268 Critchley to Burton

Cablegram K279 BATAVIA, [2 March 1949], 9.45 p.m.


If at all practicable I favour strong pressure on the Dutch to accept the terms of the January 28th resolution. [1] If, however, the attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom makes this impossible, there may still be possibilities of a satisfactory settlement at The Hague providing that the Netherlands can be pressed to clarify and amplify their proposals in advance and providing that pressure can be maintained during the conference. It is important that the proposals should be adequate, not only to obtain the Republican leaders' acceptance but to enable these leaders to convince the guerillas they should stop fighting. Furthermore, international pressure must remain the principal argument of the more progressive sections at The Hague.

2. Amplifications and clarifications should be along these lines:

(a) A clear statement that the powers of the Commission will not be less than envisaged by the Security Council resolution and that the conference will consequently be held under the auspices of the Security Council.

(b) Guarantee by the Netherlands of a specific date for the transfer of sovereignty.

(c) Clarification of the agenda and timetable of the conference.

This will not be so important if the Republic and the progressive section of the Federalists can get together on an over-all proposal.

(d) Assurance that the Dutch will not take advantage of the next few months to destroy the remaining military power of the Republic.

(e) A promise of opportunity for all sections of the Republic to consult together. Consultations are required between the Republican leaders at Bangka, the emergency Republican Government, and with the leaders with the guerilla forces in central Java.

(f) Agreement to the restoration of the Republican Government with head-quarters at Djokjakarta.

I believe the best hope of restoring order in Djokjakarta is for the Sultan to take over control in the first instance on behalf of the Republican Government.

3. Cochran has told me in strictest confidence that the United States places considerable value on pressure exerted by Gulak [2] particularly in connection with Dutch budget difficulties and Benelux conference March 10th.

1 Document 168.

2 Presumably a reference to Paul-Henri Spaak.

[AA : A1838, 403/3/1/1, xxi]