387 Dr H. V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, to Mr A. T. Stirling, External Affairs Officer in London
Cablegram unnumbered CANBERRA, 4 March 1942
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL MOST SECRET
To be decyphered by Stirling and given to Sir Stafford Cripps  alone.
1. So far as was possible we have adopted your suggestion made through Bruce  and have offered to make two brigades of A.I.F.
available as temporary garrison Ceylon. (See our telegram No. 160.
) 2. However we find that owing to circumlocution and other obstacles the flow of munitions here is only a trickle. For instance the bulk of United States production of Tommy guns and ammunition for warships (twenty-five thousand guns)  is going to the United Kingdom. We are in such a pass that Casey  in the United States has to wire to Bruce in London to ask General Macready  whether he might allocate proportion of these to Australia. Obviously these matters involve higher political direction rather than (wangling) or influence at a different stage.
3. On 12 August 1940 Churchill laid down the following principle to Australia and New Zealand. 'If however contrary to prudence and self-interest Japan sets about invading Australia and New Zealand on a large scale I have the explicit authority of the Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and proceed to your aid sacrificing every interest except only defence safety (sic) of this island on which all depends.' 
4. The above is a political and strategical guarantee the meaning and application of which I pray will never be debated in public.
5. The crisis has brought Australia and New Zealand (closer) together and within a few hours we shall probably be making a joint request to you and the United States as to a new United Kingdom/United States Anzac Council at (Washington) to cover Australia, New Zealand and Anzac area, a supreme commander and a modification of jurisdiction of Chiefs of Staff Committee at (Washington) by addition of Australian and New Zealand representation.  Frankly on this occasion support from United Kingdom instead of opposition is vital. If so future misunderstandings may be avoided. It is thought that if the United Kingdom agree Roosevelt will also agree. I hope (you will) spare no effort to [assist]  us.
6. I desire to mention also the recent Russian request in relation to post-war boundaries. (See Dominions Office telegram D. No. 112.