89 Directive by Chifley [1]

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DEFENCE POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

DIRECTIVE FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT AND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ON RELATED ASPECTS

PART I-BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. The Basis for Determining Defence Policy Defence Policy has to be determined in the light of an up to date strategical appreciation, and related to commitments under the World Security Organisation, including regional arrangements in the Pacific, Co-operation in Empire Defence, and the basic organisation and resources that should be maintained by Australia.

2. Interim Post-War Strength of the Forces An interim post-war strength is necessary to provide for:-

(i) The Force of Occupation in Japan.

(ii) The guard and garrison work in the Pacific Islands until the Japanese prisoners are repatriated.

A report by the Defence Committee on the interim strength is at present before the Government.

3. Ultimate Post-War Strength of the Forces In regard to the ultimate post-war strength of the Forces, the following Ministerial instructions have been issued for the guidance of the Defence Committee:-

'A vital factor in post-war Defence Policy will be the system of collective security which may be established and the strength of the forces that will be required to be maintained:-

As a contribution towards the collective system, and to police the observance of the Peace Treaties.

For Co-operation in Empire Defence.

For Local Defence.

'The Defence Committee, as the Government's Advisers, is to examine the matter from the strategical aspect of a defence problem, and to tender their advice of the strength and Organisation of the Forces which, in their opinion, should be provided. They have for their guidance, the elements of the strategical situation as they see it now and in the future. They are aware of the forces that were provided in the pre-war period by a population of 7,000,000 people. They have knowledge of the lessons and experience of the war.

'After the Defence Committee have formulated their proposals, which should be coordinated as a joint system of defence, the Government will consider them, together with the estimated cost, and decide whether the proposals are approved, and whether the prospective vote can be provided. If necessary, the Government will give any further instructions that may be necessary for the revision of the proposals and the allocation of the vote.' A governing consideration which has to be resolved is the impact of scientific development on the types of weapons and armament for the various Services, their efficacy, and the effects on future methods of warfare and organisation for it.

PART II-THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

4. A Regional Arrangement in the Pacific The Australian Government has suggested, in connection with the examination of the future status and use of bases established by the United States during the war in territory of the British Commonwealth, that there should be considered simultaneously the future defence arrangements in the Pacific Zone affecting the joint interest of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, including the principle of reciprocity and joint use of bases.

5. Relative Provisions of the United Nations Charter Under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations:-

(i) Members undertake to make available for the maintenance of peace, forces in accordance with agreements which are to be negotiated by the Security Council as soon as possible. (Article 43) (ii) Under the agreements, members shall hold immediately available national air force contingents. (Article 45) (iii) There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council. The Committee will consist of military representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council. Representatives of nations not permanently represented on the Council may be associated with the Committee when its work requires such participation. The Military Staff Committee may establish regional sub-committees. (Article 47) (iv) Nothing in the Charter impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

(Article 51) (v) Nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. (Article 52) (vi) The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy State. (Article 53)

6. Lines of Approach The nature, strength and functions of the Australian Forces, and the munitions and supply resources to be established for their maintenance in peace and war, will be governed by the following considerations which are blended and inter-related:-

(i) The forces to be provided in accordance with Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter, including regional arrangements under Article 52.

(ii) The forces to be maintained by Australia under arrangements for Co-operation in Empire Defence in accordance with the inherent right of collective self-defence under Article 51.

(iii) The forces to be maintained by Australia to provide for the inherent right of individual self-defence under Article 51.

7. Machinery Required It is essential that the Government should have appropriate Departmental machinery to handle the three angles of approach on which action will probably proceed simultaneously.

In Australia, the Defence and External Affairs Departments should be adequately staffed to provide for the basic examination of these problems and for advice to the Government thereon. The closest co-operation and liaison should exist between both Departments.

It is essential that the staff and organisation of these Departments should provide for appropriate and sufficient staffs in London and at the seat of the United Nations Organisation.

In London it will be necessary to provide, on the Defence aspect, Joint-Service staff for continuous consultation between members of the British Commonwealth regarding regional and international arrangements for security, including all the ramifications of Co- operation in Empire Defence. This staff will be the London counterpart of the Australian Higher Defence Machinery, and will work in an advisory capacity to the Resident Minister in London.

The channel of communication on matters of Defence Policy will be between the Prime Minister and the Resident Minister, the close relation between Defence Policy and External Affairs Policy being constantly borne in mind. On other Defence matters, communication will be on the official level, between the Defence Department and the Head of the Joint-Service staff in London.

At the seat of the United Nations Organisation, it will be necessary to provide Joint-Service staff for advice to the Australian Representative on the Security Council. This staff will have a close contact with the United Kingdom representatives on the Military Staff Committee, and the Australian representatives will be associated with this Committee when questions of security in the Pacific are under consideration. This staff also, will be the counterpart of the Australian Higher Defence Machinery. The channel of communication on matters of External Affairs and Defence Policy will be on the Ministerial level. On other Defence matters, communication will be on the official level, between the Defence Department and the Head of the Joint Service Staff.

The provision of Joint Service Staffs in London and at the seat of the United Nations Organisation does not presume that all security discussions will be carried out at these centres or that all Empire and U.N.O. Machinery will be established there. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia have been located in Melbourne to control the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. Also, under Article 47 of the Charter, the Military Staff Committee may, with the authority of the Security Council, establish regional sub-committees.

8. Empire Co-operation in Relation to the Charter Article 52 of the Charter provides that regional arrangements for security may be made, provided that they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

In the Act of Chapultepec, the signatory American republics bound themselves to a full and complete system of collective security and mutual insurance against any act of aggression during the recent war, either from within or without the Americas, and undertook, as soon as the war was over, to carry this regional collective system into the post-war period by means of appropriate treaties.

In order to embrace the Chapultepec arrangements within the framework of the World Organisation, it was provided in Article 52 of the Charter, that parties to regional arrangements should make very effort to obtain the settlement of local disputes through such agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

Secondly, a provision recognising the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, if an armed attack occurs against a member State, was inserted in Article 51.

It is apparent, therefore, that co-operation between the members of the British Commonwealth in defence, in accordance with the established principles outlined in the Memorandum of 14th December 1945 on Co-operation in Empire Defence (or such modifications as may be necessary in the light of the experience of the war and present circumstances), is consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations (Article 52). Empire Co-operation is also in conformity with the inherent right of individual or collective defence (Article 51. Finally, it is only by co-operation on a basis of standardisation of organisation, arms, equipment and training, and exchange of technical and scientific information, that the satisfactory development of Dominions Forces can be provided for.

9. Local Defence in Relation to the Charter Article 51 of the Charter provides that nothing in the Charter impairs the inherent right of individual self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member.

In addition to the forces to be provided in accordance with Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter, including regional arrangements under Article 52, it is imperative that Australia should maintain such additional forces, together with a war production potential of appropriate dimensions for expansion, as are requisite until the security system is developed and firmly established. This precaution is also necessary to provide against the contingency of the general exercise of the right of veto by a permanent member of the Council under Article 27 and, in particular, by the vetoing, under Article 53, of enforcement action under regional arrangements or by regional agencies.

10. Directive It is recommended that the following directive be approved for the guidance of the Defence Department and of the Department of External Affairs on related aspects:-

(a) Basis of Approach to the Determination of Post-War Defence Policy:

(i) The forces to be provided in accordance with Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter, including regional arrangements under Article 52.

(ii) The forces to be maintained by Australia under arrangements for Co-operation in Empire Defence in accordance with the inherent right of collective self-defence under Article 51.

(iii) The forces to be maintained by Australia to provide for the inherent right of individual self-defence under Article 51.

(b) Procedure to be Followed:

(i) The Australian Government has suggested, in connection with the examination of the future status and use of bases established by the United States during the war in territory of the British Commonwealth, that there should be considered simultaneously the future defence arrangements in the Pacific Zone affecting the joint interest of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, including the principle of reciprocity and joint use of bases.

(ii) For the purpose of (i), the Chiefs of Staff Committee is to submit, from the aspect of Australian security, a strategical appreciation of a regional arrangement in the Pacific. After consideration by the Government, action will be taken on the appropriate level for an exchange of views with the United Kingdom and New Zealand Governments and their Advisers.

(iii) The development of Empire Co-operation should proceed broadly in accordance with the principles outlined in the Memorandum of 14th December 1945 on Co-operation in Empire Defence, or such modifications as may be necessary in the light of the experience of the war and present circumstances.

The detailed procedure should be the examination of specific aspects of the problem as was done in the case of the proposals relating to:-

Guided Projectiles.

Co-operation in Development, Research, Design, etc., of Munitions.

In particular, the closest co-operation should be maintained on the impact of scientific development on the types of weapons and armament for the various Services, their efficacy, and the effects on future methods of warfare and organisation for it.

(c) Machinery to be Provided:

(i) In London it will be necessary to provide, on the Defence aspect, Joint-Service staff for continuous consultation between members of the British Commonwealth regarding regional and international arrangements for security, including all the ramifications of Co-operation in Empire Defence. This staff will be the London counterpart of the Australian Higher Defence Machinery and will work in an advisory capacity to the Resident Minister in London. The channel of communication on matters of Defence Policy will be between the Prime Minister and the Resident Minister, the close relation between Defence Policy and External Affairs Policy being constantly borne in mind. On other Defence matters, communication will be on the official level, between the Defence Department and the Head of the Joint Service Staff in London.

(ii) At the seat of the United Nations Organisation, it will be necessary to provide Joint Service Staff for advice to the Australian Representative on the Security Council. This staff will have a close contact with the United Kingdom representatives on the Military Staff Committee, and the Australian representatives will be associated with this Committee when questions of security in the Pacific are under consideration. This staff also, will be the counterpart of the Australian Higher Defence Machinery. The channel of communication on matters of External Affairs and Defence Policy will be on the Ministerial level. On other Defence matters, communication will be on the official level between the Defence Department and the Head of the Joint Service Staff.

J. B. CHIFLEY Prime Minister

[AA:A1068 T4, DL47/5/3]

1 This directive was prepared by Shedden, in late January and early February, following discussions with Chifley, Evatt and Forde, and approved by Chifley on 15 February for the guidance of the Defence Committee. The version here was printed without alteration even though in parts (e.g. the first sentence of Item 10) it reads still as a submission to Chifley.

[CANBERRA], 15 February 1946