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Appendices and Glossaries

ASNO Assistant Secretary, Dr Geoffrey Shaw (third from right), participates in the expert panel discussion at the 15–26 June 2009, training course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Research Reactors.

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Appendices

Appendix A World Nuclear Energy, June 2009

Table 16: World Nuclear Energy, June 2009[29] [30]

	Operating Reactors		% of Total Electricity in 2008	Reactors under Construction
	Total	Capacity (GWe)		Total	Capacity (GWe)
United States*	104	100.7	19.7	1	1.2
France*	59	63.3	76.2	1	1.6
Japan*	53	46.0	24.9	2	2.2
Russian Federation	31	21.7	16.9	9	6.9
Germany*	17	20.5	28.3	0	0
Republic of Korea*	20	17.6	35.6	5	5.2
Ukraine	15	13.1	47.4	2	1.9
Canada*	18	12.6	14.8	0	0
United Kingdom*	19	10.1	13.45	0	0
Sweden*	10	9.0	42.0	0	0
China*	11	8.4	2.2	16	15.2
Spain*	8	7.5	18.3	0	0
Belgium*	7	5.9	53.8	0	0
Taiwan*30	6	4.9	19.6	2	2.6
India	17	3.8	2.0	6	2.9
Czech Republic*	6	3.6	32.5	0	0
Switzerland*	5	3.2	39.2	0	0
Bulgaria*	2	1.9	32.9	2	1.9
Finland*	4	2.7	29.7	1	1.6
Slovak Republic*	4	1.7	54.4	2	0.8
Brazil	2	1.8	3.1	0	0
Hungary*	4	1.9	37.2	0	0
South Africa	2	1.8	5.3	0	0
Mexico*	2	1.3	4.0	0	0
Lithuania*	1	1.2	72.9	0	0
Argentina*	2	0.9	6.2	1	0.7
Romania*	2	1.3	17.5	0	0
Slovenia*	1	0.7	41.7	0	0
Netherlands*	1	0.5	3.8	0	0
Armenia	1	0.4	39.4	0	0
Pakistan	2	0.4	1.9	1	0.3
Iran				1	0.9
TOTAL	436	370.4	(est) 15.0	52	45.9

Source: IAEA Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) (www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/)

Appendix B Australia’s Bilateral Safeguards Agreements

Table 17: Australia’s Bilateral Safeguards Agreements at 30 June 2009[31] [32] [33]

Country	Entry into Force
Republic of Korea	2 May 1979
United Kingdom	24 July 1979
Finland	9 February 1980
United States	16 January 1981
Canada	9 March 1981
Sweden	22 May 1981
France	12 September 1981
Euratom31	15 January 1982
Philippines	11 May 1982
Japan	17 August 1982
Switzerland	27 July 1988
Egypt	2 June 1989
Russia32	24 December 1990
Mexico	17 July 1992
New Zealand	1 May 2000
United States (covering cooperation on Silex technology)	24 May 2000
Czech Republic	17 May 2002
United States (covering supply to Taiwan)	17 May 2002
Hungary	15 June 2002
Argentina	12 January 2005
People’s Republic of China33	3 February 2007

Note: Australia also has an Agreement with Singapore concerning cooperation on physical protection of nuclear materials, which entered into effect on 15 December 1989.

Appendix C Status of Additional Protocols

At 30 June 2009, there were 70 states (plus Taiwan) with significant nuclear activities[34]. Of these states, 5 were nuclear-weapon states (NWS), 62 were non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) party to the NPT, and 3 were non-NPT Parties.

In the following tables, states with significant nuclear activities are shown in bold.

Of the 62 NNWS NPT Parties with significant nuclear activities, 45 had an Additional Protocol in force (Table 18). A further 11 such states had signed an Additional Protocol or had an Additional Protocol approved by the Board of Governors (Table 19).

Table 18: States with Additional Protocols in force at 30 June 2009

State
Afghanistan	El Salvador	Latvia	Portugal
Armenia	Estonia	Libya	Republic of Korea
Australia	Fiji	Lithuania	Romania
Austria	Finland	Luxembourg	Russia
Azerbaijan	France	Madagascar	Seychelles
Bangladesh	FYROM	Malawi	Singapore
Belgium	Georgia	Mali	Slovakia
Botswana	Germany	Malta	Slovenia
Bulgaria	Ghana	Marshall Islands	South Africa
Burkina Faso	Greece	Mauritius	Spain
Burundi	Guatemala	Monaco	Sweden
Canada	Haiti	Mongolia	Switzerland
Chile	Holy See	Netherlands	Tajikistan
China	Hungary	New Zealand	Tanzania
Colombia	Iceland	Nicaragua	Turkey
Comoros	Indonesia	Niger	Turkmenistan
Croatia	Ireland	Nigeria	Uganda
Cuba	Italy	Norway	Ukraine
Cyprus	Jamaica	Palau	United Kingdom
Czech Republic	Japan	Panama	Uruguay
DR Congo	Jordan	Paraguay	USA
Denmark	Kazakhstan	Peru	Uzbekistan
Ecuador	Kuwait	Poland
TOTAL: 91 states (including 45 NNWS with significant nuclear activities), plus Taiwan

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html)

A further 38 states had signed an Additional Protocol or had an Additional Protocol that had been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.

Table 19: States with an AP signed or approved but not in force at 30 June 2009

State	State	State	State
Albania	Djibouti	Malaysia	Serbia
Algeria	Dominican Republic	Mauritania	Swaziland
Andorra	Gabon	Mexico	Thailand
Belarus	Honduras	Moldova	Timor-Leste
Benin	India (non-NPT)	Montenegro	Togo
Cameroon	Iran (1)	Morocco	Tunisia
Cape Verde	Iraq	Mozambique	United Arab Emirates
Central African Rep	Kiribati	Namibia	Vietnam
Chad	Kyrgyzstan	Philippines	Zambia
Costa Rica	Leslotho	Rwanda
Côte d’Ivoir	Liechtenstein	Senegal
TOTAL: 42 states (including 11 NNWS NPT Parties with significant nuclear activities)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html)

Note: (1) Iran implemented its AP “provisionally” from 2003 but “suspended” this in 2005.

The remaining 6 NNWS NPT Parties with significant nuclear activities had not signed an Additional Protocol.

Table 20: States with Significant Nuclear Activities and no AP at 30 June 200940[35]

State	State	State	State
Argentina	DPRK35	Israel (non-NPT)	Syria
Brazil	Egypt	Pakistan (non-NPT)	Venezuela
TOTAL: 8 states (including 6 NPT Parties)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html)

Appendix D IAEA Statements of Conclusions for Australia 2008

Inventory verification inspections carried out by the IAEA at Australian nuclear facilities and locations are shown in Table 7. In addition, the Agency carries out a range of other verification activities, such as short notice inspections, complementary accesses, design verifications and increased data collection and analysis.

The IAEA provides statements of conclusions of inspections under Article 91(b) of Australia’s NPT Safeguards Agreement. Table 21 summarises the latest available Article 91(b) statements arising from physical inventory inspections.

Table 21: IAEA Conclusions of Inspections in Australia

Verification Activity	Applicable Facilities	End Date of Material Balance Period	Conclusion
Examination of records	OPAL R&D Laboratories ANSTO Vault Storage	05/05/2009 06/05/2009 07/05/2009	‘The records satisfied the Agency requirements.’
Examination of Reports to the Agency	OPAL R&D Laboratories ANSTO Vault Storage	05/05/2009 06/05/2009 07/05/2009	‘The reports satisfied the Agency requirements.’
Application of Containment and Surveillance	OPAL R&D Laboratories ANSTO Vault Storage	05/05/2009 06/05/2009 07/05/2009	‘The application of containment measures adequately complemented the nuclear material accountancy measures.’
Verification of Domestic and International Transfers	OPAL	05/05/2009	‘The domestic and international transfers declared by the operator were verified and the results satisfied the Agency requirements.’
Verification of Physical Inventory	OPAL R&D Laboratories ANSTO Vault Storage	05/05/2009 06/05/2009 07/05/2009	‘The physical inventory declared by the operator was verified and the results satisfied the Agency requirements.’
Confirmation of the Absence of Unrecorded Production of Direct-Use Material from Material Subject to Safeguards	OPAL ANSTO Vault Storage	05/05/2009 07/05/2009	‘The absence of unrecorded production of plutonium from nuclear material subject to safeguards was confirmed by the Agency in accordance with its requirements.’
Verification Activities for Timely Detection	R&D Laboratories	06/05/2009	The verification activities for timely detection during the material balance period satisfied the Agency requirements.’

The IAEA provides statements of conclusions for states in which strengthened safeguards are in force. These statements are provided under Article 10.c. of the Additional Protocol to Australia’s NPT Safeguards Agreement. The Statement for 2008 concluded as follows:

Access pursuant to Article 4.a.(i) did not indicate the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities at the following sites. However, final conclusion is pending the results and evaluation of environmental and destructive samples analysis:

• Lucas Heights Science & Technology Centre, Silex Systems Ltd. Research Laboratories; AS-2008/001
• Lucas Heights Science & Technology Centre, Silex Systems Ltd. Research Laboratories; AS-2008/002
• Lucas Heights Science & Technology Centre, OPAL AS-2008/003
• Honeymoon Project AS-2008/004.

Appendix E IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2008

The following is extracted from the IAEA’s Annual Report for 2008.

‘In 2008, safeguards were applied for 163 States with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat’s findings and conclusions for 2008 are reported below with regard to each type of safeguards agreement. These findings and conclusions are based upon an evaluation of all the information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfilling its safeguards obligations for that year.

1. Eighty-four States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force:

(a) For 51 of these States[36], the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

(b) For 33 of the States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

2. Safeguards activities were implemented for 70 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but without additional protocols in force.[37] For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

3. The Secretariat concluded that for 2008, declared nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities. Verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations remained ongoing.

4. As of the end of 2008, 30 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had not yet brought comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency into force as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

5. Three States had safeguards agreements in force that were concluded pursuant to INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, which require the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied remained in peaceful activities.

6. Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer safeguards agreements in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in four of the five States. For these four States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material to which safeguards were applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material to which safeguards were applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or was withdrawn as provided for in the agreements.’

Appendix F Status of CTBT IMS Facilities in Australia

Table 22: Status of Australian CTBT IMS Stations at 30 June 2009[38][39]

Facility	Status	Operator
Primary Seismic Stations
Warramunga, NT	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	ANU
Alice Springs, NT	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	GA / USA
Stephens Creek, NSW	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	GA
Mawson, Antarctica	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	GA
Auxiliary Seismic Stations
Charters Towers, QLD	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	GA
Fitzroy Crossing, WA	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	GA
Narrogin, WA	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	GA
Infrasound Stations
Warramunga, NT	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	ANU
Hobart, TAS	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	GA
Shannon, WA	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	GA
Cocos Islands	Possible construction from 2011	GA
Davis Base, Antarctica	Site survey completed	GA
Radionuclide Stations
Melbourne38, VIC	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	ARPANSA
Perth, WA	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	ARPANSA
Townsville, QLD	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	ARPANSA
Darwin39, NT	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	ARPANSA
Cocos Islands	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	ARPANSA
Macquarie Island, TAS	Construction planned in 2010	ARPANSA
Mawson, Antarctica	Site survey completed	ARPANSA
Radionuclide Laboratory
Melbourne, VIC	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	ARPANSA
Hydroacoustic Stations
Cape Leeuwin, WA	Operational and certified against CTBTO standards	GA

Appendix G Freedom of Information Statement

This statement is provided in accordance with section 8 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) and is correct to 30 June 2009.

The FOI Act extends the right to obtain access to documents in the Government’s possession. Access is limited only by exemptions that, for example, protect essential public interests and the private and business affairs of people about whom departments and statutory authorities collect and hold information. ASNO received one FOI request relating to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership in 2008–09.

Members of the public seeking access to documents should lodge a formal FOI request. This must be made in writing and include a contact name, address to which notifications can be sent, telephone number and fax number (if available). All enquiries should be directed to:

Director General
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
R G Casey Building
John McEwen Crescent
BARTON ACT 0221
Australia

Telephone: +61 (2) 6261 1920
Facsimile: +61 (2) 6261 1908
E-mail: asno@dfat.gov.au

Documents

ASNO produces a wide range of documents in administering its responsibilities including:

• Submissions to the portfolio minister, Cabinet, the Director General ASNO and other government agencies
• Records of parliamentary related business such as responses to parliamentary questions on notice, briefings for parliamentary delegations and parliamentarians, possible parliamentary questions, written submissions to parliamentary committees and responses to questions from parliamentary committee inquiries
• Records of technical and other reports, literature, media reports and journals relevant to ASNO’s responsibilities
• Replies to ministerial and departmental correspondence
• Papers prepared in whole or in part by ASNO officers for presentation at conferences and meetings
• Texts of speeches and press statements on issues related to ASNO’s responsibilities
• Briefs, reports and documents on international and Australian aspects of policy relevant to ASNO’s safeguards, CWC and CTBT responsibilities
• Annual Reports
• Treaties, memoranda of understanding and other agreements between the Australian Government and other governments
• Documents relating to program and financial management, contracts and tenders
• Reviews, evaluations and audit reports on management systems, controls and the efficiency and effectiveness of development programs and activities
• Minutes and working documents of the working groups, committees and organisations to which ASNO is party
• Guidelines, policies and procedures relating to strategies and corporate planning, project planning and implementation, including risk assessment and fraud prevention
• Materials relating to staff development, training, personnel management and general administration
• Customer feedback surveys.

Publications, Presentations and Submissions

ASNO produced a range of publications and conducted various presentations to increase community awareness and understanding of ASNO responsibilities and issues for which it has expertise. ASNO also made a number of submissions to Parliamentary and other inquiries. These include:

Nuclear

• John Carlson, Safeguards in a Changing Environment, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Annual Meeting, Nashville, 13–17 July 2008.
• Stephan Bayer, Regional safeguards technology cooperation—Establishment of an Asia Asia-Pacific Safeguards Association, Nuclear Energy Non-Proliferation Workshop IV, Busan, ROK, 18–20 August 2008.
• Stephan Bayer, Evolution and challenges of Physical Protection guidelines and approaches to technical development, Nuclear Energy Non-Proliferation Workshop IV, Busan, ROK, 18–20 August 2008.
• John Carlson, Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, and Implications for Nuclear Disarmament, presentation to UN Missions, New York, 8 September 2008.
• John Carlson, Brief Outline of World Nuclear Power Industry, briefing for ICNND, 3 October 2008.
• Annette Berriman, John Carlson and Russell Leslie, State-Level Approaches: The next steps, INMM/ESARDA Workshop, Tokyo, 6–9 October 2008.
• Sarah Harding, Australia’s Experience with Implementing the Additional Protocol, Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, Tokai-mura, Japan, 20–31 October 2008.
• Craig Everton, The Experience of Australia’s National Authority on Safeguards and Physical Protection Implementation, Regional Workshop on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at Facilities, Jakarta, Indonesia, 16–29 November 2008.
• ASNO and DFAT, Joint Submission to JSCOT Inquiry into Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, January 2009.
• ASNO, Nuclear Trade Outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group, briefing for ICNND, 9 January 2009.
• John Carlson, IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol, briefing for ICNND, 20 January 2009.
• Stephan Bayer, Australia’s Experience with Implementing IAEA safeguards, ASNO Seminar Series, 26 February 2009.
• Geoffrey Shaw, Security for the Uranium Industry—A challenge for operators and regulator, paper and presentation at the International Symposium on Nuclear Security, Vienna, 30 March–3 April 2009.
• Russell Leslie, Australia’s experience of AP implementation, 3rd regional seminar on Additional Protocol Implementation, Seoul ROK, May 2009.
• John Carlson, Defining non-compliance: NPT safeguards agreements, Arms Control Today, Volume 39, Number 4, May 2009, pp. 22–27.
• Geoffrey Shaw, Australia’s Experience with Implementing the Additional Protocol, presentation at the International Training Course on State Systems of Accounting and Control, Sydney, 25 May–5 June 2009.
• Geoffrey Shaw, Australia’s Experience with Integrated Safeguards, presentation at the International Training Course on State Systems of Accounting and Control, Sydney, 25 May–5 June 2009.
• John Carlson, Introduction to the Concept of Proliferation Resistance, briefing for ICNND, revised 3 June 2009.
• John Carlson, New Verification Challenges, briefing for ICNND, 4 June 2009.
• John Carlson, Withdrawal from the NPT: Consequences for IAEA Safeguards, briefing for ICNND, 5 June 2009.
• Craig Everton, Physical Protection (Security) Requirements for Uranium Mines and Transport, AusIMM International Uranium Conference 2009, Darwin, 10–11 June 2009.
• Geoffrey Shaw, Backend proliferation risks and issues, presentation at the 3rd University of California Forum on the Future of Nuclear Power, Berkeley, USA, 11–12 June 2009.
• Geoffrey Shaw, Nuclear Security in Australia, presentation at the Regional Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Research Reactors, Sydney, 15–26 June 2009.

CTBT and disarmament verification

• Malcolm Coxhead, On-site inspections for the CTBT: long-running discussions achieve progress, VERTIC Briefs, July 2008.
• Donald Sorokowski, Containment and Surveillance concepts and techniques, presented at the Workshop on Verifying Nuclear Disarmament—Concepts and Techniques, 5–6 November 2008, Canberra.
• Malcolm Coxhead, Assurance of nuclear disarmament—some issues, presented at the Workshop on Verifying Nuclear Disarmament—Concepts and Techniques, 5–6 November 2008, Canberra.
• Malcolm Coxhead, The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—Australia’s implementation experience, presented at the Workshop on Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—Towards Indonesia’s ratification, 10 November 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia.
• Donald Sorokowski, Perspectives of Regional States in Capacity Building—Building Capacity in the support of the CTBT, presented at the Regional Workshop on CTBTO International Cooperation for States in the Pacific, 21–22 May 2009, Republic of Palau.
• Malcolm Coxhead, David Jepsen, Putting the CTBT into practice, CTBTO International Scientific Studies Conference, June 2009.
• Malcolm Coxhead, CTBT On-site inspection—a role for satellite imagery (Poster), CTBTO International Scientific Studies Conference, June 2009.

Chemical

• Mike Byers (The Hague post) in consultation with ASNO, Australian National Paper on the Proposed Use of Geographical Rotation in Relation to the Appointment of the OPCW Director-General, EC-56/NAT.9, 23 April 2009.
• Josy Meyer, ASNO and the CWC, Interdepartmental meeting for OPCW officials visiting Australia to verify finds of old chemical weapon munitions in Australia, Canberra, 18–21 May 2009. This presentation was also delivered to Defence personnel in Sydney.
• Josy Meyer, The CWC and regulatory requirements for laboratories dealing with Schedule 1 chemicals, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Melbourne, 21 May 2009.
• Josy Meyer, Update on CWC Implementation in Australia, NICNAS Regulatory Meeting, Melbourne, 22 May 2009.
• Josy Meyer, Update on CWC Implementation in Australia, NICNAS Regulatory Meeting, Sydney, 29 May 2009.
• Josy Meyer, The CWC and regulatory requirements for laboratories dealing with Schedule 1 chemicals, 2009 National Industry Outreach Program, May–June 2009.
• Josy Meyer and Michael Nagajek, The CWC and regulatory requirements for users of Schedule 2 chemicals, 2009 National Industry Outreach Program, May–June 2009.
• Josy Meyer, The CWC and regulatory requirements for importers of Scheduled chemicals, 2009 National Industry Outreach Program, May–June 2009.
• Josy Meyer and Michael Nagajek, The CWC and regulatory requirements for industry producing discrete organic chemicals, 2009 National Industry Outreach Program,
  May–June 2009.
• Josy Meyer, John Howell and Nick Browne, The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide for Australian Industry Producing, Using or Trading Chemicals, Canberra, updated June 2009.
• Josy Meyer and John Howell, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Information for Importers of Chemicals, Canberra, updated June 2009.
• Josy Meyer and John Howell, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Inspection Information for Producers of Chemicals, Canberra, updated June 2009.
• Josy Meyer, CWC Obligations and Chemical Counter Terrorism—An Australian Perspective, Asia Pacific Seminar on Chemical Safety and Security, Canberra, 10–12 June 2009.

Papers prepared during the reporting period and presented after June 2009

• John Carlson, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty—a Discussion, briefing for ICNND, 6 July 2009.
• John Carlson, New verification challenges, Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, Summer 2009, presented at Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Annual Meeting, Tucson, July 2009.
• John Carlson and Russell Leslie, Can we control what we can’t count? The challenges involved in safeguarding closed fuel cycles which include electro-processing, presented INMM Annual Meeting, Tucson, July 2009.
• John Carlson and Russell Leslie, Hard boundaries versus soft boundaries—what are the conceptual advantages to safeguarding sensitive fuel cycle facilities under integrated safeguards, presented INMM Annual Meeting, Tucson, July 2009.
• John Carlson and Russell Leslie, Maintaining focus and seeking synergies—ensuring that small R&D programs are able to maximise the effectiveness of the efforts in support of safeguards, presented INMM Annual Meeting, Tucson, July 2009.

Compliance Index

This index is prepared from the checklist of annual report requirements set out in Attachment E to the Requirements for Annual Reports for Departments, Executive Agencies and FMA Act Bodies as approved by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit under subsections 63(2) and 70(2) of the Public Service Act 1999 in June 2005.

Description	Requirement	Location
Letter of transmittal	Mandatory	Page iii
Table of contents	Mandatory	Page v
Index	Mandatory	Page 123
Glossary	Mandatory	Page 116
Contact officer(s)	Mandatory	Page ii
Internet home page address and Internet address for report	Mandatory	Page ii
Review by Secretary
Review by statutory office holder	Mandatory	Page 3
Summary of significant issues and developments	Suggested	Page 3
Overview of department’s performance and financial results	Suggested	N/A
Outlook for following year	Suggested	Page 11
Significant issues and developments—portfolio	Portfolio departments—suggested	Page 21
Departmental Overview
Overview description of Office	Mandatory	Page 39
Role and functions	Mandatory	Page 39
Organisational structure	Mandatory	Page 92
Outcome and output structure	Mandatory	Page 46
Where outcome and output structures differ from PBS format, details of variation and reasons for change	Mandatory	N/A
Portfolio structure	Portfolio departments—mandatory	DFAT AR
Report on Performance
Review of performance during the year in relation to outputs and contribution to outcomes	Mandatory	Page 49
Actual performance in relation to performance targets set out in PBS/ PAES	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Performance of purchaser/ provider arrangements	If applicable, mandatory	N/A
Where performance targets differ from the PBS/ PAES, + details of both former and new targets, and reasons for the change	Mandatory	N/A
Narrative discussion and analysis of performance	Mandatory	Page 49
Trend information	Suggested	Pages 47–95
Factors, events or trends influencing departmental performance	Suggested	N/A
Significant changes in nature of principal functions/ services	Suggested	N/A
Performance against service charter customer service standards, complaints data, and the department’s response to complaints	If applicable, mandatory	N/A
Social justice and equity impacts	Suggested	N/A
Discussion and analysis of the Office’s financial performance	Mandatory	Page 94
Discussion of any significant changes from the prior year or from budget.	Suggested	N/A
Summary resource tables by outcomes	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Developments since the end of the financial year that have affected or may significantly affect the department’s operations or financial results in future	If applicable, mandatory	N/A
Corporate Governance and Management Accountability
Statement of the main corporate governance practices in place	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Names of the senior executive and their responsibilities	Suggested	Page 91
Senior management committees and their roles	Suggested	N/A
Corporate and operational planning and associated performance reporting and review	Suggested	DFAT AR
Approach adopted to identifying areas of significant financial or operational risk and arrangements in place to manage risks	Suggested	DFAT AR
Agency heads are required to certify that their agency comply with the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines.	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Policy and practices on the establishment and maintenance of appropriate ethical standards	Suggested	DFAT AR
How nature and amount of remuneration for SES officers is determined	Suggested	Page 91
External Scrutiny
Significant developments in external scrutiny	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Judicial decisions and decisions of administrative tribunals	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Reports by the Auditor-General, a Parliamentary Committee or the Commonwealth Ombudsman	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Management of Human Resources
Assessment of effectiveness in managing and developing human resources to achieve departmental objectives	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Workforce planning, staff turnover and retention	Suggested	Page 91
Impact and features of certified agreements and AWAs	Suggested	DFAT AR
Training and development undertaken and its impact	Suggested	Page 93
Occupational health and safety performance	Suggested	DFAT AR
Productivity gains	Suggested	DFAT AR
Statistics on staffing	Mandatory	Page 93
Certified agreements and AWAs	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Performance pay	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Contracts exempt from Purchasing and Disposal Gazette	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Assets management
Assessment of effectiveness of assets management	If applicable, mandatory	DFAT AR
Purchasing
Assessment of purchasing against core policies and principles	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Consultants
The annual report must include a summary statement detailing the number of new consultancy services contracts let during the year; the total actual expenditure on all new consultancy contracts let during the year (inclusive of GST); the number of ongoing consultancy contracts that were active in the reporting year; and the total actual expenditure in the reporting year on the ongoing consultancy contracts (inclusive of GST). (Additional information as in Attachment D to be available on the Internet or published as an appendix to the report. Information must be presented in accordance with the proforma as set out in Attachment D.)	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Competitive Tendering and Contracting
Competitive tendering and contracting contracts let and outcomes	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Absence of contractual provisions allowing access by the Auditor-General	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Contracts exempt from the Purchasing and Disposal Gazette	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Financial Statements
Financial Statements	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Other Information
Occupational health and safety (section 74 of the Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991)	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Freedom of Information (subsection 8(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982)	Mandatory	Page 108
Report on performance in implementing the Commonwealth Disability Strategy	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Advertising and Market Research (section 311A of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918)	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Ecologically sustainable development and environmental performance (Section 516A of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999)	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Discretionary Grants	Mandatory	DFAT AR
Correction of material errors in previous annual report	If applicable, mandatory	N/A

 

Glossary

Additional Protocol	An agreement designed to complement a state’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. The model text of the Additional Protocol is set out in IAEA document INFCIRC/540.
Agency Inspector	Person nominated by the IAEA and declared under section 57 of the Safeguards Act to undertake IAEA inspections.
AMS	Accelerator Mass Spectroscopy.
ANSTO	Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation.
AONM	Australian Obligated Nuclear Material. Australian uranium and nuclear material derived therefrom, which is subject to obligations pursuant to Australia’s bilateral safeguards agreements.
APSN	Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network
ARPANSA	Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency.
ASIO	Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation.
ASSP	Australian Safeguards Support Program.
Australia Group	The Australian-chaired, multilateral arrangement for coordinating national export controls on materials and equipment of potential relevance to chemical and biological weapons.
BAPETEN	Indonesian Nuclear Energy Control Board.
BWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Also known as the Biological Weapons Convention.
Challenge Inspection	(for CWC purposes) An inspection, requested by a CWC State Party, of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party.
Complementary Access	The right of the IAEA pursuant to the Additional Protocol for access to a site or location to carry out verification activities.
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement	Agreement between a state and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to all of the state’s current and future nuclear activities (equivalent to ‘full scope’ safeguards) based on IAEA document INFCIRC/153.
Concise Note	Supplementary explanatory notes on formal reports from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA.
Conversion	Purification of uranium ore concentrates or recycled nuclear material and conversion to a chemical form suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication.
COAG	Council of Australian Governments
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The Vienna-based international organisation established to give effect to the CTBT.
Customs	Australian Customs Service.
CWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention.
CWC Scheduled Chemicals	Chemicals listed in the three Schedules to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Some are chemical warfare agents and others are dual-use chemicals (that can be used in industry or in the manufacture of chemical warfare agents).
Defence	Australian Department of Defence.
Depleted Uranium (DU)	Uranium with a 235U content less than that found in nature (e.g. as a result of uranium enrichment processes).
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Direct-Use Material	Nuclear material defined for safeguards purposes as being usable for nuclear explosives without transmutation or further enrichment, e.g. plutonium, HEU and 233U.
Discrete Organic Chemical	Any chemical belonging to the class of chemical compounds consisting of all compounds of carbon, except for its oxides, sulphides and metal carbonates, identifiable by chemical name, by structural formula, if known, and by Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned. Long chain polymers are not included in this definition.
DOE	United States Department of Energy.
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Enrichment	A physical or chemical process for increasing the proportion of a particular isotope. Uranium enrichment involves increasing the proportion of 235U from its level in natural uranium, 0.711%: for LEU fuel the proportion of 235U (the enrichment level) is typically increased to between 3% and 5%.
Environmental analysis	A technique for detecting residual traces of nuclear material on building surfaces, in plants and soil, in water and in the air. A very powerful safeguards tool, the value of which was first demonstrated in Iraq.
Euratom	Atomic Energy Agency of the European Union. Euratom’s safeguards office, called the Directorate General of Transport and Energy H (DG), is responsible for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden; and to all nuclear material in civil facilities in France and the United Kingdom.
Facility	(for CWC purposes) A plant, plant site or production/processing unit. (for safeguards purposes) A reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, isotope separation plant, separate storage location or any location where safeguards significant amounts of nuclear material are customarily used.
Facility Attachment	A document agreed between the IAEA and the relevant Member State that specifies the nuclear materials accountancy system for a specific facility and defines the format and scope of inspection activities.
Fissile	Referring to a nuclide capable of undergoing fission by neutrons of any energy, including ‘thermal’ neutrons (e.g. 233U, 235U, 239Pu and 241Pu).
Fission	The splitting of an atomic nucleus into roughly equal parts, often by a neutron. In a fission reaction, a neutron collides with a fissile nuclide (e.g. 235U) that then splits, releasing energy and further neutrons. Some of these neutrons may go on to collide with other fissile nuclei, setting up a nuclear chain reaction.
Fissionable	Referring to a nuclide capable of undergoing fission by ‘fast’ neutrons (e.g. 233U, 235U, 238U, 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Pu and 242Pu).
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. A proposed international treaty to prohibit production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Full Scope Safeguards	The application of IAEA safeguards to all of a state’s present and future nuclear activities. Now more commonly referred to as comprehensive safeguards.
G-8	Group of Eight. Comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
GA	Geoscience Australia (formerly the Australian Geological Survey Organisation).
GW	Gigawatt (Giga = billion, 109).
GWe	Gigawatts of electrical power.
GWt	Gigawatts of thermal power.
Heavy Water (D2O)	Water enriched in the ‘heavy’ hydrogen isotope deuterium (hydrogen 2) which consists of a proton and a neutron. D2O occurs naturally as about one part in 6000 of ordinary water. D2O is a very efficient moderator, enabling the use of natural uranium in a nuclear reactor.
HEU	High enriched uranium. Uranium enriched to 20% or more in 235U. Weapons-grade HEU is enriched to over 90% 235U.
HIFAR	High Flux Australian Reactor. The 10 MWt research reactor located at ANSTO, Lucas Heights.
Hydroacoustic	Term referring to underwater propagation of pressure waves (sounds).
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency.
ICNND	International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.
IDC	International Data Centre. Data gathered by monitoring stations in the CTBT IMS network are compiled, analysed and archived by the Vienna-based IDC. IDC products giving the results of analyses are made available to CTBT signatories.
IMS	International Monitoring System. A network of 337 monitoring stations and analytical laboratories established pursuant to the CTBT which, together with the IDC, gather and analyse data with the aim of detecting any explosive nuclear testing.
Indirect-Use Material	Nuclear material that cannot be used for a nuclear explosive without transmutation or further enrichment (e.g. depleted uranium, natural uranium, LEU and thorium).
INFCIRC	IAEA Information Circular. A series of documents published by the IAEA setting out, inter alia, safeguards, physical protection and export control arrangements.
INFCIRC/66 Rev.2	The model safeguards agreement used by the IAEA since 1965. Essentially this agreement is facility-specific. For NNWS party to the NPT it has been replaced by INFCIRC/153.
INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)	The model agreement used by the IAEA as a basis for safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT.
INFCIRC/225 Rev.4 (Corrected)	IAEA document entitled ‘The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities’. Its recommendations reflect a consensus of views among IAEA member states on desirable requirements for physical protection measures on nuclear material and facilities, that is, measures taken for their physical security.
INFCIRC/540	The model text of the Additional Protocol.
Infrasound	Sound in the frequency range of about 0.02 to 4 Hertz. One category of CTBT IMS stations will monitor sound at these frequencies with the aim of detecting explosive events such as a nuclear test explosion at a range up to 5000 km.
Integrated safeguards	The optimum combination of all safeguards measures under comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency.
Inventory Change Report	A formal report from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA on changes to nuclear materials inventories in a given period.
Isotopes	Nuclides with the same number of protons, but different numbers of neutrons, e.g. 235U (92 protons and 143 neutrons) and 238U (92 protons and 146 neutrons). The number of neutrons in an atomic nucleus, while not significantly altering its chemistry, does alter its properties in nuclear reactions. As the number of protons is the same, isotopes are different forms of the same chemical element.
LEU	Low Enriched Uranium. Uranium enriched to less than 20% 235U. Commonly, LEU used as fuel in light water reactors is enriched to between 3% and 5% 235U.
Light water	H2O. Ordinary water.
LWR—Light water reactor	A power reactor which is both moderated and cooled by ordinary (light) water. In this type of reactor, the uranium fuel must be slightly enriched (that is, LEU).
Material Balance Report	A formal report from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA comparing consolidated inventory changes in a given period with the verified inventories at the start and end of that period.
Moata	Small training reactor located at Lucas Heights. The ANSTO Board decided to cease operation of this reactor in February 1995. The reactor was defuelled in May 1995.
Moderator	A material used to slow fast neutrons to thermal speeds where they can readily be absorbed by 235U or plutonium nuclei and initiate a fission reaction. The most commonly used moderator materials are light water, heavy water or graphite.
MOX	Mixed oxide reactor fuel, consisting of a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides. The plutonium content of fresh MOX fuel for a LWR is typically around 5–7%.
MUF	Material Unaccounted For. A term used in nuclear materials accountancy to mean the difference between operator records and the verified physical inventory. A certain level of MUF is expected due to measurement processes. MUF does not usually indicate “missing” material—because it is a difference due to measurement, MUF can have either a negative or a positive value.
MWe	Megawatts of electrical power.
MWt	Megawatts of thermal power.
Natural uranium	In nature uranium consists predominantly of the isotope 238U (approx. 99.3%), with the fissile isotope 235U comprising only 0.711%.
NNWS	Non-nuclear-weapon state(s). States not recognised by the NPT as having nuclear weapons at 1 January 1967 when the Treaty was negotiated
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Nuclear material	Any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute (in practice, this means uranium, thorium and plutonium).
Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG	A group of countries (currently 45) which seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of harmonised Guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports.
Nuclide	Nuclear species characterised by the number of protons (atomic number) and the number of neutrons. The total number of protons and neutrons is called the mass number of the nuclide.
NWS	Nuclear-weapon state(s). States recognised by the NPT as having nuclear weapons at 1 January 1967 when the Treaty was negotiated, namely the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China.
OCW	Old chemical weapons.
OCPF	Other Chemical Production Facilities
OPAL	Open Pool Australian Light-Water reactor. The 20 MWt research reactor located at ANSTO, Lucas Heights, reached full power on 3 November 2006 and was officially opened on 20 April 2007.
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
OSI	On-Site Inspection. A short notice challenge-type inspection provided for in the CTBT as a means for investigation concerns about non-compliance with the prohibition on nuclear explosions.
Physical Inventory Listing	A formal report from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA on nuclear materials inventories at a given time (generally the end of a Material Balance Report period).
PrepCom	Preparatory Commission. In this report the term is used for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission Organisation.
Production	(for CWC purposes) The formation of a chemical through chemical reaction. Production of chemicals specified by the CWC is declarable, even if produced as intermediates and irrespective of whether or not they are isolated.
PTS	Provisional Technical Secretariat for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
239Pu	An isotope of plutonium with atomic mass 239 (94 protons and 235 neutrons). The fissile isotope of plutonium most suitable for nuclear weapons.
Radionuclide	An isotope with an unstable nucleus that disintegrates and emits energy in the process. Radionuclides may occur naturally, but they can also be artificially produced, and are often called radioisotopes. One category of CTBT IMS stations will detect radionuclide particles in the air. A radionuclide monitoring station contains inter alia, an air sampler and detection equipment. At the air sampler, air is forced through a filter, which retains most particles that reach it. The used filters are processed and resulting gamma radiation spectra are further analysed. 40 stations are equipped with radionuclide noble gas technology to detect the abundance of the noble gas xenon in the air.
R&D	Research and Development.
Reprocessing	Processing of spent fuel to separate uranium and plutonium from highly radioactive fission products.
ROK	Republic of Korea.
Safeguards Act	Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987.
Safeguards Inspector	For domestic purposes, person declared under section 57 of the Safeguards Act to undertake inspections to ensure compliance with provisions of the Act and to assist IAEA Inspectors in the conduct of Agency inspections and complementary access in Australia.
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. An international group of experts appointed by and advising the IAEA Director General on safeguards implementation matters.
Schedule 2A/2A*	These are toxic Part A Schedule 2 chemicals (2A: Amiton and PFIB, 2A*: B2) listed under the CWC
SNT	Sensitive Nuclear Technology
SQP	Small Quantities Protocol—A protocol to a state’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, for states with small quantities of nuclear material and no nuclear facilities. The protocol holds in abeyance most of the provisions of the state’s Safeguards Agreement.
232Th	Thorium-232.
Toxin	Compound originating from micro-organisms, animals or plants, irrespective of the method of production, whether natural or modified, that can cause death, disease or ill health to humans, animals or plants.
233U	An isotope of uranium containing 233 nucleons, usually produced through neutron irradiation of 232Th.
235U	An isotope of uranium containing 235 nucleons (92 protons and 143 neutrons) which occurs as 0.711% of natural uranium.
238U	An isotope of uranium containing 238 nucleons (92 protons and 146 neutrons) which occurs as about 99.3% of natural uranium.
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UOC	Uranium Ore Concentrates. A commercial product of a uranium mill usually containing a high proportion (greater than 90%) of uranium oxide.
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction. Refers to nuclear, chemical, biological and occasionally radiological weapons.

 

[29] Countries having bilateral agreements with Australia covering use of AONM are marked with an asterix. These countries operate 366 power reactors, which produce around 14% of total world electricity and about 88% of world nuclear energy. In addition Australia has an agreement with Russia which covers processing on behalf of third countries. Australia has signed a new agreement with Russia which, upon entry into force, would allow for the use of AONM in Russian nuclear power plants.

[30] Supply of AONM to Taiwan is covered by an agreement between Australia and the United States.

[31] The Euratom agreement covers all 27 member states of the European Union.

[32] A new agreement with Russia was signed on 7 September 2007—this has yet to enter into force.

[33] Australia has two agreements with China, one covering nuclear material transfers and one covering nuclear cooperation.

[34] ‘Significant nuclear activities’ encompasses any amount of nuclear material in a facility or ‘location outside a facility’ (LOF), or nuclear material in excess of the exemption limits in INFCIRC/153 paragraph 37.

[35] On 10 January 2003, DPRK gave notice of withdrawal from the NPT. Pending clarification of its status, DPRK is counted here as an NPT Party.

[36] And Taiwan, China.

[37] The 70 States do not include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Secretariat did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

[38] In addition to the IMS particulate monitoring station at Melbourne, an IMS Noble Gas monitoring system is installed and operating in a testing and evaluation phase.

[39] In addition to the IMS particulate monitoring station at Darwin, an IMS Noble Gas monitoring system is installed and operating in a testing and evaluation phase.

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