27 Curtin to Churchill

It will be evident from the Coral Sea, Midway and Solomon Islands naval engagements that operations in the Pacific Ocean are leading to a naval clash which may well decide the course of the conflict in this theatre.

2. I would refer to the views of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff in Dominions Office cablegram No. 362 of 6th April [2] that, when the moment is opportune, the naval forces of the United Nations should take the strategic offensive in the Pacific. It would be appreciated if a statement could be furnished giving the present views of the Chiefs of Staff on the conditions outlined by them in paragraph 4 as necessary for fulfilment before the concentration of superior naval forces in the Pacific Ocean can be undertaken. [3]

3. It would appear to be inevitable from the operations in the Solomon Islands and the increased activity in New Guinea [4] that the Japanese will offer substantial resistance to any efforts to push them back to their bases in the mandated islands. We must therefore be in a position to bring to bear at the point of contact forces superior in strength to those of the enemy, otherwise we shall be laying ourselves open to grave risks.

4. It is therefore desired to know what are the present prospects and plans for the concentration of a superior naval force in the Pacific, which presumably could only be done by the transfer of part of the Eastern fleet to that region. [5]

CURTIN