You will see from my C23  that there are urgent problems facing the Conference but that there seems to be no effective way in which I can have the Commission bring pressure to bear to solve them.
2. Although I am unhappy with Cochran's method of working on his own, I feel it would be a mistake to make any official complaint.
Formal criticism of his tactics would of course only aggravate the dangers his policy creates and approach through Washington would be resented and might backfire. It is essential that his present co-operation on a personal basis be retained particularly as the State Department will have to depend entirely on his advice.
3. Cochran although never a good team worker even with his own assistants, is sincerely seeking an early settlement of the Conference and is the main channel of American pressure on the Dutch. There is reason to believe this pressure is being kept up.
I understand, for example that Stikker returned from Washington with the information that the Conference had to be completed by the end of October.
4. I have been working closely with the Indonesians who are well aware of the importance of keeping the Commission in the foreground. With Van Royen I have pressed the suggestion that where political difficulties facing the Dutch and Indonesian leaders hamper the parties from reaching agreement the prestige of the Commission and of the United Nations should be used to justify a compromise.
5. I still believe that a settlement will be reached but it will not be as good as we want and will leave problems to be solved after the Conference.