97 Cablegram From Spender to Casey
Cablegram, Washington, 25 June 1951
1122. IMMEDIATE SECRET
Pacific Security arrangements.
Your 692 of 22nd June.
I had hoped it might be possible to postpone discussion with Dulles until later in the week but Dulles was anxious for early discussion so Berendsen and I saw him this morning.
2. Berendsen put the New Zealand Government's views of which you are aware. Dulles replied that the United States was most anxious to retain the first part of the revised Article VIII since the reference to a more comprehensive regional security system in the Pacific and the United Nations would attract criticism in some quarters that ours was a White Man's Pact and was in fact devoted to meet views expressed by Foreign Affairs Committee. With regard to the second part of Article VIII Berendsen gave Dulles the text as contained in paragraph 2 of your 679. Dulles's preliminary comment was that in lieu of the phrase 'may maintain' he was inclined to favour 'is authorized to maintain'. His reason for this amendment was to make it clear that the United States was not attempting to speak on behalf of the other Regional Organisations or States with whom the Council might consult. He asked that this amendment be referred to you for early comment. (Both Berendsen and I agreed privately that this amendment is an improvement).
3. I explained to Dulles that amendments to original draft treaty had not yet been considered by Cabinet but that Departmental thinking was along the lines of the amendment to second part of Article VIII as put forward by Berendsen.
4. Explaining that he was speaking without authorisation from the Secretary of State, Dulles said he thought that every effort should be made to reach prompt agreement on the draft treaty if possible by next week. What he had in mind was that the treaty might first be initialled and released to the press; the formal signature of the Document to take place at about the time of the signature of Japanese Peace Treaty. One reason for expediting a formal public statement on the treaty was the fear of trouble in Iran. He thought it psychologically important to make a further step in the direction of collective security which might have a deterrent effect should any coup be contemplated in Iran. He thought that this aspect might appeal to Australia and New Zealand since our primary concern might be the Middle East, and, in the event of trouble there, we would want to have our rear firmly defended.
5. We now have an excellent opportunity to proceed to finality an opportunity which, I am sure you will agree, should be firmly seized. I would hope accordingly that United Kingdom views could be cleared immediately so that we can be in a position to inform Dulles this week of our concurrence in proposed draft treaty.