The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
Report (Part One)
The Canberra Commission is persuaded that immediate and determined
efforts need to be made to rid the world of nuclear weapons and the
threat they pose to it. The Commission acknowledges that the debate
between those for and against the elimination of nuclear weapons is
not new. Both sides claim that their positions are rational and
moral. But the circumstances that created and sustained the nuclear
arms race of the Cold War have all but disappeared, and an uncertain
global strategic future lies ahead. This uniquely favourable moment
should be seized to eliminate the class of weapons which, alone, can
destroy all life on earth.
The Commission believes that to be compelling, the case for a nuclear
weapon free world must be convincingly argued from two sides of the
issue: why these weapons should be eliminated; and a rebuttal of the
rationale most commonly cited for retaining them. Simultaneously the
security concerns of the present day including, in particular,
nuclear proliferation must be addressed.
The Case for a Nuclear Weapon Free World
The case for elimination of nuclear weapons is based on three major
arguments:
The destructive power of nuclear weapons dwarfs that of any
conventional weapon or non-nuclear weapon of mass destruction. More
energy can be released in one micro-second from a single nuclear
weapon than all the energy released by conventional weapons used in
all wars throughout history. The atomic bombs detonated over
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, while by today's standards of
relatively low yield, in a matter of seconds erased both cities. In
1945 nuclear weapons became a new part of the international context
and the world had to cope as best it could with a radically changed
calculus of national and international security.
No theoretical calculation of the damage can give a true picture of
the consequences of nuclear warfare. The explosion of a nuclear
weapon causes damage through intense thermal radiation, a blast wave
and nuclear radiation from the fireball and radioactive fallout. The
effects of a major exchange of nuclear weapons, or even a more
limited exchange, would not be confined to those states directly
involved in a nuclear conflict. On the contrary, the consequences of
nuclear war would stretch beyond the immediate destruction, and into
non-belligerent states and the lives of future generations, through
fallout, widespread contamination of the environment and possible
genetic damage.
The survivors of a major nuclear war would face extraordinary
difficulties, especially in reconstruction, and the restoration of
domestic and international order. In the case of the two world wars
the most powerful states were engaged in prolonged combat, but the
international system survived, though at a terrible cost, and the
resulting physical damage was repaired relatively quickly. A major
nuclear war or exchange would make this sort of recovery immensely
difficult and for some perhaps impossible.
The world has lived under the shadow of the mushroom cloud
continuously since 1945, and the cumulative psychological impact has
been overwhelmingly negative. The threat that the existence of
nuclear weapons poses to the future of the human species and the
global environment remains undiminished. It must not be ignored or
forgotten by the international community.
The initial development and proliferation of nuclear weapons meant
that, for the first time in history, the fate of humankind was
delivered into the hands of a small group of leaders and decision
makers. An unprecedented responsibility was placed on those
controlling the deployment, use and maintenance of nuclear weapons.
That is still the case. With the end of the Cold War, the risk that
nuclear weapons might be used deliberately by a major power in a
global war has lessened, but other dangers must also be considered.
Foremost among these are the risks that nuclear weapons can be
detonated accidentally, used as a result of strategic miscalculation
during a crisis or used in an unauthorised way by those with access
to the weapons, leading to further escalation and the retaliatory use
of nuclear weapons. The complexity of the command, control,
communication and early warning systems associated with nuclear
weapons, coupled with the speed with which nuclear weapons can be
delivered, creates a broad environment for such accidental or
miscalculated use.
In the 1960s, the world looked at the prospect of dozens of nuclear
weapon states, recoiled and rejected it. The result was the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968 with its
promise of a world free of these weapons. The overall success of the
NPT and other nuclear non-proliferation regimes has been gratifying,
but it has been hard won, and is by no means guaranteed. The
prospects of a renewal of horizontal proliferation have become
real.
In parallel with the risks associated with the nuclear arsenals in
the five declared nuclear weapon states, there are the dangers of
undeclared nuclear arsenals. The states concerned have neither
articulated the doctrines supporting their nuclear forces, nor is
anything known of the arrangements they have in place to ensure the
non-use of these weapons. These states must be urged strongly to
adhere to the NPT or other equivalent non-proliferation obligations
as non-nuclear weapon states. Equally the acquisition of nuclear
weapons or material by terrorists or other sub-national groups is a
matter of grave concern.
During the Cold War, American and Soviet strategic nuclear forces
were designed to cope with sudden attack, not least by keeping large
portions of their forces on alert and ready to strike on the shortest
notice. Although the forces were structured to be able to ride out a
first nuclear strike, they also had 'launch-on-warning' or
'launch-under-attack' options, choices that would have to be
exercised after no more than a few minutes of deliberation. The need
for such a prompt response had grave drawbacks: information on the
scale and nature of the attack might be unclear and difficult to
verify in the minutes available. The recommended response might
compound the disaster or, worse, the early warning systems might be
wrong. False alarms have occurred, although never in the midst of a
severe crisis.
The profound anxiety and uncertainties imposed on advisers and
decision makers under this scenario, faced as they would be with the
imminent destruction of their society and the loss of a significant
fraction of their retaliatory forces, invoke a powerful
predisposition toward the option to 'launch-on-warning' or
'launch-under-attack'. The acute urgency of the circumstances, and
the logic of inflicting severe retaliatory damage, posed the real
likelihood that a nuclear first strike of any significant size would
trigger a massive response, despite the availability of an array of
graduated response options. Elaborate theories of escalation control
and 'intra-war bargaining' notwithstanding, the fatal flaw of
strategic nuclear deterrence is that if it fails, it will do so with
catastrophic consequences.
The continuing practice of maintaining nuclear weapons systems on
high states of alert also increases the danger of accidental
detonation, if only from the handling of nuclear weapons and their
components which such postures entail. Servicing complex systems on
alert 24 hours a day, year in and year out, requires elaborate
planning and organisation. It demands tight discipline and continuous
judgements at the margin between the requirements of safety and
responsiveness. Certainly, elaborate technologies were developed to
try to preclude the accidental or unauthorised launch of a delivery
vehicle or the detonation of the warheads it carried. The success of
these measures over five decades is a credit to those who managed and
maintained the weapons systems. But accidents did occur. During the
period from 1945 to 1980, about 100 accidents were reported which
damaged nuclear weapons and could have caused unintended detonation.
A number of serious accidents involving United States airborne alert
forces prompted the termination of this practice, although plans
permit its reinstatement in a period of acute crisis.
The US decision in 1991 to terminate entirely the 30 year practice of
maintaining a portion of its strategic bomber force on peacetime
alert further reduced the exposure of these unsheltered forces to the
likelihood of accident or deliberate damage. However salutary these
steps to reduce alert levels, and despite the transformation of
relations between the United States and Russia, the fact remains that
both of these states, and other nuclear weapon states, maintain
thousands of nuclear warheads on continuous alert. This perpetuation
of the most overtly hostile and risky aspects of the Cold War defies
logic. It needlessly prolongs an atmosphere of mistrust and the
potential for accidents. It is entirely out of keeping with the
urgent interest of fully integrating Russia into the institutions and
norms of a global community moving rapidly toward democratic
government and free and open markets.
The end of the bipolar confrontation has by no means removed
the danger of nuclear catastrophe. In some respects the risk of use
by accident or miscalculation has actually increased. Political
upheaval or the weakening of state authority in a nuclear weapon
state could cripple existing systems for ensuring the safe handling
and control of nuclear weapons and weapons material, increasing the
odds of a calamity. The same fate could befall other states or
sub-state groups with a less developed nuclear weapon capability or
those that seek to develop such a capability in the future.
The proposition that large numbers of nuclear weapons can be retained
in perpetuity and never used, accidentally or by decision, defies
credibility. The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used since
1945 is a great relief but provides little comfort. The United States
and the former Soviet Union came perilously close to outright nuclear
war during the Cuban missile crisis. It is highly doubtful that a
full accounting has been made of accidents and incidents involving
nuclear weapons since their introduction over 50 years ago. And
present and prospective nuclear weapon states have yet to resolve the
inherent contradiction of nuclear deterrence: that forces should be
postured to convey a credible capability of use, but they should not
at the same time provoke countervailing reactions that lead to
expanded arsenals, crisis instability and mounting consequences
should deterrence fail.
Limited Military Utility
Nuclear weapons have long been understood to be too destructive and
non-discriminatory to secure discrete objectives on the battlefield.
They came increasingly to be regarded as weapons to be employed only
in extremis, and then with the dismaying knowledge that the ensuing
consequences would obviate whatever military or political objective
prompted their use. As early as the 1970s, under the provisions of
the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) and subsequently
according to the obligations of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
(START), the United States and Russia began to constrain and reduce
the capabilities and size of their strategic forces. In addition,
they began to reduce the dangers of tactical nuclear weapons. These
weapons have been largely withdrawn from overseas deployment and
removed from ships and sea-based aircraft to stockpiles on their own
territory.
Even at the height of the Cold War, the ostensible use of tactical or
battlefield nuclear weapons to prevail against a conventional attack;
the 'flexible response' strategy, never satisfied the conflicting
concerns of NATO allies nor was perceived as guaranteeing either a
controllable nuclear exchange or ensuring an automatic link to United
States strategic nuclear forces. Indeed, whether nuclear weapons were
the decisive factor in or superfluous to the deterring of Warsaw Pact
aggression against Western Europe has been a matter of contention for
some time. What is clear, however, is that possession of nuclear
weapons has not prevented wars, in various regions, which directly or
indirectly involve the major powers. They were deemed unsuitable for
use even when those powers suffered humiliating military setbacks (as
in Korea) and, ultimately, defeat (as in Vietnam and
Afghanistan).
The asserted necessity, much less the utility of nuclear weapons, of
whatever yield, to deter use of such terror-inspiring devices as
chemical or biological weapons, is also greatly overstated. Moreover,
the advisability of such use is profoundly suspect. To the first
point, the nuclear weapon states have such an overwhelming strength
in military and civilian technology that a combination of defensive
measures and advanced conventional forces can deter or powerfully
retaliate against chemical or biological weapon threats. States with
less conventional capability than the nuclear weapon states would
likely find nuclear weapons highly impractical to deter attacks or
threats from their neighbours, from many standpoints. But the cost of
developing even a rudimentary capability would be extremely high and
selecting an appropriate target for retaliation would be difficult.
The consequences of nuclear retaliation are so disproportionate and
uncertain as to render this option at best implausible and at worst
self-defeating. The most appropriate course for dealing with chemical
or biological weapon threats is for the world community, and most
especially the nuclear weapon states, to press ahead with chemical
and biological disarmament.
The nuclear weapon states, through negative security assurances and
other multilateral commitments, have already placed sharp limits on
the utility of their nuclear weapons in respect to the non-nuclear
weapon states. Further, these weapons have no feasible role in
deterring terrorists or sub-state groups armed with nuclear weapons
or other weapons of mass destruction. Most importantly, apart from
their highly constrained military utility, the use of any type of
nuclear weapon, of any yield, would irretrievably diminish, if not
destroy, the vitally important threshold or firebreak between nuclear
and non-nuclear weapons that has been so carefully sustained by all
states since 1945. It would thereby raise the grim prospect of a
world of enmities, of states armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons
and of wide acceptance of the consequences of their employment.
Over the period of the Cold War, deterrence proved to be an
open-ended, highly risky and very expensive strategy for dealing with
the reality of nuclear weapons in a world of nation states with
enduring, deep-seated animosities. Conversely, given the origins and
peculiar ideological character of the East-West conflict, the extreme
alienation of the principal antagonists, the vast infrastructures put
in place and the sense of imminent, mortal danger on both sides,
deterrence may have served to at least introduce a critical caution
in superpower relationships. Whatever the final judgement may be with
respect to this era of unprecedented threats and risks, in the
post-Cold War environment, the argument for deterrence is largely
circular. Its utility implies and indeed flows from an assumption of
the continued existence of nuclear weapons, but in a world of
dramatically reduced global tensions. The only military utility that
remains for nuclear weapons is in deterring their use by others. That
utility implies the continued existence of nuclear weapons. It would
disappear if nuclear weapons were eliminated.
Reversing Nuclear Proliferation
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is amongst the most immediate
security challenges facing the international community. It is a
palpable threat to the security of both nuclear weapon states and
non-nuclear weapon states. The inherent risks attending the
possession of nuclear weapons as recounted above can only multiply
should the possession of nuclear weapons expand.
There is as much cause for alarm as there is for satisfaction
regarding the record to date. Despite the impact of the international
nuclear non-proliferation regime, the disconcerting reality is that
several states have made, and some continue to make, clandestine
efforts to develop nuclear arsenals. Indeed, the world may well find
itself at a crucial juncture with respect to the future course of
proliferation. Should the ranks of declared or undeclared states grow
by even one beyond the present roster of known or widely presumed
members, the risk of a new chain reaction of proliferation is
substantial. Some argue that it is precisely because of this
possibility that major powers such as the United States must retain
nuclear weapons in perpetuity. Such logic turns the singular role of
the major nuclear powers in the arms control arena on its head. The
undeniable truth is that these powers collectively, and the United
States in particular, govern the pace, possibilities and prospects
for nuclear arms limitations, reductions and elimination. Should they
elect to preserve their arsenals, over time other states will acquire
nuclear capabilities. But, should they make an unequivocal and
demonstrated commitment to shrink and ultimately eliminate their
nuclear arsenals, over time they will establish a global norm for
honouring this obligation.
It is false to claim that the world has traversed successfully the
most dangerous phase of the nuclear era and is now on the path to
modest, passively deployed nuclear forces that will deliver the
asserted benefits of deterrence at much reduced risk, the so-called
'low-salience nuclear world'. Such confidence is out of keeping with
the unhappy reality that even if START II is fully implemented, the
United States and Russia in 2003 will still have a large stock of
tactical nuclear warheads and a combined strategic nuclear arsenal of
around 7000 operational warheads. Beyond even this enormous residual
capability, they will likely retain a substantial reserve not
accountable under the agreement. And, of course, the forces of the
other three nuclear weapon states remain outside of any reduction
agreement, and thus will remain unconstrained. Under these
circumstances, there is no assurance whatever that a low-salience
nuclear world can ever be achieved or sustained, especially as the
number of actors multiplies. Nuclear forces by their mere existence
will have high salience.
The possible acquisition by terrorist groups of nuclear weapons or
material is a growing threat to the international community. It adds
a disturbing new dimension to the more well established concern about
proliferation among states. During the Cold War, the most probable
targets of nuclear attack were the nuclear weapon states themselves
who targeted each others' military installations and even cities.
Today, the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons or material,
including by terrorist and sub-state groups, has become a serious
threat to the international community. Even the most powerful country
in the world, the United States, is now vulnerable to such
threats.
In the absence of extremely tight controls, the development of an
already significant illegal trade in fissile material, particularly
from sites in the former Soviet Union, will make it easier for
terrorist or sub-state groups to obtain enough nuclear material for a
nuclear device. The perpetuation of a nuclear weapons culture and its
supporting infrastructure, and the increasing availability of
relevant expertise from scientists and technicians formerly employed
in nuclear weapons establishments, will also make it feasible for
terrorist or sub-state groups to assemble a workable nuclear device
able to threaten large population groups. While this does not imply
that illicit nuclear weapons will become widely available or the
weapon of choice for terrorists, it cannot be excluded that some
extreme act of terror might in the future be carried out with a
nuclear device. The most recent Harvard study on the subject makes a
telling point:
It does not require a large step to get from terrorist acts like
Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center to the first act of nuclear
terrorism. Suppose that instead of mini-vans filled with hundreds of
pounds of the crude explosives used in Oklahoma City and New York,
terrorists had acquired a suitcase carrying one hundred pounds of
highly enriched uranium (HEU), roughly the size of a grapefruit.
Using a simple, well-known design to build a weapon from this
material, terrorists could have produced a nuclear blast, equivalent
to 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT. Under normal conditions, this would
devastate a three-square-mile urban area. 1
In this context it cannot be excluded that one possible future source
of fissile material is plutonium, in vitrified form, in former
underground nuclear weapon test sites. Accordingly, these sites must
be declared and safeguarded to prevent the illicit retrieval of this
material.
It is unlikely that terrorist threats involving a nuclear device or
material can be eliminated by state-to-state cooperation, even where
a terrorist group has the backing of another state. The logic of
deterrence fails when one side does not have an easily identifiable
or vital asset at which the other can aim. In addition, terrorists
are likely to employ unconventional means of delivery for their
nuclear devices, making it even more difficult for target states to
predict, prevent or limit the successful use or threat of use of
these devices.
The nuclear weapon states, as part of the decision taken in 1995 at
the NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) to extend the NPT
indefinitely, reaffirmed their commitment to Article VI of the Treaty
and agreed to a specific program of action which includes the
determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce
nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of elimination. The
NPT rests on this promise and it must be kept. In the long run, the
nuclear weapon states cannot realistically expect to dampen
proliferation pressures by retaining their own, albeit modest,
passively deployed forces. To deal effectively with proliferation
therefore means also tackling head on the problem of nuclear
disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest
possible time.
As to the issue of legality, the Canberra Commission notes with
satisfaction that, in response to a request from the UN General
Assembly for an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use
of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in July
1996, stated unanimously that "a threat or use of force by means of
nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN
Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is
unlawful", and that "a threat or use of nuclear weapons should also
be compatible with the requirements of the international law
applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles
and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific
obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly
deal with nuclear weapons".2
By majority vote the ICJ also stated: "It follows from
above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons will generally be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict and in particular the principles and
rules of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of
international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the
Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State
would be at stake." Moreover, in its advisory opinion the Court
unanimously stated that there existed "an obligation to pursue in
good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control".3 It is precisely
this obligation the Canberra Commission wishes to see
implemented.
Security Without Nuclear Weapons
For all the reasons outlined above, the world would be a much more
secure place for everyone if there were no nuclear weapons. For forty
years the two superpowers made herculean efforts, at great cost, to
integrate nuclear weapons into their respective national security
postures - bigger warheads, smaller warheads, a greater diversity of
delivery systems and launch platforms, and all manner of innovations
in deterrence doctrine and declaratory postures. But nothing could
alter the reality that each depended for its very existence on the
rationality as well as the technical and organisational competence of
its most bitter foe.
True, during the Cold War nuclear weapons may have played a role in
reinforcing awareness of the futility of war between the major
powers, and in helping establish a framework of confidence in the
West in its own security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact. Some still believe that 'existential deterrence', a general
caution engendered in state behaviour by the prospect of escalation
to nuclear conflict, continues to have relevance in the international
system by engendering caution in state behaviour in the face of the
prospect of escalation to nuclear conflict. But the world has moved
beyond the Cold War. The risks of retaining nuclear arsenals in
perpetuity far outweigh any possible benefit imputed to deterrence.
The possession of nuclear weapons increases the possibility of a
nuclear response in a crisis, encourages others to develop nuclear
arsenals and provokes the rapid development of nuclear weapons by
adversaries. The presence of nuclear weapons in regions of chronic
tension does more to increase than alleviate the chances of
misunderstanding and conflict. It increases the risk that low
intensity regional conflicts could escalate into a wider nuclear
confrontation.
Nuclear weapons are either powerless to address or in some cases
simply exacerbate the most prevalent threats to national security in
today's world, including terrorism, ethnic conflicts, state
disintegration, humanitarian disasters and economic crises. To help
counter these security threats, states are crafting new cooperative
strategies, institutions and mechanisms, both at the global and
regional levels. Several states, most notably Argentina, Brazil,
South Africa and Sweden, have revised their earlier assessment that a
nuclear option provided a route to enhanced national security and
international influence. Meanwhile, the vast majority of states have
voluntarily rejected the nuclear weapon option while maintaining and
enhancing their national security.
Nuclear weapons to some degree influence the security outlook of a
wide range of states, not just the nuclear weapon states and other
states with a nuclear weapon capability. The elimination of nuclear
weapons will contribute to and facilitate important changes in the
international security environment. Individual states can be
reassured that their security is not undermined by the process of
elimination. Practical steps to achieve a nuclear weapon free world
can be agreed and verified. In sum, the safe and verifiable
elimination of nuclear weapons would make a major contribution to
prospects for a more secure global community in the century to
come.
A New Opportunity
The end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international
action to eliminate nuclear weapons, a new opportunity. It must be
exploited quickly or it will be lost. There has been no better
opportunity since the beginning of the nuclear age. Permanent
arsenals and proliferating nuclear powers will be the fate of the
world if this opportunity is ignored.
Nuclear weapons have not been used for 50 years but the risk is
likely to become greater as time goes on. Nuclear weapons should not
be nor should they be seen to be a natural or inevitable feature of
the human society. If, on the other hand, nuclear weapons are
accepted as a permanent feature of the international system, then
states will inevitably develop new nuclear weapons and their
associated delivery systems.
The whole global community has a direct and fundamental interest in
the elimination of nuclear weapons, and the regime which manages that
process and its outcome. The key responsibility lies with the nuclear
weapon states themselves and in particular with the United States and
Russia. The invigoration of the elimination process will depend on
decisions which they alone can make.
Rebutting the Case for Retaining Nuclear Weapons
The case for retaining nuclear weapons as instruments of national
power continues to be very influential; people of great experience
and authority remain unconvinced about the wisdom of elimination.
Accordingly, the following rebuttal deals at some length with the
arguments for retention.
"Nuclear Weapons Have Prevented and Will Continue to be Needed to
Prevent War Between the Major Powers"
Perhaps the most important role claimed for nuclear weapons - beyond
deterring the use of other nuclear weapons, is that they discourage
recourse to war among the major powers and are thus a force for
stability. The empirical evidence appears strong. The period
1870-1945 saw two world wars and several more brief, confined but
full-scale clashes between major states such as France and Germany in
1870, China and Japan in 1894-95, and Japan and Russia in 1904-5.
Since 1945 there has been no direct clash between the recognised
major powers (although China and the Soviet Union fought a brief
border war in 1969). Many therefore contend that, for better or
worse, it has taken the unique sobering capacity of nuclear weapons
to break the entrenched cycle of war between the world's most
powerful states. This broad historical correlation between nuclear
weapons and the absence of war between the major powers is seen as
being decisively reinforced by the belief of some that nuclear
weapons played a vital part in deterring the Soviet Union from
pushing the Iron Curtain in Europe further to the West. The
experience in Europe in 1945-90 in fact lies at the heart of the view
that nuclear weapons have, on balance, played a positive role.
While it must be accepted the beliefs were deeply held that the
Soviet Union aspired to invade and occupy Western Europe, and that
nuclear weapons deterred it from doing so, the evidence for those
beliefs is now unclear.
First, it is not clear that the Soviet Union, even in the company of
its Warsaw Pact allies, had the capacity to do so, nor more
particularly, that it believed its national or wider political
and strategic interests would be advanced by doing so. The
Soviet Union, at that time, was a powerful, ruthless totalitarian
state and these facts were a source of gravest concern. But, as
American records from the immediate post World War II period are
declassified and, even more important, as the end of the Cold War
permits the first authoritative investigations into the assessments
and judgements made by the Soviet leadership at the relevant times,
it is clear that the view that Soviet policy rested on a systemic
urge to aggression and that its actions were driven by this rather
than by a concrete calculation of its capabilities and interests, is
open to question.
Second, the idea that only the threat of suffering its own Hiroshimas
and Nagasakis deterred the Soviet Union from invading Western Europe
is contrary to the unfolding historical record. That record, rather
than suggesting that the Soviet Union was uniquely different in the
way it framed its interests and assessed its options to advance them,
instead suggests that World War II had reaffirmed for the Soviet
Union, as for other powers, that major war between them was not a
rational instrument of policy and should be avoided at almost any
cost. The new danger of escalation to nuclear war merely underlined
this central point.
Whatever conclusions may eventually be drawn from the historical
record, Europe's experience of nuclear deterrence after World War II
should not be extended into a general principle. A number of relevant
aspects do, however, emerge from that experience.
It was in Europe that the strategic utility of nuclear weapons was
most thoroughly explored and their limitations most clearly
displayed. The first authoritative endeavour in the United States to
accommodate nuclear weapons in a national security strategy; the
policy memorandum NSC-68 of 1950 p; recommended that the United
States make the fullest use of its advantage in atomic weaponry. In
the NATO context, facing very strong Soviet conventional forces, the
decision was taken to enlist nuclear weapons as a substitute for
conventional forces. Declaratory statements stressed that, if
attacked, NATO intended to respond promptly with nuclear weapons "by
means and at places of our own choosing". This strategy, known as
'massive retaliation', was the beginning of a determined search to
extract utility from nuclear weapons as a balance against superior
conventional forces, namely deterring major aggression against any
member of the Atlantic alliance.
This policy of extended nuclear deterrence, as it came to be known,
proved to be a most demanding one. It is noteworthy that doubts about
the credibility of nuclear threats were apparent from the outset:
NSC-68 also recommended that the post-war rundown of conventional
forces be reversed to create the largest possible firebreak between
conventional war and nuclear war. The United States and its allies
had as a common interest a threat to resort to nuclear weapons that
was, if not utterly credible, at least not blatantly incredible. But
the United States, for all the sincerity of its political
undertakings, had a compelling interest in not being drawn
automatically into full-scale intercontinental nuclear war as a
result of any instance of aggression against its European allies.
The European allies, seeking the strongest possible deterrent to war,
spoke publicly as though they wanted to see a direct linkage between
Soviet conventional attack and a response by US strategic nuclear
forces. Privately, however, many Europeans thought otherwise. And in
the 1970s and 1980s scepticism about the military utility of nuclear
weapons began to be expressed publicly by former service leaders and
officials on both sides of the Atlantic:
At the theatre or tactical level any nuclear exchange, however
limited it might be, is bound to leave NATO worse off in comparison
to the Warsaw Pact, in terms both of military and civilian casualties
and destruction...The only exception would be if the Soviet Union
were to respond to NATO's use of nuclear weapons either with a much
more limited response or none at all. To initiate use of nuclear
weapons on that assumption seems to me to be criminally
irresponsible.5
The history of extended deterrence, which included the progressive
acquisition by the Soviet Union of a comparably large and diversified
nuclear arsenal, is an anguished one. For Europe the concern was
sometimes that developments in Soviet nuclear capabilities had
weakened Washington's commitment to its defence, or else that
Washington might convince itself that any conflict could be confined
to Europe and for that reason be rather more adventurous than
Europeans might wish. Concern mounted in the early 1960s when the
United States, confronted with a rapidly developing Soviet nuclear
force both strategic and tactical, proposed to abandon 'massive
retaliation' in favour of a more cautious and nuanced strategy,
'flexible response', which pushed the nuclear threshold up behind a
new resolve to strengthen NATO's conventional defence capabilities.
Flexible response and extended deterrence both came under challenge
in the late 1970s when the Soviet Union deployed new generations of
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles (notably the SS-20) and was
thus seen to be acquiring the ability to wage strategic nuclear war
against Western Europe with a weapon that was sub-strategic in the
superpower context. Some believed that to negate or respond to the
use or threat of use of these weapons the United States would have
had to leapfrog from its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to its
US-based strategic nuclear forces. There was thought to be a missing
rung in the ladder of escalation which was seen as further
'de-coupling' the United States from the defence of Europe, that is,
putting at risk the direct linkage between aggression against NATO
and the threat of US strategic nuclear strikes against the Soviet
Union. The British and French nuclear forces were deemed, as always,
to be essentially irrelevant to this gap in the escalatory ladder.
The solution adopted by NATO was to deploy new American missiles
capable of posing from European soil the same risk to Soviet targets
that the SS-20 posed to Western Europe, and accompany this with an
offer to negotiate mutual reductions in this class of weapon.
In all of this there was little discussion, even in broad terms, of
how the strategic weapons in the United States and the broad array of
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would actually be used.
Deterrence, after all, requires that threats be credible to the
opponent: this, in turn, requires evidence that using nuclear weapons
could produce outcomes preferable to non-use. But it has proven
impossible to conceive of 'war plans' for the use of nuclear forces
against a comparably equipped foe which did not leave the initiator
worse off as a result of the action. Discussion of this problem was
muted for two main reasons.
First, the extraordinary destructiveness even of tactical nuclear
weapons in the relatively confined spaces of northern Europe came
graphically to the fore. Occasional references deriving from
exercises, based on favourable assumptions such as the constrained
use of tactical nuclear weapons against military targets, invariably
involved casualty figures which provoked public alarm. Adding to the
alarm of casualty figures in the millions was nervousness relating to
the decision to cross the nuclear threshold as a crisis unfolded,
including the prospect that authority to release nuclear weapons
might be delegated down the chain of command.
The second constraint on discussion is perhaps even more important.
As the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew and diversified, broadly matching
that of the United States in terms of flexibility, survivability and
destructiveness p; the crucial feature of flexible response,
namely the presumption of a more credible capacity to threaten to
move up the escalatory ladder, became untenable. In effect NATO was
trying to build a credible deterrent based on an incredible
action.
A degree of 'existential deterrence' existed. But the prospect of the
damage which would surely have been incurred in a conventional war
must have weighed heavily in the minds of leaders on both sides.
Notwithstanding doctrine and declaratory positions, the absolute
imperative for the United States and its NATO partners was considered
to be the non-use of nuclear weapons.
The foregoing is a brief account of the attempts by the West, and
essentially the United States, to exploit nuclear weapons to enhance
security. This bias is appropriate because the United States was
unique in overtly tasking its nuclear forces to do more than deter
nuclear attack against itself. The Soviet Union, of course, also took
nuclear weapons very seriously and invested heavily in them. Although
there is no evidence that NATO ever entertained the possibility of
dislodging the Soviet Union from Central Europe by force, the Soviet
Union undoubtedly felt that its nuclear forces deterred, particularly
perhaps at times of popular uprisings (1953, 1956 and 1968) when it
would have appeared that NATO was under considerable pressure to
intervene.
"Nuclear Weapons Protect the Credibility of Security Assurances to
Allies"
It is argued that the credibility of security assurances extended to
third parties requires the continued existence of nuclear weapons.
Extended deterrence was formulated in the first instance to address
circumstances in Western Europe, as a means of transposing United
States power and negating the proximity and ready reinforcement
capability of the Soviet Union's larger conventional forces. The
gravity of the United States' political commitment to defend its
allies in Europe and also in Asia and the Pacific lay in its declared
preparedness to expose its own territory to nuclear attack. One
consideration, never formally declared but not disguised with any
vigour, was to dampen incentives in Germany and Japan to become
nuclear weapon states themselves.
Extended deterrence has always encompassed tensions. On the one hand,
the United States has had to balance the credibility of its security
commitments to allies against its natural instinct to build
firebreaks between those commitments and nuclear attack against its
own home territory. On the other, allies who craved that commitment
have also dreaded becoming a superpower nuclear battleground. More
importantly, the circumstances in Europe which originally gave rise
to extended deterrence no longer obtain. Partly through the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), but more emphatically as
a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the dramatic
diminution in the military capability of its constituent parts,
including Russia, the prospect of an overwhelming conventional threat
against US allies on the periphery of the former Soviet Union has
simply vanished. Nor is there any prospect of a new threat arising
comparable in magnitude to that posed by the Soviet Union in the past
now that Russian forces have been withdrawn from Germany and the rest
of Central Europe.
The Canberra Commission does not propose that any nuclear weapon
state should eliminate its nuclear forces unilaterally. Moreover,
extended deterrence assurances in the form of collective defence
arrangements will remain as part of stable security arrangements.
Extended nuclear deterrence, however, cannot be used as a
justification for maintaining nuclear arsenals in perpetuity, and the
security and non-proliferation function of extended nuclear
deterrence in any case will no longer apply in a nuclear weapon free
world. Allies of the United States have lent their strong support to
the NPT's stated objective of nuclear disarmament. Their interest in
collective security arrangements based on conventional forces is sure
to continue after nuclear weapons have been eliminated.
"Nuclear Weapons Deter the Use of Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction"
Weapons of mass destruction embrace chemical and biological as well
as nuclear weapons. The claim is still sometimes made that nuclear
weapons are an effective deterrent against them all and constitute
the only guarantee of national security against threats posed by such
weapons.
All the nuclear weapon states have formulated negative security
assurances, statements that set out the circumstances in which they
would not use nuclear weapons. The United States declared in 1982
that it would "not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon
state ... except in the case of an attack on the United States, its
territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to
or associated with a nuclear weapon state in carrying out or
sustaining the attack". The clear inference that can be drawn from
this statement, which, together with that of the United Kingdom, is
the most conditional negative assurance offered by a nuclear weapon
state, is that a non-aligned non-nuclear weapon state acting on its
own but using biological weapons or chemical weapons against the
United States should not fear retaliation with nuclear weapons. In
other words, the US and the other nuclear weapon states signalled
through these security assurances that the only circumstances in
which it would be appropriate to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons was when nuclear weapons were present, directly or
indirectly, on the opposing side.
The United States has not failed to capitalise on the fact that it
has nuclear weapons and that a non-nuclear adversary might doubt its
ordinances of self-denial. In 1990 the United States did not
discourage Iraq from the view that it might be subject to nuclear
retaliation if it used chemical weapons to protect its occupation of
Kuwait. Iraq's Foreign Minister subsequently asserted that the
nuclear capability of the coalition forces cast a shadow over the
means the regime determined it could sensibly employ to resist
eviction from Kuwait. But the United States had means other than
veiled nuclear retaliation to deter Iraq from using weapons of mass
destruction, for example, the prospect of Iraq's utter devastation
through massive conventional bombings or changing the main objective
of the war from liberating Kuwait to toppling the Iraqi Government.
Furthermore, the United States would have been aware that, if Iraq
had raised the stakes and used chemical weapons, the consequences of
nuclear retaliation by the United States might have been even more
far reaching than the threat it was seeking to deter.
No nuclear weapon state has been or is prepared to declare as a
matter of national policy that it would respond to the use of
biological or chemical weapons with nuclear weapons. Whatever
incidental contribution they might consider nuclear weapons to make
in deterring the use of biological and chemical weapons (and it is
not difficult to find high-level statements short of formal policy
declarations seeking to establish this connection), the nuclear
weapon states have not specifically included this in rationales for
the maintenance of nuclear forces. They have evidently also taken
full account of the fact that use of nuclear weapons in response to
use or threat of use of other weapons of mass destruction would cross
an important psychological as well as military threshold, making the
management of future conflicts even more uncertain. The remarkable
advances in the capabilities of conventional armaments, both already
achieved and in prospect, can be expected on the whole to confirm
this self-imposed limitation on the utility of nuclear weapons.
An increasing number of states have in recent years come to be
concerned at the threat of chemical and biological weapons. The issue
has become enmeshed with policy responses to proposals for nuclear
weapon free zones. The 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba provided an
opportunity for nuclear weapon states to reaffirm to African states
the assurances they have previously given. As argued in the case for
the elimination of nuclear weapons, the solution to these concerns
lies in the strengthening and effective implementation of and
universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Biological Weapons Convention, with particular emphasis on early
detection of untoward developments. The response to any violation
should be a multilateral one.
"Nuclear Weapons Confer Political Status and Influence"
It is said of nuclear weapons, with some justification, that their
possession delivers important benefits in the form of status,
influence and autonomy in world affairs. All of these are strong
motives for states as well as individuals. Pressures to retain or
acquire nuclear weapons for these reasons must be taken seriously.
Yet the growth in influence of several non-nuclear weapon states
tends to refute this proposition.
The example most frequently cited of the correlation between nuclear
weapons and status is the fact that the five permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council, the only members with the power of
veto, are also the nuclear weapon states. None of the five, however,
secured this status because of nuclear weapons. Not even the United
States was a confirmed nuclear power when the Charter of the United
Nations was signed on 26 June 1945. And today, it is beyond doubt
that any expansion of the permanent membership of the Security
Council will not be on the basis of preserving the nexus between such
membership and the possession of nuclear weapons.
The view that nuclear weapons deliver status and influence to their
owners is due in part to the fact that nuclear weapons were in the
early aftermath of World War II the supreme embodiment of economic
strength and technological excellence. As the world slipped deeper
into Cold War, and Washington and Moscow gathered ever more of the
reins of global management into their hands, the United Kingdom,
France and then China saw themselves as potential targets of
superpower arsenals. Subsequently they were attracted also to nuclear
capability as a means to secure a place at the top table. Nuclear
weapons undeniably helped sustain the significant international
standing of both the United Kingdom and France, who, importantly,
both took the decision to acquire them when nuclear weapons were
still fresh and novel. Equally, however, their alliance with and
importance to the United States during the Cold War almost certainly
contributed far more to their continued prominence in world
affairs.
In retrospect, the United Kingdom and France in particular may
question whether their decision to secure a nuclear weapon capability
has been worthwhile. Very large economic costs, both direct and
cumulative, are inevitably involved and these need to be set against
any possible enhanced independence in foreign and defence policy. The
direct costs of developing atomic and thermonuclear weapons and an
array of specialised delivery vehicles, providing an elaborate
security apparatus for warheads and their delivery systems, and
keeping all of these up to date are themselves formidable. Moreover
the entire complex must be operated continuously at extreme standards
of excellence.
Nuclear weapons cannot exclusively be relied on for defence,
especially if potential adversaries also have them. So the cost of
the nuclear forces, including their continued modernisation, must
essentially be added to conventional means of defence. In the cases
of the United Kingdom, France and China, the need to support
extensive nuclear programs has taken resources and skilled personnel
away from conventional forces. The diversion to military purposes of
a disproportionately large share of a country's research and
development capability is a significant factor in explaining
differences in the rate of economic growth that states can sustain
over the medium and longer term. In part it explains the pronounced
shifts that have occurred over the post-war period in the relative
economic weight of the major states, and how Japan and Germany, in
particular, have improved their position markedly relative to all the
nuclear weapon states. The pressures to refine and update delivery
systems have eased although missiles, aircraft and ballistic missile
submarines will require expensive maintenance and replacement from
time to time. On the other hand the outlook for the medium and longer
term is less optimistic. In the absence of a commitment to eliminate
nuclear weapons more countries are likely to acquire them, prompting
costly competition for at least a qualitative edge. And even a modest
increase in the membership of the nuclear club must sharply diminish
whatever benefits these weapons are felt to deliver in terms of
status.
"Nuclear Weapons Provide Effective Defence at Lower Cost"
It is sometimes argued that nuclear weapons are cost-effective and
make possible a more economical defence posture. This view was
briefly entertained in the early years of the nuclear era when the
United States had a nuclear monopoly or a huge preponderance in
deliverable nuclear weapons and when there was a temptation to
discount the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and regard nuclear
weapons as an important but basically evolutionary development p;
just a bigger bomb.
While the US/NATO strategy of 'massive retaliation' was an echo of
this view, it is important to note that the United States
simultaneously decided to reverse the drastic demobilisation that
occurred after World War II and to maintain indefinitely large
standing conventional forces. The Korean War strongly reinforced this
policy position. Much the same happened in the other nuclear weapon
states. It was quickly recognised that the circumstances in which
nuclear weapons could beneficially be employed were extremely narrow
if, indeed, they existed at all. Rather than nuclear weapons being
regarded as a substitute for conventional forces, the overwhelmingly
dominant line of reasoning has been to maintain the strongest
practicable conventional capabilities and thereby maximise the
firebreak between conventional war, should it break out, and nuclear
war.
No accurate data exists on the recurring or cumulative cost of the
nuclear posture for any of the nuclear weapon states, though without
doubt a realistic full costing would yield staggering figures. Such a
costing would embrace the production of fissile material; the
fabrication of nuclear weapons; environmental clean-up; testing; the
design, development, production and operation of delivery systems;
the command, control and communications architecture; and the panoply
of early warning systems.
All the nuclear weapon states continuously face difficult decisions
on nuclear/conventional trade-offs at the margin. But such trade-offs
are governed primarily by the need to keep total military expenditure
within acceptable bounds. There has been essentially no realistic
possibility of achieving savings through assigning to nuclear weapons
missions and functions previously performed by conventional forces.
If anything, the reverse is true. Recent experience suggests that
modern conventional capabilities can reliably perform tasks that were
considered earlier to require nuclear weapons. Even here the issue is
not cost-effectiveness but the fact that such conventional
capabilities constitute a realistic deterrent. In contrast to nuclear
weapons, they can be used.
"Nuclear Weapons Deter and if Necessary Can Defeat Large Scale
Conventional Aggression by Regional Powers"
The view is held that in a prospective multipolar world with a
significant diffusion of economic, technological and military power,
nuclear weapons could prove valuable in deterring and if necessary
defeating large scale conventional aggression by regional powers,
perhaps occurring in more than one theatre at the same time. This
presupposes that a nuclear weapon state would find it morally and
politically acceptable to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear
foe.
This contention is unrealistic. Even in the most favourable
circumstances, where there has been no prospect of retaliation,
political, moral and military inhibitions have excluded the use of
nuclear weapons. Twice during the Korean War, when US forces were in
desperate straits and when North Korea and China had no nuclear
capability and the Soviet Union only a relatively small one, the US
President recoiled from the moral and political costs of resorting to
nuclear weapons. When French forces were besieged at Dien Bien Phu in
1954, serious consideration was given in the United States to
providing assistance through use of low-yield nuclear weapons. But in
these and other instances, including in the later American
involvement in Vietnam, self-deterrence proved as effective as mutual
deterrence.
The nuclear weapon states have concluded that it is in their
interests to formulate negative security assurances that formally
proclaim the inadmissibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons in circumstances where the aggressor is not a nuclear weapon
state and is not being actively supported by a nuclear weapon
state.
It is also plain that any attempt to unshackle nuclear weapons
through contemplating a role for them in conventional regional
conflicts would be short-sighted in the extreme. This would
inevitably and significantly intensify proliferation pressures.
"Deep-Seated Regional Disputes Will Always Frustrate Universal
Agreement on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons"
It is sometimes contended that even if the nuclear weapon states saw
net advantage in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the
necessary universal commitment to this goal would be frustrated by
the states involved in the most intractable regional disputes. The
two key examples given are the disputes between Israel and the Arab
states, and between India and Pakistan. But, without question, the
overt nuclearisation of these disputes would complicate them further
and make any genuine reconciliation vastly more difficult. The states
concerned would be locked into very expensive and dangerous nuclear
deterrent relationships, with the familiar incessant pressures to
increase and diversify the nuclear arsenals. The actual use of
nuclear weapons, whether by design or by accident, would exacerbate
these disputes beyond measure and make more likely the direct
involvement of the major powers.
It is clearly in the interests of the nuclear weapon states, and
substantially within their capacity and that of the international
community, to address the concerns of the few states who may believe
that a nuclear capability is indispensable to their security.
Strengthening conflict mediation procedures and providing additional
security assurances will be in the interests of both nuclear and
non-nuclear weapon states.
The striking development, post-Cold War, of increasing global
interdependence has led most states to appreciate the potential of
seeking security in cooperation with rather than in confrontation
against their neighbours. Though cautiously in some cases, many
states are now exploring the potential for dialogue, transparency and
other trust and confidence building measures with their neighbours as
a more reliable and effective means of providing for their security
than confrontation or deterrence. Furthermore, the commitment to the
goal of a nuclear weapon free world should reinforce the
determination of states to strengthen collective and cooperative
means of addressing their security concerns.
"The Elimination of Nuclear Weapons is Unverifiable: Cheating and
Breakout Will Occur"
The elimination of nuclear weapons will not be possible without the
development of adequate verification. A political judgement will be
needed on whether the levels of assurance possible from the
verification regime are sufficient. All existing arms control and
disarmament agreements have required political judgements of this
nature because no verification system provides absolute certainty.
This situation has not prevented the international community acting
in the area of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction first
with the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards system, then the CWC and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT).
The nature of nuclear weapons, the secrecy that has surrounded their
development and uncertainties about total amounts of nuclear material
produced for weapons, will make it very difficult, or in the view of
some impossible, to be confident that states which have operated
large scale military nuclear programs have made full declarations of
their holdings of nuclear weapons and fissile material. The
possession by a state of a number of nuclear weapons and the means to
deliver them in an otherwise nuclear weapon free world would present
the state concerned with a powerful coercive instrument. While such a
development is considered a significant risk it is hard to envisage
the nuclear weapon states totally eliminating their arsenals.
Confidence in the verification arrangements will have to apply to the
nuclear programs of the declared nuclear weapon states and the
undeclared and threshold nuclear weapon states. Verification
arrangements are also discussed in Part Two and in more detail in
Annex A.
Nuclear disarmament will be achieved in stages, and the decision
point on whether verification is adequate for complete elimination is
unlikely to be reached for some time. The potential uncertainty about
whether a verification regime can be developed to provide sufficient
confidence for final elimination should not be allowed to divert
attention from the benefits of making an early start on practical
steps toward a nuclear weapon free world. Development and
implementation of the verification arrangements needed for each step
toward elimination will provide immediate benefit through reducing
the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear
proliferation including nuclear terrorism. If it were to take a long
time for the verification system to deliver the levels of confidence
needed for total elimination, a world of small residual arsenals
would, in the meantime, be a safer place than at present although the
dangers of nuclear proliferation and a renewed arms race would
remain. Movement to this penultimate stage of nuclear disarmament
would establish circumstances in which states could conclude, with
increasing conviction over time, that nuclear weapons are not
relevant to their security, thereby eliminating any remaining
incentive to cheat.
It should be recognised that a verification regime is composed of
both its material and technical features, which should be of the
highest order attainable, and the common political and legal
commitments which support it. This creates the climate of confidence
essential to any verification regime. An inclusive approach to
verification can increase levels of assurance. In the case of
verification for a nuclear weapon free world, technical verification
can be supplemented by measures such as transparency in nuclear
activity, relevant national intelligence information passed to
verification bodies, an enhanced role for individuals in verification
and application of effective export controls.
A number of factors can be identified which will act in favour of
development of adequate verification arrangements for a nuclear
weapon free world. First, because the nuclear weapon scientific
industrial complex is a tightly regulated governmental enterprise,
there is an increased probability that extensive records of nuclear
weapons and weapons fissile material production will be available.
This is not to diminish the magnitude of the task of verifying the
completeness of states' declarations of holdings of weapons and
weapons nuclear material, and records can of course be destroyed or
falsified.
A second consideration is the nearly thirty years of experience
accumulated in verifying compliance with the NPT. The IAEA safeguards
system offers a proven and evolving system for delivering a high
degree of assurance that safeguarded nuclear material remains in
peaceful use. Action necessary to improve the IAEA's capacity to
detect undeclared nuclear activity is being taken and the Agency has
expertise in verifying declarations of previously unsafeguarded
nuclear programs, including its work in Iraq, the DPRK (North Korea)
and South Africa after that country renounced nuclear weapons.
Third, there is the experience of the SALT, START, INF, CFE and CWC
agreements that individually and collectively demonstrate the
powerful influence that political will can exert over what is
desirable and possible in terms of verification. In the 1980s, the
arms control agenda was transformed by the negotiation, in
particular, of the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) and the
CFE agreements. Prior to these treaties, the scope of arms control
was, with the major exception of IAEA safeguards inspections,
basically limited to arrangements that could be verified by so-called
'national technical means', that is, by the information that each
side could extract without the cooperation of the other. Once it had
been determined politically that both sides really wanted the
outcomes in question, the realm of verification expanded beyond
recognition to include on-site inspections and voluntary transparency
and cooperative measures. In a similar vein the verification regime
supporting the CWC broke significant new ground in response to the
scale and complexity of the challenge, the harnessing of new
technologies for verification purposes and the forging of a
partnership, worldwide, between governments and the chemical
industry. These agreements show that verification capabilities can
grow to support the objective when that objective is determined
unequivocally to be in the political and security interests of all
concerned.
The temptation should be resisted to demand a perfect verification
regime and total assurance of effective collective action against any
cheating state (in effect, a world government) as the only
circumstance in which it would make sense to eliminate nuclear
weapons. Inevitably, some risk will have to be accepted if the wider
benefits of a nuclear weapon free world are to be realised. Some
argue that, in a nuclear weapon free world, any state that cheats
successfully and emerges with a meaningful nuclear force, warheads
and credible delivery systems, would derive tremendous advantage.
This seems intuitively obvious but it should be examined. The history
of the nuclear era to date indicates that the threat of use of
nuclear force is in practice extremely difficult to translate into
political gains. This would be at least as true in the world that had
succeeded in crossing the threshold to zero nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, in an era in which the accuracy, penetrating power and
destructive force of conventional weapons are increasing rapidly and
economic interdependence is growing, the development of an illegal
nuclear force would, in all probability, be self-defeating.
It is important to be clear on what constitutes a 'meaningful nuclear
force' and on what force might be secretly acquired. Much would
depend on the sort of country that did the cheating and the scale of
the geopolitical threat that it could subsequently pose before its
nuclear capability was countered and negated. The risk of a single
state emerging with a meaningful nuclear force is perhaps greatest in
the case of a nuclear power or threshold state that succeeded in
hiding away a portion of its arsenal while otherwise appearing to
participate in the elimination process. This is a clear challenge for
the accounting and verification regime. If states with a known
nuclear weapon capability fail to create high and unblemished levels
of reciprocal confidence in the course of the preparatory process,
this will inevitably prejudice the elimination process.
It is already practically impossible for a government to develop
nuclear weapons without at least arousing strong suspicions. The
instruments and procedures that would come into effect as part of the
process of eliminating nuclear weapons can be expected to increase
confidence in this regard very substantially. Any state that
generated doubts about its commitment to nuclear disarmament or had
done so in the past would be subject to particularly close scrutiny.
The credibility of the new verification regime should not rest wholly
on detection of just one bomb: it should rather be based on the
ability to provide due warning that someone was preparing a
meaningful nuclear force.
Major powers with very substantial conventional forces do not require
nuclear weapons to deal with threats from small states which might
acquire some nuclear weapons capability. The advanced conventional
weapons of the major powers would be enough to discourage or
retaliate against any small state which threatens to use nuclear
weapons.
In the light of these considerations, the rational requirement is to
evaluate comparative risks. In considering the desirability of moving
to a nuclear weapon free world, some compare its hazards not with
yesterday's massive nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert holding
apart nervous and deeply antagonistic states but with the prospect of
relatively modest arsenals possessed only by a few states experienced
in their management. But, as already argued, it is much more likely
that the nuclear club will expand and the nuclear arms race
re-ignite. A more telling comparison is therefore the risk of a
failure of deterrence in an environment of thousands of warheads on
reliable delivery vehicles, against the risks associated with
whatever nuclear force a cheating state could assemble before it was
exposed. It is beyond question that, of those two, the former is the
vastly greater risk.
Conclusion
The world community has had 50 years of experience with nuclear
weapons. In this period much of its effort, including of those
members of the community which have owned nuclear weapons, has been
directed towards protecting itself from their destructive power.
Vertical proliferation, the urge of nuclear weapon states to add to
and perfect their arsenals, has been a major cause of the problem of
living with nuclear weapons. Horizontal proliferation, the urge of
other states to acquire this perceived means of enhancing their
security, has also been and remains of great concern.
It has been argued that nuclear weapons have reinforced caution in
the conduct of relationships between the major powers. But their
existence carries the inherent risk of their use, which would
inevitably have catastrophic results. The only complete defence
against such catastrophe is the elimination of nuclear weapons and
the assurance that they will never be produced again. Inertia and
complacency should not be permitted to prevent the international
community from reaching this goal.