html%20on%205%20January%202013). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
45. SSQ. Annual Progress Report 2013, October 2013, p. 18. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
46. AusAID. EP Component 2 Updated Design Document, 17 December 2012, p.4. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
47. The C2 Updated Design Document states that “this target uses the definition for calculation of CAP-F [Headline Result 11, Number of School Officials Trained](http://intranet2.ausaid.gov.au/sharedsites/arf/Headlineresultsreportingkeydocuments/Forms/Main.aspx?RootFolder=%2fsharedsites%2farf%2fHeadlineresultsreportingkeydocuments%2fHeadline%20Results%20Technical%20Notes) which takes into account some district officials, supervisors and principals will complete multiple training modules over the lifetime of the program”. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
48. SSQ. Report Evaluation of CPD Pilot, Stage 2 of Evaluation, June 2013, July 2013 p. 18. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
49. SSQ, Report Evaluation of CPD Pilot, Stage 2 of Evaluation June 2013, July 2013 p. 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
50. POM. Annual Sector Monitoring Report 2013, p. 99. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
51. ACDP. School and *Madrasah* Principals and Supervisors Competency Baseline Study, September 2013, p. 21 [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
52. POM. Annual Sector Monitoring Report 2013, p.104. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
53. POM. Annual Sector Monitoring Report 2013 p. 29. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
54. AusAID. Draft. The Education Partnership Theory of Change. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
55. Divided into three phases of support – approximately 500 Madrasah each. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
56. The ESSP Annual Results Report (2013) makes the case that the reason for significant numbers of unaccredited madrasah is because of BAN-SM capacity rather than the poor quality of education in madrasah. While this may be part of the story, even if BAN-SM had adequate resources to properly assess all madrasah against the NES it is likely that many of them would not reach minimum accreditation. Given the lack of accreditation data within MoRA it is difficult to substantiate this position but anecdotal evidence from people working in the sector suggest this to be true. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
57. POM. Annual Sector Monitoring Report 2013 [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
58. SSQ Evaluation of Component 3 Phase 1, November 2013 [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
59. see SSQ Annual Progress Report 2013, p.23 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
60. SSQ. Annual Progress Report 2013, p.28 [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
61. POM. Annual Sector Monitoring Report 2013, p.28 [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
62. SSQ. Annual Plan 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
63. SSQ. Component 3 Evaluation Report 2013, p. 36 [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
64. SSQ. Component 3 Evaluation Report 2013 [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
65. SSQ. Component 3 Evaluation Report 2013 [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
66. SSQ. Component 3 Evaluation Report 2013 [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
67. SSQ. Evaluation of Component 3 Phase 1, November 2013 [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
68. SSQ. Component 3 Evaluation Report 2013 [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
69. POM. Annual Sector Monitoring Report 2013 [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
70. The Outcome and Goal statements for Component 4 vary a little between those in the EP logic architecture and those in ACDP’s M&E Strategy. Respectively, they are as follows: *Participating policy-makers utilise analytical work to inform education sector policy, planning and budgeting* vs. *Contribute to the government's efforts to strengthen the education system and sustain organizational performance improvement over the next 15 years by modernizing the system, improving service empowerment, and enabling better regional and international competitiveness* (Outcome); *Sector governance improves through increased use of evidence for decision making* vs. *Contribute to implementing Indonesia's medium-term development policies and strategies for poverty reduction, achieving education for all and education-related Millennium Development Goals, and improving its regional and global economic competitiveness* (Goal). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
71. Each donor provides funding in their own currency and so the total funds available will depend on exchange rate variations. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
72. Although some people will have attended more than one event so the actual number of individuals will be far less. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
73. ACDP. Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2013, July 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
74. ACDP. Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2013, July 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
75. Wheeler & Leslie, interview with POM, October 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
76. ACDP’s Communication Strategy was released in March 2013. Whilst it makes reference to “policy-makers and other stakeholders” (e.g. p8) it is not immediately apparent if and how it seeks to use intermediaries as a means to stimulate interest and understanding, to influence decision-making, etc. Moreover, its “target audience” is “very wide” (p13); arguably too wide. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
77. ACDP. Six Monthly Progress Report, End 2013. Revision. March 2014 [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
78. ACDP reports that the typical lifetime of an activity is 4-12 months (see ACDP Six Monthly Progress Report, End 2012, January 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
79. ACDP reports that the poor performance and/or replacement of study team leaders and other key consultants on several occasions (e.g. ACDP 003, 004, 011, 015) and that key deliverables have been submitted later than originally expected on a number of occasions (e.g. ACDP 001, 003, 004, 007, 008, 010, 015). Difficulties between consortia partners have also been described on occasion (e.g. ACDP 011) (see ACDP Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2013, July 2013 and ACDP Six Monthly Progress Report, End 2012, January 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
80. See, for example, ACDP Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2013, July 2013. Also see ACDP Six Monthly Progress Report, End 2012, January 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
81. i.e. the benefits that an institution offers its clients in the delivery of products or services, especially by being different to or better than existing products or services in ‘the market place’. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
82. The outcome section of ACDP’s M&E Strategy makes reference to four indicators, including “Number of ACDP outputs disseminated/ discussed at senior policy-making level (echelon 1+)” and “number of ACDP outputs used to inform the development/revision of policies, regulations etc., organizational reforms, information and communication system” (ACDP Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy, Revised Version, December 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
83. “Participating policy-makers utilise analytical work to inform education sector policy, planning and budgeting”. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
84. DFAT and ACDP recognise that the scope to have meaningful engagement and influence at sub-national level may be greater, and ACDP’s work in Papua (ACDP 039), for example, offers important learning opportunities for DFAT and its upcoming delivery strategy and investments. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
85. Whilst ACDP’s frequent engagement with GoI officials is known, the quality of the engagement is unknown to POM. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
86. For example, the Team Leader of ACDP 007 now leads SSQ Component 2 of the EP and this has led to positive dialogue about ACDP’s involvement in better understanding the likely results of the EP investment in PPP. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
87. ACDP. Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy, Revised Version, December 2012. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
88. For example, a twin-track approach of system-wide interventions to benefit all, plus targeted interventions that address the particular needs of specific groups. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
89. For example, in terms of which socio-economic groups are securing places at newly constructed schools (and despite the evidence that the poorest quintiles are most likely to drop out of junior secondary schooling). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
90. Assessment of District Education Infrastructure Planning Capacity, Final Report, 11 July 2013 (v1.1), POM. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
91. SSQ. C3 Phase 1 evaluation, p.23 and beyond [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
92. This proportion increases to 76.6% for Phase 2 (see SSQ Annual Progress Report 2013, p.27) [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
93. Infrastructure Technical Oversight Group (C1); Staff Development Technical Oversight Group (C2); Islamic School Accreditation Technical Oversight Group (C3); and the Analytical and Capacity Development Technical Oversight Group (C4). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
94. Vertical, e.g. between the GOG and the TOGs, the TOGs and the managers (e.g. DFAT), and the managers and the implementing partners (e.g. SSQ, ACDP, GoI); Horizontal, i.e. between the Governments of Australia and Indonesia. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
95. One GOG meeting was held on 7 February 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
96. No ITOG meetings were held; two SDTOG meetings were held on 21 March 2013 and 27 September 2013; one MTOG meeting was held on 5 September 2013; and three ATOG meetings were held on 5 February 2013, 25 March 2013 and 4 December 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)