339 Thamboe to Harry

Memorandum WASHINGTON, 2 December 1948

1. Herewith gist of Hatta-Stikker talks.

2. Yesterday I called on Nehru of India at the Chancery. He informs me that Pandit Nehru is personally exercising the greatest pressure on the U.K. to make the Dutch abandon their plan for military action. He also told me that the Indonesian-Dutch talks at Kaliurang had struck a snag over the question of the Republican Army. My impression is-Nehru had no details to offer-that the Dutch are demanding its immediate abolition.

3. Soemitro phoned me yesterday to give me a press report originating from Batavia and transmitted to us by Jogja. From that I gather that Stikker was in Batavia on Dec 1. He is reported to have said that 'the informal and unofficial discussions' had ended and had been 'sufficient'. Asked if formal negotiations would commence, he said: 'That is our hope. There is no reason for any further delay.' 4. I called on Ispahani of Pakistan yesterday, and he has promised to add his voice to the others re the State Department.

SUBSTANCE OF HATTA-STIKKER DISCUSSIONS AT THEIR FIRST MEETING AT KALIURANG

The Hatta-Stikker discussions, entirely informal and for the purpose of orientation, were undertaken on Dutch initiative, apparently to find out the definitive viewpoints of the Republic before the commencement of official talks based on the Cochran plan.

Hatta took the opportunity to make known to Stikker certain important matters.

The points raised by Hatta were reduced to writing at the request of Stikker in the form of an aide memoire [1] for embodiment in his report to the Dutch cabinet. The aide memoire touched only upon questions of prime importance; matters of secondary importance were not discussed between Hatta and Stikker.

Hatta emphasized the following:

[1. The Republic is firmly determined that talks leading in the direction of a political agreement shall be held in the presence of the Committee of Good Offices and be based on the Cochran plan.

2. The interim period shall begin as soon as possible, with December 1, 1949, as the target date for its conclusion.

3. The interim period will fall into two phases; the beginning of the first phase will be marked by the formation of a cabinet by the Republic of Indonesia and the representative of the Dutch Crown; simultaneously there will come into being an interim representative body nominated by the constituent states on the basis of proportional representation.

4. At the end of six months elections shall be held throughout Indonesia for a Constituent Assembly.

5. The second phase will begin with the election of a president by the Constituent Assembly; the president will call upon any individual to form a cabinet, such individual thereupon becoming prime minister.

6. The members of the cabinet shall be Indonesian citizens and the cabinet, to which shall be given clearly defined powers, will be responsible to the Constituent Assembly.

7. The Constituent Assembly shall delineate the member states, establish a constitution for the United States of Indonesia, and devise the statute of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.]

[The military problem is a thorny one.] [2] 'Hatta maintains that the federal armed forces should remain under the control of the interim government; the Dutch, however, are anxious to vest control in the hands of the Crown Representative; this subject is still in abeyance. The most difficult problem centres around the powers of the Crown Representative. Hatta will only go so far as to give him the power of veto and the right of final decision in certain clearly defined matters.

Hatta is prepared to make a concession in the case of the Federal Council and will not press for more than a third of the seats being given to the Republic. Hatta is firmly of the opinion that the Committee of Good Offices should remain seized of the Indonesian question till the very moment the Dutch transfer sovereignty to the U.S.I.'

1 See Document 310.

2 Square brackets were in the text handed by Thamboe to Harry.

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