458 Note for File by Brookes

BATAVIA, 7 December 1947



The tactics of the parties can be summarized as follows:-


(i) To endeavour to insist that the political discussions should await an agreement on Cease Fire.

(ii) To put their best brains in the Cease Fire Committee, not, of course, to their exclusion from the substantive discussions.

(iii) Unless they get their own way, to procrastinate without appearing so to do viz appointment of Contact Committee. [1]

(iv) To distract the Committee's attention from its main functions by diversionary tactics, such as minor alleged breaches of the Cease Fire.

(v) To involve the Committee in connivance at a breach of the Cease Fire.

(vi) In certain instances to intimidate the Committee.

(vii) To persuade the Committee that the Republican ideal only represents the wishes of a fraction of the population. (See composition of their delegation [2], etc.) (viii) To demonstrate that everyone is well fed and happy in their territory.

(ix) To re-emphasize that the police action was only a last resort taken to protect lives, especially of minorities, and property.

(x) To persuade the Committee that the Republic is a creation of the Japs and is at least partly communist controlled.


(i) To accept the suggestions of the G.O.C.

(ii) To present the police action in its true light.

(iii) To refute Dutch efforts as set out in (vii), (viii) and (x).

(iv) To draw attention to the economic situation of the Republic in the light of Dutch attempts at economic strangulation and to appeal to the Committee to use its good offices to obtain various kinds of international assistance.

1 See Document 399, note 1.

2 Formally appointed just prior to the commencement of the Renville Conference, the Netherlands Delegation was headed by Abdulkadir and, apart from Van Vredenburch and Koets, comprised representatives of East Indonesia, West Borneo, and other non- Republican territories and groups.

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