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Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Advancing the interests of Australia and Australians internationally

Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Advancing the interests of Australia and Australians internationally

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office

Annual Report 2000-2001

Annex LPhysical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles

Objectives

The PHYSICAL PROTECTION OBJECTIVES are to establish and to maintain conditions to:

  • protect against unauthorised removal of nuclear material in use and storage, and during transport;
  • ensure the implementation of rapid and comprehensive measures by the State to locate and recover missing or stolen nuclear material;
  • protect against sabotage of nuclear facilities and sabotage of nuclear material in use and storage and during transport; and
  • mitigate or minimise the radiological consequences of sabotage.

Fundamental Principles Of Physical Protection Of Nuclear Material And Nuclear Facilities

The following physical protectionfundamental principles have to be considered as the basis for achieving the Physical Protection Objectives:

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE A: Responsibility of the State

The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State rests entirely with that State.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE B: Responsibilities during International Transport

The responsibility of a State for ensuring that nuclear material is adequately protected extends to international transport thereof, until that responsibility is properly transferred to another State, as appropriate.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE C: Legislative and Regulatory Framework.

The State is responsible for establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection. This framework should provide for the establishment of applicable physical protection requirements and include a system of evaluation and licensing or other procedures to grant authorisation. This framework should include a system of inspection of nuclear facilities and transport to verify compliance with applicable requirements and conditions of the license or other authorising document, and to establish a means to enforce applicable requirements and conditions, including effective sanctions.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE D: Competent Authority.

The State should establish or designate a competent authority which is responsible for the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework, and is provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities. The State should take steps to ensure an effective independence between the functions of the States competent authority and those of any other body in charge of the promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE E: Responsibility of the License Holders

The responsibilities for implementing the various elements of physical protection within a State should be clearly identified. The State should ensure that the prime responsibility for the implementation of physical protection of nuclear material or of nuclear facilities rests with the holders of the relevant licenses or of other authorising documents (eg., operators or shippers).

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE F: Security Culture

All organisations involved in implementing physical protection should give due priority to the security culture, to its development and maintenance necessary to ensure its effective implementation in the entire organisation.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE G: Threat

The State's physical protection should be based on the State's current evaluation of the threat

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE H: Graded Approach

Physical protection requirements should be based on a graded approach, taking into account the current evaluation of the threat, the relative attractiveness, the nature of the material and potential consequences associated with the unauthorised removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear facilities or nuclear material.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE I: Defence in Depth

The States requirements for physical protection should reflect a concept of several layers and methods of protection (structural or other technical, personnel and organisational) that have to be overcome or circumvented by an adversary in order to achieve his objectives.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE J: Quality Assurance

A quality assurance policy and quality assurance programs should be established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to physical protection are satisfied.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE K: Contingency Plans

Contingency (emergency) plans to respond to unauthorised removal of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities or nuclear material, or attempts thereof, should be prepared and appropriately exercised by all license holders and authorities concerned.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE L: Confidentiality

The State should establish requirements for protecting the confidentiality of information, the unauthorised disclosure of which could compromise the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade