Your D.1190 and your No. 398. 
1. The Australian Government regards it as essential that there
should be a frank understanding of the arrangement made in London
in July between Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, Mr. Attlee and Dr. Evatt
in relation to the protection of Australian postwar interests in
Timor including Defence, Trade and Communications.  We cannot
forget that no assistance whatever was received by us from
Portugal at the crucial time and even if Portugal now proposes to
engage in active combat With Japan the arrangement made is
necessary to protect our interests.
2. in the circumstances we regret that your proposed communication
to the United States Government was not submitted to us in the
first instance. For instance the phrase 'The Liberation of Timor'
might suggest to the United States an absolute restoration of
Portuguese sovereignty without any of the necessary qualifications
or addenda. Presumably Australia's special interests, having
already been made clear to the Portuguese, will be made equally
clear to the United States Government.
3. With regard to Staff conversations we are quite prepared to
take part in these.
1 Dispatched 29 and 28 December respectively. On file AA:A989,
E43-44/970/54. These cablegrams advised of U.K. proposals to the
United States concerning the 'considerable advantages' of
Portugal's entry into the war against Japan, and urged staff talks
in London by U.K., U.S., Portuguese and Australian officers to
'draw up a plan of Portuguese co operation in the war against
2 See Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, vol. VI,