Annual Report 2000-2001
Annex E IAEA Statements of Conclusions
IAEA Statements of Conclusions of Inspections in Australia.
During 2000-01 the IAEA carried out inspections in two of Australias five Material Balance Areas (MBAs): AS-A and AS-C. The reduction in routine inventory verification was due to the introduction of integrated safeguardsin Australia. However, this does not mean that the IAEA is monitoring Australia less, as the Agency now carries out a range of other activities, such as short notice inspections, complementary accessesand increased data collection and analysis.
The IAEA provides statements of conclusions of inspections under Article 91(b) of Australias NPT Safeguards Agreement. At the time of writing this Report the 91(b) statements for the annual inventory verifications of AS-A and AS-C, conducted in March 2001, had not been received from the IAEA. However, previous Article 91(b) statements have stated the following conclusions (Activity 3 applies only to MBAs AS-A and AS-D) and ASNO anticipates this years statement will be similar.
|
|
Verification Activity |
Conclusion |
|---|---|---|
|
(1) |
Examination of records |
The records satisfied the Agency requirements. |
|
(2) |
Examination of Reports to the Agency |
The reports satisfied the Agency requirements. |
|
(3) |
Application of Containment and Surveillance Measures |
The application of containment and surveillance measures adequately complemented the nuclear material accountancy measures. |
|
(4) |
Verification of Physical Inventory |
The physical inventory declared by the operator was verified and the results satisfied the Agency requirements. |
The material unaccounted for (MUF) declared for the year consisted of small quantities of depleted, natural and enriched uranium all in AS-C.
Explanatory note on MBA AS-E
MBA AS-E covers all locations in Australia, except Lucas Heights, where safeguardable nuclear material is present.
No IAEA statement under Article 91(b) of Australias NPT Safeguards Agreement has been provided for this MBA since the IAEA has not inspected the nuclear material located there. This is because the quantities are too small to be of proliferation significance and in most cases have been exempted from active safeguards or have had safeguards terminated in accordance with the Agreement (Articles 36, 37, 38 and 39 of the Agreement refer).