396 Department of External Affairs to Hodgson, Embassy in Washington and Beasley

Cablegrams P273, 1009, 4962 CANBERRA, 20 December 1948, 12 noon

MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET

Indonesia We have not been able to give full consideration to the line you might adopt at the Council, particularly as we have no information as to the specific proposals United States and United Kingdom might put forward or might be prepared to support.

2. We recognise that the practical approach is to accept as a fact Dutch domination of the whole area and to do what is possible to have the programme for a representative United States of Indonesia including the Republic satisfactorily completed. There are, however, strong political reasons for not accepting in the first instance at any rate, a fait accompli.

3. The following proposals are put forward having these facts in mind:

(1) An immediate cease fire by the Dutch as the aggressor party even though it is clear guerrilla warfare by the Republicans cannot be stopped immediately.

(2) Withdrawal of Dutch troops behind former demarcation lines by midnight Monday.

(3) No punitive action against any individual and military observers to have the right to interview prisoners and ensure no reprisals or executions.

(4) Elections within two months under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices to establish representative Assembly for the whole of Indonesia with full legislative power in accordance with the Cochran proposals. [1]

(5) Continuation of Committee of Good Offices until establishment of complete sovereignty is achieved not later than 30th June, 1949.

(6) Failing establishment of sovereignty at that date, or in the event of any other breakdown in negotiations, the establishment of a United Nations Trusteeship, under the administration of the Committee of Good Offices.

(7) Immediate economic sanctions imposed against N.E.I. and Netherlands until above conditions are accepted and the first two conditions are implemented.

4. So as to obtain more time for consideration and consultation, the best procedure to be followed by the Security Council would be to order the first three of these conditions-cease-fire, troop withdrawal, and supervision of prisoners-together with a form of sanction or enforcement, going on later to consider the other propositions or any other proposals which might be advanced by other governments. You should therefore regard points such as 6 and 7 matters for discussion privately with other representatives at this stage. Please report frequently.

1 See Documents 237 and 238.

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