Annual Report 2008-2009

Annual Report home |

Table of Contents |

Userguide |

Download versions

1.Director General's Report2. Current Topics3. Overview4. Performance5. Management and Accountability6. Appendices and Glossaries

Your location:

Appendices and Glossaries

Appendices

Appendices
Appendix A World Nuclear Energy, June 2009
Appendix B Australia's Bilateral Safeguards Agreements
Appendix C Status of Additional Protocols
Appendix D IAEA Statements of Conclusions for Australia 2008
Appendix E IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2008
Appendix F Status of CTBT IMS Facilities in Australia
Appendix G Freedom of Information Statement

Compliance Index

Glossary
 
Photo - See caption below for description
ASNO Assistant Secretary, Dr Geoffrey Shaw (third from right), participates in the expert panel discussion at the 15–26 June 2009, training course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Research Reactors.
Enlarge image

Appendices

Appendix A World Nuclear Energy, June 2009

Table 16: World Nuclear Energy, June 2009[29] [30]

Operating Reactors
% of Total Electricity in 2008
Reactors under Construction
Total
Capacity (GWe)
Total
Capacity (GWe)
United States*
104
100.7
19.7
1
1.2
France*
59
63.3
76.2
1
1.6
Japan*
53
46.0
24.9
2
2.2
Russian Federation
31
21.7
16.9
9
6.9
Germany*
17
20.5
28.3
0
0
Republic of Korea*
20
17.6
35.6
5
5.2
Ukraine
15
13.1
47.4
2
1.9
Canada*
18
12.6
14.8
0
0
United Kingdom*
19
10.1
13.45
0
0
Sweden*
10
9.0
42.0
0
0
China*
11
8.4
2.2
16
15.2
Spain*
8
7.5
18.3
0
0
Belgium*
7
5.9
53.8
0
0
Taiwan*30
6
4.9
19.6
2
2.6
India
17
3.8
2.0
6
2.9
Czech Republic*
6
3.6
32.5
0
0
Switzerland*
5
3.2
39.2
0
0
Bulgaria*
2
1.9
32.9
2
1.9
Finland*
4
2.7
29.7
1
1.6
Slovak Republic*
4
1.7
54.4
2
0.8
Brazil
2
1.8
3.1
0
0
Hungary*
4
1.9
37.2
0
0
South Africa
2
1.8
5.3
0
0
Mexico*
2
1.3
4.0
0
0
Lithuania*
1
1.2
72.9
0
0
Argentina*
2
0.9
6.2
1
0.7
Romania*
2
1.3
17.5
0
0
Slovenia*
1
0.7
41.7
0
0
Netherlands*
1
0.5
3.8
0
0
Armenia
1
0.4
39.4
0
0
Pakistan
2
0.4
1.9
1
0.3
Iran
1
0.9
TOTAL
436
370.4
(est) 15.0
52
45.9

Source: IAEA Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) (www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/)

Appendix B Australia’s Bilateral Safeguards Agreements

Table 17: Australia’s Bilateral Safeguards Agreements at 30 June 2009[31] [32] [33]

Country Entry into Force
Republic of Korea 2 May 1979
United Kingdom 24 July 1979
Finland 9 February 1980
United States 16 January 1981
Canada 9 March 1981
Sweden 22 May 1981
France 12 September 1981
Euratom31 15 January 1982
Philippines 11 May 1982
Japan 17 August 1982
Switzerland 27 July 1988
Egypt 2 June 1989
Russia32 24 December 1990
Mexico 17 July 1992
New Zealand 1 May 2000
United States (covering cooperation on Silex technology) 24 May 2000
Czech Republic 17 May 2002
United States (covering supply to Taiwan) 17 May 2002
Hungary 15 June 2002
Argentina 12 January 2005
People’s Republic of China33 3 February 2007

Note: Australia also has an Agreement with Singapore concerning cooperation on physical protection of nuclear materials, which entered into effect on 15 December 1989.

Appendix C Status of Additional Protocols

At 30 June 2009, there were 70 states (plus Taiwan) with significant nuclear activities[34]. Of these states, 5 were nuclear-weapon states (NWS), 62 were non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) party to the NPT, and 3 were non-NPT Parties.

In the following tables, states with significant nuclear activities are shown in bold.

Of the 62 NNWS NPT Parties with significant nuclear activities, 45 had an Additional Protocol in force (Table 18). A further 11 such states had signed an Additional Protocol or had an Additional Protocol approved by the Board of Governors (Table 19).

Table 18: States with Additional Protocols in force at 30 June 2009

State      
Afghanistan El Salvador Latvia Portugal
Armenia Estonia Libya Republic of Korea
Australia Fiji Lithuania Romania
Austria Finland Luxembourg Russia
Azerbaijan France Madagascar Seychelles
Bangladesh FYROM Malawi Singapore
Belgium Georgia Mali Slovakia
Botswana Germany Malta Slovenia
Bulgaria Ghana Marshall Islands South Africa
Burkina Faso Greece Mauritius Spain
Burundi Guatemala Monaco Sweden
Canada Haiti Mongolia Switzerland
Chile Holy See Netherlands Tajikistan
China Hungary New Zealand Tanzania
Colombia Iceland Nicaragua Turkey
Comoros Indonesia Niger Turkmenistan
Croatia Ireland Nigeria Uganda
Cuba Italy Norway Ukraine
Cyprus Jamaica Palau United Kingdom
Czech Republic Japan Panama Uruguay
DR Congo Jordan Paraguay USA
Denmark Kazakhstan Peru Uzbekistan
Ecuador Kuwait Poland  

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html)

A further 38 states had signed an Additional Protocol or had an Additional Protocol that had been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.

Table 19: States with an AP signed or approved but not in force at 30 June 2009

State State State State
Albania Djibouti Malaysia Serbia
Algeria Dominican Republic Mauritania Swaziland
Andorra Gabon Mexico Thailand
Belarus Honduras Moldova Timor-Leste
Benin India (non-NPT) Montenegro Togo
Cameroon Iran (1) Morocco Tunisia
Cape Verde Iraq Mozambique United Arab Emirates
Central African Rep Kiribati Namibia Vietnam
Chad Kyrgyzstan Philippines Zambia
Costa Rica Leslotho Rwanda  
Côte d’Ivoir Liechtenstein Senegal  
TOTAL: 42 states (including 11 NNWS NPT Parties with significant nuclear activities)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html)

Note: (1) Iran implemented its AP “provisionally” from 2003 but “suspended” this in 2005.

The remaining 6 NNWS NPT Parties with significant nuclear activities had not signed an Additional Protocol.

Table 20: States with Significant Nuclear Activities and no AP at 30 June 200940[35]

State State State State
Argentina DPRK35 Israel (non-NPT) Syria
Brazil Egypt Pakistan (non-NPT) Venezuela

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html)

Appendix D IAEA Statements of Conclusions for Australia 2008

Inventory verification inspections carried out by the IAEA at Australian nuclear facilities and locations are shown in Table 7. In addition, the Agency carries out a range of other verification activities, such as short notice inspections, complementary accesses, design verifications and increased data collection and analysis.

The IAEA provides statements of conclusions of inspections under Article 91(b) of Australia’s NPT Safeguards Agreement. Table 21 summarises the latest available Article 91(b) statements arising from physical inventory inspections.

Table 21: IAEA Conclusions of Inspections in Australia

Verification Activity Applicable Facilities End Date of Material Balance Period Conclusion
Examination of records OPAL
R&D Laboratories
ANSTO Vault Storage
05/05/2009
06/05/2009
07/05/2009
‘The records satisfied the Agency requirements.’
Examination of Reports to the Agency OPAL
R&D Laboratories
ANSTO Vault Storage
05/05/2009
06/05/2009
07/05/2009
‘The reports satisfied the Agency requirements.’
Application of Containment and Surveillance OPAL
R&D Laboratories
ANSTO Vault Storage
05/05/2009
06/05/2009
07/05/2009
‘The application of containment measures adequately complemented the nuclear material accountancy measures.’
Verification of Domestic and International Transfers OPAL 05/05/2009 ‘The domestic and international transfers declared by the operator were verified and the results satisfied the Agency requirements.’
Verification of Physical Inventory OPAL
R&D Laboratories
ANSTO Vault Storage
05/05/2009
06/05/2009
07/05/2009
‘The physical inventory declared by the operator was verified and the results satisfied the Agency requirements.’
Confirmation of the Absence of Unrecorded Production of Direct-Use Material from Material Subject to Safeguards OPAL
ANSTO Vault Storage
05/05/2009
07/05/2009
‘The absence of unrecorded production of plutonium from nuclear material subject to safeguards was confirmed by the Agency in accordance with its requirements.’
Verification Activities for Timely Detection R&D Laboratories 06/05/2009 The verification activities for timely detection during the material balance period satisfied the Agency requirements.’

The IAEA provides statements of conclusions for states in which strengthened safeguards are in force. These statements are provided under Article 10.c. of the Additional Protocol to Australia’s NPT Safeguards Agreement. The Statement for 2008 concluded as follows:

Access pursuant to Article 4.a.(i) did not indicate the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities at the following sites. However, final conclusion is pending the results and evaluation of environmental and destructive samples analysis:

Appendix E IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2008

The following is extracted from the IAEA’s Annual Report for 2008.

‘In 2008, safeguards were applied for 163 States with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat’s findings and conclusions for 2008 are reported below with regard to each type of safeguards agreement. These findings and conclusions are based upon an evaluation of all the information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfilling its safeguards obligations for that year.

1. Eighty-four States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force:

(a) For 51 of these States[36], the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

(b) For 33 of the States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

2. Safeguards activities were implemented for 70 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but without additional protocols in force.[37] For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

3. The Secretariat concluded that for 2008, declared nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities. Verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations remained ongoing.

4. As of the end of 2008, 30 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had not yet brought comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency into force as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

5. Three States had safeguards agreements in force that were concluded pursuant to INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, which require the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied remained in peaceful activities.

6. Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer safeguards agreements in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in four of the five States. For these four States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material to which safeguards were applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material to which safeguards were applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or was withdrawn as provided for in the agreements.’

Appendix F Status of CTBT IMS Facilities in Australia

Table 22: Status of Australian CTBT IMS Stations at 30 June 2009[38][39]

Facility Status Operator
Primary Seismic Stations
Warramunga, NT Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ANU
Alice Springs, NT Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA / USA
Stephens Creek, NSW Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Mawson, Antarctica Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Auxiliary Seismic Stations
Charters Towers, QLD Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Fitzroy Crossing, WA Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Narrogin, WA Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Infrasound Stations
Warramunga, NT Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ANU
Hobart, TAS Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Shannon, WA Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Cocos Islands Possible construction from 2011 GA
Davis Base, Antarctica Site survey completed GA
Radionuclide Stations
Melbourne38, VIC Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Perth, WA Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Townsville, QLD Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Darwin39, NT Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Cocos Islands Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Macquarie Island, TAS Construction planned in 2010 ARPANSA
Mawson, Antarctica Site survey completed ARPANSA
Radionuclide Laboratory
Melbourne, VIC Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Hydroacoustic Stations
Cape Leeuwin, WA Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA

Appendix G Freedom of Information Statement

This statement is provided in accordance with section 8 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) and is correct to 30 June 2009.

The FOI Act extends the right to obtain access to documents in the Government’s possession. Access is limited only by exemptions that, for example, protect essential public interests and the private and business affairs of people about whom departments and statutory authorities collect and hold information. ASNO received one FOI request relating to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership in 2008–09.

Members of the public seeking access to documents should lodge a formal FOI request. This must be made in writing and include a contact name, address to which notifications can be sent, telephone number and fax number (if available). All enquiries should be directed to:

Director General
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
R G Casey Building
John McEwen Crescent
BARTON ACT 0221
Australia

Telephone: +61 (2) 6261 1920
Facsimile: +61 (2) 6261 1908
E-mail: asno@dfat.gov.au

Documents

ASNO produces a wide range of documents in administering its responsibilities including:

Publications, Presentations and Submissions

ASNO produced a range of publications and conducted various presentations to increase community awareness and understanding of ASNO responsibilities and issues for which it has expertise. ASNO also made a number of submissions to Parliamentary and other inquiries. These include:

Nuclear

CTBT and disarmament verification

Chemical

Papers prepared during the reporting period and presented after June 2009

Compliance Index

This index is prepared from the checklist of annual report requirements set out in Attachment E to the Requirements for Annual Reports for Departments, Executive Agencies and FMA Act Bodies as approved by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit under subsections 63(2) and 70(2) of the Public Service Act 1999 in June 2005.

Description Requirement Location
Letter of transmittal Mandatory Page iii
Table of contents Mandatory Page v
Index Mandatory Page 123
Glossary Mandatory Page 116
Contact officer(s) Mandatory Page ii
Internet home page address and Internet address for report Mandatory Page ii
Review by Secretary
Review by statutory office holder Mandatory Page 3
Summary of significant issues and developments Suggested Page 3
Overview of department’s performance and financial results Suggested N/A
Outlook for following year Suggested Page 11
Significant issues and developments—portfolio Portfolio departments—suggested Page 21
Departmental Overview
Overview description of Office Mandatory Page 39
Role and functions Mandatory Page 39
Organisational structure Mandatory Page 92
Outcome and output structure Mandatory Page 46
Where outcome and output structures differ from PBS format, details of variation and reasons for change Mandatory N/A
Portfolio structure Portfolio departments—mandatory DFAT AR
Report on Performance
Review of performance during the year in relation to outputs and contribution to outcomes Mandatory Page 49
Actual performance in relation to performance targets set out in
PBS/ PAES
Mandatory DFAT AR
Performance of purchaser/ provider arrangements If applicable, mandatory N/A
Where performance targets differ from the PBS/ PAES, +

details of both former and new targets, and reasons for the change
Mandatory N/A
Narrative discussion and analysis of performance Mandatory Page 49
Trend information Suggested Pages 47–95
Factors, events or trends influencing departmental performance Suggested N/A
Significant changes in nature of principal functions/ services Suggested N/A
Performance against service charter customer service standards, complaints data, and the department’s response to complaints If applicable, mandatory N/A
Social justice and equity impacts Suggested N/A
Discussion and analysis of the Office’s financial performance Mandatory Page 94
Discussion of any significant changes from the prior year or from budget. Suggested N/A
Summary resource tables by outcomes Mandatory DFAT AR
Developments since the end of the financial year that have affected or may significantly affect the department’s operations or financial results in future If applicable, mandatory N/A
Corporate Governance and Management Accountability
Statement of the main corporate governance practices in place Mandatory DFAT AR
Names of the senior executive and their responsibilities Suggested Page 91
Senior management committees and their roles Suggested N/A
Corporate and operational planning and associated performance reporting and review Suggested DFAT AR
Approach adopted to identifying areas of significant financial or operational risk and arrangements in place to manage risks Suggested DFAT AR
Agency heads are required to certify that their agency comply with the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines. Mandatory DFAT AR
Policy and practices on the establishment and maintenance of appropriate ethical standards Suggested DFAT AR
How nature and amount of remuneration for SES officers is determined Suggested Page 91
External Scrutiny
Significant developments in external scrutiny Mandatory DFAT AR
Judicial decisions and decisions of administrative tribunals Mandatory DFAT AR
Reports by the Auditor-General, a Parliamentary Committee or the Commonwealth Ombudsman Mandatory DFAT AR
Management of Human Resources
Assessment of effectiveness in managing and developing human resources to achieve departmental objectives Mandatory DFAT AR
Workforce planning, staff turnover and retention Suggested Page 91
Impact and features of certified agreements and AWAs Suggested DFAT AR
Training and development undertaken and its impact Suggested Page 93
Occupational health and safety performance Suggested DFAT AR
Productivity gains Suggested DFAT AR
Statistics on staffing Mandatory Page 93
Certified agreements and AWAs Mandatory DFAT AR
Performance pay Mandatory DFAT AR
Contracts exempt from Purchasing and Disposal Gazette Mandatory DFAT AR
Assets management
Assessment of effectiveness of assets management If applicable, mandatory DFAT AR
Purchasing
Assessment of purchasing against core policies and principles Mandatory DFAT AR
Consultants
The annual report must include a summary statement detailing the number of new consultancy services contracts let during the year; the total actual expenditure on all new consultancy contracts let during the year (inclusive of GST); the number of ongoing consultancy contracts that were active in the reporting year; and the total actual expenditure in the reporting year on the ongoing consultancy contracts (inclusive of GST).

(Additional information as in Attachment D to be available on the Internet or published as an appendix to the report. Information must be presented in accordance with the proforma as set out in Attachment D.)
Mandatory DFAT AR
Competitive Tendering and Contracting
Competitive tendering and contracting contracts let and outcomes Mandatory DFAT AR
Absence of contractual provisions allowing access by the
Auditor-General
Mandatory DFAT AR
Contracts exempt from the Purchasing and Disposal Gazette Mandatory DFAT AR
Financial Statements
Financial Statements Mandatory DFAT AR
Other Information
Occupational health and safety (section 74 of the Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991) Mandatory DFAT AR
Freedom of Information (subsection 8(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982) Mandatory Page 108
Report on performance in implementing the Commonwealth Disability Strategy Mandatory DFAT AR
Advertising and Market Research (section 311A of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918) Mandatory DFAT AR
Ecologically sustainable development and environmental performance (Section 516A of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999) Mandatory DFAT AR
Discretionary Grants Mandatory DFAT AR
Correction of material errors in previous annual report If applicable, mandatory N/A

 

Glossary

Additional Protocol An agreement designed to complement a state’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. The model text of the Additional Protocol is set out in IAEA document INFCIRC/540.
Agency Inspector Person nominated by the IAEA and declared under section 57 of the Safeguards Act to undertake IAEA inspections.
AMS Accelerator Mass Spectroscopy.
ANSTO Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation.
AONM Australian Obligated Nuclear Material. Australian uranium and nuclear material derived therefrom, which is subject to obligations pursuant to Australia’s bilateral safeguards agreements.
APSN Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network
ARPANSA Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency.
ASIO Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation.
ASSP Australian Safeguards Support Program.
Australia Group The Australian-chaired, multilateral arrangement for coordinating national export controls on materials and equipment of potential relevance to chemical and biological weapons.
BAPETEN Indonesian Nuclear Energy Control Board.
BWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Also known as the Biological Weapons Convention.
Challenge Inspection (for CWC purposes) An inspection, requested by a CWC State Party, of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party.
Complementary Access The right of the IAEA pursuant to the Additional Protocol for access to a site or location to carry out verification activities.
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement Agreement between a state and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to all of the state’s current and future nuclear activities (equivalent to ‘full scope’ safeguards) based on IAEA document INFCIRC/153.
Concise Note Supplementary explanatory notes on formal reports from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA.
Conversion Purification of uranium ore concentrates or recycled nuclear material and conversion to a chemical form suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication.
COAG Council of Australian Governments
CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The Vienna-based international organisation established to give effect to the CTBT.
Customs Australian Customs Service.
CWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention.
CWC Scheduled Chemicals Chemicals listed in the three Schedules to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Some are chemical warfare agents and others are dual-use chemicals (that can be used in industry or in the manufacture of chemical warfare agents).
Defence Australian Department of Defence.
Depleted Uranium (DU) Uranium with a 235U content less than that found in nature (e.g. as a result of uranium enrichment processes).
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Direct-Use Material Nuclear material defined for safeguards purposes as being usable for nuclear explosives without transmutation or further enrichment, e.g. plutonium, HEU and 233U.
Discrete Organic Chemical Any chemical belonging to the class of chemical compounds consisting of all compounds of carbon, except for its oxides, sulphides and metal carbonates, identifiable by chemical name, by structural formula, if known, and by Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned. Long chain polymers are not included in this definition.
DOE United States Department of Energy.
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Enrichment A physical or chemical process for increasing the proportion of a particular isotope. Uranium enrichment involves increasing the proportion of 235U from its level in natural uranium, 0.711%: for LEU fuel the proportion of 235U (the enrichment level) is typically increased to between 3% and 5%.
Environmental analysis A technique for detecting residual traces of nuclear material on building surfaces, in plants and soil, in water and in the air. A very powerful safeguards tool, the value of which was first demonstrated in Iraq.
Euratom Atomic Energy Agency of the European Union. Euratom’s safeguards office, called the Directorate General of Transport and Energy H (DG), is responsible for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden; and to all nuclear material in civil facilities in France and the United Kingdom.
Facility (for CWC purposes) A plant, plant site or production/processing unit.

(for safeguards purposes) A reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, isotope separation plant, separate storage location or any location where safeguards significant amounts of nuclear material are customarily used.
Facility Attachment A document agreed between the IAEA and the relevant Member State that specifies the nuclear materials accountancy system for a specific facility and defines the format and scope of inspection activities.
Fissile Referring to a nuclide capable of undergoing fission by neutrons of any energy, including ‘thermal’ neutrons (e.g. 233U, 235U, 239Pu and 241Pu).
Fission The splitting of an atomic nucleus into roughly equal parts, often by a neutron. In a fission reaction, a neutron collides with a fissile nuclide (e.g. 235U) that then splits, releasing energy and further neutrons. Some of these neutrons may go on to collide with other fissile nuclei, setting up a nuclear chain reaction.
Fissionable Referring to a nuclide capable of undergoing fission by ‘fast’ neutrons (e.g. 233U, 235U, 238U, 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Pu and 242Pu).
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. A proposed international treaty to prohibit production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Full Scope Safeguards The application of IAEA safeguards to all of a state’s present and future nuclear activities. Now more commonly referred to as comprehensive safeguards.
G-8 Group of Eight. Comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
GA Geoscience Australia (formerly the Australian Geological Survey Organisation).
GW Gigawatt (Giga = billion, 109).
GWe Gigawatts of electrical power.
GWt Gigawatts of thermal power.
Heavy Water (D2O) Water enriched in the ‘heavy’ hydrogen isotope deuterium (hydrogen 2) which consists of a proton and a neutron. D2O occurs naturally as about one part in 6000 of ordinary water. D2O is a very efficient moderator, enabling the use of natural uranium in a nuclear reactor.
HEU High enriched uranium. Uranium enriched to 20% or more in 235U. Weapons-grade HEU is enriched to over 90% 235U.
HIFAR High Flux Australian Reactor. The 10 MWt research reactor located at ANSTO, Lucas Heights.
Hydroacoustic Term referring to underwater propagation of pressure waves (sounds).
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency.
ICNND International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.
IDC International Data Centre. Data gathered by monitoring stations in the CTBT IMS network are compiled, analysed and archived by the Vienna-based IDC. IDC products giving the results of analyses are made available to CTBT signatories.
IMS International Monitoring System. A network of 337 monitoring stations and analytical laboratories established pursuant to the CTBT which, together with the IDC, gather and analyse data with the aim of detecting any explosive nuclear testing.
Indirect-Use Material Nuclear material that cannot be used for a nuclear explosive without transmutation or further enrichment (e.g. depleted uranium, natural uranium, LEU and thorium).
INFCIRC IAEA Information Circular. A series of documents published by the IAEA setting out, inter alia, safeguards, physical protection and export control arrangements.
INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 The model safeguards agreement used by the IAEA since 1965. Essentially this agreement is facility-specific. For NNWS party to the NPT it has been replaced by INFCIRC/153.
INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) The model agreement used by the IAEA as a basis for safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT.
INFCIRC/225 Rev.4 (Corrected) IAEA document entitled ‘The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities’. Its recommendations reflect a consensus of views among IAEA member states on desirable requirements for physical protection measures on nuclear material and facilities, that is, measures taken for their physical security.
INFCIRC/540 The model text of the Additional Protocol.
Infrasound Sound in the frequency range of about 0.02 to 4 Hertz. One category of CTBT IMS stations will monitor sound at these frequencies with the aim of detecting explosive events such as a nuclear test explosion at a range up to 5000 km.
Integrated safeguards The optimum combination of all safeguards measures under comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency.
Inventory Change Report A formal report from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA on changes to nuclear materials inventories in a given period.
Isotopes Nuclides with the same number of protons, but different numbers of neutrons, e.g. 235U (92 protons and 143 neutrons) and 238U (92 protons and 146 neutrons). The number of neutrons in an atomic nucleus, while not significantly altering its chemistry, does alter its properties in nuclear reactions. As the number of protons is the same, isotopes are different forms of the same chemical element.
LEU Low Enriched Uranium. Uranium enriched to less than 20% 235U. Commonly, LEU used as fuel in light water reactors is enriched to between 3% and 5% 235U.
Light water H2O. Ordinary water.
LWR—Light water reactor A power reactor which is both moderated and cooled by ordinary (light) water. In this type of reactor, the uranium fuel must be slightly enriched (that is, LEU).
Material Balance Report A formal report from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA comparing consolidated inventory changes in a given period with the verified inventories at the start and end of that period.
Moata Small training reactor located at Lucas Heights. The ANSTO Board decided to cease operation of this reactor in February 1995. The reactor was defuelled in May 1995.
Moderator A material used to slow fast neutrons to thermal speeds where they can readily be absorbed by 235U or plutonium nuclei and initiate a fission reaction. The most commonly used moderator materials are light water, heavy water or graphite.
MOX Mixed oxide reactor fuel, consisting of a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides. The plutonium content of fresh MOX fuel for a LWR is typically around 5–7%.
MUF Material Unaccounted For. A term used in nuclear materials accountancy to mean the difference between operator records and the verified physical inventory. A certain level of MUF is expected due to measurement processes. MUF does not usually indicate “missing” material—because it is a difference due to measurement, MUF can have either a negative or a positive value.
MWe Megawatts of electrical power.
MWt Megawatts of thermal power.
Natural uranium In nature uranium consists predominantly of the isotope 238U (approx. 99.3%), with the fissile isotope 235U comprising only 0.711%.
NNWS Non-nuclear-weapon state(s). States not recognised by the NPT as having nuclear weapons at 1 January 1967 when the Treaty was negotiated
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Nuclear material Any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute (in practice, this means uranium, thorium and plutonium).
Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG A group of countries (currently 45) which seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of harmonised Guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports.
Nuclide Nuclear species characterised by the number of protons (atomic number) and the number of neutrons. The total number of protons and neutrons is called the mass number of the nuclide.
NWS Nuclear-weapon state(s). States recognised by the NPT as having nuclear weapons at 1 January 1967 when the Treaty was negotiated, namely the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China.
OCW Old chemical weapons.
OCPF Other Chemical Production Facilities
OPAL Open Pool Australian Light-Water reactor. The 20 MWt research reactor located at ANSTO, Lucas Heights, reached full power on 3 November 2006 and was officially opened on 20 April 2007.
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
OSI On-Site Inspection. A short notice challenge-type inspection provided for in the CTBT as a means for investigation concerns about non-compliance with the prohibition on nuclear explosions.
Physical Inventory Listing A formal report from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA on nuclear materials inventories at a given time (generally the end of a Material Balance Report period).
PrepCom Preparatory Commission. In this report the term is used for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission Organisation.
Production (for CWC purposes) The formation of a chemical through chemical reaction. Production of chemicals specified by the CWC is declarable, even if produced as intermediates and irrespective of whether or not they are isolated.
PTS Provisional Technical Secretariat for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
239Pu An isotope of plutonium with atomic mass 239 (94 protons and 235 neutrons). The fissile isotope of plutonium most suitable for nuclear weapons.
Radionuclide An isotope with an unstable nucleus that disintegrates and emits energy in the process. Radionuclides may occur naturally, but they can also be artificially produced, and are often called radioisotopes. One category of CTBT IMS stations will detect radionuclide particles in the air. A radionuclide monitoring station contains inter alia, an air sampler and detection equipment. At the air sampler, air is forced through a filter, which retains most particles that reach it. The used filters are processed and resulting gamma radiation spectra are further analysed. 40 stations are equipped with radionuclide noble gas technology to detect the abundance of the noble gas xenon in the air.
R&D Research and Development.
Reprocessing Processing of spent fuel to separate uranium and plutonium from highly radioactive fission products.
ROK Republic of Korea.
Safeguards Act Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987.
Safeguards Inspector For domestic purposes, person declared under section 57 of the Safeguards Act to undertake inspections to ensure compliance with provisions of the Act and to assist IAEA Inspectors in the conduct of Agency inspections and complementary access in Australia.
SAGSI Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. An international group of experts appointed by and advising the IAEA Director General on safeguards implementation matters.
Schedule 2A/2A* These are toxic Part A Schedule 2 chemicals (2A: Amiton and PFIB, 2A*: B2) listed under the CWC
SNT Sensitive Nuclear Technology
SQP Small Quantities Protocol—A protocol to a state’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, for states with small quantities of nuclear material and no nuclear facilities. The protocol holds in abeyance most of the provisions of the state’s Safeguards Agreement.
232Th Thorium-232.
Toxin Compound originating from micro-organisms, animals or plants, irrespective of the method of production, whether natural or modified, that can cause death, disease or ill health to humans, animals or plants.
233U An isotope of uranium containing 233 nucleons, usually produced through neutron irradiation of 232Th.
235U An isotope of uranium containing 235 nucleons (92 protons and 143 neutrons) which occurs as 0.711% of natural uranium.
238U An isotope of uranium containing 238 nucleons (92 protons and 146 neutrons) which occurs as about 99.3% of natural uranium.
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
UOC Uranium Ore Concentrates. A commercial product of a uranium mill usually containing a high proportion (greater than 90%) of uranium oxide.
WMD Weapons of mass destruction. Refers to nuclear, chemical, biological and occasionally radiological weapons.

 

[29] Countries having bilateral agreements with Australia covering use of AONM are marked with an asterix. These countries operate 366 power reactors, which produce around 14% of total world electricity and about 88% of world nuclear energy. In addition Australia has an agreement with Russia which covers processing on behalf of third countries. Australia has signed a new agreement with Russia which, upon entry into force, would allow for the use of AONM in Russian nuclear power plants.

[30] Supply of AONM to Taiwan is covered by an agreement between Australia and the United States.

[31] The Euratom agreement covers all 27 member states of the European Union.

[32] A new agreement with Russia was signed on 7 September 2007—this has yet to enter into force.

[33] Australia has two agreements with China, one covering nuclear material transfers and one covering nuclear cooperation.

[34] ‘Significant nuclear activities’ encompasses any amount of nuclear material in a facility or ‘location outside a facility’ (LOF), or nuclear material in excess of the exemption limits in INFCIRC/153 paragraph 37.

[35] On 10 January 2003, DPRK gave notice of withdrawal from the NPT. Pending clarification of its status, DPRK is counted here as an NPT Party.

[36] And Taiwan, China.

[37] The 70 States do not include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Secretariat did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

[38] In addition to the IMS particulate monitoring station at Melbourne, an IMS Noble Gas monitoring system is installed and operating in a testing and evaluation phase.

[39] In addition to the IMS particulate monitoring station at Darwin, an IMS Noble Gas monitoring system is installed and operating in a testing and evaluation phase.


Return to top of page