Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office: Annual Report 2012-13

Appendix D IAEA Statements of Conclusions for Australia 2012

Inventory verification inspections carried out by the IAEA at Australian nuclear facilities and locations are shown in Table 8. In addition, the IAEA carries out a range of other verification activities, such as short notice inspections, complementary accesses, design verifications and data collection and analysis.

The IAEA's conclusions for Australia are provided at two levels: a component of the overarching findings and conclusions published in the IAEA's Safeguards Statement for 2012 (see Appendix E); and the statements of conclusions of inspections in Australia under Article 91(b) of Australia's NPT Safeguards Agreement and the statement of conclusions the IAEA has drawn from Additional Protocol verification activities under Article 10.c of the Additional Protocol.

The highest level conclusion, known as the 'broader conclusions', the IAEA draws in the Safeguards Statement, is in paragraph 1(a) of the Safeguards Statement that 'the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.' Australia is on the list of countries covered by the IAEA's broader conclusion in the Safeguards Statement for 2012. The IAEA has drawn the broader conclusion for Australia every year since 2000.

The IAEA's statements of conclusions of inspections under Article 91(b) for the inspections it carried out in May 2013 were not available at the time of publishing this Annual Report. The 91(b) statements will be published when available on ASNO's web site: www.dfat.gov.au/asno.

The IAEA's Additional Protocol Article 10.c statements for the complementary accesses shown in Table 8 were as follows:

Access pursuant to Article 4.a.(i) did not indicate the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities at:

  • Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre
  • Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre – Silex
  • Ranger Uranium Mine, Jabiru, Northern Territory

Addendum to Appendix D of the 2012-13 Annual Report of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office

IAEA Statements of Conclusions for Australia 2013

As noted in Appendix D of the 2012-13 Annual Report, at the time of publishing that report the IAEA's statements of conclusions of inspections under Article 91(b) of Australia's NPT safeguards agreement were not available. These statements were completed by the IAEA on 17 March 2014 and summarised in this addendum to Annex D. Further detail on the IAEA's compliance conclusions is in Appendix D of the 2012-13 Annual Report.

The list of verification activities carried out by the IAEA at Australian nuclear facilities and locations in 2012-13 was provided in table 8 in Output 1.1 of the 2012-13 Annual Report. These verification activities included: short notice inventory verification inspections; routine inventory verification inspections; design information verification inspections; and, complementary access.

The 91(b) statements arise from the short notice and routine inventory verification inspections carried out in 2012-13, and relate specifically to the material balance period 17 May 2012 to 20 May 2013 for material balance area AS-F (OPAL Reactor) and the material balance period 15 May 2012 to 21 May 2013 for material balance area AS-C (ANSTO Research and Development).

The IAEA concluded that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for and that there were no indications of the undeclared presence, production or processing of nuclear material. However the IAEA noted that two reports in the material balance period did not satisfy the IAEA's requirements, because these were not dispatched to the IAEA within the timeline specified by the Facility Attachment.

These reports were processed on time but data mismatches resulted in a lengthy reconciliation effort between IAEA and ASNO which led to the reports being categorised by the IAEA as late.