118 Evatt to Makin
Cablegram 1326 CANBERRA, 16 September 1946
Reference Washington 1222.  Japanese whaling. Please approach State Department and make urgent representations along following lines:-
1. If United States feels that our request for Allied expedition would involve delay and other difficulties, it should be a S.C.A.P. expedition completely manned by Allied crews. Australia is in a position to provide at least a substantial proportion of crews. It seems certain that in conjunction United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Norway could provide total complement.
It is understood that the vessels could be adapted to use by non- Japanese crews. We would in any case stipulate:-
(a) That these arrangements will be confined to the one season 1946/47.
(b) That early consideration will be given to the prohibition of Japanese participation in whaling in the Antarctic, at least for the duration of the occupation.
(c) That Japanese whaling facilities will be subject to consideration not only in connection with the reparations but also the prospective peace settlement.
2. In connection with the S.C.A.P. order of 23rd August authorising the conversion of a tanker  it is understood that the United Kingdom Ambassador has been instructed to inform the State Department urgently of United Kingdom dissatisfaction with this development and to endeavour to secure:-
(a) Cancellation of the S.C.A.P. order of 23rd August.
(b) Issue of instruction to S.C.A.P. that no further decisions affecting whaling should be taken without prior consultation.
It is desired that you make similar representations to the State Department.
3. For your own guidance we feel that the bedrock minimum is that the expedition should be under strict control of Allied personnel, that Australia with a territorial interest in the Antarctic must have a status at least as great as that of the United Kingdom and Nor-way and that no Japanese personnel should be tolerated. The participation of any Japanese crew would be open to grave objections, including the setting of a precedent for future operations by Japanese and additional reasons referred to in our 1215.  If it is objected that the ships are unsuited to Allied personnel, reconditioning should be directed at once.