21 Kirby to Burton
Cablegram K40 BATAVIA, 16 January 1948, 2 p.m.
Your telegrams 17 and 18. 
The proposals mentioned by Lacy  would be those I left for telegraphing to you on leaving Batavia on Sunday 10th January. 
2. These proposals were adopted by the Committee in these circumstances:-
(a) Without my prior knowledge, the Americans unilaterally discussed the eight proposals  with the Dutch and when they obtained local Dutch approval to six of them , submitted them to the Committee for transmitting to the Republic as principles accepted by the Dutch in advance subject to confirmation from The Hague.
(b) The Committee brought them to Djokjakarta and here received The Hague confirmation and then handed them to the Republic.
(c) In these circumstances I must be taken to have supported these proposals of Graham but I have, to American annoyance, made it clear that they did not go far enough and should have included, as the first and urgent priority, immediate prohibition of Dutch formation or sponsoring of new [ ... ]  without plebiscite and also specific provisions for Republic's participation in the Provisional Government and specific provisions for immediate setting up of the latter with definition of powers an so on.
(d) Van Zeeland, of course, was fully satisfied with the proposals once they were disclosed as having been accepted by the Dutch.
3. The Committee has repeatedly met the Republicans here and each member has seen them informally. Van Zeeland quite specifically advised them to accept, within extendance allowed, the Dutch truce plan plus the twelve political points previously telegraphed to you plus these latest six Points.  Graham who previously had tried to sit on the fence came right down on the side of acceptance even going to the limit of addressing the Republican Cabinet and Delegations and a few other leaders. In this view he made quite an oratorical and frenzied appeal with much table thumping and said that the Republic would be foolish to reject and if they did 'would lose heaviest'.
4. For obvious reasons I cannot go too far for fear of losing all American help and support but it was tragic that American conceit should have made them waste so much of value by way of political and economic pressure on the Dutch by not insisting on two vital matters set out in paragraph two (c) of this telegram. I say 'conceit' as the kindest way of explaining their unilateral method of getting the Dutch agreement on their own proposals. Graham had repeatedly told me that he had a 'King-hit' which he would use at the right time and naturally I thought we would be in with him on its use.
5. I have made it abundantly clear that I would not join in an approach to the Republic by [...] of the Dutch truce plan even