454 Dr H. V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister
Cablegram S20 WASHINGTON, 2 April 1942, 8.24 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE TO CURTIN FOR HIMSELF ALONE MOST SECRET
1. Following is personal cable to myself from Churchill  as a result of my telegram to Bruce , of which I previously advised you. 
Churchill's is as follows: Begins.
'[Personal]  and most strictly secret. Following on a suggestion which I heard you had made I have telegraphed Mr.
Curtin  telling him second British Infantry Division will be rounding Cape during latter part of April and early May and that Eighth Armoured Division will be following one month later. I have told him that if by that time Australia is being heavily invaded I should certainly divert either or both of these Divisions to his aid. This would not apply in case of localised attacks in north or of mere raids elsewhere but that he could count upon the scheme should invasion by say eight or ten Japanese divisions occur.
(2) We must be careful not to direct our limited reserves to theatres where there will be no fighting. No one knows yet whether Japanese will strike at Australia or India or, even more likely, South China. They have enough for a considerable operation in any one of these directions but surely not in all of them at once. I am by no means convinced that Australia is the chosen target. Once the enemy shows his hand decisions can be made.
(3) I hold entirely to my promise of August 1940 quoted by you.
This dealt with facts and not with possibilities. However we have already left the Mediterranean denuded of all heavy ships and carriers in order to build up a naval force in the Indian Ocean which is already respectable. Not a day passes when we do not think of Australia.
(4) It would be a mistake for the Commonwealth Government to recall 9th Division now. The two brigades you kindly lent us for Ceylon can come on to you as soon as shipping is found. We have now got more consolidated there.
(5) It is not possible to divert the whole flow of aviation production for 6 weeks as you suggest. Ships are loaded, plans are made and everything is moving to destinations of utmost urgency. I am trying to see whether more can be done about Bofors, R.D.F.  etc.
(6) I hope you will come over here as soon as you can. You will find us very ready to lay everything before you. I look forward to meeting you.' Ends.
2. Please let me have urgently any suggestions or comments for use by me here or later on in London. It is a great satisfaction to receive Churchill's reaffirmation of the pledge given in August 1940 which I had quoted to Bruce. The pledge is contained in par.
4 of D.O. Tel. 262 Aug. 12th, 1940  and was as follows:
'A final question arises whether Japan having declared war would attempt to invade Australia or New Zealand with a considerable army. We think this very unlikely because Japan is firstly absorbed in China, secondly would be gathering rich prizes in Dutch East Indies and thirdly would fear very much to send an important part of her fleet far to southward leaving American fleet between it and home. If, however, contrary to prudence and self-interest, Japan set about invading Australia or New Zealand on a large scale, I have explicit authority of Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and proceed to your aid sacrificing every interest except only the defence position of this island on which all depends.' 3. As to 9th Division subsequent discussions here showed that the President  does not intend to depart from the non-committal attitude previously advised you.  General Marshall  mentioned in conversation with me that he preferred the 9th Division to remain in the Middle East.