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Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Advancing the interests of Australia and Australians internationally

Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Advancing the interests of Australia and Australians internationally

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office

Annual Report 1999-2000

Annex E IAEA Statements of Conclusions

IAEA Statements of Conclusions of Inspections in Australia.

During 1999-00 the IAEA carried out inspections in four of Australias five Material Balance Areas (MBAs): AS-A; AS-B; AS-C; and AS-D. The IAEA provides statements of conclusions about these inspections under Article 91(b) of Australias NPT Safeguards Agreement.

Article 91(b) statements for inspections conducted during 1998-99 stated the following conclusions (Activity 3 applies only to MBAs AS-A and AS-D).

Table 19 IAEA Conclusions of Inspections in Australia

 

Verification Activity

Conclusion

(1)

Examination of records

The records satisfied the Agency requirements.

(2)

Examination of Reports to the Agency

The reports satisfied the Agency requirements.

(3)

Application of Containment and Surveillance Measures

The application of containment and surveillance measures adequately complemented the nuclear material accountancy measures.

(4)

Verification of Physical Inventory

The physical inventory declared by the operator was verified and the results satisfied the Agency requirements.

The only material unaccounted for (MUF) declared for the year was a small quantity of enriched uranium in AS-C.

Explanatory note on MBA AS-E

This MBA covers all locations in Australia, except ANSTO at Lucas Heights, where safeguardable nuclear material is present.

No IAEA statement under Article 91(b) of Australias NPT Safeguards Agreement is provided for this MBA since the IAEA has not inspected the nuclear material located there. This is because the quantities are too small to be of proliferation significance and in most cases have been exempted from active safeguards or have had safeguards terminated in accordance with the Agreement (Articles 36, 37, 38 and 39 of the Agreement refer).

However, this year a complementary access pursuant to the Additional Protocol to INFCIRC/217 took place at the Defence Science and Technology Organisations establishment at Salisbury in South Australia. The Agencys conclusions drawn from this access have been received, together with those concerning the similar access at the Ranger Mine in June 1999. The Agency noted that access to both locations pursuant to Article 4.a.(i) of the Additional Protocol did not indicate the presence of any undeclared nuclear material or activities.

Return to the ASNO Annual Report Index | Annex FIAEA Safeguards Statistics

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