In my personal cable to you of the 1st February , I indicated that I would forward to you a Memorandum dealing with the Economic and Social aspects of the definition of our peace objective. This I now enclose. It was prepared by McDougall  as the result of many long conversations we have had on the subject which were followed by drafts which were amended by subsequent conversations.
It embodies a summary of the conclusions we have arrived at.
As the object of all the communications I have sent to you is merely to give you a picture of the way in which my thoughts are tending, I came to the conclusion after reading the Memorandum that it would quite adequately meet that requirement and I am accordingly sending it to you in the form which it has now taken.
There is no need for me to weary you with a further letter on this matter and I would only add one observation. I have repeatedly asked, ever since war broke out, how it was proposed we would achieve the victory to which we so continually refer. Up to the present moment I have received no very dear answer to that question.
It is generally agreed that it is probably impossible a conclusion can be reached by a great land offensive on either side. Similarly there is fairly general agreement that even if we achieve the objective of the Empire Air Training Scheme and establish superiority in the Air that fact alone will not be sufficient to force a conclusion. Equally it is felt that while by the exercise of our Sea Power we can increasingly embarrass the enemy, it is doubtful if we could end the war by this pressure or in any event not for a very long time.
My own view is that victory can only be achieved by bringing home to the enemy that it is not worth fighting on. To create this frame of mind a combination of all forms of pressure will be required, namely, heavy losses in land fighting; increasing destruction in the Air and an ever growing economic strangulation by the blockade. All these factors will tend to sap the morale of the enemy but the power of resistance will endure much longer if the Germans have the impression they are fighting for their very existence and that they have little to hope for should the Allies achieve victory. This resistance would be sapped if they knew that after an Allied victory there would still be left something worth while living for.
It is because I hold this view that I feel so strongly that we should declare our peace aims, in which some hope is held out to a reformed Germany, as by doing so I believe we will help to break down the German power of resistance as and when the increasing pressures I have referred to above begin to be felt.
[S. M. BRUCE]