Performance

Output 1.1: National Safeguards System

Operation of Australia's national system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material, items and facilities.

Performance Measures

• Australia's obligations are met under Australia's safeguards agreement with the IAEA
• Australia's system of safeguards permits and authorities is administered in a timely and effective manner
• Australian uranium at mines and in transit accounted for properly

Performance Assessment

International Obligations

Reporting

ASNO met all of Australia's obligations during the reporting period for the submission of declarations and notifications on nuclear materials and facilities as required by Australia's safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

ASNO reported changes to Australia's nuclear material inventory to the IAEA on a monthly basis. These reports are summarised in Tables 2 and 3 below. ASNO audited and reported on the inventory at the Lucas Heights site of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), the principal location in Australia of nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, as well as permit holders around Australia with small quantities of nuclear material. The high number of reports in Table 2 attributed to 'other locations' relates to holdings of chemical reagents, mainly held by universities, and depleted uranium shielding held by industrial radiographers.

Table 2: ASNO reports (line entries) to the IAEA, 2011–12, by facility

Facility	2006–07	2007–08	2008–09	2009–10	2010–11	2011–12
ANSTO research laboratories	454	550	588	607	989	1 291
HIFAR (defuelled 2007)	66	27	117	8	0	0
ANSTO vault storage	18	18	27	22	26	126
Moata (defuelled 1995)	9	11	10	8	0	0
OPAL reactor	67	60	106	196	381	496
Silex laboratories	39	68	4	13	0	0
Other locations	3 252	3 024	3 286	2 948	2 940	2 879
TOTAL	3 905	3 758	4 138	3 802	4 336	4 792

Table 3: ASNO reports (line entries) to the IAEA, 2011–12, by data type

Type of Data	2006–07	2007–08	2008–09	2009–10	2010–11	2011–12
Inventory Change Report	839	488	589	459	838	1 084
Physical Inventory Listing	1 232	1 476	1 550	1 584	1 541	1 551
Material Balance Report	152	152	152	136	132	143
Concise Note	1 682	1 642	1 847	1 623	1 825	2 014
TOTAL	3 905	3 758	4 138	3 802	4 336	4 792

Table 4 is a summary of total quantities of nuclear material by nuclear material category in Australia. Notable changes from the previous year's totals include an increase in enriched uranium, from the import of fresh fuel for the OPAL reactor.

Table 4: Nuclear Material in Australia at 30 June 2012

Category	Quantity	Intended End-use
Source Material
Uranium Ore Concentrates (UOC)	1 183 tonnes	Export for energy use pursuant to bilateral agreements
	6 tonnes	Storage
Natural Uranium (other than UOC)	4 477 kg	Research and shielding
Depleted Uranium	15 783 kg	Research and shielding
Thorium Ore Residues	59 tonnes	Storage/disposal
Thorium (other than Thorium Ore Residues)	1 924 kg	Research, industry
Special Fissionable Material
235U	160 636 grams	Research, radioisotope production
233U	4 grams	Research
Plutonium (other than 238Pu)	1 233 grams	Research, neutron sources

Nuclear research and development

ASNO ensured that all IAEA requirements were met during the reporting period with respect to formal reporting of nuclear research and development in Australia, and ensured that any associated technology remained in exclusively peaceful use and did not contribute to any proliferation activity.

Table 5: Associated Items in Australia at 30 June 2012

Category	Quantity	Intended End-use
Associated Material
Deuterium and heavy water	28.8 tonnes	Research, reactors
Nuclear grade graphite	83.3 tonnes	HIFAR, Moata and storage
Associated Equipment
HIFAR[19]	1	Reactor
HIFAR coarse control arms (unused)	5	Reactor components
HIFAR safety rods	3	Reactor components
HIFAR fuel charging and discharging machines	2	Reactor components
OPAL reactor[20]	1	Reactor
OPAL control rods	13	Reactor components
OPAL control rod drives	6	Reactor components
Silex equipment	–	Enrichment R&D

Permits and Authorities System

ASNO continued to operate Australia's State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material in accordance with Australia's safeguards agreement with the IAEA and national legislation. Administration of this system was carried out in a timely manner.

Table 6: Status of Safeguards Permits and Authorities at 30 June 2012

Permit or Authority	Current Total	Granted	Varied	Revoked	Expired
Possess nuclear material	95	3	9	1	0
Possess associated items	14	0	0	0	0
Transport nuclear material	22	0	12	0	2
Transport associated items	0	0	0	0	0
Establish a facility	0	0	0	0	0
Decommission a facility	2	0	0	0	0
Communicate information contained in associated technology	10	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	143	3	21	1	2

Notice of all permit changes was published in the Commonwealth Gazette as required by subsection 20(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987. Three permits were granted to organisations that possess nuclear material. Three permits were revoked or expired where the permit holder no longer held or transported nuclear material. In the past year, 21 permits were varied as a result of changes to organisational details and approved locations.

ASNO Inspections

During the reporting period, ASNO carried out 18 domestic inspections to ensure that requirements of permits and authorities were being met. From these inspections, ASNO found no indication of unauthorised access to, or use of, nuclear materials or nuclear items. Although ASNO met with ANSTO and Silex during the reporting period for discussions on permit matters. These visits did not give rise to inspection reports, hence, these have not been included as part of the statistics on the figures below. In 2010–11 the inspection effort at ANSTO was 51 per cent of total inspection effort. In 2011–12 there have been no ASNO inspections at ANSTO though there were two IAEA inspections that ASNO attended. This decrease is due to a higher than usual inspection effort in 2010–11 from a detailed audit of ANSTO's associated technology holdings (reported in ASNO's 2010–11 Annual Report), and an increase in 2011–12 in inspections at other locations around Australia such as universities and industrial radiography companies.

Figure 5: Nuclear Inspections by ASNO, 2011–12, by type of permit holder

Figure 6: Nuclear Inspections by ASNO, 2011–12, by effort for each type of permit holder

IAEA Inspections

ASNO ensured that all of Australia's obligations with respect to IAEA inspections were met. During the reporting period, the IAEA conducted three routine inventory verification inspections, four design information verification inspections and one short notice inventory verification inspection. The IAEA exercised its complementary access rights in accordance with the Additional Protocol on two occasions (see Table 7).

Table 7: IAEA Safeguards Inspections and Complementary Accesses 2011–12

Date	Facility	Material balance area	Type
25-26 October 2011	Opal Reactor SSL Laboratories	AS-F AS-G	Short Notice Inventory Verification Inspection Complementary Access
28 October 2011	University of Melbourne	AS-E	Complementary Access
14-15 May 2012	ANSTO	AS-C	Routine Inventory Verification Inspection Design Information Verification Inspection
16-17 May 2012	ANSTO	AS-F	Routine Inventory Verification Inspection Design Information Verification Inspection
18 May 2012	ANSTO	AS-D AS-B	Routine Inventory Verification Inspection Design Information Verification Inspection Design Information Verification Inspection

The IAEA reports the outcomes of safeguards Inspections and complementary access in Australia in statements under Article 91(b) of Australia's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and Article 10.c of the Additional Protocol (see Appendix D).

During the reporting period, some small inventory differences were reported to the IAEA. These were primarily due to re-measurements of batches at various locations (e.g. hospitals and universities). For the inventory difference in other locations listed below, 0.3 kilograms in natural uranium and 0.05 kilograms in thorium resulted from a few small jars of chemical reagents not being identified during a permit holder's physical inventory taking at the end of the reporting period. There were no inventory differences at Lucas Heights facilities. Details are provided at Table 8.

Table 8: Inventory Differences Recorded during 2011–12

Material Balance Area	Difference between Book and Physical Inventory	Comment
HIFAR (defuelled) MOATA Reactor (defuelled) ANSTO research laboratories ANSTO vault storage OPAL reactor Silex laboratories	none	Book inventory equalled the Physical Inventory
Other locations	2.17 kg Natural uranium	Rounding, re-measurement and items not identified in a physical inventory taking.
	0.16 kg Depleted uranium
	0.12 kg Enriched uranium
	-0.75 kg Thorium

Output 1.2: Physical Protection

Protection of Australia's nuclear facilities, nuclear material and nuclear items against unauthorised access and sabotage. Internationally agreed physical protection standards applied to Australian Obligated Nuclear Material overseas.

Performance Measures

• Physical protection of nuclear material, technology and facilities meets Australia's obligations under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), bilateral agreements and IAEA guidelines
• Australian uranium at mines and in transit is properly protected
• Internationally agreed standards for the physical protection of nuclear material are applied to all AONM
• Proactive and professional contributions made to the development and effective international implementation of the CPPNM and associated physical protection guidelines

Performance Assessment

International and Bilateral Obligations

ASNO's inspections of permit holders established that physical protection arrangements at those facilities were in accordance with Australia's obligations under the CPPNM, IAEA guidelines, and relevant bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. ASNO also met Australia's international shipment notification obligations under the CPPNM by notifying relevant parties of the transhipment of Australia's uranium ore concentrates.

Domestic Security of Australian uranium

On 13 February 2012, ASNO along with the Australian Maritime Safety Authority visited the Honeymoon uranium mine before its first export of uranium ore concentrates (UOC). During that visit, ASNO viewed the packing arrangements for placing drums of UOC in shipping containers and also confirmed that final security infrastructure had been installed.

During 10-13 April 2012 ASNO visited the Ranger uranium mine and the Toll NQX freight storage yard in Darwin. ASNO verified that Energy Resources of Australia Ltd had completed all required actions arising from ASNO's previous inspection in 2010, including changes to the security plan, adjustments to the monitoring system, and upgrades to lighting arrangements for secure areas.

Exports of Australian uranium

Reporting by conversion facilities, safeguards authorities and shipping agencies confirmed that all AONM transferred from Australia safely reached its destination. The physical protection measures specified for these transfers effectively contributed to this outcome.

ASNO continued to require exporters to adopt and report on specific procedures to ensure appropriate levels of physical protection for UOC shipments from Australia to the port of unloading overseas. These procedures included checking of the physical condition of the containers and verifying the integrity of the containers and seals at each port of unloading or transhipment to detect any breaches of physical protection.

Nuclear Security at Lucas Heights

In January 2012, CEO ARPANSA and Director General ASNO jointly issued ANSTO the terms of reference for security reviews required under the respective licences issued by ARPANSA and ASNO. In the first stage, the review will cover the OPAL reactor and associated Molybdenum-99 production facilities with the rest of the site, and emergency response procedures to be covered in a second stage. This review will be the first of its type since the OPAL reactor was granted an operating licence and will take into account revisions in international standards (e.g. IAEA INFCIRC/225) and in Australia's Design Basis Threat (see page 61). The first stage of the review was to be completed in July 2012.

Review of the Design Basis Threat

One of the central concepts in the IAEA INFCIRC/225 is the Design Basis Threat (DBT) approach to physical protection. The Design Basis Threat (DBT) is a statement of the intentions and capabilities of an adversary that could be considered a "worst-case credible threat". The DBT provides a common basis, at a national level, on which nuclear facilities design and implement physical protection systems in order to defeat an adversary with clearly defined capabilities. When security systems are tested and assessed against the DBT, this approach provides credible assurance of the security of nuclear materials and facilities against the level of threat specified in the DBT. A DBT based approach to security is used where malicious acts could cause high radiological consequences or where significant amounts of nuclear material that could be readily used in a nuclear explosive device (HEU or separated plutonium) are stored.

The most recent major revision of Australia's DBT was in November 2002 following the September 11 terrorist attacks and the 2002 Bali bombings. Since then ASNO has continued to analyse developments in the global threat environment and assess the implications for the protection of nuclear materials and facilities in Australia. The DBT is intended to be a forward looking document and it was timely for a thorough reassessment of current and potential future threats against Australian nuclear facilities. Over the last 12 months ASNO has worked with other Australian Government agencies, including the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Defence and ARPANSA, to review the existing DBT in the context of the current threat environment, amend the DBT based on changes in the threat environment and finally issue the new DBT under the relevant ASNO permits. The review was conducted in accordance with international recommendations on the development and use of a DBT.

IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and the Nuclear Security Series

In March 2012 the IAEA invited member states to join a newly established Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) to oversee the production of its nuclear security series of guidance documents in a similar fashion that safety committees oversee the production of safety standards. While robust consultative processes were in place to produce individual Nuclear Security Series documents, there was no strategic member-state body to guide the development of the entire series. Long term, the IAEA envisages to establish a joint nuclear safety-security commission that will manage both the nuclear security series and nuclear safety series.

In April 2012, Stephan Bayer, Director Nuclear Security Section was designated as Australia's member to the NSGC with Loch Castle of ARPANSA as Australia's alternate member. The first meeting of the NSGC was held from 12 to 14 June 2012 at the IAEA in Vienna. This meeting established the terms of reference for the NSGC, agreed the review and production process for new Nuclear Security Series documents, and also agreed transitional arrangements for the production of Nuclear Security Series documents already part way through a production process. The second NSGC meeting is scheduled to take place in December 2012 and bi-annually thereafter.

Nuclear Threat Initiative Index

On 11 January 2012 the non-government Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), published the Nuclear Materials Security Index providing a baseline assessment of worldwide nuclear security conditions. Australia was ranked first of 32 countries with weapons useable material. The NTI Index is a measure of the worldwide nuclear security risk and assurance and does not measure on-the-ground domestic security arrangements. Australia's small holdings of weapons-usable nuclear materials and its consistent high scoring among all categories, from political stability and requirements for protection of materials to participation in and commitment to international security regimes, contributed to the top ranking. Since the index was published Australia has ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Australia is also planning the further export of excess-to-requirements nuclear material to the USA.

Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

ASNO supported Prime Minister Julia Gillard at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit held during 26–27 March 2012. The Seoul Summit was attended by 53 countries and five international/regional organisations. The leaders at the Seoul Summit produced a new Communiqué to support the Washington Communiqué, and also agreed to hold a third Summit in 2014 in the Netherlands. Australia was able to deliver on its Washington Summit commitments and set out its vision for what could be done to sustain efforts on nuclear security up to the Netherlands summit and beyond. ASNO also attended the Nuclear Security Symposium held just before the Summit. Further outcomes of the Seoul Summit are reported in Current Topics (p 26).

Namibia

Assistant Secretary ASNO (John Kalish) represented Australia at the IAEA-organised Seminar on Good Practices in the Processing and Control of Uranium Ore Concentrate Windhoek, Namibia 23-27 April 2012. The purpose of the seminar was to promote a dialogue between industry, government and international organisations on the regulation of uranium ore concentrates in Africa. Twelve African countries with current or likely future uranium mining activities were represented as well as representatives from Australia, USA, Brazil, Canada, the European Union and Kazakhstan. ASNO's presentation on its permit based regulatory system for nuclear safeguards and security was very favourably received. Details of the Seminar can be found on the Atomic Energy Board of Namibia website (http://www.aebofnamibia.org/index.php).

Development of Nuclear Security Guidance for the Uranium Industry

In June 2012 ASNO attended an IAEA-organised consultancy group meeting on "Nuclear Security for the Uranium Industry". This followed a similar meeting in February 2012 at which Australia was represented by an expert from the uranium industry. These meetings were convened to produce detailed nuclear security guidance for the natural uranium industry (uranium mining, milling and conversion) since current IAEA guidance merely specifies that "prudent management practices" should apply. Experiences shared at the Namibia Seminar on Good Practices in the Processing and Control of Uranium Ore Concentrate (see page 63) and the expert advice from countries experienced in the uranium industry were used to form the outline of an interim nuclear security guidance document that can be road-tested ahead of the longer term goal of producing an Implementing Guide and possibly other technical guidance under the IAEA's Nuclear Security Series. A further meeting of the consultancy group is planned for October 2012.

Output 1.3: Bilateral Safeguards

Nuclear material and associated items exported from Australia under bilateral agreements remain in exclusively peaceful use.

Performance Measures

• AONM is accounted for in accordance with the procedures and standards prescribed under relevant bilateral agreements
• Implementing arrangements for the bilateral agreements are reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure their continuing effectiveness

Performance Assessment

Australian Obligated Nuclear Material

On the basis of reports from bilateral treaty partners, other information and analysis, ASNO concluded that all AONM is satisfactorily accounted for. Based on ASNO's analysis of reports and other information from counterparts on AONM located overseas, ASNO concludes that no AONM was used for non-peaceful purposes in 2011.

Table 9: Summary of AONM by category, quantity and location at 31 December 2011[21]

Category	Location	Tonnes[22]
Depleted Uranium	Canada, European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea, United States	110 079
Natural Uranium	Canada, China, European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea, United States	24 035
Uranium in Enrichment Plants	European Union, Japan, United States	22 139
Low Enriched Uranium[23]	Canada, European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States	15 341
Irradiated Plutonium[24]	Canada, European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Switzerland, United States	148
Separated Plutonium[25]	European Union, Japan	1.6
TOTAL		171 744

The end-use for all AONM is for the production of electric power in civil nuclear reactors and for related research and development. AONM cannot be used for any military purpose.

Table 10: Supply of Australian uranium to customers during 2011 – as delivered to customers' converter accounts

Region	Tonnes UOC (U3O8)	% of Total
Asia	3 531	48.5
Europe	1 871	25.7
North America	1 874	25.8
TOTAL	7 276	100.0

Note ustralian and non-Australian obligated) which has been loaned to, or purchased by, Australian uranium producers overseas to meet contractual delivery obligations due to shortfalls in production. When deliveries of loaned and purchased quantities are taken to account, uranium was delivered by Australian uranium producers to customer converter accounts during 2011 in the following proportions: North America – 39.5%, Europe – 20.3%; and, Asia – 40.2 %.

Table 11: Summary of AONM Transfers, 2011[26]

	Destination	U (tonnes)
Conversion	Canada	898
	China	657
	European Union[27]	1 833
	United States	2 596
Enrichment	European Union	670
	United States	564
Fuel Fabrication	Japan	88
	Republic of Korea	41
	United States	122
	European Union	26
Reactor Irradiation	Japan	22
	Taiwan	0

The shipper's weight for each UOC consignment is entered on ASNO's record of AONM. These weights, subject to amendment by measured Shipper/Receiver Differences, are the basic source data for ASNO's system of accounting for AONM in the international nuclear fuel cycle. ASNO notifies each export to the safeguards authorities in relevant countries. In every case, those safeguards authorities confirmed to ASNO receipt of the shipment. ASNO also notified the IAEA of each export to non-nuclear weapon states pursuant to Article 35(a) of Australia's safeguards agreement as well as to nuclear-weapon states under the IAEA's Voluntary Reporting Scheme. Receiving countries similarly reported receipts to the IAEA.

Bilateral Agreements

Reporting

Reports from ASNO's counterpart organisations were mostly received in a timely fashion and in the agreed format, which enabled analysis and reconciliation with ASNO's records. Figures provided in Table 9 and Table 11 are based on ASNO's analysis of all available information at the time of publication.

Australia-Euratom Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

The original nuclear cooperation agreement between Australia and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) that entered into force on 15 January 1982 was due to expire on 15 January 2012. Australia and Euratom negotiated a new nuclear cooperation agreement, which came into force on 1 January 2012. On 1 May 2012, Director General ASNO and Mr Philip Lowe (Director General for Energy, European Commission), signed the Administrative Arrangements underpinning the Agreement bringing the new Administrative Arrangements into effect.

Australia-United Arab Emirates Bilateral Negotiations

The Australian Government and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have finalised negotiations on a nuclear cooperation agreement and are seeking signature of the agreement[28]. The agreement meets Australia's strict safeguards and non-proliferation policy requirements on uranium supply.

Multilateral Meeting on Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

In October 2011, Australia participated in a meeting with Canada, Euratom and the US on bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. The group has met annually since January 2008, and has developed a "document of common understandings" with regard to administration of obligation accounting and transfers of nuclear and non-nuclear material, equipment, components or technology pursuant to bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. The document describes content of "administration arrangements" that outline the practical application of nuclear cooperation agreements.

Output 1.4: International Safeguards and Non-Proliferation

Contribution to the development and effective implementation of international safeguards and the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Performance Measures

• Contribute to the strengthening of international safeguards in ways that advance Australia's interests
• Contribute to policy development and diplomatic activity by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
• Contribute to the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI)
• Manage the Australian Safeguards Support Program (ASSP)
• Cooperate with counterparts in other countries in the strengthening of international safeguards and improvement of domestic safeguards implementation
• Provide advice and assistance to the Australian Intelligence Community in support of national and international non-proliferation efforts
• Manage ASNO's international outreach program
• Assess developments in nuclear technology

Performance Assessment

Strengthening International Safeguards

ASNO took an active role in the development and effective implementation of international safeguards during the reporting period. ASNO remained actively engaged with the IAEA at both management and operational levels, and participated in the Australian delegation to the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference meetings in September 2011. During the General Conference, ASNO assisted with the safeguards resolution negotiations.

ASNO also continued to be well informed of developments and emerging issues in safeguards. As such, ASNO has made a number of presentations during the reporting period at international conferences to assist in explaining and supporting the work of the IAEA. ASNO also assisted the IAEA with its communication strategy, particularly the IAEA's work on strengthening procedures for safeguards implementation and evaluation, by providing opportunities for the IAEA to present at the broad community of states that attended the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) plenary in July 2011. This type of active engagement with the IAEA ensured that ASNO's work program remained relevant to the international non-proliferation agenda.

ASNO assessed that the IAEA safeguards system effectively fulfilled its task of verifying the non-diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards. The IAEA has ongoing concerns about inadequately developed State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC) in some states; this is an ongoing safeguards implementation issue. ASNO continues to address this important matter by working with regional and international counterparts to develop the skills and capacity of regional safeguards authorities through training and support.

ASNO has worked with APSN to complete a paper on the fundamentals and good practices for safeguards regulatory authorities, which will serve as a valuable resource for states in the region and more broadly. The paper describes safeguards implementation experiences and lessons learnt from the perspective of the community of Asia-Pacific nations that make up APSN. Further, this paper will also serve as an example to promote good safeguards implementation practices internationally and will complement and support the work in the IAEA to develop new safeguards implementation guidelines.

Contribution to DFAT policy development and diplomatic activity

ASNO has provided key contributions to policy development and diplomatic activities by providing analysis and advice.

ASNO has a close and supportive working relationship with the Australian Mission in Vienna, particularly with the Australian Ambassador in the role of Australian Governor on the IAEA Board of Governors. ASNO plays a major role in providing the Mission with specialist advice on multilateral and country-specific issues, such as safeguards and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. ASNO also provides advice on IAEA reports and current issues such as Iran and the DPRK. ASNO analyses are shared with the IAEA Secretariat and with like-minded governments represented in Vienna and other key capitals and are held in high regard for their specialist expertise in examining often complex safeguards issues.

IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation

SAGSI is the international group of experts appointed by and advising the IAEA Director General on safeguards implementation issues. It has been in place since the late 1970s, and safeguards specialists in ASNO (and its predecessor the Australian Safeguards Office) have been on SAGSI for most of this time. During the reporting period Dr Craig Everton stepped down from his position on SAGSI (finishing with the 74th series of SAGSI meetings in late 2011) and was replaced by Director General ASNO for 2012.

Topics examined by SAGSI during the reporting period included:

• the long-term strategic plan of the IAEA Department of Safeguards, including the conceptual framework for safeguards implementation[29]
• development of state-level approaches to support the evolution of the IAEA's state-level concept (see report on the state-level concept on page 15 of ASNO's 2010–11 Annual Report)
• a draft IAEA safeguards implementation policy paper on the composition and purity properties of uranium at the front end of the fuel cycle (such as uranium ore concentrates) that meet the requirements for the application of full safeguards under comprehensive safeguards agreements
• a draft guideline on safeguards implementation practices for states with a Small Quantities Protocol addendum to their comprehensive safeguards agreement
• revising the process for preparing the IAEA's safeguards statements that follow each verification activity
• draft guidelines on the determination of the decommissioned status of nuclear facilities under safeguards
• the changes to the quality assurance role of the Section for Effectiveness Evaluation in the IAEA Department of Safeguards
• changes to the annual IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR).

In April 2012 ASNO hosted a SAGSI working group meeting in Darwin, Northern Territory. SAGSI holds two working group meetings each year, and typically one is hosted by one of the SAGSI members, and the other hosted by the IAEA. The meeting was attended by all nine members of the SAGSI Working Group and three representatives from the IAEA's Division of Safeguards Concepts and Planning.

The working group meeting included a tour of the Ranger uranium mine, focussing on the uranium production and accountancy processes. ASNO is very grateful to Energy Resources of Australia Ltd, operators of the mine, for making the mine and key staff available for what was a very worthwhile tour. Having a uranium mine tour during this series of SAGSI meetings was timely given the policy paper on uranium ore concentrates described above has the potential to change the way IAEA safeguards are implemented at uranium mines.

Australian Safeguards Support Program

The resources available to the IAEA are not sufficient to allow all necessary safeguards research and development programs to be conducted 'in-house'. Safeguards are an evolving discipline and the Australian Safeguards Support Program (ASSP) assists the IAEA develop the concepts, equipment and procedures needed to meet new challenges in a cost-effective way. The ASSP comprises collaborative work with ASNO, ASNO's counterparts and expert groups on a number of safeguards projects formally agreed with the IAEA. ASNO is the national manager for the ASSP, coordinating activities with other Australian agencies as well as undertaking several tasks internally. These projects are outlined below.


Re-examination of basic safeguards implementation parameters

This project remains open, but there were no activities during the reporting period.

Analytical services for environmental sampling

Environmental sampling is an important safeguards measure that enhances the IAEA's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. Work on this important project by ANSTO is ongoing.

Experimental investigation of behaviour of trace elements in uranium during the concentration and conversion processes

While the project is ongoing there was no significant progress during the reporting period. Discussions were held with the IAEA Task Officer on the best way to advance this project.

Use of multi-sensor data for monitoring and detecting signatures relevant to the nuclear fuel cycle

This project remains open, but there were no activities during the reporting period.

Updates to fuel cycle manuals

The IAEA is revising the training manuals for use by their nuclear inspectors. These training manuals include details of uranium mining operations. Australia was requested to provide updated information on types of uranium deposits and overviews of mining and metallurgical processing of uranium ores to be included in these manuals. In response to a request from ASNO, Geoscience Australia completed three comprehensive overviews on the subjects of:

• Uranium Ores, minerals, and deposits
• Uranium mining
• Uranium milling and metallurgy.

These overviews contain information on the latest Australian and international developments in technology for mining and processing uranium ores. The overviews also include material on the distribution and behaviour of thorium in uranium ores. ASNO provided this material to the IAEA in October 2011.

The overall task remains open.

Proliferation Analysis Workshop

The fifth Proliferation Analysis Workshop was conducted by the ASSP from 8 to 10 May 2012 in Vienna. The workshop participants were drawn from the support and operations divisions of the IAEA Safeguards Department. The Australian team consisted of one analyst from the Department of Defence and one from the Office of National Assessments. The Australian Permanent Mission to the IAEA actively supported the running of the workshop. The focus of the workshop was proliferation analysis. Participants explored not just analytical tools, but also the techniques for combining information from disparate sources to provide an overall picture of the objects of study. The IAEA considers that these workshops enhance the analytical culture, information exchange and capabilities of the support and operations Divisions.

All source information analysis for safeguards purposes

This project remains open, but there were no activities during the reporting period.

New Australian Safeguards Support Program tasks in the reporting period

Network of analytical laboratories

The University of Western Australia (UWA) has become a member of the IAEA's network of analytical laboratories. UWA will make available analyses of environmental samples by large geometry secondary ion mass spectrometer (see Current Topics on page 18).

Cooperation with other States Parties

ASNO has close and long-standing relationships with nuclear safeguards and security agencies and practitioners in several countries in and outside the region with nuclear power plants, or plans for nuclear power such as China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, the United States and others. During the reporting period ASNO actively worked to maintain and reinforce these relationships through both high-level and operational-level discussions and also through projects under the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network.

ASNO staff presented papers at the July 2011 Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Annual Meeting in Palm Desert, California and the October 2011 joint INMM and ESARDA (European Safeguards Research and Development Association) safeguards meeting in Aix-en-Provence, France. ASNO's papers (listed in appendix G) were aimed at contributing to and influencing the concepts underpinning current developments in the IAEA to evolve the way it does safeguards implementation and evaluations.

International Outreach

ASNO continued its international outreach activities to assist countries in the region with the fulfilment of their non-proliferation safeguards and physical protection obligations. Assistance and training have been provided to professionals in a range of countries over the past 12 months including lecturing and assisting in international State System of Accountancy and Control training courses in Tokai, Japan (December 2011), Beijing, China (September 2011) and in Commodity Identification Training for the Additional Protocol in Bangkok, Thailand (May 2012) and ASNO assisted the International Security Division of DFAT in an export control workshop in Malaysia (April 2012).

ASNO is working with DFAT and the IAEA towards achieving actions agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference including having all States Parties to the NPT conclude and bring into force Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and, for those states with limited nuclear activities, amendments to Small Quantities Protocols.

ASNO has also taken steps, in cooperation with the IAEA, to work with some African countries to promote effective safeguards, nuclear security and export control oversight, particularly in those African countries with developing uranium mining interests. ASNO attended the IAEA-organised Seminar on Good Practices in the Processing and Control of Uranium Ore Concentrate in Windhoek, Namibia, which promoted dialogue between industry, government and international organisations on the regulation of uranium ore concentrates (UOC) in Africa. Twelve African countries with current or likely future uranium mining activities were represented.

In March 2012 the International Security Division of DFAT organised and hosted an ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in Sydney. ASNO and ANSTO worked with the IAEA to design and demonstrate a mock IAEA verification exercise of the OPAL reactor, focussing on the types of activities the IAEA would conduct during a complementary access visit under the Additional Protocol. The purpose of this demonstration was to help explain and demystify this important verification element of the Additional Protocol to assist those states that have not yet brought the Additional Protocol into force to make the decision to do so.

An initiative that has made a major contribution to ASNO's ongoing efforts to improve and strengthen the non-proliferation regime in the Asia-Pacific region, is the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN), which is chaired by the Director General ASNO. The objective of APSN, established in 2009, is to improve the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation in the Asia-Pacific region, which has provided ASNO with an opportunity to enhance its cooperation in areas such as training, professional development and the sharing of experiences. For example, ASNO is coordinating the work of APSN's safeguards infrastructure, implementation and awareness-raising working group.

ASNO contributed a team member to an IAEA SSAC Advisory Service mission in Kazakhstan in October 2011, specifically to advise on safeguards practices with respect to uranium mining.

Output 1.5: CWC Implementation

Regulation and reporting of Australian chemical activities in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, and strengthening international implementation of the Convention.

Performance Measures

• Australia's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are met
• Effective regulation of CWC-related activities in Australia, involving the chemical industry, research and trade
• Contribute to strengthening CWC verification and implementation, including through cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and with CWC States Parties
• Contribute to enhancing regional CWC implementation through targeted outreach

Performance Assessments

Meeting CWC Obligations

ASNO maintained Australia's strong record of performance in meeting its CWC obligations. Comprehensive and timely annual declarations and notifications were provided to the OPCW as follows:

• declaration of imports and exports of CWC-Scheduled chemicals and of the 42 facilities with CWC-relevant chemical production, processing or consumption activities during 2011 (declared in March 2012)
• Article VI declaration of anticipated activities at six CWC-Scheduled chemical facilities during 2012 (declared in September and October 2011)
• Article X, paragraph 4, declaration of Australia's national programs for protection against chemical weapons (declared in April 2012)
• Verification Annex, Part IV(B) submission confirming the completion of destruction in April to May 2011 of 144 old chemical weapon (OCW) projectiles containing sulphur mustard, of US origin, using CH2MHill TCD-60 Controlled Detonation. This occurred at Columboola, Queensland, a remote, former WWII ammunition depot. The munitions were excavated in preparing the site for coal mining in 2009
• Verification Annex, Part IV (B) submission of the recovery and disposal plan for two empty, unusable WWII 250lb LC Bombs (which no longer had base plates), of UK origin, discovered in the Northern Territory
• responses to OPCW Third Person Notes including routine clarification of the operational status of chemical plants
• responses to OPCW questionnaires regarding Australia's implementation of Conference Decision C-14/DEC.4 "Guidelines Regarding Low Concentration Limits for Declarations of Schedule 2A and 2A* Chemicals" and a survey on "Electronic Transmission of Article VI declarations"
• routine responses to OPCW notifications and amendments/corrections to inspector details and deletions or additions to the OPCW inspectorate.

Since 1997, the OPCW has conducted 41 Article VI routine facility inspections in Australia in accordance with the provisions under the CWC. In the reporting period, ASNO facilitated four routine OPCW inspections at declared chemical facilities in Australia. Three inspections were conducted at 'Other Chemical Production Facilities' and the fourth at a facility processing Schedule 2 chemicals. All inspections proceeded smoothly and received excellent support and cooperation from industry. The OPCW inspection team verified Australia's declarations as well as the absence of undeclared CWC-Scheduled chemical production, in accordance with the inspection mandates.

In October 2011 two OCW were discovered by a local historian at a former army camp, now public property, in Lee Point, Northern Territory. The munitions were partly buried vertically and used as a ground anchor point for fence poles. Defence recovered the OCW and identified them as 250lb LC Bombs most likely to have been manufactured in 1941 and designed to contain a chemical agent fill either phosgene or mustard. These World War II munitions were empty and deemed as unusable due to their corroded state and lack of a base plate. ASNO declared them to the OPCW in accordance with the CWC.

Legislation and Regulation

The permit systems under the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994 and Regulation 5J of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956, continued to operate well. Table 12 provides statistics for permits issued during the reporting period (1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012).

Table 12: Permits for CWC-Scheduled Chemical Facilities and Importers

CWC-Scheduled Chemicals	CW(P) Act 1994	Type	Permits at 30 June 2012	New Permits issued 2011–12	Re-Issued Permits 2011–12	Permits not re-Issued 2011–12	Import Permits 2011–12
Schedule 1	s19(4)	Production (Protective)	1				0
	s19(5)	Production (Research)	10	1
	s19(6)	Consumption	10	2	2
Schedule 2	s18(1)	Processing	13	3	2	2	58
Schedule 3	s18(1)	Production	3

Cooperation with the OPCW and CWC States Parties

ASNO continued to provide ongoing technical and policy guidance in preparation for OPCW Executive Council meetings, industry cluster meetings and informal consultations. Issues under discussion during the reporting period included:

• Article VI revised policy guidelines (Industry Inspections)
• enhancing the site selection methodology for Other Chemical Production Facilities
• proposed Sampling and Analysis inspections of Schedule 3 and Other Chemical Production Facilities
• the OPCW tenure policy
• report of the Advisory Panel on Future Priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
• report by an External Consultant on the Structure of the Technical Secretariat and the Functions of Its Posts
• practice Challenge Inspection Exercises
• Chemical Weapons Production Facilities Converted for Peaceful Purposes
• CWC universality
• the final extended deadlines for chemical weapons destruction

Increased numbers of declared facilities in Asia and Latin America have resulted in an increase in the number of States Parties and facilities eligible to receive inspections under the CWC. The Executive Council of the OPCW agreed a revised policy for Article VI inspections in October 2011 with implementation commencing in January 2012. The revised policy will see the total number of Schedule 1, Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 facility inspections remain relatively stable. The number of inspections at Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) is likely to increase. However, inspections will be limited to the maximum number per year in any one State. Difficulties are likely to arise in the implementation of the new guidelines due to the limited increase in the number of OCPF inspections for 2012. As such, the revised OCPF site selection methodology guidelines will not be met until 2014. Australia supports increased numbers of inspections to ensure that verification of new and existing facilities is based on the risk posed to the object and purpose of the CWC, whilst satisfying the requirement for equitable geographical distribution of inspections.

Given the importance Australia places on verification under the CWC and in support of the OPCW's work in this field, ASNO participated in the OPCW's sixth Challenge Inspection Field Exercise which was held in Thailand, fulfilling the role of the Requesting State Party from 31 October to 4 November 2011 (see Current Topics on page 29). This exercise was instructive in identifying the deficiencies in preparedness by the OPCW Technical Secretariat and documenting lessons learned. National table-top and field exercises in relation to the conduct of Challenge Inspections have also taken place in a number of States Parties to test their preparedness to receive a Challenge Inspection, but this is the first one to occur in Asia. The outcome strengthened Australia's resolve to ensure that the OPCW maintains a high degree of preparedness and expertise through training and other measures that will enable it to effectively perform its core functions which include Challenge Inspections and Investigations of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons.

ASNO participated in the Tenth Regional Meeting of National Authorities of CWC States Parties in Asia, held in Colombo on 26-28 June 2012. The meeting was attended by 43 participants from 29 States Parties, and focussed on CWC implementation issues. The OPCW has indicated that about 50 per cent of all declared trade in CWC-scheduled chemicals results in discrepancies for a variety of practical reasons. ASNO contributed to break-out discussions on how to reduce discrepancies of trade between State Parties declarations.

The regional meetings are a priority for ASNO in order to strengthen Australia's engagement and cooperation with counterparts in the region and to share its CWC implementation experiences. ASNO spoke on the importance of regional and sub-regional cooperation on CWC implementation and Australia's chemical trade controls. In his opening remarks, Ambassador Üzümcü, Director-General OPCW, stressed the importance of the work of National Authorities which form the backbone of the Convention, highlighted the significance of the size and diversity of the chemical industry in Asia and noted the presence of Australia as another symbol of cross regional interaction and cooperation.

Representatives from ASNO and the Department of Defence attended the second Experts Meeting of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) entitled "Incapacitating Chemical Agents (ICAs)[30]: law enforcement, human rights law and policy perspectives", held in Montreux, Switzerland, 24–26 April 2012. This meeting brought together 42 experts from government, law enforcement agencies, academia and non-government organisations to discuss this complex issue and its implications for international law. Uncertainties have been expressed as to whether Article 2, paragraph 9(d) of the CWC provides appropriate boundaries or guidance for States Parties' use of toxic chemicals for "law enforcement purposes including domestic riot control".

Australian experts from ASNO and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation also participated in the following meetings held in The Hague: OPCW Conference on International Cooperation and Chemical Safety and Security (12–13 September 2011), the 12th Annual Workshop to Coordinate Assistance and Protection under Article X of the CWC (22–24 November 2011), the 13th Annual Meeting of CWC National Authorities (25–26 November 2011) and the 16th Conference of the States Parties (CSP16) (28 November to 2 December 2011).

Australia welcomed CSP16 adoption of a decision which takes a constructive and forward looking approach to address the inability of CW Possessor States to meet the final destruction deadline under the Convention. The decision ensures that destruction of the remaining CW stockpiles will be completed within the shortest time possible, and no later than the planned completion dates, under continuous monitoring by the OPCW.

Domestic Outreach

ASNO continued to engage with industry and to clarify the requirements of the permit and notification system under the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994 and the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956. Outreach visits to the Defence Science and Technology Organisation and the chemical industry focussed on promoting greater awareness of the CWC, regulatory obligations and preparing declared sites for OPCW inspections.

ASNO continued participating in relevant meetings of the National Government Advisory Group on Chemical Security with other Australian Government representatives.

In January 2012, the World Customs Organisation amended the Harmonised System of Codes for a number of CWC-scheduled chemicals. ASNO, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs) worked collaboratively to ensure the new codes were fully integrated into Australian tariff codes and Australian Harmonised Export Commodity Classification (AHECC) Codes. ASNO continued to monitor ABS chemical trade data and liaised with Customs to reduce the occurrence of misclassified chemicals, especially with the implementation of the new codes. Customs has taken measures to ensure that correct codes are applied to chemical trade. Such measures help detect unauthorised trade and improve the accuracy of trade statistics for CWC-Scheduled chemicals published by the ABS.

As part of outreach efforts to ensure traders of CWC-Scheduled chemicals apply the correct tariff and AHECC codes, ASNO distributed copies of its industry brochures and a CD for chemical traders. Copies of these publications are available on request or from ASNO's website (www.dfat.gov.au/cwco).

Output 1.6: CTBT Implementation

Development of verification systems and arrangements in support of Australia's commitments related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Performance Measures

• Australia's obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are met
• Legal and administrative mechanisms which support Australia's commitments related to the CTBT are effective
• Contribute to the development of CTBT verification, including through the work of the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission
• Contribute to Australia's CTBT outreach efforts

Performance Assessment

International Obligations

Of the 21 facilities that Australia will host for the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS), 20 are in place and certified as operating to CTBTO technical specifications. The final facility, an infrasound monitoring station at Davis Base, Australian Antarctic Territory, requires significant planning and will be installed in the coming years. A list of Australia's IMS facilities and their status is at Appendix F.

Specific advances during 2011–12 in relation to Australian hosted IMS stations included:

• the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) completed installation of the radionuclide monitoring station at Mawson Base, Australian Antarctic Territory
• Geoscience Australia completed installation of an infrasound monitoring station on the Cocos Islands
• the abovementioned stations, along with the radionuclide monitoring station at Macquarie Island, were certified by the CTBTO during the year as meeting technical requirements for treaty verification
• ASNO signed an MOU with the Tasmanian Government and ARPANSA on use of land for the Macquarie Island radionuclide station.

Legal and Administrative Measures

ASNO continues to fund Geoscience Australia to carry out nuclear test monitoring through its network of seismic stations. This arrangement, set out in a Letter of Understanding between Geoscience Australia and DFAT, has been administered by ASNO on behalf of DFAT since 1 July 2000. ASNO is satisfied that Geoscience Australia has met its requirements under the Letter of Understanding during the reporting period. ASNO and Geoscience Australia again reviewed the arrangement during the year. It was found that the arrangement remains adequate for Australia's requirements at this time.

The operation of a National Data Centre (NDC) to verify an in-force CTBT will require additional activities. ASNO, ARPANSA and Geoscience Australia, working with the Department of Defence, continue to hold the question of Australia's future NDC requirements under review.

Nuclear Test Ban Verification

While around 85 per cent of CTBT IMS stations are now in place worldwide, detailed preparatory work is continuing to bring the Treaty's verification to a good level of readiness. ASNO contributes to the verification work of the CTBTO in conjunction with technical specialists from Geoscience Australia and ARPANSA.

When the CTBT enters into force, it will provide for on-site inspections (OSI) to determine whether a nuclear explosion has taken place in a particular area. ASNO's Mr Malcolm Coxhead, as the Task Leader for the elaboration of an Operational Manual on the conduct of OSI, continued to chair discussions on this subject at the CTBTO Preparatory Commission's technical working group. Mr Coxhead contributed also to work on OSI as part of an Expert Advisory Mechanism on planning for a major inspection exercise in 2014.

Consistent with principles set out in the CTBT, activities associated with the development of CTBT verification are funded primarily from the contributions of States Signatories. This includes training of people involved with the work of the Treaty, and participation in CTBTO workshops. ASNO manages the involvement of Australians in these activities.

Outreach

A fundamental requirement for an effective CTBT will be the ability of States Parties to form sound technical judgements about the nature of events detected by the IMS. Australia continues to work with and alongside the CTBTO to promote relevant technical capacity. During the year, experts from ASNO, Geoscience Australia and ARPANSA visited counterpart agencies in Malaysia and the Philippines to consider how countries in our region can work to build and maintain NDC capacity. Some specific proposals were identified and considered toward this goal.

Regular cooperation among NDCs offers a further way to enhance their effectiveness. With this in mind, ASNO and the New Zealand Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade consulted during the year to develop an MOU that will provide a framework for cooperation between NDC agencies in Australia and New Zealand. The MOU should be finalised and put into place in 2012–13.

Output 1.7: Other Non-Proliferation Regimes

Contribution to the development and strengthening of other weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regimes.

Performance Measures

• Provide support and assistance to Australia's Permanent Mission to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva in their efforts to advance Australia's non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, in particular, on seeking to commence the negotiation of an internationally verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
• Support other developments in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament that are relevant to Australia's interests

Performance Assessment

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

ASNO continued during the year to provide technical advice to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, including Australia's mission in Geneva, helping to build confidence and momentum in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) towards the commencement of FMCT negotiations. Following the finalisation of reports for the Australia-Japan 'side-event' meetings during 2010–11, opportunities for engagement on FMCT issues have been limited.

Verification for Nuclear Disarmament

New mechanisms will be needed to verify future nuclear disarmament steps. Recent ASNO Annual Reports have described an initiative of the UK and Norway (UKNI) to develop concepts and tools for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and reported on activities ASNO has initiated with a view to Australia's involvement in such work.

During the year, ASNO led Australia's participation in a workshop in London in December 2011 for experts from interested countries to review the UKNI. Key challenges were addressed also, including the need to find verification approaches that do not risk leakage of proliferation-sensitive information; especially how to verify that an item presented for verification is a nuclear warhead as declared. Experts from ASNO and ANSTO participated actively in the workshop.

To promote a wider understanding of the need for disarmament verification research, ASNO worked with the UK High Commission in Canberra to facilitate a discussion of the UKNI at the 15th Meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific in Sydney in March 2012.

NPT Preparatory Committee

Australia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Mr Peter Woolcott, chaired the 2012 meeting of the NPT Preparatory Committee in Vienna in May-June 2012. The smooth conduct of the meeting is widely regarded as having set a sound base for further preparations toward the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

ASNO provided expert and other support for Australia's participation in the 2012 Preparatory Committee Meeting. ASNO's Malcolm Coxhead provided particular support as part of the team supporting Ambassador Woolcott as Chair.

Output 1.8: Advice to Government

Provision of high quality, timely, relevant and professional advice to Government.

Performance Measures

• Provide policy advice, analysis and briefings which meet the needs of Ministers and other key stakeholders
• Contribute to the development of Australia's policies by DFAT in the area of WMD arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
• Cooperate on technical issues of common interest with departments and agencies such as ANSTO, ARPANSA, Department of Defence, Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, and the Australian Intelligence Community

Performance Assessment

ASNO has specialist knowledge in complex policy and technical areas dealing with nuclear non-proliferation, and has substantial experience in: verification methods; domestic, bilateral and international safeguards; nuclear technology and the nuclear fuel cycle; nuclear security; and CWC and CTBT verification issues. ASNO draws on this expertise and an international network of contacts in agencies and organisations to provide high quality technical and policy advice to Government and other bodies. ASNO provides the Government with advice on nuclear non-proliferation safeguards, from both international and domestic perspectives, together with expert advice across the range of WMD technologies.

Director General ASNO, as Australia's Sherpa for the Nuclear Security Summit process, has had a key role in providing advice to the Australian Government in the lead up to, and during, the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012. ASNO's advice shaped Australia's statement at the Summit, by Prime Minister Gillard, on Australia's vision for what could be done to sustain international efforts on nuclear security in the near future. Australia's statement at the Summit was well received and provided a key platform for ongoing discussions ahead of the third Summit to be held in 2014.

During the year, ASNO provided advice and analysis on a range of non-proliferation issues and developments. ASNO has analysed and reported on nuclear programs of concern, in particular that of Iran, but also developments in Syria and the DPRK.

ASNO provided special briefing and additional assistance to the Australian Missions to the IAEA and CTBT Organization (in Vienna), to the OPCW (in The Hague) and to the CD (in Geneva), as well as to Australian missions elsewhere, particularly in Washington, London, Moscow, and Beijing.

In connection with Australia's bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, ASNO provided advice on a new agreement with Euratom, which entered into force during the year, as well as administrative arrangements to implement the agreement. ASNO also advised on the development of a new bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates and concluded negotiations on this treaty. ASNO prepared approximately 17 ministerial submissions during the year, and provided submissions and oral briefing for Ministers, departments and the Parliament on specific issues.

ASNO has worked closely with other departments on a range of issues, which may impact upon non-proliferation considerations, including foreign investment proposals, international sanctions, defence export controls and safeguards assessments for the export of ores and concentrates.

ASNO participates in the Uranium Council, a government-industry forum coordinated by the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, designed to assist in the development of a sustainable, safe, secure, socially and environmentally responsible uranium industry.

Output 2.1: Public Information

Provision of public information on the development, implementation and regulation of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regimes, and Australia's role in these activities.

Performance Measures

• Effective public education and outreach

Performance Assessment

ASNO works to ensure Australia's WMD non-proliferation objectives are widely understood. This involves liaison with industry, tertiary institutions and non-governmental institutions, including presentations at various national and international fora. Activities during the year through which ASNO pursued public information objectives included:

• the annual conference of the Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (AusIMM) in June 2012, where ASNO gave two presentations on Australia's nuclear cooperation agreements; and on physical protection (security) for the transport of uranium
• various presentations by the ASNO Director General at the National Security College – a joint venture between the Australian Government and the Australian National University, with the aim of enhancing the functioning of the national security community, strengthening networks of cooperation between practitioners and non-government experts, contributing to the development of a new generation of strategic analysts, achieving effective outreach to business and the wider community.

ASNO continued its series of seminars on non-proliferation issues for government officials. The aim of the seminars is to provide clear, understandable and accurate information on concepts relevant to officials involved in Australia's broader non-proliferation and counter-proliferation efforts.

ASNO has an active program of preparing papers and presentations for conferences and professional journals. Many of these are available on ASNO's website. Details can be found under Appendix G.

ASNO's website (www.dfat.gov.au/asno), contains detailed information on Australia's non-proliferation policies, treaty and statutory obligations and safeguards agreements as well as notification and permit application forms. The Current Topics section of this, and previous, ASNO Annual Reports is also included as a public information source.

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[19] The ANSTO Board decided to cease operation of HIFAR in January 2007. The reactor was de-fuelled in May 2007. It is now awaiting decommissioning.

[20] Includes, inter alia, the reactor reflector vessel and core grid.

[21] Figures are based on yearly reports to ASNO in accordance with Australia's bilateral agreements and other information held by ASNO.

[22] All quantities are given as tonnes weight of the element uranium, plutonium or thorium. The isotope weight of ²³⁵U is 0.711% of the element weight for natural uranium and from 1 to 5% for low enriched uranium.

[23] An estimated 80–90% of Australian obligated low enriched uranium is in the form of spent reactor fuel.

[24] Almost all Australian-obligated plutonium is irradiated, i.e. contained in irradiated power reactor fuel or plutonium reloaded in a power reactor following reprocessing.

[25] Separated plutonium is plutonium recovered from reprocessing, before return to reactors for re-use in reactors for further power generation. This plutonium is used for reactor fuel after being mixed with uranium – termed mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. A significant proportion of Australian obligated separated plutonium is stored as MOX. Separated plutonium holdings fluctuate as plutonium is fabricated as MOX fuel and returned to reactors. On return to reactors the plutonium returns to the "irradiated plutonium" category.

[26] Figures are for transfers completed between jurisdictions from 1 January to 31 December 2011. Figures do not include transfers of AONM made within the fuel cycle of a state (or of Euratom), return of heels (residual UF6 remaining in cylinders), or damaged product.

[27] Includes transfers from Cameco Corp (Blind River, Canada) to Springfields Fuels, Ltd (United Kingdom).

[28] The Agreement between Australia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) for Nuclear Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy was signed by the Australian Foreign Minister Senator the Hon Bob Carr and the UAE Foreign Minister His Highness Sheikh Abdullah on 31 July 2012 in the UAE.

[29] During the development by the IAEA of the state-level concept some terminology has evolved. The SAGSI review work described in ASNO's 2010–11 Annual Report (p. 65) as examining the "conceptual framework for making the IAEA safeguards system fully information-driven" is the same as work described here as examining the "conceptual framework for safeguards implementation".

[30] Incapacitating Chemical Agents may be considered as chemicals that act on the central nervous system which at low concentrations can cause incapacitation. These are different to Riot Control Agents (RCAs), a category of chemicals specifically defined under the CWC, which act peripherally to cause irritation to mucous membranes and/or tear formation (e.g. tear gas).