China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products DS363
Australian Responses to Panel Questions to Third Parties
Geneva, 11 August 2008
For all Third Parties:
With reference to paras. 1.2, 5.1 and 5.2 of the Accession Protocol, please answer the following questions:
(a) Is Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 available as an affirmative defence to the obligations in paras. 1.2, 5.1 and 5.2 of the Accession Protocol? Please explain your answer for each of the relevant paragraphs.
1. Paragraph 5.1 of the Accession Protocol requires that China grant to “all enterprises in China … the right to trade in all goods throughout the customs territory of China … Such right to trade shall be the right to import and export goods.” GATT Article XX, on the other hand, provides exceptions to obligations established by the GATT (“… nothing in this Agreement shall … prevent …”). To the extent that China’s obligation to grant the right to trade is established solely by the Accession Protocol, Article XX(a) is not applicable to that obligation.
2. However, to the extent that paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 identify specific obligations under GATT Article III:4, Article XX(a) could potentially be available as an affirmative defence to the obligations of those paragraphs. Similarly, to the extent that the commitments referred to in paragraph 342 of the Working Party Report, and incorporated via paragraph 1.2 of the Accession Protocol, identify specific obligations under the GATT 1994, Article XX(a) could potentially be available as an affirmative defence to those obligations.
(b) What is the meaning and effect of the opening clause ("Without prejudice . . . in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement) in para. 5.1? Could China restrict the right to trade pursuant to provisions of the WTO Agreement without committing a breach of para. 5.1? If yes, why?
3. The right to trade within the meaning of paragraph 5.1 of the Protocol is the authorisation, within three years of China’s accession, to all enterprises in China to engage in the import and export of all goods throughout the customs territory of China. Previously, the right to trade, that is, the right to engage in the import and export of goods, had existed only if an economic entity had been approved to engage in such trade. The right to trade within the meaning of paragraph 5.1 is subject only to the exceptions provided for in Annexes 2A and 2B of the Protocol.
4. However, the obligation accepted by China to grant all enterprises in China “the right to trade in all goods throughout the customs territory of China” does not affect China’s right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement. In other words, China’s obligation to grant the right to trade in all goods throughout the customs territory of China is without detriment to China’s right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement. It remains open to China to regulate trade in relation to matters such as, for example, technical regulations and standards, internal taxation, and the protection of human, animal or plant life or health in accordance with the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
5. See also Australia’s response to Question 23.
(c) Why does para. 5.1 of the Accession Protocol refer to the "right to regulate trade" in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement and not to the "right to regulate the right to trade" in such a manner?
6. The distinction reflects that China’s obligation to grant “the right to trade” is established by the Accession Protocol.
7. See Australia’s responses to Questions 1(a), 1(b) and 23.
(d) Does the phrase "all enterprises in China" in para. 5.1 include:
(i) partly or wholly foreign-owned Chinese enterprises registered in China;
(ii) such enterprises as mentioned in (i) which are not registered in China (if so, please explain how an enterprise could operate in China without being registered as such); and/or
9. No. Such enterprises are covered by paragraph 5.2.
(iii) additional/other "foreign" enterprises ?
10. No. Such enterprises are covered by paragraph 5.2.
(e) Does the phrase "all foreign enterprises" in para. 5.2 cover foreign-owned enterprises in China and/or foreign incorporated enterprises operating in China?
(f) Does the phrase "all foreign individuals" in para. 5.2 cover:
(i) non-Chinese individuals in China, non-Chinese individuals outside China or both?
(ii) individuals importing for their own use (as opposed to commercial traders)?
(g) Regarding the opening clause of para. 5.2 ("Except as …"), where does the Protocol provide otherwise?
14. See in particular paragraph 5.1 and Annexes 2A and 2B.
(h) To what category of goods does the phrase "All such goods" in the third sentence of para. 5.1 refer – all goods or Annex 2A goods?
15. The phrase “[a]ll such goods” in the third sentence of paragraph 5.1 refers to all goods in respect of which China is required to grant a right to trade.
(i) Linked to the previous sub-question, would "such goods" be subject to Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 in the absence of the third sentence of para. 5.1?
16. Yes. In that sense, the third sentence of paragraph 5.1 is co-extensive with Article III:4.
Does the GATT 1994 or any other covered agreement, permit a Member to regulate trade by regulating trade in a manner that restricts the right of enterprises or individuals to trade?
17. Not directly. Rather, the GATT permits a Member to regulate trade in a manner that restricts the right of enterprises or individuals to trade where necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not themselves inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT, provided also that the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX are observed. Other agreements generally permit a Member to regulate trade in specific goods rather than to regulate the right of enterprises or individuals to trade.
With reference to para. 16 of Japan's written submission, please comment on what role a measure's efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the pursued aims of the regulating Member plays in determining whether that measure was "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
18. In Brazil – Tyres, the Appellate Body re-capped its earlier findings in relation to the meaning of “necessary” in Article XX and said in relevant part: “… in order to determine whether a measure is ‘necessary’ …, a panel must consider the relevant factors, particularly the importance of the interests or values at stake, the extent of the contribution to the achievement of the measure’s objective, and its trade restrictiveness. …” The Appellate Body also said in that dispute: “[t]o be characterized as necessary, a measure does not have to be indispensable. However, its contribution to the achievement of the objective must be material, not merely marginal or insignificant, especially if the measure at issue is as trade restrictive as an import ban.”
19. Previously, in Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body had said: “… determination of whether a measure … may … be ‘necessary’ … involves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors …”
20. In Australia’s view, a measure’s efficiency and effectiveness in achieving a policy objective can be a factor taken into account by the panel in the “weighing and balancing” process of determining whether a measure is necessary. However, administrative efficiency and effectiveness cannot be decisive of a measure’s necessity. Particularly where a measure has the effect of negating a negotiated concession, it must be fully tested in relation to available alternatives, even if those alternatives might not maximise administrative efficiency and effectiveness.
With reference to para. 84(b) of the Working Party Report, please indicate:
(a) whether the term "non-discriminatory" concerns discrimination as between (i) different "foreign enterprises and individuals" (for instance, US enterprises and EC enterprises), (ii) foreign enterprises and individuals, on the one hand, and enterprises in China, on the other, or (iii) both.
21. Both. In Australia’s view, paragraph 84 of the Working Party Report provides relevant context for the interpretation of paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 of the Accession Protocol.
(b) the type of requirements China is permitted to impose as a precondition for granting trading rights. Please indicate, inter alia, whether requirements relating to capitalisation, prior registration, business scope, business site, compliance with Chinese laws, etc. would be permissible.
22. In accordance with paragraph 84(b), which is an integral part of the WTO Agreement pursuant to paragraph 342 of the Report and paragraph 1.2 of the Accession Protocol, “any requirements for obtaining trading rights would be for customs and fiscal purposes only”. Having regard to the ordinary meaning of the words in their context, Australia understands paragraph 84(b) would permit China to make the grant of trading rights to foreign enterprises and individuals subject to such enterprises and individuals complying with basic requirements in relation to customs formalities and internal taxation only.
23. Australia notes that some of the issues indicated, for example, capitalisation and business scope, would seem to be governed by paragraph 83 of the Working Party Report.
Article II:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement states that the Multilateral Trade Agreements are "integral parts" of the WTO Agreement. China's Accession Protocol (Para. 1.2) states that it is an "integral part" of the WTO Agreement. What does the phrase "integral part" mean? Does it mean the same thing in both cases?
24. In Brazil – Coconut, the Appellate Body noted that “[t]he authors of the new WTO regime intended to put an end to the fragmentation that had characterized the previous system”. The Appellate Body went on to say:
“Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement also provides that the Multilateral Trade Agreements are ‘integral parts’ of the WTO Agreement, ‘binding on all Members’. The single undertaking is further reflected in the articles of the WTO Agreement on original membership, accession, non-application, acceptance and withdrawal. Furthermore, the DSU establishes an integrated disputes settlement system which applies to all the ‘covered agreements’, allowing all the provisions of the WTO Agreement relevant to a particular dispute to be examined in one proceeding.”
25. Australia notes that the phrase “integral part” is also used in several of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, for example, in Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture in relation to domestic support and export subsidy commitments, GATT Article II:7 in relation to Schedules of Concessions and GATS Article XX.3 in relation to Schedules of Specific Commitments.
26. In Australia’s view, the phrase “integral part” refers to something that is an essential component of the whole, and reflects that Accession Protocols and Schedules also form part of the text of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
What is the relevance, if any, of the provisions of Articles III:10 and IV of the GATT 1994 to the issue of whether or not films for theatrical release are to be considered goods or services? In replying to this question, please address the fact that the article appears to be concerned with regulations pertaining to the exhibition of cinematographic films and screen time reservations, but at the same time is contained in the GATT 1994 which is a Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods.
27. GATT Articles III:10 and IV concern “exposed cinematograph films”, which are physical goods. Article III:10 establishes an exception from the national treatment obligation in respect of the use of imported and domestically produced films where “internal quantitative regulations” meet the requirements of Article IV. Australia notes, however, that “exposed cinematograph films” and “films for theatrical release” are not necessarily co-extensive descriptions. For example, “exposed cinematograph films” need not be for theatrical release.
28. The fact that the GATT 1994 contains some provisions in relation to “exposed cinematograph films” is not determinative of whether the content of a film, separate from the physical film as a carrier medium, is a good or a service. As the Appellate Body has observed:
“… There is … a … category of measures that could be found to fall within the scope of both the GATT 1994 and the GATS. These are measures that involve a service relating to a particular good or a service supplied in conjunction with a particular good. In all such cases …, the measure in question could be scrutinized under both the GATT 1994 and the GATS. However, while the same measure could be scrutinized under both agreements, the specific aspects of that measure examined under each agreement could be different. Under the GATT 1994, the focus is on how the measure affects the goods involved. Under the GATS, the focus is on how the measure affects the supply of the service or the service suppliers involved. Whether a certain measure affecting the supply of a service related to a particular good is scrutinized under the GATT 1994 or the GATS, or both, is a matter that can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. …”
Do the Third Parties consider that the statement by the Panel in US – Gambling regarding means of delivery (reproduced, e.g., in the EC written submission at para. 47) would apply equally in the case of commitments under mode 3? (The Panel is aware that the European Communities and Japan have already addressed this question. They may elaborate, if they wish.)
29. In principle, yes, although we note that a Member’s commitments may be written such that a positive commitment could be required for a particular means of delivery to be covered, that is, a Member may choose only to make commitments in respect of means of delivery that are expressly listed.
Article XXVIII(b) of the GATS distinguishes between the "distribution" of a service and its "delivery". In this regard, please answer the following questions:
(a) What is the meaning of the concept of "delivery" and how, if at all, does it differ from "distribution"?
30. “Delivery” is defined in relevant part as “[t]he action of handing over something to another; esp. a (scheduled) performance of the action of delivering letters, goods, etc,” while “distribution” is defined in relevant part as “[t]he action of spreading or dispersing throughout a region; the state or manner of being located in different places all over a region.”
31. In Australia’s view, “distribution” generally occurs when arrangements are put in place in relation to a specified area that enable a good or a service to be delivered throughout that area, while “delivery” generally refers to the actual passing of the good or service to the customer, for example, to fulfil a contract.
32. While the concepts can be differentiated in general terms, they need not be mutually exclusive and, in practice, often overlap. The Panel may also obtain useful guidance from the CPC sectors listed under Section 4 (Distribution Services) in W/120, although Australia notes it is important to distinguish between the process of distribution, which can occur in many different ways, and distribution services, which can be supplied in many different ways.
(b) Is it possible for a service to be distributed and delivered electronically? If so, please provide examples.
33. Yes. For example, it could be argued that the supply of education services to students in many different places via the Internet constitutes both distribution and delivery of the education services.
In the case of "sound recording distribution services" (Sector 2D of China's GATS Schedule), what is/are the relevant service(s)? If this is about distribution of a service, what is the relevant service that is being distributed?
34. In Australia’s view, the commitment would seem to concern both “sound recording(s)” and “distribution services”.
35. See also Australia’s response to Question 12.
With reference to Sector 2D of China's GATS Schedule, in the market access column, do the terms "audiovisual products" and "audio and video products" cover (i) goods, (ii) services or (iii) both? In answering this question, please address, inter alia, sub-heading "D. Audiovisual Services".
36. In Australia’s view, the terms “audiovisual products” and “audio and video products” in isolation could refer to both goods and services. The content of such products is a service, reflecting the sub-heading “audiovisual services”, but that content is frequently embedded on physical carrier media, which are goods.
37. See also Australia’s response to Question 12.
Sector 2.D.a in W/120, as well as CPC 96113, use the terms 'distribution services'. What does the service described in CPC 96113 consist of? Does it consist in the distribution of goods, or something else? How different is its scope from that of China's commitment on "Videos, including entertainment software and (CPC 83202), distribution services"?
38. The service covered by CPC 96113, headed “motion picture or video tape distribution services”, is described as: “[d]istribution services of motion pictures and video tapes. This involves the sale or rental of movies or tapes to other industries for public entertainment, television broadcasting, or sale or rental to others”. The service covered by CPC 83202, headed “leasing or rental services concerning video tape”, is described as: “[r]enting or hiring services concerning pre-recorded video cassettes for use in home entertainment equipment, predominantly for home entertainment”.
39. The activity covered by CPC 96113 seems essentially to parallel the right of distribution generally granted to the owner of copyright or a related right in a cinematographic work pursuant to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the TRIPs Agreement, and can cover both goods and services.
40. China’s commitment on “videos, including entertainment software and (CPC 83202), distribution services” would seem to encompass CPC 96113 as it relates to video tape distribution services. The commitment would also seem to encompass CPC 83202 concerning video tape rental or hiring services.
41. See also Australia’s response to Question 12.
Could the Third Parties provide their views on whether according to W/120 the distribution of sound recordings and AVHE products in physical form would be covered under Sector 4, Sector 2D, or both? With reference to para. 19 of Japan's written submission, could the third parties please also provide their views on whether the distribution of sound recordings in physical form is covered by China's commitment in relation to Sector 2D?
42. Under W/120, the distribution of sound recordings and AVHE products in physical form would normally be covered under Sector 4 “Distribution Services”.
43. However, Australia notes that the scheduling guidelines contained in W/120 are not binding on WTO Members. As the Appellate Body has previously observed:
“… Schedules also represent a common agreement among all Members.[…] Accordingly, the task of ascertaining the meaning of a concession in a Schedule … involves identifying the common intention of Members, and is to be achieved by following the customary rules of interpretation of public international law …”
44. Accordingly, China’s commitments in relation to the distribution of sound recordings and AVHE products in physical form must be clarified by reference to its Schedule rather than to W/120. So too must China’s commitments in relation to “sound recording distribution services” (Question 9), “audiovisual products” and “audio and video products” (Question 10) and “distribution services” and “videos, including entertainment software and (CPC 83202), distribution services” (Question 11).
45. In Australia’s view, the distribution of sound recordings in physical form is not necessarily precluded from coverage under China’s commitment in relation to “sound recording distribution services” in Sector 2.D. Having regard to the Appellate Body’s findings in US – Gambling, the scope of that commitment would need to be ascertained using the customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
With reference to China's assertion that "network music services constitute a new type of service" that is not included in its GATS commitments, could the third parties please answer the following questions:
(a) What is a new service?
46. Australia notes that there is no internationally agreed definition of the meaning of a “service”. In general terms and as a preliminary view, a service is an economic activity that results in an outcome, which could be tangible or intangible, or contain elements of both. Another possible definition is “something that a person or organisation does for another person or organisation”.
(b) How do you distinguish between a new mode of delivery of an existing service [and] a "new service"?
47. As noted in response to Question 8(a), delivery generally refers to the action of passing a good or a service from the supplier to the customer.
48. Whether an activity would constitute a new mode of delivery of an existing service or a “new service” would need to be determined on a case-by-case basis taking account of all available relevant information. Technological developments mean that new means of delivery of a service can be frequent, but entirely new services not previously envisaged are less common.
(c) How different must a new technology be in order to qualitatively change the nature or character of an existing service into a “new one”?
49. In Australia’s view, it is difficult to envisage that a new technology would transform an existing service into a new service. Rather, it is more likely that a new technology would itself be the new service which could affect the supply of an existing service within the meaning of GATS Article XXVIII(b). That said, each situation would need to be examined on a case-by-case basis taking account of all available relevant information.
(d) Could the Third Parties comment on how China’s assertion relates to the existing classification system used for GATS Schedules (i.e., W/120 and the Provisional CPC)? In this regard, please comment on the Appellate Body statement in US – Gambling (para. 172) that the Provisional CPC is "exhaustive"?
50. Australia notes that the Appellate Body made no finding in US – Gambling as to the status of the Provisional CPC under the GATS, although it can be inferred from that report that the Provisional CPC is not binding on WTO Members.
51. Of more relevance in Australia’s view is that the Appellate Body found in the US – Gambling dispute that:
“… [t]he agreement defines ‘services’ very broadly, as including ‘any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority’.[…] In addition, the GATS definition of ‘sector’ provides that any reference to a ‘sector’ means – unless otherwise specified in a Member’s Schedule – a reference to all of the subsectors contained within that sector.[…] … [B]ecause a Member’s obligations regarding a particular service depend on the specific commitments that it has made with respect to the sector or subsector within which that service falls, a specific service cannot fall within two different sectors or subsectors. In other words, the sectors and subsectors in a Member’s Schedule must be mutually exclusive.[…] …”
52. Accordingly, taking account of the Appellate Body’s findings in US – Gambling, Australia considers that: “network music services” are covered by the GATS; and whether China has made a specific commitment in relation to such services must be determined using the customary principles of interpretation of public international law.
With reference to para. 374 of the U.S. first written submission and paras. 609-610 of China's first written submission, on the assumption that in relation to the U.S. claim concerning "distribution of films for theatrical release" the good being distributed is exposed and developed cinematographic film, please elaborate on whether providing the exposed and developed cinematographic film to the film distributor amounts to "distribution" within the meaning of Article III:4. Please take into account China's argument that the film producers typically do not sell the master negatives to their contractual distributors and that the distributors would not resell, or supply, the master negatives to movie theatres, but copies.
53. In Australia’s view, the question potentially involves “distribution” in three different contexts: distribution of a product within the meaning of GATT Article III:4; distribution of a service within the meaning of GATS Article XXVIII(b); and “the right of distribution” granted to the owner of copyright pursuant to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as incorporated by the TRIPs Agreement.
54. As noted in response to Question 6, the Appellate Body has previously found that a measure can fall within the scope of both the GATT 1994 and GATS, although the specific aspects of a measure to be examined under each agreement could be different. “Whether a certain measure affecting the supply of service related to a particular good is scrutinized under the GATT 1994 or the GATS, or both, is a matter that can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.” In Australia’s view, a measure could also engage a Member’s rights and obligations under the TRIPs Agreement simultaneously with those under the GATT 1994 and/or GATS.
55. With such considerations in mind, whether “providing the exposed and developed cinematographic film to the film distributor” would constitute “distribution” within the meaning of GATT Article III:4 would require consideration of all relevant circumstances. Australia notes, for example, that China’s argument at paragraph 609 of its submission that only copies that have undergone transformations such as sub-titling or dubbing are distributed to movie theatres would seem, at face value, to relate primarily to rights of distribution, reproduction and/or translation pursuant to the Berne Convention as incorporated by the TRIPs Agreement.
With reference to paras. 65, 82, 117, 570 and 608 of China's first written submission, can the Third Parties comment on whether tangible, physical objects which are "accessories to services" are outside the scope of WTO disciplines on goods? If yes, please explain why and provide the Panel with any criteria for determining when a tangible physical product is such an "accessory to a service" that it is not subject to WTO disciplines on goods?
56. Australia does not consider that such “objects” necessarily fall outside the scope of WTO disciplines on goods. As noted in response to Questions 6 and 14, a measure can fall within the scope of both the GATT 1994 and GATS, although the specific aspects of a measure to be examined under each agreement could be different.
With reference to paras. 8 and 9 of Australia's oral statement, please elaborate on your assertion that China does not have the right to restrict the right of enterprises to trade in all goods on the basis of its right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement. In particular, Australia says that “a right to trade must exist for there to be the possibility of detriment to China's rights under the WTO Agreement”. Is this why para. 5.1 contains the "without prejudice" clause, so as to indicate that the requirement to grant the right to trade is not intended to be detrimental to, or to undermine, China's right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement? If not, why not? If so, please explain further why Australia considers that the "without prejudice" clause does not support the view that China may restrict the right to trade?
57. Relevant context concerning the meaning of “the right to trade” in paragraph 5.1 of China’s Accession Protocol is provided by paragraphs 80-84 of the Working Party Report. Prior to China’s accession to the WTO:
- · only some Chinese enterprises had the right to import and export goods from China;
- · foreign-invested enterprises had the right to trade restricted to the importation for production purposes and exportation according to the enterprises’ scope of business;
- · both Chinese and foreign-invested enterprises could be subject to export performance, trade balancing, foreign exchange balancing and prior experience requirements; and
- · trading rights for wholly Chinese-invested enterprises were subject to minimum registered capital requirements.
58. Paragraph 5.1 of China’s Accession Protocol provides, in relevant part:
“[w]ithout prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement, … all enterprises in China shall have the right to trade in all goods throughout the customs territory of China … Such right to trade shall be the right to import and export goods. …”
59. In paragraph 9 of its Oral Statement, Australia said in relevant part, “… it is not open to China to restrict or limit ‘the right to trade’ within the meaning of the Protocol … on the basis of its ‘right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement’.” Australia’s Oral Statement had regard to the context provided by paragraphs 80-84 of the Working Party Report in relation to paragraph 5.1.
60. Moreover, in Australia’s view, the words “without prejudice to” confirm the temporal relationship between “the right to trade” and “China’s right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement”. “Without prejudice to” is defined as being “without detriment to any existing right or claim”. In accordance with terms of paragraph 5.1, it is “the right to trade” that is to be granted “without prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade …” In other words, the right to trade, interpreted in relevant context, comes first. However, China’s obligation to grant that right to trade as a threshold matter does not detrimentally affect its right to regulate the resulting trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement.
61. In addition, Australia notes that to adopt the view that “the right to trade” is subject to “China’s right to regulate trade …” would render the introductory qualifier “without prejudice to” meaningless. If China is able to regulate the right to trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement, what would be prejudiced by China acting in accordance with that right?
62. See also responses to Questions 1(a), (b) and (c).
Can Australia please further explain what it means in para. 8 of its oral statement when it says that "the right to trade within the meaning of the Protocol is a necessary prerequisite for the application of the WTO Agreement"?
63. See answer to Question 23.
Statement of Australia, paragraph 8.
Brazil – Tyres, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS332/AB/R, paragraph 178.
 Ibid, paragraph 210.
Korea – Beef, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, paragraph 164.
 Brazil – Coconut, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS22/AB/R, page 18.
Ibid, page 18.
EC – Bananas, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS27/AB/R, paragraph 221.
 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993, Vol.1, page 626.
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993, Vol.1, page 709.
United Nations Statistics Division – Classifications Registry
United Nations Statistics Division – Classifications Registry
US – Gambling, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS285/AB/R, paragraph 176.
Ibid, paragraph 159.
US – Gambling, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS285/AB/R, paragraph 180.
EC – Bananas, Appellate Body Report, paragraph 221.
Working Party Report, paragraph 80.
Working Party Report, paragraph 80.
Working Party Report, paragraph 83(a).
Working Party Report, paragraph 83(b).
 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993, Vol.2, page 2333.