298 Critchley to Burton
Cablegram K183 BATAVIA, 2 November 1948
In view of the critical stage, I am giving you my personal views on the situation here.
These may have to be modified later particularly in the light of Hatta's interview with Stikker.
(1) Dutch military action against the Republic appears inevitable.
Despite Stikker's reassuring statements, I believe his visit is a mere formality, a last gesture by the Netherlands of their alleged desire for a peaceful settlement.
(2) Military preparations are at an advanced stage, and the Army favours an early decision to march on Djokjakarta.
(3) Decision for further military action would be taken by the new Interim Government and might be timed at the end of the Assembly Session in Paris  when there will be ample opportunity to present the Council with a fait accompli.
(4) Under the new emergency powers, an Interim Government can be set up at a few hours' notice, consisting of three or five hand- picked Indonesians. It would be a convenient mouthpiece for Dutch policy and could justify an eventual explanation to the Security Council on the Hyderabad model. 
(5) Textiles bought in Japan with American dollars would follow the Netherlands forces. It would probably not be difficult to give the impression that the troops were welcomed and set up puppet administrations in areas such as Central Java.
(6) justification for military action would be the Republican inability to implement the truce. The Republican Government is being charged with the responsibility for incidents in Netherlands-occupied areas.
I am doing my best to have the Committee issue factual statements on [ob]servation of the truce to deflate Dutch exaggerations.