381 Eaton to Department of External Affairs
Cablegram 366 BATAVIA, 18 October 1947
Your telegram No. 303  and refer also my 323  paragraph 1.
From maps submitted to you by Brigadier Dyke it can be seen that some centres of Republican resistance are located up to 100 miles within the area formed by lines joining the forward positions of Dutch Forces on 4th August and also up to 100 miles within the Van Mook demarcation lines of 29th August. This is illustrated by the incident of the forced landing of American plane. 
Two. Without surrender of Republican Forces within present area of Dutch strategical control not considered practicable to withdraw troops 5 kilometres from either side of line joining Dutch forward positions of 4th August.
Three. Consider impracticable to establish several demarcation lines to embrace extensive areas of Republican resistance within area of Dutch strategical control.
Four. If both sides withdrew troops from disputed areas, namely those areas brought under complete partial or strategical control of the Dutch between 21st July and 29th August, a Police Force would be necessary to safeguard interests of either side and maintain law and order with strict neutrality.
Such a Police Force could be controlled internationally or jointly Republican and Dutch and be composed of Foreign Police or of Indonesians who were members of Field Police before the war and Dutch. These are questions which can only be decided after discussions between Dutch and Republicans arranged and sponsored by Committee of Three. A Police Force constituted as above should not provide the Dutch with the opportunity to extend their influence at the expense of the Republicans observing that the disputed areas, other than centres of Republican resistance, are at present under complete, partial or strategical control of the Dutch.
Five. Present endeavours to establish separate States in West Java, East Coast Sumatra and Madoera will confuse the issue for Committee of Three.